Korea's Position in The ASEAN+3 Process: Review of Performance and Policy Implications

Korea's Position in the ASEAN+3 Process: Review of Performance and Policy
Implications
Author(s): Inkyo Cheong
Source: The Journal of East Asian Affairs , Fall/Winter 2008, Vol. 22, No. 2
(Fall/Winter 2008), pp. 63-95
Published by: Institute for National Security Strategy
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23257897
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Korea's Position in the ASEAN+3 Process: Review of Performance and Policy Implications 63
Korea's Position in the ASEAN+3

Process: Review of Performance
and Policy Implications
Inkyo Cheong
Inha University
Abstract
For several years after the financial crisis, Korea was quite an active
participant in the ASEAN+3 process, leading the discussions on
East Asian economic cooperation through the proposals for the
establishment of the East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) and the East
Asian Study Group (EASG). At that time, it was difficult for China
and Japan, which tend to distrust each other and hold each other in
check, to carry out active roles in these ongoing processes. This
paper examines the position of Korea and the country's contribution
to East Asian economic integration in the ASEAN+3 process after
it overcame its financial crisis, and examines the current state of
affairs regarding the promotion of an East Asia FT A with China and
Japan. Based on such an analysis, the policy direction of the Korean
government and its implications will be presented. What position Lee
Myung-bak's government, which took power in 2008, will take with
regard to East Asian economic integration is not clearly known at
the present time. Before attending the next East Asia Summit meeting
for the first time since it took power, the government should solicit
the opinions of ordinary Koreans and experts through a public debate
on what direction East Asian economic cooperation should take in
the coming years.
Key Words: ASEAN+3, East Asian Summit, East Asian FTA, East
Asian Vision Group

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64 THE JOURNAL OF EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS
INTRODUCTION
The official channel of the economic integration and economic

cooperation that are currently being discussed in East Asia has
been the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and Korea) Summit meetings.
Korea was one of active participants for ASEAN+3 forum, which
were formally institutionalized into the forum in 1998. It is well
known, for example, that at the second ASEAN+3 Summit in
Hanoi in 1998, the Korean government proposed the establishment
of the East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) and the East Asian Study
Group (EASG), and actively supported the activities of these
groups at the government level. Korea also led the discussions
on East Asian economic cooperation and economic integration,
although it was experiencing economic difficulties of its own due
to the 1998-2001 financial crisis.
Internationally, many regional cooperation organizations have
been inaugurated, but the majority of these were discontinued
after a few years due to a lack of lasting momentum. The breadth
and quality of, and participation in, the ASEAN+3 Summit Meetings
of East Asia are expanding1, however, as time goes by. This is
attributable mainly to the fact that the direction of East Asian
cooperation and the staged approach strategy adopted were decided
through EAVG activities at the early inauguration stage of the
ASEAN+3 Summit Meetings, in keeping with the contemporary
trends of globalization and regional economic integration.
For several years after the financial crisis, Korea assumed the
responsibility of leading the discussions on East Asian economic
cooperation within the ASEAN+3 forum. It was difficult for China
and Japan, which tend to distrust each other and hold each other
in check, to carry out active roles in the discussion process. At
that time, China's greatest pending issue with respect to its foreign
trade policies was to attain membership in the World Trade
Organization (WTO). For Japan, it was the country's prime economic
l For details on areas of cooperation discussed at ASEAN+3 Summit Meetings

and related organizations, refer to Appendix.

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Korea's Position in the ASEAN+3 Process•' Review of Performance and Polio.i Implications 65
policy goal to escape from the collapse of its bubble economy in

an atmosphere that restrained it from playing a critical role in
East Asia due to its relationship with China. It was also difficult
for the ASEAN countries that were affected by the financial crisis
to play any role in the international arena.
Most of the countries suffering under the Asian financial crisis
became passive rather than promoting open trade policies externally,
and more oriented towards domestic economic policies. In contrast,
Korea advocated not only the strengthening of its economic
cooperation with East Asia, but also, in the long run, facilitating
East Asian economic integration, and declared its willingness to
open up and reform its economy at home and abroad through its
decision to promote FTAs, thereby enhancing its international
credit standing and enabling it to overcome its financial crisis at
the time within a remarkably short time. Nevertheless, the
government's position towards East Asia rapidly changed after it
overcame its financial crisis, culminating in a much cooler attitude
toward the issue of economic integration within the region as the
then-President's tenure in office neared an end.
Prime Minister Kim Seok-soo, who attended the ASEAN+3
Summit Meeting on behalf of the President in 2002, the year of
Kim Dae-jung's government, disappointed the participating countries
by undiplomatically saying that the matters discussed were contrary
to Korea's position then with regard to the promotion of a Korea
ASEAN FTA. When President Roh Moo-hyun's government took
power, it decided to make Korea's positioning as the "Northeast
Asia Hub Country" the keynote of national policy, signaling an
end to President Kim Dae-jung's policy of external cooperation
with East Asia and a shift in policy approach to one oriented
towards Northeast Asia.
Since 2004, China, Japan, and the ASEAN have been keenly
interested in the discussions on the promotion of an East Asia
FTA and have been conducting research and taking diplomatic
steps to establish economic relationships that are advantageous
to their respective countries. In the 2001 EAVG report, ASEAN+3
countries set the building of an East Asian community as the long

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term goal of East Asian economic cooperation and proposed the

promotion of an East Asia FTA as an interim stage. The pan
regional FTA, i.e., the East Asia FTA that is currently under
consideration in East Asia, is being discussed in the context of
the actualization of the EAVG goals.
Recently, Korea's desire to attain East Asian economic cooperation
and economic integration seems to its neighboring East Asian
countries to have weakened. What position Lee Myung-bak's
government, which took power in 2008, will take with regard to
East Asian economic integration is not clearly known. Before
attending the next East Asia Summit meeting for the first time
since it took power, the government should solicit the opinions of
ordinary Koreans and experts through a public debate on what
direction East Asian economic cooperation should take. Although
relevant ministries such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Trade and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance are preparing
schemes to promote East Asian economic cooperation, the spirit
in which they will do so will likely not differ much from the
tepid' and passive participatory attitude of the previous Roh Moo
hyun government.
Meanwhile, the competitive relationship between China and Japan
is likely to continue for some time, while Korea is the only country
that has concluded or is negotiating an FTA with the U.S. and
the EU. Korea, having had prior experience in negotiating FTAs,
is in a position to lead the discussions on the promotion of an
East Asia FTA, and also on the issue of East Asian economic
integration; however, it needs to actively do so on an equal footing
with the two larger competitive countries, China and Japan.
This paper examines the position of Korea and the country's
contribution to East Asian economic integration in the ASEAN+3
process after it overcame its financial crisis, and examines the
current state of affairs regarding the promotion of an East Asia
FTA with China and Japan. Based on such an analysis, the policy
direction of the Korean government and its implications will be
presented.

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Korea's Position in the ASEAN+3 Process-' Review of Performance and Policy Implications 67
EAST ASIAN TRADE AND THE FEASIBILITY

OF THE EAFTA
It has been pointed out that many economic obstacles should

first be overcome in order to achieve economic integration and a
pan-regional FTA in East Asia. Besides the economic obstacles,
such as the differences between the various economies and
industrial development stages of the region's members, it can be
difficult to promote the concept an East Asia FTA due to political
factors. Since WWII, the U.S. has maintained economic cooperation
with East Asian countries in its quest to maintain regional order
and stability, in an effort to protect its own interests in East Asia.
Utilizing political, military, and economic factors, the U.S. maintained
regional hegemony in East Asia. Accordingly, the U.S. has been
very sensitive about the economic integration of East Asia, as
such a move would alienate the U.S. For example, the U.S. opposed
the EAEG that Malaysian Premier Mahathir proposed and the AMF
that Japan proposed.
The U.S.'s justification of its opposition against East Asian
regionalism has weakened, though. Most importantly, the U.S.'s
role in the East Asian financial crisis was limited. The U.S. also
established NAFTA, achieved market integration in the North
American regional economy, and concluded FTAs with many
countries. Particularly, as the U.S. has concluded the Korea-U.S.
FTA, it is difficult for it to justify its opposition to an East Asia
FTA. When the issue of East Asian regionalism was raised in the
late 1980s, the U.S. insisted upon APEC as an alternative and
continued to show a strong interest in APEC for some time. Today,
however, APEC is no better than a ' talk-shop,' as opposed to its
original objectives.
On the other hand, some years ago, East Asian member countries
were not very enthusiastic about promoting the region's economic
integration. Historically, China tended to avoid any form of formal
economic and political cooperation that could influence its decisions
on regional cooperation policies. Before it joined the WTO in 2001,
it was prudent in presenting its opinion on the region's pending

fff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff on Thu, 01 Jan 1976 12:34:56 UTC
issues that could provoke the U.S. The hostility and distrust among
the East Asian countries, which originated from Japanese imperialism
in the past, have remained. Japan's refusal to officially apologize
for its past military aggression has become a hindering factor in
the promotion of closer East Asian regional integration.
China, meanwhile, has been adopting a considerably different
stance from the past regarding the issue of East Asian economic
integration. It now tends to avoid direct collusion with the U.S.,
but nowadays is actively proposing FTAs that can influence the
position of Japan in East Asia, such as a China-ASEAN FTA, a
China-Korea FTA, and an East Asian FTA. Particularly, since
joining the WTO and concluding its FTA with ASEAN, China has
become the leading proponent in the debate about East Asian
economic integration. In contrast, Japan has not changed its passive
position, but instead it is studying various measures to cope with
China's rise in East Asia, while at the same time Japan's position
within the region has weakened.
Japan's weakening influence within the region undoubtedly
contributed to the failure to conclude the Korea-Japan FTA in
2004, although there are other complex factors. There are many
political factors that could prevent East Asian regional integration,
but from an economic point of view, economic integration is needed.
Historically, East Asian countries have maintained very interdependent
and close relationships with one another. This is because the East
Asian region has achieved high economic growth and intraregional
trade has substantially expanded over the past several decades.
The high economic interdependence of East Asian countries can
be explained by empirical research, which shows that the flow of
trade between countries is inversely proportional to their distance,
when transportation costs are taken into account. Due to the
development of transportation technology, however, international
trade costs nowadays depend on investments in human and physical
resources that facilitate international trade, including the expansion
of knowledge on the language, culture, markets, and business
environments of trading partner countries and the formation of
networks with these countries.

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Korea's Position in the ASEAN+3 Process•' Review of Performance and Policy Implications 69
Naturally, such investments are more likely to be made between

countries that are culturally similar. East Asian countries have
politico-economic differences, but their cultures are commonly
based on Confucianism and Chinese characters and they are racially
similar, which heighten the possibility of the expansion of their
trading activities in this global age.
Table 1 shows that East Asia has high shares of regional GDP,
trade volume, and foreign reserves in the world economy. In 2006,
the East Asian (ASEAN+3) economy accounted for 19% (8.93
trillion dollars at the official exchange rate at the time) of the
<Table 1> East Asian Economy in the World (2006)

(unit: %, Mil., $)
GDP Foreign
Population
Exports Imports
(million) Official rate PPP Reserve
China 1,314 25,542 105,182 9,689 7,915 10,801
Japan 128 44,636 40,692 6,499 5,796 8,953
Korea 49 8,772 10,652 3,255 3,094 2,391
ASEAN 567 10,331 29,631 7,700 6,849 3,688
East Asia 2,058 89,281 186,157 27,143 23,654 25,833
Share 31 19 29 22 19 56
USA 299 132,621 129,393 10,383 19,194 661
Share 5 28 20 9 15 1
EU 489 142,059 129,540 45,325 47,486 6,564
Share 7 30 20 38 38 14
World 6,540 477,666 651,169 120,830 124,130 46,299
Source: Worldbank, IMF
2 It is because Japan's ratio of trade to GDP is low with 20% that East
Asia's dependency on trade is low. But the entire ASEAN's share is very
high with 127%.

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world's total GDP and 22% (2.71 trillion dollars) of the world's
total exports, thus maintaining its position as one of the world's
three largest economic blocs, the two others being the EU and
North America with global GDP shares of 28% and 30%, respectively.
East Asia's degree of dependence on trade was 54.3% in 2006,
which was higher than the world average of 45.5%2. The existing
six ASEAN member countries' dependence on trade is relatively
higher than that of the other East Asian countries.3 The trade
dependence of Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Brunei, and Vietnam
exceeds 100%.
Table 2 shows the shares of the world's major economic blocs
in intraregional trade. It shows that the intraregional trade rate
of East Asia in 2003 accounted for 39.5%, which is below the
levels of both NAFTA and the EU. This is because the income
gap in East Asia is greater than in NAFTA and the EU, and
because intra-industrial trade accounts for much of East Asia's
intraregional trade. Recently, however, the proportion of intraregional
trade in East Asian intraregional trade has been increasing because
Japan and Korea have been increasingly investing in their production
bases in China and ASEAN, where wages are low. In other words,
the high-value-added core parts that are produced in Japan and
Korea are exported to East Asian production bases, and the
finished goods produced in these production bases are imported
back by Japan and Korea or exported to Third World countries.
Japan's and Korea's investments in the East Asian region are
the direct cause of the expansion of intraregional trade. From this,
it can be inferred that if Japan and Korea expand their foreign
investments depending on their respective industrial restructuring,
then intraregional trade will also expand. For this reason, a
considerable portion of East Asia's trade is composed of intra
corporate trade.
3 Of the 10 ASEAN countries, the existing member countries are Singapore,

Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Brunei and the remaining
4 recently joined countries are CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam).

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Korea's Position in the ASEAN+3 Process: Review of Performance and Policy Implications 71
<Table 2> Share of Intra-Regional Trade (1990-2006)

(unit: %)
1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
China, Japan, Korea 11.6 15.9 14.9 15.1 15.7 15.1 15.1 14.2 13.3
ASEAN 17.0 21.1 22.5 22.2 22.7 24.4 24.4 24.9 25.7
ASEAN+3 28.6 37 37.4 37.3 38.4 39.5 39.5 39.1 39.0
ASEAN+6 33 40.4 40.6 40.8 41.6 42.7 43.1 43.1 43.1
NAFTA 37.2 42 46.8 46.5 45.9 44.8 43.7 43 42.1
EU(25) 65.6 65.1 64.6 64.5 65.1 65.6 65.6 64.2 64.6
Source: Author's Calculations based on Trade Data (KITA)
Developed countries' concerns over industrial structures and

products was raised when developing countries catch up with
developed countries; and as the high-income East Asian countries
such as Japan, Korea, and Singapore differentiate their products
and fractionalize their division of labor, intra-industrial trade tends
to increase.
Meanwhile, East Asia stands out as an important regional trading
partner of Korea. The relative importance of East Asia in terms
of Korea's total exports shrank after the financial crisis, but later
continuously increased. In 2007, 38% of Korea's total exports
went to East Asia. Korea's exports to China have sharply increased,
and its exports to Japan and the ASEAN have also been rising.
Due to Korea's significantly increasing amount of exports to East
Asia and East Asian countries' high tariff and non-tariff barriers,
Korea is expected to attain high gains when intraregional trade
is liberalized, i.e., when an East Asia FTA is ratified. If East Asian
countries continue to maintain the present intraregional trade
structure, development trend and their respective intraregional
trade proportions, while at the same time strengthening the region'
s market-oriented trade integration (functional integration) based
on production sharing, then their economic relationships with one
another will become increasingly important and the need to attain

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institutional integration will become increasingly greater. The

synergy effect of overseas investments and intraregional trade
will eventually contribute to forming a favorable environment for
the institutional economic integration of East Asia.
<Figure 1> The Trend of Korea's Export Share
45.00
40.00
25.00
20.00
15.00
10.00
5.00
0.00
•— — cr> ^ ^ r~
nsnnn88888888
<N <N r-J <N
Ahn and Cheong (2007) analyze the economic effects of

establishing an East Asia FTA. Although there are some differences
among East Asian countries, most of them can gain considerable
economic profits from the conclusion of an East Asia FTA.
Particularly, the countries that are heavily dependent on trade,
such as Korea, will gain greater economic gains than the countries
that are not. Such prospects for significant economic benefits will
heighten the need to promote an East Asia FTA. Today, most
East Asian countries are making efforts to reinforce their growth
potentials, and an East Asia FTA will strengthen the growth
potential of the overall region. Moreover, an East Asia FTA can
be regarded as the core stage towards the building of an East
Asian community in the long term. The disparities among the East
Asian countries with respect to the size of their economies and
their respective developmental stages are often cited as stumbling
blocks in promoting an East Asia FTA. Despite these disparities,

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however, the results of the projection that the conclusion of a

pan-regional FTA will contribute significantly to economic growth
in the region should induce the member countries' interest and
participation in formal discussions on the prospects of an East
Asia FTA.
THE 1998-2007 ASEAN+3 SUMMIT MEETINGS

AND THE ROLE OF KOREA
The organization in which East Asian economic integration and

economic cooperation are officially being discussed is the ASEAN+3,
through a series of Summit Meetings. For the past 10 years,
comprising the governments of Kim Dae-jung (February 1998
February 2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (February 2003-February
2008), Korea's position and role in East Asia gradually took on
greater significance, only to weaken over time eventually. Fortunately,
the Korea-ASEAN FTA was concluded during the Roh Moo-hyun
government, which satisfied the expectations of the ASEAN
countries to a certain extent. Korea's position and role in the
ASEAN+3 Summit Meetings over individual periods are examined
as follows.
1998-2003
Since ASEAN was established in 1967, the ASEAN Summit

Meetings have been held on an occasional basis. The first ASEAN+3
Summit Meeting was held when the then Malaysian Prime Minister
Mahathir unofficially invited the heads of China, Japan, and Korea
to the ceremony that marked ASEAN's 30th founding anniversary
in 1997, when the East Asian financial crisis occurred. The financial
crisis spread to other ASEAN countries such as Thailand and
Indonesia; and as the ASEAN countries recognized their need to
cooperate with Northeast Asian countries, all of which maintained
close political and economic relationships with one another to
overcome the financial crisis, the second ASEAN+3 Summit

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Meeting was held in Hanoi the following year, in December 1998,

after which the meetings became a regular occurrence.
During the early rounds of ASEAN+3 Summit Meetings, the
area in which economic cooperation was most vigorously discussed
was the need for cooperation to overcome the financial crisis. It
can be said that it was in the 1997 ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting
that the discussions on financial cooperation in East Asia began.
At that time, as the financial crisis that began in Southeast Asia
spread to Northeast Asia, East Asian countries recognized the
financial crisis as the problem of the East Asian region as a whole,
and began to discuss steps to minimize the damage caused by
the crisis and to prevent a second financial crisis from arising.
In the 1999 ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting, it was agreed that a
financial support mechanism in the East Asian region should be
enforced through the ASEAN+3 process to prevent future financial
crises in the region. Based on this, in the ASEAN+3 finance
ministers' meeting that was held in Chiang Mai, Thailand in May
2000, it was agreed that the "Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI)" would
be promoted. The CMI set as its goal the establishment of a
bilateral Swap/Repo contract network among the central banks of
Korea, China, Japan, and each of the ASEAN countries to supply
the contracted amount of US dollars to the counterpart country
at times of temporary liquidity problems during the financial crisis.
The ASEAN+3 process focused on expanding the existing currency
swap contract at the time between five ASEAN countries to all
the ASEAN member countries in order to prevent future financial
crises in the region. In the ASEAN+3 finance ministers' meeting
held in Honolulu in May 2001, the manner in which the bilateral
swap contract negotiations were developed was reported, and it
was agreed that the finance ministers would more actively promote
the existing contracts. Meetings between the respective finance
ministers were held on several occasions, and the currency swap
contracts were expanded in such a way that the total amount of
the currency swap contracts as of the end of 2007 amounted to
nearly 83 billion dollars.
In the third ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting held in Manila in November

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1999, the "Joint Statement on East Asian Cooperation" was adopted

and a basic direction for areas of cooperation by the region was
agreed upon. Afterwards, to implement the joint statement by
area/sector, meetings of the foreign affairs, economy, and finance
ministers and of the agriculture and labor ministers were regularly
held.
In the fifth Brunei ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting in 2001, the
EAVG reports were discussed.4 The EAVG, the establishment of
which the Korean government first proposed in the 1998 Vietnam
ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting, was composed of a total of 26 experts,
with two experts from each of the 13 ASEAN+3 member countries.
The report, which set the building of an East Asian community
as the goal that East Asia should pursue, can be said to be a
blueprint of East Asian cooperation that proposes schemes based
on diverse cooperation in the political, economic, social, and cultural
areas to attain the aforementioned goal.
It was difficult to prepare an overall East Asian economic
cooperation strategy in stages, especially considering the facts
that conferences had to be held on five separate occasions, 26
researchers had to be organized into the EAVG to represent East
Asia overall, and that the 13 ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting member
countries, all with diverse political and economic backgrounds, had
to be persuaded to cooperate. Thanks to the Korean government'
s active support in the aspects of manpower and financial support
and its leadership in research, the final report was completed
within the agreed time limit of two years.
The Korean government proposed the forming of an East Asia
Study Group (EASG) separately from the EAVG at the Singapore
Summit meeting in 2000 so that the cooperation tasks discussed
in the EAVG could be concretely implemented. The East Asian
countries highly praised Korea over the proposal. The EAVG is
a scholar-oriented research group, whereas the EASG is a group
4 The major focused research projects of the East Asia Vision Group
(EAVG) include East Asia Summit Meetings, an East Asia Forum, the
establishment of an East Asia Free Trade Zone, and the establishment of an
East Asia Economic Community.

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comprising government officials in charge of East Asian economic

cooperation, which deals with economic cooperation measures that
working-level policymakers can carry out in stages, and which
particularly examines practical business schemes to encourage
Northeast Asian support of Southeast Asian developing countries.
The then-President Kim led the discussions on the EAVG report
with the title of "Toward an East Asian Community" at the Brunei
ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting held with the theme of 'Establishing
a Close East Asian Partnership.' As the first speaker, President
Kim announced the major contents of the EAVG, which proposed
the establishment of an East Asia community with the basic
principles of the 3Ps (Peace, Prosperity, and Progress). Based
on the EAVG report, Korea proposed six cooperation projects in
three sectors, including the conversion of the ASEAN+3 Summit
Meeting into the ' East Asia Summit Meeting' and the establishment
of an ' East Asian Forum' to be composed of East Asian governments
and civilians. Korea received a favorable response to the proposal
from the heads of the member countries, thus playing the leading
role.5 Korea also proposed that the EASG focus on studying the
aforementioned three major schemes, namely the conversion of
the ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting into the East Asia Summit Meeting;
the establishment of an East Asian ETA; and the establishment
of an East Asia forum.
Domestically, Korea also established an organization to study
schemes for East Asian economic cooperation. Then called the
Ministry of Finance and Economy, now the Ministry of Planning
and Finance, prepared a draft plan to establish the tentatively
named "East Asia Cooperation Committee" in July 2001 to explore
East Asian economic cooperation schemes. In the following month,
the committee was finally named the East Asia Economic Cooperation
Research Group, and its first meeting was held. According to the
view of the Ministry of Finance and Economy, which proposed
the establishment of the research group, regionalism was growing
even as the world trading system was developing under the
5 The East Asian Forum was held in Seoul in December 2003.

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Korea's Position in the ASEAN+3 Process■' Review of Performance and Policy Implications 77
auspices of the WTO, but as Korea did not belong to any regional
bloc, the country was in a relatively unfavorable position compared
to other regions in terms of trade and investment. As such, China
and Japan were also pushing ahead with the conclusion of their
bilateral FTAs with ASEAN. In these international situations, Korea
should establish a grand strategy for cooperation with the East
Asian region, including with China, Japan, and the ASEAN; it should
explore detailed schemes to form closer trading relationships; and
it should form a national consensus. At the same time, the research
group felt that Korea needed to enhance its international position
by taking the leading role in the regional reorganization of East
Asia. The research group planned to develop a long-term strategy
for East Asian economic cooperation, and concretely recommended
projects as well as prepared for the ASEAN+3 Summit Meetings,
the summit meeting of China, Japan, and Korea, and the Korea
ASEAN summit meeting at the end of that year. The group tried
to develop the agenda for the 2001 Summit meeting, but as interest
in the ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting weakened in 2002, it was
virtually abolished. After that time, no government-support research
group on East Asia was formed, and East Asia seemed to be
merely one of several trading partners rather than a viewed as
a distinct region under the goal of economic integration.
In the latter half of President Kim Dae-jung's tenure, the Korean
government's interest in the ASEAN+3 Summit Meetings also
noticeably weakened. The report by one of the Korean news
medias on this issue at the time is summarized as follows.6
President Kim Dae-jung proposed the establishment of an

East Asia Free Trade Agreement at the Brunei ASEAN+3
Summit Meeting in November 2001 while reviewing the final
EAVG report. He stressed, "As an interim stage toward a
free trade area [for the entire East Asian region], the method
of connecting the countries' free trade areas like a belt can
6 Maeil Business newspaper (2002) " [Pressmen 24 Hours] What on earth

is the National Affair Coordination Office doing?" Nov. 7

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be considered." He led the discussion on the conclusion of

the FTA in the East Asian region, which was left behind in
the global trend of building regional trade blocs.
One year later, in November 2002, Prime Minister Kim Seok
soo, on behalf of President Kim, attended the Cambodia
Summit meeting. The biggest point of contention therein was
the conclusion of the FTA in the East Asian region. China
and Japan had made thorough preparations and were vying
for the promotion of the 'East Asia FTA' Both the Thai
Premier and the Singaporean Premier also emphasized the
need for Korea to conclude an FTA with the ASEAN.
Particularly, the Singapore Premier complained, "While Korea
has concluded an FTA with Chile, now it is passive in
discussing this matter with the ASEAN."
With regard to this, Prime Minister Kim repeated his formal
position, saying, "We are not yet prepared to conclude an
FTA with the ASEAN." This was when Korea suddenly fell
to the position of an onlooker in the discussion of East Asian
economic integration. Why was this so? Simply put, the
government neglected to prepare for the summit meeting,
since (the) President did not attend. The excuse that it was
because Prime Minister Kim instead of President Kim attended
the meeting does not stand to reason. It is clear that unlike
China and Japan, Korea attended the ASEAN+3 Summit
Meeting without making proper preparations. (Maeil Business
Newspaper, 2002)
After Prime Minister Kim's comments, the ASEAN countries

began to take an interest in what had caused Korea, which had
led the discussions on East Asian economic cooperation from 1999
to 2001, to change its position so abruptly. They also mentioned
the Korean government's inconsistency and inadequate preparations
for the summit meeting. On November 6, 2002, the Thai newspaper
Bangkok Post reported that Korea appeared to be a strange
country, as it was going against the trend of East Asia to conclude
a free trade agreement with the ASEAN. The Bangkok Post,

133.11.204.55 on Mon, 26 Oct 2020 14:00:12 UTC
Korea's Position in the ASEAN+3 Process'- Review of Performance and Policy Implications 79
quoting the Thai Premier's comments, reported that Prime Minister

Kim revealed at the ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting held in Phnom
Penh that Korea was not yet prepared to conclude a free trade
agreement because Korea and the ASEAN are mutually based on
agriculture. (YTN News, 2002)
2003-2007
Early on in President Roh Moo-hyun's government, the administration

set Northeast Asia as the major target of East Asian regional
economic cooperation, and its foreign trade policies also focused
mainly on policies related to the Northeast Asian region. According
to the administration's Policy Portal (2007),7 President Roh Moo
hyun, from the time when he was still a presidential candidate in
2002, had the position of strengthening economic cooperation with
Northeast Asia rather than the U.S., a position which was established
in his election campaign. After he was elected President, the
Presidential Undertaking Committee decided to make 'Korea as
the Northeast Asian Hub of Peace and Prosperity' the goal of the
Roh Moo-hyun administration. Under this goal, Korea was to be
born again as the economic hub of Northeast Asia to spearhead
a Northeast Asian era of 21st-century peace and prosperity. Under
these key policies, the so-called Participatory Government of Roh
Moo-Hyun, in its early period, decided to promote an FTA with
China and Japan. This was because if Korea, on its own initiative,
were to conclude an FTA with these countries, a China-Japan
FTA could be induced and the base for an eventual Northeast
Asian economic community could be established.
Right after the presidential inauguration, Korea and Japan agreed
to promote an FTA. Regarding the Korea-Japan FTA, then Minister
of Foreign Affairs and Trade Yoon Yeong-gwan said at the National
Assembly on June 12, 2003, "The Korea-Japan FTA is not just
an economic issue but also a peace and security issue. Just as
7 Korea Policy Forum (www.korea.kr). "the Beginning, Agony and the

remaining Problems" (Nov. 2007 internet search)

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Germany and France built (a) base (for) peace in Europe through
economic integration, President Roh went to Japan and presented
his vision of Northeast Asian economic integration and joint
prosperity. One of his core subjects was the economic integration
of Northeast Asian countries, in the preliminary stage of which a
Korea-Japan FTA is important" (The Participatory Government
Economy: 5 Years).
On September 2, 2003, the Korean government finalized its
FTA Promotion Roadmap, which stipulated key policies that gave
priority to establishing a close relationship with the Northeast
Asian region. The roadmap was meant to actively utilize an FTA
as a policy tool for Korea to become a Northeast Asian business
hub. The government decided to enforce an FTA with Japan and
Singapore, which, had been promoted during the early stages of
the Kim Dae-jung government. The government also decided to
promote FTAs with the ASEAN and Mexico as soon as possible.
Furthermore, in the mid-term and the long term, the government
also decided to promote FTAs with large economic regions such
as the U.S. and the EU, a China-Japan-Korea FTA, and an East
Asia FTA.
As the Japan-Korea FTA experienced difficulties in negotiations,
the road driven by Korea to Northeast Asian economic integration
became increasingly rough. Moreover, due to the competition
between Japan and China for regional hegemony, the possibility
of concluding a China-Japan FTA or a China-Japan-Korea FTA
became remote. The government chose the policy of ' befriending
distant states and inducing neighbors.' Particularly, the trend
towards individual countries focusing on their respective concerns
during discussions on FTAs was strengthened, and as the Doha
Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations became sluggish, the
Korean government decided to promote FTAs with as many
countries as possible. When its competitor countries concluded
FTAs with the countries to which Korea exported its products,
it was clear that Korea's access to markets of those countries
would narrow. Korea, whose dependency on trade was as much
as 70%, was worried about the possibility of its export markets

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Korea's Position in the ASEAN+3 Process'■ Review of Performance and Policy Implications 81
shrinking by trade diversion caused by the conclusion of FTAs

from which it was excluded; indeed, the event that bared such
worries symbolically occurred shortly afterwards. In January 2004,
Mexico sharply raised its safeguard tariffs on tires from those
countries with which Mexico did not have an FTA. As a result,
13 container ships loaded with Korean-made tires bound for Mexico
turned around at the port of Mexico and returned to Busan Port,
and afterwards, exports of Korean-made tires to Mexico sharply
dropped. On the other hand, Japan, which had concluded an
Economic Partnership Agreement (virtually the same as an FTA)
with Mexico in March 2004, had a boom period for its tire exports,
while Korean business firms were virtually forced to withdraw
from the Mexican market (The Participatory Government: 5 Years).
Thereafter, the government promoted FTAs with Mexico and
Canada. Also around this period, policymakers began to generally
feel the need to promote a Korea-U.S. FTA. In 2005, the Korean
government actively studied the establishment of an FTA with
the U.S.; and the next year, it began official negotiations. The
Korean government's trade policy from 2005-2007 was formulated
with a future Korea-U.S. FTA as the central axis, whereas the
Korean government's interest and determination to push East
Asian economic cooperation along with its counterpart relatively
declined.
The promotion of an FTA with the ASEAN is a typical example
of the lack of a strategic and grand trade strategy towards East
Asia on the part of Korea. Prime Minister Kim Seok-soo's
undiplomatic statement with respect to a Korea-ASEAN FTA at
the 2002 Kuala Lumpur ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting became to
be criticized in Korea as well as the criticism of the ASEAN
countries strengthened. Prime Minister Kim changed his position
regarding a FTA with ASEAN on the spot, ignoring his Summit
Meeting remark the previous day that caused the upset. He later
added in a press interview that the ASEAN was an important
economic cooperation region for Korea and that the Korean
government would consider the promotion of an FTA with the
ASEAN. The whole story behind the affair cannot be grasped,

133.11.204.55 on Mon, 26 Oct 2020 14:00:12 UTC
but in any case, the promotion of an FTA with the ASEAN was
thereafter decided on overnight.
An FTA with the ASEAN was not considered for some time
after the Roh Moo-hyun government took power, but the Korean
government considered a Korea-ASEAN FTA in response to the
abovementioned circumstances rather than a strategic decision
based on East Asian economic integration, given the fact that
China had fast-tracked its FTA with the ASEAN and even Japan
had shown its willingness to promote an FTA with the ASEAN.
In response, the Roh Moo-hyun government agreed to conduct
joint research on schemes to reinforce comprehensive economic
cooperation in the region by forming an expert group with ASEAN,
after which negotiations for a bilateral FTA between China and
ASEAN was near to a conclusion in 2004. The government could
have at least avoided the situation in which Korea was alienated
from East Asian regionalism due to its refusal to conclude an FTA
with the ASEAN, but the abrupt end of the negotiations had many
undesired side effects.8
The Northeast Asian Economic Hub Policy cannot be described
as successful under the government of President Roh Moo-hyun,
although it was the president's prime national administrative task.
President Roh aspired for the rise of Korea to become an economic
and transshipment hub in Northeast Asia and for it to be an integral
part of the global economy. After five years, the concept has
remained unclear. Even the Blue House cited it as the most
unsuccessful project of the national administration. (Chosunllbo
2008) As opposed to initial expectations, the Korea-Japan FTA
was discontinued after a year of negotiations and the relationship
between the two countries has worsened. Although joint research
on a China-Japan-Korea FTA and a FTA with China has been
conducted with the initiative of national policy research institutes,
8 Thailand was excluded from the Korea-ASEAN FTA due to a difference

in positions on market access. And only 5 ASEAN countries promulgated
that the Korea-ASEAN FTA was due to come into effect in June 2007. As
of October 2008, there were eight ASEAN countries are implementing the
Agreement.

133.11.204.55 on Mon, 26 Oct 2020 14:00:12 UTC
these have not gone beyond the research stage. The Northeast
Asian Hub policy was virtually abolished in 2004. The core of
the trade policy was converted into the Korea-US FTA and
negotiations on the Korea-ASEAN FTA became the major pending
trade issue during the period 2006-2007.
Compared to President Kim's era, the position of Korea in East
Asia greatly weakened under President Roh. Although Korea
participated in the ASEAN+3 Summit Meetings and the East Asian
Summits (EAS), the nation has not played the lead role in discussions
on the mid-and long-term integration of the region's economy.
The relationships among member countries have also occasionally
deteriorated due to unreasonable remarks. MBN (2005) reported
that at the 1st EAS, where the heads of 17 East Asian countries9
gathered, President Roh said that a thorough reflection on Japan'
s aggressive military past is needed. At the time, the relationship
between Korea and Japan was expected to decline sharply due
to President Roh's continued remarks criticizing Japan. Moreover,
the Japanese government stirred up politically sensitive issues for
Korea. For example, the government of Abe Shinzo raised the
issue of editing Japanese history textbooks with intentional distortion
and brought other issues to the fore, such as the Dokdo territorial
dispute as well as other historical issues. The bilateral summit
talks and the China-Japan-Korea Summit were also cancelled during
the ASEAN+3 Summit, despite the fact that the China-Japan
Korea Summit used to be a convention at the ASEAN+3 meeting.
President Roh Moo-hyun attended the EAS and the ASEAN+3
Summit held in Cebu, in the Philippines in January 2007.10 However,
he did not attend the official luncheon and dinner. Although the
President was absent due to physical fatigue, it is very unusual
for political leaders to miss the luncheon and dinner in a diplomatic
9 The regular member countries of EAS are ASEAN+3 member counties

together with India, Australia, and New Zealand and Russia with a status of
an observer; a total of 17 countries participated in 2007.
10 It is a convention that the ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting is held at year
end but owing to the host nation's, the Philippines', unavoidable circumstances
it was postponed to January of the following year.

133.11.204.55 on Mon, 26 Oct 2020 14:00:12 UTC
convention. The President was also known to have had a heated

debate with Abe Shinzo about their respective positions on North
Korea that resulted in different political interpretations. Then the
President's chief secretary on public relations at the time, Yoon
Seung-yong, revealed that the President "did not attend the luncheon
because its nature had changed from a business luncheon to a
social one. But he had lunch with the presidential staff in attendance,
and President Roh's condition is normal." It is hardly understandable
to be absent from an official luncheon when his condition is normal.11
Without prior notice in accordance with diplomatic convention,
absence from luncheon and dinner is a diplomatic blunder that
could cause misunderstanding with other countries.
The EAS and the 11th ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting were held
in Singapore in November 2007. Korea signed the agreement of
the Korea-ASEAN FTA concerning the service sector and seemed
to be trying to restore its diplomatic relationships with Japan. By
holding both the Korea-Japan Summit, with Japanese Premier
Fukuda Yazuo, Abe Shinzo's successor and the China-Japan-Korea
Summit, the three countries' diplomatic relationships seemed to
be restored in the ASEAN+3 process in 2007. To reduce the
ASEAN intra-regional developmental gap starting in 2008, the
Korean government promised financial support of an additional 5
million dollars to ASEAN countries. Korea also agreed to establish
a Korean-ASEAN center in Seoul next year to revitalize intra
regional exchanges in economic, cultural, educational and other
areas. Of note is the fact that Japan had already established a
Japan-ASEAN center in 1981, and China also established a China
ASEAN center in January 2008.
President Roh revealed in a farewell speech at his last ASEAN+3
Summit Meeting that, "when I first attended the meeting, I was
not familiar with the atmosphere. I am grateful to the ASEAN+3
Leaders for their warm hospitality so that I would not feel uneasy.
Since Korea's will to strengthen its relationship with ASEAN and
li Dong-A Ilbo (2007) "President Roh, ASEAN+3 Absent from Summit

Dinner following Yesterday's Luncheon'.

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EAS countries is very strong and the Korean people's cooperative

spirit is also very strong, the next government's policy keynote
toward ASEAN and EAS will remain unchanged and the (spirit
of) cooperation will also be well maintained."
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
While East Asia absorbs a third of Korea's exports and East

Asia' economic growth rate is higher than other regions, the
regional economy heavily depends on the non-Asian Market such
as the US. Caused by the losses of sub-prime mortgages, the US
economy has recently plunged into a financial crisis and sent the
world economy into a depressed state. Despite sluggish domestic
demand, Korea has maintained sound economic growth mainly due
to a favorable growth rate of exports to China, the US, EU and
other regions. Now, Korea's exports are also bound to be hard
hit because of a depressed world economy; therefore, the secure
expansion of its export markets is now more important than ever
before.
Regional economic cooperation with the U.S. and Europe should
be reinforced; in addition, strengthening economic cooperation
within the East Asian region is urgently needed. Under these
circumstances, the EAFTA will contribute to enhancing not only
Korea's export growth but also the growth potential of the East
Asian economy overall.
East Asian economic cooperation can be attained through many
channels but the official channel is the forum of ASEAN+3 Summit
Meetings. Right after the Asian financial crisis, Korea led the
discussions on East Asian economic integration and greatly
contributed to imbuing East Asia. Korean influence was seen
particularly among ASEAN countries that shared the vision of
reinforcing intra-regional economic cooperation. For the past 5~
6 years, however, Korea's influential role in furthering East Asian
economic integration has sharply diminished. In light of this, East
Asian countries have placed great expectations on President Lee

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Myung-bak's government. For example, Hank Lim, a well-known

international economist in East Asia, made a similar remark by
saying "Korea has bigger potential for leading East Asian economic
integration than China and Japan."12 He highly evaluated the
performance of Korea's FTA policy in recent years, quoting
bilateral FTAs with the US and the EU. Regional policy on economic
cooperation and integration over the next five years of presidential
tenure should ideally be established before the next ASEAN+3
Summit Meeting in December 2008.
<Table 3> Korea's FTA Performance
Stage Country\Region Remarks
Chile (2004.4) Chile (2004.4)
Implementation Singapore (2006.3) Singapore (2006.3)
EFTA (2006.9) EFTA (2006.9)
ASEAN (2007.6) ASEAN (2007.6)
Ratification US (2008) US (2008)
EU EU
ASEAN ASEAN
Negotiation India India
Canada, Mexico Canada, Mexico
GCC GCC
Japan Negotiation (2003.12-2004.12)
Joint Study China Likely to start negotiation soon
Australia-NZ, Mercosur Possible negotiation in 2009
Source: Complied from information by Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
12 Dr Lim is Director of Research, Singaporean Institute of International

Affairs. He made this remark at the the 1st Taiwan-East Asia Conference on
FTA (Taipei, October 11-12).

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With regard to this, let me present some policy implications on

pending issues. First, over the next 5 years, the discussions on
East Asian economic integration will likely progress faster than
the past 5 years. It can be said that all East Asian countries have
already jumped on the bandwagon of FTA regionalism and have
accumulated different experiences of regionalism. Some regional
consensus towards East Asian regional economic integration is
forming or improving at least, which can speed up progress towards
economic integration. In particular, the current global financial
crisis (2008) has weakened the U.S.' s influence on East Asia;
countries in the region should therefore be more interested in
regional economic integration. Baldwin (1997) explains the evolvement
of regionalism with his domino theory. Once the wind of regionalism
starts to blow it won't stop but will eventually develop into a
large scale economic bloc. He pointed out that the next 5 years
can be that period in time when the domino effect of East Asian
economic integration is generated.13 Considering the mutual distrust
and scrutiny between China and Japan, Korea can undoubtedly
fulfill a role as a facilitator of economic integration. Korea can
also be the mediator to encourage Japan and China to join an East
Asian FTA. Accordingly, the government's systematic research
and study, and administrative support for the concept of East
Asian economic integration are needed.
With regard to this, the government needs to establish a
mechanism for research coordination to deal systematically with
research on ways to promote an East Asia FTA and East Asian
economic integration. In 2001 under the Presidency of Kim, Dae
jung, the Korean government formed the East Asia Economic
Cooperation Research Group (EAECRG) and systematically studied
the analysis of summit meeting topics and cooperation projects.
The government could strengthen Korea's role and position in
the ASEAN+3 Summit Meetings by utilizing the results of such
research. The government's regional trade officials and trade
13 Remarks at the ADBI conference on "East Asia Regionalism." (Tokyo,

September 2008)

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experts (academic) could hold research meetings regularly so that

an in-depth analysis on future East Asian economic integration
could be explored. Since it would be a research group, a group
similar to the EAECRG could only operate if a secretariat responsible
for carrying out research and providing research funds were to
be established. Korea should keep in mind that the U.K., which
acted as an observer in the European integration process during
the period from the 1950s to the 1970s, was able to play only
a limited role in the process of European economic integration.
Korea should decide whether or not to promote an East Asia
FTA. Since the new government's inauguration, "the expansion
of the basis of FTA policies" has been the keynote to FTA policy.
But seven months after the inauguration of the new president, no
detailed direction has been presented. It seems that the government'
s position on the promotion of an East Asia FTA has not been
established. However, the promotion of bilateral FTAs with China
and Japan is mentioned from time to time. Korea has concluded
an FTA with the U.S. and is carrying out negotiations for an FTA
with the EU, the world's largest economic bloc. The nation can
actually lead the movement towards an East Asia FTA by taking
advantage of its FTA experience and competence in developing
itself into an FTA regional hub country. Thus, we should incorporate
the promotion of an East Asian FTA into the country's FTA
policies. Moreover, whether or not Korea is to promote the Korea
China FTA and the Korea-Japan FTA, which are also now under
consideration, should be decided in the context of and in connection
with an overall East Asia FTA promotion strategy. By doing so,
the efficiency of trade policy can be enhanced.
The government also needs to establish its position regarding
membership of an East Asian FTA. China has openly proposed
an ASEAN+3 FTA, while Japan argues for an ASEAN+6 FTA
(3+Australia, New Zealand and India). In part, Japan has been
successful in including the extra 3 countries into the EAS. In
2004, President Roh Moo-hyun proposed the participation of Russia
in the East Asia Summit (EAS). "Regarding the range of participating
countries which has been controversial, President Roh emphasized

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Korea's Position in the ASEAN+3 Process'■ Review of Performance and Policy Implications 89
Russia should participate in the dialogue of FTAs since it is

desirable for all the countries that have contributed to maintaining
peace in the East Asian region to participate." (MBN 2005) The
expansion of member countries in the EAS is one of the most
sensitive issues. Before the proposal by the former President is
taken any further, the country should decide its position on the
promotion of the EAFTA, and in relation to its membership of a
future regional trade bloc. It can be said that adding even one
more country into the EAFTA will make the process of integration
more difficult.
Looking at the current trend of the discussions regarding East
Asian economic integration, it is likely that the concept of an
ASEAN+6 can gain greater momentum than the current ASEAN+3
format, since the idea of allowing the participation of concerned
countries sounds more convincing than trying to limit members
in the arena of international politics. In the former case, the
participation of Russia, the U.S., and Canada cannot be ruled out.
In this case, the shape of the ASEAN+3 system 10 years from
now will be similar to that of today's APEC. Considering the
request of Japan for an ASEAN+6 FT A, and the relationships
with concerned countries such as India, Australia and New Zealand,
it is difficult for Korea to ignore this proposal. A scheme that can
accommodate both proposals by China and Japan can be a two
step approach. First, an East Asian FTA based on the current
ASEAN+3 forum should be promoted. Then, the remaining concerned
countries can participate as member countries under specified
conditions later. In this case, the current ASEAN+3 process will
not be disturbed until an EAFTA is formed.
Mutual trust and consistency are prerequisites in order to make
substantial progress on the issue of regional economic cooperation
and integration. Taking a lesson from the previous mistakes by
former governments of Korea, losing the trust or disappointing
the expectations of fellow member countries in East Asia should
not be repeated. Japan and China are reinforcing economic
cooperation with ASEAN due to their status as regional economic
powerhouses. At the same time, they are competing with each

133.11.204.55 on Mon, 26 Oct 2020 14:00:12 UTC
other in taking the initiative in promoting an East Asian FTA. The

three countries-China, Japan and Korea-provide considerable
amount of economic aid to Southeast Asian countries. The aid
from Japan and China respectively is far more than that provided
by Korea. Looking at the size of their respective economies, we
can hardly compete with these countries. Nevertheless, if Korea
utilizes its experience in economic development and competence
in promoting FTAs with large economies, it won't lag behind China
or Japan when it comes to the promotion process of an East Asian
FTA. A deliberate strategy, a strong will and maintaining consistency
will be critical in enhancing Korea's role in leading economic
cooperation and integration in East Asia. President Lee declared
that he will adopt a strategy of pragmatic diplomacy. "It is the
right direction... we expect him to make preparations scrupulously
and with substance, taking a wide view of diplomacy from the
planning stage." (DongAIlbo 2008)

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Korea's Position in the ASEAN+3 Process■ Review of Performance and Policy Implications 91
REFERENCES
Ahn, Choong Yong and Inkyo Cheong. 2007. A Search for Closer
Economic Relations in East Asia. The Japanese Economic
Review Vol. 58, No. 2. June.
Angkinand, Apanard Penny and Eric M.P. Chiu. 2008. Will Institutional
Reform Enhance Bilateral Trade Flows. Presented for the
conference at the 1st Taiwan-East Asia Conference on FTA
(Taipei, October 11-12).
Baldwin, R.E. 2003. The Spoke Trap: Hub and Spoke Bilateralism
in East Asia. Northeast Asian Study Series. Seoul: Korea
Institute for International Economic Policy
Chosunllbo. 2008. The Policy of Northeast Asia Hub to be the
Worst Failure. January 16.
DongAIlbo. 2007. President Roh, ASEAN+3 Absent from Summit
Dinner following Yesterday Luncheon. January 16.
DongAIlbo. 2008. [Editorial] Diplomacy of the Government of
President Lee, It Should Be Grand-designed and Systematic.
January 1.
East Asian Vision Group. 2001. Towards an East Asian Community.
Seoul: EAVG Secretariat
Kawai, Masahiro and Ganeshan Wignaraja. 2007. ASEAN+3 or
ASEAN+6: Which way forwards?. Discussion paper No. 77.
Tokyo: ADB Institute
Korea Policy Portal (www.korea.kr). The Beginning, Agony and
the remaining Problems. (Internet Search: Nov. 2007)
MBN. 2005. President Roh's Criticism against Japan. News Report.
December 15.
Maeil Business newspaper. 2002. [Pressmen 24 Hours] What on
earth is the National Affair Coordination Office doing?. Nov. 7.
Policy Briefing. 2008. The Participatory Government: 5 Years.
Seoul: Han's Media. (Korean)
SERI. 2004. ASEAN+3 Process and Economic Cooperation in East
Asia. Global Issue 9.
Urata, Shujiro. 2008. Institutionalization of Regional Economic

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Integration in East Asia. Presented at the 13th International

Conference of Korean Economic Association "Leap-off Strategy
for Global Korea" in Seoul, Korea, August 12-13.
Yonhap News. 2002. Korea moves against the trend of Free Trade
Agreement. Nov. 6.

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<Appendix 1> ASEAN+3 Structure
Level High ranked Other

Leaders Minister DG Expert Total
Issue Official Track
Diplomacy ASEAN+3 ASEAN+3 ASEAN+3 ASEAN+3 ASEAN+3 5
Summit FMM SOM DGs DGs WG
Crime AMMTC+3 SOMTC+3 SOMTC+3 3
WG on drug
Economy AEM+3 SEOM+3 2
Finance AFMM+3 AFDM+3 - 6 Expert 13
Meeting
- ABMI Focal
Group
- CMI Expert
Meeting
- ETWG
- ASEAN+3 SG
Energy AME+3 SOME+3 SOME+3 5 forums 8
EPGG
Environment AEMM+3 ASOEN+3 2
Agriculture AMAF+3 SOM 2
AMAF+3
Telecom TELMIN+3 TELSOM+3 2
Tour M-ATM+3 NTOs+3 2
Labor ALMM+3 SLOM+3 2
Health AHMM+3 SOMHD+3 2
Culture 1 AMCA+3 SOMCA+3 2
Social Welfare AMMSWD+3 SOMSWD+3 2
Youth AMMY+3 ASOMY+3 2
Science COST+3 1
Rural Economy SOMRDPE+3 1
Disaster ACDM+3 1
Mining ASOMM+3 1
Female Issue ACW+3 1
Other Track - EAF 2
- NEAT
Total 1 14 19 2 18 2 56

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<Appendix 2> Abbreviation for ASEAN+3 Process
ASEAN+3 FMM ASEAN Plus Three : Foreign Ministers Meeting
ASEAN+3 SOM ASEAN Plus Three Senior Official Meeting
ASEAN+3 DGs ASEAN Plus Three Directors-General
ASEAN+3 DGSWG ASEAN Plus Three Directors-General Working Group
AMMTC+3 ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime
SOMTC+3 ASEAN Plus Three Senior Official Meeting on Transnational Crime
AEM+3 ASEAN Economic Ministers Plus Three Consultations
SEOM+3 Senior Economic Official Meeting Plus Three Consultations
AFMM+3 ASEAN Plus Three Finance Ministers' Meeting
AFDM+3 ASEAN Plus Three Finance and Central Bank Deputies' Meeting
AME+3 ASEAN Plus Three Ministers' Meeting on Energy
SOME+3 ASEAN Plus Three Senior Officials Meeting on Energy
SOME+3 EGPP ASEAN Plus Three Senior Officials Meeting on Energy Policy Governing
Group
AEMM+3 ASEAN Plus Three Environment Ministers Meeting
ASOEN+3 ASEAN Plus Three Senior Officials on Environment
AMAF+3 ASEAN Plus Three Minister on Agriculture and Forestry
SOM-AMAF+3 ASEAN Senior Officials on Agriculture and Forestry Plus Three Meeting
TELMIN+3 ASEAN Plus Three Telecommunications and IT Ministers Meeting
TELSOM+3 ASEAN Plus Three Telecommunication Senior Officials Meeting
ATM_3 ASEAN Plus Three Tourism Ministers
NTOS+3 ASEAN Plus Three National Tourism Organizations
ALMM+3 ASEAN Plus Three Labour Ministers Meeting
SLOM+3 ASEAN Plus Three Senior Labour Officials Meeting
AHMM+3 ASEAN Plus Three Health Ministers Meeting
SOMHD+3 ASEAN Plus Three Senior Officials on Health and Development

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AMCA+3 ASEAN Plus Three Ministers Meeting on Culture and Arts
SOMCA+3 ASEAN Plus Three Senior Officials Meeting on Culture and Arts
AMMSWD+3 ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting on Social Welfare and Development
ASOMSWD+3 ASEAN Plus Three Senior Officials Meeting on Social Welfare and Development
AMMY+3 ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial Meeting on Youth
ASOMY+3 ASEAN Plus Three Senior Officials Meeting on Youth
COST+3 ASEAN Plus Three on Science and Technology
SOMRDPE+3 ASEAN Plus Three Senior Officials Meeting on Rural Development
ACDM+3 ASEAN Plus Three Committee on Disaster Management
ASOMM+3 ASEAN Plus Three Senior Officials on Minerals
ACW+3 ASEAN Plus Three on Women
EAF East Asia Forum
NEAT Network of East Asia Think-Tanks
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Korea's Position in The ASEAN+3 Process: Review of Performance and Policy Implications

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Korea's Position in The ASEAN+3 Process: Review of Performance and Policy Implications

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Korea's Position in the ASEAN+3 Process: Review of Performance and Policy

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