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Prof.

Michael Reiterer HIST 3100/50 Shradda Thapa

Diplomatic History 5th March 2021 4164630

ASEAN concerned by Chinese claims in the South China Sea,


seeks alliances to hedge.

Strategically, the South China sea have played an enormously role to the region because of its
rich marine life, abundances of nutrient laden food supply and transportation of goods and
services. Although, dominance over the region is claimed by states of Brunei, China, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam, there is a sign of ‘assertive dominance’ illustrated by
China as well. Over the last two decades, China has made a general progress to improve relation
with these ASEAN states, the depth of this relationship was choreographed. “...these relations
were confirmed, both in terms of security cooperation and economic cooperation: for the further
deepening and expansion of mutually beneficial economic cooperation was confirmed, including
production capacity cooperation.” (Oba, 2016) As of the 2002 the non-binding, Declaration on
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed by 10 ASEAN states and China have been
violated over Chinese claim to the internal waters, territorial sea and contiguous zone, based on
sovereignty over the South China Sea islands. This dispute has further increased political and
diplomatic friction, causing ASEAN member states to launch containment against China through
hedging strategies.

These territorial disputes have a strong economic grievance as Chinese economy is crucial for
the development of the ASEAN regions. But with Chinese dominance, ASEAN as a regional
interlocutor is “deploying a hedging strategy that seeks to benefit from the opportunities and
manage the challenges emanating from the rise of China (Shekhar, 2012).” China’s growing
power cannot be staggered with ASEAN’s combined armed forces as they aren’t well equipped
to compete with the Chinese navy (PLA navy), hence, diplomacy is the best solution to cope
with Chinese maritime offense. Hedging strategy also doesn't represent all the ASEAN countries
aligned interest towards a policy against China, which makes it insufficient to settle territorial
conflicts. ASEAN countries “reaffirmed its compliance with the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other international laws, the importance of the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), the implementation by
China and ASEAN countries of the principles set out in the DOC, and ongoing work on the
adoption of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC)” in their strategy as they are
concerned with the recent hostility in the region (Oba, 2016).

The alliance politics of ASEAN members, especially Vietnam has resorted to multileveled
hedging strategy combined with both band-wagoning and balancing elements as the state has
aligned with stronger adversarial power to equalize the odds against China. In order to
operationalize the strategy, “Vietnam has directly engaged with China politically and promoted
economic cooperation with the ASEAN countries to help maintain a peaceful and stable regional
environment” while also “pursuing a military modernization program through the development
of its domestic defense industry as well as military acquisitions from foreign partners (Hiep,
2016).” Although Vietnam has a ‘comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership’ with China
as of 2008 after bilateral trade increased exponentially within these two countries and Vietnam
wants to continue a stable and peaceful relationship with China but has been constrained by the
disputes over the sea. To strengthen this approach of hedging, by the end of 2014, “Vietnam had
maintained regular defense and strategic dialogues at deputy ministerial level with most major
military powers, including Australia, China, France, India, Italy, Japan, Singapore, South Korea,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Ibid).”

Beyond ASEAN countries, rival countries have wrangled over territory in the South China Sea
for centuries, but tension has steadily increased in recent years following China's rapid rise in
military prowess and since “one third of the world's maritime shipping passes through the South
China sea, carrying over US$3 trillion in trade each year” which holds interest of other countries
as well (Valencia, 2010). Since the rise of Beijing as the global power, and with this position of
strength, China has used coercion to obtain bargaining hand at the East China Sea, South China
Sea, China-India border, and toward the US on the question of freedom of navigation. China’s
declaration of viewing South China Sea as a ‘core interest’ have several implications towards the
regional security. In the March of 2009, “an incident with US naval surveillance ship –
Impeccable – was harassed repeatedly by five Chinese vessels” later followed up with “China's
unilateral ban on fishing in the Gulf of Tonkin and its detention of Vietnamese fishing boats” has
deteriorated Chinese relation with many countries. US had even offered to act as a mediator as
Vietnam and Malaysia had jointly seek “extended continental shelf claims in the South China
Sea” to which Chinese government objected in both cases (Ibid). Given the importance of the
South China Sea with its geopolitical location, strategic and economic resources and military
advantage of tackling an offense, USA need to engage more with the region to diminish China’s
growing belligerence in the region by taking an active interest in dispute management.

The rise and success of Chinese diplomacy has unarguably stemmed from ASEAN countries and
their cooperation as they recognize common interest of security, international trade and further
economic interest with their giant neighbor. Despite the ongoing trade war, even “the United
States adopts a mix of hardline and conciliatory actions toward China, as shown in its rigorous
opposition to China’s expansion in the South China Sea on the one hand, and the continuation of
strategic economic dialogue between the two countries on the other.” (Oba, 2016) But with
growing tensions over the region, with China inconveniently not abiding by the UN law of Sea
Treaty, global pressure is soon to be outright displayed. President Duterte of the Philippines and
his administration demanded that “due regard be given to the tribunal’s ruling as a precondition
for discussions on territorial disputes with China” under UNCLOS, which the Permanent Court
of Arbitration at The Hague ruled in favor of the Philippines on almost every count. With the US
extending their national interest in the region as well, a dramatic compromise in the region is
necessary to avert a potential war.

References used:

1. Oba, M (2016) Tokyo University of science. ASEAN’s Hedging Strategy. The Diplomat.
https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/aseans-hedging-strategy/

2. Hong Hiep, Le. (2016). Vietnam’s Pursuit of Alliance Politics in the South China Sea.
10.1007/978-3-319-26152-2_13.
3. Sen, A (2020). South China Sea: Beijing has a major natural advantage in the geopolitical
power game. The economic times online.
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/south-china-sea-beijing-has-a-major-
natural-advantage-in-the-geopolitical-power-
game/articleshow/76423659.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_camp
aign=cppst

4. Shekhar, V (2012). ASEAN’s Response to the Rise of China: Deploying a Hedging Strategy.
China Report. 2012;48(3):253-268. doi:10.1177/0009445512462314

5. Valencia, M.J (2010). The South china Sea: Back to the Future? Global Asia Foundation.
https://www.globalasia.org/v5no4/cover/the-south-china-sea-back-to-the-future_mark-j-valencia

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