17o JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : 1 JANUARY 1 9 9 9

J e n n i f e r A. Herdt. Religion andFaction in Hume's MoralPhilosophy. Studies in Religion and

Critical T h o u g h t 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xv + 300.
Cloth, $59.95.

J e n n i f e r A. Herdt's book, Religion and Faction in Hume's Moral Philosophy, is a study of

H u m e ' s notion of sympathy. It is not, however, just an analysis of the psychological
mechanism of sympathy as e x p o u n d e d in Books II and III of the Treatise. For Herdt,
sympathy plays a crucial role in H u m e ' s vision of how to combat m a n y social ills,
especially the effects of religious fanaticism, and H u m e self-consciously drew on the
notion of sympathy to secularize discourse about morality and social responsibility.
Awareness of H u m e ' s use of sympathy illuminates H u m e ' s critique of religion and it
also casts new light on the philosophical merits of H u m e ' s History. H e r d t notes that,
according to most H u m e commentators, H u m e ' s attacks on religion were driven by
epistemological problems arising from attempts at rationally justifying religion. Accord-
ing to Herdt, though, the u n f o r t u n a t e effects of religion on society more directly
motivated H u m e ' s religious critique. H u m e exposes these effects in his History, and
offers sympathy as an antidote to religious fanaticism. H u m e is not merely a vocal
philosophical critic of religion, b u t he is also a social reformer attempting to advance
peace and prosperity in Scotland.
T h e key to Herdt's interpretation is H u m e ' s distinction between limited and exten-
sive sympathy (T 384-389). Briefly, for H u m e , the degree to which I sympathetically
commiserate with you hinges on both the degree of your misery and my relation to you.
H e r d t refines H u m e ' s notions of sympathy, distinguishing between active/passive sym-
pathy, occurrent/dispositional sympathy, weak/strong sympathy, the sympathetic un-
derstanding, and the sympathetic imagination. In essence, there are both bad and good
social aspects of the various types of sympathy. A bad social aspect is when sympathy is
only a superficial emotional contagion, which can even breed religious fanaticism. The
principal good social aspect is when sympathy becomes more generalized a n d gives rise
to a sense of concern for the well-being of others. Herdt's r e f i n e m e n t of Hume's
sympathy vocabulary is both textually justified and an important aid in u n d e r s t a n d i n g
the various technical senses of sympathy especially in H u m e ' s Treatise. H e r d t argues
that, after the moral Enquiry, H u m e ' s use of the term "sympathy" diminished, and when
he did use it he m e a n t it mainly in the sense of limited sympathy. H e r d t believes,
though, that the f u n d a m e n t a l conception of extended and general sympathy is a run-
n i n g theme in the History.
H u m e ' s later use of the term "sympathy" is not quite as diminished as Herdt con-
tends. By consulting a text file database of H u m e ' s writings, we can quickly spot the
frequency with which H u m e used both the term "sympathy" and the related word
"compassion": Treatise:. sympathy (a5o), compassion (8), First Enquiry: sympathy (6), Sec-
ondEnquiry: sympathy (26), compassion (9), "Of Tragedy:" sympathy (4), compassion (6),
"Dissertation on the Passions:" sympathy (3), compassion (8), Natural History of Religion:
sympathy (3), History: Sympathy (25); compassion (54)-Additionally, about twelve of
H u m e ' s essays contain one or two occurrences each of either the words "sympathy" or
"compassion." Examination of the various occurrences of these terms shows that H u m e
 BOOR REVIEWS 171

sometimes had in m i n d a technicalnotion of sympathy a n d other times a colloquialnotion.

The technical notion typically makes a psychological point, such as the discussion at T
3 8 4 - 3 8 9 . We find the technical notion largely in the Treatiseand the Moral Enquiry, with
more isolated discussions in the Natural History ofRelifion, "Of Tragedy," the "Disserta-
tion on the Passions," a n d a letter to A d a m Smith on July 28, 1759.
By contrast, H u m e ' s more colloquial uses of "sympathy" and "compassion" usually
appear alongside other terms, such as fellow-feeling, cordial affection, humanity,
friendship, mutual attachment, and fidelity. The colloquial use is also sometimes desig-
nated in the phrases "sympathy of m a n n e r s " and "sympathy of character." H u m e ' s use
of the terms "sympathy" and "compassion" in the History are virtually all colloquial,
such as these: "the q u e e n was engaged, by a sympathy of manners, to take adulterers
and fornicators u n d e r her protection" (volume 4, chapter 38); "The executioner him-
self was touched with sympathy" (volume 6, chapter 68); "Lewis received him with the
highest generosity, sympathy, and regard" (volume 6, chapter 71).Just as these uses of
the "sympathy" a n d "compassion" are colloquial, m a n y of the more implied sympathy
elements of H u m e ' s History are also colloquial, a n d not technical in the ways the H e r d t
suggests. Further, m a n y of the other sentimentalist c o m p o n e n t s of H u m e ' s History
noted by H e r d t may only be a function of lively writing style, as H u m e himself pre-
scribes in the lengthy e x p u n g e d portion of the first Enquiry, section three. Thus, H e r d t
may exaggerate the idea that sympathy is a philosophical theme of the History'.
Nevertheless, Herdt's book is a well-written and original work of scholarship that
breaks new g r o u n d both in its analysis of H u m e ' s technical n o t i o n of sympathy, a n d in
its social emphasis of H u m e ' s religious critique.
JAMES FIESER
Universitv of Tennessee at Martin

Richard H. Popkin, Ezequiel de Olaso a n d Giorgio Tonelli, editors. Scepticism in the

Enlightenment. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997. PP. xiii + 192. Cloth,
$99.oo.
J o h a n van der Zande and Richard H. Popkin, editors. The Skeptical Tradition around
r 8oo: Skepticism in Philosophy, Science, and Society. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub-
lishers, x998. Pp. xix + 462. Cloth, $15o.oo.

Who could reasonably question the importance of skepticism for the philosophical
achievements of the period known as the E n l i g h t e n m e n t ? Skepticism seems to be the
most appropriate means for illuminating a philosophical landscape shrouded in fog.
T h e relatively restrained m e t a p h o r of "Aufkldren" was used first by G e r m a n philoso-
phers to describe their project of removing prejudice a n d obscurity. British philoso-
phers instead used the concept of "improvement," a n d in France, the endeavours of
the philosophes were largely associated with a d e t e r m i n e d fight against the dogmatic
teachings of an all-powerful church and for religious a n d political freedom. But n o t
every philosopher who employed skeptical a r g u m e n t s or the method of skepticism was
therefore a skeptic, or someone who i n t e n d e d to establish a form of skepticism. A n d