Topic: Chapter 0: Prescription - Cases

Applicable Provisions: Art. 1106-1155 (Start) Date:

Acquisitive Prescription

Case Title: Calicdan v Cendana

Ticker: Denying Donation
Facts

 The parcel of land in question was formerly owned by Sixto Calicdan, who died
intestate on November 4, 1941. He was survived by his wife, Fermina, and
three children, namely, petitioner Soledad, Jose and Benigno, all surnamed
Calicdan.
 On August 25, 1947, Fermina executed a deed of donation inter vivos whereby
she conveyed the land to respondent Silverio Cendana, who immediately
entered into possession of the land, built a fence around the land and
constructed a two-storey residential house thereon sometime in 1949, where
he resided until his death in 1998.
 In 1992, petitioner, through her legal guardian Guadalupe Castillo, filed a
complaint for “Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages” against the
respondent, alleging that the donation was void; that respondent took
advantage of her incompetence in acquiring the land; and that she merely
tolerated respondent’s possession of the land as well as the construction of his
house thereon.
 Respondent alleged, by way of affirmative defenses, that the land was donated
to him by Fermina in 1947; and that he had been publicly, peacefully,
continuously, and adversely in possession of the land for a period of 45 years.
 The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner.
 The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and declared that the
donation was valid.

Issue

 Whether the donation inter vivos is valid [No]

 Whether petitioner lost ownership of the land by prescription.[Yes]

Ruling

 The trial court found the donation of the land void because Fermina was not
the owner thereof, considering that it was inherited by Sixto from his parents.
Thus, the land was not part of the conjugal property of the spouses Sixto and
Fermina Calicdan, because under the Spanish Civil Code, the law applicable
when Sixto died in 1941, the surviving spouse had a right of usufruct only over
the estate of the deceased spouse. Consequently, respondent, who derived his
rights from Fermina, only acquired the right of usufruct as it was the only right
 which the latter could convey.
 Notwithstanding the invalidity of the donation, we find that respondent has
become the rightful owner of the land by extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
 Assuming arguendo that ordinary acquisitive prescription is unavailing in the
case at bar as it demands that the possession be “in good faith and with just
title,” and there is no evidence on record to prove respondent’s “good faith,”
nevertheless, his adverse possession of the land for more than 45 years aptly
shows that he has met the requirements for extraordinary acquisitive
prescription to set in.
 Moreover, the deed of donation inter vivos, albeit void for having been
executed by one who was not the owner of the property donated, may still be
used to show the exclusive and adverse character of respondent’s possession.

Final Ruling: The petition is denied.

Doctrine

 Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over
immovable property. It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under
conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the
concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.
 Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive
prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten years. In
extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable
property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for
thirty years without need of title or of good faith.
 The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the
person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could
transmit his ownership. For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights,
but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.

Case Title: Spouses Ragudo v Fabella Estate

Ticker: Torrens Title
Facts

 Earlier, the tenants of a parcel of land which formed part of the estate of the
late Don Dionisio M. Fabella, organized themselves and formed the Fabella
Estate Tenants Association, Inc. (FETA), for the purpose of acquiring said
property and distributing it to its members.
 Unable to raise the amount sufficient to buy the property from the heirs of Don
Dionisio M. Fabella, FETA applied for a loan from the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC) under the latter’s Community Mortgage
Program.
  NHMFC required all tenants to become members of FETA.
 Spouses Ramon Ragudo and Estrella Ragudo who were occupying the lot
subject matter of this controversy refused to join the Association.
Consequently, the portion occupied by them was awarded to Mrs. Miriam De
Guzman, a qualified FETA member.
 FETA became the registered owner of the entire Fabella Estate.
 FETA then filed with the RTC-Pasig a complaint for recovery of possession
against the Ragudos.
 The trial court rendered judgment in FETA’s favor.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC decision in the main
case.

Issue

 Whether the Ragudos have acquired the property by prescription

Arguments
Ruling
Petitioner
they have already
The contention holds no water.
acquired ownership of
the disputed portion
It is not disputed that at the core of this controversy is a
since they have been in
parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. In a
occupation thereof in
long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands
the concept of an owner
covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or
for more than forty (40)
adverse possession.
years
Final Ruling: The petition is denied.
Doctrine

 In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title
(through Torrents system) cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession.
 A claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a
registered land because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code.
 Under Article 1126 of the Civil Code, prescription of ownership of lands
registered under the Land Registration Act shall be governed by special laws.
Correlatively, Act No. 496 provides that no title to registered land in derogation
of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by adverse possession.

Case Title: Bautista v Poblete

Ticker: Lot 1243
Facts

 Private respondents, the successors-in-interest of Socorro Reyes vda. de

 Poblete (Socorro), claimed that Lot 1243 was donated by Marcelo Reyes Sr.
(Marcelo Sr.) to Socorro, his daughter by a second marriage and that they and
their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, peaceful and
notorious possession of the subject lot in the concept of owner for more than
50 years.
 Petitioners, Marcelo Sr.’s children by his third marriage, opposed said
application alleging that Lot 1243 had been acquired by the deceased Marcelo
Reyes, Sr. by purchase from a certain Juan Aranda. Hence, said lot should be
awarded to them as their father’s lawful heirs.
 To buttress their claim over Lot 1243, private respondents ventured to prove
that it was Marcelo Sr.’s practice to give all his children by each of his three
wives similar gifts of land.
 Private respondents failed to present the deed of donation by which Marcelo
Sr. allegedly gave Lot 1243 to Socorro, claiming that the deed was burned
when fire razed their house sometime in 1980. Thus, the trial court dismissed
the petition for registration.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals considered private respondents’ contention
that even if the donation may have been invalid, the same could still serve as
basis for acquisitive prescription. Consequently, the appellate court reversed
the trial court’s decision and ordered the issuance of a decree of registration
over Lot 1243 in favor of private respondents.

Issue

 Whether private respondents have already acquired the land by prescription

[Yes]

Arguments
Ruling
Petitioner
Petitioners insist Perusal of the records reveals that Socorro Reyes was already in
that Socorro physical possession of Lot 1243 as early as 1934, even before the
expressly and death of Marcelo Sr., and had the land planted to sugarcane and
impliedly palay.
recognized their
rights as her co- In 1948, Socorro registered Lot 1243 in her name under tax
heirs when she declaration No. 1430 and, thereafter, religiously paid the real
was entrusted estate tax on the property.
with the
management of In 1983, Socorro sold Lot 1243 to her children, the private
the land in respondents.
1934; that the
harvest had However, other than the bare allegation of cestui que trust,
always been petitioners failed to present proof of their claim. There was no
divided among evidence showing that Socorro managed Lot 1243 on behalf of
the heirs, with Marcelo Sr.’s heirs, including petitioners.
petitioner
 The fact that petitioner Dominador Sino allegedly got a share of the
harvest twice did not disprove at all that the entire harvest
belonged to Socorro.

Marcelo Sr., died in 1932 under the regime of the old Civil Code
which granted no successional rights to illegitimate children.
Corollarily, the inheritance rights established by the new Civil Code
in favor of illegitimate children could be claimed only by those
whose parents died after the effectivity of the law.
Final Ruling: The decision is affirmed.
Doctrine

 It is the essence of the statute of limitations that, whether the party had the
right to the possession or not, if he entered under the claim of such right and
remained in possession for the period required for acquisitive prescription, the
right of action of a party claiming title is barred by that adverse possession.
The right given by the statute of limitations does not depend on and has no
necessary connection to the validity of the claim under which the possession is
held.

Case Title: Restar v Cichon

Ticker: Battle of the Heirs
Facts

 In 1935, Emilio Restar (Restar) died intestate, leaving eight (8) children-
compulsory heirs.
 In 1960, Restar’s eldest child, Flores, caused the cancellation of Tax
Declaration and issuance of another in his name.
 Flores died in 1989.
 In 1998, the co-heirs of Flores discovered the cancellation of Restar’s Tax
Declaration No. 6696 and the issuance in lieu thereof of Tax Declaration No.
11134 in his name.
 The heirs of Flores’ sisters Dolores R. Cichon filed a Complaint against Flores’
heirs for “partition [of the lot], declaration of nullity of documents, ownership
with damages and preliminary injunction” before the Regional Trial Court.
 The RTC held that Flores’ share in Restar’s estate was not the lot but that
covered by Cadastral Lot No. 3183. Nevertheless, the trial court, holding that
Flores and his heirs had performed acts sufficient to constitute repudiation of
the coownership, concluded that they had acquired the lot by prescription.
 The CA reversed the decision of the trial court it finding that the defendants
Heirs of Flores failed to prove that their possession of the lot excluded their co-
owners or that they derived title to it from a separate conveyance to them by
Restar.
 Issue

 Whether the heirs of Flores have acquired the land by acquisition. [Yes]

Arguments
Ruling
Petitioner Respondent

 The petition is impressed with merit.

 Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, the records of the case amply
support petitioners’ claim that the requirements for extraordinary prescription
had been duly met.
 When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of
the lot by intestate succession. Respondents never possessed the lot,
however, much less asserted their claim thereto until January 21, 1999 when
they filed the complaint for partition subject of the present petition.
 In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restar’s death and
exercised acts of dominion thereon— tilling and cultivating the land, introducing
improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof.
 The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not in 1935 but in
1960 when Flores, who had neither title nor good faith, secured a tax
declaration in his name and may, therefore, be said to have adversely claimed
ownership of the lot. And respondents were also deemed to have been on said
date become aware of the adverse claim.
 Flores’ possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription
after the lapse of thirty years in accordance with the earlier quoted Article 1137
of the New Civil Code.
 Indeed, the following acts of Flores show possession adverse to his co-heirs:
the cancellation of the tax declaration certificate in the name of Restar and
securing another in his name; the execution of a Joint Affidavit stating that he
is the owner and possessor thereof to the exclusion of respondents; payment
of real estate tax and irrigation fees without respondents having ever
contributed any share therein; and continued enjoyment of the property and its
produce to the exclusion of respondents. And Flores’ adverse possession was
continued by his heirs.

Final Ruling: The petition is granted.

Doctrine

 While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not

prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription where
there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are
apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.
 Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in
good faith and with just title for a period of ten years. Without good faith and
 just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which
requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years.
 While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership
and do not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual
possession, they constitute evidence of great weight and can be the basis of a
claim of ownership through prescription.

Case Title: Heirs of Crisologo v Rañon

Ticker:
Facts

Issue

Arguments
Ruling
Petitioner Respondent

Final Ruling:
Doctrine

Case Title: Aguirre v Court of Appeals

Ticker:
Facts

Issue

Arguments
Ruling
Petitioner Respondent

Final Ruling:
Doctrine

Extinctive Prescription

Case Title: Vda. De Gualberto v Go

Ticker: Kasulatan
Facts

 Petitioners are the heirs of the late Generoso Gualberto, former registered
owner of a parcel of land.
 Sometime in 1965, the subject parcel of land was sold by Generoso Gualberto
and his wife, herein petitioner Consuelo Natividad Vda. de Gulaberto to
 respondents’ father Go S. Kiang as evidenced by a deed entitled “Kasulatan ng
Bilihang Tuluyan” which deed appears to have been duly notarized.
 In 1973, petitioner Consuelo executed an Affidavit 5 attesting to the fact that
the aforementioned parcel of land had truly been sold by her and her husband
Generoso to the spouses Go S. Kiang and Rosa Javier Go, as borne by the
said “Kasulatan.” Evidently, the affidavit was executed for purposes of securing
a new tax declaration in the name of the spouses Go.
 In a Forcible Entry case filed by respondents against petitioners before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court a decision was rendered in favor of respondents,
which decision was affirmed in toto by the RTC of Siniloan, Laguna. When
elevated to the Court of Appeals, that same decision was affirmed by the latter
court.
 In the meantime, Original Certificate of Title was issued in the name of
respondent Rosa Javier Go, wife of Go S. Kiang.

Issue

 Whether the right of the registered owner to demand the return of his property
can be lost by prescription or laches.
 Whether an action for reconveyance of property based on a nullity of title
prescribes. [Yes]

Arguments
Ruling
Petitioner
The first issue raised by petitioners attacks the validity of respondent
Rosa Javier Go’s free patent title. This cannot be done in the present
recourse for two (2) basic reasons: first, the validity of a torrens title
cannot be assailed collaterally; and second, the issue is being raised
for the first time before this Court.
We simply find no cogent reason to disturb the same, much less to
review the factual basis of both courts’ holding that the 10-year
prescriptive period had expired.

An action for reconveyance of real property based on implied or

constructive trust is not barred by the aforementioned 10-year
action for prescriptive period only if the plaintiff is in actual, continuous and
reconveyance peaceful possession of the property involved.
is
imprescriptibl Here, it was never established that petitioners remained in actual
e possession of the property after their father’s sale thereof to Go S.
Kiang in 1965 and up to the filing of their complaint in this case on
August 10, 1995. On the contrary, the trial court’s factual conclusion
is that respondents had actual possession of the subject property
ever since. The action for reconveyance in the instant case is,
therefore, not in the nature of an action for quieting of title, and is not
imprescriptible.
 Final Ruling: The petition is denied.
Doctrine

 Generally, an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive

trust, such as the instant case, prescribes in 10 years from the date of
issuance of decree of registration. However, an action for reconveyance of real
property based on implied or constructive trust is not barred by the
aforementioned 10-year prescriptive period only if the plaintiff is in actual,
continuous and peaceful possession of the property involved.

Case Title: Solid Homes v Tan

Ticker: Subdivision Lot
Facts

 In 1980, petitioner Solid Homes, Inc., sold to the spouses Joe Uy and Myrna
Uy a subdivision lot. Thereafter, the lot was registered in the name of the Uys
under Transfer Certificate of Title.
 In 1985, the spouses Uy sold the same lot to herein respondents, the spouses
Ancheta K. Tan and Corazon de Jesus-Tan, by reason of which the former title
covering the lot was cancelled and replaced in respondents’ name.
 Respondents visited their property a number of times, only to find out the sad
state of development thereat. There was no infrastructure and utility systems
for water, sewerage, electricity and telephone, as announced in the approved
plans and advertisements of the subdivision. Worse, squatters occupy their lot
and its surrounding areas.
 Respondents demanded on petitioner to provide the needed utility systems
and clear the area of squatters and other obstructions by the end of January,
1996.
 Having received no reply from petitioner, respondents filed with the Field Office
of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), NCR a complaint for
specific performance and damages.
 After due proceedings, the Housing and Land Use Arbiter, rendered judgment
for the respondents directing petitioner to provide subdivision facilities in the
subject premises and to pay complainants P 20,000.00
 Dissatisfied, petitioner went on appeal to the HLURB Board of Commissioners,
which, in a decision affirmed that of the Arbiter.
 the O.P., thru then Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora, affirmed with
modification the appealed decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners.
 The CA affirmed the HLURB decision.

Issue

 Whether prescription has set in [No]

Arguments Ruling
 Petitioner
We disagree.

There can be no debate at all on the legal postulate that the

prescriptive period for bringing action for specific performance,
as here, prescribes in ten (10) years. This is so provided in
Article 1144 of the Civil Code. What we cannot agree on with
the petitioner, and about which petitioner is in serious error, is
its submission that the 10- year prescriptive period should
commence either on April 7, 1980, when petitioner originally
sold the lot to spouses Uy; or in February, 1985, when the
respondents’ right to
respondents thereafter bought the same lot from the Uy
bring the action
couple.
against it has
already prescribed,
Obviously, petitioner misread Article 1144 which specifically
arguing that the 10-
provides that the 10-year period therein referred to commences
year prescriptive
to run only from the time the right of action accrues.
period therefor
should be reckoned
If not on a written contract, petitioner’s obligation to introduce
from April 7, 1980
improvements on the area in question arises from law, more
when petitioner
specifically P.D. 957.
originally sold the lot
in question to the
Here, it was only on December 18, 1995 when respondents
spouses Joe Uy and
made a written demand upon petitioner to construct subdivision
Myrna Uy, or, at the
roads, put up utility facilities and rid the premises of squatters,
latest from
obligations which are unquestionably in the nature of an
February, 1985,
obligation to do. And under Article 1169 of the Code, a party
when respondents
who is under obligation to do something incurs delay only from
acquired the same
the time that the obligee demands, either judicially or
lot from the Uy
extrajudicially, for the fulfillment of the obligation.
spouses.
With the reality that in this case, respondents made their
written demand upon petitioner to perform what is incumbent
upon it only on December 18, 1995, it was only from that date
when the 10-year prescriptive period under Article 1144
commenced to run. And since respondents’ complaint for
specific performance was filed with the Field Office of the
HLURB only on April 1, 1996, or less than four (4) months after
the date of their demand, petitioner’s reliance on prescription of
action is simply without any leg to stand on.
Final Ruling: The instant petition is denied.
Doctrine

 Thus, the period of prescription of any action is reckoned only from the date
the cause of action accrued. And a cause of action arises when that which
should have been done is not done, or that which should not have been done
 is done.
 In law, a cause of action exists when the following requisites concur, to wit:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part on the defendant to respect such right; and
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the
plaintiff.
 Time and again, we have emphasized that it is only upon the happening of the
last element when it can be said that a cause of action has arisen. In short, it is
from the time an act is performed or an omission incurred which is violative of
the plaintiff’s right, that signals the accrual of a cause of action.
 Hence, absent any demand from the obligee, the obligor does not incur delay.
And so long as the obligor does not incur in delay, he cannot be said to be
guilty of some omission violative of the obligee’s rights. Consequently, as long
as the obligor is not guilty of some omission violative of the obligee’s rights, the
latter has no cause of action against the former. As a result, the prescriptive
period within which the obligee may bring an action against the obligor does
not commence to run until a demand is made.

Case Title: Mariano v Petron

Ticker: 90-Year Lease Contract
Facts

 In 1968, Pacita V. Aure, Nicomedes Aure Bundac, and Zeny Abundo (Aure
Group), owners of a 2,064 square meter parcel of land in Tagaytay City, leased
the Property to ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc., (ESSO Eastern).
 The lease period is 90 years and the rent is payable monthly for the first 10
years, and annually for the remaining period.
 The lease contract (Contract) contained an assignment veto clause barring the
parties from assigning the lease without prior consent of the other.
 In 1977, ESSO Eastern sold ESSO Philippines to the Philippine National Oil
Corporation (PNOC). Apparently, the Aure Group was not informed of the sale.
ESSO Philippines, whose corporate name was successively changed to
Petrophil Corporation then to Petron Corporation (Petron), took possession of
the Property.
 In 1993, petitioner Romeo D. Mariano (petitioner) bought the Property from the
Aure Group and obtained title to the Property issued in his name bearing an
annotation of ESSO Eastern’s lease.
 In 1998, petitioner sent to Petron a notice to vacate the Property. Despite
receiving the notice to vacate on 21 December 1998, Petron remained on the
Property.
 In 1999, petitioner sued Petron to rescind the Contract and recover possession
of the Property.
 Petron argued that petitioner’s suit, filed on 18 March 1999, was barred by
 prescription under Article 1389 and Article 1146(1) of the Civil Code as
petitioner should have sought rescission within four years from PNOC’s
purchase of ESSO Philippines on 23 December 1977 or before 23 December
1981.
 The trial court ruled for petitioner, rescinded the Contract, ordered Petron to
vacate the Property, and cancelled the annotation on petitioner’s title of
Petron’s lease.
 The CA set aside the trial court’s ruling, declared the Contract subsisting until
13 November 2058 and ordered petitioner to pay Petron P300,000 as
attorney’s fees. Alternatively, the Court of Appeals found petitioner’s suit
barred by the fouryear prescriptive period under Article 1389 and Article 1146
(1) of the Civil Code, reckoned from PNOC’s buy-out of ESSO Philippines on
23 December 1977 (for Article 1389) or the execution of the Contract on 13
November 1968 (for Article 1146 [1]).

Issue

 Whether the action is barred by prescription. [Yes]

Arguments
Ruling
Petitioner Respondent

 Petitioner’s waiver of Petron’s contractual breach was compounded by his long

inaction to seek judicial redress. Petitioner filed his complaint nearly 22 years
after PNOC acquired the leasehold rights to the Property and almost six years
after petitioner bought the Property from the Aure Group. The more than two
decades lapse puts this case well within the territory of the 10 year prescriptive
bar to suits based upon a written contract under Article 1144 (1) of the Civil
Code.

Final Ruling: The petition is denied.