Royal Institute of Philosophy

Royal Institute of Philosophy
Representation in Music
Author(s): Roger Scruton
Source: Philosophy, Vol. 51, No. 197 (Jul., 1976), pp. 273-287
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy
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Representationin Music
ROGER SCRUTON
Music maybe used to expressemotion,to heightena drama,to emphasize

the meaningof a ceremony;but it is neverthelessan abstractart,withno
power to representthe world. Representation,as I understandit, is a
propertythatdoes not belongto music.
The word 'representation' has manyuses, and may oftenbe applied to
music. ThereforeI shall discuss not the word,but the phenomenon,as it
occurs in poetry,drama,sculptureand painting.Being commonto both
painting and poetry,this phenomenon cannot be identifiedwith the
semanticpropertiesof a linguisticsystem,forpainting,unlikepoetry,does
notbelongto such a system.How, then,is it to be characterized?I suggest
the followingfiveconditions,not as a completeanalysis,but as a partial
description.As we reflecton thesefiveconditionsthe aestheticsignificance
of representation will, I hope, become apparent.
(i) A man understandsa representational workof art only if he gains
someawarenessof what it represents.His awarenessmay be incomplete,
but it must be adequate. He may not see Masaccio's TributeMoney as a
representation of the scene fromthe Gospel; but to understandit as a
representation he shouldat leastsee thefrescoas a groupofgesturingmen.
If a man does not see the frescoin some such way-say because he can
appreciateit only as an abstractarrangementof colours and lines-then
he does not understandit.
(2) Representation requiresa medium,and is understoodonlywhen the
distinctionbetweensubject and medium has been recognized.Merely to
mistakea paintingfor its subject is to misunderstandit; so too is there
misunderstanding when a man is unable to extractthe featuresof the
subjectfromthepeculiaritiesand conventionsofthemedium.(A varnished
paintingof a man is not a paintingof a varnishedman, howevermuch it
may look as thoughit were.)
(3) Interestin a representation requiresan interestin its subject. If an
interestin the Masaccio depends in no way upon an interestin the scene
portrayed,thenthe frescois beingtreatednot as a representation but as a
workof abstractart.
(4) A representational work of art must express thoughtsabout its
subject, and an interestin the workshould involvean understandingof
thosethoughts.(This is an ingredientin condition(3) ) I meanby 'thought'
roughlywhatFrege meantby 'Gedanke': the sense or contentof a declara-
tive sentence.In this sense thoughtsmay be spoken of as true or false,
Philosophy
51 1976 273
Roger Scruton
althoughof course it is not alwaysthe truth-valueof a thoughtthatis of

interestin aestheticunderstanding. It is clearthata representational work
of art always conveysthoughts,in this Fregean sense, about its subject.
Amongthe thoughtsthatgive riseto myinterestin King Lear, and which
give a reasonforthatinterest,are thoughtsabout Lear. These thoughtsare
communicatedby the play, and are common propertyamong all who
understandit. Somethingsimilaroccurs in the appreciationof a painting.
Even in the mostminimaldepiction-say, of an apple on a cloth-appreci-
ationdependson determinate thoughtsthatcould be expressedin language
withoutreferenceto the picture;forexample: 'Here is an apple; the apple
restson a cloth; the clothis chequeredand foldedat the edge'. Represen-
tation,in otherwords,is essentiallypropositional.
Sometimeswe feelthata workof art is filledwiththought,but thatthe
thoughtcannotbe detachedfromthe work.It is impossibleto put it into
words(or intootherwords). Such cases, I should liketo say,are cases not
of representation but of expression.Why I should makesuch a distinction,
and whyI should make it in thatway,will be apparentlater.
(5) Interest in representationmay involve an interestin its lifelike
quality; but it is not,forall that,an interestin literaltruth.It is irrelevant
that the depictionbe inaccurate;what mattersis that it be convincing.
To requireaccuracyis to ask fora reportratherthan a representation.
I shall relyon an intuitiveunderstandingof these conditions:theytell
us whatit is to treatsomethingas a representation, ratherthanas a report,
a copy,or a mereinarticulatesign. On this account,whatmakesa passage
of prose into a representation is not so much its semanticstructureas the
specificintentionwith which it is composed. The semanticstructureis
relevantonly because it provides the means wherebythat intentionis
fulfilled.Representational literatureis literaturewrittenwiththe intention
that conditions(I)-(S) should be satisfied.Thus one maytreatas a repre-
sentationsomethingthat is not a representation;one may achieve
representation by novel means; one may create a representation that is
neverunderstood,and so on.
Now some philosophers-thosewho thinkthat music is a language-
will give an accountof musicalrepresentation on the model of description
in prose or verse. But such an approachis surelymostimplausible.Any-
thingthatwe could envisageas a semanticinterpretation ofmusic(a theory
of 'musicaltruth')would deprivemusic of preciselythe aestheticaims for
which we admireit, turningit insteadinto a clumsycode. Furthermore,
all attemptsto explainmusicin such termsend by givingrules ofreference
withoutrulesoftruth.We are told thata certainpassage carriesa reference
to love; but we are nottoldwhatthe passageis supposedto say about love.
And to speak of languagewherethereis 'reference',but no predication,is
simplyto misusea word.We are in factleavingthe realmof representation
altogetherand enteringinto that of expression.But there is no need to
274
prove that music is a language in order to assign to it the expressive

propertiesthatare mentioned,forexample,by DeryckCooke.1
A betterattemptto provethatmusicis a representational mediumbegins
by comparingmusicto painting.It can be said withsome truththatmusic,
like painting,may deliberately'imitate',or 'copy' featuresof an object.
Is this not, then,a kind of representation?Examples are familiar:Saint-
Saens' Carnaval des Animaux,Gretchenam Spinnrade,La Mer. And it is
naturalto considersuch pieces as attemptsto 'depict' the objects referred
to in theirtitles.But perhapswhatis meanthereby 'depiction'is notwhat
is meantwhenwe referto thevisualarts.A fewobservationsaboutpainting
will therefore be appropriate.
It is a commonplacethatdepictionis notsimplya matterofresemblance.2
Nor is it enoughthatthe resemblancebe intended;nor even thatthe artist
should intendthe resemblanceto be noticed. No doubt Manet intended
us to noticethe resemblancebetweenhis Olympiaand Titian's Venusof
Urbino. But that is certainlynot a case of one painting representing
another.It is forsuch reasonsthatwe mightwishto lay the burdenof our
analysisof depictionon the notionof an 'aspect'. The artistintendsthat
the spectatorshould see the paintingas its subject, not merelythat the
spectatorshouldnoticea resemblancebetweenthetwo. In otherwords,the
painterintendsthat we should have the experienceof a certainaspect-
that we should feel that seeing his paintingis importantly like seeing its
subject-and not merely that we should notice a resemblance. Thus a
a
paintermayintendto copytheMona Lisa, but he does not(as rule)intend
that his paintingshould be seen as Leonardo's; rather,he intendsthatit
should be seen as the woman in Leonardo's painting.On this view, the
intentionin depictingis not to 'copy' an object, but ratherto create a
certainvisual impression.And surely,it will be argued,preciselythe same
process,and the same intention,may exist in writingmusic. Sounds are
createdwhich are meant to be heard as otherthings,as the babbling of
brooks,the warblingof birds,the roaringand ploddingof animals.
However,a difficultynow arises.We findthat,afterall, it is notsufficient
forthe truthof 'A depictsB' thatA should be intendedto be seen as B.
Imagine,forexample,a paintingdesignedto illustratethe scene in Hamlet
in whichthe princequestionsPolonius about the shape of a cloud, saying
'Do you see yondercloud that'salmostin shape of a camel?' Suppose that
the paintingrepresentsa cloud that has the aspect of a camel. The artist
will then intendthat a certainpart of his canvas (the part which is to be
seen as a cloud) should also bear the aspect of a camel. But he does not
1DeryckCooke,TheLanguageofMusic(Oxford,1959).
2 See,for example,R. Wollheim,Art and its Objects(New York, i968);
N. Goodman,LanguagesofArt(London,i969); and,in relationto thepresent
and theArts,
in Music', in Philosophy
subject:J. 0. Urmson,'Representation
RoyalInstitute Lectures,Vol. 6, I97I-2 (London,I973).
ofPhilosophy
275
Roger Scruton
intend the paintingto contain a representation of a camel. Rather,the

paintingrepresentssomethingwhichmaybe seen as a camel,but whichis
in facta cloud. If thisexampleshould appear far-fetched, considerinstead
the manypaintingsof paintings:in Dutch interiors,forinstance,one may
oftensee a picture hangingon the wall. The Dutch paintingdoes not
depictthe subjectof the wall-picture;rather,it representsthe pictureof a
tree,say, and in doing so may itselfhave the aspect of a tree.
Taken in isolation,therefore,a part of the canvas may have many
aspects,each of whichis intended,and only one of which is fundamental
to the subject of the painting.This seems to suggestthatthe partsof the
painting acquire their representationalstatus only from the context
providedby the totalrepresentation. Out of contextthe aspect is indeter-
minate: it can serve as a representation only when completed,for only
when completedwill the aspect conveya thought,and it is the thought
which is the heartof depiction.3Representationis not like ostension;to
representan object is to convey a thoughtabout it. In representing
Mr Smith'shouse I also characterizeit; but I may pointto the house and
say nothingwhateveras to its propertiesor nature. To understanda
representation is to understandthethoughtwhichit conveys;it is therefore
to have some grasp of the contextwhich completesthat thought.In the
absence of such a contextrepresentation is vague and indeterminate, and
if the contextis always absent,then representation is no more possible
than referenceis possible outsidethe syntaxof a language.
Representationcan be begun, therefore,only where it can also be
completed.If music is to be representational, thenits subjectmustbe not
onlypickedout, but also characterized.But thatrequiresa context,and in
musicthecontextseemsto add no further precisionto the 'representational'
parts. A certainpassage in Der Rosenkavalier'imitates'the glitterof a
silverrose. But what more does this passage say about the glitter,except
that it is a glitter(and even that may go unnoticed)?The contextadds
nothingto the thought,and while there is musical development,the
developmentofa description seemsscarcelyto be in point.So too,whenthe
imitationofbirdsongin Messiaen is givenmusicaldevelopment, thereis no
thoughtabout the birdsongwhich is made more determinateby that
process.The birdsongis absorbedintothemusicalstructureand takeson a
meaningthatis purelymusical. But, it mightbe said, does not the music
none the less conveya thoughtabout the birdsong,in the sense of a purely
musicalthought?Whyshould it matterthatthethoughtcannotbe put into
words? Such a retortgetsus nowhere.For whateveris meantby a purely
musical thought,we can envisage also a purely painterlythought-a
thoughtthat finds its only expressionin lines and colours, but which
3 Cf. Frege's strictlycomparableidea that only in the contextof a sentencedo
words have 'Bedeutung',and the holisticview of language which springs from
that insight: see M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophyof Language (London, I973).
276
cannotbe put into words,and which consequentlycannotbe regardedas

true or false. And it is part of the point of calling paintinga represen-
tationalartthatthe thoughtsinvolvedin its appreciationare notall purely
painterly,that,on the contrary,an experienceof a paintingwill involve
thoughtsabout its subject,thoughtsthat could be put into words. This
'narrative'elementis an essentialfeatureof the phenomenonof represen-
tation.If we insistnone the less thatthereis a typeof 'representation' that
is purelysymbolic(which containsostensionbut no description)then we
are simplyremovingfromrepresentation the role in aestheticinterestthat
it is normallyheld to play.
It is true,all the same,thatI may hear a passage of music as something
that I know it not to be. I may hear a passage as forestmurmurs,for
example, as rushingwater,as an approachingor recedinghorse. Should
we lay anyemphasison thisphenomenon?One problemis thata man may
hear and appreciate'representational'music withouthearingthe aspect.
And while it is truethat I may also hear poetrywithoutknowingwhat it
says (as when I listento the readingof a poem in Chinese),to do so is not
to appreciatethe poem as poetry.An interestin poetryis not an interest
in pure sound; a genuineinterestin music,on the otherhand,mayby-pass
its representational pretensionsaltogether.Thereforewe cannot assume
thata composermaysit down withthe honestintentionof creatinga piece
to be heard as, say, the quarrel betweenMr Pickwickand Mrs Bardell's
lawyers.For he cannotbe surethatitwillbe heardin thatway; his intention
is vitiated,and mustbe replacedby whatis at best a hope or a wish. If the
intentionendures none the less, it is because there is available to the
composersome independentway of specifyinghis subject: for instance,
throughthe wordsof a song, or throughactionon the stage. Thus, in the
more adventurousattemptsat representation,such as we find in the
symphonicpoem, the composer is apt to depend on a specificliterary
referencein order to secure the hearer's complicityin what is better
describedas an imaginativeendeavourthan as an inevitableperception.
It is thus with Don Juan and Don Quixote,with Taras Bulba and the
anecdotalworksof Ives.
The argumentis of courseby no means conclusive.But certainfactsare
significant forexample,that,whilea man may
all thesame. It is significant,
look at an untitledpictureand know immediatelywhat it represents,it is
mostunlikelythathe shoulddo thesame withan untitledsymphonicpoem.
Significanttoo is the indefiniteness of the relationbetweenmusic and its
'subject': the music does not determinesome one naturalclass of inter-
pretations, and can usuallybe fittedto widelycontrasting themes.A quarrel
between Mr Pickwickand a lawyermay be 'represented'by music that
serves equally well the purpose of 'depicting'a forestfire.We see this
ambiguityevidencedin the ballet,where the action is usually leftso far
indeterminate by the music thatseveralincompatiblechoreographiesmay
277
Roger Scruton
existside by side as acceptedmembersof the repertoire;as in The Rite of

Spring.Hence, whiletheaspectofa painting,and themeaningofa sentence,
are publiclyrecognizedfacts,whichmakepossiblethe intentioncharacter-
isticofrepresentational art,thereare no similarfactsto enabletheintention
to be carriedover intothe realmof music.
It mightseem thatthereis anotherargumentagainstthe possibilityof
musical representationin the following: in music nothing can be
representedexceptsounds; forno sound can be heard as anythingthatis
not itselfa sound. But sounds are not, strictlyspeaking,propertiesof
objects. They are individuals,with a life and identityseparatefromthe
objectswhichemitthem.A sound is nota property;noris it an appearance;
rather,itis somethingthathas an appearance.Of course,thequestionofthe
identityof soundsis a difficult one: it is not certainwhethersounds should
be identifiedas eventsor as event-types;it is not certainthattheyhave a
precisespatiallocation,and so on. However,we do say,and forverygood
reasons,such thingsas the following:'There has been a noise in thisroom
all afternoon,and I thinkthat it is gettinglouder', a sentencethat both
identifiesan individual, and also re-identifiesthe individual through
change.4This seems to suggestthata sound is detachablefromthe object
that emitsit, and that it is capable of independentexistence.However,it
is the sound,notthe object,that'appears' in the music.How, then,can the
music representthe subjectsthat are normallyascribedto it, when those
subjectsshareno appearancewiththe music?A paintingpresentsa certain
appearance,and an appearance can be describedonly in termsof some
object thatnormallypossessesit. An appearanceis not an individual,but
ratheran intentionalobject; it has no propertiesthat are not properties
which an object appears to have. This means that, in characterizingan
appearance,I am automatically engagedin describinghow an objectmight
appear. Object and appearancecannotbe detachedin thought.In so faras
one sees the aspect of the painting,therefore, one will be led inevitablyto
the thoughtof the subjectrepresented.Music, however,'imitates'not the
appearanceof a thing,but a sound whichthe thingemits.How then does
the sound of the music lead us to the thoughtof the subjectrepresented?
There is, however,a certainnarrow-mindedness in thisobjectionwhich
we must tryto overcome.Why can we not hear a passage of music as
somethingthatis not itselfa sound? Surelythe operativefactorhereis the
extentto whicha subjectcan makeitselfknownin auditoryterms.Sadness,
which is not strictlya visual property,can make itselfknownin the face:
in such a case I maysee the sadnessin the face.5In a similarway emotions
4Many considerations relevantto the logicalstatusof soundsare raisedby
Strawson, in Individuals,
chs. i and 2 (London,1959).
5 On thequestionwhatmight be meantby a 'strictly
visualproperty'
see the
admirablediscussionin H. P. Grice, 'Some Remarksabout the Senses' in
R. J. Butler(ed.), Analytical
Philosophy, FirstSeries(Oxford,i966).
278
can be heardin thetoneofa voice.And it is certainly

truethat,whether
rightly or wrongly,peoplespeakof musicas 'depicting'suchthingsas
fights,journeys,
movements and attitudes.
Wagnerattempts to represent
notonlytheclapofthunder, butalsothestrokeoflightningthatprecedes
it, and theshimmering rainbowthatfollowsin itswake.Thereare even
musical'representations'
of thingsthatare notevents,whoserelationto
thetemporal seriesis whollyunlikethatofsound:forexample,'represen-
tations'of character(Don Quixote),of objects(the SinfoniaDomestica),of
lightand darkness(The Creation).It wouldbe wrongto insistthatwe cannot
hear these thingsin the music. Indeed, the contraryview seems closerto
our intuitions.When we learn of a piece of music that it is supposed to
representsomething,then its 'auditoryaspect' (the way it sounds) may
changeforus, even when whatis 'depicted' is not a sound. On learningof
its subject we may come to 'hear it differently', despitethe fact that the
subject is not somethingaudible. Consider Debussy's prelude, Voiles,
which may be said to depict the slow driftof sails in a summerbreeze.
Learningthat,I may beginto hear in the musicalline a leisurelyand day-
dreamingqualitythatI did not hearbefore,as thoughI werewatchingthe
to-ingand fro-ingof sails on a calm brightsea. But here,of course,whatis
'depicted' is not somethingheard. May we not say, all the same, thatwe
hearthe music as the drifting of sails?
Even if we grantthe forceof these remarks,however,we findourselves
facinganother,and yet more serious objectionto the view that there is
'representation'in music. The objection is that one can understanda
'representational'piece of music withouttreatingit as a representation,
indeed,withoutbeing aware thatit is supposed to have such a status.On
the other hand, the very suggestionthat one mightunderstand-say-
Raphael's St George(National Gallery of Art, Washington)while being
indifferent to, or ignorantof, its representational quality,is absurd. To
suggest such a thingis to suggesttreating Raphael as a workof abstract
the
art; it is to ignorethe featureof representation altogether,because it is
thoughtto be insignificant, or because it is thoughtto play no part in
aestheticinterest.But to takesuch a view is simplyto dismissthe problem.
If I recognizethe existenceof a problemabout music it is partlybecause
I thinkthat there is an aestheticallysignificantnotion of representation
employedin the discussionand enjoymentof painting.
Now someonemightobjectto theview thatone cannotbothunderstand
the Raphael and also have no knowledgeof its subject. He mightclaim
that at least a partial understandingof the paintingcould be achievedby
studyingit as a piece of abstractart. One mayunderstandthe composition
of the painting,he will say,the balance of tensionsbetweenascendingand
descendinglines,the sequence of spatialplanes,and so on, and in none of
thisneed one have an awarenessof the subject. But such a replyis wholly
misguided.For it seemsto suggestthattheseimportantaestheticproperties
279
Roger Scruton
of the Raphael-composition, balance, spatial rhythm-are quite

independentof the representation;whereas that is clearlynot so. For
examplewe perceivethe balance betweenthe upwardthrustof the horse's
hind legs and the downwardpressureof the lance onlybecause we see the
two lines as filledwith the forcesof the thingsdepicted-of the horse's
muscles and the horseman'slance. Take away the representation and the
balance too would dissolve.And the same goes forthe composition.Alter
the representational meaningof the horse (close its eye, for example,or
attacha bangleto itshoof) and thecompositionwouldbe utterlydestroyed.
Nothinghere is comprehensibleuntilthe representation is grasped.
Let us return,then,to our example.When a passagefromVoilesreminds
me of driftingsails I do indeed hear an aspect of the music. But the
important partofthisaspect-the partthatseemsessentialto a fullmusical
understanding-canbe perceivedby someonewho is deafto the represen-
tation.It is possibleto hearthe relaxedand leisurelyqualityofthe musical
line while being unaware that it depicts the movementof sails. The
'reference'to sails does not determineour understandingof the music in
thewaythatrepresentation determines our understanding ofthevisualarts.
We should considerhere the normalcase of representational art,as we
knowit frompaintingand literature.In such a case it goes withoutsaying
thatan understanding oftheworkdependson a graspofitsrepresentational
quality.For, in such a case, aestheticinterestdepends on certainthoughts
whichare onlyexpressedin therepresentation. In music,on theotherhand,
the 'representation'is of littlerelevanceto understanding.We can have
considerableunderstandingof a 'representational'piece of music, while
being ignorantof, indifferent to, or contemptuoustowards,its represen-
tationalclaims.Thus, not onlydoes our interestin music failto answerto
the fourthof our conditionsfor a representational art; it also fails to
answerto the first.To understanda representational painting,one must
have some knowledgeofthe subject; but the same has neverbeen honestly
claimedformusic.It has alwaysbeen concededthata majorpartof musical
understanding is independentof depiction.It is whollynaturalto listento
and appreciatethe music of the Ringlong beforeone has a complete-or
even a partial-understandingof its representational claims. And later,
one's understanding ofthemusicis enrichedprimarily throughan increasing
grasp of thematic,harmonicand structuralrelations,ratherthan through
knowledge of its representationalframework.There is a story that
Bruckner,havingstared rapturouslyinto the orchestrapit throughouta
performanceof Die Walkfire,looked up during the final scene to ask
'Why are theyburningthatwoman?' The storyis credible;few,however,
would wish to arguethatBrucknerhad an impoverishedunderstanding of
Wagner'smusic.
It follows,I suggest,that the point of 'representation'in music is not
strictlycomparablewiththe pointof representation in the visual arts.But
280
I have definedrepresentation in termsof its point; thereforeit must be

wrongto saythatmusicis representational. To put theargumentso bluntly
is, however,to open the pathto a certainscepticism.Why,afterall, should
we definerepresentation as I have definedit? Briefly,the answeris this:
we need to make a distinctionbetween two kinds of aestheticinterest.
In eithercase thereis one centralobjectofinterest-usuallya workofart-
beyondwhichone's attentiondoes notwander.But in one typeof aesthetic
interestone does not thinkonlyof the workof art. One's attention may be
focused on the work,even thoughone's thoughtsare not. This happens
when one's thoughtsare not about the work of art, but are nevertheless
derivedfromit,and remainin the work'scontrol.One's thoughtsin such a
case are not mereassociations, but on the contraryare both conveyedand
developed by the work to which one attends.The true subject of these
thoughtsmay be somethingquite otherthan the work of art: the man
Aeneas, forexample. But in reflecting on Aeneas and his adventuresone
may also be attendingto the Aeneid; and thatis whyit is rightto say that
the Aeneidis a representation of the adventuresof Aeneas. The 'subject'
of a representational workof art is also the subject of our thoughtswhen
we understandthe work,and therefore to enjoythe workis to reflectupon
its subject. There we begin to see the importanceof such an aesthetic
interest,in whichthethoughtof a subjectis entirelywithinthe controlof a
work of art. And we can see too why we should wish to distinguishthe
quite different kindof aestheticinterestin whichan attentionto the work
of art is not bound up with an interestin a subject,and why we should
wishto saythat'understanding' theworkis a different matterin eithercase.
Here we should make a distinctionbetweenrepresentation and expres-
sion, since the remarks in the last paragraph help to explain why
philosophersconstantlyrelyon that distinction.Even in the second type
of aestheticinterest-wherethereis no narrativeor anecdotalelement-
it is possible that our enjoymentof the workwill involveus in thoughts
about other things.But such thoughtshave no narrativeor descriptive
character;they are much more like ostensionthan statement,consisting
in referenceto or reminiscenceof thingsthatare not described.A passage
of music may seem to carrysome referenceto grief,say, or to a flightof
birds,or to somethingone knowsnotwhat.Characteristic of such reference
is the frequentdifficulty one has in puttingthe 'thoughts'conveyedby the
musicintowords.A man mayfeelthatsomething is beingsaid by themusic,
but be quite unable to say whatitis. Butthisinabilityis in no waya signthat
he has not understoodthe music. Here we may wish to speak not of
representation but ratherof expression.Characteristic of expressionis the
presence of 'reference'withoutpredication.Sadness is expressedby the
music but nothingis said about the sadness,or the flightof birds is made
'present'in the music,but is not describedthere.(We begin to see why
Croce and Collingwood distinguishedexpressionfrom description,and
28i
'9
Roger Scruton
why they claimed that the formeronly presentsthings,and does not

generalize.)
But even whenthis distinctionis made clear (and obviouslymuch more
needs to be said), an objectionwill be raised.I have claimedthatwe do not
understandmusic in the way thatis necessaryif musicis to be a represen-
tationalart. But it will be asked: what is meantby 'understanding'here?
And it mightbe thoughtthatthe claimsI am makingare purelylegislative,
thatI am simplytryingto defineaway the possibilityof musicalrepresen-
tation.The objectionis a welcomeone, since it helps us to understandthe
point at issue. We are not concernedto show that music can or cannot
representobjects. We are attemptingto show ratherthat the question
whethermusic is representational is a question about the appreciationof
music,and not a questionabout music's structure.The questionis: do we
understandmusicin thatway?It is clearthatwe could envisagedefinitions
of 'understanding'musicaccordingto whichmusicis interpreted as a kind
of code, with a systematicinterpretation the parametersof which are
grasped by all who could be said to understandit. On such a view music
would becomean inherently information-bearing medium,and its capacity
to representtheworldwould hardlybe disputed.6I do notproposeto argue
for the notion of musical understandingthat I am here assuming.7My
point is that we do have an intuitiveidea of musical understanding, and
thatthis idea reflectsour experienceof music as an aestheticobject. And
accordingto this intuitiveidea-with its emphasison melody,harmony
and auditory relations-there is little place for representationin the
appreciationof music.If we insist,nevertheless,thatthereis such a place,
thenwe findourselvesimposingan idea of musicalunderstanding thathas
no intuitiveappeal, and which fails to reflect of
the activities those who
composeand listento music. Suppose now thatsomeonewereto developa
musicalsemantics,in thefullsenseofa theorythatassignstruth-conditions
to musical utterances.Then therewould still be no argumentfor saying
thatmusic is a representational medium.For we should stillhave to show
that this semantictheoryalso provides an account of the way music is
understood.
In searchforexamplesof genuinemusicalrepresentation we maybe led
by this argumentback to the suggestionthat the true subject-matterof
music is sound. Sounds have propertieswhich music,being itselfsound,
mayshare; so musicoughtto be able to depictsounds.For therewill be no
difficultyherein explaininghow it is thatthe music maylead us inevitably
6 It is preciselysuch a modelof musicalunderstanding

thatis implicitin
V. A. Howard'sattempt to applyGoodman'stheoryofrepresentation
to music:
see 'On Representational Music',Nou's,1972.
7 For further remarkson 'understandingmusic'see myArtand Imagination,
ch. I2 (London,1974).
282
to the thoughtof whatis represented.Thoughtsof a subjectwill therefore

forman integralpartofmusicalappreciation.But againthereis a peculiarity
thatdeservesmention,since it seemsto suggestthateven here,in the most
plausible examples,thereis yet anotherof our fivefeaturesof represen-
tationthatfailsto belongto music: feature(2). When music attemptsthe
direct'representation' of sounds it has a tendencyto become transparent,
as it were,to its subject.Representation giveswayto reproduction, and the
musical medium drops out of considerationaltogetheras superfluous.
In a sensethefirstsceneofDie Meistersinger containsan excellentrepresen-
tation of a Lutheran chorale. But then it is a Lutheranchorale.Similarly,
the tinklingof teaspoons in Strauss's Sinfonia Domestica,and the striking
of anvils in Rheingold,are not so much sounds representedas sounds
reproduced,which in consequence detach themselves fromthe musical
structureand stand out on their own. Nor is this an accident. On the
contrary, it is an inevitableconsequenceofthelogicalpropertiesof sounds.
For sounds,as I have alreadymentioned,may be identifiedas individuals
independently of the objectsthatpossess them.In attempting to represent
them,therefore, one need have no regardto theobjectthatproducesthem:
one representsthe sound alone. But since thereis nothingto musicexcept
sound, thereceases to be any essentialdifference betweenthe mediumof
representation and the subjectrepresented.Inevitably,therefore, thereis a
tendencytowardsisomorphismof the two.
The most ambitiousattemptsat musical representationoftenfail as
music for this very reason. In Charles Ives' evocationof the sounds of
CentralParkwe finda constanttendencyon thepartofthemusicalmedium
to collapse intothe sound represented,to become absorbedin it, to cease
therebyto have anyindependentlife.All thatwe are leftwithis a succession
of brass-bands,jazz groups,cries and murmurs,which stand out in the
music as isolated particularsbearingno musical relationone to another,
just like the sounds in CentralPark. The musical medium is no longer
strongenough to impose on those sounds any unityor relationshipthat
theydo not alreadycarryin themselves.(Contrasthere the Cataloguedes
Oiseaux,whereMessiaen, leaningso heavilyon the harmonicand textural
traditionsestablishedby Debussy, has produced unfailingmusical sense:
the birdsongfinds a proper musical reality,it does not merelyremain
itself,however closely it is copied in the music.) In Ives the sounds
'depicted' enterso forciblyinto the music as to destroyits independent
structure.Their effectis like that of the actor,who, havingto simulatea
murderon the stage, profitsfromthe opportunityto kill his rival. The
fundamentalseparationof art and realityis destroyed,and our under-
standingceases, as a result,to have any aestheticaim. In Ives, when we
hear the representation, we cease to hear the music.
Perhaps it would be betterto considerthe case of a 'representation' of
one musical stylein the 'syntax' of another. We do indeed find in such
283
Roger Scruton
cases interestingexamples that might lead us to speak more freelyof

representation. Consider,forexample,thedance musicfromAct II scene 4
of Wozzeck. In Don GiovanniMozart had placed a lightorchestraon the
stage, but this orchestradid not 'imitate'the sounds of popular music;
rather,it reproduced them. Representationwas achieved throughthe
purelytheatrical,non-musicalconventionthatwhat is on the stageis part
oftheaction.The 'representational' statusofthemusiccould be understood
by someone with no musicalunderstandingwhatsoever.In Wozzeck,on
the otherhand, we findthe remarkableeffectof an imitationof Viennese
dance musicwrittenin the prevailingatonalidiomofthe work.The music
has a partto play in the total representationover and above the factthat
it is performedon the stage. For the music must be heardas the robust
tonalitiesofJohannStrauss,and yet,at the same time,can be fullyunder-
stood onlyin atonalterms.The atonalityof the mediumrendersit opaque
to the tonal subject-matter, so thatthe sounds representedare not merely
reproducedin the music.
Many of the elementsof representation are here,and the analogywith
paintingis perhaps never more apparent. Thus: (a) the extra-musical
reference(to a Viennesewaltz) seemsto be essentialto our understanding
of the music; (b) the object representedis not simplyreproducedin the
music, nor, given the conventionsof the style,could it be reproduced
there; (c) the music and its subject are relatedin the experienceof the
music,whichmust be heardas a Viennesewaltz; (d) all this is manifestly
intendedby the composer.
Nevertheless,it is importantto realize that, even here, one's under-
standingof the music is only partlydeterminedby its 'representational'
status,and forthe mostpartproceedsin quite anotherway.Moreover,the
representational characteris not an autonomouspropertyofthe music,and
can be fullyunderstoodonly through theatricalconventionsthat are
entirelynon-musicalin their origin. Thus the most importantof our
conditionsfor representation-theconditionthat the workof art should
convey definitethoughtsabout its subject-is not obviouslysatisfiedby
the musiceven here. If it does seem to be satisfiedit is largelybecause of
the dramaticcontext,which enables us to give contentto the composer's
thoughts.
It is not onlyin dramaticmusic thata fullunderstanding may requirea
grasp of some extra-musicalrelation.Consider,for example,the last of
Picturesat an Exhibition.Here thereis a deliberateimitationof twofamiliar
sounds: cathedralbells, and a distanthymn.Their combinationleads to a
splendideffectof musicalunity,but it is a unitythatcould not existwere
it not forour priordispositionto associatethe two kindsof sound. But to
see how far even this case is fromordinaryrepresentation we need only
ask ourselves what a man must lack who fails to recognizethe extra-
musicalreference.Even he mayexperiencethe musicalunity;and forhim
284
too the associationof bells and hymn-tunesmay be operatingto lead him

to accept Mussorgsky'sstrikingcombinationas a naturalone. In no sense
must his musical understandingbe diminishedby his failureto entertain
the thoughtthatis here suggestedby the 'representation'.
Despite all theseobjections,it cannotbe claimedthatmusic has no part
to play in representation.In the opera, forexample,where dramaticand
literaryconventionsalreadydetermineour understandingof the workof
art,music can play a partin the representation thatis entirelyits own,and
nota merecommenton theactionon thestage.Indeed, in therightcontext,
music may go so far as to presentthoughtsthat are conveyedneitherby
theactionnorbythewords.Consider,forexample,thescenethatBruckner
foundso bewildering.When Wotan, havingsummonedthe god of fireto
protectthe sleepingBriinnhilde,pointshis spear and says
WermeinesSpeeres
Spitzeffirchtet,
das Feuernie!
durchschreite
the music, not the words,tells us that the referenceis to Siegfried,the

unbornherowho was earlierthesubjectof Briinnhilde'spleading.Here the
music plays an essentialpart in the completionof the dramaticthought.
Withoutit, the full impact of the scene as drama could not be under-
stood.
But of course,we should not attemptto provethe possibilityof musical
representation throughcitingthe place of musicin an operaticor theatrical
context. This context no more proves the representationalnature of
dramaticmusic than it proves the representational nature of costumes,
lightingand make-up. Clearlyarchitecturetoo has a part to play in the
theatre:does that make architectureinto a representational art? To take
such a view would be shallow indeed; it would amount,in effect,to an
abolitionof the verypossibilityof an abstractformof art.
I wishto concludewitha fewremarksthatare farmorespeculativethan
the argumentsI have given. I have argued that music is not represen-
tational, since thoughts about a subject are never essential to the
understandingof music. But, it mightbe said, that is all verywell; but
you have done nothingto show that we mustunderstandmusic as we
presentlyunderstandit, nothingto show that there could not be a new
way of understandingmusic which yet had the characterof an aesthetic
(ratherthan, say, a practicalor scientific)interest,and which accorded
to music a representational status.
Throughout this paper have been concernedto point out specific
I
differences between music and the otherarts,specificpropertiesof music
to
thatseem distinguish it from the otherartspreciselyin respectof those
featuresthat are relevantto The objectionjust mentioned
representation.
285
Roger Scruton
wouldbe answeredifitcould be shownthatthesefeaturesare notaccidental

featuresderivedfromour presentmode of interestin music, but on the
contraryessentialfeatures,arisingfromthe verynatureof music as an art
of sound.
Now it would be wrongto say thatsounds simplycannotbe understood
as representations:forwhatis poetryifnotsound?But therepresentational
nature of poetryis a consequence of the medium of language; poetry
achieves the status of representation throughexploitingpre-established
semanticrules.If thesoundsofmusicwerelikewiseto be put to a linguistic
use-if there were literallya musical language-then of course music
would also be capable of representation. But then it would cease to be
music. It would be poetrywrittenin a languageof absolutepitch(a kind
of superlativetonic language). In contrastto such a suggestion,we need
to show thattherecould be a representational use of music whichdid not
depend on semanticrules. Such a use would arise if our interestin music
wereto involvean interestin the music as sound and, at thesametimeand
in the same act of attention,an interestin some extra-musicalsubject.
Only thencould it be essentialto an understanding of the soundthatthere
should also be some understandingof the subject. But I doubt thatthere
could be such a combinationof interestsoutsidethe special contextof the
music-drama.For we should need a relation between sound and its
'subject' thatwas so intimatethatto listento and understandthe sound
was also to thinkof and understandthe subject,just as to see a painting
and to grasp the narrativethoughtsabout its subject are simultaneous
partsof one identicalact of attention.In otherwords,we should need the
sound to be as intimately connectedto a subjectas a paintingis connected
to its visual aspect. But I suspect that there can be no such intimate
connection,preciselybecause of the logical statusof sounds that I noted
earlier. Sounds are individuals,not properties:two sounds may stand
in the same relationto two respectiveobjects, but they are not strictly
sharedby thoseobjects.By contrast,two objectsmaysharea singleappear-
ance, and in describingthat appearanceone will also be describingboth
the objectsthatpossessit. Whilewe maypass,therefore, withouthesitation
froma visual appearance to that which possesses it-and hence froma
paintingto its subject-we can pass withease froman auditoryappearance
only to a sound,and not, exceptwithdifficulty, to the object whichemits
the sound. Thus the experience of the sound will not automatically
involvethoughtsabout the subjectrepresented, and the sound can acquire
no directiconic relationto a subject.Moreover,while a visual appearance
mayidentify the subject-since it maybe sufficientlydetailedto conveyan
identifyingdescription-asound remainsmerelya sound, and will tell us
nothingfurtherabout the subject to which it is referred.The subject
remains hidden, as it were, behind the veil of sound, and neitherits
identitynor its natureis easilydiscoveredthroughthe veil. I suspectthat
286
such considerations,
whileby no meansconclusive,indicatethatsounds
cannotbe representational
untiltheyareorganizedbysemanticrules,and
therefore
thatmusic,ifitis to remaindistinct
frompoetry,
simplymustbe
understoodas an abstract
art.
Birkbeck
College,
London
287

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Music maybe used to expressemotion,to heightena drama,to emphasize

althoughof course it is not alwaysthe truth-valueof a thoughtthatis of

prove that music is a language in order to assign to it the expressive

intend the paintingto contain a representation of a camel. Rather,the

cannotbe put into words,and which consequentlycannotbe regardedas

existside by side as acceptedmembersof the repertoire;as in The Rite of

can be heardin thetoneofa voice.And it is certainly

of the Raphael-composition, balance, spatial rhythm-are quite

I have definedrepresentation in termsof its point; thereforeit must be

why they claimed that the formeronly presentsthings,and does not

6 It is preciselysuch a modelof musicalunderstanding

to the thoughtof whatis represented.Thoughtsof a subjectwill therefore

cases interestingexamples that might lead us to speak more freelyof

too the associationof bells and hymn-tunesmay be operatingto lead him

the music, not the words,tells us that the referenceis to Siegfried,the

wouldbe answeredifitcould be shownthatthesefeaturesare notaccidental

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