SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present
Rules 72 to 109
1. METROPOLITAN BANK vs. ABSOLUTE
MANAGEMENT CORP,
G.R. No. 170498, 9 JANUARY 2013
Facts: Sherwood Holdings Corporation, Inc. (SHCI)
filed a complaint for sum of money against Absolute
Management Corporation (AMC). SHCI alleged in its
complaint that it made advance payments to AMC
for the purchase of 27,000pieces of plywood and 16,500
plyboards in the sum of P12,277,500.00, covered by
Metrobank Check Nos. 1407668502, 140768507,
140768530,140768531, 140768532, 140768533 and
140768534. These checks were all crossed, and were all
made payable to AMC. They were given to Chua, AMC’s
General Manager, in 1998.Chua died in 1999, and a
special proceeding forthe settlement of his estate
was commenced before the RTC of Pasay City. SHCI
made demands on AMC, after Chua’s death, for allegedly
undelivered items worth P8,331,700.00. According to
AMC, these transactions could not be found in its
records. Upon investigation, AMC discovered that in
1998, Chuareceived from SHCI 18 Metrobank checks
worth P31,807,500.00. These were all payable to AMC
and were crossed or "for payee’s account only."
In its answer with counterclaims and third-party
complaint, AMC averred that it had no knowledge of
Chua’s transactions with SHCI and it did not receive any
money from the latter.In the meantime, Metrobank filed
a motion to dismiss against AMC on theground that the
latter engaged in prohibited forum shopping. According
to Metrobank, AMC’s claim against it is the same claim
that it raised againstChua’s estate in Special Proceedings
before the RTC.
The RTC subsequently denied this motion. Subsequently,
Metrobank filed a motion for leave to admitfourth-party
complaint against Chua’s estate. It alleged that Chua’s
estate should reimburse Metrobank in case it would be
held liable in the third-partycomplaint filed against it by
AMC. RTC denied Metrobank’s motion. The
RTC categorized Metrobank’s allegation in the fourth-
party complaint as a "cobro de lo indebido"–a kind of
quasi-contract that mandates recovery of what has been
improperly paid. Quasi-contracts fall within the concept
of implied contracts that must be included in the claims
required to be filed with the judicial settlement of the
deceased’s estate under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules
of Court.As such claim, it shouldhave been filed in
Special Proceedings, not before the RTC as a fourth-
partycomplaint. The RTC, acting in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction, does nothave the authority to
adjudicate the fourth-party complaint. As a trial
courthearing an ordinary action, it cannot resolve
matters pertaining to specialproceedings because the
latter is subject to specific rules. The Court of Appeals
petition.
Issues
1) WON Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint against
Chua’s estate should be allowed.
a) Are quasi- contracts included in claims that
should be filed pursuant to Rule 86, Section 5
of the Rules of Court?
b) If so, is Metrobank’s claim against the Estate of
Jose Chua based on quasi-contract?
Ruling
1) Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint as a
contingent claim, falls within the claims that
should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court.
A distinctive character of Metrobank’s fourth-party
complaint is its contingent nature---the claim depends
on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged
liable to AMC, a future event that may or may not
happen. This characterized unmistakably marks the
complaint as a contingent one that must be included in
the claims under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court.
Note: Specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court prevail over general provisions of Section
11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court.
The court supports the conclusion of the CA to wit:
Notably, a comparison of the respective provisions
of Section 11, Rule 6 and Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court readily shows that Section 11, Rule 6
applies to ordinary civil actions while Section 5 ,
Rule 86 specifically applies to money claims against
the estate. The specific provisions of Section 5 ,
Rule 86.. must therefore prevail over the general
provisions of Section 11, Rule 6. Therefore, the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons
(where claims against the deceased should be filed)
is primarily governed by the rules on special
proceedings, while the rules provided for ordinary
claims, including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of
Court, merely apply suppletorily.
A) Quasi- contracts are included in claims that
should be filed under Rule 86, Section 5 of the
Rules of court
The term quasi-contract is included in the concept
“implied contracts” as used in the Rules of Court.
“Implied Contracts” , as used in our remedial law,
originated from the Common Law where obligations
derived from quasi-contract and from law are both
considered implied contracts. Accordingly , liabilities of
the deceased arising from quasi-contracts should be
filed as claims in the settlement of his estate, as
provided in Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.
B) Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is based
on quasi-contract
Both RTC and CA described Metrobank’s claim against
Chua’s estate as one based on quasi-contract. CA further
claimed that Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint falls
under the quasi-contracts enunciated in Article 2154 of
the Civil Code which embodies the concept “solutio
indebiti” which arises when something is delivered
through mistake to a person who has no right to
demand it. It obligates the latter to return what has
been received through mistake.
In its fourth-party complaint, Metrobank claims that
Chua’s estate should reimburse it if become liable on the
checks that it deposited to Ayala Lumber and Hardware’s
account upon Chua’s instructions. This fullfills the
requisites of solutio indebiti. First, Metrobank acted in a
mannder akin to a mistake when it deposited the AMC
checks to Ayala Lumber and Hardware’s account.
Second, Ayala lumber had no right to demand and
receive the checks that were deposited to its account.
This created an obligation on the part of Ayala Lumber
and Hardware , through its sole proprietor, Chua, to
return the amount of these checks to Metrobank.
The Court ,notes however , that its description of
Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint as a claim closely
analogous to solutio indebiti is only to determine the
validity of the lower court’s orders denying it. It is not an
adjudication determining the liability of Chua’s estate
against Metrobank. The appropriate trial court should
still determine whether Metrobank has a lawful claim
against Chua’s estate based on quasi-contract.
In sum, on all counts in the considerations material to
the issues posed, the resolution points to the affirmation
of the assailed CA decision and resolution. Metrobank’s
claim in its fourth-party complaint against Chua’s estate
is based on quasi-contract. It is also a contingent claim
that depends on another event. Both belong to the
category of claims against a deceased person that
should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court and, as such , should have been so filed in Special
Proceedings No. 99-0023.
2. HILADO vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. 164108, 8 MAY 2009
Facts: The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S.
Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was
survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos
Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only
daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. At the time of his
death, there were two cases pending before the Bacolod
RTC with petitioners as the respective plaintiffs in the
two cases.
Private respondent applied for the issuance of letters of
administration which was later on granted by the court.
On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila
RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela
praying that they be furnished with copies of all
processes and orders pertaining to the intestate
proceedings. Private respondent opposed the
manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of
petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of
her husband.
In their motions, Petitioners sought three specific reliefs.
First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished
"copies of all processes and orders issued" by the
intestate court as well as the pleadings filed. Second,
they prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for
the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a
verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon
submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the
appraisal of the fair market value of the same. Third,
petitioners moved that the intestate court set a deadline
for the submission by the administrator of her verified
annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the
date for her examination under oath with respect
thereto, with due notice to them and other parties
interested in the collation, preservation and disposition
of the estate.
On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order
denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that
petitioners are not interested parties within the
contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the
intestate proceedings. This ruling was affirmed by the
CA.
ISSUE: WON petitioners have the right intervene in the
intestate proceedings.
RULING: NO. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the
court.” While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does
not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the
intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held
that the legal interest required of an intervenor "must be
actual and material, direct and immediate, and not
simply contingent and expectant."
Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that
intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure
necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings.
The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within
the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of
Court, not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule
72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of special
provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions
shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special
proceedings."
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2
of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does
not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is
based on a contingent claim. The definition of
"intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not
accommodate contingent claims.
Yet, even if it were declared that petitioners have no
right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would
not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they
had sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is
not one of those reliefs.
Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been
based on contract, whether express or implied, then
they should have filed their claim, even if contingent,
under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by
the court immediately after granting letters of
administration and published by the administrator
immediately after the issuance of such notice. However,
it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based
on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with
Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions
for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of
claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required
under Rule 86. These actions, being as they are civil,
survive the death of the decedent and may be
commenced against the administrator pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 86.
Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against
Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where they
were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the
event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted,
they would have the right to enforce the judgment
against the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent
may they be allowed to participate in the intestate
proceedings?
Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be
inchoate interests, but they are viable interests
nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special
Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also "any
person interested" or "persons interested in the estate"
various specified capacities to protect their respective
interests in the estate.
In the same manner that the Rules on Special
Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person
interested in the estate, the right to participate in every
aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but
instead provides for specific instances when such
persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we
deem that while there is no general right to intervene on
the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek
certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not
explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or
relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the
estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules
by which such interests can be protected. It is under this
standard that we assess the three prayers sought by
petitioners.
The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all
processes and orders issued in connection with the
intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by
the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning
as to the utility of such relief for the petitioners. They
would be duly alerted of the developments in the
intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets
of the estate. Also, Section 2 of Rule 135 states that
“the records of every court of justice shall be public
records and shall be available for the inspection of any
interested person.” Allowing creditors, contingent or
otherwise, access to the records of the intestate
proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than
mandating the service of court processes and pleadings
upon them.
As to the other reliefs, Petitioners are not entitled to
such.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as we have
explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their
prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as
enunciated in this decision.
3. URIARTE vs. CFI NEGROS,
G.R. No. L-21938-39, 29 MAY 1970
Facts:
Don Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain. Vincent
Uriarte filed with the CFI of Negros Occidental a petition
for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan
(Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging that, as a natural
son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during
the lifetime of said decedent, Vicente had instituted a
civil case in the same Court for his compulsory
acknowledgment as such natural son. However, said
petition was opposed by the nephews of Juan stating
that there is a valid will left by the deceased in Spain.
The nephews then filed a settlement of the estate in the
court of Manila, on the basis of the alleged will of the
deceased, commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in
the CFI of Manila for the probate of a document alleged
to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite,
and on the same date, they filed in Special Proceeding
No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the
same on the following grounds: (1) that, as the
deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there
was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate
proceedings, and (2) that Vicente Uriarte had no legal
personality and interest to initiate said intestate
proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son
of the decedent.
Vicente filed an opposition to the settlement of
estate in the court of Manila stating that the court of
Negros Occidental has already acquired original
jurisdiction over the case. The opposition of Vicente was
dismissed together with the intestate settlement In the
CFI of Negros. Hence, Vicente filed a petition for
certiorari questioning the dismissal of the intestate
settlement in the CFI of Negros.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing
Special Proceeding No. 6344.
2. Whether the Manila Court erred in not dismissing
Special Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding prior
filing of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros
Court.
Held:
1. No. While the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance over "all matters of probate" is beyond
question, the matter of venue, or the particular
Court of First Instance where the special
proceeding should be commenced, is regulated
by Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides that the estate of a
decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien,
shall be in the court of first instance in the
province in which he resided at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the court of first instance of any
province in which he had estate.
Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is
that of a nonresident alien (like the deceased)
the Courts of First Instance in provinces where
the deceased left any property have concurrent
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper
special proceeding for the settlement of his
estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of
First Instance are the Negros and the Manila
Courts - province and city where the deceased
left considerable properties. In accordance with
settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate
proceedings, for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person take
precedence over intestate proceedings for
the same purpose.
Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in
the course of intestate proceedings
pending before a court of first instance it
is found it that the decedent had left a last
will, proceedings for the probate of the of
the latter should replace the intestate
proceedings even if at that stage an
administrator had already been appointed,
the latter being required to render final
account and turn over the estate in his
possession to the executor subsequently
appointed. This, however, is understood to
be without prejudice that should the
alleged last will be rejected or is
disapproved, the proceeding shall
continue as an intestacy. As already
adverted to, this is a clear indication that
 proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy
priority over intestate proceedings.
2. No. Wrong venue is merely a waiveable
procedural defect, and, in the light of the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case,
Vicente Uriarte has waived the right to raise
such objection or is precluded from doing so by
laches. Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of
a will executed by Don Juan since 1961 when
Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial
petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344. To
allow him now to assail the exercise of
jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the
Manila Court and the validity of all the
proceedings had in Special Proceeding No.
51396 would put a premium on his negligence.
4. RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS vs. REGISTRY OF
DEEDS,
G.R. No. 133240, 15 NOVEMBER 2000
Facts: Petitioner Corporation amended its Articles of
Incorporation to change its name from Rudolf Lietz,
Incorporated to Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. and such was
approved by SEC. As a consequence of its change of
name, petitioner sought the amendment of the transfer
certificates of title over real properties owned by them,
all of which were under the old name. For this purpose,
petitioner instituted a petition for amendment of titles
with the RTC Parañaque City.
The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of
Deeds of Pasay City, apparently because the titles
sought to be amended, all state that they were issued
by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City. Petitioner
likewise inadvertently alleged in the body of the petition
that the lands covered by the subject titles are located in
Pasay City. Subsequently, petitioner learned that the
subject titles are in the custody of the Register of Deeds
of Parañaque City. Hence, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte
Motion to Admit Amended Petition impleading instead as
respondent the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City, and
alleged that its lands are located in Parañaque City.
In the meantime, however, the court a quo had
dismissed the petition motu proprio on the ground of
improper venue, it appearing therein that the
respondent is the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City and
the properties are located in Pasay City. Petitioner filed
with the lower court a Motion for Reconsideration but
was denied. On the other hand, in view of the dismissal
of the petition, the lower court also denied the Ex-Parte
Motion to Admit Amended Petition.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment contending that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the res because it appeared from the original petition
that the lands are situated in Pasay City; hence, outside
the jurisdiction of the Parañaque court. Since it had no
jurisdiction over the case, it could not have acted on the
motion to admit amended petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not trial court motu proprio dismiss a
complaint on the ground of improper venue.
HELD:
Venue of real actions
This question has already been answered in Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, where this Court held that
it may not. The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s
complaint by respondent trial court on the ground of
improper venue is plain error, obviously attributable to
its inability to distinguish between jurisdiction and
venue.
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are
basically governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of
an action is conferred only by law. It may not be
conferred by consent or waiver upon a court which
otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of an action. On the other hand, the venue of an
action as fixed by statute may be changed by the
consent of the parties, and an objection on improper
venue may be waived by the failure of the defendant to
raise it at the proper time. In such an event, the court
may still render a valid judgment. Rules as to
jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or
agreement of the parties. Venue is procedural, not
jurisdictional, and hence may be waived. It is meant to
provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict
their access to the courts as it relates to the place of
trial.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper
venue is certainly not the appropriate course of action at
this stage of the proceedings. Where the defendant fails
to challenge timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as
provided by Section 4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court,
and allows the trial to be held and a decision to be
rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be
permitted to belatedly challenge the wrong venue, which
is deemed waived. Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for
the trial court to have taken a procedural short-cut by
dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the ground of
improper venue without first allowing the procedure
outlined in the rules of court to take its proper course.
Amendments as a matter of right
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
right at any time before a responsive pleading is served
or, in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10)
days after it is served.
Amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice, in order that every case may so
far as possible be determined on its real facts, and in
order to speed the trial of cases or prevent the circuitry
of action and unnecessary expense. The trial court,
therefore, should have allowed the amendment
proposed by petitioner for in so doing, it would have
allowed the actual merits of the case to be speedily
determined, without regard to technicalities, and in the
most expeditious and inexpensive manner.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to
pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that
the real controversies between the parties are
presented, their rights determined and the case decided
on the merits without unnecessary delay. This liberality
is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in
this case where the amendment to the complaint was
made before the trial of the case thereby giving
petitioner all the time allowed by law to answer and to
prepare for trial.
5. HEIRS OF SANDEJAS vs. LINA,
G.R. No. 141634, 5 FEBRUARY 2001
Probate jurisdiction; effect of court’s approval;
application for approval of sale of property under
administration
A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that it is
subject to probate court approval. The transaction
remains binding on the seller-heir, but not on the other
heirs who have not given their consent to it. In settling
the estate of the deceased, a probate court has
jurisdiction over matters incidental and collateral to the
exercise of its recognized powers. Such matters include
selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty
belonging to the estate. Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules
of Court, deals with the conveyance of real property
contracted by the decedent while still alive. In contrast
with Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, the said
provision does not limit to the executor or administrator
the right to file the application for authority to sell,
mortgage or otherwise encumber realty under
administration. The standing to pursue such course of
action before the probate court inures to any person
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
or to be entitled to the avails of the suit.
Facts:
Petitioners are heirs of Spouses Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr.
and Remedios Sandejas. Prior to the death of Eliodoro,
he was appointed as administrator for the settlement of
the estate of his late wife, Remedios. He bound himself
and his heirs to sell to respondent Lina, for Php1M, four
parcels of land which formed part of the estate of
Remedios. Lina gave Php170k earnest money to Eliodoro
who filed a motion for authority to sell the subject lands.
Resolution of the motion, however, was delayed due to
the burning of records, and preceded by the death of
Eliodoro. Sixto Sandejas, son of the spouses, was then
appointed as administrator.
Before the intestate court, Lina filed an Omnibus
Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-
intervention alleging Eliodoro bound himself and the
heirs to sell the parcels of land that formed part of the
estate of Remedios which the court granted. Lina then
filed a motion for the approval of the Receipt of Earnest
Money With Promise to Sell and To Buy which the court
granted. The intestate court also ordered Administrator
Sixto to execute the necessary deeds for conveyance.
CA:
1. The contract between Eliodoro and Lina was
merely a contract to sell. The ownership of the
four lots was to remain in the intestate estate of
Remedios until the approval of the sale, which is
a positive suspensive condition obtained from
the settlement court.
2. Ordered the petitioners to convey Eliodoro’s
undivided shares of the disputed properties to
Lina.
ISSUES:
1. Did the CA err in ordering the conveyance due
to the nonfulfillment of the suspensive condition
-- court approval of the sale?
2. Does the intestate court have jurisdiction to
compel the petitioners to enforce the sale?
3. May Lina, despite not being the administrator,
file an application for the approval of the sale in
the settlement case?
Held:
1. No, CA was correct in ordering the conveyance
but the contract was a contract of conditional
sale, not a contract to sell. A contract to sell is
subject to the suspensive condition of payment
of the purchase price. Here, the suspensive
 condition was the procurement of a court
approval.
Court approval is required in any disposition of
the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the Rules
of Court. However, such approval cannot
adversely affect the substantive rights of heirs to
dispose of their own pro indiviso shares. In
other words, they can sell their rights, interests
or participation in the property under
administration. A stipulation requiring court
approval does not affect the validity and the
effectivity of the sale as regards the selling
heirs. It merely implies that the property may be
taken out of custodia legis, but only with the
court's permission. It would seem that the
suspensive condition in the present conditional
sale was imposed only for this reason.
Here, the sale was approved by the intestate
court. Because petitioners did not consent to the
sale of their ideal shares, the receipt of the
earnest money is only limited to the share of
Eliodoro.
2. Yes, the intestate court has jurisdiction over the
approval of the subject conditional sale.
Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to
the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91)
and the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of
deceased persons, including the appointment
and the removal of administrators and executors
(Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of a
probate court's recognized powers such as
selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering
realty belonging to the estate.
Here, the Motion for Approval was meant to
settle the decedent's obligation to Lina; hence,
that obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction
of the settlement court. To require Lina to file a
separate action — on whether petitioners should
convey the title to Eliodoro's share of the
disputed realty — will unnecessarily prolong the
settlement of the intestate estates of the
deceased spouses.
3. Yes, Lina may file an application for the approval
of the sale in the settlement case.
Petitioners contend that under Section 8, Rule
89, only the executor or administrator is
authorized to apply for the approval of a sale of
realty under administration. However, there is
no such limitation.
Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule specifically
requires only the executor or administrator to
file the application for authority to sell, mortgage
or otherwise encumber real estate for the
purpose of paying debts, expenses and legacies
(Section 2); or for authority to sell real or
personal estate beneficial to the heirs, devisees
or legatees and other interested persons,
although such authority is not necessary to pay
debts, legacies or expenses of administration
(Section 4). Section 8 mentions only an
application to authorize the conveyance of realty
under a contract that the deceased entered into
while still alive.
While this Rule does not specify who should file
the application, it stands to reason that the
proper party must be one who is to be benefited
or injured by the judgment, or one who is to be
entitled to the avails of the suit.
6. PIO BARRETTO REALTY vs. CA,
G.R. No. 132362, 28 JUNE 2001
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION OF CERTIORARI-
AMENDMENT OF FINAL AND EXECUTORY
JUDGMENT CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION
Facts:
In 1980, petitioner Pio Barretto Realty Devt. Corporation
(Barretto Realty) bought several parcels of land from the
estate of Deprin represented by Atty. Trinidad.
Consequently, titles were transferred in its name. Later,
respondent Moslares instituted an action for annulment
of sale claiming that the same parcels of land had
already been sold to him by the deceased Drepin.
To settle the case, a compromise agreement
was executed by both parties which was
approved by the Court. The agreement gave Moslares
and Barretto Realty options to buy the disputed lots thus
implicitly recognizing that the one who paid first had
priority in right. Subsequent disagreements, however,
arose on the question of who bought the properties first.
Moslares claimed that he bought the lots fist on
January 1990 by delivering to Atty. Trinidad two checks,
one in favor of Barretto Realty and the other, in favor of
the Drepin Estate. But petitioner Barretto Realty denied
receiving the check. Instead, it claimed that it bought
the properties on March 1990 by tendering checks to
Moslares and to the judicial administrator of the estate.
However, Moslares and Atty. Trinidad refused
acceptance, prompting Barretto Realty to move for
execution the compromise judgment.
Held:
The court granted the same and issued an
order directing the parties to deposit with the
court their respective monetary obligations.
Pursuant thereto, the deputy sheriff personally
delivered petitioner's checks to Moslares and the
estate.
More than 3 years later, Moslares filed a motion
for execution alleging that he bought the lots subject of
the compromise and that the previous tender of the
checks by petitioner did not produce the effect of
payment. Respondent Judge granted Moslares' Motion
for Execution and issued an order for Barreto Realty to
execute a deed of conveyance in favor of Moslares.
Aggrieved, Barretto Realty moved for
reconsideration alleging that respondent Judge
could no longer grant Moslares' motion since the
prior sale of subject lots in its favor had already
been recognized when the court sheriff was
directed to deliver, and did in fact deliver, the
checks it issued in payment therefor to Moslares
and Atty. Trinidad.
Respondent Judge granted the motion of
Barretto Realty for reconsideration. This was however
overturned by the same Judge when respondent
Mosrales moved for reconsideration and claimed that the
check was not valid because the check was not
encashed, hence, did not produce the effect of payment.
Judge Laguio ruled that Barretto Realty's payment
through checks was not valid because "a check is not
legal tender and it cannot produce the effect of payment
until it is encashed.”
Ultimately, Barretto Realty filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction with the
Court of Appeals assailing the Orders of respondent
Judge on the ground that they were issued with grave
abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals however
dismissed the petition and ruled that the Respondent
Judge has not gravely abused his discretion. Hence, this
petition in Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in
granting Moslares’ motion for
execution which nullified the 1990 sale
in favor of petitioner (Remedial)
2. Whether or not petitioner’s payment in
check constituted a legal tender of payment
(Mercantile)
3. Whether or not the principle of laches
already attached against the Petitioner
(Remedial)
I. YES, Respondent judge gravely abused
his discretion in granting Moslares’
motion for execution.
Final and executory decisions, more so with
those already executed, may no longer be
amended except only to correct errors
which are clerical in nature. They become
the law of the case and are immutable and
unalterable regardless of any claim of error
or incorrectness. Amendments or
alterations which substantially affect such
judgments as well as the entire proceedings
held for that purpose are null and void for
lack of jurisdiction.
It is not disputed that petitioner Barretto
Realty bought the disputed lots of the
Drepin Estate subject matter of the
Compromise Agreement ahead of Moslares
and that the checks issued in payment
thereof were even personally delivered by
the Deputy Sheriff of the RTC-Br. 18,
Manila, upon Order of respondent Judge
after tender was refused by Moslares and
the Drepin Estate. Respondent Moslares
never raised the invalidity of the payment
through checks either through a motion for
reconsideration or a timely appeal. Hence,
with the complete execution and
satisfaction of the Decision dated 24 July
1986 which approved the Compromise
Agreement, Civil Case No. 84-27008
became closed and terminated leaving
nothing else to be done by the trial court.
Clearly then respondent Judge Laguio no
longer had any jurisdiction whatsoever to
act on, much less grant, the motion for
execution and supplement thereto filed by
Moslares.
Considering the foregoing, respondent
Judge’s Order which granted private
respondent's motion for execution thus
nullifying the 1990 sale in favor of
petitioner after he had in effect approved
such sale in his Order of 14 June 1990 and
after such order had already become final
and executory, amounted to an oppressive
exercise of judicial authority, a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack
 of jurisdiction, for which reason, all
further orders stemming therefrom are also
null and void and without effect.
II. YES, petitioner’s payment in check
constituted a legal tender of payment.
While delivery of a check produces the
effect of payment only when it is encashed,
the rule is otherwise if the debtor was
prejudiced by the creditor's unreasonable
delay in presentment.
Acceptance of a check implies an
undertaking of due diligence in presenting it
for payment. If no such presentment was
made, the drawer cannot be held liable
irrespective of loss or injury sustained by
the payee. Payment will be deemed effected
and the obligation for which the check was
given as conditional payment will be
discharged.
III. NO, the principle of laches does not attach
when the judgment is null and void for want
of jurisdiction.
For one thing, petitioner from the very start had always
consistently questioned and assailed the jurisdiction of
the trial court to entertain respondent's motion for
execution filed three (3) years after the case had in fact
been executed. Secondly, estoppel being an equitable
doctrine cannot be invoked to perpetuate an injustice.
7. PACIOLES vs. CHUATOCO-CHING,
G.R. No. 127920, 9 AUGUST 2005
Facts: (Petitioner – husband of the deceased;
Respondent – mother of the deceased)
Miguelita died intestate. She was survived by her
husband (petitioner) and their two minor children.
Petitioner then filed a verified petition in the RTC for the
settlement of Miguelita’s estate.
Miguelita’s mother (respondent) filed an opposition on
the ground that: (1) petitioner is incompetent and unfit;
and (2) bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of
paraphernal properties. Respondent then prayed that
letters of administration be issued to her.
Petitioner moved to strike out the opposition alleging
that respondent has no direct and material interest in
the estate, she not being a compulsory heir. Respondent
countered that she has interest in the estate because
she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on
the condition that both would undertake to be business
partners. She then nominated her son, Emmanuel Ching,
to be special administrator.
The RTC(intestate court) issued an order appointing
petitioner and Emmanuel Ching as administrators of the
Estate. Petitioner submitted an inventory of the estate
while Emmanuel did not.
Petitioner then filed a motion for the: (1) payment of
estate taxes; (2) partition and distribution of estate
among declared heirs; and (3) payment of attorney’s
fees. Respondent opposed stating that it was premature
to distribute as there is still no determination whether
the properties in the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal
or owned in a joint venture.
RTC denied the petitioner’s prayer for the partition and
distribution of estate because it is premature. But it
allowed the payment of tax and attorney’s fees.
CA – the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
WON A TRIAL COURT, ACTING AS AN INTESTATE
COURT, MAY HEAR AND PASS UPON QUESTIONS
OF OWNERSHIP INVOLVING PROPERTIES
CLAIMED TO BE PART OF THE DECEDENT’S
ESTATE.
RULING:
As a general rule, the jurisdiction of the trial court either
as an intestate or probate court relates only to matters
having to do with the settlement of the estate and
probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend
to the determination of questions of ownership that arise
during the proceedings. (Rationale: Intestate or Probate
Court exercises special and limited jurisdiction. The
questions must be submitted to the court in the exercise
of its general jurisdictions as a RTC)
An exception to the rule: when its purpose is to
determine whether or not a property should be included
in the inventory. In such situations, the adjudication is
merely incidental and provisional.
The CA misapplied the above rule. Under the said pri-
nciple, the key consideration is that the purpose
of the intestate or probate court in hearing and
passing upon questions of ownership is merely to
determine WON a property should be included in
the inventory. Such was not the purpose in this
case.
First, the inventory was not disputed. The respondent
expressly adopted the inventory prepared by petitioner.
Second, Respondent’s son, Emmanuel did not submit
his own inventory. He is deemed to have acquiesced
with petitioner’s inventory.
Obviously, respondent’s purpose was not to obtain from
the RTC a ruling what properties should or should not be
included in the inventory. She instead wanted to secure
from the intestate court a final determination of her
claim of ownership over the properties comprising
Miguelita’s estate.
Respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a
court of general jurisdiction. The bulk of Miguelita’s
estate comprises real estates covered by the Torren
Systems which are registered in the name of Miguelita
alone or with petitioner. They are considered the owners
until such is nullified or modified in an appropriate
ordinary action.
8. BAGAYAS vs. BAGAYAS,
G.R. Nos. 187308 & 187517,
18 SEPTEMBER 2013
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of sale and
partition before the RTC claiming that Rogelio, Felicidad,
Rosalina, Michael, and Mariel Bagayas (respondents)
intended to exclude her from inheriting from the estate
of her legally adoptive parents, Maximino Bagayas and
Eligia Clemente, by falsifying a deed of absolute sale
purportedly executed by the spouses, transferring 2
parcels of land to their biological children, Rogelio and
Orlando. The deed, supposedly executed in 1974, bore
Eligia’s signature who could not have affixed the same
because she died in 1971. By virtue of the same, the
Bagayas brothers were able to secure 2 TCTs in their
favor.
During trial, respondents denied the adoption; that
petitioner had not even lived with them. Rogelio also
claimed that after their parents died, he and Orlando
executed a document denominated as “Deed of
Extrajudicial Succession” over the subject lands to effect
the transfer of titles to their names. But before it could
be registered, a deed of absolute sale transferring the
subject lands to them was discovered from Maximino’s
old files, which they used to acquire titles.
RTC dismissed the case. It declared petitioner as an
adopted child on the strength of the order of adoption.
However, she could not ask for partition of the subject
lands as she was not able to prove any of the instances
that would invalidate the deed of absolute sale.
Moreover, the action for annulment of sale was
improper as it constituted a collateral attack on the title
of Rogelio and Orlando.ralaw
irtualaw library
On MR, RTC held that while it may have committed a
mistake in declaring the subject lands as exclusive
properties of Maximino (as its conjugal nature had
already been admitted by the parties), the action was
still dismissible on the ground that it was a collateral
attack on the title of Rogelio and Orlando. No appeal
was taken thereby, allowing the same to lapse into
finality.
Subsequently, petitioner filed twin petitions (LRC cases)
before the same RTC, for the amendment of Rogelio &
Orlando’s TCTs to include her name and her heirs and
successors-in-interest as registered owners to the extent
of 1/3 of the lands covered therein based on Sec. 108 of
PD No. 1529 or the “Property Registration Decree.” To
substantiate her “interest”, petitioner capitalized on the
RTC’s finding that she is the adopted child of the
deceased spouses, and that Eligia’s signature in the
deed of absolute sale was falsified.ralaw vtualaw library
Petitions were dismissed on the ground of res judicata;
that the causes of action of the previously dismissed
case and LRC cases were similar as the ultimate
objective would be her inclusion as co-owner of the
subject lands and the partition thereof.
Issues
1. WON the RTC was correct in dismissing petitioner’s
petition for annulment of sale and partition on the
ground that it constituted a collateral attack on the title
of Rogelio and Orlando? (NO)
2. WON it was proper to dismiss the LRC cases for
amendment of title? (YES)
The Court's Ruling
1. NO. RTC erroneously dismissed petitioner’s petition
for annulment of sale and partition on the ground that it
constituted a collateral attack since she was actually
assailing Rogelio and Orlando’s title to the subject lands
and not any Torrens certificate of title over it.
In a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a
declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject
properties; and second, the conveyance of his lawful
shares. An action for partition is at once an action
for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate
portion of the properties involved. The
determination, therefore, as to the existence of co-
ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for
partition. As held in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia:
The first phase of a partition
and/or accounting suit is taken up
with the determination of whether
or not a co-ownership in fact
exists, and a partition is proper and
may be made by voluntary agreement
of all the parties interested in the
property. This phase may end with a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled
to have a partition either because a co-
ownership does not exist, or partition is
legally prohibited. It may end, on the
other hand, with an adjudgment that a
co-ownership does in truth exist,
partition is proper in the premises and
an accounting of rents and profits
received by the defendant from the real
estate in question is in order. In the
latter case, the parties may, if they are
able to agree, make partition among
themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, and the court shall confirm
the partition so agreed upon. In either
case – i.e., either the action is dismissed
or partition and/or accounting is
decreed – the order is a final one, and
may be appealed by any party
aggrieved thereby. x x x
In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr., the Court categorically
pronounced that a resolution on the issue of ownership
does not subject the Torrens title issued over the
disputed realties to a collateral attack. What cannot be
collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the
title itself. The certificate referred to is that document
issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In
contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership
which is, more often than not, represented by that
document. Title as a concept of ownership should not
be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of
such ownership.
2. YES, dismissal was proper, but not on the ground of
res judicata as the two cases involved different causes
of action.
First. No partition was decreed in the first case, instead,
it was dismissed. Consequently, the declaration that
petitioner is the legally adopted child did not amount to
a declaration of heirship and co-ownership upon which
petitioner may institute an action for the amendment of
the certificates of title covering the subject land. More
importantly, the Court consistently ruled that the trial
court cannot make a declaration of heirship in an
ordinary civil action, for matters relating to the
rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated
in a special proceeding instituted precisely for
the purpose of determining such rights.cralaw
virtualaw library
Second. Petitioner cannot avail of the summary
proceedings under Section 108 of PD 1529 because the
present controversy involves not the amendment of the
certificates of title issued in favor of Rogelio and
Orlando but the partition of the estate of Maximino and
Eligia who are both deceased. The prevailing rule is that
proceedings under Section 108 are summary in nature,
contemplating corrections or insertions of mistakes
which are only clerical but certainly not controversial
issues. Relief under said legal provision can only be
granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or that
there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the
part of any party in interest. (PVB v. Valenzuela)
The remedy then of petitioner is to institute
intestate proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouses Maximino and
Eligia. Petition denied.
9. ROMERO vs. CA & ROMERO,
G.R. No. 188921, 18 APRIL 2012
Facts:
This regards a case of nullification of sale filed by
petitioner heirs against the administrator, and aslo their
mother, Aurora and brother Vittorio. This involves
property that they allege is a part of the estate of their
deceased father and whose title was transferred to
Vittorio’s name employing force and threat against her.
Vittorio on the otherhand in his defense claims that the
subject properties are paraphernal and he was just
redeeming it. The RTC dismissed the petition on the
ground that there was still no partition among the
compulsory heirs thus requiring first the determination
of the intestate court as to the particular share of each.
After, they filed a rule 65 petition with the CA but the
latter also dismissed the case reiterating the ruling of
the RTC, thus they finally appealed it through a rule 45
petition with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WoN petitioners can file a separate action of
annulment, and reconveyance of title despite the
pendency of the settlement of the estate?
RULING: NO. 1) While a probate court can issue a
provisional determination of ownership it is only
applicable when it is between the reprsentative of the
estate and strangers. In this case, the parties are both
heirs of the estate.
2) The Court also noted that the real issue in this case
was not the determination of ownership but the
determination of which property is deemed to be
included in the estate, thus such matters rest with the
probate court.
3) Sec. 3, Rule 87 applies in this particular case because
none of the exceptions are present. It was not
established that Aurora violated the order of the probate
court or entered into sales of agreement in violation of
her trust. Thus the no case can be filed against the
administrator until there is an order of assignment or the
expiration of the time to pay debts.
4) Lastly the Court said that even if the properties were
conjugal, the actions of the administrator are subject to
the sole jurisdiction of the probate court.
10. REPUBLIC vs. JOMOC,
6 MAY 2005
Facts:
In "In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of
Absentee Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc, Apolinaria
Malinao Jomoc, petitioner," the Ormoc City, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order of September 29, 1999,
granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioner's
Report and accordingly declared the absentee spouse,
who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier,
presumptively dead.
In granting the petition, the trial judge, cited Article 41,
par. 2 of the Family Code. Said article provides that for
the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage
where the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years, the spouse present must
institute summary proceedings for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee spouse , without
prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent
spouse.
The OSG subsequently filed an appeal through notice of
appeal. The trial court noting that no record of appeal
was filed and served pursuant to the Rules of the Court,
denied the appeal.
The decision was then elevated before the Court of
Appeals on which the OSG contented that the
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code is not a special proceeding nor a case
involving multiple or separate appeals therefore
requiring a record on appeal.
Issue: WON declaration of presumptive is a special
proceeding and therefore would require a record on
appeal?
Ruling: No. Declaration of presumptive death is not a
special proceeding therefore requiring a record on
appeal.
RULE 72
SUBJECT MATTER AND
APPLICABILITY OF GENERAL RULES
Section 1. Subject matter of special
proceedings.— Rules of special proceedings are
provided for in the following: xxxx
(m) Declaration of absence and death;
Art. 41 of Family Code
xxxAHcDEI
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph, the
spouses present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a
reappearance of the absent spouse
There is no doubt that the petition of
Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore, a summary
proceeding under the Family Code, not a special
proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court appeal for
which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being
a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of
Appeal from the trial court's order sufficed.
11. SAMPILO vs. SALACUP,
28 FEBRUARY 1958
Facts: (Rule 74)
Teodoro Tolete died intestate in 1945. He left four
parcels of land. He left as heirs his widow Leoncia and
several nephews and nieces, children of deceased
brothers and sisters. Without any judicial proceedings,
Leoncia, in July 1946 executed an affidavit stating that
Teodoro left no children or dependents, neither
ascendants or acknowledged natural children, neither
brother, sisters, nephews or nieces, but her, the
legitimate wife, the one and only person to inherit the
above properties.
The affidavit was registered in the Register of Deeds. On
the same day, she executed a deed of sale of all the
parcels of land in favor of Sampilo. The sale was also
registered in the Register of Deeds. Sampilo in turn sold
the parcels of land to Salacup and was registered in the
Register of Deeds.
In March 1950, Sinopera then instituted proceedings
for the administration of the estate of Teodoro and
having secured her appointment as administratrix,
brought the action to recover the parcels of land. The
complaint alleges that Leoncia had no right to execute
the affidavit of adjudication and that Salacup acquired
no rights to the lands sold to him, and neither did
Sampilo. Salacup and Sampilo filed an amended answer
alleging that they were innocent purchasers for value
CFI rendered judgment for Sinopera, that the affidavit of
adjudication and the 2 deed of sales were null and void,
that Sinopera was owner of ½ portion of the 4 parcels
of land, and that the usufructuary rights of Leoncia to
the properties terminated.
CA held the annulment of the adjudication, but the
annulment of the deed of sales and the adjudication of
the ½ share to Sinopera as premature.
In appealing to SC by certiorari, they argued that the
action was instituted almost 4 years after the affidavit of
adjudication was registered in the Register of Deeds,
hence the right of action has prescribed since it was not
brought within 2 years as prescribed by Sec. 4, Rule 74.
Issues
1. Whether or not Sinopera’s right of action to recover
her and her co-heir’s participation to the lands had not
prescribed at the time the action to recover was filed.
2. Whether or not the Sinopera and Sampilo are
innocent purchasers for value?
Ruling
1. Yes, it did not prescribe. In Sec. 1, Rule 74, it is
required that if there are two or more heirs, both or all
of them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement.
In Sec. 4, the “distributes and estate” are indicated as
persons to answer for the rights violated by the
extrajudicial settlement. There cannot be any doubt that
those who took part or had knowledge are bound. As to
them, they may demand their rights or interest within
the period of 2 years and both distributes and estate
would be liable.
In both sections, there is no express mention of the
effect of the extrajudicial settlement on persons who did
not take part or had no notice or knowledge. It is
unreasonable and unjust that they also be required to
assert their claims within 2 years. To extend the effects
of the settlement to them would be violative of the
fundamental right to due process.
The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of
extrajudicial settlement or by affidavit, is an ex parte
proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be
contended that such settlement or distribution would
affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the
death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement
or affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect is
made, either directly or by implication.
Hence, Sec. 4, barring distributees or heirs from
objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration
of 2 years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable
only (1) to persons who have participated or taken part
or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in
addition, (2) when the provisions of Sec. 1 have been
strictly complied with. The case at bar fails to comply
with both requirements because not all the heirs
interested have participated in the extrajudicial
settlement, the CA having found that the decedent left,
aside from his widow, nephews and nieces living at the
time of his death.
Furthermore, appellants argued that Sinopera’s action is
barred by the statute of limitations. There is nothing that
supports this contention. It is only a bar against parties
who had taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings, but
not against 3rd persons not parties thereto.
Even if Sec. 4 was a statute of limitations, it is still
unavailing as 1) the action was based on fraud, and 2)
the right of action did not lapse as the judicial
proceedings were instituted in March 1950 and was
instituted soon after the discovery of fraud.
2. They are not innocent purchasers of value. As
Sampilo is a nephew of Leoncia and had been living with
her and was with Leoncia during the preparation of the
affidavit of adjudication and deed of conveyance.
12. HEIRS OF SALUDARES vs. CA,
G.R. No. 128254, 17 JANUARY 2004
Facts: (RECONVEYANCE)
At the core of the present controversy is a parcel of
land, Lot 5793, which formed part of the conjugal
properties of spouses Juan Dator and Pomposa
Saludares, known as the Tanza estate. Pomposa died on
1 May 1923, leaving herein Petitioners, Enrica, Petra,
Restituto, Amado, Delfina, Beata, Vicenta, and Isabel, all
surnamed Dator, as her compulsory heirs.
The Heirs and their father, Juan, executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition of the share of Pomposa in the
Tanza estate, with the eastern half going to Juan, and
the western half to the heirs. After the partition, the
Heirs took possession of their share and had the same
tenanted by a certain Miguel Dahilig, husband of Petra,
one of the Heirs, who in turn managed the land in behalf
of the other siblings. Juan, the father, remained in
possession of his half of the land until his death in 1940.
On 13 December 1976, Isabel Dator applied for a free
patent over the entire Tanza estate, including Lot 5793,
in behalf of the Heirs. On 26 May 1977, after compliance
with all the requirements, the Register of Deeds
awarded Free Patent No. 4A-2-8976 and issued OCT No.
0-23617 in the names of the Heirs.
On 25 August 1988, private Respondents filed an action
for reconveyance against petitioners.
Respondent’s Argument/s:
They allege that: (a) they were the owners in fee simple
of Lot No. 5793; (b) they bought the land from the
successors-in-interest of Petra Dator, one of the heirs;
(c) they were in possession of the subject land from
1966 to present; and (d) petitioner Isabel Dator
obtained the free patent by means of fraud and
misrepresentation.
Petitioner’s Argument/s:
In their answer, the Heirs: (a) denied having sold any
portion of the Tanza estate to anyone; (b) they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been and were still in
actual, continuous, adverse and public possession of the
land in the concept of an owner since time immemorial;
and (c) title to Lot 5793 was issued in their favor after
faithful compliance with all the requirements necessary
for the issuance of a free patent.
Issue/s:
1. Whether or not Reconveyance is still available
notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title.
2. Whether or not the heirs have been in open and
continuous possession of the disputed land.
Held:
1. Yes, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the
Torrens title, the registered owner may still be
compelled to reconvey the registered property to its true
owner. The rationale for the rule is that reconveyance
does not set aside or re-subject to review the findings of
fact of the Bureau of Lands. In an action for
reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as
incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of
the property or its title which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its
rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better right.
Nevertheless, the right to seek reconveyance of
registered property is not absolute because it is subject
to extinctive prescription. Correlating Section 53(3) of
P.D. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil Code with Article
1144(2) of the Civil Code, the prescriptive period for the
reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is
ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of
the certificate of title.
There is but one instance when prescription cannot be
invoked in an action for reconveyance, that is, when the
plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed. In
a series of cases, the Court has permitted the filing of an
action for reconveyance despite the lapse of ten years
and declared that said action, when based on fraud, is
imprescriptible as long as the land has not passed to an
innocent purchaser for value. In all those cases, the
common factual backdrop was that the registered
owners were never in possession of the disputed
property; instead, it was the persons with the better
right or the legal owners of the land who had always
been in possession of the same.
In the case at bar, however, it is the rule rather than the
exception which should apply.
2. Yes, the heirs convincingly established their
open and continuous possession of the entire Tanza
estate, including Lot 5793, through their tenant Miguel
Dahilig. After Miguel’s death, he was succeeded by
Marcelo Saludares who testified during the trial that: (a)
the farm was under the administration of Beata and
Isabel Dator who took over its management after Petra
Dator died; (b) he had been consistently tending the
land since 1947; (c) he was the one who planted the
various crops and trees thereon.
If private Respondents indeed owned Lot 5793, they
should have filed an application for it, or at least
opposed the Heirs’ application for free patent over said
lot, to protect their interests. But even assuming that
private Respondents indeed validly acquired Lot 5793 in
1966 as they claimed, they nevertheless slept on their
right to secure title thereto. Their unexplained inaction
for more than 11 years rendered their demand for
reconveyance stale.
13. PEZA vs. FERNANDEZ,
G.R. No. 138971, 6 JUNE 2001
Facts:
On May 15, 1982, Jorgea Igot-Soroño, Frisca Booc and
Felix Cuizon executed an Extrajudicial Partition, in which
they declared themselves as the only surviving heirs of
the registered owners of the contested lot.
Consequently, they were issued a Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) on July 8, 1982.
The said lot was among the objects of expropriation
proceedings with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City, which
rendered a partial Decision on August 11, 1982
approving the Compromise Agreement entered into
between the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA)
and the new registered owners; namely, Jorgea Igot-
Soroño, Frisca Booc and Felix Cuizon. As a
consequence, PEZA acquired title over the lot and the
corresponding TCT was issued in its name on October
13, 1982.
On July 29, 1996, private respondents filed with the RTC
of Lapu-Lapu City a Complaint for Nullity of Documents,
Redemption and Damages against petitioner and Jorgea-
Igot Soroño et al. The Complaint alleged that the private
respondents had been excluded from the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate. It likewise sought the
nullification of several documents, including the TCT
dated October 13, 1992, issued in the name of PEZA.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint
arguing that private respondents’ claim against the
subject property has already prescribed, because the
two-year period under Section 4, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, within which an unduly excluded heir
may seek a new settlement of the estate had already
lapsed. Petitioner further argues that private
respondents received constructive notice in view of the
registration of the extrajudicial partition with the
Registry of Deeds. According to petitioner, the two-year
period commenced from July 8, 1982, the date of
inscription of the extrajudicial settlement on the OCT.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the private respondents’ claim against
expropriated property already prescribed?
2. Whether or not an action for reconveyance lie against
the expropriated property?
RULING:
1. A perusal of Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court will show that persons unduly deprived of their
lawful participation in a settlement may assert their
claim only within the two-year period after the
settlement and distribution of the estate. This
prescription period does not apply, however, to
those who had no part in or had no notice of the
settlement. The above provision is not meant to be a
statute of limitations. Moreover, by no reason or logic
can one contend that an extrajudicial partition, being
merely an ex parte proceeding, would affect third
persons who had no knowledge thereof. Be that as it
may, it cannot be denied, either, that by its registration
in the manner provided by law, a transaction may be
known actually or constructively.
In the present case, private respondents are deemed to
have been constructively notified of the extrajudicial
settlement by reason of its registration and annotation in
the certificate of title over the subject lot. From the time
of registration, private respondents had two (2) years or
until July 8, 1984, within which to file their objections or
to demand the appropriate settlement of the estate.
The only exception to the above-mentioned prescription
is when the title remains in the hands of the heirs who
have fraudulently caused the partition of the subject
property or in those of their transferees who cannot be
considered innocent purchasers for value. In this case,
however, title to the property was no longer in the name
of the allegedly fraudulent heirs, but already in that of
an innocent purchaser for value – the government.
Moreover, the government is presumed to have acted in
good faith in the acquisition of the lot, considering that
title thereto was obtained through a Compromise
Agreement judicially approved in proper expropriation
proceedings.
Even assuming that there was in fact fraud on the part
of the other heirs, private respondents may proceed only
against the defrauding heirs, not against PEZA which
had no participation in or knowledge of the alleged
fraud. The fact that the co-heirs’ title to the property
was fraudulently secured cannot prejudice the rights of
petitioner which, absent any showing that it had
knowledge or participation in the irregularity, is
considered a purchaser in good faith and for value.
(Issue below is not related to special proceedings but
may be asked during recitations)
2. The private respondents’ action to recover the subject
property from the government cannot be maintained,
not only because of the prescription of the action, but on
account of the protection given to innocent purchasers
for value granted under our land registration laws.
An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud
prescribes 4 years from the discovery of the fraud; such
discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the
issuance of the certificate of title over the
property. Registration of real property is considered a
constructive notice to all persons and, thus, the four-
year period shall be counted therefrom. Clearly then,
private respondents’ action for reconveyance based on
fraud has already prescribed, considering that title to
said property had been issued way back on August 11,
1982, while the reivindicatory suit was instituted only on
July 29, 1996.
Even an action for reconveyance based on an implied or
a constructive trust would have already prescribed just
the same, because such action prescribes ten (10) years
from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of
issuance of the certificate of title over the property. The
imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on
implied or constructive trust applies only when the
plaintiff or the person enforcing the trust is in possession
of the property. In effect, the action for reconveyance is
an action to quiet the property title, which does not
prescribe. Undisputedly, private respondents are not in
possession of the disputed property. In fact, they do not
even claim to be in possession of it, even if to do so
would enable them to justify the imprescriptibility of
their action.
Finally, it must be remembered that reconveyance is a
remedy of those whose property has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in the name of another. Such
recourse, however, cannot be availed of once the
property has passed to an innocent purchaser for value.
For an action for reconveyance to prosper,
the property should not have passed into the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value. In this
case, the property has already been conveyed to the
government in appropriate expropriation proceedings,
the regularity or validity of which has not been
questioned. PEZA should enjoy the security afforded to
innocent third persons under our registration laws.
Notwithstanding, the remedy of an owner alleged to
have been prejudiced or fraudulently deprived of
property that was subsequently sold to an innocent
purchaser for value is an action for damages against
the person or persons who perpetrated the fraud.
14. CUA vs. VARGAS,
G.R. No. , 31 OCTOBER 2006
Facts: A parcel of land with an area of 99 sqm located
in Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina
Vargas. A notarized Extrajudicial Settlement among the
9 heirs of Paulina was executed, each one of them
getting a share of 11 sqm. Only 5 heirs of the 9
signed it. The extrajudicial settlement was published in
the Catanduanes Tribune for three consecutive weeks.
An Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale was
again executed by and among the same heirs over the
same property and also with the same sharings. Still,
only 5 of the 9 signed it. The land was sold to petitioner
Cua.
Gloria Vargas (widow of one of the heirs who didn’t sign
the extrajudicial settlement) claimed that she came to
know of the Extra Judicial Settlement with Sale only 1
year later. After knowing of the sale of the 55 sqm, she
tried to redeem the property.
When the offer to redeem was refused, she filed a case
for annulment of Extra Judicial Settlement and Legal
Redemption of the lot.
The MTC and RTC ruled against her. However, the CA
reversed the ruling and pronounced that pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the extrajudicial
settlement made by the other co-heirs is not binding
upon respondents considering the latter never
participated in it nor did they ever signify their consent
to the same. Thus, this petition.
Petitioner’s Argument: The acquisition by petitioner
of the subject property subsequent to the extrajudicial
partition was valid because the partition was duly
published. The publication of the same constitutes due
notice to respondents and signifies their implied
acquiescence. Respondents are therefore estopped from
denying the validity of the partition and sale at this late
stage. Considering that the partition was valid,
respondents no longer have the right to redeem the
property.
ISSUE: 1. WON heirs are deemed constructively notified
and bound, regardless of their failure to participate
therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and partition of
estate when such has been duly published – NO, not
bound.
2. WON respondents can redeem – YES.
RULING: 1. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule
74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states,
however, that persons who do not participate or
had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will
not be bound thereby.
It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or
issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is
agreed upon, and not after such an agreement has
already been executed as what happened in the instant
case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial
settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute
constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge
or did not take part in it because the same was notice
after the fact of execution
The records of the present case confirm that
respondents never signed either of the settlement
documents. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial
settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition
made without their knowledge and consent is invalid
insofar as they are concerned.
2. Respondents are given the right to redeem the shares
sold pursuant to Article 1088 of the NCC. The right to
redeem was never lost because respondents were never
notified in writing of the actual sale by their co-heirs.
Based on the provision, there is a need for written notice
to start the period of redemption
The period of one month within which to redeem shall
be reckoned from the time that a co-heir is notified in
writing by the vendor of the actual sale. Written notice
is indispensable and mandatory, actual
knowledge of the sale notwithstanding.
15. NERI vs. HEIRS OF SPOUSES UY,
G.R. No. 194366, 10 OCTOBER 2012
Facts:
Anunciacion Neri had seven children, 2 from her first
marriage (Eutropia and Victoria) and 5 from her second
marriage with Enrique Neri (Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda,
Douglas and Rosa). From 1957 to 1967, Anunciacion
and Enrique acquired homestead properties in Samal,
Davao del Norte. Anunciacion died intestate. On 7 July
1979, Enrique--in his personal capacity and as the
natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and
Dougles--and his 3 adult children adjudicated among
themselves the homestead properties and sold them to
the Spouses Uy.
On June 11, 1996, the 5 Neri children filed a complaint
for annulment of sale of the homestead properties. They
later amended the complaint to include Eutropia and
Victoria as additional plaintiffs, for having been excluded
and deprived of their legitimes as children of
Anunciacion from her first marriage. The Heirs of the
Spouses Uy denied knowledge of Eutropia and Victoria’s
exclusion. They raised the defenses of prescription and
knowledge.
The RTC annulled the sale, but this was reversed by the
CA, which found it unconscionable to annul a sale
executed 17 years ago. The children of Anunciacion thus
filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUES
1. W/N the sale should be annulled.
2. W/N the action to recover property had prescribed.
RULING
1. YES, but only with respect to the shares of
Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas. Petitioners herein
are all legitimate children of Anunciacion, who are
entitled to inherit in equal shares. Because Eutropia
and Victoria were excluded and minors Rosa and
Douglas were not properly represented, the
extrajudicial settlement of Anunciacion’s properties
was void. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court
provides:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement
or administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the
manner provided in the next succeeding
section; but no extra judicial
settlement shall be binding upon
 any person who has not
participated therein or had no
notice thereof.
While the settlement of the estate is void, the
sale of the homestead properties by Enrique and
his 3 adult children is valid, but only with
respect to their proportionate shares therein. As
owners, they can sell their undivided share in
the estate. With respect to the minors Rosa and
Douglas, the laws prevailing at that time clothed
Enrique only with powers of administration.
Administration includes all acts for the
preservation of the property and the receipt of
fruits according to the natural purpose of the
thing.
The natural guardian of the minor under
parental authority does not have the power to
dispose or encumber the property of the latter.
Such power is granted by law only to a judicial
guardian of the ward's property, which requires
the giving of a bond subject to the approval of
the RTC. Furthermore, such disposal must be
with the courts' prior approval. Unless the sale is
ratified by Rosa and Douglas when they reach
the age of majority, he disputed sale entered
into by Enrique in their behalf, without the
proper judicial authority, is unenforceable in
accordance with Articles 1317 and 1403(1) of
the Civil Code.
Ratification means that one under no disability
voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some
unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which
without his sanction would not be binding on
him. Records of the case show that Rosa had
ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate
with absolute deed of sale, but the same is not
true with respect to Douglas.
2. NO. Because the sale was partially
defective, the Spouses Uy were deemed to
be holding the 3/16 shares of Eutropia,
Victoria and Douglas under an implied
constructive trust, in accordance with
Article 1456 of the Civil Code. The action to
recover property held in trust prescribes
after 10 years from the time the cause of
action accrues, which is from the time of
actual notice in case of unregistered deed.
Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas claimed to have
knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement with sale after
the death Enrique in 1994. The Spouses Uy failed to
refute this. Hence, the complaint filed in 1997 was well
within the prescriptive period.
16. TORBELA vs. ROSARIO,
G.R. No. 140528, 7 DECEMBER 2011
Special Proceeding Topic: Rule 98 (Trustees)
NOTE: This is a very long case (31 pages). I included all
issues just in case Atty likes to ask unrelated questions.
But focus on the issue on Trusts.
SUMMARY:
The spouses Eugenio and Marta Torbela received a
parcel of land from Marta’s sister.
Upon the death of the spouses, the Land was
adjudicated in equal shares among their children. These
children executed a Deed of Absolute Quitclaim over the
land in favor of their nephew, Dr. Rosario. Another Deed
of Absolute Quitclaim was executed, this time by Dr.
Rosario, acknowledging that he only borrowed the land
and was already returning it to his aunts and uncles.
The latter Deed was notarized but was not immediately
annotated on the title of the land, hence, the title was
still in the name of Dr. Rosario. Dr. Rosario mortgaged
the land to Banco Filipino for a loan, without the consent
of the Torbela Siblings.
The Torbela Siblings filed a complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession of the subject land against
Dr. Rosario and Banco Filipino. The trial court ruled in
their favor which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
The main contention of the Torbela siblings in this case
is that Dr. Rosario could not have validly mortgaged the
lot in issue since he only held it in trust for the Torbela
Siblings.
FACTS:
This case involves two consolidated petitions:
1. G.R. No. 140528- Petitioners are the Torbela
siblings
2. G.R. No. 140553- Petitioner is the ex-wife of
Dr. Andres Rosario (they are legally separated).
Dr. Rosario is the son of Eufrosina Torbela
Rosario and the nephew of the other Torbela
siblings.
The case involves a parcel of land located in Pangasinan,
Lot No. 356-A that belonged to Marta Semilla, married to
Eugenio Torbela (spouses Torbela). Upon the deaths of
the spouses Torbela, Lot No. 356-A was adjudicated in
equal shares among their children, the Torbela siblings,
by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition 9 dated
December 3, 1962.

The Torbela siblings executed a Deed of Absolute
Quitclaim on December 12, 1964 in which they
transferred and conveyed Lot No. 356-A to Dr. Rosario
for the consideration of P9.00. However, the Torbela
siblings explained that they only executed the Deed as
an accommodation so that Dr. Rosario could have Lot
No. 356-A registered in his name and use said property
to secure a loan from DBP, the proceeds of which would
be used for building a hospital on Lot No. 356-A — a
claim supported by testimonial and documentary
evidence, and borne out by the sequence of events
immediately following the execution by the Torbela
siblings of said Deed.
On December 16, 1964, TCT No. 52751, covering Lot
No. 356-A, was already issued in Dr. Rosario's name. On
December 28, 1964, Dr. Rosario executed his own
Deed of Absolute Quitclaim, in which he expressly
acknowledged that he "only borrowed" Lot No. 356-A
and was transferring and conveying the same back to
the Torbela siblings for the consideration of P1.00. On
February 21, 1965, Dr. Rosario's loan in the amount
of P70,200.00, secured by a mortgage on Lot No. 356-A,
was approved by DBP. Soon thereafter, construction of a
hospital building started on Lot No. 356-A.
On May 16, 1967, Cornelio T. Tosino (Cornelio)
executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, on behalf of the
Torbela siblings.
On May 17, 1967, the Torbela siblings had Cornelio's
Affidavit of Adverse Claim dated May 16, 1967 and Dr.
Rosario's Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated December
28, 1964 annotated on TCT No. 52751 as Entry Nos.
274471 and 274472, respectively.
In the meantime, Dr. Rosario acquired another loan
from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) sometime in
1979-1981. The loan was constituted on several
properties named under Dr. Rosario and Lot No. 356-A
was among those. The loan agreement was annotated
on TCT No. 52751 (Lot No. 356-A) on March 6, 1981
as Entry No. 520099.
On December 8, 1981, Dr. Rosario and his wife,
Duque-Rosario (spouses Rosario), acquired a third loan
in the amount of P1,200,000.00 from Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank (Banco Filipino). To secure
said loan, the spouses Rosario again constituted
mortgages on their properties including Lot No. 356-A.
On February 13, 1986, the Torbela siblings filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, a Complaint for recovery of ownership and
possession of Lot No. 356-A, plus damages, against the
spouses Rosario, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
U-4359.
The spouses Rosario afterwards failed to pay their loan
from Banco Filipino. Banco Filipino extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgages on Dr. Rosario’s property
including Lot No. 356-A. Banco Filipino was the lone
bidder and the certificate of Sale was annotated on Lot
No. 356-A (TCT No. 52751).
On December 9, 1987, the Torbela siblings filed
before the RTC their Amended Complaint, impleading
Banco Filipino as additional defendant in Civil Case No.
U-4359 and praying that the spouses Rosario be
ordered to redeem Lot No. 356-A from Banco Filipino.
The spouses Rosario instituted before the RTC on
March 4, 1988 a case for annulment of extrajudicial
foreclosure and damages, with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order,
against Banco Filipino, the Provincial Ex Officio Sheriff
and his Deputy, and the Register of Deeds of
Pangasinan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. U-
4667. The Torbela siblings intervened in this case.
Meanwhile, the Torbela siblings tried to redeem Lot No.
356-A from Banco Filipino, but their efforts were
unsuccessful. Upon the expiration of the one-year
redemption period in April 1988, the Certificate of Final
Sale and Affidavit of Consolidation covering all
foreclosed properties were executed on May 24, 1988
and May 25, 1988, respectively. New certificate of title
was issued for Lot 356-A namely TCT No. 165813.
The Torbela siblings thereafter filed before the RTC on
August 29, 1988 a Complaint for annulment of the
Certificate of Final Sale dated May 24, 1988, judicial
cancellation of TCT No. 165813, and damages, against
Banco Filipino, the Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff, and the
Register of Deeds of Pangasinan, which was docketed as
Civil Case No. U-4733.
On June 19, 1991, Banco Filipino filed before the RTC
of Urdaneta City a Petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession over the properties mortgaged by Dr. Rosario
including Lot No. 356-A, docketed as Pet. Case No. U-
822.
The RTC jointly heard Civil Case Nos. U-4359 and U-
4733 and Pet. Case No. U-822. The RTC ruled that:
 The real estate mortgage over Lot 356-A
covered by TCT 52751 executed by Spouses
Andres Rosario in favor of Banco Filipino, legal
and valid;
 Declaring the sheriff's sale over Lot 356-A
covered by TCT No. 52751 legal and valid;
 Declaring Banco Filipino the owner of Lot 356-A
covered by TCT No. 52751 (now TCT 165813);
 Banco Filipino is entitled to a Writ of Possession
over Lot 356-A together with the improvements
thereon (Rose Inn Building);
  The Torbela siblings are hereby ordered to
render accounting to Banco Filipino the rental
they received from tenants of Rose Inn Building;
 Banco Filipino is hereby ordered to give the
Torbela siblings the right of first refusal over Lot
356-A;
 Dr. Rosario and Lena Rosario are hereby
ordered to reimburse the Torbela siblings the
market value of Lot 356-A as of December,
1964;
 Dismissing the complaint of the Torbela siblings
against Banco Filipino, Pedro Habon and Rufino
Moreno.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC with
modifications. Motion for reconsideration was denied.
Torbela siblings and Duque-Rosario filed separate
Petitions before the SC.
The Torbela siblings asks the court that respondent
Banco Filipino reconvey back Lot No. 356-A, covered by
T.C.T. No. 52751, in favor of the Torbela siblings who
are the actual owners of the same.
ISSUE/S:
PROCEDURAL
1. W/N the SC can review the findings of fact by the
RTC and CA? YES
2. W/N Barangay Conciliation was a requisite to the
institution of Civil case No. U-4359? NO
SUBSTANTIVE
1. W/N an express trust was established between the
Torbela Siblings and Dr. Rosario? YES
2. W/N the right of the Torbela siblings to
recover Lot No. 356-A has prescribed? NO
3. W/N Banco Filipino was a mortgagee in good faith?
NO
4. W/N rules on accession shall govern the
improvements on Lot No. 356-A and the rents thereof?
YES
5. W/N Dr. Rosario is liable for damages to
the Torbela siblings? YES
6. W/N Banco Filipino is entitled to a writ of possession
for the other lots mortgaged by Dr. Rosario? YES
HELD:
PROCEDURAL ASPECT
1. W/N the SC can review the findings of fact by
the RTC and CA? YES
Ordinarily, the Court will not review, much less reverse,
the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially
where such findings coincide with those of the trial
court. The findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are,
as a general rule, conclusive and binding upon this
Court, since this Court is not a trier of facts and does not
routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the contending parties during the trial of
the case.
The above rule, however, is subject to a number of
exceptions, such as (1) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when
there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding
is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of
Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when
the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both parties; (7) when the findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when
the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record.
The first, fourth, and ninth exceptions are extant in
these case.
2. W/N Barangay Conciliation was a requisite to
the institution of Civil case No. U-4359? NO
Dr. Rosario contends that the Complaint of the Torbela
siblings for recovery of ownership and possession of Lot
No. 356-A, plus damages, should have been dismissed
by the RTC because of the failure of the Torbela siblings
to comply with the prior requirement of submitting the
dispute to barangay conciliation.
The original parties in Civil Case No. U-4359 (the Torbela
siblings and the spouses Rosario) do not reside in the
same barangay, or in different barangays within the
same city or municipality, or in different barangays of
different cities or municipalities but are adjoining each
other.
Resultantly, the Lupon had no jurisdiction over the
dispute and barangay conciliation was not a pre-
condition for the filing of Civil Case No. U-4359.
SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT
1. W/N an express trust was established between
the Torbela Siblings and Dr. Rosario? YES
Registration does not vest title; it is merely the evidence
of such title. Land registration laws do not give the
holder any better title than what he actually has.
Consequently, Dr. Rosario must still prove herein his
acquisition of title to Lot No. 356-A, apart from his
submission of TCT No. 52751 in his name.

Dr. Rosario testified that he obtained Lot No. 356-A after
paying the Torbela siblings P25,000.00, pursuant to a
verbal agreement with the latter. The Court though
observes that Dr. Rosario's testimony on the execution
and existence of the verbal agreement with the Torbela
siblings lacks significant details (such as the names of
the parties present, dates, places, etc.) and is not
corroborated by independent evidence. He may not
introduce extrinsic or oral evidence in violation of the
Parol Evidence Rule.
It can also be said that Dr. Rosario is estopped from
claiming or asserting ownership over Lot No. 356-A
based on his Deed of Absolute Quitclaim dated
December 28, 1964. Dr. Rosario's admission in the said
Deed that he merely borrowed Lot No. 356-A is deemed
conclusive upon him.
Considering the foregoing, the Court agrees with the
RTC and the Court of Appeals that Dr. Rosario only holds
Lot No. 356-A in trust for the Torbela siblings.
Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of
property, the legal title to which is vested in another. It
is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal
with the property for the benefit of the beneficiary. Trust
relations between parties may either be express or
implied. An express trust is created by the intention of
the trustor or of the parties, while an implied trust
comes into being by operation of law.
Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of
the parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or by words
either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to
create a trust. Under Article 1444 of the Civil Code, "[n]o
particular words are required for the creation of an
express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly
intended." It is possible to create a trust without using
the word "trust" or "trustee." Conversely, the mere fact
that these words are used does not necessarily indicate
an intention to create a trust. The question in each case
is whether the trustor manifested an intention to create
the kind of relationship which to lawyers is known as
trust. It is immaterial whether or not he knows that the
relationship which he intends to create is called a trust,
and whether or not he knows the precise characteristics
of the relationship which is called a trust.
In Tamayo v. Callejo, the Court recognized that a trust
may have a constructive or implied nature in the
beginning, but the registered owner's subsequent
express acknowledgement in a public document of a
previous sale of the property to another party, had the
effect of imparting to the aforementioned trust the
nature of an express trust. The same situation exists in
this case. When Dr. Rosario was able to register Lot No.
356-A in his name under TCT No. 52751 on December
16, 1964, an implied trust was initially established
between him and the Torbela siblings under Article 1451
of the Civil Code.
Dr. Rosario's execution of the Deed of Absolute
Quitclaim on December 28, 1964, containing his express
admission that he only borrowed Lot No. 356-A from the
Torbela siblings, eventually transformed the nature of
the trust to an express one. The express trust continued
despite Dr. Rosario stating in his Deed of Absolute
Quitclaim that he was already returning Lot No. 356-A to
the Torbela siblings as Lot No. 356-A remained
registered in Dr. Rosario's name under TCT No. 52751
and Dr. Rosario kept possession of said property,
together with the improvements thereon.
2. W/N the right of the Torbela siblings to
recover Lot No. 356-A has prescribed? NO
The prescriptive period for the enforcement of an
express trust of ten (10) years starts upon the
repudiation of the trust by the trustee.
To apply the 10-year prescriptive period, which would
bar a beneficiary's action to recover in an express trust,
the repudiation of the trust must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence and made known to the beneficiary.
The express trust disables the trustee from acquiring for
his own benefit the property committed to his
management or custody, at least while he does not
openly repudiate the trust, and makes such repudiation
known to the beneficiary or cestui que trust. For this
reason, the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190)
declared that the rules on adverse possession do not
apply to "continuing and subsisting" (i.e., unrepudiated)
trusts. In an express trust, the delay of the beneficiary is
directly attributable to the trustee who undertakes to
hold the property for the former, or who is linked to the
beneficiary by confidential or fiduciary relations. The
trustee's possession is, therefore, not adverse to the
beneficiary, until and unless the latter is made aware
that the trust has been repudiated.
Dr. Rosario argues that he is deemed to have repudiated
the trust on December 16, 1964, when he registered Lot
No. 356-A in his name under TCT No. 52751, so when
on February 13, 1986, the Torbela siblings instituted
before the RTC Civil Case No. U-4359, for the recovery
of ownership and possession of Lot No. 356-A from the
spouses Rosario, over 21 years had passed. Civil Case
No. U-4359 was already barred by prescription, as well
as laches.
The Court already rejected a similar argument in Ringor
v. Ringor. A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a
property held in trust for him by another cannot
repudiate the trust by relying on the registration. The
Court has held that for acquisitive prescription to bar the
action of the beneficiary against the trustee in an
express trust for the recovery of the property held in
trust it must be shown that: (a) the trustee has
performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to
an ouster of the cestui que trust; (b) such positive acts
of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que
trust, and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and
conclusive.
It is clear that under the foregoing jurisprudence, the
registration of Lot No. 356-A by Dr. Rosario in his name
under TCT No. 52751 on December 16, 1964 is not the
repudiation that would have caused the 10-year
prescriptive period for the enforcement of an express
trust to run.
For repudiation of an express trust to be effective, the
unequivocal act of repudiation had to be made known to
the Torbela siblings as the cestuis que trust and must be
proven by clear and conclusive evidence.
The Court held that that Dr. Rosario repudiated the
express trust when he acquired another loan from PNB
and constituted a second mortgage on Lot No. 356-A
which, unlike the first mortgage to DBP in 1965, was
without the knowledge and/or consent of the Torbela
siblings.
The Torbela siblings can only be charged with
knowledge of the mortgage of Lot No. 356-A to PNB on
March 6, 1981 when the amended loan and mortgage
agreement was registered as Entry No. 520099. Entry
No. 520099 is constructive notice to the whole world
that Lot No. 356-A was mortgaged by Dr. Rosario to
PNB as security for a loan.
From March 6, 1981, when the amended loan and
mortgage agreement was registered on TCT No. 52751,
to February 13, 1986, when the Torbela siblings
instituted before the RTC Civil Case No. U-4359 against
the spouses Rosario, only about five years had passed.
The Torbela siblings were able to institute Civil Case No.
U-4359 well before the lapse of the 10-year prescriptive
period for the enforcement of their express trust with
Dr. Rosario.
Civil Case No. U-4359 is likewise not barred by laches.
The Torbela siblings instituted Civil Case No. U-4359 five
years after Dr. Rosario's repudiation of the express trust,
still within the 10-year prescriptive period for
enforcement of such trusts. This does not constitute an
unreasonable delay in asserting one's right. A delay
within the prescriptive period is sanctioned by law and is
not considered to be a delay that would bar relief.
Laches apply only in the absence of a statutory
prescriptive period.
3. W/N Banco Filipino was a mortgagee in good
faith? NO (note: not related to Special
Proceedings topic)
The Court finds that Banco Filipino is not a mortgagee in
good faith. Entry Nos. 274471-274472 (the adverse
claim of Torbela siblings that was annotated on the title)
were not validly cancelled, and the improper cancellation
should have been apparent to Banco Filipino and
aroused suspicion in said bank of some defect in Dr.
Rosario's title.
Whether under Section 110 of the Land Registration Act
or Section 70 of the Property Registration Decree, notice
of adverse claim can only be cancelled after a party in
interest files a petition for cancellation before the RTC
wherein the property is located, and the RTC conducts a
hearing and determines the said claim to be invalid or
unmeritorious.
No petition for cancellation has been filed and no
hearing has been conducted herein to determine the
validity or merit of the adverse claim of the Torbela
siblings. Entry No. 520469 cancelled the adverse claim
of the Torbela siblings, annotated as Entry Nos. 274471-
774472, upon the presentation by Dr. Rosario of a mere
Cancellation and Discharge of Mortgage.
There were several things amiss in Entry No. 520469
which should have already aroused suspicions in Banco
Filipino, and compelled the bank to look beyond TCT No.
52751 and inquire into Dr. Rosario's title. First, Entry No.
520469 does not mention any court order as basis for
the cancellation of the adverse claim. Second, the
adverse claim was not a mortgage which could be
cancelled with Dr. Rosario's Cancellation and Discharge
of Mortgage. And third, the adverse claim was against
Dr. Rosario, yet it was cancelled based on a document
also executed by Dr. Rosario.
While the defective cancellation of Entry Nos. 274471-
274472 by Entry No. 520469 might not be evident to a
private individual, the same should have been apparent
to Banco Filipino. Banco Filipino is not an ordinary
mortgagee, but is a mortgagee-bank, whose business is
impressed with public interest.
Banco Filipino cannot be deemed a mortgagee in good
faith, much less a purchaser in good faith at the
foreclosure sale of Lot No. 356-A. Hence, the right of the
Torbela siblings over Lot No. 356-A is superior over that
of Banco Filipino; and as the true owners of Lot No. 356-
A, the Torbela siblings are entitled to a reconveyance of
said property even from Banco Filipino.
4. W/N rules on accession shall govern the
improvements on Lot No. 356-A and the rents
thereof? YES (note: not related to Special
Proceedings topic)
The accessory follows the principal. The right of
accession is recognized under Article 440 of the Civil
Code which states that "[t]he ownership of property
gives the right by accession to everything which is
produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached
thereto, either naturally or artificially."
When it comes to the improvements on Lot No. 356-A,
both the Torbela siblings (as landowners) and Dr.
Rosario (as builder) are deemed in bad faith. The
Torbela siblings were aware of the construction of a
building by Dr. Rosario on Lot No. 356-A, while Dr.
Rosario proceeded with the said construction despite his
knowledge that Lot No. 356-A belonged to the Torbela
siblings.
This case then must be remanded to the RTC for the
determination of matters necessary for the proper
application of Article 448, in relation to Article 546, of
the Civil Code. Such matters include the option that the
Torbela siblings will choose; the amount of indemnity
that they will pay if they decide to appropriate the
improvements on Lot No. 356-A; the value of Lot No.
356-A if they prefer to sell it to Dr. Rosario; or the
reasonable rent if they opt to sell Lot No. 356-A to Dr.
Rosario but the value of the land is considerably more
than the improvements.
5. W/N Dr. Rosario is liable for damages to
the Torbela siblings? YES (note: not related to
Special Proceedings topic)
Indeed, Dr. Rosario's deceit and bad faith is evident
when, being fully aware that he only held Lot No. 356-A
in trust for the Torbela siblings, he mortgaged said
property to PNB and Banco Filipino absent the consent
of the Torbela siblings, and caused the irregular
cancellation of the Torbela siblings' adverse claim on
TCT No. 52751. Irrefragably, Dr. Rosario's betrayal had
caused the Torbela siblings (which included Dr. Rosario's
own mother, Eufrosina Torbela Rosario) mental anguish,
serious anxiety, and wounded feelings. Resultantly, the
award of moral damages is justified, but the amount
thereof is reduced to P200,000.00.
In addition to the moral damages, exemplary damages
may also be imposed given that Dr. Rosario's wrongful
acts were accompanied by bad faith. However, judicial
discretion granted to the courts in the assessment of
damages must always be exercised with balanced
restraint and measured objectivity. The circumstances of
the case call for a reduction of the award of exemplary
damages to P100,000.00.
As regards attorney's fees, they may be awarded when
the defendant's act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest. Because of Dr. Rosario's
acts, the Torbela siblings were constrained to institute
several cases against Dr. Rosario and his spouse,
Duque-Rosario, as well as Banco Filipino, which had
lasted for more than 25 years. Consequently, the
Torbela siblings are entitled to an award of attorney's
fees and the amount of P100,000.00 may be considered
rational, fair, and reasonable.
6. W/N Banco Filipino is entitled to a writ of
possession for the other lots mortgaged by Dr.
Rosario? YES (note: not related to Special
Proceedings topic)
Since the Court has already granted herein the
reconveyance of Lot No. 356-A from Banco Filipino to
the Torbela siblings, the writ of possession now pertains
only to Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A (the other property of
Dr. Rosario that was validly mortgaged to Banco
Filipino).
To recall, the Court of Appeals affirmed the issuance by
the RTC of a writ of possession in favor of Banco
Filipino. Dr. Rosario no longer appealed from said
judgment of the appellate court. Already legally
separated from Dr. Rosario, Duque-Rosario alone
challenges the writ of possession before this Court
through her Petition in G.R. No. 140553.
The following facts are undisputed: Banco Filipino
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage constituted on
Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A and the two other properties
after Dr. Rosario defaulted on the payment of his loan;
Banco Filipino was the highest bidder for all three
properties at the foreclosure sale on April 2, 1987; the
Certificate of Sale dated April 2, 1987 was registered in
April 1987; and based on the Certificate of Final Sale
dated May 24, 1988 and Affidavit of Consolidation dated
May 25, 1988, the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No.
104189 and issued TCT No. 165812 in the name of
Banco Filipino for Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A on June 7,
1988.
The Court has consistently ruled that the one-year
redemption period should be counted not from the date
of foreclosure sale, but from the time the certificate of
sale is registered with the Registry of Deeds.
Even if the Court concedes that the Certificate of Sale
was annotated on TCT No. 104189 on the later date,
April 15, 1987, the one-year redemption period already
expired on April 14, 1988. The Certificate of Final Sale
and Affidavit of Consolidation were executed more than
a month thereafter, on May 24, 1988 and May 25, 1988,
respectively, and were clearly not premature.
Duque-Rosario also cannot bar the issuance of the writ
of possession over Lot No. 5-F-8-C-2-B-2-A in favor of
Banco Filipino by invoking the pendency of Civil Case
No. U-4359, the Torbela siblings' action for recovery of
ownership and possession and damages, which
supposedly tolled the period for redemption of the
foreclosed properties. The Court simply points out to
Duque-Rosario that Civil Case No. U-4359 involved Lot
No. 356-A only, and the legal consequences of the
institution, pendency, and resolution of Civil Case No. U-
4359 apply to Lot No. 356-A alone.
The right of the purchaser to the possession of the
foreclosed property becomes absolute upon the
expiration of the redemption period. The basis of this
right to possession is the purchaser's ownership of the
property. After the consolidation of title in the buyer's
name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of
possession becomes a matter of right and its issuance to
a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a
ministerial function.
17. REILLO vs. SAN JOSE,
G.R. No. 166393, 18 JUNE 2009
Facts:
Quiterio San Jose and Antonina Espiritu Santo are
husband and wife. Both died intestate in 1970 and 1976
respectively. They have five children, to wit: Virginia,
Virgilio, Galicano, Victoria, and Catalina.
In 1998, Virginia with the help of her husband (Zosimo
Fernando, Sr.) and her children (Cristina Reillo et al)
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
where they made it appear that Virginia was the only
heir of the spouses Quiterio and Antonina. They
adjudicated among themselves the estate and then later
sold it to Ma. Teresa Piñon (a.k.a ma. Teresa s.j.
Fernando). On the strength of the said falsified Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, Ma. Teresa piñon
(a.k.a ma. Teresa s.j. Fernando) succeeded in causing
the cancellation of TCT No. 458396 in the name of Sps
Quiterio San Jose And Antonina Espiritu Santo and the
issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in her
name.
Later, the other siblings found out about what Virginia
did and so in October 1999, they filed a complaint in
RTC-Rizal for the annulment of the deed of extrajudicial
settlement as well as the subsequent deed of sale.
In their answer, Reillo et al (children of the now
deceased Virginia) admitted that their grandparents
(Quiterio and Antonina) indeed had five children and
that their mom isn’t the only heir. However, they alleged
that what their mom adjudicated to herself is her
inheritance; that other than the parcel of land their mom
adjudicated to herself, their grandparents have 12 other
parcels of land which are under the possession of
Galicano et al; that as such, they are filing a
“compulsory” counterclaim for the partition of the other
12 parcels of land.
Galicano et al then filed a motion for the court to render
judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted the
motion. The RTC ruled that the admission of Reillo et al
that there are 4 other heirs is proof that the extrajudicial
settlement is void because the other heirs were
excluded. The RTC also ruled that Reillo et al’s
counterclaim is not compulsory but rather it is a
permissive counterclaim. As such, Reillo et al should
have paid docket fees therefor but they failed to do so
hence their counterclaim is dismissed. The RTC then
ordered the heirs to partition the estate according to the
laws of intestate succession. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Reillo et al appealed the decision of the CA on the
ground that the judgment on the pleading is void; that it
is the RTC’s fault why they failed to pay the docket fees
for its failure to direct them; and that the order for
partition is void because it does not come with an order
of publication pursuant to Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order for partition issued by the trial
court is void because there was no corresponding order
for publication pursuant to the provisions of Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court.
HELD:
No. The applicable rule is Rule 69 of the Rules of Court
which deals with the action for partition. Since the
extrajudicial settlement is void, the property is reverted
back to its previous state which is: that it is part of the
estate of Quiterio and Antonina. As such, the estate is
deemed undivided among the heirs. And every action to
end an in division among heirs is deemed an action for
partition. Therefore Rule 69 applies and under this rule,
there is no need to publish the partition in a newspaper
of general circulation.
Anent the issue of the judgment on the pleadings, the
same is valid because Reillo et al failed to raise an issue
when they already admitted that there are other heirs
which were excluded in the deed of extrajudicial
settlement. Their allegation that the parcel of land
adjudicated by their mother is her inheritance is not
tenable because the same was not indicated in the deed
of extrajudicial settlement. In fact, what was stated was
that she was the sole heir.
Anent the issue of the counterclaim, Reillo et al’s
counterclaim is permissive in nature and not a
compulsory one because their claim is not “necessarily
connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s
claim”. Their counterclaim consists of a claim that there
are 12 other parcels of land owned by Quiterio and
Antonina. Such allegation is already entirely different
from the action brought by Galicano et al., hence it is
permissive and it can even be brought in a separate
proceeding. As a permissive pleading, it requires the
payment of docket fees and the RTC cannot be faulted
for not directing Reillo et al to do so. The payment is
incumbent upon Reillo et al and the obligation cannot be
shifted to the RTC.
18. MARQUEZ vs. CA,
29 DECEMBER 1998
Facts:
During their lifetime, the spouses Rafael Marquez, Sr.
and Felicidad Marquez begot twelve children, namely:
(1) Natividad; (2) Aurea; (3) Herminigildo; (4) Filomena;
(5) Exequel; (6) Salvador; (7) Guadencio; (8) Rafael, Jr.,
(9) Belen; (10) Alfredo; (11) Ricardo; and (12) Antonio.
Sometime in 1945, the spouses acquired a parcel of land
with a lot area of 161 square meters in San Juan Del
Monte, Rizal, more particularly described in TCT No.
47572, where they constructed their conjugal home.
In 1952, Felicidad Marquez died intestate. 30 yrs later or
in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed an "Affidavit of
Adjudication" vesting unto himself sole ownership to the
property. Consequently, TCT No. 47572 was cancelled
and TCT No. 33350 2 was issued in his name on June
16, 1982.
On December 29, 1983 Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed a
"Deed of Donation Inter Vivos" covering the land
described in TCT No. 33350, as well as the house
constructed thereon to three of this children, namely:
(1) petitioner Rafael, Jr.; (2) Alfredo; and (3) Belen,
both private respondents herein, to the exclusion of his
other children
From 1983 to 1991, private respondents were in actual
possession of the land. However, when petitioners
learned about the existence of TCT No. 47572, they
immediately demanded that since they are also children
of Rafael Marquez, Sr., they are entitled to their
respective shares over the land in question.
Petitioners, now joined by Rafael Jr., filed a complaint
on May 31, 1991 for "Reconveyance and Partition with
Damages" alleging that the private respondents took
advantage of the advanced age of their father in making
him execute the said documents, thus making the other
documents fraudulently made.
Petitioners, in contending that the action had not yet
prescribed, assert that by virtue of the fraudulent
"Affidavit of Adjudication" and "Deed of Donation"
wherein they were allegedly deprived of their just share
over the parcel of land, a constructive trust was
created. Forthwith, they maintain that an action for
reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten (10) years.
In their Answer, private respondents argued that
petitioner's action was already barred by the statute of
limitations since the same should have been filed within
four years from the date of discovery of the alleged
fraud. RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA reversed the
trial court's ruling
ISSUE: Whether their action for reconveyance had
prescribed.
RULING: NO
It must be noted that Felicidad Marquez died in 1952;
thus, succession to her estate is governed by the
present Civil Code. Under Article 887 thereof, her
compulsory heirs are her legitimate children, petitioners
and private respondent therein, and her spouse, Rafael
Marquez, Sr. Now, in 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. decided
to adjudicate the entire property by executing an
"Affidavit of Adjudication" claiming that he is the sole
surviving heir of his deceased wife Felicidad F. Marquez.
As such, when Rafael Marquez Sr., for one reason or
another, misrepresented in his unilateral affidavit that he
was the only heir of his wife when in fact their children
were still alive, and managed to secure a transfer of
certificate of title under his name, a constructive trust
under Article 1456 was established.
In this regard, it is settled that an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years from the isuance of the Torrens
title over the property. For the purpose of this case, the
prescriptive period shall start to run when TCT No.
33350 was issued, which was on June 16, 1982. Thus,
considering that the action for reconveyance was filed
on May 31, 1991, or approximately nine years later, it is
evident that prescription had not yet barred the action.
Court of Appeals' reliance on Gerona v. de Guzman is
misplaced. In Amerol v. Bagumbaran, we ruled that the
doctrine laid down in the earlier Gerona case was based
on the old Code of Civil Procedure 1166 which provided
that an action based on fraud prescribes within four
years from the date of discovery. However, with the
effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950,
the provisions on prescriptive periods are now governed
by Articles 1139 to 1155. Since implied or constructive
trusts are obligations created by law, then the
prescriptive period to enforce the same prescribes in ten
years
Cognizant of the fact that the disputed land was
conjugal property of the spouses Rafael, Sr. and
Felicidad, ownership of the same is to be equally divided
between both of them. Rafael Marquez Sr., as trustee of
his wife's share cannot validly donate this portion to the
respondents, as expressly provided in Art. 736 of the
Civil Code, thus:
“Art. 736. Guardians and trustees cannot
donate the property entrusted to them.”
Moreover, nobody can dispose of that which does not
belong to him.
19. DANILO ALAUD vs. ZENAIDO ALAUD,
G.R. No. 176943, 17 OCTOBER 2008
Donation; Mortis causa v. Inter vivos; Characteristics of
a donation mortis causa; Formalities of a will
Facts:
Petitioners' mother, Maria Aluad, and
respondent Zenaido Aluad were raised by the childless
spouses Matilde Aluad and Crispin Aluad. After the death
of Crispin, Matilde executed a document entitled "Deed
of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor Maria
covering all the six lots which Matilde inherited from her
husband Crispin. Subsequently, Matilde sold Lot 676 to
respondent by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property.
Before Matilde died, she executed a last will and
testament, devising Lot 675, 677, 682, and 680 to Maria,
and her "remaining properties" including Lot 674 to
respondent. Maria thereafter died in the same year.
Maria's heirs filed before the RTC a Complaint,
for declaration and recovery of ownership and
possession of Lot 674 and 676, and damages against
respondent.
The trial court rendered a judgment declaring
the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the subject lots. It
held that Matilde could not have transmitted any right
over Lot Nos. 674 and 676 to respondent, she having
previously alienated them to Maria via the Deed of
Donation.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
decision, holding that the Deed of Donation was actually
a donation mortis causa, not inter vivos, and as such it
had to, but did not, comply with the formalities of a will.
ISSUE
Whether the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos in favor of
Petitioner’s mother is in fact a Donation Mortis Cause
RULING
The donation is one of mortis causa, it having
the following characteristics:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to
the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or what amounts to the
same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;
(2) That before the death of the
transferor, the transfer should be
revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revocability may be provided
for indirectly by means of a reserved
power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed; and
(3) That the transfer should be void if
the transferor should survive the
transferee.
The statement in the Deed of Donation reading
"anytime during the lifetime of the DONOR or
anyone of them who should survive, they could use,
encumber or even dispose of any or even all the
parcels of land herein donated" means that Matilde
retained ownership of the lots and reserved in her the
right to dispose them. For the right to dispose of a thing
without other limitations than those established by law is
an attribute of ownership. The phrase in the Deed of
Donation "or anyone of them who should survive" is of
course out of sync. For the Deed of Donation clearly
stated that it would take effect upon the death of the
donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to
the donor Matilde.
That the donation is mortis causa is fortified by
Matilde's acts of possession as she continued to pay the
taxes for the said properties which remained under her
name; appropriated the produce; and applied for free
patents for which OCTs were issued under her name".
The donation being then mortis causa, the
formalities of a will should have been observed but they
were not, as it was witnessed by only two, not three or
more witnesses following Article 805 of the Civil Code.
Further, the witnesses did not even sign the
attestation clause 38 the execution of which clause is a
requirement separate from the subscription of the will
and the affixing Furthermore, the witnesses did not
acknowledge the will before the notary public, which is
not in accordance with the requirement of Article 806 of
the Civil Code that every will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.
 More. The requirement that all the pages of the
will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on
the upper part of each page was not also followed.
The Deed of Donation which is, as already discussed,
one of mortis causa, not having followed the
formalities of a will, it is void and transmitted no
right to petitioners' mother.
20. UY KIAO ENG vs. NIXON LEE,
G.R. No. 176831, 15 JANUARY 2010
Facts:
Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992
and left a holographic will, which is now in the custody
of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent Nixon
Lee led, on May 28, 2001, a petition for m a n d a m u
s with damages to compel petitioner to produce the will
so that probate proceedings for the allowance thereof
could be instituted.
Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the
original holographic will and that she knew of its
whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies
of the will were given to respondent and to his siblings.
After the presentation and formal offer of respondent's
evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son
failed to prove that she had in her custody the original
holographic will.
The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to
evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioner's
motion for reconsideration. The CA initially denied the
appeal for lack of merit. It ruled that the writ of
mandamus would issue only in instances when no other
remedy would be available and sufficient to afford
redress. Respondent moved for reconsideration. The
appellate court, in the assailed August 23, 2006
Amended Decision, granted the motion, set aside its
earlier ruling, issued the writ, and ordered the
production of the will and the payment of attorney's
fees.
Issue: Whether or not Mandamus is the proper
remedy.
Ruling: No.
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the
principle that m a n d a m u s cannot be used to enforce
contractual obligations. Generally, m a n d a m u s will
not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will
not lie against an individual unless some obligation in
the nature of a public or quasi-public duty is imposed.
The writ is not appropriate to enforce a private right
against an individual. To preserve its prerogative
character, m a n d a m u s is not used for the redress of
private wrongs, but only in matters relating to the
public.
Moreover, an important principle followed in the
issuance of the writ is that there should be no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law other than the remedy of mandamus being invoked.
In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases
where the usual modes of procedure and forms of
remedy are powerless to afford relief.
In the instant case, the Court, without
unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation
involved here — the production of the original
holographic will — is in the nature of a public or a
private duty, rules that the remedy of m a n d a m u s
cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there
lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
The Rules of Court does not prevent him from
instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the
will whether the same is in his possession or not under
Rule 76, Section 1.
An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule
75, Sections 2 to 5, for the production of the original
holographic will. There being a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
production of the subject will, the remedy of m a n d a
m u s cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that
respondent Lee lacks a cause of action in his petition.
Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.
Relevant Codal Provisions:
M a n d a m u s - a command issuing from a
court of law of competent jurisdiction, in the name of
the state or the sovereign, directed to some inferior
court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or
person requiring the performance of a particular duty
therein specified, which duty results from the official
station of the party to whom the writ is directed or from
operation of law.
Rule 75
SEC. 2. Custodian of the will to deliver. —
The person who has custody of a will shall, within
twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the
testator, deliver the will to the court having jurisdiction,
or to the executor named in the will.
SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept
or refuse trust — A person named as executor in a will
shall within twenty (20) days after he knows of the
death of the testator, or within twenty (20) days after he
knows that he is named executor if he obtained such
knowledge after the death of the testator, present such
will to the court having jurisdiction, unless the will has
reached the court in any other manner, and shall, within
such period, signify to the court in writing his
acceptance of the trust or his refusal to accept it.
SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to
fine for neglect-— A person who neglects any of the
duties required in the two last preceding sections
without excuse satisfactory to the court shall be fined
not exceeding two thousand pesos.
SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be
committed — A person having custody of a will after
the death of the testator who neglects without
reasonable cause to deliver the same, when ordered so
to do, to the court having jurisdiction, may be
committed to prison and there kept until he delivers the
will.
Rule 76, Section 1:
Section 1. Who may petition for the
allowance of will- Any executor, devisee, or legatee
named in a will, or any other person interested in the
estate, may, at any time, after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will
allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not,
or is lost or destroyed.
21. ALABAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
23 SEPTEMBER 2005
Facts:
Respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a
petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament
of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado (decedent).
Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent
and the executor of her will. RTC allowed the probate of
the will of the decedent and directed the issuance of
letters testamentary to respondent.
More than four (4) months later, petitioners filed a
motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings
and filed an opposition to the allowance of the will of the
decedent, as well as the issuance of letters testamentary
to respondent, claiming that they are the intestate heirs
of the decedent. Petitioners claimed that the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-
payment of the correct docket fees, defective
publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs.
Moreover, they alleged that the will could not have been
probated because: (1) the signature of the decedent
was forged; (2) the will was not executed in accordance
with law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the
attestation clause; (3) the decedent lacked testamentary
capacity to execute and publish a will; (4) the will was
executed by force and under duress and improper
pressure; (5) the decedent had no intention to make a
will at the time of affixing of her signature; and (6) she
did not know the properties to be disposed of, having
included in the will properties which no longer belonged
to her.
The RTC denied petitioners' motion. RTC held that
petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing by
publication and that the deficiency in the payment of
docket fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal of
the petition.
Petitioners thereafter filed a petition with an application
for preliminary injunction with the CA, seeking the
annulment of the RTC's Decision on the following
grounds: Petitioners allegedly drafted a compromise
agreement to implement the division of the estate.
Despite receipt of the agreement, respondent refused to
sign and return the same. Due to that, they did not
suspect his intention to secure the probate of the will.
They claimed that they learnt of the probate
proceedings as a result of which they filed their motion
to reopen the proceedings. They argued that the
RTC Decision should be annulled and set aside on the
ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the RTC.
CA dismissed the petition.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT Petitioners were not made parties to
the case in which the decision sought to be annulled was
rendered and, thus, they could not have availed of the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
from judgment and other appropriate remedies, contrary
to the ruling of the CA?
RULING:
ON THE PROCEDURAL REQUISITE:
Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved
party to file a motion for new trial on the ground of
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The
same Rule permits the filing of a motion for
reconsideration on the grounds' of excessive award of
damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision
or final order, or that the decision or final order is
contrary to law. Both motions should be filed within the
period for taking an appeal, or fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order.
Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under
Section 3 of Rule 38 is resorted to when a judgment or
final order is entered, or any other proceeding is
thereafter taken, against a party in any court through
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. Said
party may file a petition in the same court and in the
same case to set aside the judgment, order or
proceeding. It must be filed within sixty (60) days after
the petitioner learns of the judgment and within six (6)
months after entry thereof.
A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition
for relief from judgment are remedies available only to
parties' in the proceedings' where the assailed judgment
is rendered. In fact, it has been held that a person who
was never a party to the case, or even summoned to
appear therein, cannot avail of a petition for relief from
judgment.
However, petitioners in this case are mistaken in
asserting that they are not or have not become parties
to the probate proceedings.
Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or
legatee named in a will, or any other person interested
in the estate may, at any time after the death of the
testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have
the will allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving
the will must be published for three (3) consecutive
weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province, as well as furnished to the designated or other
known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator. Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the
probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the
corresponding publication of the petition the court's
jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will
or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
Publication is notice to the whole world that the
proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who
might be minded to make an objection of any sort
against the right sought to be established. Thus, even
though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition
for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a
consequence of the publication of the notice of hearing.
As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could
have validly availed of the remedies of motion for new
trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from
judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen,
which is essentially a motion for new trial, with
petitioners praying for the reopening of the case and the
setting of further proceedings. However, the motion was
denied for having been filed out of time, long after
the Decision became final and executory.
Conceding that petitioners became aware of
the Decision after it had become final, they could have
still filed a petition for relief from judgment after the
denial of their motion to reopen. Petitioners claim that
they learned of the Decision only on 4 October 2001, or
almost four (4) months from the time the Decision had
attained finality. But they failed to avail of the remedy.
For failure to make use without sufficient justification of
the said remedies available to them, petitioners could no
longer resort to a petition for annulment of judgment;
otherwise, they would benefit from their own inaction or
negligence.
ON THE SUBSTANTIVE REQUISITE:
Even casting aside the procedural requisite, the petition
for annulment of judgment must still fail for failure to
comply with the substantive requisites.
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law
independent of the case where the judgment sought to
be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is
to have the final and executory judgment set aside so
that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to
in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner, and is based on only two
grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial
of due process. A person need not be a party to the
judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential
that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was
obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would
be adversely affected thereby.
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of
fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in
character. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it
prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting
his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon
matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the
manner in which it is procured. The overriding
consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a
party from having his day in court.
To sustain their allegation of extrinsic fraud, petitioners
assert that as a result of respondent's deliberate
omission or concealment of their names, ages and
residences as the other heirs of the decedent in his
petition for allowance of the will, they were not notified
of the proceedings, and thus they were denied their day
in court.
According to the Rules, notice is required to be
personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees
of the testator. A perusal of the will shows that
respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the
decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the
decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who
are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings
under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to
mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to
personally notify them of the same.
Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled
to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by the
publication of the notice.
22. FRIANELA vs. BANAYAD,
G.R. No. 169700, 30 JULY 2009
Facts:
Apolonia Frianela (Frianela, Petitioner) was
named as devisee in the will of Moises Banayad
(Decedent). On June 3, 1991, she filed before the RTC
of Pasay City for the allowance of the November 18,
1985 holographic will of the decedent and alleged that
Moises died without issue (docketed as Sp. Proc. No.
3664-P). Servillano Banayad, Jr. (Respondent), who
is a cousin of Frianela filed his opposition and counter-
petitioned for the allowance of two other holographic
wills of the decedent, one dated September 27, 1989
and September 28, 1989.
The RTC declared that the September 27, 1989
revoked the November 18, 1985 will. The CA on the
other hand modified the trial court’s decision and ruled
that the September 27, 1989 only reviked the November
18, 1985 will insofar as the testamentary disposition of
Moises’s real property was concerned. Her Motion for
Reconsideraton before the CA was denied, hence the
petition before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in its decision.
*Note that there was no categorical statement of issue
in the case because the Supreme Court did not dwell on
the merits raised before the lower courts, rather it ruled
on jurisdiction.
Ruling
This Court, after a meticulous review of the
records, finds that the RTC of Pasay City had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The
Court notes that the trial court focused all of its
attention on the merits of the case without first
determining whether it could have validly exercised
jurisdiction to hear and decide Sp. Proc. No. 3664-P. On
appeal, the appellate court also overlooked the issue on
the jurisdictional competence of the trial court over the
said case.
The jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide
a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action unless such statute provides for
a retroactive application thereof. Jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations or averments in the
complaint or petition. In this case, at the time the
petition for the allowance of the Moises’s holographic
will was instituted, the then Section 19 and 33 of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 were in force, which in
essence provided that the RTC or MTC’s jurisdiction over
probate proceedings will depend on the gross value of
the estate, which value must be alleged I the complaint
or petition to be filed.
Nowhere in the petition is there a statement of
the gross value of Moises’s estate. Thus, from a reading
of the original petition filed, it cannot be determined
which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
the proceedings. The RTC should have, at the outset,
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, be it noted
that the dismissal on the said ground may be ordered
motu proprio by the courts. The CA, on appeal, should
have dismissed the case on the same ground. Settled is
the doctrine that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised
by any of the parties or may be reckoned by the court,
at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is
not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Despite the pendency of the case for 18 years,
the exception (on estoppel) in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy
cannot be applied. First, as a general rule, the principle
of estoppel by laches cannot lie against the government.
Second, in Tijam the delayed onvocation of lack of
jurisdiction has been made during the execution stage of
a final and executory ruling of a court. Estoppel by
laches only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to
the factual milieu in Tijam (issue of lack of jurisdiction
has only been raised during the execution stage,
specifically when the matter of the trial court's denial of
the surety's motion to quash the writ of execution has
been brought to the appellate court for review).
In the present case, the trial court’s assumption
of unauthorized jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings has been discovered by the Court during
the appeal stage of the main case, not during the
execution stage of a final and executory decision. This,
the exceptional rule laid down in Tijam cannot apply.
23. ANCHETA vs. GUERSEY-DALAYGON,
G.R. No. 139868, 8 JUNE 2006
Facts:
Sps. Audrey O’Neill and Richard Guersey were American
citizens who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years.
They adopted Kyle Guersey Hill as their daughter. In
1979, Audrey died and in her will, she left her entire
estate to Richard, who was also the executor. The will
was admitted to probate before Maryland, USA. The
court also named Atty. Ancheta (Petitioner) as the
ancillary administrator.
Richard was remarried to Candelaria Guersey-
Dalaygon (Respondent), with whom he had two children
Kimberly and Kevin. Then Audrey’s will was also
admitted to probate by the CFI of Rizal in 1982 in Spec.
Pro. Case No. 9625.
Then, Richard died sometime in 1984, leaving a
will and he left his entire estate to Candelaria, save for
his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc.
shares, which he left to Kyle. Then, Richard’s will was
submitted for probate before court in Maryland, USA and
in RTC docketed as S. P. Case No. M-888.
In 1987, petitioner filed a motion to declare
Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey and a project of
partition of Audrey’s estate in S.P. Case No. 9625.
Petitioner also filed a project of partition of Audrey’s
estate, with Richard being apportioned the ¾ undivided
interest in Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G
Interiors, cash from Citibank current account, and Kyle
the ¼ undivided interest in Makati property, shares in
A/G Interiors and cash.
The motion and project of partition was granted
and approved by the RTC.
Meanwhile, the ancilliary administrator of S.P.
No. M-888 also filed a project of partition wherein 2/3 of
Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property
was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were
allocated to Richard’s three children. This was opposed
by respondent on the ground that under the law of the
State of Maryland, “a legacy passes to the legatee
the entire interest of the testator in the property
subject of the legacy.” Since Richard left his entire
estate to Candelaria, except for his rights over A/G
Interiors Inc. shares, then his entire ¾ undivided
interest in Makati property should be given to
respondent.
RTC subsequently disapproved the project of
partition insofar as it affects the Makati property and it
adjudicated the entire ¾ undivided interest to
respondent.
Then, respondent filed with the CA to annul the
trial court’s Orders related to Audrey’s estate.
Respondent contended that petitioner breached his
fiduciary duty when he disregarded the law of the State
of Maryland on the distribution of her assets in
accordance with her will. CA rendered the assailed
Decision annulling the trial court’s Orders.
Petitioner filed a motion for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 to the SC.
Petitioner’s arguments:
He acted in good faith in performing his duties as
ancillary administrator and he was not aware of the
relevant laws of Maryland.
Respondent’s arguments:
He argued that breach of petitioner’s fiduciary duty is
extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was
duty bound to follow the express terms of Aubrey’s will,
and his denial of knowledge of Maryland’ laws cannot
stand because he is a senior partner in a prestigious law
firm and it was his duty to know the relevant laws.
ISSUE:
WON the Petitioner breached his fiduciary duty
when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland
in the distribution of Audrey’s will (YES)
RULING:
YES. The Court DENIED the petition and the
Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in
the performance of his duties as an official of the court.
Petitioner’s failure to manage the distribution of Audrey’s
estate according to the terms of her will and as dictated
by applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud.
Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of
Audrey's estate. As such, he occupies a position of the
highest trust and confidence, and he is required to
exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith
in the performance of that trust. Although he is not a
guarantor or insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he
expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of
prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair
average capacity and ability exercises in similar
transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which
his conduct is to be judged.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of
Audrey's will, especially with regard as to who are her
heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of
the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the
Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder,
states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered. — When a
will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will
annexed, and such letters testamentary or of
administration, shall extend to all the estate of the
testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the
payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to
such will, so far as such will may operate upon it;
and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is
provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines
belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another
state or country. (Emphasis supplied)
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in
our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them; however, petitioner, as ancillary
administrator of Audrey's estate, was duty-bound to
introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of
Maryland.
How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine
laws apply when as early as the reprobate of Audrey's
will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought
to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the
State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner
is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big
legal staff and a large library." He had all the legal
resources to determine the applicable law. It was
incumbent upon him to exercise his functions as
ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and to
discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully.
Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his fiduciary
duties.

However, intestate and testamentary

succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides

that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent.

As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the

Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the