Economic and Political Weekly

Social Forces and Ideology in the Making of Pakistan

Author(s): Hamza Alavi
Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 51 (Dec. 21-27, 2002), pp. 5119-5124
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4412987
Accessed: 06-10-2015 09:50 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Economic and Political Weekly is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Economic and Political
Weekly.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 111.68.96.57 on Tue, 06 Oct 2015 09:50:02 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Social Forces and Ideology in the
Making of Pakistan
Religious parties were implacably hostile to the Pakistan Movement. When, inaugurating
Pakistan's constituent assembly, Jinnah proclaimed Pakistan's secular ideology he
was voicing the established secular ideological position that the Muslim League had adhered
to throughoutits career. Futndanmentalist Islamic ideology played no part in the origins of
Pakistan, although contemporaryideologues of Islamic fundamtentalism,including
academics, claim that it was Islamic ideology and slogans that created Pakistan and that
they therefore have the right to decide its future.
HAMZA ALA\VI

mentsof Islamas setoutin theHolyQuran isolatethe Bengalinationalistsby raising

M a 'anyof you will recallMohammad
Ali Jinnah's well known speech
that he gave when inaugurating
Pakistan's new constituent assembly. In
that speech he spelt out the secular vision
for the new country, which had inspired
him and others through the many decades
of struggle. He said:
You may belong to any religion or caste
or creed. That has nothing to do with the
business of the state. ... We are starting
withthisfundamentalprinciplethatwe are
all citizens and equal citizens of the state.
...We should keep that in front of us as
our ideal and you will find that in the
course of time Hindus will cease to be
Hindus and Muslims will cease to be
Muslims, not in the religious sense be-
cause that is the personal faith of each
individual, but in the political sense, as
citizens of the state.
It was not until 1952 that Jinnah's
unworthy successors turned away from
that secular ideal and began to exploit the
worn out rhetoric of religion to restore
their failing political fortunes. They cried
out that 'Islam was in danger'! Coming
from them, that was an insincere, bogus
and empty slogan, when they had nothing
positive to offer to the people. Our totter-
ing leadership believing mistakenly that
the slogan of Islam would be sufficient to
silence any opposition, resorted to that
stratagem.
At first they had not yet gone beyond
paying lip-service to the name of Islam.
In March 1949, the constituent assembly
adoptedthe 'Objectives Resolution' which
included a clause which said that: 'Mus-
lims shall be enabled to order their lives,
in the individualandthe collective spheres,
in accord with the teachings and require-
andthe Sunna.'Thatwas not intended,as
yet,to signaladoptionof Islamicideology.
That was madequite clear in the speech
of LiaquatAli Khanwhen he movedthe
objectivesresolution.This was no more
than a formal nod in the direction of
religiousrhetoric,withoutactuallyrestrict-
ing the constitutionin any way. When
movingthe objectivesresolutionLiaquat
explicitly ruledout mullahideology. He
said: 'Sir, I just now said thatthe people
are the real recipients of power. This,
naturally,eliminatesany danger of the
establishmentof a theocracy'.That was
followed, in September1950 by the In-
terimReportof theBasicPrinciplesCom-
mittee (BPC) which too said little about
Islamicideology.Indeed,GWChoudhury,
who was a committedIslamist,said that
it contained'verylittleif anyprovisionas
to the Islamiccharacterof the new con-
stitution.The ulama,he continuedwere
most unhappyaboutthat.(Speechesand
Documentson the Constitutionof Paki-
stan, p 30)
However,beforethe BPC could move
on to prepareits finalreport,a majorevent
took place which shook the foundations
of the state of Pakistanto its roots. On
February21, 1952 the historic Bengali
languagemovementeruptedspontaneously
all overEastBengal,withgreatforce.For
severaldaysthewholeof EastBengalwas
in the hands of the languagemovement
committee.Surprisedat the unbelievable
success of the movement,its leadership
was unprepared to takethemovementany
furtherforward.In a few daysit subsided.
But it remaineda majorpotentialchal-
lenge. Ratherfoolishly Pakistan'sruling
elite, insteadof going some way to meet
Bengalidemands,thoughtthattheycould
religious slogans. Slogans of 'Islamic'
ideologyand'Islamic'identityweretaken
up to counterBengali anger. Insteadof
lookingattheunderlyingcausesof Bengali
discontent,they put forwardan argument
that we are all 'Muslimsand Pakistanis'
and thereforewe cannot be Bengalis or
Sindhisor Baluchor Pathan.This was an
ethnicredefinitionwhich had little to do
withreligiousvaluesas such.Itwasmerely
a bankruptpolitical argumentwhich led
only to disaster.
In responseto the Bengali movement,
therefore,the Final Reportof the BPC,
presentedon December 22, 1952, now
containeda largedose of 'Islamic'ideol-
ogy. G W Choudhury,jumpedwithjoy
andwrote:'The seconddraftconstitution
(which was his namefor the final report
of the BPC) was noted for its elaborate
provisionsrelatingto theIslamiccharacter
of the proposedconstitution.'(ibid,p 31).
Liaquatand his cohort,when faced with
the challenge of regionalmovementsas
well as a crumblingparty,shoutedeven
more loudly that 'Islam was in danger'.
Nearly five years after partition,thus,
Islamic ideology was adoptedby our
mediocrerulers,whohadnothingpositive
to offerto the people.To makethisabout-
turnmore credible,they decidedto give
the newfoundreligiousideologyan insti-
tutionalform.A boardof Talimat-i-Islamia
was set up and the senior ulamawhom
Liaquathad persuadedto find theirfor-
tunes in Pakistan,were given jobs in it.
The board was not to have any real
powers.Pakistan'srulingbureaucracy was
in no moodto sharepowerwithmullahs.
Therefore,the functionof the boardwas
only advisoryandthattoo on mattersspe-
cifically referredto it. 'Advice' fromthe

Economic and Political Weekly December 21, 2002 5119

This content downloaded from 111.68.96.57 on Tue, 06 Oct 2015 09:50:02 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
boardwas notbindingon thegovernment.
When the boarddid make suggestions,
theywereunceremoniously brushedaside.
But the seniorulamaseemedto be happy
enoughwith theirwell paidjobs and at-
tendantprestige.Recalcitrant mullahssuch
as MaulanaMaududifoundthemselvesin
jail. Suchnominalconcessionsto Islamic
ideologycontinuedundersuccessivegov-
ernmentsuntil ZulfiqarAli Bhutto,with
hismisguidedpopulistpolicies,reactivated
the mullahswho, ironically,turnedout to
be his nemesis.GeneralZia, in turn,lack-
ing all legitimacy,decidedfor his partto
exploit Islamto the hilt. Severaldecades
later,we arestill sufferingfromhis legacy
which even successive democratically
electedgovernmentshave failed to undo.
The unexpectedsuccesses of fundamen-
talistreligiouspartiesin the generalelec-
tions of 2002, testify to the fact that we
arereapingtheinevitablefruitof thepolicy
of placatingthem.
SweepingasideJinnah's clearstatement
about Pakistanideology, his successors
belatedlyredefinedit. In 1969 General
YahyaKhan'sminister,GeneralSherAli,
declaredthat'Islamicideology'was to be
'Pakistanideology'. This solution was
projectedbackwardsinto the past and
historians(in Pakistanand also abroad)
have takenup the task of justifyingthat
bogus claim. Textbookswere rewritten.
Todaywe areseparatedfromourpast by
half a centuryof lies. Even people with
a secularoutlook,have begunto wonder
whetherit was not religion,afterall, that
reallybroughtaboutthe creationof Paki-
stan.Someof themassumethattheremust
havebeen a mass movement.How can a
massmovementgetoff thegroundwithout
a powerfulreligiousideology drivingit.
What other explanationcould there be,
they ask. All this is mereconjecture.No
one has as yet examinedthe social forces
that were actually responsible for the
creationof Pakistan.Ourtruepasthasbeen
snatchedfromus andlies buriedwhereit
cannotbe found.We have to disinterit.
Let us thereforehave a look at it.
II
Moder IndianMuslimpoliticshad its
beginningsin the Muslimminorityprov-
inces of northernIndia,notablythe UP,
andBengal.In the Muslimmajorityareas
of westernIndia,thatnow formPakistan,
namely, the Punjab,Sindh, Baluchistan
and the NWFP,Muslimswere relatively
backwardand the urbanpopulationwas
5120
This content downloaded from 111.68.96.57 on Tue, 06 Oct 2015 09:50:02 UTC
predominantlynon-Muslim. The educated
classes that were behind modern Indian
Muslim politics were absent in those areas.
It was in northern India, that modern
Indian Muslim politics were triggered off
by the new Anglo-vernacular language
policy that was introduced by the British
in the 19th century. It abolished the use
of Persian as the official language. Persian
was the language of the northern Indian,
Muslim Ashraf, the pre-colonial ruling
elite. Abolition of Persian as the official
language hit them hard. To qualify for
governmentjobs,they hadto taketo English
education. Hindu service castes, like
kayasthas, khatrisand Kashmiribrahmins
in northernIndia(or the baidyas, kayasthas
and brahmins in Bengal) took to English
education morerapidlyandcompeted more
successfully for jobs than the Muslim
Ashraf had previously monopolised.
Muslims began to lose their primacy.
In looking at the impact of colonial rule
on the Muslim Ashraf, we can divide them
into three categories, for they were af-
fected differently. Firstly, there were the
landlords who were political allies of the
Britishfor which they were muchfavoured.
As a class they were the most loyal to the
raj. There were some exceptions though,
like the rajasof Mahmoodabad(father and
son) who were active in the Muslim League.
The second group of Muslim Ashraf were
the ulema, who were the hardesthit by the
new language policy. They lost out when
children who used to go to their madaris,
to learn Persian and Arabic, were now sent
to English teaching schools. The introduc-
tion of new statute law written in English,
took away legal roles which the ulama
performed by way of the application of
shari'a law in particularcases or issuing
fatawa on contentious issues or mediating
disputes. These functions atrophied. In
response, the ulama at first engaged in
militant campaigns against the British
(and the Sikh) and played a prominentrole
in the national revolt of 1857. They were
crushed brutally.After the revolt the ulama
retreatedinto their seminaries such as the
newly establisheddar-ul-uloomatDeoband
or the older Firangi Mahal, etc. As a class,
they did not re-enter the political arena
until they were drawn into the Khilafat
movement in 1918.
The most importantAshraf group, how-
ever, behind modern Indian Muslim poli-
tics, were the educated Ashraf who
depended mainly on careers in govern-
ment employment. I have designated them
as the 'salariat', i e, those who aspire to
Economicand PoliticalWeekly December21, 2002
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
anddependon careersin salariedemploy-
ment,overwhelminglyin the government
in the absenceof a large enoughprivate
sector.Associatedwith the salariatwere
professionalssuchas lawyersanddoctors.
For themthe new languagepolicy meant
thatthey too had to have Englisheduca-
tion. Competingwith the Muslimsalariat
and professionalswere Hindus who as-
pired to similaremploymentin govern-
ment or as professionals.Unfortunately,
given the communal(caste!)structureof
Indiansociety, Muslimand Hindumem-
bersof the salariatandprofessionalswere
pittedagainsteachotherbecausetheirlives
and careerswere embeddedwithin rival
institutionalised
communities.Themutual
competition between theMuslimandHindu
salariatwasof nodirectconcernforthe vast
majorityof Muslimsor Hindus.Muslim
Ashrafwere preoccupiedwith questions
abouttheirown futureand ignoredpoor
Muslimsandtheirproblems.Forexample
large numbersof Muslim Julahaswere
goingthrougha profoundcrisisin the19th
century,becauseof competitionfrommill
made cloth, both importedand locally
producedinIndiantextilemills.TheAshraf
were unconcernedwith the problemsof
the very poor and sufferingJulahas.The
salariatand the professionalshad their
own specific intereststo pursue.Compe-
titionbetweenthesepetitbourgeoisMus-
lim andHindugroups,shapedthepolicies
of the All IndiaMuslimLeague,and the
Indian National Congress, respectively.
Theyusedconceptsof Indiannationalism
andMuslimnationalism,tolegitimisetheir
narrowclass demands.
There is a myth that Muslim Ashraf
were underprivileged andbackward.That
idea comes from WilliamHunter'sbook
on Indian Musalmans, which is based on
easternBengaldata,whereMuslimswere
trulyunderprivileged.ButMuslimAshraf
of northernIndiawereover-privileged.In
the UP, Muslimswere only about 12 per
cent of the population,a small minority.
Nevertheless,in 1857 MuslimAshrafof
UP held no less than64 percent of posts
in the subordinatejudicial and executive
services(positionsabove thatrankbeing
the domainof the white-man).However,
thosehighlyprivilegedMuslimAshrafwere
rapidlylosingthatlead.By 1886Muslims
heldonly45 percentof thoseposts,though
with a Muslimpopulationof only 12 per
cent,theywerestillveryprivileged.These
figuresshow thattheirlead was beingcut
down.SirSyedAhmadthereforeproposed
that there should be a 50-50 quotaeach
for the two communities. Modem Indian
Muslimpolitics, in its origin, was therefore
quota politics and not a religious move-
ment. English education was the key to
futureprosperity.The Aligarh movement
sought to propagate English education
amongstMuslims.Given SirSyed Ahmad's
lead Muslim educational societies began
to come up all over India, to teach English.
A new Anglo-vernacularculture, which
was relatively more oriented towards sci-
ence and reason, began to evolve, though
often expressed in Indian idiom. It was the
culture of Muslim Ashraf salariat and
professional groups. It did not extend to
the poor, whetherMuslim or non-Muslim.
The culture of the Muslim poor tended to
be dominated by the mullahs. Sir Syed
Ahmad pioneered the cause of English
education and rational and scientific
thought amongst Indian Muslims. He was
concerned only with the future of Muslim
Ashraf; not with the future of all Muslims
inclusive of the poor. This is not widely
realised. Sir Syed Ahmad looked upon
'low born' people with aristocratic dis-
dain. Commenting upon qualifications for
membership of the viceroy's legislative
council, for example, he expressed his
deeply rootedclass (caste?) prejudicewhen
he said that 'It is essential for the viceroy's
council to have members of high social
standing. Would our aristocracy like that
a man of low caste or insignificant origin,
though he may be a B A or an M A , and
have the requisite ability, be placed in a
position of authorityabove them and have
the power of making laws that affect their
lives and property?'
Political activity on behalf of the Mus-
lim salariatand professionals emerged on
the public platform in 1906, when a
delegation of Muslim notables called on
Lord Minto the viceroy to lobby for the
English educated Muslim Ashraf. When
Nawab Mohsin ul-Mulk, who then headed
the Aligarh establishment, learntabout the
speech of Lord Morley, the secretary of
state for India, announcing plans for con-
stitutional reforms in India, he at once set
about organising a delegation of Muslim
notables to put their proposals before tile
viceroy, setting out demands of the edu-
cated Muslim Ashraf. Francis Robinson,
summing up the result, writes: Lord Minto
'promised (them) ...nothing except
sympathy.' Indian nationalist as well as
communist historians have blown up the
significance of that meeting out of all pro-
portion,claiming, in MaulanaMohammad
Ali's words, that this was a 'command
Economicand PoliticalWeekly December21, 2002
This content downloaded from 111.68.96.57 on Tue, 06 Oct 2015 09:50:02 UTC
performance'at thebehestof the viceroy,
as partof a policy of divide-and-rule.It
has now beenestablishedthatthis charge
has no truth in it. Amongst others the
IndianhistorianBimalPrasadhasrecently
unravelledthedetailsof thatstoryto prove
that this charge is not at all true. The
initiativefor the meeting came entirely
from Mohsin-ulMulk.
Laterinthesameyear,inDecember1906,
the Muslim League was founded when
MuslimleadersmetatDhakaattheinvita-
tion of Nawab Salimullah.But the UP
Ashraf,led by Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulkof
Aligarh, hijackedthe new organisation
takingall the top posts and a majorityof
theworkingcommitteememberships. The
League took up seculardemandsof the
western educatedMuslim professionals
andthesalariat.Attemptsto placetheissue
of Islamicideologyon theMuslimLeague
agendawererareandinvariably unsuccess-
ful.Religiousideologyplayednopartin its
ideology. Not surprisingly,the mullahs
were hostile to the MuslimLeaguefrom
the outset.
Arguably,theearliestattemptto takeup
Islamic ideology, was made by Shibli
Nu'mani, who was committedto theo-
craticvalues.HeproposedthattheAligarh
syllabusshouldbeIslamised.Shibliwanted
to changethe syllabusawayfromEnglish
and modern sciences, towards Islamic
learningand the Arabic language.The
responseof the Muslimprofessionaland
salariatclasses to thatattemptis exempli-
fied by theviews of SirRazaAli, a lawyer
who was a close and very influential
collaboratorof Sir Syed's successors,
Mohsinul-MulkandViqarul-Mulk,atthe
centreof the Aligarhestablishment.Raza
Ali attackedShibli'sproposalin anarticle
publishedin TheStatesman,of which he
offers an extractin his autobiography
RazaAli wrotethatthereis sometimes
a conflictbetweenreasonandsentiments.
But,he wrote,theconflictbetweenreason
and the sentimentsthatunderlieShibli's
proposalis greaterthansuchconflictabout
anyotherissue.Thememoryof theachieve-
ments of Cordova and Baghdad is as
enticingtoMuslimsasheramulet('taawiz')
is to a superstitiouswomanwho holds it
close to her heart.The truthis that it is
extremelydifficultnotto sympathisewith
suchfeelingsof Muslims.Butit is alsotrue
thatto deny realitythatis openandmani-
fest, would also be very foolish. The
proposalthat is now in front of us (i e,
Arabiceducation,as proposedby Shibli
HA)is, superficially,extremelyappealing.
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
However,we mustnotturnourfacesaway
from reality. ...The question before us is:
'Whatkindof educationdoesourcommu-
nity wantand need?In my view the kind
of educationthatwe most need is educa-
tion thatwouldbe most usefulin helping
us to deal with the affairsof this world
... which can help the coming generations
to earn their livelihood.' (AimalNama,
p 170).Thatwastheessenceofthe Muslim
Leagueideology.
Raza Ali warnedthat the need of the
IndianeducatedMuslimmiddleclass was
notthatof a hypotheticalreturnto original
Islamandthecreationof an'IslamicState',
to be ruledover by mullahs.Theirmost
urgentneed was the provisionof an edu-
cationthatwould help them in grappling
with the affairsof this world;education
thatwouldhelp theircominggenerations
to earntheir livelihood.He spelt out the
secularideology of Muslimnationalism,
clearly reiterating the interests of the
Muslimsalariatand professionalclasses.
Shiblihadto leave Aligarh,for it was not
a place where his theocraticideas could
flourish.
As fortheMuslimLeague,as it attracted
moreandmoresupport,therewasa parallel
shift in its class supportbase. Therewas
an increasedparticipationof men drawn
from more modest strataof society. Far
fewerof themwere now fromsubstantial
landed families. According to Francis
Robinson,the great majority(of them)
belongedto the class which occasionally
hada smallpittancein rentsfromlandbut,
generally,in orderto survive,hadto find
employmentin serviceor theprofessions.
Thatwas a less privilegedsection of the
MuslimAshraf.Amongstthemthe Mus-
lim Leaguefoundits enduringclass base,
even thoughsalariatmembersfrombetter
off families,some landlordslike the Raja
of Mahmudabad,the father (not to be
confusedwithhisequallyactiveson,Amir
AhmadKhan)andsomebusinessmen,still
continuedto play a partin it.
III
Withthesechangesin its class base,the
centreof gravityof the Muslim League
shiftedawayfromtheAligarhconservatives
toarelativelymoreradicalleadershipbased
on Lucknow(to which the Leagueoffice
was moved). By 1912 the energeticand
radicalWazirHasan,tookoveras general
secretary. A new phase began in the
politicalstyleof theLeagueanditsattitude
towardsthe Congress.Therewas a grow-
5121
ing realisationin the MuslimLeaguethat
theywouldnotmakeanyheadwayagainst
theBritishcolonialrulewithoutestablish-
ing a unitedfrontwiththeCongress.Calls
for Hindu-Muslimunity were therefore
reiterated.
TheMuslimLeaguelookedforsomeone
who could build bridges between the
Leagueandthe Congress.Jinnahwas the
obviouschoice.He hada highstandingin
the Indian National Congress and was
ideallyplacedto bringthetwo movements
together.In October 1913 when Wazir
HasanandMaulanaMohammadAli were
in Londonto see the secretaryof statefor
India (who, in the event, refusedto see
them!)they took the opportunityto meet
Jinnah.Thetwo persuadedhimtojoin the
MuslimLeagueand work for Congress-
LeagueUnity.Jinnahagreed,providedthat
his commitmentsto the Congresswould
remain.
JinnahworkedhardforCongress-League
unity,which was sealedby the Lucknow
pact adopted at a joint session of the
Congressandthe Leaguein 1916. Under
the pact, the Congress accepted some
Muslim demands, including their key
demandforseparateelectorates,a Muslim
demandwhichwas stronglysupportedby
Gokhale.Thepactalsospecifiedprovince-
wise weightage for Muslims. That was
verycontroversial. Muslimminorityprov-
incesliketheUP,weregivenabiggershare
of seats than that provided under the
Morley-MintoReforms.That was at the
costof Muslimmajorityprovinces.Bengal
with a Muslimpopulationof 52 per cent
was given a shareof only 40 per cent of
seats. Punjabwith a Muslim population
of nearly55 per cent was given a share
of only 50 per cent of the seats. On the
otherhand,the UP with a Muslimpopu-
lationof only 12percentwasgivena share
of no less than30 per cent. After all the
UPelitewererunningtheshow.Thisturned
out to be the most contentiousaspect of
the Lucknowpact.The Congressfor its
parthadconcededtheMuslimdemandfor
separate electorates because Muslims
believedthat they could not get elected
underjoint electorateseven in Muslim
majorityconstituencies,because of the
effects of propertyqualifications.Later,
however,thisturnedoutto be a sorepoint
witha newgenerationof Congressleaders.
Justifiedcriticismof the Lucknowpact
shouldnotmakeusunderestimate itssigni-
ficance. It had succeededin bringingthe
CongressandtheMuslimLeaguetogether
on to a commonplatformto fight British
5122
This content downloaded from 111.68.96.57 on Tue, 06 Oct 2015 09:50:02 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
imperialism.It was the Muslim League
andJinnahwho had initiatedthatbid for
unity and the Congressrespondedposi-
tively. Jinnah was a unifier and not a
separationist,as generallysuggested.He
persisted in that difficult role, despite
setbacks,for a quarterof a centuryuntil
a pointwas reachedwhen,despiteall his
efforts, unity was no longer an option.
The LucknowPactwas not only about
Muslim demands. It also incorporated
shareddemandsof the Congressand the
Leaguevis-a-visthe colonialgovernment
againstwhich they would struggletogether.
Thus,forexample,thepactdemandedthat
inthelegislatures,electedmembersshould
be in a majority.It demandedthatin the
provincesthereshouldbefour-fifths elected
membersand only one-fifth nominated,
and thatthe membersof councilsshould
be elected directlyby the people, on as
broada franchiseas possible and so on.
Thus contraryto popular opinion, the
Lucknowpact was not just about con-
cessions to the Muslim League. It also
speltout the basison whichthe Congress
and the Muslim League could carrythe
anti-colonialfreedom struggle forward
together,as close allies. The significance
of the Lucknowpact was greaterthanis
generallysupposed.
Beforethe politicsof the Lucknowpact
could have a chance to unfold, it was
torpedoed.by the Khilafatmovementof
1918-24, in which the mullahswere the
mainforce. Until thenreligiousideology
was absentfrom IndianMuslimpolitics.
The religiousfocus of the Khilafatmove-
mentbroughtaboutshifts in the Muslim
Leagueleadership.SecularistslikeJinnah
and WazirHasanwere drivenout of the
League and second rank leaders like
MaulanaShaukatAli movedintothe first
rank.It was MahatmaGandhi,however,
who was the true leaderof the Khilafat
movement- in his own words he had
become the dictatorof the movement.
aroundhim were fanaticalmullahslike
MaulanaAbdulBariof FirangiMahal.But
at every stage they asked Gandhito tell
themwhatto do. UnderGandhi'sleader-
ship the Khilafat movement became a
powerfulmassmovement.Butit collapsed
soon becauseof its own internalcontra-
dictions. Gandhi claimed that he had
madethe Khilafatmovementa meansof
establishing Hindu-Muslimunity. But
unlike the Lucknow pact, the Khilafat
movementtriggeredoff fiercecommunal
riotsinthe1920s.TheLucknowpactwhich
hadworkedforunitybetweentheMuslim
Economicand PoliticalWeekly December21, 2002
Leagueandthe Congress,was lost some-
where along the way.
It is quite truethatthe MuslimLeague
represented only a smallMuslimelite.The
Muslimmasses,theworkersandpeasants,
werelargelyuntouchedby it.Themullahs,
who were behindthe Khilafatmovement,
did not voice the demandsof the Muslim
peasantand the workingclass either;its
methodsremainedrestrictedto elite nego-
tiationsat the top.The mullahswerepetty
bourgeois radicals who representedthe
deadpastratherthanthe future,the direc-
tion towardswhich Muslimsalong with
the rest of Indianeededto go. The main
consequenceof the Khilafatmovement
was that it dealt a blow to the Muslim
Leaguefromwhichit did not recoverfor
morethana decade.Havingno truemass
base amongst the working masses, the
MuslimLeagueexisted duringthat time
only nominally,as a side-show for the
Khilafatists.
After the abolition of the Ottoman
Khilafatby theTurkishrepublicannation-
alists led by MustafaKemal,the Khilafat
movement,in spite of its mass base, be-
camea lost causein India.It did not leave
a permanent mark on Indian Muslim
politics, except that it had enabled the
mullahs to organise. Gandhi helped
hardlinerMuslim mullahs,the so-called
'DeobandiSunnis', to set up a political
organisation, namely the Jamiat-i-Ulama-
i-Hind which implacably opposed the
Muslim League and its leadership.The
BarelviSunnis,moresuperstitiousbutalso
moretolerant,playednopartintheKhilafat
movementbecausetheydidnotacceptthe
legitimacyof the OttomanKhalifa,on the
groundthathe wasnotdescendedfromthe
Quraysh.Itmightbe notedthatin addition
to the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Hind, two other
extremely dogmatic religious political
organisationsof mullahswereto emerge,
namely,theMajlis-i-Ahrarand theJamaat-
i-lslami. They were all bitterlyopposed
the Muslim League and its westernised
leadership, and eventually they also
opposedthe demand for Pakistan with
unabatedvehemence.
These religiouspartieswere unableto
generateenoughsupportto allow themto
stop the Muslim League. Some Muslim
Leaguers,like the Ali Brothersand even
Jinnah'sward,theyoungRajaAmirAhmad
Khan of Mahmudabad(the son) did
succumbfor a time to Islamic ideology.
But, as he told me, that was a passing
phase. He realisedsoon that this funda-
mentalistideology was a delusion.Like-
wise,theAli Brothersandotherslikethem
too returnedto the secularist Muslim
League.The Khilafatinterludedid not
converttheMuslimLeagueintoa religious
ideologicalmovement.It was only on the
eveof independencethatLiaquatAli Khan
was able to induce a few Ulama of the
Jamiat-i-Ulanla-i-Hind, to migrate to
Pakistanin thehopethatin a Muslimstate
theymightfarebetterthanin HinduIndia.
They formed the Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam.
They had little influenceon state power
untilthe adventof the regimeof General
Zia.All thatwhile,thePakistanmovement
remaineda secularmovementof Muslims,
not a movementof Islam.
However,by the time secularistslike
Jinnah,who had left the MuslimLeague
at the time of the Khilafat movement,
rejoinedit,itwasachangedMuslimLeague
inaradicallychangedpolitical(andconsti-
tutional)context.As a result,thecentreof
gravityhadshiftedfromMuslimminority
provinceslike UP andits salariatbase, to
Muslimmajorityprovincesandtheirdomi-
natingfeudallandedmagnates.Thathap-
pened becauseof the implementationof
the Montague-Chelmsford reformsunder
thegovernment of Indiaactof 1919.Under
thatact, limitedpowerwas transferred to
Indianministers,at the provinciallevel,
over certaindepartmentsof the govern-
ment.Thatinjecteda new logic in Indian
politics.Fromthenon distributionof state
patronageby Indianministersbegan to
playa partin buildinguppoliticalsupport.
Muslimsof theUPandMuslimminority
provincesand their salariatand profes-
sionals, who were the MuslimLeague's
main power-base,being a minorityand
unableto forma government,were now
outof thegame.NordidtheMuslimLeague
securethe supportof the feudalmagnates
automatically. Theyhadtheirownpolitics.
The MuslimLeague continuedon their
supportbut it was now a shadow of its
formerself.
In the Punjab,Muslimfeudals,in alli-
ancewithHinduandSikhfeudalsandthe
jat biraderiof East Punjab(led by Sir
ChhotuRam) ruled the roost underthe
bannerof the unionistparty,which was
presidedoverby SirFazliHusainwho was
not a feudal but who understood the
needsof feudals better than they could
themselves.Along with their clear class
interestsas landedmagnates,the unionist
ideologyincludedPunjabiyat,i e, Punjabi
nationalism.They were wary of more
radicalpolitics impingingon them from
otherpartsof India.Theunionistsbelieved
Economic and Political Weekly December 21, 2002
This content downloaded from 111.68.96.57 on Tue, 06 Oct 2015 09:50:02 UTC
thatthe Britishwouldruleover Indiafor
ever. Theiraims thereforewere narrowly
focused on governingand exploitingthe
Punjab and insulating it from outside
influenceswhilethegoingwasgoodunder
the British.As the prospectsof indepen-
dence (underCongressrule)appearedon
the agendathey optedfor an independent
Punjab,withintheBritishCommonwealth.
Chief minister Sikandar Hayat, Fazli
Husain's successor, even tried to get
Churchill'ssupportfor an independent
Punjabwithintheempire.But,intheevent,
that projectwas not taken up.
Fazli Husain successfullydivided the
Punjabimiddleclassintotworivalgroups,
urbanand rural.The salariatand profes-
sionalsof ruralorigin,whoenjoyedfeudal
patronage,got priorityand preference.
UrbanMuslims,on the otherhand,were
a deprived minority in unionist ruled
Punjab.Beingbitteraboutsocialinjustice,
manyof themrespondedto thehotrhetoric
of the fundamentalistreligiousgroup,the
Majlis-i-Ahrar. The MuslimLeaguewas
weak and ineffectiveand too dependent
on the unionists,to be able to give them
an independentlead.The Punjabifeudals,
especially,SirFazliHusain,sawtheMuslim
Leaguenot as a seriousrival who might
possiblythreatentheirholdoverpowerin
the province.They toleratedit, and even
patronisedit andcertainlyusedit for their
purposeswhen the occasion requiredit.
SikandarHayat thereforeeven entered
into a pact with Jinnah.
IV
It was notuntilthemid-1940s,whenthe
approachof independencebeganto look
like a reality,thatthe landedmagnatesof
Punjabrealised,firstly,thattheywouldnot
be givenanindependentPunjabwithinthe
Commonwealth, which they wanted.
Secondlytheysawa mortaldangerto their
survivalas a class, if independencewere
to come to the Punjabunderthe Indian
NationalCongress.TheCongresswasfully
committedto land reform,on which a
committee,presidedover PanditNehru
himself,hadbeenworkingforsomeyears.
Forthe survivalof theirclass, the Punjabi
feudalsreckonedthatPakistanunderthe
MuslimLeaguewasa workablealternative
for them,the moreso becausethey knew
thatif they'joined'theLeague,theywould,
in effect, 'takeit over'.Theywouldcontrol
it. MianMumtazDaulatanawas amongst
thefirsttosee thisandhejoinedtheMuslim
Leaguein 1943. By 1945 virtuallyall of
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
theMuslimlandedmagnatesof thePunjab
hadjoinedit, exceptfora smallmisguided
rumpunderKhizrHayatKhan.Theyhung
on to thedreamsof an independentPunjab
in the BritishCommonwealthwhich the
Britishwere not going to give them.The
situationin Sindh was similarto that of
the Punjab.So by the time thatindepen-
dence came, the feudal landedmagnates
of Punjaband Sindh had takenover the
MuslimLeague.No ideologyexcepttheir
concernfor self-preservationwas needed
to drawthemto the League.The peasants
whomtheydominatedcompletelyneeded
no ideology to make them vote as their
landlordinstructedthem to do.
The Pakistanmovement,thus,was not
drivenby any religious ideology andexcept
for EastBengal,therewas no massmove-
ment as such to go with it. Manypirs in
Punjaband Sindh were amongthe great
landedmagnateswho optedfor Pakistan.
At theirbehesttheir'mureeds'celebrated
the ideaof Pakistanwithgusto.Fromthis
a false impressionhasbeentakenby some
scholarsthat it was the idea of Pakistan
which had motivatedthem, whereas in
truthwhatthey were celebratingwas the
joy of theirpir,whenhejoinedtheLeague
andtherebyavertedthethreatof Congress
land reforms.
'Islamic'ideology was indeedinvoked
inthePunjabbutnotbytheMuslimLeague.
It was invokedby the hardlinerMajlis-i-
Ahrar,whichbitterlyopposedtheMuslim
League, tooth and nail, denouncingits
leadersas kaffirs.It was the only 'mass'
movement in the Punjab that made its
appealin the name of Islam and with it
opposedthe Pakistanidea.The mainbase
of the Majlis-i-Ahrarwas amongst the
urbanpettybourgeoisie,the lowermiddle
class, which had been neglectedbecause
of the anti-urbanpolicy of the unionist
party with whom the Muslim League had
collaborated.
It was only in Bengal that the Muslim
Leagueled a genuinemass movement,in
the 1945 elections; but that was not a
religiousmovement.Untiltheelectionsof
1937theBengalMuslimLeaguewasunder
thecontrolof theDhakaNawabfamilyand
a small coterie aroundit - the Bengali
feudals. They were challenged by the
KrishakProjaParty,led by Fazlul Haq,
whosepoliticalbasewas amongstthewell
off peasantry.The final vote in the 1937
electionwasevenlydividedbetweenthem
and they formeda coalitiongovernment.
In 1943 the greatBengalfaminekilled
three and a half million Bengali poor
5123
peasantswho hadno reservesto fall back
on whenthefaminehit.Thepeasantswere
soon on the warpath.Their movement
known as the Tebhagamovement,was
mobilisedby the communistled All India
Kisan Sabha. It was against that back-
ground,whentheBengalpeasanthadbeen
aroused,thatthe 1945electionswereheld.
In 1943 a remarkableman named Abul
Hashimwas elected as the generalsecre-
tary of the Bengal Provincial Muslim
League.He professeda confusedmixture
of socialismand Islam.He took over the
taskof organisingsupportfor the Muslim
League, with the help of the Tebhaga
activistsas his localcadres.Pushingaside
the Dacca Nawabfamily and otherelite
leaders who had so far controlled the
BengalProvincialMuslimLeague,Abul
Hashim organised the Muslim League
election campaignin which he focused
on the concrete needs and economic
demandsof the small peasants. If that
mass movementwas drivenby an ideo-
logy, it was not religious ideology. He
mobilisedthe peasantrybehindthe Mus-
lim League by giving class slogans and
not religious slogans.
Religiousideologythereforeplayedno
part in the 1945 election campaign in
Bengal. It turnedalmost entirelyon the
economicdemandsof theBengalpeasant;
the genius of Abul Hashimand his col-
leagues of the All India Kisan Sabha,
preventedtheir movementfrom degene-
ratingintocommunalslogansthatit could
havehappenedall too easily. The Bengal
peasants (who were overwhelmingly
Muslim)dependedverylargelyonjute as
a cash crop and were therebyenmeshed
in the globalised cash economy. Their
immediateconflict was with tradersand
moneylenders,who all happenedto be
Hindu,Abul Hashimtook up both these
issuesbutas purelyeconomicclass issues,
withoutallowingthemto turninto com-
munalconflict.He promisedthe peasants
thatthefuturePakistangovernmentwould
be theirgovernment,a peasantraj. That
governmentwouldscaledowntheirdebts
andtakestepsto preventthe tradersfrom
manipulating pricesagainsttheirinterests.
Thepeasantswerealsopromisedabolition
of zamindari.The Bengalpeasantrywas
led to believe thatPakistanwas going to
be ruled by the peasants.If an ideology
therewas, it was a peasantideology.That
was the oppositeof the feudaldominated
PunjabandSindh.Due to AbulHashim's
successfulcampaignthe BengalMuslim
Leaguesecured114seatsin theprovincial
5124
This content downloaded from 111.68.96.57 on Tue, 06 Oct 2015 09:50:02 UTC
assemblyas againsta totalof 121Muslim
seats. Religiousideology played no part
in this, not even by way of rhetoric.But,
in the end, the peasantswere cheated,as
they always are. Abul Hashim having
servedtheirpurpose,thepowerfulDacca
Nawab group had little difficulty in
manoeuvring him out of the way; in
February1947 when he was sent on in-
definite leave to his native village in
Burdwan.The Bengali Muslim feudals
were back in the saddle- that is a long
story and sad story by itself.
The final result,as we can see, was a
Pakistandominatedby feudals (both of
West Pakistanand also of East Bengal)
associatedwitha rulingbureaucracy. The
ruling group was soon joined by an all
powerfulmilitary.InthePunjabandSindh
the feudalswon andimposedtheirfeudal
values on us for decades.In Bengal, de-
spitetheoverwhelmingpopularvictory,it
wastheBengaliMuslimfeudalswhowere
backin powerat the timeof the partition.
Atthetimewhenit wascreated,Pakistan's
problemwasnotthatof religiousideology
but, rather,that of feudal domination..
Contrarytothepresent-day claimsof the
mullahs,the MuslimLeaguehad consis-
tentlymaintained a secularstancethrough-
out its careerexceptfor the briefKhilafat
interlude.Therehad been some attempts
to bringIslamicideologyon to theMuslim
Leagueplatform.But suchattemptswere
rareandtheywereinvariablydefeated.For
brevity,to give only one example,one of
the rare attemptsto bring the issue of
Islamicideology on to the agendaof the
All IndiaMuslimLeaguehas been docu-
mented by SharifuddinPirzada in his
collectionof MuslimLeaguedocuments.
At theAIMLsessionin Delhiin 1943,one
Abdul Hameed Kazi canvassedsupport
for a resolutionthathe proposedto table,
to committhe MuslimLeagueto Islamic
ideology and the creationof an Islamic
state.Immediatelytherewaspressurefrom
everyonethatforced Kazito abandonhis
idea. It was such widespreadopposition
in the MuslimLeagueto the ideology of
the religious parties that marginalised
religious fanaticswho were bitterlyop-
posedto theAll IndiaMuslimLeagueand
its leadershipand,eventually,to the idea
of the Pakistan.
Religiouspartieswere, as I have said,
implacablyhostile to the Pakistanmove-
ment.In Punjaband Sindh,the powerof
the feudal landed magnates was itself
sufficientto line up supportin the 1945
elections and no mass movement was
Economicand PoliticalWeekly December21, 2002
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
needed; nor did any mass movement
actuallyarise.Anyonewho has lived in a
Punjab village for an extended period
wouldrealise this. In East Bengal there
was indeed a powerfulmass movement,
as I havesaid.It was led by the legendary
HashimKhan,with the help of cadresof
the Tebhaga movement.Their slogans,
however, were explicitly secular.There
were indeed occasionalpopulardemon-
strationsin towns.The sloganswouldbe
cast in termsof demandsof Muslimsand
not in termsof Islam, thoughat times a
rarevoice speakingin the nameof Islam
mightjoin in. But thatwouldnot makeit
anIslamic'mass'movement.Negotiations
with the Congressand the Britishwere
settled throughnegotiationsat the top.
When Jinnah proclaimed Pakistan's
secularideologyhe wasvoicingtheestab-
lishedsecularideologicalpositionthatthe
MuslimLeaguehadadheredto throughout
its career.FundamentalistIslamic ideo-
logy played no part in the origins of
Pakistan,although contemporaryideo-
loguesof Islamicfundamentalism includ-
ing academics,claim that it was Islamic
ideology and slogans that createdPaki-
stanandthattheythereforehavethe right
to decide its future.BE
Addressfor correspondence:
halavi@cyber.net.pk
[This paper is based on the author's Professor
KarrarHussain Memorial Lecture delivered on
November 2, 2002.]
THECHALLENGESOF
PARENTING
Implicationsof Maternal
Employmentfor Psychological
Developmentof the Child
Kiran Mathur
The book reports an empirical
study of relationship between
employment and personality
development of children of
employed and unemployed
mothers.
2001 Rs. 350
255pp.
Concept Publishing Company
A/15-16, Commercial Block,
Mohan Garden, New Delhi-59
Ph.5351460,5351794 Fax:091-11-5357103
Email : publishing@conceptpub.com