a74 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY o r PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : 1 JANUARY ~ 9 9 9

E n l i g h t e n m e n t in general a n d in the history of skepticism from the 176o's to the

b e g i n n i n g of the n i n e t e e n t h century in particular.
H ~ r N E R F. KLEMME
Otto-von-Guericke Universitdt Magdeburg

Robert R. Williams. Hegel's Ethics of Recognition. Los Angeles: University of California

Press, a998. Pp. xviii +433- Cloth, $6o.oo.

T h e e m i n e n t Hegel scholar, Vittorio Hoesle, perceived the major weakness of Hegel's

philosophy in its seeming failure to adequately deal with the issue of interpersonal
relations. Hardly a new objection, as Hoesle's critique has a lineage that reaches at least as
far back as Schleiermacher. Against this thesis, Robert Williams had earlier developed a
coun ter-argument which he presented in his work, Recognition:Fichte andHegel on the Other
(1992). I n this foundational work, Williams drew out and clarified Hegel's concept of
recognition from its inchoate source in Fichte; and by so doing defended "Hegel against
charges that his thought violates intersubjectivity a n d difference by reducing the other to
the same."(l) I n the present work, the conceptual a n d textual g r o u n d s established by
Williams in his first work on the topic allow for a more extensive extrapolation of Hegel's
doctrine, and argues that "The story of recognition is a story about Fichte and Hegel.
Fichte introduced the concept but did not make it the basis of either his ethics or his
politics. Hegel appropriated a n d transformed the concept of recognition and regarded it
as the f u n d a m e n t a l intersubjective structure of ethical life." (26)
After a brief introductory critical survey of some of the more or less misleading
contemporary views of both Hegelians and non-Hegelians regarding Hegel's concept
of interpersonal recognition, Williams proceeds to present its historical genesis, of how
it emerged from its early and unfocused appearances in the philosophies of Fichte and
Schelling. Williams then traces the further development and elaboration of this con-
cept as it gains expression in the course of Hegel's own ethical theory, not only as it is
f o u n d in such major works as the Phenomenology of Mind and The Philosophy of Spirit, but
also as it appears in his earlier and lesser known Jena Manuscripts of x8o 5. After this
preliminary doctrinal and historical introduction, Williams turns to the most substantial
section of his study, that work of Hegel's in which the concept of recognition would be
expected to and does indeed play its most evident ethical role: The Philosophy of Right.
Almost every category within The Philosophy of Right is examined not only for the
appearance of the concept, but for the defining role which it plays in the construction
of that category. Such an examination is necessary for Williams, since "Reciprocal
recognition in its various determinate types and instances is the general structure of
ethical life and the e m b o d i m e n t of social reason that underlies and supports the con-
cepts of law and state." (364) A m o n g the categories considered, categories that Wil-
liams discusses within the context of contemporary issues and each of which is taken up
in a separate chapter of his work, are Family, Crime and Punishment, Poverty, and the
State. In every instance considered he argues that an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the defining
role of recognition is a necessary prerequisite not only for a clear a n d correct compre-
 BOOK REVIEWS 175

hension of Hegel's ethical theory but of all ethical theory. Certainly, after this scholarly
tour de force Hegel's concept of recognition will have to be taken into account in any
credible discussion of his ethical theory. I n a final chapter Williams turns to some
contemporary ethical theorists who have n o t taken that concept into consideration, or
if they have, have either misunderstood or have rejected it. For Williams, such thinkers
as Kojeve, Sartre, Deleuze, Derrida and Levinas, in their m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g or rejection
of the ethically mediating concept of recognition, have all contributed toward the
"disrupted and fragmented cultural situation at the e n d of the twentieth century."
(412)
In sum, Williams' presentation and support of Hegel's ethical e m p l o y m e n t of the
concept of intersubjective recognition c a n n o t but encourage theorists to reconsider the
subject, and to see in it not only a conceptual tool which can serve to lucidly contex-
tualize Hegel's ethical theory into the matrix of his total philosophical system, but also
as a needed ethical concept able to transcend both the crude amorality of an isolating
individualism or the unreal morality of a stifling communalism. I n sun,, Williams has
written a fine scholarly work, thoughtfully argued a n d clearly presented.
LAWRENCE S. STEPELEVICH
Villanova University _

Dietmar H. H e i d e m a n n . Kant und das Problem des metaphysischen Idealismus. Kantstudien

Erg/inzungshefte 131, Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1998. Pp. 268. Cloth,
DM 158.oo.

I m m a n u e l Kant's critical philosophy was controversial from the very beginning. His
refutations of idealism played an i m p o r t a n t part in these debates. Dietmar H.
H e i d e m a n n ' s book on the problem of idealism is an attempt to evaluate Kant's argu-
ments against metaphysical idealism. Yet H e i d e m a n n never takes a position on whether
Kant eventually succeeded or failed in refuting idealism. O n the one hand, he thinks it is
possible "to consider the p r o o f of the existence of the external world as ultimately
unsatisfactory" (238). O n the other h a n d he ambiguously talks of Kant's "solution of the
problem of metaphysical idealism, which is, though not satisfactory in all parts, still quite
convincing and even plausible" (238). This indecisiveness constitutes a f u n d a m e n t a l
shortcoming in an otherwise interesting discussion of a central K a n t i a n problem. T h e
book is distinguished by its close reading of the relevant Kantian texts between 178 a a n d
18oo a n d its scrupulous r e n d e r i n g of the respective steps of Kant's argumentation.
H e i d e m a n n ' s well written investigation consists of an introduction, dealing with the
pre-Kantian discussion of that problem, followed by three chapters that present Kant's
criticism of "metaphysical idealism" (3). T h e author lumps together the theories of
Descartes's 'skeptical' or 'problematic' idealism and Berkeley's 'dogmatic' idealism with
this n o n - K a n t i a n term. T h e three chapters correspond to different chronological stages
in Kant's attempts at refuting idealism. First, H e i d e m a n n analyzes the structure of the
Fourth Paralogism of the Critique of Pure Reason, which was directed against Descartes.
This a r g u m e n t was i n t e n d e d to prove that our knowledge of the external world is