STATEMENT OF FACTS..............................................................................................................

I. The Wedding and Visit to Sheikh Abdul Tayyar............................................................3

II. Disappearance of Mrs Rohini......................................................................................3

III. Trial in Dubai..............................................................................................................3

IV. Chandigarh Police - FIR No. 920 of 2019...................................................................4

V. Money Laundering Charges - FIR No. 923 of 2019...................................................4

VI. The Instant Appeal Petition for Quashing FIRs..........................................................4

ISSUES RAISED...........................................................................................................................5

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED...........................................................................................................6

ISSUE 1: THAT THE HON’BLE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO TRY THE PRESENT CASE
................................................................................................................................................6

Issue 1.1 The Present Set of Facts make it Pre-Dominantly Apparent that the
Quashing of the FIRs are indeed a necessity to secure the ends of justice........................6

Issue 1.2 The Facts of the Case makes it crystal clear that the Quashing of the FIRs
are indeed a necessity to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.............................7

Issue 1.3 Proceedings brought against the plaintiff is vexatious.......................................8

Issue 1.4 The Proceedings and its Continuity could add to Futility of Cause and
Abuse of Process of Court..................................................................................................9

ISSUE 2: THAT THE TRIAL OF MR VEER BY THE COURT IN INDIA, FOR THE SAME
CHARGES THAT HE HAD ALREADY FACED IN DUBAI, AMOUNTS TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY.....11

Issue 2.1 That the facts on the present FIR has been filed are same as the ones for
which the trial took place in Dubai and hence repetitive and frivolous...........................11

Issue 2.2 That the present case was tried under a court of competent jurisdiction and
application of laws which were not violative of Indian lex loci......................................12

Issue 2.2.1 The laws were not in contradiction to laws of India..................................12

Issue 2.2.2 The court was a competent court with proper jurisdiction........................13

Issue 2.3 That the filing of the present FIR and any proceedings/tria on the basis of
such filing would amount to double jeopardy..................................................................14
ISSUE 3: THAT MR VEER HAS NOT COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCE PUNISHABLE
UNDER SECTIONS 363, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE AND
ALSO UNDER SECTION 5, 8 OF THE IMMORAL TRAFFIC (PREVENTION) ACT, 1956..............16

Issue 3.1 Sections related to Kidnapping.........................................................................16

Issue 3.2 Sections dealing with Slavery...........................................................................17

Issue 3.3 Sections of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956...........................18

ISSUE 4: THE ALLEGED TRANSACTION THROUGH BITCOIN AND ITS EXCHANGE INTO
INDIAN CURRENCY IS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW IN INDIA.....................................................19

Issue 4.1 The RBI Stance and validity of Virtual Currencies....................................19

Issue 4.2 The Circular of RBI dated 06-04-2018.......................................................20

Issue 4.2.1 The test of Reasonability...........................................................................20

Issue 4.2.2 RBIs Contradictory Stance........................................................................21
Issue 4.3 The trading of cryptocurrency is valid and not illegal in India..................22

ISSUE 5: THAT VEER HAS NOT COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER
PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT AND THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MANAGEMENT
ACT 23

Issue 5.1 Bitcoin is not a currency...................................................................................23

Issue 5.1.1 Currency under Indian Laws......................................................................23

Issue 5.1.2 Origin and Nature of Bitcoin.....................................................................23
Issue 5.1.3 Bitcoin and its stance.................................................................................25
Issue 5.2 The charges framed under section 4 of the Prevention of money laundering
act does not satisfy the essentials provided in the definition of money laundering.........26

Issue 5.2.1 The charges pressed on Mr Veer in Dubai................................................27

Issue 5.2.2 The question of ‘proceeds of crime’ in case of Dubai Trial......................27

Issue 5.2.3 The charges pressed on Mr Veer in Chandigarh.......................................27

Issue 5.2.4 The question of ‘proceeds of crime’ in case of Chandigarh Case.............27

Issue 5.3 That the charges pressed under the Foreign Exchange Management Act,
1999 are inapplicable.......................................................................................................28

Issue 5.3.1 The Incident and FIR 923/2019.................................................................28

Issue 5.3.2 Inapplicability of Section 3, 4, 7 and 13 of FEMA...................................28

 STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. THE WEDDING AND VISIT TO SHEIKH ABDUL TAYYAR

Mr Veer Singhania fell in love with Ms Rohini Singh after meeting through tinder. Ms Rohini
wanted to be with him forever and hence decided to enter into a wedlock despite her family’s
opposition. On 31st December 2018, Mr Veer and Ms Rohini got married without the
blessings of family and left for their honeymoon on the 5th of January 2019. During the
travel Mr Veer started conversation with one Sheikh Abdul Tayyar whose business office is
in Venice (Italy), and who was on his way to home, Dubai. After a brief conversation, Tayyar
invited them to come and visit him and expressed how his wives would be happy to meet
Rohini. After three days of sightseeing in and around Dubai, the couple paid a visit to Abdul
Tayyar’s residence.

II. DISAPPEARANCE OF MRS ROHINI

Mr Tayyar informed Mr Veer that since his family had a traditional mind-set Mrs Rohini
would not be able to join them as they talked business, and that he should let his wives show
her around. Post this both Mr Veer and Mr Tayyar began business negotiations and a
successful business proposition was decided upon. In furtherance of the same, a sum of 7,000
Bitcoins was transferred to Mr Veer’s account. Post this when Mr Veer called for his wife,
Mr Tayyar informed that he had no wife and he was becoming delusional. The same narrative
was reiterated by the taxi driver, the hotel staff and also his honeymoon suite was substituted
for a business suite and all his wife belongings were missing apart from a few photos on Mr
Veer’s Smartphone which were the sole evidence.

III. TRIAL IN DUBAI

Meanwhile Mrs Rohini’s father Mr Bhisham Singh had flew to Dubai being concerned for
the safety of her daughter and met Mr Veer. When he was narrated the whole incident he was
not convinced and filed a complaint in the local police station in Dubai. A lengthy
investigation was carried out and Veer was charged under Article 344 of the Penal Code and
also Article 2 of the Federal Law on Combating Human Trafficking. It was argued in the
court that Mr Veer was being victimized by the system and that he was deeply in love with
Mrs Rohini, and would never dream of doing such a heinous crime. A plethora of evidences,
from documented photographs to testimonies of the hotel staffs were produced in the court
and on basis on it the court finally acquitted Veer.
 IV. CHANDIGARH POLICE - FIR NO. 920 OF 2019
When Mr Veer flew back to India on the 21st of December, 2019 he was arrested by a special
detail of the Chandigarh police at the Indira Gandhi International Airport and was taken to
Chandigarh for questioning. The Chandigarh police had been acting on the basis of FIR No.
920 of 2019 under Sections 363, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371 of the Indian Penal Code and
also under Section 5, 8 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 which had been
registered by Mrs Swapna Singh on December 16, 2019, the day after the acquittal of Mr
Veer.

V. MONEY LAUNDERING CHARGES - FIR NO. 923 OF 2019

Mr Veer applied for and was granted bail conditioned on a bond of Rs. 20, 00,000 on 29th
December 2019. In order to pay for legal defence Mr Veer decided to withdraw money from
his business account. For this purpose he approached Mr Rahamat Saeed where he transferred
5000 Bitcoins to Mr Rahamat and received Rs. 46,00,000 in cash. After the exchange was
made, the Chandigarh police along with the special team in-charge of economic offences
arrested Mr Veer and Mr Rahamat for dealing in Bitcoins.

It was done by stating it as activity in contravention to the foreign trade and exchange laws
and various RBI regulations and that amounting to an offence under the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, among other laws that are in force in India. During the investigation Mr
Rahamat Saeed’s shop was also sealed and the special team ceased all electronic machinery
including computers, external hard drives, USB sticks, and other documents.Post the raids
and arrests, a FIR dated January 1, 2020 was filed under Section 4 of the Prevention of
Money Laundering Act, 2002 and Sections 3, 4, 7 and 13 of the Foreign Exchange
Management Act, 1999.

VI. THE INSTANT APPEAL PETITION FOR QUASHING FIRS

Mr Veer and Mr Rahamat Saeed have filed separate quashing petitions before the Hon’ble
Punjab and Haryana High Court with respect to FIR No. 920 of 2019 and FIR No. 923 of
2019. The Hon’ble High Court has admitted both the petitions and have clubbed them for
hearings and argumentation to take place before the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court
on 4th February, 2020.
 ISSUES RAISED

1. WHETHER THE COMPETENT COURT IN INDIA HAS JURISDICTION TO TRY THE PRESENT

CASE?

2. WHETHER TRIAL OF MR VEER BY THE COURT IN INDIA, FOR THE SAME CHARGES THAT HE
HAD ALREADY FACED IN DUBAI, AS THAT WOULD AMOUNT TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
3. WHETHER MR VEER HAS COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER

SECTIONS 363, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE AND ALSO

UNDER SECTION 5, 8 OF THE IMMORAL TRAFFIC (PREVENTION) ACT, 1956?

4. WHETHER ALLEGED TRANSACTION THROUGH BITCOINS AND ITS EXCHANGE INTO INDIAN

CURRENCY IS CONTRARY TO LAW IN INDIA?

5. WHETHER VEER HAS COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 4
OF THE PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT, 2002 AND SECTION 13 OF THE

FOREIGN EXCHANGE MANAGEMENT ACT, 1999?

 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1: THAT THE HON’BLE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO TRY THE PRESENT CASE
(¶ 1.) It is most humbly and respectfully submitted before this Hon’ble Court that
Section 4821 of Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) confers upon this court the inherent
power to quash FIRs2 and exercise this power as a device to advance justice and not to
frustrate it3. Further, the police station at which the FIRs have been lodged are under the
territorial jurisdiction of this Hon’ble High Court. Thus, broadly in light of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court’s defined grounds under which such a power can be exercised 4, the inherent
power of this Hon’ble High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised:

I. to secure the ends of justice, or;

II. to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;

Issue 1.1 The Present Set of Facts make it Pre-Dominantly Apparent that
the Quashing of the FIRs are indeed a necessity to secure the ends of justice.
(¶ 2.) It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the facts of the
case clearly reflect that the present case is an apparent one where there has been an
attempt at systematic harassment of Mr Veer. The case reflects a malifide intent of Mr
Bhisham Singh who tried to harass Mr Veer by falsely implicating him of charges of
human trafficking at Dubai. The same however failed to materialize owing to the fact
that there existed a plethora of evidences, testimony, etc. which clearly pointed
towards the innocence of Mr Veer and his bonafide love that he shared with his
missing wife Mrs Rohini.

(¶ 3.) The malifide intent behind the FIR filed at Dubai was evident from the
fact that even the court found Mr Veer and his intentions far from being tainted in any
way, and the fact that such heinous charges were pressed against him by Mr Bhisham
Singh shows that he wanted to falsely implicate him. In furtherance of this systemic
oppression Mr Bhisham’s Wife, Mrs Swapna Singh yet again filed an FIR at
Chandigarh UT just the next day when Mr Veer was acquitted by the Dubai Court.
1
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 states that “Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the
inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order this
Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”
2
Anurag Chopra v. State, 1989 CrLJ 2227 (Del.)
3
State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors., 1992 AIR 604
4
State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 2042.
 (¶ 4.) The date for filing such a FIR clearly reflects on the malifide motive
behind this plan of systemic harassment that Mr Veer has been subjected too. As the
malifide intent is clearly visible in these FIRs, it is humbly submitted before this
Hon’ble Court that the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Neelam Mahajan Singh
v. Commissioner of Police5, while considering the question of quashing of the first
information report, has stated that “to see the malafides of the comlainant, if there be
any. If dominant purpose in filing the first information report is malafide, FIR
would have to be quashed.”

(¶ 5.) The view of the Delhi High Court in case of Neelam Mahajan6 was re-
iterated by this Hon’ble Court in the case of Vishal Singh Chauhan v. State of
Haryana and Ors7 where the court after a careful examination of the facts at record
was pleased to quash the FIR on the basis that the prima facie intent behind its
institution was malifide in nature.

(¶ 6.) Such reckless and malafide FIR deserves to be quashed, in view of the
law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in a celebrated case State of
Haryana v. Ch Bhajan Lal8 which was again reiterated in case Som Mittal v.
Government of Karnataka9. In this manner the present FIRs cannot legally be
permitted to subsist as they will amount to frivolous criminal proceedings against the
petitioner.

(¶ 7.) It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the present FIRs
against Mr Veer have been instituted purely on grounds of malice. Further, in light of
the existing views of Supreme Court of India, High Courts across Indian Territory and
this Hon’ble High Court as well, it is only fitting that the FIRs are immediately
quashed to secure the ends of justice 10 and to provide the Petitioners the respite that
they wish to obtain through their present petition.

5
Neelam Mahajan Singh v. Commissioner of Police 1994 (2) CLR 181.
6
Id.
7
Vishal Singh Chauhan v. State of Haryana and Ors CRM-M-16430 of 2014.
8
State of Haryana v. Ch Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 Supreme Court 604.
9
Som Mittal v. Government of Karnataka, 2008 (2) R.C.R (Criminal) 92.
10
Yadav, Dr Raj. (2012). Quashing and Cancellation of FIR in India: A Study of Legislative and Judicial
Trends.
 Issue 1.2 The Facts of the Case makes it crystal clear that the Quashing of
the FIRs are indeed a necessity to prevent an abuse of the process of any
court.
(¶ 8.) It is humbly and respectfully submitted before this Hon’ble Court that
by a mere glance at the fact sheet of the existing case, it will be clear that the offence
for which the FIR was lodged in Dubai revolved around the not only the same parties
but also the same facts for which FIR 920 of 2019 was filed by Mrs Swapna.

(¶ 9.) The above stated fact clearly highlights the contention of the plaintiff
that the present FIR is merely a tool to advance the malafide motive of the
complainants and a very apparent attempt at abusing the process of the courts to
systematically oppress, mentally harass and stain the impeccable image of Mr Veer.

(¶ 10.) In the case of State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh11 this Hon’ble Court was
of the opinion that the second complaint on the same facts is not maintainable and this
was inferred from the previous judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases
of Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar12, Major General A.S. Gauraya v.
S.N. Thakur13 and in Ajit Singh v. Makhan Singh14.

(¶ 11.) In the present case, the matter was heard and decided upon by a
criminal court in Dubai, which also is a reciprocating territory of India, and this
makes the court a competent court to try the case at hand. 15 Further, it is well
established that one of the principles on which foreign courts are recognized to be
internationally competent is voluntary submission of the party to the jurisdiction of
such foreign court.16 The reason behind this principle is that having taken a chance of
judgment in his favour by submitting to the jurisdiction of the court, it is not open to
the party to turn round when the judgment is against him and to contend that the court
had no jurisdiction.17

11
State of Punjab v. Surjit Singh 1977 Chand LR (Cri) 73
12
Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, (1962) 1 Cri LJ 770
13
Major General A.S. Gauraya v. S.N. Thakur, 1986 Cri LJ 1074
14
Ajit Singh v. Makhan Singh, (1994) 2 Rec Cri R 361.
15
Garnett, Richard. (2019). Recognition of jurisdictional determinations by foreign courts. Journal of Private
International Law. 15. 490-515. 10.1080/17441048.2019.1679435.
16
Klyuchnikov, Andrew. (2019). The main approaches to the definition of the international courts’ competence.
Tyumen State University Herald. Social, Economic, and Law Research. 5. 128-143. 10.21684/2411-7897-2019-
5-3-128-143.
17
Leigh, Monroe. (1984). Decisions of Foreign Courts. The American Journal of International Law. 78. 451.
10.2307/2202293.
 (¶ 12.) Submission to jurisdiction of a foreign court may be express or
implied. Whether the defendant has or has not submitted to the jurisdiction of a
foreign court is a question of fact, which must be decided in the light of the facts, and
circumstances of each case.18 However, it’s clearly seen that Mr Bhishan had
voluntary submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and so did Mr Veer. The present
FIR can be seen as an attempt at Judgment shopping by Mr and Mrs Bhishan.

Issue 1.3 Proceedings brought against the plaintiff is vexatious

(¶ 12.) It is within the power of the Hon'ble High Court to interfere in the
interest of justice and to stop the abuse of the process of law 19. The term ‘an abuse of
the process’ has been very aptly put forth in the case of Prem Pharmaceuticals and
Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh20 as "an abuse of the process may be committed by a
party by starting proceedings which is wanting in bona fide and is frivolous,
vexatious or oppressive".

(¶ 13.) In the instant case, the FIR no. 920 of 2012 does not make out any
offence for which Veer has been charged as he married Rohini with her consent and
took her on honeymoon. Moreover, there is no evidence, direct or indirect, which
shows any type of role played by Veer in the disappearance of Rohini, neither can it
be circumstantially deduced that Veer was involved in kidnapping Rohini from India
for slavery or prostitution. Thus, charging Veer of offences such as kidnapping from
India and further subjecting Rohini to slavery and prostitution, etc. is totally baseless
without any evidence and no offence for which Veer is charged in the said FIR can be
made out. If the FIR cannot make out any case, it will be a valid reason for quashing
it21. If no offence is proved, FIR cannot stand.

(¶ 14.) The finding the counsel wants the court to make is the broad principle
for exercise of this extraordinary power is that in case the allegations made against the
accused prima facia do not disclose an offence, there can be no reason as to why the
accused should suffer the agony of a legal proceeding. A prosecution which is

18
Belović, Jelena. (2018). Recognition and enforcement of foreign court decisions. Zbornik radova Pravnog
fakulteta Nis. 57. 275-288. 10.5937/zrpfni1880275B.
19
The State of Andhra Pradesh v. Vangaveeti Nagaiah, AIR 2009 SC 2646
20
Prem Pharmaceuticals and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1991 MPLJ 473.
21
State of Haryana v Bhajan A.I.R. 1991 SC 35.
 bound to overcome lame or a sham out to be interdicted in the interest of justice
as continuance thereof will amount to an abuse of process of law22.

Issue 1.4 The Proceedings and its Continuity could add to Futility of Cause
and Abuse of Process of Court

(¶ 15.) It is humbly submitted that in the instant case, Veer was at first
charged by Rohini's Father in Dubai under its Penal Code and Federal Law on
combating Human Traffic where Veer faced litigation and he was acquitted there and
that when he returned back to the country dejected at the loss of his wife, Rohini's
Mother yet again sued him under IPC and Immoral Trafficking (Prevention) Act. This
was clearly done to harass and to oppress Veer. Moreover, it is also to be brought up
in the light of this Hon'ble Court that suing Veer under different laws and different
jurisdiction is just to harass Veer.

(¶ 16.) To prevent abuse of process of the court, the High Court may quash an
order taking cognizance where the proceeding is frivolous and vexatious or mala
fide23. It is well settled in the Manoj Sharma case24 that if the High Court is convinced
that continuing with the proceeding would be futility, quashing of FIR is not to be
refused. It is duly submitted that the every High Court has inherent power to act ex
debito justitiae25 which can be exercised to give effect to an order under the CrPC or
to prevent abuse of the process of the court, or to otherwise secure the ends of
justice26. It has the powers as are necessary to do right and to undo a wrong in course
of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit,
concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest27.

(¶ 17.) In exercise of the powers, the Court would be justified to quash any
proceeding if it finds that initiation/ continuance of it amounts to an abuse of the
process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of
justice28. The Apex Court has stated in a case that the test is that taking the allegations
22
State of Maharashtra v. Arun Gulab Gawali, AIR 2010 SC 3762
23
Central Bureau of Investigation v. Shri Ravi Shankar Srivastava, IAS, AIR 2006 SC 2872; State ofAndhra
Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy, AIR 2004 SC 3967.Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy, AIR 2004
SC 3967.
24
Manoj Sharma v State & Ors. A.I.R.2008 SCC 359.
25
Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A.P. & Ors., (2008) 12 SCC 531.
26
State of Karnataka v L. Muniswamy A.I.R. 1977 SCC 1489.
27
State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa & Anr., (2002) 3 SCC 89
28
Vineet Kumar and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr., (2017) 13 SCC 369.
 in the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence has
been made out then the Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise
of its powers under section 482 of the Code 29. Hence, it is humbly submitted that the
said Hon'ble Court to prevent the abuse of process of the court if allegations made in
FIR do not make any offence, prima facie, it can be quashed.

(¶ 18.) Thus, the fact that the present case deals with FIRs which have to be quashed
to secure the ends of justice, and to prevent an abuse of the process of court. Therefore, in
light of its own previous Judgments and the binding nature of the Apex Court Judgments 30
stated above, this court not only has the Jurisdiction but also power as well as reason to try
the present case.

29
Satish Mehra v State of NCT of Delhi A.I.R. 2013 SCC 53.
30
TEWARI, MANISH, and REKHA SAXENA. “The Supreme Court of India: The Rise of Judicial Power and
the Protection of Federalism.” Courts in Federal Countries: Federalists or Unitarists?, edited by NICHOLAS
ARONEY and JOHN KINCAID, University of Toronto Press, Toronto; Buffalo; London, 2017, pp. 223–255.
ISSUE 2: THAT THE TRIAL OF MR VEER BY THE COURT IN INDIA, FOR THE SAME

CHARGES THAT HE HAD ALREADY FACED IN DUBAI, AMOUNTS TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY

(¶ 19.) It is most humbly and respectfully submitted before this Hon’ble Court that
the Constitution of India guarantees protection against double jeopardy to every person 31.
This right is enshrined under Article 20(2)32 of the Indian Constitution which provides as
under: "No person can be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.”33
The major ingredients to prove existence of double Jeopardy are34:

i. The person must be accused of an offense. The word ‘offense’ as defined in

general clauses Act means ‘any act or omission made punishable by law for the
time being in force35;
ii. The preceding or prosecution must have taken place before a competent Court or
Judicial Tribunal36;
iii. The offense must be the same as of before compulsorily for which he was
prosecuted or punished37;

Issue 2.1 That the facts on the present FIR has been filed are same as the
ones for which the trial took place in Dubai and hence repetitive and
frivolous
(¶ 20.) It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the facts for which Mr
Veer was tried for in Dubai which included the charges of Human Trafficking, Sham
Marriage, etc. in furtherance of which a lengthy investigation was carried out and Mr
Veer was charged under Article 344 of the Penal Code38 and also Article 2 of the Federal
Law on Combating Human Trafficking 39, both being the respective statues at United Arab
Emirates.

(¶ 21.) It is humbly requested from this Hon’ble Court that if it casts a mere glance at
the charges pressed and the facts stated in FIR No. 920 of 2019 would clearly indicate
31
Ranjit Singh Alias Jeeta v. Union of India and another, 2009 SCC ONLINE P&H 11010.
32
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 20(2).
33
Amar, Akhil. (1996). Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple. The Yale Law Journal. 106. 10.2307/797320.
34
Mohammad Ali vs. Sri Ram Swaroop, 1965 CriLJ 413.
35
Carissa Byrne Hessick and F. Andrew Hessick, Double Jeopardy as a Limit on Punishment, 97 Cornell L.
Rev. 45 (2011).
36
Narayanlal Bansilal v M.P. Mistry , (1959) 1 SCR 274.
37
Manipur Administration v Nila Chandra Singh, AIR 1964 SC 1533.
38
The Criminal Penal Code of UAE (Federal Law No. 3 of 1987) ,Article 344
39
Federal Law No. (51) of 2006 on Combating Human Trafficking Crimes As amended under Federal Law No.
(1) of 2015, Article 2
 that not only the grounds of pressing the charges are similar but also the statement of facts
which led to such speculation and registration of FIR by the police are completely same
as what was quotes in the FIR filed at Dubai by Mr Bhishan.

(¶ 22.) The fact that the FIR has been filed on information that was already used in
the previous FIR and on basis of which a trial took place at Dubai, and further that the
same offence40 has again been alleged to have been committed by Mr Veer clearly fulfil
the third ingredient necessary for claiming double jeopardy and hence needs to be looked
into.

Issue 2.2 That the present case was tried under a court of competent
jurisdiction and application of laws which were not violative of Indian lex
loci
(¶ 23.) It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that whereas Mr Veer
was first prosecuted in Dubai and when he was acquitted of the charges levelled against
him by the court of competent jurisdiction, a fresh proceedings were initiated against him
in India. To have the foreign judgment of Dubai Court be enforced, it is mandatory that it
is proved that the court was a competent court 41 and the laws applied were not in
contradiction to laws existent in India42.

Issue 2.2.1 The laws were not in contradiction to laws of India

(¶ 24.) To understand this issue, the Hon’ble court may refer to the
respective charges that were pressed in Dubai and the legal backing for the
same. It is stated that Article 344 of the Penal Code 43 and Article 244 of the
Federal Law on Combating Human Trafficking, (UAE) deal with Human
Trafficking and kidnapping respectively, which are both offences in India too.

(¶ 25.) As per Article 2 of the Federal Law on Combating Human

Trafficking, (UAE): Whoever commits any of the human trafficking crimes
provided for in Article (1)45 bis of this Law shall be punished by temporary
40
State of Bihar V. Murad Ali Khan, AIR 1989 SC 1.
41
Rodin, Siniša. (2016). Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions†. The American Journal of
Comparative Law. 64. 815-840. 10.1093/ajcl/avw014.
42
Shashank Verma , Ronak Arora and Mahima Verma, Worldwide: Execution Of United Arab Emirates
Decrees In India, Mondaq ( 08th July 2020), https://www.mondaq.com/india/constitutional-administrative-
law/962612/execution-of-united-arab-emirates-decrees-in-india
43
The Criminal Penal Code of UAE (Federal Law No. 3 of 1987), Art. 344.
44
Combating Human Trafficking Crimes, Federal Law No. (51) of 2006, Art. 2.
45
1. Whoever commits any of the following shall be deemed a perpetrator of a human trafficking crime: a.
Selling persons, offering persons for selling or buying, or promising the same. b. Soliciting persons, employing,
 imprisonment for a term of no less than five years, and a fine of no less than
one hundred thousand AED. The penalty of life imprisonment shall apply in
any one of the following cases:

i. If the victim is a child or a person with a disability.

ii. If the act is committed by the threat of murder or grave harm or
involved physical or psychological torture, or if the perpetrator was
armed.
iii. The perpetrator of the crime has created or assumed a leading role in
an organized criminal gang, has been a member therein or participated
in the actions thereof while being aware of the purposes of such gang.
iv. The perpetrator is the spouse, a relative, antecedent, descendant, or
guardian of the victim.
v. If the perpetrator is a public servant, or assigned to public service,
where he exploited the occupation or assignments thereof to commit
the crime.
vi. If the committed crime is trans-national.
vii. If the victim has been inflicted, as a result of the crime, with an
incurable disease or permanent disability.

(¶ 26.) Whereas, The Criminal Penal Code of UAE (Federal Law No.
3 of 1987) under Article 344 penalizes the act of kidnapping and reads as
follows: “anyone whosoever illegally kidnaps, arrests or detain any individual
from his/her freedom by any means and whether by himself or through a
mediator shall be sentenced to imprisonment.”

(¶ 27.) It is evident from the bare reading of both the provisions under which
the charges were pressed that none of them is violative of any law at force in the

recruiting, transferring, deporting, harboring, receiving, receiving or sending the same whether within the
country or across the national borders thereof, by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability the person for
the purpose of exploitation. c. Giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation of the latter.
2. The following shall be deemed human trafficking, even if the same does not incorporate the use of any of the
means provided in the previous Paragraph: a. Recruiting a child, transferring, deporting, harboring or receiving
the same for the purpose of exploitation. b. Selling a child, offering the same for selling or buying.
3. Under this Article, exploitation includes all forms of sexual exploitation, engaging others in prostitution,
servitude, forced labor, organ-trafficking, coerced service, enslavement, mendicancy, and quasi-slavery
practices
 territory of India and hence, such application of provisions stands the test of
applicability46.

Issue 2.2.2 The court was a competent court with proper jurisdiction
(¶ 28.) It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the
competence of a court when judged on issues such as the one present before
the court, the nature of the proceedings need to be on the similar lines 47. For
this we need to understand the nature of proceedings and the competent court
for such issues in India.

(¶ 29.) It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that had the
same issue arisen in India, the nature of the proceedings would have been
criminal and the competent court to hear the matter would have been a trial
court. Thus, any deviance from this can lead to determination of the court of
Dubai as a non-competent court.

(¶ 30.) A bare perusal of the case record from Dubai shall clearly show
that the nature of the proceedings were indeed criminal and the court was an
equivalent court to what we refer as trial court in India.

(¶ 31.) Thus, as the proceedings were carried out and were same in nature as
to what would have been in India, and further the fact that the court was an equivalent
court too, proves that the court was a competent court48.Same offence

(¶ 32.) Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the present case was tried under a court
of competent jurisdiction and application of laws which were not violative of Indian lex loci,
hence should be completely applicable and acceptable by this Hon’ble Court49. Thus, the
second ingredient for existence of a case of double jeopardy also stands aptly put forth and
verified.

46
 R.S. Rama Shenoi and Anr v. M.A. Hallagna And Anr, 45 Ind Cas 703.
47
In Maqbool Hussain v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 SC 325.
48
Reg. v. Miles (1890) 24 Q. B.D. 423(A)
49
In State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan and others, AIR 1989 SC 1.
 Issue 2.3 That the filing of the present FIR and any proceedings/trial on the
basis of such filing would amount to double jeopardy
(¶ 33.) It is most humbly and respectfully submitted that apart from the Article
20(2) of the India Constitution, even Section 30050 of the Criminal Procedure Code
contains the protection of an accused against double jeopardy.

(¶ 34.) The brief analysis of section 300(1)51 says that the basic rule is that a
person who has once been tried by the court of competent jurisdiction for an offence
and convicted or acquitted of such an offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal
remains in force, not to be liable to be tried again for the same offence.

(¶ 35.) It must be noted that in the instant case, Mr Veer was tried in Dubai
before the court of competent jurisdiction and he was acquitted. Subsequently, when
he came to India he was again charged for various offences for which he had already
been charged and acquitted in Dubai. Thus his statutory right under Section 300 of the
Criminal procedure Code and his fundamental right against double jeopardy as
enshrined under Article 20(2)52 of the Indian Constitution were violated.

(¶ 36.) In the case of The State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte and Anr.53 the
Constitution Bench of this Court while dealing with the issue of double jeopardy
under Article 20(2), held: “To operate as a bar the second prosecution and the
consequential punishment thereunder, must be for “the same offence”. The crucial
requirement therefore for attracting the Article is that the offences are the same i.e.
they should be identical. If, however, the two offences are distinct, then
notwithstanding that the allegations of facts in the two complaints might be
substantially similar, the benefit of the ban cannot be invoked.” As in this case, the
facts as well as the complaint are same, hence the double jeopardy plea can be
invoked.

(¶ 37.) The classical argument for the need of maintaining the rule is apparent
in the observation of the court in Green v. The United States54. In this landmark case,
the Court observed thus: “The underlying idea… is that the State with all its resources

50
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 300.
51
The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, § 300 (1).
52
Shipra arora, Double Jeopardy - Can an accused be actually punished twice for same offence in India, Legal
Service India (20th September 2018), www.legalservicesindia.com/article/1633/Double-Jeopardy-in-India.html.
53
The State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte and Anr 1961 AIR 578.
54
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
 and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual
for an alleged offence, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.”

(¶ 38.) The Supreme Court in the case of S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of

India55 laid down that Art.20(3) refers to judicial punishment and gives immunity to a
person from being prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once.

(¶ 39.) The Supreme Court in a recent decision of Kolla Veera Raghav Rao v.
Gorantla Venkateswara Rao56, explaining this proposition of law inter alia observed
that a person cannot be convicted even for a different offence under a different
statute if the facts leading to the conviction under both the statutes are the same.

(¶ 40.) It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that an analysis of the above
stated facts, coupled with the judicial pronouncements from Apex Court over the years
clearly highlight as to how the present issue before this court can be broadly termed as a case
of double jeopardy57. In furtherance of the same, the court can very well understand as to how
this whole systemic cycle of harassment has been weaved around Mr Veer in this present
case and why it becomes an essential step to quash the present FIRs to secure the ends of
justice.

55
S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of India 1954 AIR 375.
56
Kolla Veera Raghav Rao v. Gorantla Venkateswara Rao, (2011) 2 SCC 703.
57
Mohit Chaturvedi, Doctrine of Double Jeopady, Law Times Journal (25th September 2019),
lawtimesjournal.in/doctrine-of-double-jeopardy/.
ISSUE 3: THAT MR VEER HAS NOT COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCE

PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 363, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371 OF THE INDIAN PENAL
CODE AND ALSO UNDER SECTION 5, 8 OF THE IMMORAL TRAFFIC (PREVENTION) ACT,
1956
(¶ 41.) It is humbly and respectfully submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the
charges under Sections 363, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371 of the Indian Penal Code and also
under Section 5, 8 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 58 are completely baseless
and are indicative for a myriad systemic scheme of harassment in which Mr Veer is being
pushed into.

Issue 3.1 Sections related to Kidnapping

(¶ 42.) If the Hon’ble Court may direct its justiciable gaze towards the Section
of Indian Penal Codes under which Mr Veer was booked, it may see that Section
36359 deals with - Punishment for kidnapping. And reads as - Whoever kidnaps any
person from [India] or from lawful guardianship, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and
shall also be liable to fine.

(¶ 43.) Further, Section 36660 deals with Kidnapping, abducting or inducing

woman to compel her marriage, etc. and reads as - Whoever kidnaps or abducts any
woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will
be compelled, to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be
forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it to be likely that she will be
forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine;
1[and whoever, by means of criminal intimidation as defined in this Code or of abuse
of authority or any other method of compulsion, induces any woman to go from any
place with intent that she may be, or knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced
or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall be punishable as
aforesaid].

58
The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 Act No. 104 Of 1956
59
The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 363.
60
The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 366.
 (¶ 44.) The other Sections namely Section 36761 and 36862 which deal with
Kidnapping or abducting in order to subject person to grievous hurt, slavery, etc. and
Wrongfully concealing or keeping in confinement, kidnapped or abducted person,
respectively are inapplicable in the present case because Mr Veer and Mrs Rohini
were lawfully wedded to each other63 and hence Mr Veer cannot be said to have
abducted or kidnapped her because she went with him on her free consent and that too
as a lawfully wedded wife of his.

(¶ 45.) Further, Section 36964 is inapplicable as it deals with Kidnapping or

abducting child under ten years with intent to steal from its person, however, Mrs
Rohini was a full grown adult.65

(¶ 46.) The brazened and out brightly painted picture that has been perceived
in the present case and the evident fact that the sections applied have been so hastily
applied that few of them make no sense in the present facts, clearly point out towards
the fact that Mr Veer is being harassed by the complainants. There can be no offence
of kidnapping in the present case as Mrs Rohini went to the honeymoon with Mr
Veer. Further, the testimony of the staffs at hotel and the pictures on the phone of Mr
Veer clearly show that the two were deeply in love and Mr Veer in no way had
kidnapped Mrs Rohini.

Issue 3.2 Sections dealing with Slavery

(¶ 47.) It is humbly stated before this Hon’ble court that there exists no proofs
on record to show that Mr Veer sold Mrs Rohini as a slave or that Mr Veer was a
habitual slave dealer. The two Sections applied on Mr Veer, namely Section 370 66 and
Section 37167 deal with Buying or disposing of any person as a slave and Habitual
dealing in slaves however, as no concrete evidence exists to prove such heinous
allegations, the charges are baseless and the benefit of doubt shall be given to Mr
Veer as is the general rule.

61
The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 367.
62
The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 368.
63
Lata singh v.State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2006 SC 2522.
64
Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 369.
65
Lalwani, Sanjeev & Kumar, Reena & Dogra, Tirath. (2004). Format for Age Estimation. Journal of the
Academy of Hospital Administration. 16. 1-6.
66
Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 370.
67
Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 371.
 (¶ 48.) Further, the investigation of Dubai police in this regard also yielded no
fruits and Mr Veer was acquitted of all the charges after a prolonged investigation.
During the investigation a lot of Hotel Staffs were investigated and their testimonies
were taken. They were all of the view that Mr Veer and Mrs Rohini looked like
anyother couple in love.

(¶ 49.) Such testimonies and investigation of the Dubai police cannot be

ignored vehemently.68 Further, the fact that a Honeymoon suit was booked and the
two travelled together on the airplane to the hotel, went to a three day sightseeing in
Dubai and clicked many photographs are in every possible way indicative that they
were a happily married couple in love with each other.

(¶ 50.) Thus, in light of the above mentioned facts and circumstantial

evidences, the slavery charges against Mr Veer look prima facie baseless and
unjustified.

Issue 3.3 Sections of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956

(¶ 51.) It is very respectfully and humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court
that Section 569 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 deals with Procuring,
inducing or taking person for the sake of prostitution, while Section 870 of the same
act deals with Seducing or soliciting of a person for the purpose of prostitution. 71
However, in the instant case we have seen from the above contentions in this petition
as well as evidences and testimonies at record that the two were more of a loving
couple.

(¶ 52.) The extent of the love can be understood from this fact that Mrs Rohini
even went against the will of her family to marry Mr Veer. Even thought they had an
age difference of six years, they were so much in love that they wanted to break the
stereotypes.

(¶ 53.) The love that they shared is evident from the fact that how both of
them realized at a very short period of time that both of them were made for each
other and married too. All this point towards one single fact that Mr Veer and Mrs
Rohini were deeply in love with each other and hence no apparent case of kidnapping,

68
Cohen, Amichai. (2006). Domestic Courts and Sovereignty. SSRN Electronic Journal. 10.2139/ssrn.917048.
69
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, § 5.
70
Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956, § 8.
71
Bhat, Mudasir. (2013). 'Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956: A Critique. II.
 slavery or trafficking can be made out in the instant case without any circumstantial
evidence or concrete proof. The present case is a mere way by which Mr Veer is
being oppressed by Mr Bhishan and his wife who were against this marriage and now
want to have their revenge.

(¶ 54.) Here in the instant case, Mr Veer although took away Mrs Rohini from India
but it was with the prior consent of Mrs Rohini as it is clearly stated in the facts that Mrs
Rohini was very much willing to live with Mr Veer forever, and she was very much willing
to marry Mr Veer. In fact, they went out of India to celebrate honeymoon. Hence, the
essential ingredients of any of the Sections which have been pressed on Mr Veer have not
been found to be present and the instant case can be seen as a mere malafide attempt at
disrupting and harassing Mr Veer.
ISSUE 4: THE ALLEGED TRANSACTION THROUGH BITCOIN AND ITS EXCHANGE INTO

INDIAN CURRENCY IS NOT CONTRARY TO LAW IN INDIA

(¶ 55.) It is humbly and most respectfully submitted before this Hon’ble Court
that though no policy exists from Reserve Bank of India regarding the
regulation of Bitcoin72, the Apex Court is about to hear a petition challenging
the RBI Circular dated 06-04-2018 in the writ petition of Internet and Mobile
Association of India vs. Reserve Bank of India 73 where the petitioners have
specifically asked to set aside the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) circular
restricting the dealing in virtual currencies and/or operating the virtual
currency exchange in India, thereby effectively ruling out the question of
using Bitcoin, which is a virtual currency, being an illegal practise which is
contrary to law in India.74 To effectively understand this stance, we may need
to revisit the statutory conundrum surrounding Bitcoin75.

Issue 4.1 The RBI Stance and validity of Virtual Currencies

(¶ 56.) The stance of RBI has been very ambiguous and uncertain regarding
the validity and usage of cryptocurrencies in India76. The brief synopsis of the
development for the bare perusal of the Hon’ble Court is as follows:

i. RBI took note of technology risks in changing business environment, in their

Financial Stability Report of June 201377. Paragraph 3.60 of this report noted
that globally, the use of online and mobile technologies was driving the
proliferation of virtual currencies. Therefore, the report stated that those
developments pose challenges in the form of regulatory, legal and operational
risks. Box 3.4 of the said report dealt specifically with virtual currency
schemes and it started by defining virtual currency as a type of unregulated

72
Vijay Pal Dalmia and Siddharth Dalmia, Explaining Bitcoin and Legal Position in India, Lexology ( 28th
March 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5cc1e39e-2bd5-45cf-a555-63b4e80ed52b.
73
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 528 of 2018
74
Jain, Pankaj & Mcinish, Thomas & Miller, Jonathan. (2019). Insights from bitcoin trading. Financial
Management. 48. 1031-1048. 10.1111/fima.12299.
75
Kaushalya Venkataraman and Lagna Panda, Decrypting Crypto: A Look At Cryptocurrencies And Its
Regulation In India, Mondaq ( 24th July 2020), https://www.mondaq.com/india/fin-tech/969292/decrypting-
crypto-a-look-at-cryptocurrencies-and-its-regulation-in-india.
76
Neil Borate, Government's new bill may finish India’s crypto spring, Live Mint (16th June 2020),
https://www.livemint.com/money/personal-finance/government-new-bill-may-finish-india-s-crypto-spring-
11592283789942.html.
77
Reserve Bank of India, Financial Stability Report Issue No. 7 ( June 2013),
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PublicationReport/Pdfs/FSPI260613FL.pdf
 digital money, issued and controlled by its developers and used and accepted
by the members of a specific virtual community.
ii. On 24-12-2013, a Press Release was issued by RBI 78 cautioning the users,
holders and traders of virtual currencies about the potential financial,
operational, legal and customer protection and security related risks that they
are exposing themselves to.
iii. On 27-12-2013, newspapers reported the first ever raid in India by the
Enforcement Directorate, of two Bitcoin trading firms in Ahmedabad 79, by
name, rBitco.in and buysellbitco.in. This was stated to be India's first raid on a
Bitcoin trading firm and the second globally, after Federal Bureau of
Investigation of the United States of America conducted a raid in October of
the same year.
iv. In December 2015, the Financial Stability Report of RBI was issued, and it
included a chapter on “Financial Sector Regulation80”. The same dealt with the
challenges posed by technology based innovations such as virtual currency
schemes. In Box 3.1 of the said report, it was indicated that though the initial
concerns over the emergence of virtual currency schemes were about the
underlying design, episodes of excessive volatility in their value and their
anonymous nature which goes against global money laundering rules
rendered their very existence questionable81.
v. On 01-02-2017, RBI again issued a Press Release cautioning users, holders
and traders of virtual currencies82.
vi. RBI issued another Press Release dated 05- 12-2017 reiterating the concerns
expressed in earlier press releases83.
vii. The Statement dated 05-04-2018 and the Circular dated 06-04-2018 of RBI,
impugned were a culmination of a flurry of activities by different stakeholders,

78
Reserve Bank of India, RBI cautions users of Virtual Currencies against Risks, Press Release (24th December
2013), https://www.rbi.org.in/commonperson/English/Scripts/PressReleases.aspx?Id=2522.
79
Vishal Dutta, ED officials raided two bitcoin trading firm in Ahmedabad, The Economic Times (27th
December 2013), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/ed-officials-raided-two-bitcoin-
trading-firm-in ahmedabad/articleshow/28006859.cms?from=mdr.
80
Reserve Bank of India, Financial Stability Report Issue No. 12 (December 2015),
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/PublicationReport/Pdfs/0FSR6F7E7BC6C14F42E99568A80D9FF7BBA6.PDF.
81
Id.
82
Reserve Bank of India, RBI cautions users of Virtual Currencies, Press Release (1st February 2017),
https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=39435.
83
Reserve Bank of India, Reserve Bank cautions regarding risk of virtual currencies including Bitcoins, Press
Release (05th December 2017), https://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_PressReleaseDisplay.aspx?prid=42462.
 nationally and globally, over a period of about 5 years 84. Vide this circular, the
RBI banned cryptocurrency trading in India and directed that all entities
regulated by it shall not deal in virtual currencies or provide services for
facilitating any person or entity in dealing with or settling those85.

Issue 4.2 The Circular of RBI dated 06-04-2018

Issue 4.2.1 The test of Reasonability
(¶ 57.) Since the RBI Circular has almost wiped the VC exchanges out
of the industrial map of the country, thereby infringing Article 19(1)(g)86. On
the question of proportionality, we need to rely upon the four-pronged test
summed up in the opinion of the majority in Modern Dental College and
Research Centre v. State of Madhya Pradesh87. These tests and conditions are:

(i) that the measure is designated for a proper purpose

(ii) that the measures are rationally connected to the fulfillment of the
purpose
(iii) that there are no alternative less invasive measures and;
(iv) that there is a proper relation between the importance of achieving the
aim and the importance of limiting the right. The court in the said case
held that a mere ritualistic incantation of “money laundering” or “black
money” does not satisfy the first test and that alternative methods
should have been explored.

(¶ 58.) From a bare reading of the tests, it can be inferred that the RBI
step was extremely hasty and no alternative methods were explored before
implementing such a ban88 and hence the circular is arbitrary in its way of
exercising a ban on cryptocurrency.

84
Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance New Delhi, India, Report of the Committee to propose
specific actions to be taken in relation to Virtual Currencies (28th February
2019),https://dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/Approved%20and%20Signed%20Report%20and%20Bill%20of
%20IMC%20on%20VCs%2028%20Feb%202019.pdf.
85
Ateesh Tankha, Why it's better for RBI to just wait and watch on cryptocurrency, The Economic Times (10th
March 2020), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/view-why-its-better-for-rbi-to-just-
wait-and-watch-on-cryptocurrency/articleshow/74567245.cms?from=mdr.
86
The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 19(1)(g).
87
Modern Dental College and Research Centre V. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016) 7 SCC 353.
88
Nupur Anand, India’s central bank admits it did no research before strangling cryptocurrencies, Quartz India
(13th June 2018), https://qz.com/india/1303363/indias-cryptocurrency-crackdown-was-backed-by-zero-
research-rbi-admits/.
 Issue 4.2.2 RBIs Contradictory Stance
(¶ 59.) The Hon’ble Court needs to consider three important aspects
namely,

(i) that RBI has not so far found, in the past 5 years or more, the
activities of VC exchanges to have actually impacted adversely,
the way the entities regulated by RBI function
(ii) that the consistent stand taken by RBI up to and including in
their reply dated 04-09-2019 is that RBI has not prohibited
VCs in the country89 and;
(iii) that even the Inter-Ministerial Committee constituted on 02-11-
2017, which initially recommended a specific legal framework
including the introduction of a new law namely90, Crypto-token
Regulation Bill 2018, was of the opinion that a ban might be an
extreme tool and that the same objectives can be achieved
through regulatory measures.

Thus, it’s clearly apparent that even RBI is dubious of the status of Virtual
Currencies, which include even Bitcoin. Hence, the benefit of doubt shall
anyway be given to Mr Veer, as the absence of regulation and ambiguity
surrounding the VCs cannot and should not be used to the disadvantage of Mr
Veer.

Issue 4.3 The trading of cryptocurrency is valid and not illegal in India
(¶ 60.) From the RBI circular dated 06-04-2018, it is very much evident that
the RBI has the banned cryptocurrency trading in India and directed that all entities
regulated by it not to deal in virtual currencies or provide services for facilitating any
person or entity in dealing with or settling those 91. However, in the present case Mr
Veer even though indulged in the trading of cryptocurrency cannot be brought into the
ambit of this circular as:

89
Karan Dhar, RBI crackdown on cryptocurrencies: What Bitcoin investors should do right away, Business
Today (12th September 2018), https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/rbi-ban-banks-trading-in-
cryptocurrencies-bitcoin-investors/story/274312.html
90
Report of Inter-Ministerial Committee on Virtual Currencies, Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of
Finance (28th Februaury 2019),https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1579759#:~:text=The
%20Government%20had%20constituted%20an,be%20taken%20in%20this%20matter.
91
Krishna Kumar Thakur and Dr. G.G. Banik, “Cryptocurrency: Its Risks And Gains And The Way Ahead”,
IOSR Journal of Economics and Finance, Volume 9, Issue 2 (March - April 2018), PP 38-42,
http://www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jef/papers/Vol9-Issue2/Version-1/F0902013842.pdf.
 i. He did not trade in VCs with any institution regulated by Reserve Bank of
India
ii. The private broker Mr Rahamat Saeed was not an entity regulated by Reserve
Bank of India.

(¶ 61.) Further, as stated above, the RBI in its reply to the Apex Court dated
04-09-2019 in the ongoing case of Internet and Mobile Association of India vs.
Reserve Bank of India92 has specifically stated that it has not prohibited VCs in the
country. Thus, this Hon’ble Court can foresee from the bare perusal of the fact that
Mr Veer cannot be blamed or held liable for any such trading as his trading in Bitcoin
and exchange through the private broker into India Currency is not contrary to any
law in India.

92
Internet and Mobile Association of India v Reserve Bank of India, 2020 SCC 275.
ISSUE 5: THAT VEER HAS NOT COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCE PUNISHABLE

UNDER PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT AND THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE

MANAGEMENT ACT
(¶ 62.) It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the present
issue can only be made to fall within the ambit of operation of Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, 2002 and The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, if the
defined asset transfer is monetary in nature or in simpler terms it involves currency.
However, the counsel shall bring forth before this Hon’ble court that Virtual
Currencies like Bitcoin cannot be deemed to be a currency and hence the charges
pressed are inherently inapplicable.

Issue 5.1 Bitcoin is not a currency

Issue 5.1.1 Currency under Indian Laws
(¶ 63.) We have to look at the definition of currency given in Indian
Laws. Indian laws do not define digital currency or virtual currency, so we
will have to look at the traditional definition of currency to see if Bitcoin falls
in that definition. The term currency is defined in section 2(h) 93 of the Foreign
Exchange Management Act, 1999 ("FEMA") in the following words:
"currency" includes all currency notes, postal notes, postal orders, money
orders, cheques, drafts, travellers cheques, letters of credit, bills of
exchange and promissory notes, credit cards or such other similar
instruments, as may be notified by the Reserve Bank;

(¶ 64.) It is notable here that this is an inclusive definition which

means that it has a large scope for expansion. The legislature has consciously
made the definition capable of further expansion by making it inclusive and
also by giving the Reserve Bank of India ("RBI") the authority to notify other
similar instruments94. This means that if any instrument which is being used as
a currency is not covered by the definition as it stands, then the RBI is free to
notify it and include it in the definition of currency95.

93
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, § 2(h).
94
Reserve Bank of India, History of The Reserve Bank of India (Volume 1),
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/content/PDFs/89630.pdf.
95
Vipul Kharbanda, Cryptocurrency Regulation in India – A brief history, The Centre for Internet and Society
(05th March 2020), https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/cryptocurrency-regulation-in-india-2013-a-
brief-history.
 Issue 5.1.2 Origin and Nature of Bitcoin
(¶ 65.) Bitcoin is a decentralized, P2P network-based virtual currency
that is traded online.96 Bitcoin, when paired with third-party services, allows
users to mine, buy, sell, or accept bitcoins from anywhere in the world
Bitcoin's decentralized feature is unique among virtual currencies. 97 Though
Bitcoin developers maintain Web sites providing guidance to the Bitcoin
community, they do not have a centralized database of authority 98. The P2P
network issues bitcoin through the mining process and validates all
transactions.99

(¶ 66.) Furthermore it is humbly submitted before this honourable

court that bitcoin is not a currency because it is not listed in ISO 4217 100 where
it recognizes the precious metals such as gold, silver, platinum etc. but not the
Digital Currency, i.e. Bitcoin.101

(¶ 67.) It is further submitted that Black's law dictionary defines

currency as "Coined money and such bank-notes or other paper money that are
authorized by law and do in fact circulate from hand to hand on the medium of
exchange102. And thus, it is submitted that Bitcoin does not fall under the
definition of currency because it is not authorized by any law and are not
controlled by any government.103

(¶ 68.) To shed light on historical aspect of this issue, the first legal
issue directly relating to Bitcoin was first adjudged in France 104. The France

96
Arora, Deepika & Vigg Kushwah, Silky. (2018). Virtual Currencies: Focus on Bitcoins Virtual Currencies:
Focus on Bitcoins Virtual Currencies: Focus on Bitcoins.
97
Mullan, P.. (2014). Bitcoin Decentralized Virtual Currency. 10.1057/9781137382559_13.
98
Nathan Reiff, What Are the Advantages of Paying With Bitcoin, Investopedia (13th July 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/100314/what-are-advantages-paying-bitcoin.asp
99
DURMUŞ, Savaş & POLAT, M.. (2019). VIRTUAL CURRENCY BITCOIN. Kafkas Universitesi Veteriner
Fakultesi Dergisi. 10.9775/kauiibfd.2018.031.
100
Jon Matonis, Why Bitcoin Needs an ISO-Certified Currency Code, Coindesk (21st October 2014),
https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-needs-iso-certified-currency-code.
101
Jurik, Pavol. (2021). BENEFITS AND DRAWBACKS OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY BITCOIN.
102
 Black’s Law Dictionary 1200 (3d ed. 1933) (in its “popular sense, ‘money’ means any currency, tokens,
bank-notes, or other circulating medium in general use as the representative of value”)
103
Nakamoto, Satoshi. (2009). Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System.
104
Tatjana Boshkov, Blockchain and Digital Currency in the world of Finance, Intech Open ( 5th November
2018), https://www.intechopen.com/books/blockchain-and cryptocurrencies/blockchain-and-digital-currency-
in-the-world-of-finance
 court did not make any claims about the legitimacy of Bitcoin but has claimed
that using Bitcoin is not illegal in France105.

(¶ 69.) Another case study that can be considered is that of Germany's

financial supervisory authority which has published a report delineating their
status under German law106. The document has the following to state on the
subject: tokens of value meant to be used as a method of payment which are
issued by barter clubs, private exchange rings or other payment systems in
exchange for real economic goods or services or like for example Bitcoin,
which are issued in computer networks without any service in return, are
therefore exempt from the definition of e money, even though they fulfil the
same economic function as e-money and have the actual potential of privately
issued currencies.107

(¶ 70.) The legal concept of e-money in Germany applies only to

instruments that ultimately derive from legal tender currencies and so Bitcoin
is effectively classified as a commodity HSBC's global head of e channels
strategy and innovation108, Andrew Davis, stated that he believes that virtual
currencies are going to enter the mainstream soon because it is becoming
normal way of buying goods and services, around the world and that HSBC
has Bitcoin highly in mind109.

(¶ 71.) Argundeo, Bitcoins can also be termed as domestic currency

because it can be mined in India and thus the provisions of FEMA, 1999 does
not relate to Bitcoin110.

105
Sebastien Praicheux and Célestine Barthout, French court decision on the legal nature of bitcoin in the
spotlight, Lexology (13th October 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a967682f-213c-
4251-b717-4b3e2f8ff9a2.
106
Michael Juenemann and Joerg Alexander Paul, FinTech Comparative Guide, Mondaq (16th September
2020), https://www.mondaq.com/germany/technology/985684/fintech-comparative-guide.
107
Wolfson, Shael. (2015). Bitcoin: The Early Market. Journal of Business & Economics Research (JBER). 13.
201. 10.19030/jber.v13i4.9452.
108
Vitalik Buterin, A Recap of Mega-Corporate and Government Attention on Bitcoin This Past Year, Bitcoin
Magazine ( 26th September 2012), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/a-recap-of-mega-corporate-and-
government-attention-on-bitcoin-this-past-year-1348619542.
109
Id.
110
Vallari Dubey, Legal Nature of Bitcoins the Encrypted Digital Currency (29th April 2017),
http://vinodkothari.com/2017/04/legal-nature-of-bitcoins-the-encrypted-digital-currency-by-vallari-dubey/.
 Issue 5.1.3 Bitcoin and its stance
(¶ 72.) All "currency" other than Indian currency is considered by the
FEMA as "foreign currency" which would have to then comply with various
rules and regulations under FEMA111. This means that if Bitcoin is classified
as a "currency", it would have to come under the definition of "foreign
currency" and Bitcoin transactions would therefore have to comply with the
entire foreign exchange regime under FEMA112. However, till date the RBI has
not taken out any Circulars/Notifications/Regulations recognizing Bitcoin/VCs
as ‘currency’.

(¶ 73.) It is clear that Bitcoin is not really similar to any of the

instruments mentioned in the definition, not least because none of them are
digital or virtual in nature. On May 3, 2000 the RBI notified "debit cards,
ATM cards or any other instrument that can be used to create a financial
liability" as "currency" under the FEMA (by Notification No. FEMA
15/2000/RB dated May 3, 2001). Since Bitcoin is not really backed by any
institution and has no backing by any central bank or institution and because
most of the transactions involving acceptance of Bitcoin are voluntary in
nature, therefore it does not seem that Bitcoin is an instrument that can be used
to create a financial liability. 4.4 Bitcoin per se cannot be classified as
security, Derivative, Negotiable Instrument or prepaid Instrument.

(¶ 74.) It is therefore, humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that

Bitcoin or other virtual currencies cannot be termed as currencies in any sense,
and hence the applicability of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and
The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 is invalidated. In the view of
the foregoing, it is humbly submitted before this court that the defence taken
by the petitioner is valid in the present context as Bitcoin cannot be termed as
a currency

111
IBA Health (India) Private Ltd. V. INFO-DRIVE Systems SDN. BHD. (2010) 10 SCC 553
112
Mitchell S Sackheim, The Virtual Currency Regulation Review, The Law Reviews Edition 2 ( September
2019), https://thelawreviews.co.uk/digital_assets/079249ba-c1fd-43cb-b3ad-6c23efb53357/The-Virtual-
Currency-Regulation-Review---Edition-2.pdf
 Issue 5.2 The charges framed under section 4 of the Prevention of money
laundering act does not satisfy the essentials provided in the definition of
money laundering

(¶ 75.) It is very humbly and respectfully submitted before this Hon’ble Court
that in the present case, Mr Veer has been charged under Section 4 of the Prevention
of Money Laundering Act. The Section reads as follows:

(¶ 76.) Section 4: Punishment for Money-Laundering - Whoever commits the

offence of money-laundering shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and
shall also be liable to fine113: Provided that where the proceeds of crime involved in
money-laundering relates to any offence specified under paragraph 2 of Part A of the
Schedule, the provisions of this section shall have effect as if for the words "which
may extend to seven years", the words "which may extend to ten years" had been
substituted.

(¶ 77.) However, to understand this punishment, it is to be read with Section 3

of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act which deals with what shall be essential
ingredients in constituting the act of money laundering and states as under114

(¶ 78.) Section 3. Offence of money-Laundering - Whosoever directly or

indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is
actually involved in any process or activity connected proceeds of crime including its
concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming it as untainted
property shall be guilty of offence of money-laundering115.

(¶ 79.) For the purpose of this act, the explicit definition of ‘proceeds of
crime’ has been laid down under the PMLA Act as: Section 2(u) "proceeds of crime"
- means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a
result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such
property116;

113
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, § 4.
114
Avinash Kumar Chauhan v. Vijay Krishna Mishra (2009) 2 SCC 532
115
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, § 3.
116
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, § 2 (u).
 Issue 5.2.1 The charges pressed on Mr Veer in Dubai

(¶ 80.) Mr Veer was charged with Immoral Trafficking Prevention

Act, 2002. This means that the ‘proceeds of crime’ in case shall mean any
property derived from any act of human trafficking that Mr Veer would have
carried out, which allegedly in this case has been the trafficking of his own
wife Mrs Rohini.

Issue 5.2.2 The question of ‘proceeds of crime’ in case of Dubai

Trial
(¶ 81.) Thus, it is pertinent to note that for proving the existence of a
viable case of money laundering, it has to be proved beyond reasonable
doubt117 that Mr Veer was indeed indulged in the immoral human trafficking
of his wife. However, as a court of competent jurisdiction in Dubai has already
decided and acquitted Mr Veer in this regards, it is fitting to say that no
element of commission of crime exists in the instant case.

Issue 5.2.3 The charges pressed on Mr Veer in Chandigarh

(¶ 82.) It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that when the
FIR was filed in Chandigarh against Mr Veer, to pay for his legal expenses
and other charges, he converted the Bitcoin he owned to Indian Currency and
was falsely framed for Money laundering by commission of the said act.

Issue 5.2.4 The question of ‘proceeds of crime’ in case of

Chandigarh Case

(¶ 83.) It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Mr Veer

is an enthusiastic and serial entrepreneur and it was his this nature which made
him get into a business transaction with Sheikh Tayyar. It was on the date of
this visit that 7000 Bitcoin were transferred in his account for furtherance of
the business proposal. This clearly shows that the main purpose of the money
transfer was not trafficking of Mrs Rohini but rather furtherance of the
business transaction. Thus, the money transfer was done in lieu of a perfectly

117
 Industrial Investment Bank of India Ltd. v. Biswanath Jhunjhunwala (2009) 9 SCC 478.
 legal transaction and not for a criminal activity. Thus, it can be clearly said
that even this shall not constitute the required element of ‘proceeds of crime’.

(¶ 84.) As the very element of a criminal action is absent, there arises

no claim for existence of any ‘proceeds of crime’ and hence, the major
ingredient118 which is required for prosecution under the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act119, is absent thereby making the charges under the PMLA Act
inapplicable in the instant case.

Issue 5.3 That the charges pressed under the Foreign Exchange
Management Act, 1999 are inapplicable
(¶ 85.) It is very humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the
provisions of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 are inapplicable in the
present case because Bitcoin, being a non-currency, is not governable under the ambit
of the FEMA.

Issue 5.3.1 The Incident and FIR 923/2019

(¶ 86.) Mr Veer was granted bail conditioned on a bond of Rs. 20,
00,000 on 29th December 2019. In order to pay for legal defence Mr Veer
decided to withdraw money from his business account. For this purpose he
approached Mr Rahamat Saeed where he transferred 5000 Bitcoins to Mr
Rahamat and received Rs. 46,00,000 in cash. After the exchange was made,
the Chandigarh police along with the special team in-charge of economic
offences arrested Mr Veer and Mr Rahamat for dealing in Bitcoins. However,
the arrest should not have been made in the first place as the trade was in no
way illegal or contrary to provisions of any law in India.

Issue 5.3.2 Inapplicability of Section 3, 4, 7 and 13 of FEMA

(¶ 87.) It is humbly and respectfully submitted before the Hon’ble
High Court that Section 13120 of FEMA deals with the punishment for
violations and states that: If any person contravenes any provision of this Act,
or contravenes any rule, regulation, notification, direction or order issued in
exercise of the powers under this Act, or contravenes any condition subject to
118
 Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar and Another (2012) 4 SCC 379.
119
Vijay Pal Dalmia, Law Of Money Laundering In India, Mondaq (17th November 2013),
https://www.mondaq.com/india/white-collar-crime-anti-corruption-fraud/245524/law-of-money-laundering-in-
india.
120
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, § 13.
 which an authorisation is issued by the Reserve Bank, he shall, upon
adjudication, be liable to a penalty up to thrice the sum involved in such
contravention where such amount is quantifiable, or up to two lakh rupees
where the amount is not quantifiable, and where such contravention is a
continuing one, further penalty which may extend to five thousand rupees for
every day after the first day during which the contravention continues.

(¶ 88.) A bare perusal of the fact of the case would mean that Section 13 was
pressed for punishing Mr Veer for violation of Section 3, 4 and 7 of the FEMA.
Hence, an overview of these Sections becomes pertinent to have a better
understanding of the issues. Section 3 of the FEMA deals with special permission of
RBI and restrictions on people in certain cases. The section reads as:

(¶ 89.) Section 3: Save as otherwise provided in this Act, rules or regulations

made thereunder, or with the general or special permission of the Reserve Bank, no
person shall121

a. deal in or transfer any foreign exchange or foreign security to any person not
being an authorised person;
b. make any payment to or for the credit of any person resident outside India in
any manner;
c. receive otherwise through an authorised person, any payment by order or on
behalf of any person resident outside India in any manner; Explanation.—For
the purpose of this clause, where any person in, or resident in, India receives
any payment by order or on behalf of any person resident outside India
through any other person (including an authorised person) without a
corresponding inward remittance from any place outside India, then, such
person shall be deemed to have received such payment otherwise than
through an authorised person;
d. enter into any financial transaction in India as consideration for or in
association with acquisition or creation or transfer of a right to acquire, any
asset outside India by any person.

121
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, § 3.
 (¶ 90.) Further, Section 4122 deals with holding of foreign exchange while Section 7123
lays down the responsibilities of every exporter of good and his duty to report to the
Reserve Bank of India such information as may be required by the Reserve Bank for
the purpose of ensuring the realisation of the export proceeds by such exporter.

(¶ 91.) In the present case, by a simple reading of the textual definition of where
FEMA shall be applicable, mainly Section 3, we can see that the usage of Bitcoin cannot
be governed under it in any circumstance. This is because Bitcoin does not satisfy the
definition of Bitcoin under Section 2(n)124 of FEMA and hence, the charges pressed are
out rightly baseless.

(¶ 92.) It can be witnessed that the list includes firstly tangible objects whereas
Bitcoin under no circumstances tangible and the significant feature of currency under its
definition is that it has to be notified by RBI and the RBI specifically has not notified
Bitcoin as a form of currency125 therefore it is proved that Bitcoin do not meet the
standards and guideline for meeting up the requirement of currency.126 Therefore, the
respective section made as a ground of FIR does not stand relevant.

(¶ 93.) Under section 4 of the FEMA. 1999, the appellants did not hold, acquire, own
or possess any foreign currency as Bitcoin is not a foreign currency but a domestic
currency127 as it can be easily mined even in India.

(¶ 94.) Further, it is submitted that Section 7 of FEMA, 1999 provides with provision
regarding exporting of goods and services.128 And in the above situation, there has been
no incidence of exporting of goods and services. As stated above Bitcoin can also be
termed as a commodity129 but it cannot fall under the above stated provision because there
has been no exporting of Bitcoin, but rather a mere transfer on the digital scape. Further,

122
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, § 4.
123
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, § 7.
124
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, § 2(n).
125
Rajput, Dharmendra & Shukla, Pankaj & Gadekallu, Thippa & Kaluri, Rajesh & Lakshman, Kuruva &
Maddikunta, Praveen & Patel, Harshita. (2021). A Review on Bitcoin and Currency Encryption: Bitcoin and
Blockchain. 10.4018/978-1-7998-2414-5.ch005.
126
Chowdhary, Chiranji. (2020). Growth of Financial Transaction toward Bitcoin and Blockchain Technology.
10.1201/9781003032588-6.
127
Harwick, Cameron. “Cryptocurrency and the Problem of Intermediation.” The Independent Review, vol. 20,
no. 4, 2016, pp. 569–588.
128
Nevskaya, Anastasia. (2017). Exports of Goods and Services from Cultural and Creative Industries.
International Affairs. 63. 163-172. 10.21557/IAF.48992147.
129
Marc Pilkington. “Can Global Elites Pave the Way for a New Transnational Unit of Account? A Reflection
on the Numerical Nature of Money.” World Review of Political Economy, vol. 8, no. 4, 2017, pp. 542–563.
 Section 13130 of FEMA penalizes for the violations of section 3, 4 and 7 and in the instant
case the respective sections were not violated

(¶ 95.) Henceforth, the ground of FIR made for the violation section 3, 4, 7 and 13 are
not valid and clearly reflect the malafide intentions of police who deliberately arrested
Veer under false accusation. Therefore it is humbly submitted that FIR No. 923 of 2019
lodged against Mr Veer is not valid and should be quashed with immediate effect.

130
Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, § 13.