Trust Index I

Trust in Institutions Index 2020
The Parliament and Beyond

Regenerating trust by exploring
the roots of its shortage
Director and Main Editor : Mohammed Masbah

Authors : Rachid Aourraz - Francesco Colin
The Parliament and Beyond

Regenerating trust by exploring
the roots of its shortage
Director and Main Editor:
Dr. Mohammed Masbah
Authors:
Dr. Rachid Aourraz
Mr. Francesco Colin
Researchers and Contributors:

Mr. Imru Al Qais Talha Jibril
Ms. Maha Ghazi
Research assistants:
Ms. Gretchen Mary Coleman
Ms. Noor Traina
Edition: 2020
This project was supported by :
Accuracy - Depth - Timeliness - Impact
Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis

No. 5, Apt. 5, Rue Figuig, Rabat
Tél. : +212 5 37 26 26 02
https://mipa.institute/
contact@mipa.institute
Legal Deposit : 2020MO3995
ISBN : 978-9920-9022-0-5
© 2020 Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis (MIPA). All rights reserved.
The Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis is a nonprofit public policy institution
headquartered in Rabat, Morocco. The institute aims to conduct in-depth research
on various public policy issues by proposing new ideas to solve the problems
facing society in terms of democracy and development.
The main activity of the Institute is to produce a systematic, in-depth, accurate and
objective analysis of policy related issues. The results and analyses are published
by the institute in the form of policy summaries, research articles and reports.
Table of Content
Foreword 9
Acknowledgment 11
Executive Summary 13
Social Trust 13
Political Trust 14
Trust in the Parliament 15
Introduction 17
Methodology 23
Chapter I : Social Trust 27
Introduction 28
Social trust: its importance and components 28
Trust and social change 30
Sources of social trust 33
Personal experiences 34
Socialization 35
Religion and social values 36
Social media 37
Levels of social trust 38
The family 38
Friends and co-workers 40
Neighbors 42
Trust in others and in strangers 45
Conclusion 48
Chapter II : Political Trust 49
Introduction 50
Trust in Non-Elected Institutions 50
Public Administrations 51
Justice system 53
Service providers 57
Education 57
Healthcare 63
Security apparatus 69
Trust in Mediators 75
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) 75
Labor Unions 79
Trust in elected institutions 81
Government 82
Political parties 85
Participation and political trust 90
Corruption and political trust 94
Conclusion 98
Chapter III : Trust in Parliament 101
Introduction 102
Trustworthiness 105
Capabilities 108
Roles and capabilities of the Parliament 109
Social contract and institutional limitations 111
Education 113
Performance 114
Confusion of roles 119
Elements to judge performance 120
Accountability 122
Communication 124
Lack of communication? 125
Social Media 129
Communication differences between Parliament and Municipalities 131
MPs’ perspective on (dis)trust in the Parliament 132
Perceptions of the Parliament 133
Parliament-Government relations 134
Human and material resources 135
Communication and social media 137
Conclusions 138
Gaining Trust : Recommendations 141
About the Authors and Contributors 144
Index of figures 146
Appendixes 148
Annex 1: Social and Political trust between theory and practice 148
Annex 2: Global and Local perceptions of Trust 169
Foreword
Since 2011, Morocco has gone through constant changes with

unpredictable outcomes. These changes affect citizens perception of
their political institutions and the general direction of the country.
While most of the studies have paid attention to the structure of

power and institutional framework, the role of “ordinary” people has
been neglected for a long time. Citizens were perceived as passive
agents who lack intention and will. Yet, the 2011 revolutions in the Arab
World have questioned these assumptions. Citizens are not passive, but
rather active agents of change.
Within this context, MIPA institute believes that it is important to

shed the light on “ordinary” people’s perceptions and attitudes in
order to build strong foundation for political and social participation
and strengthen the confidence in institutions. In this regard, it is
fundamental to understand the relationship between citizens and their
political institutions. This relationship is defined by social and political
trust, as the level of trust people have for their institutions denotes the
quality of political engagement and affects the outcomes of policies.
In an ideal world, the relationship between citizens and their

institutions is characterized by a high level of trust, based on a strong
knowledge of the role and function of the institutions. In turn, such
knowledge enhances the trust in institutions and leads citizens toward
greater political participation through formal political channels which
create in return greater social cohesion. Nevertheless, this ideal situation
has never existed in the real world. It is probably the opposite, as the
current citizen-state relation remains strained and contaminated with
suspicion and distrust.
This unpleasant situation explains the relevance of this report. The

latter is the fruit of a year-long hard work of MIPA’s team aimed at
providing systematic and in-depth study of trust in Morocco, through
9
the combination of different quantitative and qualitative research

approaches. It investigates in detail social trust, political trust and trust
in the Parliament.
The key findings of Morocco’s Trust in Institutions Index demonstrate

that the relationship between citizens and their institutions, especially
the elected institutions, is characterized by suspicion and low levels of
trust. Most citizens have little knowledge about their institutions and
have difficulties in understanding their roles, functions and utility.
This weak knowledge is coupled with poor quality of public services,
such as healthcare and education, and inadequate job opportunities:
these constitute the most important priorities that citizens believe the
government should address in the next five to ten years. In fact, the
poor delivery of public services increases the sense of prevalence of
corruption, and hence strengthens citizens’ eagerness in seeking other
(informal) alternatives to get better public services, such as bribes or
Wasta (cronies or political connections), and this consequently led
to the disengagement of citizens from formal political channels of
political expression and recurrence toward the new forms of political
contestations, such as the economic boycott and street protests.
MIPA strives in its mission to produce relevant and in-depth analysis

of policy issues which can lead to innovative ways to solving issues
relating to democracy. This is why MIPA decided to embark on an annual
report on trust in social and political institutions as a way to measure
the capacity as well as the willingness of citizens to engage in public life
and to create a more inclusive policy.
The report is useful for both researchers and policymakers.

Researchers can use the data and the analyses provided in this report
to enhance the academic literature, while policymakers can use its
findings to enhance the quality of political institutions and the quality
of policy outcomes.
Dr. Mohammed Masbah
Director
Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis
10
Acknowledgment
This report is the fruit of the collaborative work led by Dr. Mohammed
Masbah and composed by Dr. Rachid Aourraz and Mr. Francesco Colin
(principal authors) as well as Mr. Imru Al Qais Talha Jibril and Ms. Maha
Ghazi (researchers and contributors). Dr. Masbah supervised the whole
project since the inception and co-led, alongside Dr. Aourraz, the initial
study design and coordinated the early phase of the study. Then Dr.
Masbah and Mr. Talha Jibril supervised the fieldwork that was partly
executed by AVERTY, and supervised the background papers and the
analysis of the report. This phase involved principally Mr. Talha Jibril, Ms.
Ghazi, Ms. Gretchen Coleman and Ms. Noor Traina. Under the guidance and
supervision of Dr. Masbah, Mr. Talha Jibril and Ms. Ghazi worked on coding
and drafting the initial analysis of the report and provided consistent
background research that constituted the backbone of this report. The
final version of the report was written and edited first in English jointly
by Dr. Masbah and Mr. Colin, and then it was translated into Arabic and
reviewed by Dr. Aourraz and Dr. Masbah. Mr. Talha Jibril and Ms. Ghazi
provided feedback on the final English version of the report.
The authors sincerely express their gratitude to the National

Endowment for Democracy (NED) and Heinrich Böll Stiftung (HBS) Rabat
- Maroc for their generous support of this project from the beginning,
especially Fatima Hadji from the NED and Bauke Baumman, Ilham
Siba and Zaina Benaddi from HBS. We also want to thank Sim-Sim
Participation Citoyenne for helping with the fieldwork with members
of parliament, especially Meriem Belial, Ayoub Touati, Smail Ilsouk and
Ayman Cherragui. Also, a special thanks is owed to all citizens and
elected officials who participated in the interviews and focus groups
we organized, including members of parliaments, local elected councils
and members of business community and syndicates.
This report benefited from feedback received by colleagues and

experts. We are specifically thankful to Dr. Aziz Mechouate, Dr. Hicham Ait
11
Mansour, and Carolyn L. Barnett who provided feedback on the draft of

the questionnaire and contributed their time and valuable ideas to the
project. The authors would also like to thank the team who helped in this
report, especially Mr. Imru Al Qays Talha Jebril and Ms. Maha Ghazi whose
work and assistance in various phases of this project were essential for
its success. Also, thanks to Ms. Gretchen Coleman and Ms. Noor Traina for
preparing background research and thanks also for Noura Sedrati for
proofreading the report and her support in translating some chapters.
The responsibility for any errors remains with the authors.
12
Executive Summary
Social Trust
· Family is the most trusted social institution. The Moroccans surveyed

feel that family (nuclear and extended) as well as close friends
are the most trustworthy people within their entourage: 95.2 % of
Moroccans surveyed saying they trust family.
· As the social circle expands to include colleagues, neighbors and people

you may encounter on a daily basis (for business transactions for
example), the levels of trust tend to decrease: 42.9 % of respondents
said they do not trust other Moroccans; furthermore, respondents
felt that the general levels of trust in society have overall declined in
the last few decades.
· The least trusted part of society is strangers or people whom they

have met the first time (only 19.4% of respondents said they trust
people they’ve met for the first time). Moroccans are also highly
distrustful of people from other religions (73.2% declaring they either
don’t trust, or don’t trust at all people from other religions), as well as
of people from other nationalities (71.5 % said they were distrustful).
Similarly, the Moroccans surveyed could be considered conservative
regarding their perceptions of homosexuality and atheism (78.5%
and 67.6%, respectively, said they wouldn’t accept having a friend
from these categories,).
· People from the in-group, with the same religious faith or nationality,
or those with ties of kinship with the respondents, highly increase
the likelihood of trust in them; while difference is seen in a bad
light, where respondents don’t feel specifically trustful of strangers,
foreigners or people practicing a different religion.
13
Political Trust
· According to the study, around 31% of Moroccans claimed they

followed politics or political affairs in general. The 69% of Moroccans
surveyed claimed that they do not follow politics or do not follow
politics at all.
· The Moroccans surveyed expressed a low level of satisfaction in

the economy (55.5% expressed their dissatisfaction), the general
direction of the country (69.7% dissatisfied) or in the efforts of
the government in fighting corruption (74.1% dissatisfied); these
numbers revealed the largely pessimistic outlook that Moroccans
had in regards to the future of the country, the economic situation
and their confidence (as well as hope) for the ability of government
to curb corruption within the country.
· In regard to the priorities that the respondents want to see the

government achieving in the next 5 to 10 years, better access to
education, health and more job opportunities for youth are the
most important. Around 32% of Moroccans surveyed believe that
providing better education for their children is the first priority the
government should take, followed by more job prospects for youth
by almost 20% and then better health delivery by 18%.
· Moroccans did enjoy a relatively varied degree of participation in

political actions, with 35.5% of them saying they have participated in
a protest in the last year, as well as a staggering 58.3% of respondents
saying they have participated in the economic boycott. The surveyed
respondents also participated in electoral politics with a rate of 37.6%
of them declaring having voted in the last election.
· In terms of trust in political institutions, Moroccans had overall

very low levels of trust in institutions that govern them, especially
the youngest respondents of the survey, such as 32.7% of trust in
parliament, 22.6% for political parties, and 23.4% for the government.
14
· However, they had really high contrasting levels of trust in non-

elected institutions such as the police (78.1%) and the military
(83.3%), which in the study enjoyed the highest levels of trust or
confidence expressed by the surveyed citizens.
· In the middle were the non-elected institutions such as civil society

organizations (52.5% of respondents expressed confidence in NGO’s)
and the justice system (41.3%) which were still relatively more
trusted than elected political institutions.
· It was also denoted in the study, that two important non-elected

institutions were distrusted extremely, the education sector (around
50% of respondents distrusted the public educational system) and
healthcare system (74.4% of respondents distrusted the public
healthcare system).
· When asked about their confidence or trust in their politicians or

parliamentarians that represented them, Moroccans expressed their
lack of trust as a result or as a direct correlation to the quality of
services in the sector of education and health.
Trust in the Parliament
· The study revealed that most participants ignored the workings of

parliament or the different roles it has as an institution, and about
90% of all respondents could not name either of the Presidents of
the two houses of the Parliament.
· It was revealed from the qualitative interviews that citizens felt

that parliamentarians’ role was confined to the Monday plenary
sessions, and that their protest and discussions were confined to
the institution. Often enough, they were labeled as ‘theatrics’, and
citizens did not see the correlation or the ostensible link between
their concerns, and the MP representing them in parliament. They
also expressed inability or unwillingness, and in some cases lack of
guidance on how to reach out to a MP for a national or local concern.
15
Introduction
Why should we study trust? Simply put, trust is the glue of society.
It is one of the first things we learn at birth, and it underscores our
relationships with others: our actions are grounded on trust. In daily
life, trust exists everywhere, from trusting the taxi driver to get you
to the right destination safely, to trusting the barber to use his sharp
razor around your neck, or simply walking safely in the street without
fear of being assaulted. Without trust, society cannot hold itself up.
Families would lack the connection that binds them together, and
institutions would lack the power and legitimacy to govern. This
network of interactions is the foundation on which society is built, and
governments are legitimatized only by a collective trust in them. In
fact, a government can use excessive power and violence to govern for
the short term but for the long-term it needs to garner people’s trust,
otherwise, it cannot sustain itself.
As trust is everywhere, people tend to take it for granted. It is

so entrenched in our society that recognizing and appreciating its
value can prove difficult. However, breaking down components of
trust, quantifying them, and analyzing them can foster a clearer
understanding about our societies that we would not recognize
otherwise. And because trust is the glue that holds society together,
studying it helps us identify the cracks in its foundation and provides
pathways to restoring it. The study of trust allows us to explain social
and political connections and disconnections in society and – more
importantly – suggest the steps to take in order to fix them.
Understanding social and political trust has benefits not only for
research but also for the policy realm. Firstly, it helps researchers and
decision makers to understand the complex relation between trust in
institutions on one hand and government performance, perceptions
of corruption, (in)formal political participation on the other. Secondly,
it provides insights on the underpinnings of democratic deficits and
17
difficulties that elected institutions, such as the Parliament and

political parties, face. Finally, studying political trust and distrust helps
to identify the gaps and factors leading to distrust and lays down the
road to reverse the vicious circle of poor-performance, perception of
corruption and political disengagement.1
In this regard, the Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis dedicated

this annual report to study social and political trust in Morocco, with
the aim to contribute to the academic and policy debates on social
and political trust, and to propose alternative policies and feasible
recommendations to help restore confidence in public institutions.
Morocco provides a good case study for social and political trust. It is
characterized by a low institutional trust, while it maintains a relatively
strong social bonds and highly level of trust in personalized trust, such as
the family and kinship. The results of this study reveal that family is the
most trusted social institution. As the social circle expands - colleagues,
neighbors and people you may encounter on a daily basis - the levels
of trust tend to decrease. The least trusted part of society is strangers
or people whom are met the first time, in addition to people from other
1 Eri Bertsou, ‘Rethinking Political Distrust’, European Political Science Review,
11.2 (2019), 213–30 <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773919000080>.and it is
often used to explain current political phenomena. In contrast to most schol-
arship that focuses solely on the concept of trust and leaves distrust untheo-
rized, this article makes a contribution by analysing political distrust. It argues
that citizen distrust of government and political institutions poses a threat for
democratic politics and clarifies the relationship between the distrust observed
in established democracies and classical ‘liberal distrust’, which is considered
beneficial for democracy. Further, it addresses the relationship between trust
and distrust, identifying a series of functional asymmetries between the two
concepts, with important implications for theoretical and empirical work in po-
litical science. The article suggests that a conceptualization of political distrust
based on evaluations of incompetence, unethical conduct and incongruent in-
terests can provide a fruitful ground for future research that aims to understand
the causes, consequences, and potential remedies for political distrust.»,»au-
thor»:[{«dropping-particle»:»»,»family»:»Bertsou»,»given»:»Eri»,»non-drop-
ping-particle»:»»,»parse-names»:false,»suffix»:»»}],»container-title»:»Eu-
ropean Political Science Review»,»id»:»ITEM-1»,»issue»:»2»,»issued»:{«dat
e-parts»:[[«2019»,»5»,»17»]]},»page»:»213-230»,»title»:»Rethinking polit-
ical distrust»,»type»:»article-journal»,»volume»:»11»},»uris»:[«http://www.
mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=640fa754-437f-45ec-bc72-8fdb57c-
8d844»]}],»mendeley»:{«formattedCitation»:»Eri Bertsou, ‘Rethinking Politi-
cal Distrust’, European Political Science Review, 11.2 (2019
18
religions, nationalities or sexual orientations. It should also be noted

that there is a growing feeling, especially among older generations,
that the general levels of trust in society have overall declined in the
last few decades.
While trust in close social groups is high, trust in political institutions

remains generally low. Moroccans are skeptical about the government
performance and its ability to provide good services, especially in
education and health. They are also unsatisfied about the performance
of the economy and are highly disappointed by the government’s efforts
in fighting corruption. Most likely, this is also related to the increased
interest in informal political participation in recent years, such as the
economic and electoral boycott and protests. While political parties and
elected institutions are seen as underperforming, useless, and lacking
trustworthiness, the only trusted institutions are the monarchy and
the security apparatus.
Likewise, the Parliament is one of the least trusted institutions.

Members of Parliament interviewed in this study interpreted this
situation by the role of social media in showcasing a negative image of
the Parliament and reduced their credibility in the eyes of the public.
The deficiency of institutional communication by the Parliament
makes citizens unaware of the actual efforts of MPs in discussing laws
and regulations. In turn, this played into the perception that MPs were
rent seekers. In the absence of resources such as skilled staff and lack
of office space within the Parliament, MPs cannot properly conduct
their work as legislators. Finally, the electoral law combined with archaic
party structures produced a parliamentary elite that is not necessarily
based on meritocracy or competence, but rather on political loyalty
and cronyism.
How to explain political distrust?
The nexus between government performance, quality of public

services, and perceptions of corruption in the government bureaucracy
19
is central to understanding the low levels of trust in political institutions.

Furthermore, these are the key elements to explain the resort to
informal channels for political engagement. In 2015, the World Bank
released a report on the relation between trust, voice, and incentives.
One of the main findings is that poor performance of public institutions
in the MENA regions led citizens to perceive government as corrupt and
ineffective and hence reinforced their disengagement and increased
the perceptions of distrust.2 Morocco is a country with high level of
(both perceived and real) corruption, which is one of the factors that
cause citizens’ distrust in the political institutions – hence providing
the ground for political contestation.
Consequently, the plummeting trust in public institutions leaves

citizens with few options to engage in the formal channels to fulfill their
needs, thus reinforcing informal social networks (Wasta) and corruption.
The World Bank team concludes that without dependable institutions
and citizens’ trust in them, there is little formal citizen engagement,
institutions remain stagnant, and service delivery is poor3.
In this regard, this report proposes an ideal-model that links political

trust to government performance and communication strategies,
perceptions of corruption, the quality of public services and the
trustworthiness of individual political actors.4 Such ideal-model serves
as a mean to explain and simplify the complex realities, and hence
cannot explain all the cases. Nevertheless, they are useful tools to
provide sense to the complex reality. In this regard, the model this
report proposes can be simplified as the following.
2 Hana Brixi, Ellen Lust, and Michael Woolcock, Trust, Voice, and Incentives : Learn-
ing from Local Success Stories in Service Delivery in the Middle East and North
Africa (Washington, DC, 2015) <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/han-
dle/10986/21607>.
3 Ibid.
4 This model has been inspired by the World Bank report cited above.
20
Cycle of political trust
Quality of
political instiutions
(govt. performance)
Quatity of
Political
public
engagement
services
Perception
Citizens’trust
of corruption
Source: MIPA’s own elaboration
This annual report is divided into three sections that contain the
analyses of the field research related to social and political trust in
Morocco.
The first section will discuss Social Trust, including trust in family,
neighbors and others. It will first discuss the importance and relevance
of social trust, the role of personal experience and socialization in
simmering the perceptions of social trust. It will also examine and
explain the sources of trust, specifically looking at family, and at the
role of religion and moral values. Finally, it will describe and analyze the
different levels of social trust in the different categories of interpersonal
relations, such as the family, friends and neighbors, and trust in others
and in strangers.
The second section will study Political Trust, and especially the
difference between trust in elected and non-elected Institutions. It will
explain how and why the trust is low in the elected executive branch (the
Government) and in political parties, as well as in institutions dedicated
21
to public service delivery, such as education and healthcare. It will also

look at the high level of trust in the security apparatus. Special attention
will be dedicated to institutions that mediate between citizens and the
state – civil society organizations (CSOs) and labor unions.
While the first and second sections will research the evolution of
social and political trust over the years, the final section will look in-
depth at a specific institution. This year, MIPA decided to work on the
Parliament, which will be the subject of discussion in the final section of
this report, namely the Trust in the Parliament. A particular interest will
be devoted to components that affect trust in the Moroccan Parliament.
Concretely, it will look at the trustworthiness, capabilities, performance
and communication of the Parliament as an institution and members
of Parliament as actors of this institution. Crosscutting issues, such as
social contract, confusions about the roles of MPs, will be discussed as
well.
At the end of the report, we provided a literature review that aims at

providing a broad overview of the current research on trust – empirical
investigations, global and regional analyses, and their theoretical
implications. While it is by no means a substitute for the studies
themselves, the review will discuss their common trends and findings
as well as identify the missing elements that need to be addressed.
Unpacking the findings on social and political trust in Morocco will

shed light on those social and political institutions that are trusted
the most, and those that lack the same confidence, thus exposing the
strengths and malfunctioning of the main institutions in Moroccan
society. Furthermore, the analysis of the trust in the Parliament will
provide a clarification on the key issues that revolve around the lack
of trust in this central institution for the functioning of democratic
life. Grounded on original empirical data, MIPA’s study of trust has the
objective of both contributing to the discussion on trust in Morocco and
suggesting the first key steps to renovate trust in institutions.
22
Methodology
This report is the fruit of rich and dense data collected from fieldwork
throughout 2019. It is based on a combination of quantitative and
qualitative research techniques.
The quantitative analysis was based on a sample of 1,000 people in

October 2019, targeting Moroccans aged 18 and over. The representative
nature of the sample was ensured by the quota method (sex, age,
and geographical area) according to the structure of the Moroccan
population designed by the High Commission for Planning (RGHP
2014). The questions of the survey constituted about 84 variables via
CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews).5
Concerning the sample of the survey, half of the participants

were women and the other half were men. The under-29 age group
represents about 31%, while the over-50 age group represents about
28.7%. In terms of geographic distribution, the Atlantic coast regions
accounted for 37%, the centre regions for 18.6%, the north regions for
16.7%, and the south regions for 27.6%. 35% of those surveyed live in
rural areas, while 65% of them live in urban areas. In terms of average
wages, households with an income of less than 8,000 dirhams per
month make up the largest share of the sample: 57% of the respondents
(32 people had a salary of less than 3,000 dirhams, and 25 people had a
salary between 3,000 and 8,000 dirhams). As for their education levels,
14% of respondents had an elementary education level, and 13% of
respondents were illiterate. Survey data will be made publicly available
on MIPA’s website to increase transparency, as well as to provide other
researchers with the possibility to make use of the potential of the data
collected for this research.
In terms of qualitative analysis, the report relies upon the ‘grounded

theory’ approach, which is a methodology based on the construction of
analytical frameworks through a dense and structured set of field data.6
5 For more information about the questionnaire, please refer to the appendix of
the report.
6 Barney G Glaser and Anselm L Strauss, Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strate-
23
In this regard, the in-depth interview technique was used with semi-
structured questions with 23 participants from the cities of Casablanca,
Rabat and Marrakech during the period between mid-September to late
October 2019. It included a diverse sample that considers gender equality
and socio-economic diversity. The interviews lasted approximately
60 minutes per participant. In addition, in-depth individual interviews
were conducted with seven MPs and a staff member from the House
of Councillors. Moreover, three focus groups were organized with
about 16 participants in total: one for businessmen, another for labour
unions, and the third for local elected officials and political activists.
The duration of each focus group was about 2 hours. The names of the
interviewees have been concealed in order to ensure the anonymity
and the protection of the privacy of the research participants.
After collecting the data, the team worked on the analysis of the
report, which has been done in five phases: in the first phase, the research
team transcribed all the interviews in the original language, and made
a quality control check to make sure of the accuracy of transcription.
This phase was followed by the coding of each of the interviews by
identifying the main themes and sub-themes. After the identification
of the main and sub-themes, the researchers wrote memos in the form
of short notes that resumed the main concepts. Then they worked on
formulating the main categories for the analysis by developing the
memos into a more coherent analysis, which constituted the backbone
of the report. In this phase, we integrated the different codes and
memos and merged the themes and notes that have been repeated
in different interviews and focus groups and tried to focus them into
key themes. Fourthly, the team worked to analyse the quantitative and
qualitative data by putting the similar themes and memos in the main
sections of the report. In this phase, we also worked to harmonize the
text with the existing literature on social and political trust, by including
quotations from participants, making sure of the quality of analysis
by triangulating the quantitative and qualitative data, and the existing
gies for Qualitative Research (Routledge, 1967).
24
literature. Finally, we worked on generating a coherent interpretation of

social and political trust in the Moroccan context.
Generally speaking, the authors followed a thorough approach and

methodology in order to ensure the highest standards of impartiality
and balance in their analyses. In this regard, we have taken several steps.
First, the quantitative data was collected by a professional company
specialized in public opinion research. Their expertise ensured the
collection of data from a representative sample representing Moroccan
society. Secondly, the collection of the qualitative data has been done
with respect for the ethics of research, by explicitly explaining to the
interviewees the purpose of the research and getting their approval
to record the interviews. Participants in the qualitative research were
selected from different backgrounds to ensure a diversity of opinion.
Then all interviews have been transcribed, coded and then compiled
according to the different themes. Researchers of this report worked as
a team to ensure the impartiality of the analysis proposed.
Yet, as in any scientific inquiry, this project has its own limitations.
Despite all the efforts aimed at impartiality, the authors are citizens
who have their own opinions, passion, and biases. Moreover, academic
scholarship has thoroughly scrutinized the claims (as well as the very
idea) of absolute neutrality in research, often concluding that complete
non-interference does not exist.7 Furthermore, the project has faced
some challenges related to the human and financial resources. For
instance, we were unable to conduct interviews in the rural areas
and different regions or categories, because we did not have enough
researchers to help in this project due to the lack of sufficient financial
resources. So far, the authors believe that the quality of the data
collected and the steps followed in the analysis render those challenges
minimal and make this report of high quality.
7 Linda Alcoff, ‘The Problem of Speaking for Others’, Cultural Critique, 1991, 5–32,
<https://doi.org/10.2307/1354221>.
25
Chapter I : Social Trust
Results snapshot:
- Social trust decreases steadily moving away from the narrow

circle (nuclear family) to other social units, like other members
of the family (uncles and aunts), then friends, co-workers,
and neighbors, until it virtually vanishes with strangers.
- Substantial differences arise in trusting neighbors depending

on the average household income, thereby suggesting
that albeit broader practices of solidarity, the poor living
conditions of popular neighborhoods negatively affect the
feeling of safety and therefore the trust in neighbors.
- Trust relationships are socially constructed based on rational

choice. They are the result of a balance between the degree of
caution and the estimation of the trust that can be granted.
- Research participants reported unanimously the perception

that social trust has substantially decreased over time.
- Social media became an important source of social trust and

distrust, playing both a positive role in educating individuals
and facilitating communication, but also substantially
increasing the exposure to distressing events and thereby
nurturing preoccupations and fear when dealing with others.
27
Introduction
This section is dedicated to the exploration of the different facets of

social trust. Based on quantitative and qualitative data, it analyzes both
the sources and the levels of social trust.
Personal experience seems a defining element of social trust, despite

the growing influence of social media, as the closer the person is, the
higher the level of trust gets. The nuclear family is the most trusted
social institution, and trust tends to decrease as the relationship
becomes less personalized, culminating in very low levels of trust for
strangers.
Moreover, religion plays an important role in defining trust. As it

is seen as having a substantial influence on individual behavior, the
decline in perceived religiosity over time is a major cause of the decline
of trust in others. If sometimes individual behaviors seem to contradict
one’s opinion on trust, MIPA’s research has found some common traits
in respect to social trust in Morocco.
Social trust: its importance and components
The notion of social trust differs from one person to another. However,
there were several agreed elements in defining trust, often linking it
with the concept of reassurance and reliance on others in a moral or
material way.
Participants in this research projects agreed that trust is an essential

component of society, regardless of their levels of trust and of the way
in which each of them justifies the importance of social trust. There was
a wide agreement on the fact that trust is the bedrock of relationships,
and that it is the base that ensures the progress of society.
Generally speaking, social trust in Morocco has three key features:

relativity, selectivity, and progression. Relativity relates to the idea
that the trust of Moroccans is neither absolute nor “blind” (as in
28
unconditional). Rather, trust is a rationally balanced perception,

grounded on great caution, keeping a sort of safety distance, and always
being alert to those unexpected elements that may cause the end of a
trust relationship. Trust has often been expressed through the principle
of “trusting until betrayed”, also reaffirming the importance of having
good intentions and expectations (“niya”: in Moroccan Arabic) at the
beginning of a trust relationship. Selectivity, on the other hand, indicates
that the trust is granted to individual cases, rather than general. This
element also reaffirms the great importance of personal relationships
in the development of social trust. Finally, progression denotes the
fact that trust is built through successive moments and through lived
experience. Increasing levels of trust are granted over times in which
trust is granted and not betrayed. Therefore, the progression of trust
depends on both subjective and objective circumstances.
Yet, it has been noticed that issues related to trust invoked some
ambivalence in the positions of the research participants. This
ambivalence has been clear in the cases of some participants who
have expressed the importance of social trust in building relationships,
feeling secure and being able to coexist in society, but at the same
time have expressed their mistrust in others. There has also been the
case of a research participant who showed absolute and indiscriminate
absence of trust – towards his/her close family, towards social and
political institutions. This person believed that nowadays interpersonal
relationships are purely based on self-interests. Moreover, a number of
interviewees, who do not fully or partially trust others, admitted having
engaged in negative practices. For instance, some of them admitted
they evade taxes, and there was the case of a participant who does not
trust political institutions because of the pervasive corruption, but in
the same time admitted having been paid to vote for a certain party.
We can also mention the contradiction of describing politicians as
opportunists or selfish people, whereas the respondents themselves
expressed, in other questions and sometimes indirectly, that they are
only concerned about themselves and their nuclear families.
29
Trust and social change
Unanimously, research participants have reported that trust in

Moroccan society has decreased over time. None of the respondents
has indicated that the level of trust has stabilized or increased, nor did
they show a neutral position. While it is not possible to verify whether
the level of social trust has increased or decreased over time, this
perception is worth noting, as it provides the general mood in society
vis-à-vis the development of social trust.
The reasons for the decline in social trust in time are explained
by the participants in terms of the economic, social and cultural
transformations that Moroccan society went through since the nineties.
The economic transformations have contributed to the establishment
of “individualism”, where people became more self-interested. The
economic transformations have also contributed to increasing class
disparity, which in turn affected the value system by phenomena such
as poverty, crime and drugs, thereby making people more cautious
within their environments. As one participant said:
Society has changed since the 1980s (I was born in 1970s). I remember
that we used to dress the same, there was no difference between the rich
and the poor. We belonged to the middle class but we no longer do, and
those who have wealth are making headway.8
For older generations, there is nostalgia for the customs of the past.
“Time has changed”, as one of the respondents said.9 Here, respondents
refer to the change in the nature of authority that prevailed in the
traditional cultural and political system of the past. Thus, older
respondents tended to reject the current cultural system to such an
extent that the decline in authority was sometimes criticized at the
expense of individual freedoms. For many people, a system based on
individual freedoms is “chaotic” and has affected the education of the
present generation.
8 Interview with, H., small entrepreneur, Casablanca, October 2019.

9 Extract from focus group discussion, October 2019.
30
Indeed, there is a correlation between the cultural transformations in

society and the decline in trust. One of the most important manifestations
of these transformations is the decline in the religiosity pattern, as
older individuals of the sample compared the current situation with the
one in which they grew up (or in which their families lived). For instance,
the shift from the extended family to the nuclear family is seen as one
of the most prominent of these cultural transformations, as well as
the weak relationships with neighbors, and the impossibility of leaving
doors open like in past times, which was possible thanks to a wide sense
of security in the neighborhoods.
While there is a relationship between time and trust, the relationship

between place and trust is more complex. The survey data show few
differences between urban and rural areas in regards of trust, yet the
qualitative research shows different results. In fact, the qualitative
research shows a difference in perceptions between trust in rural areas
and trust in urban areas, as well as between large cities and smaller
cities. In other words, the smaller the geographical space, the more
the social and political trust increases. This is due to the demographic
factor that stands out when the population is smaller in rural areas,
smaller cities and even in popular neighborhoods within major cities,
which generates a relational connection among people, and highlights
their attachment to local norms and societal traditions.
There is another observation regarding the geographical scope, and it

relates to the degree of the sense of security. There was a paradox even
in major cities such as Marrakesh and Casablanca, as the respondents
in Marrakech expressed their great sense of security because of the
presence of policemen in the city streets, contrary to the respondents
in Casablanca who expressed their fear by describing the city as “the
wild”.
In the same context, for a person to feel that they are a member of
society, they must interact with others positively. For this reason, the
sense of security in public areas in the neighborhood as well as at home
is a reflection of the level of social trust. However57.2% did not feel safe
31
in the neighborhood in which they live. This rate is proportional to the

amount of decline mentioned in a previous international report, except
that the latter focused on the “night” while our report was more general.10
Survey data collected by MIPA supports the correlation between the
perceived security in the neighborhood and trust:
Graph1: Trust in Merchants depending on the feeling of safety
in the neighbourhood
150
Not feeling safe at all

120
30,34% 29,21%
Feeling relatively not safe
Feeling relatively safe
Feeling safe at a large extent

90 33,95%
34,69%
30,34%
60
35,56%
36,75% 10,11%
21,03% 10,33%
30 9,79%
17,90%
29,95% 35,75%
22,22%
12,08%
0
I don't trust at all I don't trust I trust somehow I trust completely
10 Pamela Abbott and Roger Sapsford, WP6 The Arab Transformations Project.
After the Arab Uprisings: Political, Social and Economic Attitudes in the MENA
Region in 2014, 2016, <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.31133.31209>.
32
Graph2: Trust in most people depending on the feeling of safety

in the neighbourhood
200
Not feeling safe at all

32,58%
Feeling relatively not safe
150
43,96% Feeling safe at a large extent
100
30,34%
33,33% 52,61%
50 29,21%
30,57% 7,87%
16,48% 49,28% 6,23%
7,34%
9,48% 23,19%
9,66% 17,87%
0
I don't trust at all I don't trust I trust somehow I trust completely
It appears clear that feeling safe in one’s own neighborhood has

a substantial impact not only on the trust in neighbors, but also (and
perhaps especially) on the trust in most people.
One of the most important factors that made the respondents

feel unsafe in Casablanca is probably the fact that the city is ruled by
competitiveness. This has affected the degree of class disparities and
hence the security. The significance of trust has been repeatedly linked
to utilitarianism and materialism, as respondents are likely to think that
commercial dealings and seeking profit and economic gains have also
affected the personal relationships of people in many ways.
Sources of social trust
There interviewees and the participants in the focus groups

generally referred to six basic sources for the concept of social trust:
personal experiences, social media, family upbringing, the surrounding
environment, religion, and culture and traditions. In order to facilitate
the analysis, these have been regrouped into four main areas:
33
Personal experiences
The immediate relations and daily interactions are one of the main
drivers of social trust. Frequently, the decisive factor in granting or
withdrawing trust is the personal experiences and experiences of
the close ones. Indeed, personal experiences are both a factor for a
determination of trust, since positive or negative experiences habitually
result in trust and distrust, and a factor that may entail a shift in the
attribution of trust, as a positive experience may restore trust when it
was lacking and, of course, a negative experience will likely result in a
corresponding loss of trust.
“The distrust is related to experiences in life. […] Fraud and betrayal are
the most important factors of distrust towards individuals.”11
In all instances, interviewees reported that the reasons for their

trust and/or distrust were due to personal experiences. This may be
due to a series of positive (or negative) experiences that resulted in the
constructed perception that people are trustworthy or not, as it may
affect their overall judgment of trust (or distrust) towards someone or
something. As mentioned by one of the interviewees when asked why
he trusted his entourage:
“I trust them because of how they treat me.”12
At the same time, a particularly negative or positive experience may

entail a complete change of attitude towards someone or something.
For example, one of the interviewees reported that even the close
family can be distrusted after a negative experience with them. Indeed,
it appears clear that if a series of positive experiences is necessary to
build trust, it can be seriously discredited by even a single negative
experience.
11 Interview with F., industry worker, Casablanca, October 2019.

12 Interview with L., Rabat, October 2019.
34
“There are some people in whom you completely trust, and then they
betray you. In my experience, as a former merchant, there was someone
I know who was also a merchant who had business with people from
Casablanca and Marrakech, he used to send them money in exchange for
the merchandise. It worked for a while, but then the other guy turned his
back on him after having collected enough money. He trusted him but the
other one cheated”.13
Socialization
Socialization is one of the most basic factors that caused variations

in the levels of social trust among individuals. This includes family
upbringing, the surrounding environment and, more in general,
elements related to education. For instance, the interviewees that
were raised in a good family environment, with positive relations and
solidarity with neighbors, reported high levels of trust. An interviewee
said that she was raised since her childhood to trust, as evidence of
this she said that in her parents’ house, they never locked down their
belongings:
“when I was living with my mother, we never locked down our stuff, this
is in contrast with my in-laws who lock down everything out of fear of
being robbed. I lock the house from outside, but never inside the house”14
Some of the interviewees who reported great trust in their children

also expressed that this trust is in fact due to self-confidence in how
to raise them – thereby stressing the importance of the educational
feature. Nonetheless, people that showed high levels of trust deplored
the fact that they had to change their stance towards social trust in
later stages of their lives.
Positive domestic situations, favorable surroundings and other

features of individuals’ education are central to establishing trust
relations. Moreover, it has been pointed out that ignorance, lack of
13 Interview with M. Marrakech, October 2019.

14 Interview with A., Casablanca, October 2019.
35
awareness, and decline in the education sector have undermined some

of the reasons for interpersonal trust through their influence on social
values.
Religion and social values
Religion is an essential source of social trust in Morocco, as one’s faith

is understood as a major guide of morality on one hand, and on the other
hand religious bonds are often the basis on which the relational fabric is
built. When individuals were asked whom they trusted the most, almost
all of the participants answered ‘naturally’ that they trusted “God” and
themselves before anyone, any group or entity.
There was unanimous agreement on the important relationship

between religion and trust. First of all, the decline in trust has been
interpreted as a consequence of the decline in religion being a guide
of behavior. Moreover, some participants pointed to the exploitation of
religion to achieve personal gains, which also contributes to deteriorating
levels of trust in society.
Throughout the interviews, one of the crucial and recurrent elements

that entails a decline of trust in society is the fact that people “do not
fear God anymore”, referring to the absence of integrity and moral
values rather than an expression of a particular religious pattern. This
illustrates the importance of religion in Moroccan society, not necessarily
as a dogmatic practice, but especially as a cultural component that
governs social behavior. Hence the attribute of “God’s fearsome”, which
in conservative Moroccan culture refers to trustworthy people, who
do their jobs efficiently and do not cheat, because they “fear God”. As
there is a relationship between religious and moral values, there is a
relationship between these two and social trust. Specifically, many of
the interviewees saw that the main reason for the decline in trust lies
in the lack of respect for religious values, and thus in the lack of self-
governing principles. As it has been reported in the last edition of the
Arab Barometer, there is a tangible generational gap in the association
36
with religiosity, as only 24% of the respondents aged between 18-29

would consider themselves religious, while this segment reaches the
85% of the respondents between 50-59 and the 68% of the individuals
aged above 60 years old.15
The use of religion to achieve personal gains has frequently been

witnessed by MIPA’s research participants, and it has been described as
“hypocrisy”. For instance, the focus group of business people reported
that it has become a “fashion” that merchants grow their beards as
a form of showcasing one’s religiosity, in order to gain trust for their
business, since there is the perception that Moroccans tend to trust
more those who are religious and/or “fear God”. As one participant
explicitly said:
“we got used to the fact that religion is based on trust, when you meet
someone with a beard, you automatically trust him. He uses religion to
achieve his objective”.16
Similarly, some of the participants of the same focus group reported

how female thieves often wear veils to cover their faces in order to hide
stolen goods. This exploitation of religious feelings to achieve personal
gains and/or facilitate an illicit conduct contributes to the establishment
of a negative stereotype about religious people.
Social media
Moreover, social media stands out as it is acquiring a new role as a

source of social trust. Participants expressed that they rely not only
on personal experiences to define social trust, but also on experiences
shared by others, especially on social media. Specifically, it has been
noted that social media foster the visibility of misconducts and
therefore negatively affect social trust. For instance, social media
15 Arab Barometer V, Country Report Morocco, Published: June 27, 2019. P: 13.
https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABV_Morocco_Re-
port_Public-Opinion_Arab-Barometer_2019.pdf
16 Participant in focus group with business community, Casablanca, October
2019.
37
has allowed for an increased awareness of crimes, frauds, political

corruption as well as other daily violations – ultimately increasing fear,
caution and reducing social trust overall. Participants considered that
these events have always been a part of the current events, but that
there were fewer means to find out about them. In this sense, social
media represents a double-edged sword, as it plays a positive role in
educating individuals and facilitating communication between people,
yet it is also a vehicle that fosters preoccupations and caution as the
rule when dealing with others.
Levels of social trust
This section will explore the levels of trust. Generally speaking, social
trust tends to decrease whenever the narrow circle (nuclear family) is
expanded to reach other social units, like other members of the family
(uncles and aunts), then friends, co-workers, and neighbors, until social
trust virtually disappears with strangers. In this section, we will break
down these different units to understand the key issues in the trust –
or lack thereof – of Moroccans.
The family
The family, and the nuclear family in particular, has the highest
percentage of societal trust. Specifically, 96% of the respondents of
MIPA’s survey said they trust their close family – with a staggering 86%
who completely trust their families. Generally speaking, interviewees
reported quite similar levels of trust in all the members of the nuclear
family (the mother, the father, the siblings, and the children), with some
exceptions of slightly lower trust for the partner. The extended family
(which includes cousins, uncles and aunts) is slightly less trusted than
the nuclear family, but still reports very high level of trust. Out of the
78% of the respondents that trust the extended family, only 41% trusts
it completely, implying that the trust in the extended family is not as
absolute as the trust in the close family.
38
Lower levels of trust for the extended family are mostly due to
previous experiences of the respondents, in which they were let down by
a cousin. However, even within the nuclear family, trust is not attributed
evenly. For instance, the respondents did not hesitate to express their
trust in their mothers, while their fathers were sometimes overlooked or
referred to only at a later stage of the interview. Some other respondents
expressed their mistrust in their children due to a specific misconduct
they have done at a certain age, or even their mistrust in their siblings,
justified by the concern for an unequal treatment, for example, the fear
of seeing their inheritance getting stolen after the parents’ passing.
Predominantly, the trust in mothers and fathers was characterized

by being absolute. When the respondents were asked about the
reasons for this, they said that it is not innate as one would expect.
Rather, it is based on a rational foundation, which is that parents are
seen as a refuge from the shocks of life. Indeed, the respondents have
often been supported by their parents, whether financially or morally,
when they have gone through difficult times in which other people
have abandoned or let them down. Once again, the role of personal
experiences in building trust emerges in its centrality.
Levels of trust in the partner are also very high, but not as absolute
as the ones for the parents. The data collected in MIPA’s survey shows,
perhaps unsurprisingly, that trust in the close family decreases
substantially among divorced respondents – of which only 83% trusts
the nuclear family, in respect of the 97% of trust of single respondents
and 98% of married respondents. Interestingly enough, the pool of
survey respondents that trust the extended family the most are the
divorced ones, of which 84% said they either trust partially or completely
the extended family, while only 68% of the widowed respondents said
they trust the extended family.
39
Friends and co-workers
Increasing the distance from the closest familiar relationships, friends

are less trusted compared to the extended family, but still reaching high
levels of trust – as 75% of survey respondents said that they either trust
completely or somehow their friends. Interviewees also reported that
childhood friends are more trusted than other friends, corroborating
the assumption that longer bonds of trust are valued more than recent
friendships. MIPA’s survey also highlighted that there appears to be a
correlation between age and trust in friends, as the graph below shows:
Graph3 Trust in friends depending on the age
100
I trust comlpetely
I trust somehow
28,00% 25,96%
36,54% 34,83% I don't trust
80
I don't trust at all
60
42,11%
39,73% 50,29%
40
43,27%
20
12,50% 16,96% 14,29% 20,70%
7,69% 8,48% 7,43% 11,23%

0
18-29 30-39 40-49 50+
It seems that levels of complete trust slightly decrease with age,

showing that over time the absolute trust in friends is mitigated as
people become more cautious about their friends. There seems to be a
similar trend in trust in general, with the exception of the respondents
aged between 40-49, that shows similar levels of trust to the youth –
with respectively 78% and 80% of respondents who trust their friends.
Among the respondents of MIPA’s survey, people seemed more open

to the idea of having either a friend from another religion or a refugee,
rather than having an atheist or a homosexual friend. The staggering
difference of 41 points between the openness of having a friend from
40
another religion (72% of respondents) and an atheist friend (31% of

respondents) may reflect the understanding of religion as the moral
guide of one’s behavior in society. Therefore, it becomes less of a
problem that a person believes in another religion in respect of being
atheist – and being perceived as lacking a moral compass. Furthermore,
Moroccans showed very low levels of acceptance towards homosexuals,
as 79% of respondents said that they do not, or absolutely do not,
accept having a homosexual friend. No relevant differences have been
noted in the acceptance towards a homosexual friend depending on
whether respondents came from rural areas (14%) or urban areas
(15%), and only limited differences have been noted depending on the
sex of respondents, as 18% of female respondents said that they would
accept a homosexual friend against 12% of male respondents. The
youngest segment of the respondents is quite more tolerant towards
having a homosexual friend in comparison to the other segments, as
21% of the respondents aged between 18-29 would accept having a
homosexual friend, against only 10% of the respondents aged between
40-49 and 13% of the respondents aged between 30-39 and above 50
years old.
Graph4: Do you accept to have a friend if...?
9,60%
43,40% Homosexual
Yes withouth problem 24,50%
4,30% Refugee (either from Syria or Sub-Saharian Africa)
From another religion

21,10%
28,90% Atheist
Yes probably 37,00%
10,70%
26,10%
12,30%
No 17,90%
18,40%
41,50%
14,90%
Absolutely not 18,90%
60,10%
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
41
Neighbors
In Morocco’s traditional society, neighbors have been perceived as

an extension of the family. Religious scripts provide special status to
neighbors. They played important roles in socialization and we have
already seen above how the trust in neighbors can be regarded as a
general barometer of social trust. However, the findings of this research
reveal that neighbors are not trusted as it is thought. In fact, less than
the majority of survey respondents (47%) either trusted partially or
completely their neighbors.
The participants of the qualitative research agreed that trust in the

neighbors is no longer as it used to be before. For instance, it has been
noted that it is no longer possible to let children stay with a neighbor to
baby-sit them in the absence of their guardians. Plus, the weakening of
trust in neighbors has often been related to the notion of “lhadya”, as it
is expressed in Moroccan dialect, which means meddling in others’ lives.
This points to the fact that Moroccan society is moving more and more
towards an individualistic society, where the focus is on the nuclear
family, rather than the larger networks, such as neighbors.
During the interviews, there was the common assumption that

former practices of solidarity and mutual support among neighbors
still exist in smaller cities and popular neighborhoods. However, MIPA’s
survey data add interesting elements to this debate and provides a
more concrete picture.
First, the difference of trust in neighbors of respondents residing in

rural or urban areas is insignificant, (1-point difference), indicating no
substantial impact of the dimension of the city in the trust in neighbors.
42
Graph5: Trust in neighbours depending on area of provenance
100
I trust comlpetely
13,53% 12,27%
I trust somehow
I don't trust
80
34,41% 34,51%
60
40
32,65% 35,12%
20
19,41% 18,10%
0
Rural Urban
Second, the fact that trust in neighbors of popular neighborhoods

is higher due to the persistence of former practices of solidarity and
mutual support is only a part of a more nuanced story. Two graphs,
the distribution of trust in neighbors and the feeling of safety in
one’s neighborhood depending of the average household income, are
particularly helpful:
43
Graph6: Trust in neighbours depending on average monthly

household income
100
9,10% 9,03% I trust comlpetely
12,11% 14,29% 16,41%
I trust somehow
I don't trust
80
37,01% 33,83% I don't trust at all

30,57%
34,52%
38,81%
60
40 35,35% 33,08%
35,71%
36,11% 29,85%
20
21,97% 24,06%
15,08% 18,18% 14,93%
0
Less than 3000 MAD Between 3000 MAD Between 8001 MAD Between 15001 MAD More than 30000 MAD
and 8000 MAD and 15000 MAD and 30000 MAD
Graph7: Feeling of safety in the neighbourhood depending

on average monthly household income
100 2,99% 1,49%
9,65% 7,15% Not feeling safe at all
14,83% 16,42% Feeling relatively not safe
22,39%
80 26,62%
30,52% Feeling safe at a large extent
30,28%
60 44,78%
51,49%
47,40%
40 33,44%
46,18%
20 37,31%
21,45% 23,13%
13,65% 18,83%
0
Less than 3000 MAD Between 3000 MAD Between 8001 MAD Between 15001 MAD More than 30000 MAD
and 8000 MAD and 15000 MAD and 30000 MAD
The distribution of trust in neighbors depending on the average

household income only partially reflects the trend highlighted in
qualitative interviews – as respondents with an average household
income between 3,000 and 8,000 dirhams show relatively high levels
of trust in their neighbors, while those with an average income ranging
44
between 15,001 and 30,000 dirhams reported relatively low levels of

trust. Nevertheless, the most interesting result is that the highest level
of trust in neighbors comes from the respondents with the highest
average income, while the lowest levels of trust come from the ones
with the lowest income. We see a reflection of this trend in the graph
correlating the household’s financial situation to the feeling of safety
in the neighborhood. Here, the vast majority (82%) of respondents
with the highest income feel safe in their neighborhoods, while only
the 55% of respondents with the lowest income feel safe in their
neighborhoods. These considerations lead us to the recognition of the
fact that the living conditions of the popular neighborhoods have a
substantial impact on the feeling of safety, and therefore in the trust
in neighbors, while the living conditions of wealthier neighborhoods
may result in high levels of safety and, in turn, higher levels of trust. If
these reflections do not discard the hypothesis that solidarity is higher
in popular neighborhoods, they do bring forward the fact that income
inequalities in Morocco also have a spatial dimension, where popular
and wealthier neighborhoods – and neighbors – live very different
social realities.
Ultimately, the fact that there was an 8 points difference in the

feeling of safety in the neighborhoods between male (67% of which
felt partially or completely safe) and female (of which 59% felt
partially or completely safe) prompts the attention to the reasons for
such differentiated levels of trust. They may be related to the greater
exposure of women to issues such as harassment and/or catcalling in
Morocco.
Trust in others and in strangers
Survey data shows that a small majority of respondents (54%)

thinks that Moroccans either trust each other partially or a lot, and that
a slightly higher percentage of respondents (57%) trusts most people.
Yet, the respondents in the qualitative research said that they do not
45
trust others at all, and that they do not believe that Moroccans are
trustworthy, nor do they believe that Moroccans trust each other.
Graph8: In your opinion, do Moroccans trust each other?
Trust each other a lot 8,04%

11,46% Don't trust each
other at all
Partially trust
each other 46,33% 34,17% Don't trust each other
Graph9: Do you trust most people?
I trust a lot 9,23%

13,24% I don't trust at all
I don't trust
29,79%
I trust somehow 47,74%
These mild levels of trust in strangers are reduced even further when
referring to foreigners, as only 28% of survey respondents said they
trust (either partially or completely) people from other nationalities
and 32% do not trust foreigners at all.
In fact, participants expressed two contrasting points of view in

regards of the trust in strangers. While both were based on personal
experiences and the surrounding environment, the first one stressed
46
the importance of trust in general including trust in strangers, while the

second one takes the opposite stance.
On one hand, the interviewees who expressed the importance of social

trust thought it is important to ensure the social progress, asserting that
in the absence of social trust in strangers, people would not be able to
leave their homes and go through the daily life. Some gave the example
of the relationship between the grocer in the neighborhood (“Moul
Lhanut”) with the people of the neighborhood. Based on trusting the
prices declared by the grocer, purchasing the needs and paying later,
trusting the expiration date and quality of the products automatically,
and trusting the change returned by the grocer without re-checking
it, this relationship is considered as a reflection of social trust. It is a
mutual trust between the two parties, which has no safeguards other
than it being a custom, recalling the notion of trust being the glue of
society as expressed in the introduction.
On the other hand, other research participants were supporting an

opposite point of view that considers trust to be dependent on the
narrow relationship circle surrounding the individual, and therefore it is
by no means necessary when it comes to strangers. These individuals
in particular had a negative perception of the rest of the Moroccans and
described them with critical and uncomplimentary features. Further,
they consider that “absolute” trust in general is nothing but naivety,
and that cheating is a daily practice not only financially beneficial but
also in interpersonal relationships – where it has been described as a
survival mechanism.
Overall, social trust is seen as a “hard currency”: it is rare, it can be sold

and bought, it can be subject to bids, it has a balance which increases and
decreases, and is almost nonexistent when consumed. The interviewees
constantly expressed that they do not act spontaneously regarding the
issue of trust. Trust relationships are built with great caution, embodied
in the continuous estimation – and subsequent verification – of the
degree of trust that can be granted. One of the interviewees said:
47
“I trust but I give myself 70% trust and 30% caution. Life and experience
taught me not to give full trust, because you might get a painful blow.”17
These subjective and continuous evaluations, sometimes translated

into actual percentages, represent the main way in which individuals
assess trust in their daily life.
Conclusion
The respondents’ concept of trust has been dominated by a kind

of rationality to contextualize the gains and losses that result in any
knowledge, whether the relationship is with friends, co-workers or the
social environment. The pursuit of self-assertion and success in the
age of speed has become subject to immoral and unlawful behaviors.
It is noted in this regard that the examples provided by the research
sample were not related to economic dealings or money in particular,
but rather to daily practices, such as cheating in exams, for example, or
using friends to fulfill personal needs.
There is a correlation in the foundational principles of social trust that

individuals who are cautious about others tend to be untrustworthy as
well, and vice versa. Although this data is not verifiable in this research,
there are a number of indicators that almost make mention of this
analysis. For instance, some interviewees who have a high level of trust
even towards strangers, indicated that the reason for granting this
trust is that they expect to encounter honest people like themselves;
contrarily, those who disagree with them and have low trust, show
caution and presume that others will misbehave, perhaps base these
assumptions on their personal behavior.
17 Interview with M., Marrakech, October 2019.
48
Chapter II : Political Trust
Results snapshot:
- Moroccans’ trust in non-elected institutions (public

administration, justice system, but also army and police) is
largely felt unavoidable, but trust in security apparatus seems
the highest, despite some suspicions about impartiality in
the law enforcement.
- The malfunctioning of public services (healthcare and

education) is at the core of the distrust of Morocco’s political
system. The increased monetization of these sectors
increased feelings of segregations among social classes and
resulted in less trust among the lower social classes.
- Not only the Government and political parties scored the

lowest levels of trust, but the prevalence of corruption, poor
performance of main sectors (health and education) and lack
of political will are creating a vicious circle of distrust that can
hardly be broken.
- The perception of pervasive corruption, especially within

political parties, together with the dissatisfaction towards
Government’s efforts to curb corruption, has a substantial
negative effect on the intentions to vote in future elections.
- Forms of political participation are varied and decidedly

differentiated in terms of age, gender, and provenance.
However, new forms of political participations are more linked
to younger generations.
49
Introduction
Political trust, as stated in the introductory section, is fundamentally

different from social trust. Its main characteristic is that political trust is
anonymous. It does not reflect a direct relationship between individuals,
but rather the level of confidence towards institutions. Political trust has
been recognized as an essential indicator of legitimacy in democratic
rule.18 Such confidence is based on three pillars: the knowledge of roles
of the trustee, the knowledge of his/her motivations (from which stems
trustworthiness) and the sanctions that keep the trustee accountable.
Hence, it is imperative to operate a distinction between elected and
non-elected institutions. Surely, both categories of institutions
significantly shape the political system of a state, but only the former
is held accountable through electoral processes.
MIPA’s Trust Index surveyed the trust of Moroccans in a variety of

institutions and this section aims at discussing the main findings related
to how and why Moroccans trust – and do not trust – institutions. It
will start by examining trust in non-elected institutions, such as private
and public service providers, administration, as well as the institutions
related to the security apparatus. It will move on to analyzing trust in
mediators (such as civil society organizations and labor unions) and
finally, it will discuss trust in elected institutions. Examining how trust is
distributed amongst institutions, as well as understanding the factors
that lead to trust and distrust, will serve as the basis for presenting key
recommendations on how to strengthen the cohesion of Moroccan
society.
Trust in Non-Elected Institutions
One of the main outcomes of the research conducted by MIPA is that

respondents felt that the trust in non-elected institution is “necessary”
and something that they are not able to control per se. Indeed, non-
18 Margaret Levi and Laura Stoker, ‘Political Trust and Trustworthiness’, Annu-
al Review of Political Science, 3.1 (2000), 475–507, <https://doi.org/10.1146/
annurev.polisci.3.1.475>.
50
elected institutions are not directly accountable through electoral

processes and therefore trustors cannot simply withdraw their support
for one institution or another – as happens through electoral processes.
If sometimes a decline in trust can be sanctioned in alternatives way,
in other cases it is more complicated to hold the trustee accountable.
For instance, it is possible that a loss of trust for public healthcare
institutions entails a shift to the private sector, or vice versa, but a
similar change cannot happen for other non-elected institutions, such
as security apparatus.
Moreover, people that have a higher household income were more

trusting of non-elected institutions than people who have lower
household incomes. This may be related to the fact that their income
allows them to access better services (be it schooling, healthcare, or
judiciary) and therefore to have a better relationship with non-elected
institutions.
During the course of the research, research participants referred to a

wide variety of non-elected institutions that can be dissected into four
main areas: public administrations, justice system, service providers,
and security apparatus.
Public Administrations
In this section, we discuss the trust that the respondents showed for
public administrations. These institutions were seen by interviewees as
having an important role, being close to citizens and providing the most
essential services to them.
Trust levels in public administrations varied depending on the

experience people had, the type of institution and the perceived
performance of the institution. As one interviewee stated:
“In the Administration, when people treat me well, I trust them”19
19 Interview with R., Sales representative, Marrakech, October 2019
51
Several factors influence the citizens’ perception of public

administration. One of which is the how performant is the administration.
In fact, most respondents felt that the negative performances of public
administrations depend on human resources in the administrations and
lack of organization and transparency of the procedures. Similarly, local
administrations were criticized for not having a proper queuing system,
and the turns were not specifically respected. Moreover, a majority of
respondents did not show outright trust in the local administrations:
the moqaddem in particular is perceived as a security tool controlled
by the state, who has to report people’s affairs and their whereabouts.
Yet, one of the most elements that influence the level of trust in
the public administration is the perceptions of lack of transparency in
the administrations, which are generally seen as corrupt. “Corruption
is the solution”20 has been described as the motto when dealing with
public administrations. This is surely related to the highly personalized
character of the interactions with public administrations which has
been broadly reported by the research participants. Relying on personal
interactions increases the possibility for corrupt practices to arise and
be established as the current state of affairs within administrations.
“You need to give in order to receive in administrations”21
None of the research participants mentioned mitigation tools,

despite the creation of the figure of the Ombudsman (also known as “le
mediateur” in French and “‫ ديــوان المظالــم‬- ‫ ”وســيط المملكــة‬in Arabic) in 2001,
who serves as a mechanism for citizens to express their grievances
against the abuses of public administration, and the ability to sue an
administration for not providing a public service. Even if not all citizens
may have the resources to resort to these mechanisms, this gave the
impression that the interviewees were not aware of the legal arsenal at
their disposal to counter the administration in any way.
20 Interview with Z., Marrakech, October 2019.

21 Interview with A., Law student, Marrakech, October 2019
52
Justice system
This section will discuss the trust that Moroccans showed towards
the judiciary institutions. Rule of law is a fundamental element of any
democratic society, where every person is deemed equal, and must be
treated as such, before the law. The concrete perception of the trust in
the justice system is composed of trust in courts, judges, lawyers and
judiciary processes in general.
Indeed, trust in the justice system is seen in a different light in respect

to other institutions. In this case, most interviewees felt that trust in
this institution was not a choice and that they were bound by its rules,
existence and its applications.
“If we do not believe in justice, it is a catastrophe. There’s an obligation

to believe and trust judiciary.”22
One of the respondents said that the distrust in the judiciary was ‘a
catastrophe’, because it is an obligation, not a choice, and it lays the basis
of rules in society. In other words, citizens were under the impression
that they had “no choice” but to trust the judiciary.
Nonetheless, the overall levels of trust in the judiciary system are

relatively medium-low. The average level of trust in the judiciary is 42%.
The respondents aged between 18-29 have reported the lower levels of
trust in the justice system, with only 40% of the respondents that trust
it. The respondents aged between 30-49 have showed a higher level of
trust, reporting 50% of trust by the segment between 30-39 and 51%
of trust by the segment between 40-49.
Yet, the issue of independence of the judiciary is one key theme that
has been highlighted by the participants. In theory, the judiciary system
in Morocco is independent and the Constitution provides stipulation to
guarantee this independence, however, interviewees have different
opinions. For instance, one of the interviewees mentioned the difficulty
to trust the judiciary, given the strength of the Ministry of Interior that
22 Interview with A., October, Rabat.
53
may influence the independence of judiciary. While it is difficult to prove

such interference, it is nonetheless a perception that citizens hold.
Moreover, the issues of impartiality and transparency have been also

evoked. One participant mentioned that the judiciary was not fair and
that there was no equality in terms of treatment by the justice system.
In essence, nepotism and corruption have a huge influence on the
outcome of a process in the justice system. The majority of respondents
that said they outright distrusted the judiciary mentioned that judges
were corrupt. Indeed, the importance of informal ties and connections
has already been highlighted in another survey that reports that 82% of
respondents believe citizens with connections (Wasta) in courthouses
are more likely to receive favorable judgment.23
Generally speaking, respondents felt compelled to trust the judiciary

albeit it lacks transparency and accountability mechanisms. However, in
short, none of them felt they could do anything about it. If we correlate
the responses on the general perception of corruption with the trust
in the justice system, we can observe the same situation from another
perspective.
Graph10: Perception of corruption and trust in the justice system
100
I trust completely
11,81%
21,94% 21,28% I trust somehow
28,57% I don't trust
80
29,62%
24,47%
31,61% 21,43%
60
40 36,08%
39,36%
32,26% 35,71%
20
22,49%
14,19% 14,89% 14,29%
0
Highly prevalent Prevalent Not prevalent Not prevalent at all
23 Matt Buehler, ‘Do You Have “Connections” at the Courthouse? An Original Survey
on Informal Influence and Judicial Rulings in Morocco’, Political Research Quar-
terly, 69.4 (2016), 760–72, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912916662358>.
54
This graph shows that levels of trust in the justice system remain
fairly constant, ranging between 41% and 54%. Even in the case in which
corruption is perceived as a pervasive element of Moroccan society,
trust in the justice system is still quite high and, most importantly,
does not vary significantly among those who believe that corruption is
pervasive in Morocco and those who think that it is not. This observation
further sustains what has been observed in the qualitative interviews:
an important part of Moroccans still feels that they have to trust the
justice system no matter what.
Nonetheless, there was a clear demand for the justice system to be

independent, without specifically indicating how that could be achieved.
Moreover, most of the respondents were under the impression that the
justice system worked in favor of the rich and powerful, rather than the
underprivileged. Paraphrasing the words of the interviewees, people
with money are believed to have preferential access to justice, and
there appears to be a social class that had access to justice, while the
others didn’t. The following graph reports the distribution of trust in the
justice system depending on the income:
Graph11: Trust in justice system depending on average monthly household income
100
I trust completely
17,41% 13,06% 16,43% 18,26% 20,64% I trust somehow
I don't trust
80
27,93%
29,69% 30,00% 26,98%
60
36,51%
40 38,29%
35,15% 35,00% 37,30%
33,33%
20
20,72% 18,57% 17,46%

17,75%
9,52%
0
Less than 3000MAD 3000-8000 MAD 8001-15000 MAD 15001 - 30000 MAD More than 30000 MAD
55
Unsurprisingly, the segment of respondents that trusts justice the

most is the one with an average household income above 30.000
dirhams per month – of which 57% shows trust in the justice system.
This may be explained by the fact that these households may have a
higher propensity to resort to the judiciary in their lives or that they are
able to afford the services of the highest calibre of lawyers. Moreover,
this segment of Morocco’s society is also more likely to have reached
higher levels of education, and therefore have a better understanding
of both the functioning of the justice system and their rights and
responsibilities. The lowest level of trust has been reported by the
citizens with a monthly income between 3.000 and 8.000 dirhams, of
which only 41% has confidence in the justice system. The apparent
outlier of these observations is the segment of respondents with the
lowest average monthly income (below 3.000 dirhams), of which 47%
trusts in the judiciary.
“Achieving justice depends on money. Lawyers do not defend a simple,

ignorant citizen.”24
These results sustain the observations made during the other

qualitative interviews, describing a situation in which a portion of the
population is aware of the fact that the access and quality of the justice
system depend on one’s status and resources, and there is another
portion that is compelled to trust the rulings of the judiciary – since
they are not in the position to question the integrity of the justice
system.
From a gender perspective, there is a slight difference between the

level of confidence of women and men towards the institutions of the
justice system. In specific terms, the justice system is trusted by 48%
of female respondents and by 43% of male respondents.
In conclusion, if many of the interviewees highly ranked justice

amongst the non-elected institutions, then it is unclear whether such
trust depends on the supposed (impartial) nature of the institution
24 Interview with B., attendant in a catering company. Casablanca, October 2019.
56
and its fundamental role for society or if it depends on their direct

experiences in the justice system. Moreover, people feel compelled
to trust the judiciary, regardless of corruption, because they lack the
means to take direct action. However, one of the interviewees noted
that in the eventuality of perceived injustice, people that are more
aware of their rights and duties were able to challenge the court, either
directly in the judicial process or in a broader social and political sense.
Service providers
In this section, we will discuss the trust that Moroccans have in the
education and healthcare systems. The analysis involved both the
public and the private sector, as both healthcare and education services
are increasingly being delivered by private entities. Therefore, we will
also look at the differences between trust in the public and private
sectors.
Education
Education institutions were trusted slightly more than healthcare.

Nevertheless, many of the respondents were wary of schooling quality;
and some spoke of schools as a sort of ‘failing project’. Regardless of the
accessing public or private institutions, the majority of the respondents
did not feel that the quality of education was in line with their
expectations. Nonetheless, the survey conducted by MIPA showed that
there is a staggering difference between the trust in public and private
schooling systems, where the private sector scores considerably better
than the public one. Indeed, the level of trust in the private schooling
system does not fall below 83%, while the trust in the public system
floats between 46% and 53%.
57
Graph12: Trust in private schools depending on the age
100
I trust completely
I trust somehow
I don't trust
80 37,01% 41,67% 39,66% 43,12%
60
40 46,43%
46,76% 47,70% 40,94%
20
12,99% 8,33% 11,49% 11,23%

3,57% 3,24% 1,15% 4,71%
0
18-29 30-39 40-49 50+
Graph13: Trust in public schools depending on the age
100
I trust completely
10,97% 10,45% 14,74%
17,45% I trust somehow
I don't trust
80
35,48% 36,82%
30,81% 37,89%
60
40
34,84% 31,82% 30,81%
31,93%
20
18,71% 20,91% 20,93%

15,44%
0
18-29 30-39 40-49 50+
In both the private and public sectors, the people with lower trust
in the education system are the ones between 18-29. With a level of
distrust of 17% for the private sector and a shocking 54% for the public
sector, Moroccan youth gives a strong message to these institutions,
especially given its direct and recent experience with the education
institutions. In the specific case of universities, the perception is
58
that they do not provide an even playing field. On one hand, some
respondents mentioned the discriminatory practices of some teachers
vis-à-vis some students, for instance, students with a specific “Fassi”
background or last name are privileged. On the other hand, respondents
felt that in order to go ahead and advance in university, students have
to cheat, and not cheating is seen as a sign of naivety.
Similarly, the trust that parents showed in the education sector

depended on their experience and that of their children as well. Parents
need to devote a great deal of trust to those who are in charge of
looking after their children. This was the case for a father, who trusted
his daughter’s school because of the fact that they were responsible for
her. However, respondents in the focus group mentioned that schools
sometimes do not act in the best interest of one’s child, and that
schooling no longer teaches the right values anymore.
Sometimes, parents do not have much choice over which school to

trust with their children. In this respect, the analysis of the differences
between trust in the public and private education sector depending on
the household income adds interesting points to the debate.
Graph14: Trust in private schools depending on average monthly
household income
100
I trust completely
I trust somehow
80 35,39%
45,27% 43,61%
60
40 45,68% 54,25%
40,72% 44,36%
46,15%
20
14,40%
10,75% 11,76% 10,53% 3,08%
3,26% 4,53% 3,27% 1,50% 1,54%
0
59
Graph15: Trust in public schools depending on average monthly

household income
100
I trust completely
12,80% 8,50% 10,53%
I don't trust
80
28,10%
37,59%
33,97% 40,80% 35,94%
60
42,48%
40
30,48% 34,59%
28,80% 34,38%
20
18,73% 17,60% 20,92% 17,29% 14,06%

0
The first element that captures attention, perhaps unsurprisingly,

is that the highest trust in the private sector comes from those who
have the highest income. The segment of respondents with the highest
income (above 30.000 dirhams per month) responded with a level of
trust of 95% in private education institutions. Followed by the next
segment in terms of income (between 15.001 and 30.000 dirhams per
month) with a level of trust in private education institutions of up to 88%.
It has also been noted elsewhere that private universities in Morocco
often have the explicit aim of being an exclusive environment for the
elites.25 However, the respondents with the lowest income (below 3.000
dirhams per month) gave a surprising signal, with 45% of respondents
saying they trust private education. This may not necessarily depend
on the actual access of this segment to private schools (which may
be very difficult given their income), but rather on their aspiration to
access a better system in comparison to the public one.
25 Elizabeth Buckner, ‘The Growth of Private Higher Education in North Africa: A

Comparative Analysis of Morocco and Tunisia’, Studies in Higher Education,
43.7 (2018), 1295–1306,<https://doi.org/10.1080/03075079.2016.1250075>.
60
The lowest level of trust in private education institutions comes from

the respondents with an income between 3.001 and 8.000 dirhams –
of which 19% do not trust private schools. As one interviewee said:
“when financial aspects come in, [they] decrease trust, because [school]
becomes a commercial trade”26
This may be attributed to the fact that with such income, families
may access private schools, but not top-quality ones. Thus, the
quality of education hardly matches both their expectations and the
substantial budgetary effort they made. This element is significant
because it shows that the private education sector is not a unique bloc.
Rather, it is very differentiated in terms of the quality of education and
the fees that one has to pay for it.
Correspondingly, the segment that trusts public education the most

is the one with a household income between 3.001 and 8.000 dirhams
per month – where 54% of respondents say they trust public schooling.
At this level of resources, public education may be chosen because they
do not have access to the best levels of private education, and therefore
they have to trust public education more. Furthermore, only 37% of
respondents with a household income between 8.001 and 15.000
dirhams per month said that they trust public education, making it the
lowest level of trust for educational establishments. Such a low level of
trust for public education institutions may be due to the fact that this
segment of the population has the possibility to access high-quality
private education and the choice to do so, often with a substantial effort.
From a gender perspective, no substantial differences have been

noted between respondents’ trust in public or private institutions.
Private schooling is trusted by 85% of women and by 86% of men,
while public schooling is trusted by 55% of women and by 42% of men.
Therefore, schooling is felt to be a heavy burden for families.

Education institutions are not only meant to provide proper education,
but are also considered to be the main source for learning ethics and
26 Interview with A., Rabat, October 2019
61
values. However, the progressive monetization of the system has

put economic pressure on families in order to get a better education
for their children. At the same time, families are not satisfied with
the overall quality of education. Positive feedbacks in relation to the
education system derived mainly from the relative security and the
responsibility of such institutions towards children. The general feeling,
however, is that people are not in control of neither the quality nor the
cost of education – even in private education institutions.
In conclusion, substantial inequalities remain a key feature of the

educational sector, both between the public and private sectors, and
also within the private sector.
Graph 16: Level of education depending on average monthly
household income
1,95% 2,24%
100
6,72% 1,94% 4,47% No formal education
Primary school
11,07% 18,83% 20,15%
31,97% High School
80 32,84%
University level
Masters
60
42,29% Doctoral level and above
43,28%
30,41%
61,69%
35,82%
40
23,20%
36,76%
20 29,85%
14,29% 26,87%
13,79%
0,63% 3,16% 1,30% 4,48%
0
This graph clearly shows that under the current educational system
income inequalities have a clear reflection in the levels of education,
creating (and nurturing at the same time) a division between wealthy
and educated citizens, and unprivileged and uneducated citizens.
62
Healthcare
The cleavage that has been observed between public and private
sector in education is even more remarkable in healthcare institutions.
Among the main issues that have been highlighted is the access
to the healthcare services, as several interviewees mentioned that
without adequate financial resources it is difficult to access proper
healthcare services. Public healthcare facilities are usually free, or at
least cheaper compared to the private sector. However, people feel that
they are no longer able to rely on free services, since public hospitals
lack both human and material resources and the overall quality is
deemed poor. The interviewees reported that the personnel are scarce,
sometimes medications are not provided, and people may be asked to
get themselves the medicines that the doctors need to carry out their
work. This may probably explain the high level of distrust in healthcare
institutions in general, but mainly in the public healthcare system.
It should be noted also that the difference between the public and
private sector is even greater than the case of educational institutions.
On one hand, the private healthcare sector records generally high
levels of trust, as it is trusted by at least 71% of all respondents. On the
other hand, trust in public healthcare institutions records dramatic
levels ranging between 20% by respondents aged 18-29 and 29% by
respondents aged 30-39. It is dramatic to record that 80% do not trust
public healthcare institutions, and 49% of them do not trust them at all.
63
Graph17: Trust in private healthcare depending on the age
100
I trust completely
I trust somehow
26,79% 26,02% 27,02%
80
60
47,39% 49,32% 44,25%

45,32%
40
20 15,69% 15,98% 20,11%

15,11%
10,13% 8,68% 8,62% 7,55%
0
18-29 30-39 40-49 50+
Graph18: Trust in public healthcare depending on the age
100
5,47% 5,88% 6,90% 6,31% I trust completely
I trust somehow
14,47% 14,94%
23,53% 22,46% I don't trust
80
31,19%
60 33,91%
30,77%
34,74%
40
48,87% 44,25%
20 39,82% 36,49%
0
18-29 30-39 40-49 50+
These ratios reflect the picture described by many interviewees who

say that choosing private healthcare over public healthcare is often due
to the fact that the pauperized state of public health infrastructures
leaves no choice.
64
“We have bad health (sector) in Morocco. If you have money you can
get treated. Public health facilities are bad.”27
The alarming state of public health infrastructure is also quoted as

a reason for people to leave the country, as the availability of free and
effective healthcare in other countries provides a strong stimulus to
emigrate.
From a gender perspective, no substantial differences have been

noted between respondents’ trust in public or private healthcare sector.
Private institutions are trusted by 75% of women and men (with a
difference of less than 0,5% of men trusting private institutions more
than women), while public institutions are trusted by 28% of women
and by 21% of men.
The distribution of trust in healthcare institutions depending on

household incomes shows a trend which is analogous to the one
observed in the educational sector – reaffirming the important
inequalities that mark service providers in Morocco.
Graph19: Trust in private healthcare depending on average monthly
household income
100
I trust completely
I trust somehow
23,89% 24,03%
29,87% 34,85% 35,38% I don't trust
80
60
50,61% 48,70%
47,40% 42,42% 44,62%
40
20
17,81% 16,23%
13,64% 15,91% 15,38%
9,09% 7,69% 11,04% 6,82% 4,62%
0
27 Interview with A, Housewife, Marrakech, October 2019.
65
Graph20: Trust in public healthcare depending on average monthly

household income
100
6,78% 3,90% 3,75% 4,61%
8,20% I trust completely
17,53% 18,05%
80 22,71%
27,27% 30,83% 41,54%

60
33,86%
33,44%
40
51,30% 47,37%
41,43% 44,62%
20
35,65%
0
Starting from the public healthcare system, we can observe that the
respondents with the highest level of income (above 30.000 dirhams
per month) distrust the public healthcare institutions the most – with
the 86% of respondents that do not trust public health and, within this
percentage, an impressive 45% that do not trust public healthcare at all.
The highest level of trust in these institutions is given by the respondents
with the lowest income (less than 3.000 dirhams per month), of which
31% trust public health infrastructures – most probably because they
have no other choice.
In relation to the private sector, we observe once again that the

respondents that rely the most on the private healthcare institutions
are the wealthiest, with the trust of 80% of the respondents with an
income above 30.000 dirhams per month and the trust of 77% of the
respondents with an income between 15.001 and 30.000 dirhams per
month. The respondents that reported the lowest income (below 3.000
dirhams per month) have shown a surprisingly high level of trust in the
private sector, with 78% that trust private healthcare institutions. Such
high confidence follows the same dynamic observed in the educational
system, where higher levels of trust from the respondents who are
66
unlikely to have the resources to access the private sector reflect their
aspiration rather than an actual usage of such services. In the case of
private healthcare, the users of public healthcare may project their
hopes for better healthcare on the trust in the private sector. Albeit still
being relatively high, the lower trust in the private healthcare system is
showed by those with an income between 8.000 and 15.000 dirhams – of
which only 73% trust the private sector. These people may have resorted
to private healthcare, but the concrete quality of the services (also in
respect of the financial resources they had to allocate to access private
institutions) may have failed to meet their expectations. Indeed, some
of the interviewees said that they trust private healthcare, however,
some behaviors (like being asked to pay prior to the treatment) made
them suspicious about these institutions. They were not sure whether
private healthcare institutions were actually providing a service that
was necessary or if they were engaging in strategies that aimed at
getting the maximum benefits (i.e.: money) from them.
The resources that are invested in private healthcare have a direct

correlation with the trust that is attributed to the health sector.
Interviewees felt safer when they spent more on their treatment, and
they trusted more the institution that was costlier. Albeit free and
public institutions exist, participants in this research do not perceive
healthcare as a right but rather a luxury for which one needs to pay.
Like other public administration services, healthcare institutions

are also afflicted by the phenomenon of corruption: a large pool of
interviewees said that when accessing treatments in private healthcare
they either experienced corruption directly or they observed it.
“Receiving health services depends on people’s connections and

money.”28
Interviewees also noted that those with the least financial resources
are the most exposed to corruption within healthcare services. The
distrust in the public sector brings those with the least income,
28 Interview with B., attendant in a catering company. Casablanca, October 2019.
67
who sometimes need to travel long distances to access healthcare

infrastructures, to the conclusion that it is better to pay someone than
not receiving a treatment they need.
Graph21: Relation between the perception of corruption and trust
in public healthcare
100
6,14% 4,10% 8,25% I trust completely

16,56% 17,60%
I don't trust
80 26,80%
18,75%
60 32,31% 35,19%
12,50%
28,87%
40
44,99% 43,11% 50,00%

20
36,08%
0
The chart correlating the perception of corruption in Morocco and

the trust in the public healthcare system shows that between 77% and
78% of respondents that do not trust public healthcare institutions
also believe that corruption is either prevalent or highly prevalent.
This sustains the observation on the relation between the perception
of corruption and the trust in healthcare systems – the public
one in particular. Corruption often represents the last resort of the
underprivileged to be sure they receive the minimum assistance from
the healthcare sector.
On a final note, interviewees often mentioned the lack of good public

policies on education and healthcare as a central reason for the lack
of trust in the Parliament. There is a general belief that the negative
performance of these sectors is related to the failure of MPs (and to
the Parliament in general) in dealing with the issues of education and
healthcare. None of the respondents blamed the local municipality
for a non-working, or non-efficient hospital or school, as communes
68
are mostly concerned with issues such as the management of roads,

electricity and local facilities. This contributes to the establishment of a
link between the quality of the education and healthcare on one hand,
and the performance of the ruling government coalition on the other.
Security apparatus
This section will discuss the findings related to the institutions

belonging to the security apparatus, namely the army and police forces.
These two institutions reported the highest level of confidence, with
the army being the most trusted institution and the police the second-
most trusted institution.
The army had an outstanding level of confidence, ranging from the

trust of 87% of respondents aged 18-29 and the trust of the 92% of
the respondents aged 40-49. Likewise, the high level of trust in police
forces are distributed between 77% of the respondents aged 18-29
and 88% of the respondents aged 40-49.
An interesting remark is that none of the respondents discussed

their perceptions of the army or mentioned ‘positively or negatively’
the role of army. This may be attributed to the fact that the civil-
military relations in Morocco are well defined with the armed forces
being kept far away from the citizens’ day-to-day activities. This lack
of daily encounter makes citizens indecisive about this institution and
hence wary of having a definite opinion about it.
However, the situation is different when it comes to the police, which

is an institution that has direct and daily interactions with citizens.
Some respondents claimed that the police could be trusted because
generally they do not come from the elites of the country. Coming
from a popular and/or underprivileged background has been related
to the capacity of the police to represent people’s interests. Plus, they
are recognised as an important and trustworthy institution due to their
role in the safeguard of the interest of the country at the state level.
However, some respondents claimed that the police were likely to push
69
a person away if he/she turns to them for a personal issue (such as

robbery, minor crimes, etc.).
The geographical distribution of trust in security apparatus

institutions also provides interesting insights. The lowest levels of
confidence have been recorded in the Atlantic region, where 76% of
the respondents trust the police and 84% of respondents trust the
army. Differently, the highest levels of trust are reported in the North,
where 87% of respondents have confidence in the police and 94% of
respondents have confidence in the army, and in the South, where 83%
of respondents have confidence in the police and 92% of respondents
have confidence in the army. The two following graphs show this
distribution:
Graph22: Trust in armed forces divided by Morocco’s regions
100
I trust completely
I trust somehow
I don't trust
80 40,76%
46,70% 48,80% I don't trust at all
54,43%
60
40
43,40%
43,96% 42,29%
39,24%
20
11,44%
7,14% 5,06% 5,53%
4,40% 2,20% 1,27% 3,38%
0
Atlantic Center North South
70
Graph23: Trust in police forces divided by Morocco’s regions
100
I trust completely
I trust somehow
27,22% 30,98%
80
36,14% 33,96% I don't trust
60
48,89%
48,37%
48,68%
40 49,40%
20
18,33% 19,02% 12,65% 13,21%

5,56% 1,63% 1,81% 4,15%
0
Atlantic Center North South
For instance, in Marrakech most respondents had a positive view of

the police, in terms of both performance and efficiency: they said police
officers were clearly present, especially in touristic sites, and had a
prompt reaction when an issue arises. People praised the police in a way
that showed pride in having a security force so present, so ubiquitous
and on standby when in need. On the contrary, the interviewees in
Casablanca stated that they did not feel that police forces were close
to the citizens at all, and that sometimes police do not even respond to
emergency calls.
From a gender perspective, there is a slight difference between the

level of confidence of women and men towards the institutions of the
security apparatus. Particularly, the army is trusted by 90% of female
respondents and by 88% of male respondents, while police forces are
trusted by 83% of female respondents and 78% of male respondents.
Even if police forces reported a very high level of confidence, some of

the interviewees did mention some of the main issues that undermine
trust in the police. In this regard some respondents mentioned nepotism,
as they expressed displeasure with the fact that some people are able
71
to leverage their social status in order to avoid a bad situation with the
police.
“The police are not completely enforcing their own laws. Especially with
people who can leverage them out of situations”29
Some others mentioned that the police do not treat people fairly,
and sometimes they act in an oppressive way.
However, the main issue that affected respondents’ trust in police

forces is related to corruption. Specifically, respondents recognized
that police forces may be prone to be influenced by money and that
those who have an absolute trust in police are the ones that have
money, power and/or the right connections. The graphs that show the
distribution of trust in police forces depending on the income further
sustain this point:
Graph24: Trust in police depending on average monthly household income
100
I trust completely

26,32%
34,19% 32,02% I don't trust
80 38,46%
60
51,66%
52,23%
48,24% 46,88%
40
47,69%
20
23,18%
13,42% 17,81% 17,19%
13,85%
4,15% 3,64% 3,97% 3,91% 0,00%
0
Those with the highest income showed the highest level of trust in
the police. In this matter, it has to be noted that no respondent with
an income above 30.000 dirhams per month completely distrusts the
police. Moreover, the segment of respondents with a monthly income
29 Interview with M, works in a sewing laboratory. Casablanca, October 2019.
72
between 8.001 and 15.000 dirhams is the one that reported the least
trust in police forces – with only 73% of respondents who trust the
police. People with a medium-high income, may be the most exposed to
the discretionary power that is sometimes exercised by the police. They
may be the ones who most frequently observe, directly or indirectly,
episodes of corruption of police forces. Inversely, the segment of the
respondents with a monthly income below 3.000 dirhams showed
relatively high confidence in the police – with 82% of respondents who
trusts police forces. This may be related to the fact that this segment
of respondent’s experiences corruption less often, since these people
do not have the income that may influence police’s behavior. Moreover,
this may be related to the fact that becoming part of police forces (as
well as of the army) is often perceived as a social elevator from this
sector of Moroccan society: joining the police (or the army) would entail
both economic stability as well as amelioration of the reputation of the
family, resulting in increased overall respect.
In sum, citizens trust police forces based on the fact that police
officers themselves are not privileged or rich: they represent a popular
segment of the population, having the same grievances, and burdened
with the inability to refuse orders when requested. Plus, police forces, as
a whole, are not perceived as a corrupt institution, but rather, corruption
depends on police officers (as individuals) that one encounters. This
creates a particularly nuanced picture of the institution, in which police
forces manage to maintain high levels of trust in spite of negative
personal encounters with members of the force. This particular
assessment of police forces is also clear when looking at the correlation
between the perception of the prevalence of corruption and the trust
that respondents demonstrated for police forces.
73
Graph25: Perception of corruption and trust in police forces
100
I trust completely
I trust somehow
24,90%
80
50,00%
60
50,83%
40
50,30%
37,11%
37,50%
20
18,88%
14,97% 14,43% 6,25%
5,39% 2,10% 2,06% 6,25%
0
Indeed, trust in police forces seems to be only partially influenced by

the perception of corruption, reporting very good results with rates of
trust between 76% and 87%. An interesting signal is given by looking at
the column showing the level of trust in the police by respondents who
believe that corruption is highly prevalent: this segment reports the
least absolute trust in police and, at the same time, the highest levels of
general trust in police forces. Even those who believe that corruption is
a pervasive issue, and accordingly showed low rates of complete trust in
the police, still maintain a general confidence in this security apparatus.
Last but not least, one of the interviewees also made a clear
differentiation between the work of police forces at the national level
and their work for citizens’ security. If this person claimed that at the
level of the citizens police officers are less active (and more exposed to
the issues –outlined above, especially corruption), then police forces are
perceived as being highly professional in their work for state security;
especially through the interventions against the spread of terrorism,
which is granted high visibility in mainstream media. Police forces
display very good performances and give the impression that they are
actively working for the security of Moroccan society as a whole. The
police were seen as one of the best performing institutions, because
74
they are visible to people, they are actively pursuing terrorists, and they
are the ring that keeps the society held together in some way, yet when
it comes to daily confrontation with people, individual police agents are
not always perceived as positive.
Trust in Mediators
In this section, we will discuss the results of MIPA’s research concerning

trust in a very specific category of Morocco’s society: mediators. The
research conducted by MIPA for the Trust Index also included civil society
organizations (CSOs) and labor unions as a part of this analysis. The role
of both CSOs and labor unions has consistently evolved over time, but
their actions as institutions working in the space “in between” state and
society are still of importance in Morocco. In the following sections we
will look at the way in which these mediator institutions are trusted by
Moroccans.
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)
Before engaging in the analysis of the trust in CSOs, it is important to

remember that the civil society environment in morocco is composed of
a wide variety of actors. Indeed, the definition of civil society actors has
the effect of including and/or excluding a series of actors – ultimately
influencing our perception of this part of the society. Therefore, in the
assessment of the trust of Moroccans in CSOs we have to remember
that these institutions are extremely diversified.
A general remark is that CSOs are relatively trusted by the respondents

to MIPA’s survey, with an average of 52.5% of answers that indicated
trust in CSOs.
75
Graph26: Trust in CSOs depending on the age
100
I trust completely
12,96%
19,41% 19,48% 20,00% I trust somehow
I don't trust
80
45,56%
37,31% 41,20%
60 45,45%
40
22,96% 29,85%
23,38% 25,20%
20
18,52% 13,43% 13,60%

11,69%
0
18-29 30-39 40-49 50+
The different age groups of the respondents also reported quite

similar levels of trust, with small variations between the respondents
aged between 40-49, of which 65% trust CSOs, and the respondents
aged between 30-39, of which only 57% trust CSOs. The age group
that is most suspicious about the role of CSOs in society is the youth,
reporting only 13% of absolute trust in CSOs. Since the same group also
reported the highest level of general trust in CSOs (46% of respondents
between 18-29 said they “somehow trust” CSOs), we could assume that
the youth have an overall positive view of civil society organizations but,
at the same time, are aware that the environment is highly diversified
and not all CSOs can be trusted completely.
The participants in the interviews identified the direct and personal

contact with a CSO as the main variable that could influence both
the trust and the distrust in these institutions. On one hand, some
interviewees reported that their trust in CSOs is due to their work for
the population, whether due to their general philanthropic or in some
specific instances (such as in healthcare).
76
“CSOs are trustworthy, they give you the information, they are honest
and helpful”30
Some of the respondents said that they could probably trust a CSO
if they had to deal with them. On the other hand, negative personal
experiences resulted in the absolute distrust in such institutions. Only
one of the interviewees said that some organizations are serious and
aim at making an impact on society, but the majority does not pursue
such objective.
A quite widespread idea is that CSOs are not to be trusted because

they do not always follow a non-profit logic. Indeed, a recurrent reason
for distrust in these institutions was the manner they manage finances.
When CSOs are perceived to work for financial profit rather than social
benefit, citizens tend to trust them less. Furthermore, a perceived lack
of transparency in the management of funds from donors was also
mentioned as a reason for the great distrust in NGOs.
Another interesting element is the distribution of trust in CSOs by

the geographical dimension. Indeed, there are almost no differences in
the way respondents from rural and urban areas said they trust CSOs.
30 Interview with R., Sales representative, Marrakech, October 2019.
77
Graph27: Trust in CSOs divided in rural and urban municipalities
100
I trust completely
I don't trust
80
60
43,43% 41,87%
40
24,58% 25,61%
20
15,15% 14,53%
0
Rural Urban
As showed in the graph above, both the percentages of respondents

that trust and distrust CSOs are very similar. One would expect a variation
since both the typology of actors and the work that CSOs do in rural and
urban areas vary greatly. However, the fact that these variables do not
seem to influence the trust in CSOs supports the conclusion that levels
of trust in these institutions depend primarily on the actual encounters
between citizens and CSOs, rather than on the type of actor or of their
work.
From a gender perspective, the difference in the levels of trust

attributed to CSOs by male and female respondents is not substantial.
However, the difference of 12 points between the trust of females and
males in CSOs (66% for female and 54% for males) has been one of the
highest recorded in MIPA’s study. This may be due to the numerous CSOs
that devote their work to the improvement of women’s livelihoods, from
the perspective of economic empowerment, increasing access to health
services, and/or fighting gender-based violence and discrimination.
78
Labor Unions
While CSOs are relatively perceived as trustworthy, the case is different

for labor unions. One of the main observations is that interviewees
expressed their lack of knowledge of the work of syndicates. They
knew that their main goal was somehow to represent workers’ rights,
but many respondents felt that the action of labor unions in favor of
workers was replaced by their seizure for personal benefits of union
representatives.
“They only care about their interests”31
When labor unions were distrusted, they were described as a

nepotistic club serving its own interests or the interests of the people
ascribed to it, rather than the general population.
Nonetheless, one of the interviewees mentioned that syndicates still

play a key role in defending workers’ rights, and organizing concrete
activities like protests or boycotts. This has been mentioned as a reason
why labor unions are more trustworthy than civil society organizations.
Plus, the fact that labor unions are elected institutions also represents
a positive element to build trust in them. Voting for syndicates reflects
the trust that people have in them as an institution, as it was highlighted
by one of the interviewees. Others did mention that they trusted them
in comparison to other institutions, as they still felt they represent the
workers and people. For these people, syndicates were always ranked in
the top 3 or top 4 of institutions they trusted.
If the trust in labor union is quite low across all ages, we can
nevertheless note some important traits. The respondents with lower
trust in syndicates are the respondents aged between 18-29, of which
only 28% trust labor unions, and the respondents aged between 30-39,
of which only 27% trust these institutions. Such low levels of trust may
be explained by the fact that the younger generation did not directly
experience the time in which labor unions were key player for workers’
rights. Plus, labor unions hardly adapted to the current evolutions in
31 Interview with Y. Marrakech, October 2019.
79
the job market and the new economies (such as the gig economy), and
thus these institutions did not play a key role in safeguarding these
generations of workers. This may be corroborated by the fact that the
older generations trust syndicates more, with 34% of the respondents
aged between 40-49 and 32% of the respondents aged above 50.
Indeed, these generations directly experienced the great struggles
for workers’ rights and the tangible improvements in the conditions
of the working classes. On top of trusting syndicates more than the
youth do, older segments of the population were also more aware of
their prerogatives. Their relatively higher trust may stem from these
experiences.
From a gender perspective, there are almost no differences in terms

of trust in labor unions; they were trusted by 31% of female respondents
and by 29% of male respondents. However, we are not in the position to
draw conclusions about such difference.
However, the distribution of trust depending on the average

household income also provides a clear picture of the situation:
Graph28: Trust in labour unions depending on average monthly
household income
100
7,60% 5,47% 5,74% I trust completely
11,11%
18,80% 19,40%
I don't trust
80 29,51%
36,51%
34,15%
60
45,20% 50,25%
40 46,72%
41,27%
47,15%
20
28,40% 24,88%
18,03%
11,11%
0,00%
0
80
The two segments that trust syndicates the least are the ones that
report the lower incomes. Namely, only 26% of those with a monthly
income below 3.000 and only 25% of those with a monthly income
between 3.000- and 8.000-dirhams trust syndicates. These segments
represent the most vulnerable parts of the workers, the ones that are
supposed to be at the center of the work of the syndicates. Thus, the fact
that they showed the least trust to the syndicates sends an important
signal to these institutions.
Trust in elected institutions
As presented in the beginning of this chapter, the main difference

between elected and non-elected institutions lies in the way in which
these institutions can be held accountable. Indeed, distrust in elected
institutions can be directly sanctioned through electoral processes.
Changes in voting trends, and perhaps more importantly disaffection
and abstention from participation in elections, are in this respect
important signals that the citizens can send to their elected institutions
to show them that their trust in them is deteriorating.
In general, Moroccans feel a great deal of distrust in elected

institutions.
“The Parliament, the government and political parties, no one trusts

them”32
Two main issues have been highlighted throughout the survey

conducted by MIPA. The first one is the issue of representation, since
elected institutions are perceived as if they lack the ability to effectively
represent the interests of the trustees. Second, there is the issue of
knowledge. Indeed, the limited knowledge of the roles and functions
of elected institutions, as well as of the wider context in which these
institutions operate, fail to provide a concrete framework for citizens to
32 Interview with Z., Marrakech, October 2019.
81
effectively assess the performances and the shortcomings of elected

institutions.
Concretely, these issues translated into very low levels of trust in

the elected institutions, which will be discussed in the following pages.
Specifically, about 69% of the respondents said they did not trust
political parties, and only 23% of respondents have confidence in their
government. Ranking among the least trusted institutions in this
study, the trust in these institutions will be thoroughly explored in the
following sections.
Government
Trust in government is amongst the lowest from all the surveyed

institutions. It is acutely distrusted amongst the youngest segment
of the survey with only 23% of respondents showing confidence in
their government. Even if the difference is not significant, the 40-49
age cohort reports a slightly higher level of trust in the government,
with 30% of the respondents reporting trust in this institution. From a
gender perspective, there is once again a slight difference in the trust
of men and women in the government. Specifically, 28% of female
respondents and 22% of male respondents affirmed that they trust
the government.
Generally speaking, the distrust in the government has often been

related to the perceived lack of action to solve the most pressing issues
of the country. This element is clear when looking at the correlation
between the satisfaction of the general direction of the country and
the trust in the government. As the main executive body of the country,
it is particularly interesting to note that the distrust in the government
is higher among respondents who are either not satisfied (75%) or not
satisfied at all – where distrust reaches a staggering 91%.
82
Graph29: Trust in Government and satisfaction of the direction

of the country
0,81%
100 4,34% I trust completely
8,03% 12,30% 13,43%
I trust somehow
20,46%
80

34,76%
60 32,74%
37,31%
40 27,27%
70,68%
20 42,46%
25,67% 26,87%
0
Not satisfied at all Not satisfied Satisfied somehow Satisfied at a large extent
Amongst the respondents of MIPA’s survey, there does not seem to

be a significant difference between the ways in which the inhabitants
of the different regions trust the government. With an average of
27% of respondents that trust either partially or completely the
government in the North, Centre and South, the only region that stands
out is the Atlantic – where levels of trust in the government only reach
21%. However, the respondents of MIPA’s survey coming from rural
areas have showed significantly less trust in the government (22%) in
comparison to the respondents coming from urban areas (32%). This
difference of 10 points may be attributed to the fact that in rural areas
the actions of the government (development of infrastructures, fight
against marginalization and the implementation of economic projects)
are seen as even less effective, thereby enhancing the perception of
the government as a trustworthy institution.
Ultimately, the trust in the government is also strictly correlated

with the satisfaction with the government’s efforts to fight corruption.
83
Graph30: Trust in Government by satisfaction with efforts to fight corruption

0,53%
100
9,79% 14,54%
I trust somehow

80
24,07% 41,19%
35,76%
60
32,91%
40 35,29%
65,61% 30,91%
20
37,06% 11,76%
18,79%
11,76%
0
Not satisfied at all Not satisfied Satisfied somehow Satisfied to a large extent
Among the respondents who believed that the government’s efforts

to fight corruption are satisfying at a large extent, the levels of trust in
government reached 76% – with an impressive share of absolute trust
of 41%, Unsurprisingly, among the respondents that deem that the
government’s efforts to fight corruption are far from being satisfying,
the high levels of trust are the least possible – as trust in those efforts
is hardly reaching 10%. This result implies that concrete action to tackle
corruption may have a substantial impact in the trust in government.
Finally, we could draw some further observation from the relation

between the trust in the government and the declared intentions to
vote in next elections.
“The people have lost faith in the government and the upcoming
elections will prove that.”33
Even if the formation of the government is not a direct result of

elections, voting is seen as a mechanism to hold the government
accountable – as it stems from the political party, or the coalition of
party, that is able to ensure a majority in the houses of the Parliament.
33 Interview with A., attendant in a catering company. Casablanca, October 2019.
84
Graph31: Intention to vote in next elections and trust in Government
100 2,38% 3,92% I trust completely

9,45%
17,16%
I don't trust
80
26,51%
21,43%
30,88%
60
33,86%
40
62,50%
48,04%
20
30,18%
0
Yes No No opinion
The relationship between the trust in the government and voting

intentions shows that lack of trust in the government is related to a
broad disaffection for electoral participation. Therefore, it appears
clear that ameliorating the trust in the government will also have a
substantial effect on voter turnout.
Given the tight relationship between the government and political

parties, further considerations on the trust in this institution may be
extrapolated by the analysis of trust in political parties.
Political parties
Trust in political parties is amongst the lowest levels of trust throughout

the Trust Index survey with an average of 22%. The general perception
is that political parties are concerned mainly with the accumulation of
power and financial resources rather than the representation of the
population. For instance, the interviewees felt that political parties are
prone to nominate people that can contribute financially to political
campaigns instead of candidates that have better levels of education.
The impression of parties not choosing the candidates based on their
85
performance, capabilities and honesty ultimately perpetuates the

perception of low quality of the MPs in the Parliament.
Youth in particular express a distressing level of distrust in political

parties: 81% of the respondents do not trust political parties, of which
there is a worrying 42% that do not trust them at all. The percentage
of youth who have a complete trust for political parties is lower than
1%. The highest levels of trust in an overall distrustful population
is shown by the 40-49 age cohort and those above 50, which have
reached a maximum of 30% of respondents that said they either
trusted somewhat or completely the political parties. We can perhaps
attribute the higher level of trust amongst this segment to the time
when political parties in Morocco had higher standing, more credibility
and substantial influence. The lower levels of trust as you go down in
age also support the idea that the perception of political parties has
progressively waned. Indeed, the population above 50 is the only
segment that had 6% of respondents saying they completely trusted
political parties, thereby substantiating the importance and relevance
of political parties to this age cohort.
The distribution of trust in political parties by gender is once again

very similar, with women trusting political parties a little more than men.
Female respondents reported a rate of 27% of trust in political parties,
while only 22% of male respondents reported trust in such institution.
86
Graph32: Following politics and trust in political parties
100
5,49% 3,39% 3,40% 3,71% I trust completely
I trust somehow
16,03% 22,25% 23,11%
I don't trust
80
60
35,44%
35,77%
40,91%
40
33,33%
20 43,04% 38,59%
32,58%
18,52%
0
I don't follow at all I don't follow I follow somehow I follow to a large extent
There appears to be a relationship between the extent to which citizens

follow politics and the trust they allocate to political parties. Higher
levels of trust are not necessarily associated with a seldom follow-up
of politics, but they seem to be related with a thorough update with the
political life of the country. Indeed, 48% of the respondents who follow
politics assiduously also trust political parties. If it is unsurprising that
the respondents who either do not follow or do not follow politics at all
showed lower levels of trust (between 22% and 26%), the fact that “only”
27% of respondents who follow politics and somehow showed trust in
political parties, raises further questions. This result may be related to
the fact that close attention to politics also entails a greater exposure
to the negative image with which political parties are portrayed – which
is nurtured by the many issues of party politics in Morocco. Through the
amplification of both positive and negative features and behaviours of
party politics, an increased knowledge and awareness about politics
have the potential to bolster both trust and distrust in political parties.
Ultimately, the effect on increased awareness will depend on the
performance of political parties themselves.
Furthermore, corruption and fraud in elections are also recurrent

elements that lead to the discrediting of political parties in the eyes
87
of the interviewees. Corruption is almost perceived as an endemic trait,

which is also a key feature of new political parties – since their inception,
perhaps solely on the basis of being a political party. Political parties
were also perceived to increase nepotism and favoritism, and that
parliament was mainly constituted of the same political families. The
correlation between the perception of corruption and trust in political
parties provided by survey data clearly sustains the observations
of the interviewees: it shows that the highest level of trust can be
found amongst those respondents who do not believe corruption is a
problem, whilst those respondents with the lowest levels of trust have
the opposite perception in respect to the prevalence of corruption in
Morocco.
Graph33: Perception of corruption and trust in political parties

9,89%
14,29%

80
35,71%
34,08%
60
41,96%
40 40,66% 21,43%
46,99%
20
29,02% 28,57%
20,88%
0
Concerning the levels of trust in relation to the average household

income, we observed a clear correlation between the level of income
and the trust that is allocated to political parties. The highest levels of
trust come from the wealthiest respondents, reaching a 43% of trust
by the respondents with a monthly income above 30.000 dirhams.
Unsurprisingly, the least levels of trust come from those with the
lowest income, ranging between 22% (monthly income between 3.000
and 8.000 dirhams) and 24% (monthly income below 3.000 dirhams).
88
Furthermore, interviews demonstrated that there is a widespread

perception that political parties are exploiting the underprivileged for
their own electoral benefits: the success in elections is attributed to the
votes from the lowest strata of society. This part of the population is
in dire need of more resources and better access to services, and the
impression one gets is that they – as well as their grievances – are
exploited by political parties to gain votes. The other aspect of this
issue is that underprivileged categories of society are unaware of the
consequences of their vote, because of their lack of education and
awareness, and the consequent lack of interest in the medium and
long-term repercussions of their vote.
A small number of interviewees expressed the idea that the Justice

and Development Party (PJD) had their trust at first, but then lost it
because of the non-advancement of issues in the country. As the
education and healthcare sectors became more privatized and things
overall in the country went in the wrong direction, the party had lost
their trust.
“ I am the kind of person who takes part in elections even if sometimes

I can be busy or my time is short, I find time to vote. Last time I asked
women in a popular area about the party they voted for, and they told me
they voted for the PJD.I asked why? And one of them told me: we tried all
of them and we want to try this party and give them a chance to see what
they can do. It was the only party that we trusted, but in the end, they
were actually the worst. Today, trust is absent. In the next elections, I will
vote but not for the PJD. I will vote for any other party; I have no preference
anymore »34.
Even those who have not participated in the electoral process felt
that when the party was in the opposition, it used to deliver convincing
speeches and arguments, but once in power it sought the self-interest
of its own MPs and party, and started disregarding the actual needs
of the people who voted for them. For some interviewees, a major
source of distrust was that they believed that religion had been used to
achieve political gains. It has been noted that trust in these people used
34 Interview, Y, Businesswoman, Casablanca, October 2019.
89
to be higher than it is now. There is the idea that time contributed to the
decline of trust in the political party, the opposition, or the MPs, because
time revealed the lack of initiative, and policies that were detrimental
for the country.
Participation and political trust
The survey data also collected some information regarding the

tendencies of political participation of the respondents, that provide
both relevant insights for the study of trust and other general elements
that help understand how political participation is configured in
Morocco.
We can start by noticing that levels of participation are overall quite

low. The economic boycott has resulted in the most used form of
participation in our survey (58% of respondents), followed by voting
in elections (38% of respondents), the participation in a protest or
sit-in (36% of respondents), and in the last three positions there are
the electoral boycott (27% of respondents), participating in online
activism (17% of respondents), and finally signing a petition (13% of
respondents).
Graph34: Forms of political participation
60 58,3%
50
40 37,6%
35,5%
30 27,1%
20 17,3%
13,3%
10
0
Protest or sit-in Petition (online or legal) Economic boycott Electoral boycott Online activism Voted in last election
90
Plus, the different modes of participation of respondents vary greatly

depending on the age of the respondents.
Graph35: Modes of participation depending on the age
80
50+
67,8%
40-49
70
58,9%
30-39
56,0%
60 18-29
48,8%
47,4%
46,0%
40,8%
41,5%
50
37,9%
32,1%
30,3%
40
29,1%
26,8%
26,8%
26,5%
22,9%
23,2%
20,5%
30
14,6%
13,8%
13,4%
13,7%
20
10,3%
6,6%
10
0
The youth privileged either the resort to forms of boycott (both

electoral and economic) or the engagement in online activism to express
their political views. They also scored the lowest rate of participation
in election, showing great disaffection for the participation in the so-
called “formal politics”. Nonetheless, it appears clear that Moroccan
youth is politically active and participates in different arenas of political
engagement. Furthermore, we can observe that the respondents aged
between 40-49 privileged the participation in election, rather than
other forms of participation. Notably, they scored the lowest in almost
all other forms of participation excluding the economic boycott and
online activism. In the latter, unsurprisingly, the least active age segment
is the one of the respondents aged over 50. However, this group has
reported the highest level of participation in a petition. Due to the very
low rate of engagement in online activism, we could further assume
that the respondents aged over 50 are the ones that are engaging the
most with legal petitions.
91
The data on participation also showed great differences in terms of

gender and depending on whether respondents came from a rural or
urban municipality. A general result that emerges from the survey data
collected by MIPA is that women tend to participate less often than men.
Graph 36: Gender differences for people who answered “yes” to the
question: have you ever participated in one of these?
70
57,9%
Male
56,1%
54,6%
54,4%
53,8%
52,3%
Female
60
47,7%
46,2%
45,6%
45,5%
43,9%
42,1%
50
40
30
20
10
0
However, the difference in participation between male and female

respondents is also related to the modes of participation. Specifically,
we can observe that the greatest differences in participation rates
among the respondents appear in the participation in election (12
points difference) and in signing a petition (16 points difference). The
fact that women engaged less with institutionalized mechanisms for
participation may be related to the increased difficulty for women to
participate in the institutional political game, perhaps due to societal
issues which render women’s access to politics “constantly blocked by
35
ideological, cultural, economic and social factors.”
The existence of a quota system for women and youth was known
only to 13% of the respondents to MIPA’s survey, and the large majority
of the respondents who knew about the quota system came from urban
35 Moha Ennaji, ‘Multiculturalism, Gender and Political Participa-

tion in Morocco’, Diogenes, 57.1 (2010), 46–57 (p. 50), <https://doi.
o r g / 1 0 . 1 17 7 / 0 3 9 2 19 2 1 1 0 3 74 2 4 7 > .
92
municipalities (95% against 13%). The quota system has also been
thoroughly discussed in the interviews and in the focus groups, which
were generally supportive of this system – whether they already knew
about it or they were introduced to the concept during the interview.
“If there is no mechanism to force change and integrate women and

youth, parliament will be exclusively for older men”36
However, such support was diversified. Some interviewees expressed

more trust in the youth rather than in women, claiming that women
may be focused only on women’s rights issues, while the youth
is deemed to have a more creative and inclusive vision of change
that allows them to transcend classic politics. The interviewees that
favored women over youth justified their perspective on the basis of
assumption that women work more than man in general. In parallel,
the quota system was criticized for two main reasons. On one hand, a
group of critics claimed that efficiency and integrity should be the two
criteria that grant access to the Parliament, and that they should not
be overlooked only because of a person’s age or gender. On the other
hand, the quota system has sometimes been identified as “restrictive”,
in the sense that it is considered as a limitation to the representation
of women and youth in politics instead of a tool to promote their
representation. In one of the focus groups, the quota system has been
criticized on the basis that it should only be a temporary mechanism to
stimulate a dynamic of inclusion of women and youth and that it should
be removed once the presence of these categories in the Parliament
was established. To conclude, we can recall that even if the participation
of women in formal politics due to the quota system helped raising
awareness on the importance of their inclusion in the political arena,
“this gendered distribution of tasks and spaces clearly reproduces
gendered representations that highlight men’s capacity to act in the
name of all citizens while denying women’s ability to do so.”37
36 Interview with Y., Businesswoman, Casablanca, October 2019.
37 Yasmine Berriane, ‘The Micropolitics of Reform: Gender Quota, Grassroots As-
sociations and the Renewal of Local Elites in Morocco’, The Journal of North
African Studies, 20.3 (2015), 432–49 (p. 445), <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629
387.2015.1017815>.
93
Finally, the distribution between participation in rural and urban

municipalities also draws a stark picture of Morocco’s reality.
Graph 37: Rural-urban differences for people who answered “yes” to the
question: have you ever participated in one of these?
90
76,3%
Urban
73,6%
73,8%
89,0%
86,5%
80 Rural
65,6%
70
60
50
27,4%
26,4%
40
26,2%
23,7%
30
13,5%
11,0%
20
10
0
Enormous differences have been noted between the modes and

levels of participation of respondents depending on whether they came
from a rural or urban municipality. The most significant differences
have been found in online activism (78 points of difference) and in the
engagement with petitionary initiatives (73 points of difference). If the
former may be due to the lack of access to the infrastructure and the
resources needed to engage in online activism, the non-participation
in petitions may be related either to a limited resort to petitions in
rural municipalities, or to the lack of knowledge of this mechanism.
Nevertheless, the profound disengagement of rural municipalities
should be urgently tackled with actions to close this substantial divide.
Corruption and political trust
Throughout the analysis of different political institutions, we have

seen that corruption often represent a key variable in determining the
trust – or lack thereof – in a political institution. Corruption is a pervasive
94
issue in the eyes of Moroccans, and indeed 88% of respondents said that
it is either prevalent or highly prevalent in the country. This prompts the
need to develop some further considerations on the data on corruption
that has been collected during this research.
Graph38: Perception of corruption depending on the age
100
Highly prevalent
Prevalent
Not prevalent
80
52,56% 44,38% 43,80%
Not prevalent at all
62,93%
60
40
39,64% 37,96%
37,67%
20 31,97%
13,02% 15,69%
8,84%
4,42% 0,93% 2,96% 2,55%
0 0,68%
18-29 30-39 40-49 50+
The perception of corruption in Morocco varies with age. Our research

showed that the Moroccan youth believe that there is more corruption
in comparison with the older segments of the respondents – reaching
a troubling 95% among the respondents aged 18-29 and a lower, but
still worrying, 82% among the respondents aged over 50. Albeit being
unsettling, these observations are in line with other survey data on
corruption in Morocco. For instance, the 2019 Arab Barometer Survey
on Morocco also reports high levels of perception of corruption and a
similar generational divide.38
In addition to the overall very high perception of corruption,

respondents to MIPA’s survey do not believe that the government
is taking serious steps to crack down corruption. Specifically, 80%
of respondents are not satisfied with government actions against
corruption – and of these respondents the majority (45%) is not
satisfied at all. It is worth noticing that the segment of the respondents
38 Arab Barometer, Arab Barometer V - Morocco Country Report, 2019. Op cit.
95
who are most satisfied with government’s efforts to tackle corruption is

the one with no formal education.
Graph39: Satisfaction with Government’s efforts to fight corruption
depending on the level of education
0,79% 2,03% 0,00% 1,05% 0,00%
100
Satisfied to a large extent
8,41%
15,75% 14,98% 18,95% 15,39%
Satisfied somehow
Not satisfied
80
26,05% 43,95%
Not satisfied at all
38,46%
38,58% 34,41% 31,58%
60
29,41%
40
36,94%
44,88% 48,58% 48,42% 46,15%

20
36,13%
19,11%
0
No formal education Primary education High School University level Masters Doctoral level or above
Since the respondents’ perception of corruption varied between 85%

and 92%, this information does not seem necessarily related to a lack
of awareness of the issue of corruption. However, a difference of 15
points with all the other segments may indicate a lack of awareness of
what can be done to fight corruption.
Finally, we will look at the way in which corruption has an impact on

voting behavior.
96
Graph40: Participation in last election depending on the perception

of corruption
100
Highly prevalent
Prevalent
Not prevalent
80
48,90% 53,56% Not prevalent at all
60
40
39,78% 34,24%
20
10,50% 10,00%
0,82% 2,20%
0
Yes No
Graph41: Intention to vote in next election depending on the perception

of corruption
100
Highly prevalent
Prevalent
Not prevalent
80
44,21% 43,60% Not prevalent at all
64,54%
60
40
43,68% 42,18%
25,21%
20
11,32% 11,85%
8,03%
0,79% 2,22% 2,37%
0
Yes No No opinion
From the data collected by MIPA it became clear that corruption

not only affects the way people vote, but has an even greater impact
on future voting intentions. As anticipated above, this implies that
concrete action to tackle corruption could substantially increase voter
turnout.
97
Conclusion
The most evident consideration on political trust is that non-elected

institutions are more trusted than elected ones. This may be due to
different elements, like the fact that some non-elected institutions are
trusted by respondents because it seems that they do not have another
choice, or the fact that some institutions manage to maintain an overall
positive image despite some negative behaviours of their agents. It
may also be possible that elected institutions entered a vicious circle
in which the decline in trust worsens their effectiveness, which in turn
further deteriorates the levels of trust in them.
For each institution, we outlined the differences in how trust was

allocated in terms of gender. The differences specific to each institution
have been limited, as the trust was distributed quite evenly amongst
genders varying only of few points. However, the small and constant
higher level of female respondents’ trust in political institutions may
indicate an interesting insight for future analyses. Women are generally
less represented by such institutions, and the apparent paradox of their
increased trust definitely deserves more research. Discussions over the
quota system, and particularly the ones around systemic limitations
of women’s role in Moroccan politics, may serve as a first direction
for future research on the topic. Nonetheless, the gender divide in
the strategies of political participation calls for more attention to the
reasons why women tend to resort less to institutional mechanisms
rather than informal ones.
A clear element is that inequalities in income influence levels of trust

substantially. In almost all the institutions that have been surveyed, the
wealthiest categories of Moroccan society demonstrated higher levels
of trust. The only differences can be found in the service providers,
as the respondents with higher income showed a great distrust of
public institutions, in favour of an exclusive trust for the private sector.
Relying on the possibility of accessing the private sector granted by
their income, the wealthiest segments of Moroccan society are aware
of the declining quality of public service providers and this has been
98
proven by the lowest levels of trust. Always in the realm of service

providers, the respondents with a middle range income often showed
a lower level of trust and that has been attributed to the fact that their
expectations for the quality of private services is betrayed by the fact
that their income does not allow them to access the best services.
Specifically, the segment of respondents with an average household
income between 8.001 and 15.000 dirhams scored the least levels of
trust in all the surveyed political institutions. The great distrust that
Morocco’s middle-class shows for its political institutions calls for
greater attention to the underlying causes of this distrust. This shows
that income inequalities are a determining influence of trust between,
but also within, private and public sector. Access to education and
healthcare is broadly considered a privilege rather than a right.
Corruption is, unfortunately, a keyword when discussing political

institutions. It is troubling that practices of corruption, in different
forms, have been noted by the respondents in all the surveyed
institutions. Corruption has a direct effect on trust, undermining the
relationship between citizens and institutions. However, such relation
has been stronger in elected rather than in non-elected institutions. In
non-elected institutions, and especially in police forces and the justice
system, corrupted behaviours of agents had a limited impact on the
institution as a whole – to which trust has often been understood as an
obligation. Differently, in elected institutions, corruption is perceived as
a pervasive element that undeniably affects the quality of all agents
within them. For instance, positive behaviours by a party (or any of its
members) are understood as exceptions rather than a rule, and they
hardly entail an improvement of the overall perception of corruption
within the institution of political parties. Due to the recognized
importance of public administration in providing essential services to
citizens, corruption in these institutions is a key issue to be tackled in
order to raise trust in them.
In the next chapter, we will complement the analysis of political

institutions with a thematic in-depth analysis of the trust in the
Parliament.
99
Chapter III : Trust in Parliament
Results snapshot:
- The Parliament is perceived as a rent-based institution. This

perception is nurtured by both the privileges that benefit
MPs while serving their mandate and by the entitlements for
their retirement, outstandingly eroding trust in Parliament.
- Trust in Parliament is positively correlated with the level of
knowledge of its prerogatives, even if some respondents
remain wary of trusting the Parliament due to the low levels
of education of some MPs. This implies that the more people
know the role of the Parliament, the more they are likely to
trust it.
- The inadequate performance in the sectors of healthcare
and education are the central elements that nurture the
perception of the Parliament as a non-functioning institution.
- The absence of tangible evidence to judge the performance
of MPs, together with the lack of responsive instruments to
hold them accountable, are pivotal reasons for increasing the
distance between citizens and the Parliament.
- Communication activities limited to electoral campaigns
play a significant role in deteriorating the trust in MPs and
the Parliament, while social media principally disseminates
detrimental information that further increases distrust.
- MPs admit the negative perceptions of the parliament, but
they interpret the latter’s weakness as a result of the non-
cooperation of the government, the lack of appropriate
human and financial resources available to them and the
negative ‘buzz’ on social media.
101
Introduction
This section of the report comprehensively discusses the particular

features of the trust – and the distrust – of Moroccans in an institution
which is central for the functioning of the democratic life of a country:
The Parliament. The choice to target the Parliament in particular is
due to multiple considerations, related to the institution itself and to
the way in which it is situated in the political system in Morocco. In
theory, the Parliament is a fundamental representative institution in a
country: Members of Parliament (MPs) are elected by citizens in order
to represent them and voice their grievances at the legislative level. The
fact that individuals believe that they are represented in the Parliament
is positively correlated with their trust in the institutions,39 and thus low
levels of confidence may be related to the fact that citizens do not feel
that they have a voice in the political life of the country.
When looking at the case of Morocco, the Parliament has been one
of the least trusted institutions – both in the qualitative exploration
and the quantitative survey. It is perceived as a non-functioning
institution, in which MPs do not have a clear agenda and cannot be held
accountable by the citizenry. In order to assess the multiple reasons
39 Kris Dunn, ‘Voice, Representation and Trust in Parliament’, Acta Politica, 50.2
(2015), 171–92 <https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2014.15>.voice is provided to the
citizenry via political representation. In this article, I apply the procedural jus-
tice argument to trust in parliament, equating representation with voice: if
individuals believe they are represented in parliament, they will trust par-
liament more than if they believe otherwise. Analyses of data from three of
four countries find support for this argument: those individuals who believe
that a party with at least one seat in parliament represents their views trust
parliament more than those who do not. This relationship holds even when
accounting for political self-interest. For those who wish to promote trust in
parliament, a suggested normative good with a host of politically import-
ant consequences, one potential pathway is to facilitate individuals’ belief
that there is a party in parliament that represents them.»,»author»:[{«-
dropping-particle»:»»,»family»:»Dunn»,»given»:»Kris»,»non-dropping-par-
ticle»:»»,»parse-names»:false,»suffix»:»»}],»container-title»:»Acta Politi-
ca»,»id»:»ITEM-1»,»issue»:»2»,»issued»:{«date-parts»:[[«2015»]]},»page»:»1
71-192»,»title»:»Voice, representation and trust in parliament»,»type»:»ar-
ticle-journal»,»volume»:»50»},»uris»:[«http://www.mendeley.com/docu-
ments/?uuid=679dbefb-90d0-47d9-9889-2c5a07e53687»]}],»mende-
ley»:{«formattedCitation»:»Kris Dunn, ‘Voice, Representation and Trust in
Parliament’, Acta Politica, 50.2 (2015
102
that ground such low levels of trust, we will rely on four categories:
trustworthiness, capability, performance and communication. These
analytical categories guided our exploration of the data collected
during the research, serving as a pathway to study the allocation and
withdrawal of trust in the Parliament.
Furthermore, two sub-themes have emerged from our analysis. On

one hand, the lack of civic education, specifically the lack of knowledge
of the actual role of the parliament and the scope of its work that has
been identified as a major reason for the distrust in the Parliament.
On the other, despite the short surge in trust in early 2011, there is an
increasing suspicion towards the Parliament in the recent years. This
is attributed to the unfulfilled promises by the political class, including
the Justice and Development Party, as several citizens expressed the
feeling of having been betrayed by the non-delivery of promises made
during electoral campaigns.
The chart below shows some major concerns about the Moroccan
Parliament, which have been translated into particularly low levels of
trust.
Graph42: Trust in Parliament depending on age
100
6,03% 10,00% 11,80% 10,81%
I trust completely
I trust somehow
80
29,50% 30,43% 25,48% I don't trust at all
60
28,37%
25,48%
24,50%
27,33%
40
20 41,13% 36,00% 38,22%

30,43%
0
18-29 30-39 40-49 50+
103
Graph43: Trust in Parliament depending on gender
100
10,64% 7,98% I trust completely
I trust somehow
I don't trust
80 26,16%
60
27,05%
25,94%
40
20 38,80%
35,70%
0
Female Male
The distribution of trust in Parliament by different age groups

already provides interesting insights. Mainly, the main result is that two
thirds of the surveyed population do not trust the Parliament (64%
either do not somehow or completely trust the Parliament). If it is quite
low on average, there are some differences in the trust in Parliament
between the ages. Similarly, to the considerations regarding political
parties, youth seem to trust Parliament the least. Indeed, only 31% of
respondents to MIPA’s survey aged between 18-29 said they trust the
Parliament. This result is in line with the general lack of interest and
participation in elections showed by this segment of Moroccan society.
Older generations tend to participate more in elections, but their levels
of trust in the Parliament also differ. The respondents aged between
30-49 trust the Parliament the most, reaching 40% of trust for the
segment 30-39 and 42% of trust for the segment 40-49.
One can also note that women trust the Parliament more than men,
with 38% of female respondents who trust it against 34% of male
respondents. Since women are less represented in the Parliament
compared to men, this may come as a surprise worth exploring in
further research.
104
In the next sections, we will see in detail how each component

contributed to such negative result, and we will draw some lessons
that could open pathways for the rebuilding of trust in the Parliament.
Our results will be presented following the four components that
define political trust in an institution: trustworthiness, capabilities,
performance and communication; for each component we will explore
in-depth some crucial factors that emerged from the qualitative and
quantitative research and are determining in influencing the trust in
the Parliament.
Trustworthiness
In the next paragraphs, we will explore in detail some of the main

issues that impact Moroccans’ trustworthiness towards the MPs.
Specifically, we will focus on the issues of MPs privileges (retirement
and salaries), as well as the perception of the scope of the function and
powers of the Parliament.
Trustworthiness is derived from knowledge of the trustee’s motivation.

In the case of the Parliament, it represents the trust that citizens
have in MPs to carry out their functions. In terms of trustworthiness,
Moroccans surveyed displayed numerous reservations about the
Moroccan Parliament. Predominantly, respondents feel that MPs are
either self-interested or driven by the interest of their party. Lack of
trustworthiness was described as a reflection of the unwillingness to
trust MPs, since respondents have the impression that most of them
have neither specifically tailored programs nor an ideological reference
that they seek to implement within their circumscription. In turn, this
reduces the possibilities of holding them accountable for their negative
or absent performance – ultimately eroding trust.
Most interviewed citizens feel that parliamentarians are running for

office to gain personal benefits, and not to represent and serve the
interest of the people they are deemed to represent. The reason for this
negative perception has been identified in the recurrent failure of MPs
105
to uphold promises made during electoral campaigns, as well as their

presence only during the electoral campaigns and their disappearance
after the election. Therefore, causing the citizens to feel that they are
heard only during the electoral campaign, which further exacerbates
the already low levels of trust that citizens have for their MPs. Such loss
of credibility is reinforced by the behavior of MPs during parliamentary
sessions, where they often appear to be negligent and, in some extreme
cases, some of them were seen sleeping during the sessions. This does
not only impact the trust in the single politician, but also the credibility
of the whole Parliament as an institution.
Another element is that citizens expect MPs to promote their welfare.

So, the perceived absence of changes to the livelihoods of the citizens
reinforces the idea that MPs do not deliver on the promises made during
the electoral campaigns. In fact, some MPs contribute to this image, as
during the campaign they make promises that cannot be fulfilled, which
in turn makes citizens suspicious about the MPs. The respondents felt
that MPs rely on slogans and rhetorical messages without being able
to provide the evidence to prove neither their claims nor the supposed
changes they brought to communities. This kind of communication
in particular is perceived to target directly least-educated voters, who
are especially exposed to the practice of exchanging their votes for a
financial reward. Indeed, interviewees often felt that MPs did not value
citizens, seeing people as mere voters rather than people with needs
and aspirations. Furthermore, the lack of trust is deteriorated by the
fact that respondents feel that the electoral programs and political
agendas of MPs are obscure, poorly articulated, and often voided of any
substance.
In some cases, the distrust in the Parliament may be rooted even

deeper. One of the interviewees stated that MPs could not be trusted
even if they had seen their work directly.40 Such distrust is so profound
that it seems that it cannot be ameliorated even after a positive
performance. In this scenario, the limited political participation, and a
low voter turnout in particular, are both the cause and the result of the
106
lack of trust in the Parliament. The distrust for whoever is in power is

nurtured by the feeling that the MPs are not making relevant changes
for the average voter. Ultimately, this contributes to the vicious circle in
which citizens who did not vote because they distrust the Parliament
will not change their mind, and their unwillingness to vote will be further
reinforced, due to the perceived poor performance of the Parliament.
Nonetheless, when trust is given to MPs, respondents reported that

they trust a specific individual and not an entire party or the institution
itself. When citizens vote for a party during the elections, it may be more
related to the trust that they have for a candidate, for his or her values
and perceived selflessness, rather than the trust for the party as a whole.
This validates the assumption that the trust (and distrust) in political
parties is strictly correlated with the levels of trust in the Parliament.
Furthermore, some of the interviewees said that they can trust the MPs
but not the Parliament as an institution, given its history of inefficiency
and of political irrelevance in the political system in Morocco.
The trustworthiness of MPs is not only affected by their behavior

prior to the election or by their performance in Parliament, but also by
the benefits to which they are entitled during and after their mandate.
A number of interviewees felt that the salaries of MPs are too high and
not in line with the country’s financial capacity. In fact, the monthly
salary of a member of parliament is around 36000 MAD (around 3300
Euro) and its tax exempt, together with additional benefits, such as
per diems or travel expenses and they can use the train for free. These
benefits are justified as factors that decrease trust because citizens
see that this remuneration is quite excessive and that their role should
be carried out as a civic duty and thus not paid as much. The perception
of an excessive remuneration reinforces the idea that individuals are
running for seats in Parliament predominantly because they want
to ensure a good salary. However, it is the benefits to which MPs are
entitled at the end of their mandate that represent the main causes
for lack of trustworthiness. There is a widespread perception that being
a member of parliament is a rent-based occupation, which is sought
by individuals not to serve the community, but rather to enjoy the
107
benefits that come with this position – especially after the end of their
mandate.
Indeed, the topic of retirement is recurrent when discussing trust

in the Parliament, seemingly being the most pressing issue after the
improvement of the performance of the healthcare and education
sector. Indeed, almost all of the interviewees showed that this perception
of the retirement prospects of MPs was a major reason for the distrust
in the Parliament. Until recently, MPs were entitled to a retirement
pension after they finish their term. It was based on the number of
years served in parliament. For instance, a 25-year-old MP can get a
5000 MAD pension right after she/he finished the term and not until
she/he reached 60 years old. This situation has been changed recently
because of pressure emanating from the public who heavily criticized
this retirement fund but also because the parliament retirement fund
was bankrupted as the state could no longer sustain it.
Despite this, it seems that the lack of communication on the side of

MPs has created a lot of misconceptions among citizens and damaged
the image of the parliament. If the MPs communicated better and took
concrete actions to end the rent-based retirement and salaries, levels
of trust in Parliament could significantly improve: respondents reported
that working to shift their perception of the Parliament as being a rent-
based institution, as well as making an adjustment of MPs’ privileges
namely salaries and pension, would significantly increase their trust in
the Parliament.
Capabilities
There is a direct link between capabilities and trust, as the level of

trust in the Parliament is related to MPs’ perceived capability to cover
their roles and carry out their functions.
First and foremost, comprehensive civic education about the

Parliament as a democratic institution was quite limited amongst the
participants of MIPA’s study. Indeed, in terms of capabilities or roles,
108
most respondents were overall confused as to what is the actual role

of the Parliament and the MPs. This confusion related to both the
prerogatives of the Parliament in respect to the ones of municipalities,
and to the different roles of the two Chambers of the Parliament.
Another important element was the absolute lack of knowledge of the
roles and functions of parliamentary committees – which do cover a
crucial role within the Parliament. Finally, respondents felt that the low
levels of education of some MPs substantially affected their capability
to engage in their functions.
Nonetheless, if participants were quite disenchanted in terms of

the capabilities of the Parliament, they also demonstrated a solid
understanding of the relationship – that we could refer to as the social
contract – that bounds the Parliament to its citizenry. In the following
sections, we will provide more details in relation to the way in which
the lack of awareness of the capabilities of the Parliament and the MPs
affect trust in the institution overall.
Roles and capabilities of the Parliament
In respect to the role and capabilities of the Parliament as a whole,

a number of respondents brought forward the Parliament as the
legitimate source for solutions to public issues. They felt that the
Parliament was the only organ of the state which was actually capable
of bringing into being positive changes and solutions to citizens’
problems – due to the fact that it is the direct result of elections.
However, the difference between the various institutions within

the Moroccan political system caused confusion. For instance, the
composition of the Parliament was quite unclear for some of the
respondents, who thought that the presidents of the municipalities and
the ministries were also part of the Parliament. Such confusion related
also to the two Chambers of the Parliament, as some respondents
thought that the House of Representatives and the Parliament were
two different institutions. Plus, the different roles of the two chambers
109
were not understood, people either considered both of them advisory

bodies, or that the House of Councilors proposes the laws and the House
of Representatives either accepts or refuses those suggestions. Among
all of the interviewees, only two said that the Parliament was a legislator
and it was mentioned – rightfully, but only in one case – as having
power over the government and the capacity to hold it accountable.
Moreover, there appears to be a correlation between realizing the role

of the Parliament and the trust allocated to it. Among the respondents
of MIPA’s survey, there was a substantial difference (16 points) in the
levels of trust between those who know the role of the Parliament and
the ones who do not, as showed by the graph below.
Graph44: Knowledge about the role of the Parliament and trust in it
100
I trust completely
9,50% 9,07%
I trust somehow
80
60 24,43%
28,12%
40
48,11%
20
28,71%
0
Yes No
Indeed, the central mission of the Parliament was the object of a series
of misunderstandings. Some respondents thought that the Parliament
had the sole purpose of fixing housing, education and the healthcare
sector, whereas some others thought that the Parliament had the
objective of “protecting” the nation from illegal migration. Interestingly,
another part of the respondents thought that the role of the Parliament
is to defend the national interest of the country, including the protection
of minorities and all social groups, and to create a better future nation-
110
wide. These overlapping conceptions of the Parliament within the State

created confusion and hindered a proper comprehension of whether
the Parliament was actually carrying out its functions.
Another misconception that deteriorates the trust in the Parliament

is the idea that it does not possess the means to implement policies
and develop solutions to popular issues. Respondents perceive it as
an essentially weak and thus useless institution precisely due to their
apparent lack of enforcement mechanisms.
As discussed above, people’s knowledge of the Parliament was

often limited to MPs’ role as representatives of the citizenry, with the
mission of voicing their concerns and speaking on their behalf. In the
discussions, people often referred to MPs’ duty as the “power” to talk
about people’s issues. However, the roles of the MPs and the presidents
of the municipalities were often confused, and sometimes even
assimilated as the same role.
Furthermore, the interviewees had a broad understanding of the

role of the MP, which went beyond the representative function and saw
them as mediators. Specifically, they are the ones that are supposed
to “deliver the message” (i.e.: present people’s claims) to the highest
spheres of the State. In this scenario, the lack of trust comes from the
fact that MPs do not manage to present people’s claims in a proper
fashion – if they manage to do so at all. Sometimes, they are seen to
pursue a “strategic plan” that does not go beyond the Parliament’s
walls, while some other times it seems that their role is limited to being
members of a party who only serve their interests.
Social contract and institutional limitations
When asked what the role of the Parliament is, most interviewees
answered by referring to the representative role of MPs, saying that the
Parliament is the place in which citizens’ concerns are discussed and
solutions to their issues are found. The majority of the interviewees felt
that the Parliament is the only really representative institution. However,
111
in very few instances the interviewees mentioned in concrete the actual

functions that the Parliament is supposed to carry out (for instance,
to legislate, to follow-up on public policies, to develop parliamentary
diplomacy). The data from the qualitative research indicated that,
generally, people are aware of the social contract of the Parliament but
are less familiar with its actual legal prerogatives. In other words, the
respondents demonstrated a very democratic conception of the social
and legal relation that binds them to the Parliament, while being less
aware of the concrete actions of the institution.
The fact that the social contract binding citizens and Parliament is
known, but that the way in which it operates was not, may contribute
to the idea that the general understanding of the Parliament that
Moroccans have is not due to the observation of the work of the MPs
in Morocco, but rather to the fact that Moroccans know that in other
countries the Parliament performs such duties. Even if in some cases
the interviewees affirmed that they trusted a specific MP because they
saw the direct and concrete exercise of their functions (for example,
bringing forward issues that concern them on television or in the
plenary session), however, these cases remain only an exception.
Overall, citizens have a better idea of the social contract that binds
the Parliament to represent them instead of performing its actual
duties, functions and prerogatives. As the respondents could not
observe whether the Parliament is in the position to properly cover its
role and execute its functions, the trust in it as an institution has been
further eroded.
Indeed, different interviewees pointed out that the lack of power as

a factor contributing to the distrust in Parliament. Such lack of trust is
due to the perception that decisions are taken at higher levels of the
Government, or even by the Monarchy, and thus the Parliament was
devoid of any real power. Starting from this perspective, interviewees
felt that they were unable to trust an institution that lacked the means
to make a tangible and effective change – a power often seen as
exclusive to the Monarchy.
112
“Parliamentarians do nothing unless the King pressures them. They

simply wait for their mandate to end and their salary to be cashed in.”41
Indeed, the important influence that the monarchy has on the

Parliament was largely recognized by the respondents and the issues
and legislative proposals that received the Monarch’s attention are the
absolute priority. Furthermore, some of the interviewees felt that it is
the King that enables an efficient Parliament, reaching the point that
sometimes MPs await the King’s blessing to take action.
Education
One of the reasons that contributes to the citizens’ distrust in

the Parliament is the perceived low level of education (sometimes
seemingly close to illiteracy) of some MPs. Citizens believe that they
should not be represented by people who do not have an adequate
education, who lack expertise, and therefore are not fit to govern the
country or to discuss issues relevant to the citizenry. This perception is
based on the fact that around 25% of MPs do not possess a high school
diploma and 7% did not complete primary education.42 Once again,
the distrust in some MPs due to the low levels of education is directly
translated into lower levels of trust for the Parliament as an institution.
These considerations do not imply that no member of the Parliament

has the tools to represent the citizens. However, they demonstrate
that the MPs who are educated and have the means to represent
the citizenry through legislative work either lack the possibility to
present policy or recommendations or they do not have the ability to
effectively communicate their work. This implies that better visibility
of parliamentary work would considerably improve trust in Parliament.
41 Interview with M., Accountant, Casablanca, October 2019

42 Mohammed Boudarham and Youssef El Harrak, ‘Infographies. Ces Parlem-
entaires Qui n’ont (Même) Pas Le Bac’, Le360.Ma, 2019, <https://fr.le360.ma/
politique/infographies-ces-parlementaires-qui-nont-meme-pas-le-
bac-197017> [accessed 15 June 2020].
113
We have observed how the confusion and lack of awareness of the

overall capabilities of both the MPs and the Parliament as an institution,
combined with low levels of education of MPs, remarkably influence
citizens’ in the Parliament. On top of the capabilities, it is through an
appreciation of the actual performances of the Parliament (and of the
MPs) that citizens will decide whether to trust the Parliament or not. The
plural dynamics interrelating performance and trust will be explored in
the next section.
Performance
The section of the performance is particularly relevant for MIPA’s study

of trust in the Parliament, since the distrust that Moroccans showed
towards the Parliament largely emanated from the perception of a
negative performance, or even a non-performance, of the Parliament.
Generally speaking, we can see that there is a negative correlation
between the levels of trust in the Parliament and the satisfaction with
the country’s direction, as showed by the graph below:
Graph45: Satisfaction with the direction of the country and trust
in Parliament
100 2,12%

80
19,49% 27,72%
40,74%
60
32,64%
40 53,03%
68,64%
24,34%
20
32,90%
12,12%
18,52%
3,03%
0
Not satisfied at all Not satisfied Satisfied somehowSatisfied at a large extent
114
More concretely, the first reaction of interviewees when asked if the

Parliament was trusted was constantly related to their perception of the
performance of the healthcare and education sectors. The dedicated
section above already explained how these two sectors are crucial to
determine the trust of Moroccans in political institutions. Moreover, the
overwhelming majority of respondents said that the improvement of
both the healthcare and education sectors should be the two most
prioritized sectors for policy action in the next 10 years. The failures
to systematically improve these areas are seen as a reflection of the
fact that people’s demands are not being met by the work done in the
Parliament. The performance of these two sectors served as a sort
of barometer of the performance of the Parliament, as if it was the
sole responsible institution for the decay or the improvement of the
healthcare and education sectors.
On top of these two main indicators, healthcare and education, the

performance of the Parliament was also judged because of the overall
quality of the economy, the lack of job opportunities, the increasing
inequalities in the access of public services.
Graph46: Satisfaction with the current economic situation of the country
and trust in Parliament

4,74% 9,91%
I trust somehow
15,17% 27,15%
80

39,29%
60
38,57%
32,04%
40
77,73%
31,75%
22,14%
20
34,86%
19,05%
12,14%
0
115
The assumption that the satisfaction of the current economic

situation impacts the trust in the Parliament is also sustained by the
graph above. Specifically, among the respondents that are not satisfied
at all with the situation, only 7% trust the parliament. Contrarily, among
the respondents with a more positive perception of the economic
situation we find higher levels of trust, reaching 66% of the respondents
that are broadly satisfied with the economic situation. In addition to this,
the 2019 Arab Barometer noted that only 30% of Moroccans expect the
economic situation to improve in the future, which represents a dramatic
inversion of previous years’ trends of hope for the economy.43 It is also
important to report that, perhaps unsurprisingly, the respondents with
the highest household income were substantially more satisfied with
the current economic situation compared to the respondents with the
lowest level of income. The fact that 55% of the respondents with an
income above 30.000 MAD were satisfied with the current economic
situation, compared to only 38% of those with an income below 3.000
MAD points out the attention to the relation between the household
income and the trust in the Parliament. Indeed, the graph showing this
relation also provides elements for reflection:
Graph47: Trust in Parliament depending on average monthly
household income
100
10,51% 8,00% 8,27% 9,53% 12,70%
I trust completely
I trust somehow
I don't trust
80 22,37% 24,00%
39,68% 33,33%
60
23,39% 27,11%
29,32%
40
28,57% 34,92%
20
43,73% 40,89%
30,83%
22,22% 19,05%
0
43 Arab Barometer. Op Cit.
116
The quantitative data collected by MIPA shows that there are

important differences between the different levels of income and the
levels of trust in the Parliament. Thus, this corroborates the idea that
in Morocco the actual levels of trust are more related to the financial
situation of every household – as it has been showed in similar studies
on trust elsewhere.44 Only between 32% and 33% of the respondents
44 Tom van der Meer, ‘In What We Trust? A Multi-Level Study into Trust
in Parliament as an Evaluation of State Characteristics’, Internation-
al Review of Administrative Sciences, 76.3 (2010), 517–36 <https://doi.
org/10.1177/0020852310372450>.scholars and politicians have been con-
cerned with low or declining levels of trust in political institutions. This arti-
cle focuses on trust in parliament. Many theories have been offered to ex-
plain cross-national differences or longitudinal changes in trust, but they
have not been subject to systematic empirical tests. This article aims to fill
that theoretical and empirical gap. I conceptualize trust in parliament as cit-
izens? rather rational evaluations of the state?citizen relationship along four
dimensions: competence, intrinsic care, accountability, and reliability. Next, I
relate state characteristics to each of these four aspects, and hypothesize
how they might affect political trust. These hypotheses are tested simul-
taneously by multi-level analysis on stapled data from the European So-
cial Survey 2002?06. The tests show that three factors explain very well the
cross-national differences in trust: corruption, the electoral system, and
former regime type. Somewhat surprisingly, economic performance is not
related to trust in parliament. Although the analyses do not explain chang-
es in trust across time very well, they at least dismiss some of the exist-
ing explanations.Points for practitionersThis article describes to what ex-
tent levels of trust in parliament differ across countries and change across
time, and tests several explanations for comparatively low or longitudinal-
ly declining levels of trust. It offers practitioners a theoretical approach to
make sense of trust issues by distinguishing four trust aspects. Moreover, it
shows that objective state characteristics are crucial in explaining cross-na-
tional differences. Widespread perceptions of corruption are most harm-
ful to trust in parliament, while democratic rule and a proportional elector-
al system are beneficial. Equally important, actual economic performance
is unrelated to trust. Institutional designs that emphasize care and integ-
rity appear to be more beneficial than ones that emphasize competence
and performance.»,»author»:[{«dropping-particle»:»»,»family»:»Meer»,»-
given»:»Tom»,»non-dropping-particle»:»van der»,»parse-names»:false,»-
suffix»:»»}],»container-title»:»International Review of Administrative Sci-
ences»,»id»:»ITEM-1»,»issue»:»3»,»issued»:{«date-parts»:[[«2010»,»9»,»1»
]]},»note»:»doi: 10.1177/0020852310372450»,»page»:»517-536»,»publish-
er»:»SAGE Publications Ltd»,»title»:»In what we trust? A multi-level study
into trust in parliament as an evaluation of state characteristics»,»type»:»ar-
ticle-journal»,»volume»:»76»},»uris»:[«http://www.mendeley.com/documen
ts/?uuid=69330073-820e-46ad-9dfe-d7fb0ad21c27»]}],»mendeley»:{«-
formattedCitation»:»Tom van der Meer, ‘In What We Trust? A Multi-Lev-
el Study into Trust in Parliament as an Evaluation of State Characteristics’,
International Review of Administrative Sciences, 76.3 (2010
117
with a monthly income up to 8,000 dirhams trust the Parliament,

compared to 49% of the respondents with a monthly income between
15,001 and 30,000 dirhams, and 46% of the respondents with a monthly
income above 30,000 dirhams that trust the Parliament. Even if the
overall state of the economy is used as an indicator to decide whether
to trust the Parliament or not, the strong income inequalities still affect
concretely the levels of trust in the Parliament.
As reported in the previous section, the trust in Morocco’s Parliament

is being deteriorated by its perceived lack of potential to bring about
change. The majority of the interviewees made it clear that they would
trust the parliament if it could be effective in carrying out its duties,
but unfortunately that is not the case. Five of them reached the point
of affirming that the Parliament was an overall useless institution. The
general perception is that even if complaints are made, things do not
change through the work of the Parliament. For instance, even when
MPs do present their queries to the relevant ministers, respondents felt
that parliamentary interrogations are not taken into consideration by
ministries. This was due to both the short period of time allocated to
present parliamentary questions, and the lack of transparency in the
follow-up of a question raised by a MP. This example proves the fact
that even if citizens might manage to voice their concerns through the
questions asked by MPs, they do not have the tools to follow-up on
the procedure, actions and even less on the concrete policy solutions
that may (or may not) have been taken to address the issue at stake.
Moreover, citizens’ lack of knowledge of the MPs performance was
also strictly related to the fact that the information to measure MPs’
performance are extremely scarce, and often inexistent. This sort of
opaqueness, coupled with inadequate performances, increases distrust
in the effectiveness of the institution.
In the next paragraphs, we will explore in detail some of the main

issues that impact the perceived performance of the Parliament and
their relationship with increased or decreased trust in this institution.
Specifically, we will look at the confusion of roles (of both the MPs and
118
the two Chambers), the lack of means to assess their performance, and
accountability issues.
Confusion of roles
As highlighted in the section on capabilities, Moroccans tend to

confuse the roles of the various institutions and of their members.
Moreover, the understanding of the role of the MPs has been identified
as a major factor that affects the way in which citizens measure their
performance. Sometimes, interviewees felt that they could not judge
the performance of a MP because they did not know what an MP is
supposed to do. Some other interviewees thought that Ministers were
part of the Parliament, since they are part of televised debates and sit
in the chamber during the plenary session. Further, the majority of the
interviewees thought that the MPs were supposed to deal with issues
that actually belong to the competencies of the municipalities (for
instance, fixing roads, electrification and dealing with insects and/or
animals).
The lack of action to resolve proximity issues further deteriorated

the perceived performance of MPs as interviewees felt that, when local
problems are solved, it is thanks to the work of the municipality. Overall,
most citizens felt that the municipality (and its president) were closer to
people’s needs, more reachable and more effective in carrying out their
functions. Similarly, local administrations (the mouqataa and mqadem
in particular) were given the same attributes, as being closer and more
in line with what people need or want, and more effective in serving
citizens in general. The simple idea that the municipality is a building
that people could access, in order to voice their concerns, and even offer
them the possibility of meeting and talking to the president of the
municipality, substantially contributed to the trust in municipalities.
Another central finding of this study is that respondents did not have
a clear understanding of the role of the House of Representatives, and
they were completely unaware of the role of the House of Councilors.
119
Only the focus group with elected officials had some knowledge of
the prerogatives/competencies of the House of Councilors. If research
participants had some information that could base their judgment
of the performance of the first chamber, the second chamber was a
complete mystery to most respondents – who were neither aware of
its role nor of the way in which the members of the House of Councilors
were elected. Both chambers are perceived as rent-based institutions,
but the fact that the second chamber does not receive the same media
attention, its members and its electoral process are not well known, and
its prerogatives are not clear (if known at all), contributes to producing
an even worse image of the House of Councilors. Due to the impression
given by its name, a substantial part of the interviewees thought that
the role of the House of Councilors was limited to provide advice on law
projects, or in some other cases, approves them.
Not even the participants of the focus group with representatives of

businesses knew that the House of Councilors is supposed to represent
their interests: none of them knew that it represents artisans, companies
or other sectors elected through chamber internal electoral processes.
If the social contract of the House of Representatives was known,
there was a complete confusion regarding the role, responsibility and
concrete function of the House of Councilors. If a smaller part of the
participants of MIPA’s study felt that there was no need of a Parliament
altogether, even among those who advocated for the importance of
the institution, there was the widespread opinion that it was useless to
have a second, “extra”, chamber, which only contributed to providing
more rent-based positions within the Parliament.
Elements to judge performance
It has been already noted how the lack of trust in Parliament is largely
attributed to the dissonance between the promises made during
speeches and their effective implementation. Respondents felt that
even if there are texts, laws and other written documents, they are not
120
applied during Parliament’s work. Even if MPs may propose a solution, it

will hardly be implemented.
“we only see oral questions, and no actual results.”45
Altogether, all the different facets of the perceived unwillingness and/

or inability of transforming words into action further reduce citizens’
means to evaluate the performance of MPs.
Amongst the research participants, there was a widespread

awareness that citizens are not in a position to judge the performance
of MPs solely on the basis of parliamentary interrogations, and are only
able to observe Parliament’s theatrics without having the means to
appreciate the substance of its action. Citizens are not in a position to
see what MPs voted, and therefore cannot exact accountability from
this particular part of MPs’ mandate. Participants of MIPA’s study were
under the impression that MPs act as if they were actually taking
actions, giving good and emotional speeches, but that in practice those
were barely related to issues important for the livelihoods of citizens.
Plus, even in the case that speeches actually dealt with real-life issues,
the perception is that MPs have a limited power of following-up the
concerns they raised, and even less power to enforce concrete policy
action to solve citizens’ issues. Nonetheless, a recent study showed
that indeed parliamentary questions may be used by MPs to look for
electoral rewards, since the effective transmission of citizens’ demands
may entail positive turnout in future elections.46
This limited appreciation of the role of MPs is also due to the fact
that some respondents felt that they are out of the reach of MPs.
For instance, it seems that MPs do not reach out to seek an active
appreciation of people’s concerns, that they have no office to which
you could go to voice your concerns, that there is not an official phone
number, and that in general there are no information on how to contact
the MP that represents a voter – if citizens actually know him/her. On a
45 Interview with A., Rabat, October 2019.
46 Tafra, ‘Pourquoi Pose-t-on Des Questions à La Chambre Des Représentants ?’,
2019.
121
positive note, interviewees indicated that if MPs strive to be more aware

of the concerns of the people, the people would trust them considerably
more.
Ultimately, the only element that citizens seem to have in hand

in order to evaluate MPs’ performance is whether they speak or not
during parliamentary sessions, through information (mainly videos)
that circulate on social media. In this framework, MPs’ performance
is individualized and media-based, often assuming the features of a
lynching process.
Accountability
The issue of the lack of accountability persists when addressing

the performances of the MPs. As it has been noted in the section on
trustworthiness, respondents mentioned that they cannot trust the
Parliament because they have no means to hold the MPs accountable.
The issue of accountability relates also to the performance of the MPs
since citizens are under the impression that negative performances
(such as corruption, not upholding promises or ignoring electoral
programs, and general insincerity) are not met with actions that aim at
holding the MPs accountable. Moreover, interviewees felt that they did
not have the means to effectively evaluate two other aspects related
to the performance: the lengthiness of MPs’ actions and the effective
ownership of initiatives and policy priorities. On one hand, citizens are
not in a position to assess how long a MP has worked to produce a result,
and therefore they do not possess all the means to understand if an
MP is performing its duties efficiently or not. On the other hand, the
fact that MPs do not provide localized and dedicated programs for the
citizens of their constituency makes it hard for citizens to understand
if successes (as well as failures) have to be attributed to one single MP
or to the party’s policies.
Generally speaking, respondents felt that MPs manage to avoid

any type of sanction that should hold them to account for a negative
122
performance. The idea that the Parliament is not an accountable

institution stems from these conceptions, building the belief that
it cannot be trusted. The problems with accountability are directly
correlated with elections, since changing voting trends is one of the
main tools that citizens have to hold MPs to account.
Amongst the participants in MIPA’s study, however, those who

voted and those who did not largely felt the same way about electoral
processes. Often, those who vote felt deceived by the fact that a change
in the voting pattern did not result in an actual change – as the alternative
candidate they voted for also proved to be a disappointment. Similarly,
those who do not vote mentioned the disenchantment of the people
who voted (and felt deceived) as the main reason that perpetrates their
unwillingness to vote.
The general feeling is that MPs show up and behave as good candidates
only during electoral campaigns, but as they get elected, they “drop the
act” and disappear. These perceptions emanate from two main sources
of information: television but mostly social media. Voting and electoral
processes do not seem to be recognized as opportunities for citizens
to express the disappointment for the MPs’ performances, since the
process of voting itself seems to not have much of an impact on the
Parliament as an institution. Not only this dynamic contributes to the
vicious circle that discourages voting, further deteriorating citizens’
trust in the Parliament, but the lack of trust in the parliament is also
related to future voting intentions.
123
Graph48: Intention to vote in next elections and trust in the Parliament

13,00% 12,25%
I trust somehow
16,72%
I don't trust
80

34,48% 21,58%
60
22,96%
40
32,63%
58,36%
20
35,20%
19,89%
0
Yes No No opinion
The graph above clearly shows that those who are unwilling to vote
in next elections also distrust the Parliament (only 20% of respondents
who do not plan to vote in next elections trust the Parliament), but
also that concrete actions to increase trust in Parliament may have a
positive effect on participation in the next elections.
Communication
Last but not least, communication (or lack thereof) was seen as a
major source of distrust in MPs, consequently deteriorating trust in the
Parliament as an institution. Lack of communication on MPs activities is
seen as one of the structural issues of the Parliament, which obstructs
the citizens’ access to proper information to assess the trustworthiness,
the performance and the capabilities of MPs and the Parliament overall.
Conversely, discussing the communication problems of the

Parliament and studying ways in which they can be overcome could
significantly bolster the trust in in this institution. Better communicating
the role and the functioning of the Parliament, as well as providing more
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information on the performances of the MPs, are seen as fundamental

steps to ameliorate the trust in the Parliament.
Lack of communication?
During interviews and focus groups, the Parliament has been

mentioned very often as simply being ‘theatrical’, and that aggressive
communication and internal conflict are the main ways in which MPs
show their interest for an issue and demonstrate that they are working.
Of course, this type of communication is not trusted, and citizens often
referred to these behaviors as a strategy to fake MPs interest in a topic.
In this sense, 86% of the respondents of MIPA’s survey affirmed that
they were either not satisfied (51%) or not satisfied at all (35%) with
MPs’ communication within their district.
Graph49: Satisfaction of MPs’ communication within your district and trust
in Parliament
100
5,55% 8,06% I trust completely
18,08% 15,39%
I trust somehow
19,05%
I don't trust
80 24,72%
17,86%
60
48,94% 53,85%
32,78%
40
57,54%
22,34% 15,38%
20
34,44%
10,64% 15,38%
0
Such low levels of satisfaction are also reflected in lower levels of

trust in the Parliament: only 25% of respondents that are not satisfied
at all with MPs’ communication demonstrated trust in the Parliament.
Conversely, higher levels of trust in this institution are related to
125
higher levels of satisfaction in MPs’ communication, corroborating the

assumption that better communication entails more trust.
The main issue with showing only the moment when MPs discuss
and argue during parliamentary sessions is that people think that this is
their only function, and that they do not possess any legal prerogative
(such as proposing and voting on legislations). Most of the participants
felt that the only contact they had with MPs’ work was while watching
the plenary sessions held on Mondays and broadcasted on television.
And even in that case, most respondents felt that parliamentary
sessions are hard to follow. This is due to both the language that is used
and the unappealing format of discussions: sometimes people would
stumble upon the Parliament’s session, but would only watch it for a
few minutes and not actively listen to it, because the format was boring,
inappropriate or simply because the discussions were perceived to be
out of touch with people’s issues.
Another major cause of distrust that has been quoted different

times throughout the report is the fact that MPs’ communication with
citizens only happens between one electoral cycle and the next, rather
than throughout their tenure in Parliament. It is clear that such limited
and strategic communication substantially impacts citizens’ trust in
the MPs. Specifically, actively listening to citizens’ concerns, but also
offering solutions and promises (in spite of how void these may be), is a
practice which only happens during electoral appointments. This cycle
of presence and absence of MPs has been mentioned broadly as one of
the main causes why respondents did not trust the Parliament as an
institution.
Other than that, citizens neither know what MPs do, nor have the
means to get in touch with them. This observation is also grounded by
looking at the quantitative data collected by MIPA:
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Graph50: Attempt to contact a MP (for a personal or public issue)

and trust in the Parliament

9,48% 11,08% 9,80%
I trust somehow
17,91%
I don't trust
80
29,66% 25,49%
26,87%
60
23,53%
25,69% 27,58%
40
51,49%
20 41,18%
35,17% 33,25%
0
Not concerned Didn't think about it Tried to contact but failed I don't know how
Those who do not know how to get in touch with MPs trust the
Parliament substantially less than the other respondents: more than
half of the respondents who do not know how to contact MPs also
demonstrated an absolute distrust for the Parliament. Most respondents
never tried, or even thought of contacting their MP, either because of
the perceived uselessness of the act, or because they did not know how
to. None of the respondents felt that they could reach out to their MP
because they had no information whatsoever about their whereabouts,
where they lived, what was the right way to reach, or even if there was
any use at all in reaching out to them. Moreover, these issues depend
greatly on the different age groups:
127
Graph51: Attempts to contact a MP (for a personal or public issue)

depending on age
100
50+
40-49
25,35% 26,32%
30,94% 30-39
80 40,35%
18-29
18,66% 15,79%
60 17,67%
14,04%
21,73% 24,34%
40 21,16%
29,82%
20
34,26% 30,23% 33,55%
15,79%
0
Not concerned Didn't think about it Tried to contact but failed I don't know how
The youngest respondents showed the least interest, but also

demonstrated the least awareness on the ways by which they could get
in touch with the MPs. The respondents aged over 50 were the ones that
least considered getting in touch with an MP, as 31% of them did not
think about this possibility. However, when they did try to do so, they
were the ones that failed with the highest percentage (40%), indicating
that the ways of engaging with MPs are not necessarily adapted to all
the segments of the population.
In respect to the issue of not knowing what the MPs do, a number
of interviewees complained about the fact that there is no information
on where a certain dossier stands in terms of progress and/or solution.
Citizens expressed their will to be informed on the advancements of
parliamentary work, especially when issues are being solved. Similarly,
interviewees also reported that there are no sources of information
regarding projects, laws or policies that are being enacted. Only one
interviewee mentioned that information on the work of the Parliament
was available online and could be found through a proactive research.
They also noted that they often obtained information on a specific project
or policy from social media, but that such communications rarely have
128
the aim of engaging in a process of monitoring and evaluation, being

mostly a tool for direct protest. The lack of transparent communication
is especially perceived with regard to financial decisions. The fact that
MPs’ initiatives and results are not being showcased contributes to the
perception that the Parliament is useless and ineffective. If MPs fail to
demonstrate the results they have achieved, respondents feel that they
have no means to see the results of their work – ultimately questioning
the very foundation of their existence as political actors.
Nevertheless, the general feeling of respondents is that MPs are not

interested in their concerns: they belong to an elite that is distant from,
and not interested in, the grievances of ordinary people. Moreover, they
felt that the only case in which an MP is actually acting upon a specific
issue is when this issue receives a lot of media attention. However, even
in this case, MPs are not seen to be taking an initiative, but are rather
simply reacting to a pressing public opinion issue that is circulating on
social media.
Social Media
A large majority of interviewees reported that social media is the

main way to know what is happening in the Parliament. Plus, the fact
that some respondents suggested that MPs should be available offline
rather than online, sheds light on the issues of this relatively new form of
communication. On one hand, social media is perceived as a new source
of information that is contributing to raise awareness on the workings
of the Parliament. Facebook and YouTube have been described as the
most used platforms for receiving news about the Parliament.
“You cannot sit through the whole assembly but you can do it through
Facebook later”47
The increased awareness may entail a decrease in the trust in the

Parliament as citizens are more exposed to its problems – which may
have been hidden behind the lack of information in the past. On the
47 Interview with I., housewife and fashion designer. Casablanca, October 2019.
129
other, it seems that the information about the Parliament on social

media do not contribute positively to its image. This has been noted
because people tend to share media content (mostly videos) that is
in line with their opinions, thus creating a bias in the content, and also
because the viral content is often related to negative episodes (for
instance, what is known as the incident of parliamentarians stealing
sweets/cookies, or videos of MPs who are unable to speak properly).
Nonetheless, interviewees also noted that MPs tend to react quickly

on social media.
“You can air your frustrations or problems on social media. This is what
brings you closer to parliamentarians.”48
Therefore, social media presents an unprecedented occasion to voice

concerns about MPs’ work, performance, and even to advocate for other
claims. This has been possible due to the fact that MPs use social media
as a barometer of public opinion and popularity. At the same time, MPs
are sometimes only seen through satirical content on social media.
Satire has been frequently employed as a strategy to air the frustration
with the political system in Morocco.49 Furthermore, interviewees felt
that social media may highlight MPs’ secrets and corrupt practices.
Some, more skeptical, interviewees said that MPs decide what issues to
take into consideration depending on the opinion of social media.
In conclusion, social media is a double-edged sword, which brings

people’s concerns to the MPs, thus potentially reducing the gap
between them and increasing trust, but it also exposes the weaknesses
49 Mohamed El Marzouki, ‘Satire as Counter-Discourse: Dissent, Cultural Citizen-
ship, and Youth Culture in Morocco’, International Communication Gazette,
77.3 (2015), 282–96, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1748048514568762>.partici-
patory cultural production in the context of post-protest Morocco. Using a
combined method of textual and critical discourse analysis, I map out the
issues most satirized in these alternative cultural forms, then examine their
counter-discursive ideological positions, and last explore the consequences
of online satire on political culture in Morocco. I argue that the emergence of
the web as a participatory medium and a competing cultural form is giving
rise to new articulations of dissenting political culture through the enabling
of (counter
130
of MPs and their poor performance, hence reducing trust in their ability
to solve problems. If communication in general has the potential of
both increasing and reducing trust, communication on social media is
capable of amplifying exponentially the effects of communication in
both ways.
The confusion on the role of the Parliament and of the MPs that we
outlined above is also closely related to the way in which the work of
the Parliament and of the MPs is communicated. Since the work outside
the plenary sessions is not shown on television or social media, none of
the respondents mentioned the work that is done outside the debate
(especially in parliamentary committees, which represent a substantial
part of MPs’ work). Thus, the lack of good communication entails a faulty
perception of the work of the Parliament – ultimately deteriorating
its image and lowering overall trust in it. Plus, the fact that people saw
certain ministers, or the Head of the Government, in the Parliament with
the MPs caused ulterior confusion about the roles.
Communication differences between Parliament and

Municipalities
Municipalities were constantly brought forward as a comparative

element to assess how the MPs could improve their action – and so it
was the case for the communication. Indeed, respondents overall felt
that municipalities manage to communicate better than the MPs, that
they were more reachable to ordinary citizens, and that in general
they managed to develop a sort of institutional communication. The
difference with the MPs is especially stark since they are considered to
be completely out of reach, with no physical presence in their vicinity/
neighborhood and no proper communication channels to get in touch
with them.
The physical aspect of the presence was also central: people did not
know whether they had the right to enter and/or visit the Parliament,
or even simply observe the proceedings of a plenary session, further
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contributing to the idea that the Parliament was an inaccessible and

distant institution. Once again, the comparison with the municipality is
striking as respondents are very aware that they can simply walk into
its building.
Sometimes, the overlapping roles of the president of the municipality

and the MP have caused increased distrust. Furthermore, some of the
respondents thought that one had to be president of the municipality
to be able to become an MP, and even that individuals sought the role
of president of the municipality in order for them to be able to access
the Parliament.
The division of labor between the municipality and the Parliament

was also quite unclear, mainly limited to the understanding of
the municipality as the entity dealing with local issues and the
Parliament as the institution acting at the national level. Connected
to such division of labor, it was also unclear to which extent these two
institutions collaborated on a political level. For instance, it was unclear
whether municipalities (or other local administrations) had a role in the
communications of local concerns to the MPs.
MPs’ perspective on (dis)trust in the Parliament
As stated above, MIPA’s research also included Members of the

Parliament. Their voices will be included in the report to add a point
of view on the question of trust (and distrust), thereby adding
complementary elements to the perceptions of the citizens. They also
provided some recommendations on how such shortcomings may be
overcome, aiming at the amelioration of their work and the consequent
increase in trust in them.
Overall, the MPs who took part in MIPA’s research considered that
the lack of confidence is a complex issue and there is no ready solution
to this problem, especially since it is linked to systemic obstacles as well
as to the broader historical context. MPs are aware that the issues they
face in conducting their work are reinforcing the negative appreciation
132
that citizens have – and thereby increment distrust. If the MPs believe
that some perceptions are linked to a bias that citizens have towards
them, they also recognized that there are concrete limitations to their
work and that these have an important impact on trust. In this respect,
MPs’ assessment mainly related to the relation between the Parliament
and the Government, and to the lack of the resources (both human and
material) to effectively conduct their work. Moreover, they are aware of
the important role that communication has in their work and the effect
that social media has on the way in which their conduct is perceived. In
the following sections, we will explore these dynamics in detail.
Perceptions of the Parliament
If the Parliament did not enjoy a positive image for the vast majority
of respondents, surveyed MPs admitted being aware of such negative
image to the point that they affirmed that they believe the Parliament
is the most criticized institution by the public. For instance, it has been
mentioned that popular protests in Morocco are often held in front of
the Parliament (and rarely in front of the Ministries’ headquarters, for
example). Nonetheless, all the interviewed MPs considered that there
is an underestimation of parliamentary work and that many of the
assumptions grounding the negative perception of the Parliament are
emotional and often unsubstantiated by facts.
The issues related to retirement benefits are exemplary of this

apparent bias. While citizens considered that the compensation that
MPs receive is a rent that mainly consumes the nation’s budget, MPs
considered that the money they receive was not commensurate
with the amount of work they performed, and that they were even
financially better off with their previous jobs. A deputy remarked that
citizens rarely know the actual amount of this compensation, but
they are prone to exaggerate. To compensate this tendency, this MP
suggested that their salaries should be transparently communicated
to the citizens.50 It is worth remembering that the MPs’ benefits, and
50 Interview with MP A, Rabat, October 2019.
133
specifically the retirement system currently in place, are one of the

most prominent reasons for the distrust in the Parliament. Therefore,
action on these issues may contribute to restoring confidence. Another
example of this underestimation mentioned by one of the MPs is the
great amount of work behind Law 13.09 on Renewable Energies; citizens
do not know how much effort is being made in order for this law to be
promulgated, from the development of studies, to holding multiple
rounds of consultations with experts, and studying various reports.51
At the same time, MPs generally understand the reasons behind

criticism towards their work and link it to a number of factors and
obstacles to parliamentary work. First, the fact that the current political
context does not allow for the establishment of an independent
and effective parliamentary system was recognised by many of
the interviewed MPs – but also by a number of interviewees and in
the focus groups. Furthermore, many of the MPs considered that
ideological affiliations (and resulting political balances) are a concrete
obstacle to their action within the Parliament. Specifically, ideological
difference and diverging political agendas (of their respective political
parties) contribute to the inability to efficiently work towards a general
consensus that serves the interest of citizens and the state. Linked to
this, the specific prerogatives of the Parliament within the Moroccan
system were perceived to further hinder the MPs work: they considered
that they lack the power, mechanisms and tools to perform their duties
effectively, especially to hold government accountable.
Parliament-Government relations
Even if the revision of the Constitution of 2011 expanded the role and
functions of the Parliament, MPs still consider that they have very limited
powers “on the ground”. Concretely, this is reflected by the dominance
of the executive branch over the legislative, its lack of cooperation, and
the lack of coordination and flexibility. All interviewed MPs agreed that
such dominance and lack of cooperation with Parliament demonstrated
51 Interview with MP D, Rabat, October 2019.
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by the Government is the most prominent obstacle undermining their

parliamentary functions. For instance, MPs brought attention to the
fact that many sectors of the Government answer after long delay (in
case they answer at all) to the written questions presented by the MPs,
making this accountability mechanisms ineffective. Moreover, there
was a wide agreement amongst the MPs that the mechanisms that are
used to keep track of the actions of the government, to exercise effective
oversight and ultimately to hold them to account are inadequate. Failing
to oversee government’s action leads to ignoring the directives given
by the Parliament, leaving MPs in a vulnerable position and reinforcing
citizens’ mistrust in them. They reaffirmed that the poor coordination
and cooperation between the executive and legislative authority
ultimately impede the legislative process. One of the interviewed MPs
also remarked that some amendments proposed by the Parliament to
contribute to legislative productivity were rejected or withdrawn by the
Government.52
Some MPs underlined the need for cooperation and complementarity

amongst all institution governing Morocco, since the impairment of one
(elected or non-elected) institution affects the performance of the rest
of the institutions too. Specifically, the importance of implementing a
balance between the legislative and executive branches was broadly
mentioned by the MPs interviewed as a crucial way to establish the
Parliament’s role as the legislative body.
Human and material resources
Contrarily to the popular image of the Parliament as a bountiful

institution, all the interviewed MPs criticized the fact that the budget
allocated to their functions is not sufficient and that they are forced
to exhaust their personal resources to carry out the tasks entrusted to
them. Be it for transportation at the local and/or national level, for hiring
experts to carry out studies and conducting research, or to remunerate
support personnel (staff for the parliamentary groups in particular), MPs
52 Interview with MP B, Rabat, October 2019.
135
believe that the resources that are allocated to them are insufficient to
do their jobs.
Deputies compared their situation with other countries, quoting

Western countries in particular, where advisers and dedicated staff are
often provided to MPs to assist them in research and coordination with
citizens. In contrast, in Morocco there is a limited number of administrative
assistants who are employed by the Parliament as a whole and not for
the MPs themselves. Many MPs expressed the difficulty of performing
their legislative work without the support of external resources,
such as ministries’ experts and/or research institutions. A high-level
employee of the Parliament told MIPA that the House of Councillors has
created a research centre, but its limited budget negatively affects its
performance. Furthermore, its administrative staff (which amounts to
one employee for approximately 5 or 6 deputies) complained that they
are carrying research in addition to their already assigned tasks, and
that they should be appropriately remunerated for the additional work.53
Moreover, the fact that they are not allocated an office within the
Parliament also contributes to increase the distance between the
citizens and the MPs, as it is very hard for citizens to physically situate
the MPs and especially get in touch with them to present their demands.
This element has been often mentioned by interviewees during our
research, remarking the substantial difference in availability between
MPs and other elected (and non-elected) local officials. Indeed, MPs are
aware that local officials (for instance, the elected councillors of the
municipality) are closer to the problems of the citizenry and often cover
the role of “mediators” between the citizens and the MPs – who then
should address citizens’ demands at the national level. The interviewed
deputies also recognized the great role of local authorities (especially
qaids, pashas and governors) in local governance.
When parliamentarians were asked about the possibility of

demanding logistical and human resources to help them perform
their tasks, they considered that such demand would backfire in a
53 Interview with M, high level employee of the Parliament, Rabat, October 2019.
136
great media attack, reinforcing popular discontent. Moreover, one MP

considered that there are some mechanisms that can be employed
without the need for additional funds and that could help overcome
these organizational obstacles.54 Among these solutions, there is the
possibility of recurring to legal consultancies and expertise in various
government sectors through party relations. Another deputy reminded
that taking into account the recommendations and report presented
by other state institution could significantly improve their work.55 The
resources of political parties should be used as well, as they have broad
experience in many fields and wide networks of experts constantly
willing to contribute to the draft laws related to their field of expertise.
Moreover, an interviewed MP suggested that civil society actors and
organizations should be allowed to integrate the legislative process by
presenting their proposals, involving them in the legislative cycle in a
more organic and permanent manner.56 Notably, the reports prepared
by research centres play a very important role in enhancing the work
of the Parliament. As remarked by an interviewed MP, think tanks can
provide objective and impartial research that enhances the productivity
of MPs.57
Communication and social media
MPs are aware that there are concrete issues with the communication
with the citizens and that overall the Parliament enjoys a quite negative
image. As highlighted above, such a negative image is mainly due to
a negative behaviour in the plenary sessions, including poor quality of
the discussion, and an overall limited performance of the institution
as a whole. Arguably, the institutional communication channels of the
Parliament are weak and unable to change the negative perception on
the parliament. Further, MPs believe that the actual amount of work
that is carried out by the deputies is not evident from the institutional
communication channels of the Parliament – thereby fostering the
54 Interview with MP C, Rabat, October 2019.
55 Interview with MP E, Rabat, October 2019.
56 Interview with MP G, Rabat, October 2019.
57 Interview with MP F, Rabat, October 2019.
137
perception of the Parliament as a rent-based institution where nothing

gets done.
Accordingly, the role of social media has increased over the last
years as an alternative through which the MPs can communicate with
their constituencies and beyond. Consistently with what has been
highlighted in our report, MPs considered that social media is a double-
edged sword: it contributes to the increase of communication with
citizens and to the follow-up to people’s issues; however, it has been
the main source for the decline in confidence. The interviewed MPs
unanimously agree that social media has made the parliamentary work
a subject of ridicule. With citizens being more interested in following
the “buzz”, social media has substantially damaged parliamentary
work and corrupted the reputation of political actors.
Nonetheless, MPs are aware that social media does not often
represent the complete picture of society’s reality. On one hand, wide
support and/or discreditation on social media does not necessarily
entail negative results during elections. For example, one of the MPs
remarked that the huge popular support demonstrated on social
media for the Federation of the Democratic Left (Fédération de la
gauche démocratique, or FGD) for the 2016 legislative elections did not
match the final result for that party – which received “only” 2,83% of
votes. On the other, those citizens who have access to social media are
not necessarily the majority of voters. Two deputies observed that the
popular classes are the true determinants of the political future of the
country: they often do not have access to social media and are busy
with their daily struggles.
Conclusions
The low levels of trust in the Moroccan Parliament are due to a

plurality of factors. Firstly, citizens are wary of MPs’ motivations to carry
out their functions. The research remarked a broad perception that
MPs’ work in the Parliament follows an agenda dictated by the party,
138
or even worse, an agenda of special interest, instead of their duty of

serving the citizens and the country. This perception is based on both
the failure to uphold the promises made during election campaigns
and the perceived disproportionality in MPs’ salaries and retirement
benefits for their work.
Salary and retirement privileges have been identified as major

issues that negatively affect the trustworthiness of MPs, given their
disproportionality in terms of both the overall economic situation of
the country and the actual work that gets done by the Parliament.
Furthermore, a partial and sometimes distorted understanding the

role – and the prerogatives – of both the Parliament and the MPs also
contributes to an increase in distrust. A specific understanding of the
capabilities of the Parliament greatly affects citizens’ perception of
both the trustworthiness and of the performance of the institution and
its agents.
Chiefly, lack of effective action in the fields of education and

healthcare has substantively decreased the trust in the parliament.
Action in these sectors is a central priority for Moroccans and inaction
has been constantly reported as a key source of distrusts in the
Parliament. Income inequalities are also central in the perception of the
Parliament’s performance, as levels of trust have been correlated to the
satisfaction of the overall economic situation and, more importantly, to
the particular level of average household income.
Poor performances of MPs also damage their trustworthiness, further

eroding trust in the Parliament. Furthermore, citizens feel they lack
elements to judge the performances of MPs. Obstacles to understand
and assess MPs’ work beyond oral questions, as well as the absence
of evidence-based mechanisms to showcase MPs’ actions, work and
results, are deteriorating the citizens’ perception of the Parliament’s
performance – thereby considerably eroding trust in this institution.
Citizens also feel that they lack concrete means to hold the MPs
to account. Elections are seen as the only strategy provided to
139
achieve accountability, but the feeling that changing voting patterns

will not affect the situation produces substantial disaffection and
disengagement – simultaneously as the answer to and the cause of
loss of trust.
Finally, lack of proper communication between the MPs and the

citizens serves as an echo chamber for all the issues outlined above.
Citizens neither feel that they can understand what the MPs actually
do, nor believe that they could get in touch with a MP to find a solution
to a problem. Issues with communication have also been highlighted by
the MPs themselves, who believe that the citizens do not realize what is
the actual work of an MP. In this framework, social media exponentially
exposed MPs’ work to the citizens. On one hand, information technologies
multiply the potential for contact between citizens and MPs, and on the
other hand they also amplify the resonance of negative conducts of
MPs. The way in which communication mechanisms and social media in
particular, affect trust will ultimately depend on MPs’ behaviors.
140
Gaining Trust : Recommendations
The extensive research conducted by MIPA on trust in Morocco can

also be translated in some concrete recommendations that may serve
as a basis to improve trust. Our work aimed at the description and the
exploration of the dynamics that affect social institutions (like the family,
the neighbors, etc.), and may be useful to deepen the understanding of
some social dynamics in Morocco. However, the considerations made
on the institutions studied in the chapters on Political Trust and Trust
in Parliament present an opportunity to suggest some directions to
stimulate the reflection on how to ameliorate trust in Morocco. Indeed,
the aim of this section is to provide some recommendations to restore
trust in Morocco’s institutions.
First of all, the section on political trust brought forward the colossal
damage of widespread corruption on Moroccans’ trust. Tangible
actions to tackle corruption need to be swift and meaningful.
These actions should sanction individual behaviors on one hand, and
target corruption in (private and public) service delivery on the other.
Eradicating corruption in service delivery, especially in the education
and healthcare sectors, has to be aimed at the establishment of these
services as citizens’ rights – and not as a privilege to which only the
most affluent parts of society can access.
Essentially, citizens crave to be heard. Therefore, citizens should

be provided with effective and substantial means to exact
accountability to all political institutions. Especially for non-elected
institutions, creating new accountability mechanisms has the objective
of providing citizens with concrete tools that enable them to ensure the
realization of their rights. Citizens must be in a position to have their
rights fulfilled: in the case of a malfunctioning of political institutions,
the responsible has to be held to account. Even in the case of elected
political institutions, accountability mechanisms must assure the
citizen that action will be taken. As the lack of trust in political parties
141
entails a disproportionate lack of trust in all other elected political

institutions, actions of political parties should be primordial.
While attempting to boost confidence, it is important to activate

mechanisms that guarantee democratic practices within the parties
– notably by holding to account their representatives in case of poor
performances and by avoiding re-nominations in cases of misconduct.
An improvement in the levels of trust in the Parliament is strictly

connected with a series of public policies that aim at the overall
improvement of the situation in Morocco. The interviewees provided a
wide spectrum of sectors of Moroccan society which are in dire need
of action. First and foremost, they made it clear that it is paramount
to take action to radically improve the healthcare and education
sectors. Then, concrete steps to increase the average income of
Moroccans (also through the reduction of income taxes) and to give
a sense of security in terms of livelihood are deemed to be crucial to
increase trust. Other recommendations include offering more job
opportunities and reducing the suffering of the middle class in terms
of quality of services provided to them, raising the quality of strategic
sectors. It is also imperative to take action to reduce the profound
inequalities existing in present-day Morocco, since they represent an
underlying cause for the incessant decrease in trust.
On top of policy change, citizens strongly felt that one of the main and
most pressing issues had to do with retirement benefits of MPs, which,
if removed, would substantially increase trust in the Parliament. If a
complete elimination of the benefits seems an arduous policy goal, it
would be at least appropriate to consider a substantial cutback of such
benefits in a potential reform of the retirement scheme of MPs – which
would also contribute to the increase in trust in the Parliament.
Another central pathway to improve trust in the Parliament is to

deliver on the promises of the MPs. Showing more genuine interest
in their constituency, delivering on promises and solving concrete
societal issues are key elements to build MPs trustworthiness,
142
and thus increasing trust in the Parliament. The overall feeling of

respondents was that MPs should avoid making promises that they
may not be able to stick to in reality. The interviewees felt that they
should rather focus on a specific set of citizens’ demands, work on
them and communicating the evidence on the achievements in order
to mark a clear distinction from their predecessors. This is crucial for the
element of the trustworthiness, as better delivering on the promises
made throughout the work of MPs contributes to building citizens’ trust
in the motivation that MPs have in order to do their work.
An improvement in communication strategies of the MPs should entail

an amelioration in both the quantity and quality of the information.
From a quantitative side, citizens need to be better informed of the way
in which MPs work, of the way in which parliamentary work is done and
of results they achieve. Fundamentally, citizens need to see tangible
change. The broad disaffection for political processes (and institutions)
is reinforced by the feeling that no matter what they do, nothing will
change. Evidence-based policies and communications would play a
substantial role in the amelioration of trust in political institutions.
From a qualitative side, citizens feel that the presence of the MPs should
be more concrete, in terms of both continuity (i.e.: not only during
elections but throughout their mandate) and presence (i.e.: increasing
their physical proximity with the citizens they represent). For instance,
MPs should take the initiative to introduce themselves to the citizens
and seek other proactive ways to directly engage with the citizenry
and be more attentive to their demands and ambitions. Ultimately, this
should also be translated into better organized, adapted, inclusive, and
more transparent mechanisms to contact MPs. It is vital to recall the
fundamental role of interpersonal relations in all types of trust, and
reduce the distance between the MPs and the citizens.
143
About the Authors and Contributors
| Dr. Mohammed Masbah is the director of the Moroccan Institute

for Policy Analysis and associate fellow with the Middle East and
North Africa Programme at Chatham House. Dr. Masbah is a political
sociologist whose work centers on authoritarianism, youth movements
and political Islam, with a focus on North Africa.
He was previously a junior research fellow at the Crown Center for
Middle East Studies in the United States, a non-resident scholar at the
Carnegie Middle East Center, and a fellow at the German Institute for
International and Security Affairs (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik,
SWP) in Berlin. He also previously served as an expert for the Moroccan
minister of communication.
| Dr. Rachid Aourraz is an Economist and founding member of the

Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis. Dr. Aourraz got a PhD in Economics
from Ibn Zohr University in Agadir. His doctoral dissertation focused on
the role of institutions and human capital in the economic development
process of Morocco. Dr. Aourraz is also often invited in newspapers and
TV programs to comment on economic issues throughout the Arab
world.
| Mr. Francesco Colin is a non-resident PhD researcher of the Civic

Innovation Research Group at the International Institute of Social Studies
(The Hague), who works on civic engagement and active citizenship
through local petitions in Morocco. His academic engagement with
Moroccan participatory democracy is coupled with a long-standing
commitment to civic education, as proved by the years of service in
the youth association “European Youth Parliament”. Mr. Colin has also
worked as a junior expert at the Heinrich Böll Stiftung in Rabat, where
he engaged with the Democratization and Human Rights component
assisting in background research, project development and workshop
facilitation.
144
| Mr. Imru Al Qais Talha Jibril is an associate fellow with the Moroccan
Institute for Policy Analysis; he is also a consultant and analyst of public
policy for UN Women, and Open Government Partnership. Previously,
he worked as a former technical advisor to the High Commissioner for
Planning (Ahmed Lahlimi Alami) and conducted research at the Library
of Congress with Dr. Jeremy Gunn, on the origins of Separation of Church
and State in the United States. Mr. Talha Jebril holds a Bachelor’s Degree
from Al Akhawayn University, and is enrolled in an MA in International
law at SOAS University of London; He is also part of the Future Leaders
Connect and New Narratives programs of the British Council.
| Ms. Maha Ghazi is a PhD candidate in political sciences (University

Mohamed V Rabat-Agdal), before that Maha held a master’s degree
with honors in international and political studies from the same
university. Besides developing her academic dissertation and research
projects on security issues, she focuses on field research in public
policies, political reforms and communication, for that, Maha has had
several experiences in public sector. She had also participated in many
international conferences and had published many studies.
145
Index of figures
Cycle of political trust 21
Graph1: Trust in Merchants depending on the feeling of safety
in the neighbourhood 32
Graph2: Trust in most people depending on the feeling of safety
in the neighbourhood 33
Graph3 Trust in friends depending on the age 40
Graph4: Do you accept to have a friend if...? 41
Graph5: Trust in neighbours depending on area of provenance 43
Graph6: Trust in neighbours depending on average monthly
household income 44
Graph7: Feeling of safety in the neighbourhood depending
on average monthly household income 44
Graph8: In your opinion, do Moroccans trust each other? 46
Graph9: Do you trust most people? 46
Graph10: Perception of corruption and trust in the justice system 54
Graph11: Trust in justice system depending on average monthly household income 55
Graph12: Trust in private schools depending on the age 58
Graph13: Trust in public schools depending on the age 58
Graph14: Trust in private schools depending on average monthly
household income 59
Graph15: Trust in public schools depending on average monthly
household income 60
Graph 16: Level of education depending on average monthly
household income 62
Graph17: Trust in private healthcare depending on the age 64
Graph18: Trust in public healthcare depending on the age 64
Graph19: Trust in private healthcare depending on average monthly household
income 65
Graph20: Trust in public healthcare depending on average monthly household
income 66
Graph21: Relation between the perception of corruption and trust
in public healthcare 68
Graph22: Trust in armed forces divided by Morocco’s regions 70
Graph23: Trust in police forces divided by Morocco’s regions 71
Graph24: Trust in police depending on average monthly household income 72
Graph25: Perception of corruption and trust in police forces 74
Graph26: Trust in CSOs depending on the age 76
146
Graph27: Trust in CSOs divided in rural and urban municipalities 78

Graph28: Trust in labour unions depending on average monthly
household income 80
Graph29: Trust in Government and satisfaction of the direction
of the country 83
Graph30: Trust in Government by satisfaction with efforts to fight corruption 84
Graph31: Intention to vote in next elections and trust in Government 85
Graph32: Following politics and trust in political parties 87
Graph33: Perception of corruption and trust in political parties 88
Graph34: Forms of political participation 90
Graph35: Modes of participation depending on the age 91
Graph 36: Gender differences for people who answered “yes” to the 92
question: have you ever participated in one of these? 92
Graph 37: Rural-urban differences for people who answered “yes” to the 94
question: have you ever participated in one of these? 94
Graph38: Perception of corruption depending on the age 95
Graph39: Satisfaction with Government’s efforts to fight corruption depending on the
level of education 96
Graph40: Participation in last election depending on the perception
of corruption 97
Graph41: Intention to vote in next election depending on the perception
of corruption 97
Graph42: Trust in Parliament depending on age 103
Graph43: Trust in Parliament depending on gender 104
Graph44: Knowledge about the role of the Parliament and trust in it 110
Graph45: Satisfaction with the direction of the country and trust
in Parliament 114
Graph46: Satisfaction with the current economic situation of the country
and trust in Parliament 115
Graph47: Trust in Parliament depending on average monthly
household income 116
Graph48: Intention to vote in next elections and trust in the Parliament 124
Graph49: Satisfaction of MPs’ communication within your district and trust
in Parliament 125
Graph50: Attempt to contact a MP (for a personal or public issue)
and trust in the Parliament 127
Graph51: Attempts to contact a MP (for a personal or public issue)
depending on age 128
147
Appendixes
Annex 1: Social and Political trust between theory and

practice
Prior to engaging with the research, MIPA has conducted an extensive

review of literature on the subject of trust. Such endeavor supported
the development of our research by better situating it in the current
debates on trust, as well as by ensuring that it was conducted with
academic rigor. The literature review should be an ongoing process of an
academic research, as it unfolds following the evolving understanding
of the object of the study.58 By situating our findings in the landscape of
academic scholarship, the literature review provides new pathways for
future iterations of the research process.
If by no means this review can substitute the appreciation of the

studies themselves, it provides a wide and detailed summary of the
current discussions and a useful starting point for the study of trust.
What is Trust?
In Arabic, “Trust “or (Thiqa ‫ )ثقــة‬comes from the verb (wathiqa ‫ــق‬

َ ِ‫) َوث‬
which refers to different meanings such as depending on someone,
being certain, and trustworthy.59 The Merriam-Webster English
dictionary provides similar definition of the word “trust” as follows: 1a:
assured reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone
58 Kathryn Herr and Gary L Anderson, ‘Designing the Plane While Flying It: Pro-
posing and Doing the Dissertation’, in The Action Research Dissertation:
A Guide for Students and Faculty, ed. by Kathryn Herr and Gary L Anderson
(2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks California 91320 United States: SAGE Publi-
cations, Inc., 2005), pp. 70–88 <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452226644.n5>.
59 Almaany Arabic dictionary:https://www.almaany.com/ar/dict/arar/%D9%88
%D8%AB%D9%90%D9%82%D9%8E/
148
or something. b: one in which confidence is placed. 2a: dependence on

something future or contingent: HOPE.60
The definition features the variables of ability, character, strength

and truth as well as the dependence on the future. This showcases that
trust is a concept that stretches out in time and has a component of
belief in the ability of something or someone.
In psychology, interpersonal trust is defined as “confidence that

[one] will find what is desired [from another] rather than what is feared”.61
According to such interpersonal perspective, trust is a psychological
state or orientation of an actor (the trustor) toward a specific partner
(the trustee) with whom the actor is in some way interdependent
(that is, the trustor needs the trustee’s cooperation to attain valued
outcomes or resources).62 On one hand, a psychological understanding
of trust assumes that trust is a core personality trait, as trusting
individuals tends to be optimistic and distrusting individuals tends to
be pessimistic.
On the other hand, from a sociological perspective, trust is often

a social construct associated with social causes – such as levels of
education and income.63 Within the study of trust, the element of
trustworthiness stands out: as there is a distinction between an
individual’s appraisal of the situation (trust) and their appraisal of
others (trustworthiness). Indeed, “if an individual sense of trust is based
on accumulated experience, then it is based on how we feel about the
trustworthiness of others according to how they have acted in the past
or how they might be expected to react in the future.”64
60 Merriam-Webster English dictionary: https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/trust
61 M Deutsch, ‘Trust and Suspicion: Theoretical Notes’, The Resolution of Conflict,
1973, 143–76 (p. 148).
62 Jeffry A Simpson, ‘Psychological Foundations of Trust’, Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 16.5 (2007), 264–68 (p. 264).
63 Eric M Uslaner, The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust, ed. by Eric
M. Uslaner (Oxford University Press, 2017), i, p. 37 <https://doi.org/10.1093/ox-
fordhb/9780190274801.001.0001>.
64 Kenneth Newton, Dietlind Stolle, and Sonja Zmerli, Social and Political Trust,
ed. by Eric M. Uslaner (Oxford University Press, 2017), i, p. 40 <https://doi.
org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274801.013.20>.
149
The prominence of trust in social and political life has been

recognized by philosophers throughout history. In one of the earliest
examinations of the concept, Confucius wrote that the crucial requisites
for government are weapons, food, and trust. If a leader could not keep
all three, however, they should let go of the weapons and the food first
– trust is paramount. In his Analects, he discussed the concept of xin,
the idea of being true to one’s word as the starting point for any fruitful
relationship with another.65
In the 14th century, Maghrebi historian Ibn Khaldun expanded on this

horizontal dimension of trust in a larger sense with his explanation
of the asabiyyah, which translates loosely to “group feeling” or the
strong social ties and sense of solidarity within a group, which create
social cohesion. He believes that the anarchy that characterizes the
life of a sedentary group creates social cohesion and enhances trust,
while urbanization destroys it66. He found the interaction between the
asabiyyah and the royal authority to be the essence of social change,
65 Cecilia Wee, ‘“Xin”, Trust, and Confucious’ Ethics’, Philosophy East and West, 61.3
(2011), 516–33 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23015356>.however, one needs
first to understand what Confucius encompasses within his notion of xin. The
article begins by delineating the Confucian conception of xin, as presented in
the Analects. The notion of xin is often taken to be isomorphic with the notion
of trust. I argue that Confucius› notion of xin does not quite map onto the no-
tion of trust as usually understood in contemporary Western contexts. To un-
derstand better what Confucian xin amounts to, I compare and contrast the
Confucian conception of xin with contemporary Western accounts of trust by
Baier, McLeod, and Mullin. This comparison helps elucidate what xin is as well as
how xin relates to morality. With this in hand, the roles that Confucius ascribes
to xin in social and political contexts are then delineated.»,»author»:[{«drop-
ping-particle»:»»,»family»:»Wee»,»given»:»Cecilia»,»non-dropping-par-
ticle»:»»,»parse-names»:false,»suffix»:»»}],»container-title»:»Philoso-
phy East and West»,»id»:»ITEM-1»,»issue»:»3»,»issued»:{«date-parts»:[[«
2011»]]},»page»:»516-533»,»publisher»:»University of Hawai›i Press»,»ti-
tle»:»\»Xin\», Trust, and Confucious› Ethics»,»type»:»article-journal»,»vol-
ume»:»61»},»uris»:[«http://www.mendeley.com/documents/?uuid=992a5
ec1-16a2-41bf-a590-88675b2e3a98»]}],»mendeley»:{«formattedCita-
tion»:»Cecilia Wee, ‘“Xin”, Trust, and Confucious’ Ethics’, Philosophy East
and West, 61.3 (2011
66 Gellner, Ernest (2000) ‘Trust, Cohesion, and the Social Order’, in Gambetta, Di-
ego (ed.) Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, electronic edition,
Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, chapter 9, pp. 142-157.
150
and he explained the rise and fall of civilizations on the basis of this
shifting relationship.67
Few centuries later, French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau

further outlined the political aspects of trust in his treaties on the social
contract. When citizens consent to be governed, they put implicit trust in
their representatives, which forms the basis of a legitimate government.68
Alexis de Tocqueville took the idea of trust and representation further
in discussing the relationship between associational activity, political
participation, and democracy. He illustrated the importance of
associations in creating a network of relationships that helps establish
the basis for generalized social trust. This kind of “associative trust” is
now studied in the domain of “social capital.”69
Trust became a more explicit field of study in academic research

after World War II. Sidney Verba and Gabriel Almond were among the first
to explain Tocqueville’s social context for trust as it relates to political
culture. In their seminal work The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and
Democracy in Five Nations (1963), they analyzed general surveys of the
socialization of citizens across five states (the United States, the United
Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Mexico) to gather baseline data regarding
citizens’ relationships to the state and each other. They contend that
social trust and cooperativeness are a core component of a country’s
civic culture (the norms and attitudes of both the ordinary citizen and
the political elite) and are thus critical components of democracy.70
They found, for example, that the lower levels of trust in Germany,
Italy, and Mexico limit citizens’ respective abilities to cooperate with
each other and influence their governments, whereas the higher levels
of trust in the United States and United Kingdom facilitate a more
67 Mark Muhannad Ayyash, ‘Rethinking the Social–Political through Ibn Khaldûn
and Aristotle’, Interventions, 19.8 (2017), 1193–1209 <https://doi.org/10.1080
/1369801X.2017.1347054>.
68 Matthew Simpson, Rousseau: A Guide for the Perplexed (Bloomsbury Pub-
lishing, 2007).
69 Mark Warren, ‘Trust and Democracy’, in The Oxford Handbook of Social and
Political Trust, ed. by Eric M. Uslaner (Oxford University Press, 2017), i, p. 83
<https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274801.013.5>.
70 Sidney Verba and Gabriel Almond, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and
Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963).
151
responsive democracy. On top of the findings, Verba and Almond’s work

was perhaps most influential in bringing systematic, cross-national
analysis into the study of comparative politics: such large-scale
multi-state surveys have proven to be instrumental in expanding the
dimensions of the study of trust.
Later, Robert Putnam famously illustrated on the idea of trust in

the context of “social capital” which he defines as “features of social
organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate
coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.”71 His work Bowling
Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (2000) posits
that the weakening of social ties since the 1960s relates to a decline in
associational membership, a category broadly defined as participation
in social organizations.72 This concept is characterized by “networks
of organized reciprocity and civic solidarity” and is closely correlated
with levels of interpersonal trust. Putnam analyzes a plethora of public
opinion and social science surveys and believes that the recent trend of
distrust has stern implications for the future of democratic institutions.
Critics of his work contend that the institutions he analyzes – everything
from book clubs to the Red Cross, passing through bowling leagues –
are arbitrary and insufficient as indicators of social participation. Some
argue that there are other factors that more substantially influence
and determine historical change, notably the role of corporations in
everyday life.73 Others dispute his methodology, fearing that Putnam’s
heavy reliance on statistical analysis can operationalize the concept of
social capital, adding moral and ethical value to what should be a neutral
term.74 Nevertheless, Putnam’s work has been critical in illustrating the
complexity of social capital and bringing it to the forefront of intellectual
debate.
71 Robert D. Putnam, ‘Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital’, Journal of

Democracy, 6.1 (1995), 65–78 (p. 67) <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1995.0002>.
72 Robert D Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Com-
munity (Simon and schuster, 2000).
73 Carl Boggs, ‘Social Capital and Political Fantasy: Robert Putnam’s” Bowling
Alone”’, Theory and Society, 30.2 (2001), 281–97.
74 Bob Edwards and Michael W Foley, ‘Civil Society and Social Capital beyond
Putnam’, American Behavioral Scientist, 42.1 (1998), 124–39.
152
A more recent academic debate tried to integrate the notions of

social and political trust. In his edited volume Oxford Handbook on
Social and Political Trust, Eric Uslaner makes a fundamental distinction
between particularized trust and generalized trust. Particularized trust
is the faith in the ‘in-group’ (to whom we feel associated or belonging)
while generalized (or social, horizontal) trust is the trust that does not
depend on any specific group or purpose75. Thus, social trust relates
to the the belief that most people can be trusted. Moreover, trust is an
‘expectation’ rather than a behaviour, and social trust encompasses
the idea that we can expect others to operate with our best interests
in mind. In this respect, Barber defines trust as a set of “socially learned
and socially confirmed expectations that people have of each other, of
the organizations and institutions in which they live, and of the natural
and moral social orders that set the fundamental understandings for
their lives.”76
Moreover, generalized and particularized trust have to be distinguished

from political trust, which is defined as the trust in institutions or
systems of government – specific ability and willingness – to either
do what is right or to serve your interests.77 Furthermore, political (or
vertical) trust has also been conceptualized as “the degree to which
people perceive that government is producing outcomes consistent
with their expectations”78 and as “people’s acknowledgement of the
government’s authority and their willingness to accept the outcomes
of the government’s decision making as they believe politicians
generally act fairly”.79 These definitions consolidate the key elements
75 Eric M. Uslaner, ‘The Study of Trust’, ed. by Eric M. Uslaner (Oxford University
Press, 2017), i<https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274801.013.39>.
76 Bernard Barber, ‘The Logic and Limits of Trust’, 1983, p. 149.
77 Eric M. Uslaner, i, p. 4.
78 Marc J Hetherington, Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the De-
mise of American Liberalism (Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 9.
79 Marc Hooghe and Sonja Zmerli, Political Trust: Why Context Matters (ECPR
Press, 2011), p. 3; Niels Spierings, ‘Trust and Tolerance across the Middle East
and North Africa: A Comparative Perspective on the Impact of the Arab Up-
risings’, Politics and Governance, 5.2 (2017), 4–15, <https://doi.org/10.17645/
pag.v5i2.750>.
153
of political trust as “the belief that the political system or some part of
it will produce preferred outcomes even if left untended.”80
Within the concept of political trust, we can identify four major

variables to assess people’s trust in government: their confidence
in government’s competence, trustworthiness, performance, and
communication. In essence, the government’s ability to increase its
competence, trustworthiness, and performance is bolstered by its
ability to communicate effectively. To judge the work of a governmental
institution – and specifically the amount of trust a community or society
attributes to it – one should be able to understand the differences
between confidence (representing the belief in the capacity of an
agency to perform effectively), trust (reflecting a rational or affective
belief in the benevolent motivation and performance capacity of
another party), skepticism (suspended judgment), and cynicism ( jaded
negativity).81
These foundational works have been followed by a proliferation of

research into both social and political trust. The factors underlying these
trust relationships have been explained through numerous studies,
ranging from genetic variation to income inequality, but they all have
a common denominator: attempting to understand the root causes of
disconnect in our society. Yet, it seems that despite the development
of literature of political trust, there are still disagreements on how we
study trust.
Measuring Trust: Methodological Challenges
Another recent academic literature discusses a core challenge in

measuring trust: how to isolate the causes and effects of trust, as social
80 Tianjian Shi, ‘Cultural Values and Political Trust: A Comparison of the People’s
Republic of China and Taiwan’, Comparative Politics, 33.4 (2001), 401, <https://
doi.org/10.2307/422441>.
81 Pippa Norris, ‘The Conceptual Framework of Political Support’, in Handbook
on Political Trust, ed. by Sonja Zmerli and Tom W G van der Meer (Edward Elgar
Publishing), pp. 19–32 (p. 19), <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781782545118.000
12>.
154
and political trust are tied with several interdependent variables, making
it difficult to attribute any single factor as the cause of another.82 It is
impossible to determine which shapes what: is the trust in institutions
shapes social trust? Or is it the other way around? While some scholars
noted that trust in neutral and impartial institutions does shape social
trust,83 others argue that such institutions also depend upon it.84
This begs the fundamental question: is trust a lived experience or a

mere perception?
Social Trust is a multi-dimensional and context-specific concept. The

common sociological approach in defining it is a “person’s disposition
or general belief that other people – regardless of who they are – are
willing to behave in ways that are not detrimental to the first person.”85
This is in contrast to particularized trust, which is the trust one holds for
someone close to them.86 Some researchers argue that particularized
trust is less important to the general economic growth of a country,
social cohesion, and it is often referred to as the “dark side” of social
capital.87
In the literature some argue that trust is contingent upon people

and circumstances, therefore only questions that specify exactly the
object and circumstances of trust make sense, however social scientists
themselves are unable to agree on what exactly constitutes trust or
its definition, therefore respondent’s perception cannot be faulted for
82 Newton, Stolle, and Zmerli, i, p. 41.

83 Bo Rothstein and Dietlind Stolle, ‘The State and Social Capital: An Institution-
al Theory of Generalized Trust’, Comparative Politics, 40.4 (2008), 441–59,
<https://doi.org/10.5129/001041508X12911362383354>.
84 Eric M Uslaner, The Moral Foundations of Trust (Cambridge University Press,
2002), p. 42.
85 Niels Spierings, ‘Social Trust in the Middle East and North Africa: The Con-
text-Dependent Impact of Citizens’ Socio-Economic and Religious Char-
acteristics’, European Sociological Review, 35.6 (2019), 894–911 (p. 895),
<https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcz038>.
86 Spierings, ‘Social Trust in the Middle East and North Africa: The Context-De-
pendent Impact of Citizens’ Socio-Economic and Religious Characteristics’,
p. 895.
87 Spierings, ‘Social Trust in the Middle East and North Africa: The Context-De-
pendent Impact of Citizens’ Socio-Economic and Religious Characteristics’,
p. 895.
155
their vagueness or irrelevance.88 In measurement of trust, usually the

Rosenberg scale is considered a reliable and valid measure of trust.89
Trust also has a time component: it can change depending on the
circumstances and events within a specific timeframe.
Contrarily, political (or institutional) trust can be dissected in two

different clusters: trust in elected institutions such as parliament, heads
of state, cabinets, and syndicates, and trust in non-elected institutions
such as police, courts, administrations, and civil service.
Without trust in institutions, democracy and all its facets would

become unworkable, resulting in lack of personal safety and freedom,
welfare supports, protections, banking and pensions, economic division
of labor that creates wealth. In essence, when one refers to trust of an
institution, it is equivalent to trusting a person who holds an office,
defined by the rules that comprise the institution.90
The essential difference between institutional trust and social trust

is that the former is anonymous.91 When a citizen is deciding whether
to trust an institution, they are basing that decision on three factors:
the normative definition of roles; the knowledge of trustee’s motivation
(to derive trustworthiness); and the sanctions to keep the trustee
accountable (given the lack of knowledge on trustee’s commitment
to office). In other words, warranted trust judgments on institutions
depend on a congruence of (a) the knowledge of institutional norms
shared between trustor and trustee and (b) the trustor’s knowledge of
the trustee’s motivations, which can be inferred from (c) professional
role identity combined with sanctions that render office-holders
accountable to the norms of office. Generally speaking, when these
88 Russell J. Dalton and Hans‐Dieter Klingemann, ‘Citizens and Political Behav-

ior’, in The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior, ed. by Russel J Dalton and
Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 4, <https://doi.
org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199270125.003.0001>.
89 Dalton and Klingemann, p. 5.
90 Claus Offe, ‘How Can We Trust Our Fellow Citizens?’, in Democracy and Trust,
ed. by Mark E Warren (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 42–
87 (pp. 65–76), <https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511659959.003>.
91 Warren, i, p. 88.
156
elements of warranted trust judgments are publicly available and

knowable, institutional trust will be supporting the democratic polity.92
Frameworks to study Trust
Generally speaking, there are two ways to study trust, namely the
so called “bottom-up” and “top-down” approaches. On the individual
“bottom-up” level trust can take on a scientific dimension through
biological and psychological theories. A person’s biological and
psychological composition does not vary depending on the situation,
which means that these traits can be understood as a sort of “anchor”
for attitudes and behavior. Trust must be a transmissible trait in
order to be influenced by biology; to assess whether this is the case,
researchers have used twin studies to test if genetic similarities in trust
levels can be found between sets of twins.93 In terms of psychology,
trust is seen as a core personality characteristic. In measuring the
psychology of trust, scholars often refer to the “Big Five Personality
Framework” that summarizes an individual’s trait structure through the
following five dimensions: openness, conscientiousness, extraversion,
agreeableness, and emotional stability. Each of the five factors’
associated characteristics has implications for likely levels of both social
and political trust.94 Scholars synthesize this framework with surveys on
trust to measure correlation between trust and personality.
While biological and psychological theories are grounded in valid

empirical research, they are fundamentally limited in scope by not
addressing the impact of the environment on the individual. To fully
comprehend trust, psychological and biological factors must be viewed
as an anchor that can be influenced by the broader social contexts of
the situation.
92 Warren, i, p. 88.
93 Matthew Cawvey and others, ‘Biological and Psychological Influences on In-
terpersonal and Political Trust’, in The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political
Trust, ed. by Eric M. Uslaner (Oxford University Press, 2017), i, p. 120 <https://
doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274801.013.11>.
94 Cawvey and others, i, p. 127.
157
An individual’s trust can also be analyzed technically through the

Rational Choice Theory (RCT). This theory assumes that an individual’s
rationality and decisions are determined based on cognitive calculations
of the costs and benefits of an action. Applied to trust, RCT asserts that
trust is a cognitive process; trustworthiness is more likely to occur when
the interests of the “trustee” are linked to those of the “trustor.” While
this theory shares many premises with neoclassical economics and
game theory, proponents of the RCT argue that a person’s interests can
be derived from not only individual but also social gains, which means
that people can be motivated to trust by both intrinsic and extrinsic
values.95 Critics of the theory, however, maintain that the RCT neglects
“social embeddedness,” or the institutional, social, or cultural context of
the situation.
These individual-based theories are contrasted with the “top-

down” approach that focuses on societies or communities as a whole.
This idea finds “a strong association between trust and homogeneity,
national wealth, income equality, lack of corruption, and various levels
of democratic government”96 and assigns more responsibility to the
national institutions’ and policies’ role influencing circumstances in
which social and political trust develop. Essentially, trust is more related
to the collective properties of whole communities rather than the sum
of individual experiences. This theory can be perceived as too broad
and imprecise, as it does not account for the diversity of individual
experiences.
Politics of Trust
As highlighted in the sections above, trust is a central element

in politics. Generally speaking, “political trust thus functions as the glue
that keeps the system together and as the oil that lubricates the policy
95 Karen S. Cook and Jessica J. Santana, ‘Trust and Rational Choice’, in The Oxford
Handbook of Social and Political Trust, ed. by Eric M. Uslaner (Oxford University
Press, 2017), i<https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274801.013.4>.
96 Newton, Stolle, and Zmerli, i, p. 39.
158
machine.”97 Indeed, the study of the connections between politics and

trust does provide meaningful insights on their reciprocal influences.
For instance, Hetherington argued that the impact of trust varies
depending on whether political support is diffused (as for an institution
or a polity as a whole) or specific (as for politicians individually).98 On
one hand, his findings show that better economic performances and
higher levels of policy effectiveness and specific support can bolster
political trust. On the other hand, a decline in political trust, which may
be both the reflection of and the cause for wider dissatisfaction for a
government, hinders the possibility to successfully pass legislation.
More recently, Citrin and Stoker discussed the literature on the

continuous decline in political trust and found that policy dissatisfaction,
amongst other issues, seems to be a central cause for distrust.99 Such
decline in political trust also has consequences at the individual level,
which influence political participation, electoral choices and general
compliance. Notably, if an individual lacks political trust, he or she will be
less likely to support policies that may involve personal risk or sacrifice.
Partisan logics also influence political trust significantly. It has been

observed how an increase in party polarization is not necessarily related
to ideological reasons, but rather in active distrust of other partisan
forces.100 The effect of an increase in partisan polarization is not limited
to electoral dynamics, since policy makers will equally be less inclined
to cooperate with oppositions to achieve compromises – thus limiting
governments’ policy responsiveness and, in turn, further obstructing
trust. In a context of increased partisan polarization, we can find Miller’s
study Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970, in which
he posits that “discontent can be functional for a political system if it
97 Tom W.G. van der Meer and Sonja Zmerli, ‘The Deeply Rooted Concern with
Political Trust’, in Handbook on Political Trust, ed. by Sonja Zmerli and Tom W.G.
van der Meer, 2017, p. 1.
98 Marc J Hetherington, ‘The Political Relevance of Political Trust’, American Po-
litical Science Review, 92.4 (1998), 791–808.
99 Jack Citrin and Laura Stoker, ‘Political Trust in a Cynical Age’, Annual Review of
Political Science, 21 (2018), 49–70.
100 Marc Hetherington, ‘Why Polarized Trust Matters’, in The Forum (De Gruyter,
2015), xiii, 445–58.
159
acts as a catalyst for orderly change, but when the normal channels
are perceived as ineffective, the probability that the conflict may burst
forth in the form of extra-legal behavior increase.”101
Therefore, it seems that an increase in partisan polarization might

affect trust only if normal policy channels are deemed as ineffective.
In this context, Miller claims that centrist policies will only foster
dissatisfaction with government and will inhibit the restoration of
political trust in it. Hence, political cynicism seems to be the antithesis of
political trust. However, some have argued that this vision lacks a clear
distinction between disillusionment with government as a whole and
mistrust of specific politicians, and that a decrease in political trust is
also due to an increase in political sophistication and realism.102 Anyhow,
the relationship between trust and politics is not simply univocal. On
the contrary, there has to be a clear distinction between trust, distrust/
cynicism and skepticism. Specifically, Cook & Gronke argue that low
confidence in government and in institutions does not necessarily
mean distrust, but rather means that individuals are skeptic, this is
understood as the “unwillingness to presume that political authorities
should be given the benefit of the doubt.”103 Therefore, they suggest to
methodically distinguish the measurement of trust and of confidence.
Finally, the establishment of democracy as a predominant political

system has also fostered the questions on whether levels of political
trust differ between new and established democracies. Catterberg and
Moreno found out that new democracies have experienced an important
drop in political trust due to what they call a “post-honeymoon period
of political disaffection”.104 Specifically, they uphold the relationship
101 Arthur H Miller, ‘Political Issues and Trust in Government : 1964-1970’, The

American Political Science Review, 68.3 (1974), 951–72 (p. 970).
102 Jack Citrin, ‘Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government’,
American Political Science Review, 68.3 (1974), 973–88, <https://doi.
org/10.2307/1959141>.
103 Timothy E. Cook and Paul Gronke, ‘The Skeptical American: Revisiting the
Meanings of Trust in Government and Confidence in Institutions’, The
Journal of Politics, 67.3 (2005), 784–803 (p. 785), <https://doi.org/10.1111
/j.1468-2508.2005.00339.x>.
104 Gabriela Catterberg and Alejandro Moreno, ‘The Individual Bases of Political
Trust: Trends in New and Established Democracies’, International Journal of
160
between the level of trust and the capacity of a system to maintain

or increase well-being. Nevertheless, they observe that the weight of
both the elements that may foster trust (such as financial satisfaction,
government responsiveness, and democratic attitudes) and the ones
that might hinder it (such as political radicalism, post materialist
values, and corruption permissiveness) also are highly dependent on
the broader context.
Economic Performance and Trust
Economic performance – and inequalities specifically – is one of the

most evident indicators of trust and has a direct correlation with levels
of political trust. This substantiates the theory known as the “trust-as-
evaluation approach”, which posits that trust is an object that stems
from the evaluation of the object’s performance. Levels of trust (results)
are influenced by the mediation of macro and microeconomic factors:
perceived changes in economic growth, prior expectations and values
of citizens (anticipation), and citizens’ attributions of responsibility
(as governments are not always held responsible for macroeconomic
outcomes).105 Nonetheless, not all studies converge on a univocal
correlation between economic inequality and political trust. Multilevel
governance makes it hard to determine who exactly was responsible
for the current state of economic affairs, as the responsibility can be
attributed to local, national, or supranational levels of government.106
Overall, however, confidence and trust in government generally tend to
be lower during times of negative economic performance.
In the following illustration, one can clearly see that GDP per capita
correlates directly with social trust, indicating a very strong positive
relationship:
Public Opinion Research, 18.1 (2005), 31–48, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/

edh081>.
105 Tom W.G. van der Meer, ‘Economic Performance and Political Trust’, in The
Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust, ed. by Eric M. Uslaner (Ox-
ford University Press, 2017), i, p. 599, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxford-
hb/9780190274801.013.16>.
106 van der Meer, i, p. 606.
161
In terms of income inequality, conversely, the correlation is strongly

negative, as inequality directly affects trust levels as shown below:
162
The reasons for such correlation are attributed to both the fact that
people feel closer (and thus trust more) to those who are from a closer
socio-economic level, and the fact that higher inequality increases the
fight for resources. If this is remarked when comparing countries on a
macro perspective, the same patterns can be found at the micro level as
well. To put it differently, the negative relationship between economic
inequalities and levels of trust is visible not only between countries,
but also within the same country. Even within low inequality countries,
such as Sweden, imbalances in income negatively affect interpersonal
trust.107 Furthermore, economic crisis do not impact all citizens in the
107 Fabian Stephany, ‘Who Are Your Joneses? Socio-Specific Income Inequali-

ty and Trust’, Social Indicators Research, 134.3 (2017), 877–98, <https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11205-016-1460-9>.institutions or society as a whole. It is a
key element in almost every commercial transaction over time and might
be one of the main explanations of economic success and development.
Trust diminishes the more we perceive others to have economically dif-
ferent living realities. In most of the relevant contributions, scholars have
taken a macro perspective on the inequality-trust linkage, with an aggre-
gation of both trust and inequality on a country level. However, patterns of
163
same way, and therefore we can expect that the influence of economic
crises on citizens will also be diversified. A study of trust in the European
Parliament after the 2008 economic crisis shows that the countries
that were most affected in terms of decline of trust were also the
ones that were hit harder by the crisis.108 Going further, the same study
demonstrates that such fall in levels of trust was more pronounced in
those citizens with lower social status, potentially perpetuating the
divide amongst citizens of the same country.
The Welfare state and Trust
Trust in government is also shaped by the government’s redistributive

policies and outcomes, what we call the welfare state. Generally
speaking, higher income inequality and poverty levels are related to
lower levels of political trust.109 In other words, states that redistribute
income more equitably are more trusted. This might explain the recent
surge of protest movements denouncing economic elites across the
world as well as the appearance of political outsiders across the electoral
spectrum who promise to deliver on economic equality.
The root causes of these movements may be attributed to the

distrust of governmental institutions (especially elected ones) in
redistributing wealth and addressing inequality. Accountability is
difficult to establish in the welfare state domain: as politicians are
skilled at masking retrenchment policies to avoid blame, citizens
tend to distrust the government as a whole rather than punish the
representatives in elections.110 This idea that inequality leads to lower
within-country inequality and possibly influential determinants, such as
perception and socioeconomic reference, remained undetected. This paper
offers the opportunity to look at the interplay between inequality and trust
at a more refined level. A measure of (generalized
108 Giulia M Dotti Sani and Beatrice Magistro, ‘Increasingly Unequal? The Eco-
nomic Crisis, Social Inequalities and Trust in the European Parliament in 20
European Countries’, European Journal of Political Research, 55.2 (2016),
246–64, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12126>.
109 Staffan Kumlin and Atle Haugsgjerd, ‘The Welfatre State and Political Trust:
Bringing Performance Back In’, in Handbook on Political Trust, ed. by Sonja
Zmerli and Tom W G van der Meer, 2017, pp. 285–86.
110 Kumlin and Haugsgjerd, p. 289.
164
levels of trust could ostensibly be explained through theories of self-

interest, but research has found that “welfare generosity variables
seem to exercise largely similar effects on democratic satisfaction
across different socioeconomic groups”111 and even ideological values
as well.
Some theories advance that a more equal welfare state

encourages the perception of a level playing field for political
participation, which could instill a feeling of equal recognition by the
state. As such, theories of trust advance that a limited welfare state,
high inequality, and subsequent low trust form a self-feeding vicious
cycle.112 Conversely, others argue that social capital is harmed by a
generous welfare system because civic engagement and social trust
are eroded by the increasing role of the state for those in need. The idea
of causality is also extensively debated. While strong welfare states
can decrease inequality, inequality may not have a causal influence on
social trust. However, in order to form a strong welfare state, societal
groups must cooperate, which means that social trust is a prerequisite
for the formation of the larger welfare states.
Trust in welfare systems also significantly fluctuates depending

on whether the economy is in crisis. In normal times, citizens tend
to perceive the welfare state differently than they do in crisis: they
are aware of the costs of generous social protection and increasing
unemployment may reduce its support.113 However, large welfare
states are even more strongly correlated with political trust during the
economic crises of 1930s, 1970s, and the latest one in 2008. The low
political trust in smaller welfare states could be explained by the “crisis-
retrenchment hypothesis,” where crises hurt political trust because
they threaten the welfare state (in terms of retrenchment policies)
just when it is needed the most. Moreover, political trust is directly
111 Staffan Kumlin, Isabelle Stadelmann-Steffen, and Atle Haugsgjerd, ‘Trust

and the Welfare State’, in The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust,
ed. by Eric M. Uslaner (Oxford University Press, 2017), i, p. 289, <https://doi.
org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274801.013.8>.
112 Kumlin, Stadelmann-Steffen, and Haugsgjerd, i, p. 390.
165
influenced by public perception of the welfare state, which is based on

information learned through the media and personal experiences with
the welfare state.114 This validates the importance of the welfare state in
the levels of political trust, as well as the prerequisite in terms of cultural
and societal trust needed to build large and effective welfare states.115
Democracy and Trust
Trust holds a complicated relationship with democracy. It is necessary

for a democracy to function, meanwhile democracy also works to
“institutionalize distrust” and put healthy checks on institutional power.
This means that not all kinds of trust are advantageous for democracy
– as a misplaced trust can lead to authoritarian regimes. Trust must
be warranted; the trustor needs a reason to believe that their interests
converge with those of the trustee.116 The issue is further complicated,
as warrants derive from a variety of sources with various motivations,
including the media, institutions, and interpersonal connections. Modern
democracies work to strike this balance by drawing clear distinctions
between areas designed for conflict and distrust, such as elections and
the partisan legislature, as well as areas for trustworthy institutions,
such as non-partisan bureaucratic agencies and the judiciary system.
To assess how trust works in a democratic polity, a further distinction

needs to be done: “first-order,” public trust, and “second-order,”
representative trust. “First-order” trust, is that given to basic needed
services, with impartiality, meaning that electoral politics are not part
of the decision making process.117 For public trust, the warrants are
institutional in nature; the norms of public entities are understood
by the people they affect, and those who hold public offices must
be subject to sanctions if they depart from those norms.118 Therefore,

115 Kumlin, Stadelmann-Steffen, and Haugsgjerd, i, p. 393.
116 Mark Warren, ‘What Kinds of Trust Does a Democracy Need? Trust from the
Perspective of Democratic Theory’, in Handbook on Political Trust, ed. by
Sonja Zmerli and Tom W.G. van der Meer, 2017, pp. 33–52 (p. 40).
117 Warren, i, p. 89.
118 Warren, i, p. 90.
166
public trust is betrayed in the presence of corruption and clientelism

in particular. Institutions can be attacked by ‘political entrepreneurs’
for the aforementioned reasons because the information within them
is strategic and their function is sophisticated. When the larger public
finds it difficult to understand institutional information due to its
technicality, it becomes attacked. Leading to distrust by the general
public (for example attacks by the far right on institutional trust).119
Secondly, “second-order” trust stems from elected institutions such as
parliament. Parliaments are dependent on second order trust to channel
conflict into democratic voting and media.120 As such, media not only
needs to be a trusted and reliable medium, but parliaments also need
to be effective in dealing with conflicting views within society, whether
those are ideologies, visions of the future, public policy proposals, or
general societal trends.
In conclusion, there are five general classifications of trust needed to

support a democracy:
· Generalized trust in society: this type of trust exists among the

citizens of the democracy; it is highly correlated with the performance
of a democracy because it is closely tied with social capital, the
network of relationships in a society. According to Warren’s analysis,
“low levels of generalized trust undermine democracy by providing
opportunities for political entrepreneurs to organize politics of
resentment, religious division, nativism, and racism that feed distrust
of any collective provision.”121
· Trust in experts and professionals: legitimizing the work of experts

and professionals allows for the division of labor and enables
specialization. This trust is especially apparent in the medical field;
an extensive review process for every proposed medical policy is
needed for people to have confidence in the safety of their medicine.
119 Warren, i, p. 90.
120 Warren, i, p. 90.
121 Warren, p. 47.
167
· Trust in offices that hold a public trust: these agencies must be

insulated from electoral policies and interest group pressures in
order to serve the needs of the citizenry in an unbiased manner.
Democracy cannot function without a strong, neutral bureaucratic
backbone.
· Second-order trust in political institutions: this trust is “second-

order” because it depends not on trusting that the institution will
produce the desired result, but rather that the institution will produce
the legal and fair result.
· Selective trust in representatives: Similarly, trust in political

representation is a kind of modified trust. While most citizens do not
trust politicians in general, they have more trust in their particular
representatives to serve their personal interests.122
122 Warren, p. 49.
168
Annex 2: Global and Local perceptions of Trust
This section is dedicated to providing a summary of different

researches, studies and reports that aimed at evaluating the perception
of trust. Looking at globalized perspective on trust and at more local
focus of analysis, this section will review some key assessments of trust.
Global perspectives
There are a number of surveys that, under various perspectives,

have attempted to assess the level of trust from a global viewpoint. For
instance, the “World Value Survey” published results of a 2014 study
which gauges interpersonal (or social) trust in all countries of the
world. The results of that study can be quickly glanced at through the
following map:
169
This map shows higher levels of social trust in the Scandinavian

countries, China, Northern America, Australia, New Zealand, and Saudi
Arabia. Furthermore, it highlights that levels of social trust plummet
in the MENA region, as well as Latin America and Western Europe.
Other examples of global surveys that tackle trust in governments in
particular. For instance, a 2017 research poll from PEW Research Centre
provides a comprehensive picture of the levels of trust in government
all over the world:
170
Again, countries in Latin American as well as in the MENA region

demonstrate low levels of trust that their governments will do the right
thing for them. In parallel, those countries that display higher trust in the
government are close to the ones that have high social trust (like North
America and Scandinavian countries). This may corroborate a sort of
correlation between interpersonal trust and trust in the governments
in these countries – as highlighted by a part of the literature. However,
these correlations need to be nuanced, since other data may show
different trends. For instance, such tendencies can be glanced in
following graph, from Forbes and Statista:123
123 Niall McCarthy, ‘The Countries That Trust Their Government Most And Least
[Infographic]’, Forbes, 2018, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccar-
thy/2018/01/22/the-countries-that-trust-their-government-most-
and-least-infographic> [accessed 28 April 2020].
171
On one hand, this data partially confirms the positive correlation

between high social trust and high political trust in some countries
(such as China and Canada), but it also shows that trust in government is
fairly low in some countries where social trust is high (such as the United
States). These considerations do not invalidate the data presented in
these surveys, but rather demand increased attention in cross-use of
statistical data, ultimately showing the need for empirical qualitative
research to ground these surveys.
Another dynamic that has been noted in European countries

specifically is that people usually trust non-elected institutions
more than they trust each other or their political system. This can be
visualized in the graph below, based on a study of the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD):
172
The fact that all European countries display higher level of trust
in police and the legal system in respect of the political system is an
important element to take into account.
In general, we can notice a downward trend of public trust in

institutions or governments all over the world. For example, data on the
United States in particular shows that between 1958 and 2015 public
trust in the national government went from a staggering 78 % to a
mere 19 %.
173
A similar trend has been observed in interpersonal trust, which also

decreased drastically in the last 40 years going from 45.78 % in 1972 to
30.78 % in 2014.124
Some final insights can be drawn from the Edelman Trust Barometer,
which is a comprehensive source for trust levels in the world. Its latest
2019 edition reveals that trust in CSOs is high and constantly increasing,
scoring amongst the highest in institutions all over the world (equated
only by financial institutions). Plus, it also shows that trust in media
scores the lowest amongst all institutions. Finally, a slight increase in
trust in governments has been noted in few countries of the world. As
showed above, China remains the country where citizens trust their
government the most.125
124 Esteban Ortiz-Ospina and Mx Roser, ‘Trust’, OurWorldInData.Org, 2020.

125 Edelman, 2019 Edelman Trust Barometer, 2019.
174
Trust in the MENA region
In order to grasp the specific characteristics of trust in the MENA

region, we analyzed recent studies on social and political trust in this
region and drawn a few broad notable trends.126 Generally speaking,
social, interpersonal trust has been generally low throughout the
region with a tendency of gradual decline. The percentage of people
who believe that “most people are trustworthy” generally falls between
10% and 20% in each study. The only exceptions are Egypt and Yemen,
which tend to score overall higher percentages, usually between 30%
and 40%.
Political trust surveys are distinguished into different facets of the

political system and politics. Overall, parliament is the institution with
the lowest levels of trust. Especially high levels of distrust in parliament
were recorded in Iraq, Jordan, Libya, and Tunisia. Similar results were
found for the council of ministers and local governments. The highest
levels of trust were recorded in bureaucratic institutions, including
the police and especially the armed forces. Notably, Jordan scored
exceptionally high level of trust in these areas, while Palestine scored
exceptionally low. The highest levels of distrust, however, were generally
found in ideological organizations. Specifically, distrust in political
parties is generally high - especially in Iraq, Jordan, Libya, and Tunisia -,
peaking for the main Islamist movements. Notable exceptions are the
cases of Morocco, Palestine and Yemen. Religious leaders and presidents
(or prime ministers) recorded a tendency of levels of trust around the
average, perhaps slightly leaning toward distrust. In this area, higher
levels of trust were recorded in Egypt, whilst low levels of trust were
recorded in Iraq, Libya, and Tunisia. Geographically, both political and
social trust tended to be the lowest for Iraq, Jordan, Libya, and Tunisia
and the highest for Egypt and Yemen. Once again, this supports the
suggestion on the general positive correlation between social and
political trust. The most notable longitudinal trend was the slight spike in
126 The following observations were extrapolated from the Arab Barometer,

World Value Survey, Arab Transformations, and Afro-barometer surveys
conducted between 2007 and 2019.
175
trust in 2011 in most countries, particularly those impacted by the Arab

Spring, suggesting a general hope for more trustworthy governments
throughout the MENA region.
Political Trust in the MENA region has also been linked to the stability
of authoritarian regimes. In an authoritarian context, political trust
encompasses the confidence people have in state institutions, such as
the executive, the judiciary, the bureaucracy, the police and the state’s
ability to respond to short term evaluations of social and economic life
changing across a specific time and space.127 Since most of the literature
on political trust derives from samples of democratic countries, case
studies of trust in some countries of the MENA region can provide
original insights on the study on political trust within repressive or
autocratic regimes. For example, in the cases of Tunisia and Turkey the
state’s reliance on police forces and oppressive means entailed a fall
in the trust for the security apparatus – therefore fostering protest
activity and activism against them. Both countries reported high levels
of trust in police forces (58 % for Tunisia and 62 % for Turkey), but the
fact that the security apparatus is mobilized in a repressive way by
the state reduces trust in police forces, and increases the likelihood of
contentious activism.
Social and Political Trust in Morocco
To conclude this section, we will look at the data on trust that has been
reported by different studies specifically in Morocco. Fundamentally,
we can refer to the Arab Barometer report on Morocco, which concluded
2400 qualitative face-to-face interviews between October and
December 2018, with a response rate of 55%. Although the Royal Institute
of Strategic Studies (Institut Royale des Etudes Strategiques, or IRES)
has revealed that Moroccans judge their institutions very differently,
the Arab Barometer reveals a number of important indicators about
how Moroccans feel about their institutions.128
127 Nadine Sika, ‘Trust and Activism in the MENA’, MENA Politics Newsletter Vol-
ume 2 Issue 2, 2019.
128 Arab Barometer. For more information on the study conducted by
176
A first general finding of the Arab Barometer report on Morocco is

that older Moroccan generations still hold reasonable confidence in
the institutions of the country, while the younger generations are
increasingly frustrated by the state of affairs, specifically because
of the lack of economic and political opportunities.129 Only 17% of
respondents aged between 18-29 affirmed that they trust their
government, reaching a level of trust that is three times lower than
the trust of those who are 60 and older. Also, in terms of trust in the
Parliament, only 21% of youth respondents have a lot of, or some, trust
in the institution. A slightly lower percentage of trust (18%) is attributed
to political parties.130 Contrarily, institutions charged with ensuring law
and order enjoy higher levels of trust. For example, 78 % of respondents
trust the army, and two thirds of them trust police forces. Additionally,
6 in 10 respondents trust the Judiciary apparatus. Notably, a leap in the
confidence in the judiciary system has to be highlighted, increasing
from 37% in 2006to 45% in 2016.
Furthermore, the overall trust of Moroccans in their government has

been declining over the years. In 2006, 39% of Moroccans trusted their
government, in comparison to its current standing at 29%. A staggering
64% of Moroccans think that it is necessary to give bribes to get things
done, and another 30% think that it is essential to bribe to receive better
health services. In relation to corruption, only 36% of respondents think
that the government is taking substantial steps in fighting corruption
– with youth being once again the category that is least likely to think
that government is tackling corruption. In such context, it comes with
no surprise that 26% of the respondents think that the economy is the
biggest challenge the country has to face.
The most visible element that arises from these numbers is a clear
pattern of distrust in government due to corruption, an inefficient
and badly perceived parliament and a lack of economic and political
opportunities. This pushes citizens (especially the youth) to think of
the IRES, please refer to https://www.ires.ma/forums/degre-de-confi-
ance-dans-les-institutions/
129 Arab Barometer, p. 2.
130 Arab Barometer, p. 9.
177
migrating and increases their distrust in the ability of their government

to provide for them. The only institutions which are perceived to be
efficient are the ones relating the security apparatus (the army and
police forces) and, to a lesser extent, the judiciary. In this situation,
Moroccan youth do not feel that their concerns can be canalized through
the formal political institutions, especially political parties or parliament,
and the job market is not able to absorb the gap of unemployment. All
these factors have significantly lowered the trust in Morocco’s political
system overall, thus sustaining its systematic crisis.
178
The Trust in Institutions Index demonstrates that the
relationship between citizens and their institutions, especially
the elected ones, is characterized by suspicion and low levels
of trust. Most citizens have little knowledge about their
institutions, showing difficulties in understanding their roles,
functions and utility. This weak knowledge is coupled with poor
quality of public services, such as healthcare and education,
and inadequate job opportunities: these constitute the most
important priorities that citizens believe the government
should address in the next five to ten years. In fact, the poor
delivery of public services increases the sense of prevalence
of corruption, and hence strengthens citizens’ eagerness
in seeking other (informal) alternatives to get better
public services, such as bribes or Wasta (cronies or political
connections). Consequently, this leads to the disengagement
of citizens from formal channels of political expression and
to resort to new forms of political contestations, such as the
economic boycott and street protests.
mipa.institute contact@mipa.institute
MIPAInstitute
N 5, Appartement 5, Rue Figuig - Hassan - Rabat - Tél. : +212 5 37 26 26 02

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Trust in Institutions Index 2020

The Parliament and Beyond

Director and Main Editor : Mohammed Masbah

The Parliament and Beyond

Researchers and Contributors:

Accuracy - Depth - Timeliness - Impact

Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis

Legal Deposit : 2020MO3995

Since 2011, Morocco has gone through constant changes with

While most of the studies have paid attention to the structure of

Within this context, MIPA institute believes that it is important to

In an ideal world, the relationship between citizens and their

This unpleasant situation explains the relevance of this report. The

the combination of different quantitative and qualitative research

The key findings of Morocco’s Trust in Institutions Index demonstrate

MIPA strives in its mission to produce relevant and in-depth analysis

The report is useful for both researchers and policymakers.

The authors sincerely express their gratitude to the National

This report benefited from feedback received by colleagues and

Mansour, and Carolyn L. Barnett who provided feedback on the draft of

· Family is the most trusted social institution. The Moroccans surveyed

· As the social circle expands to include colleagues, neighbors and people

· The least trusted part of society is strangers or people whom they

· According to the study, around 31% of Moroccans claimed they

· The Moroccans surveyed expressed a low level of satisfaction in

· In regard to the priorities that the respondents want to see the

· Moroccans did enjoy a relatively varied degree of participation in

· In terms of trust in political institutions, Moroccans had overall

· However, they had really high contrasting levels of trust in non-

· In the middle were the non-elected institutions such as civil society

· It was also denoted in the study, that two important non-elected

· When asked about their confidence or trust in their politicians or

Trust in the Parliament

· The study revealed that most participants ignored the workings of

· It was revealed from the qualitative interviews that citizens felt

As trust is everywhere, people tend to take it for granted. It is

difficulties that elected institutions, such as the Parliament and

In this regard, the Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis dedicated

religions, nationalities or sexual orientations. It should also be noted

While trust in close social groups is high, trust in political institutions

Likewise, the Parliament is one of the least trusted institutions.

How to explain political distrust?

The nexus between government performance, quality of public

is central to understanding the low levels of trust in political institutions.

Consequently, the plummeting trust in public institutions leaves

In this regard, this report proposes an ideal-model that links political

Cycle of political trust

Source: MIPA’s own elaboration

to public service delivery, such as education and healthcare. It will also

At the end of the report, we provided a literature review that aims at

Unpacking the findings on social and political trust in Morocco will

The quantitative analysis was based on a sample of 1,000 people in

Concerning the sample of the survey, half of the participants

In terms of qualitative analysis, the report relies upon the ‘grounded

gies for Qualitative Research (Routledge, 1967).

literature. Finally, we worked on generating a coherent interpretation of

Generally speaking, the authors followed a thorough approach and

Chapter I : Social Trust

- Social trust decreases steadily moving away from the narrow

8 Interview with, H., small entrepreneur, Casablanca, October 2019.

11 Interview with F., industry worker, Casablanca, October 2019.

13 Interview with M. Marrakech, October 2019.