1. PEDRO L.

LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672

Complainant,
Present:
 
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,
Respondent. Promulgated:
 
This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients [2] to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance [3] and expeditious collection
on their claims.[4] To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
 
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit [5] of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondents
services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondents calling card: [6]
 
Front
 
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
 
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
 
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719
 
 
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card. [7]
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. [8]
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation, [9] found that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 [10] and other
canons[11] of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 [12] of the
Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainants professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR.  And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said
misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
 
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. [13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his
talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.
[14]

 
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
 
RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.
 
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers. [15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment. [16]
 
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
 
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.
 
 
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) [17] as a measure to protect the community from
barratry and champerty.[18]
Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal
business as well as profited from referrals suits.
 
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory hearing.
 
Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a more
favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or
reduced fees for his services. [20] Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never denied Labianos
connection to his office.[21] Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:
 
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.  Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client
except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees for transcript of
stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
 
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. [22] It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the
case or an additional stake in its outcome. [23] Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest
in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause. [24]
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice [25] which calls for the exercise of the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating
contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. [26] Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to
uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
 
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the
wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
 
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.
[27]
 For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
 
(a)         lawyers name;
(b)        name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c)         address;
(d)        telephone number and
(e)         special branch of law practiced.[28]
 
 
Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance
their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity
of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly
responsible for the printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.
 
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.

2. G.R. No. L-18727 August 31, 1964

JESUS MA. CUI, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant, 

ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.law library
This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The office in contention is that of Administrator of the  Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27 April 1961 in
favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Do �a Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless
persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislature passed 27 November 1925) and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a series of donations,
principally the deed of donation executed on 2 January 1926.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them." Section 2
of the deed of donation provides as follows:

Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o incapacidad se hallare residiendo en la caudad de Cebu, y
nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese residiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu, designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitime Mauricio Cui. Ambos
sobrinos administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o incapacidad de estos dos administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona
que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimainente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero
civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor impuesto o contribution. En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la
administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare persona de estas cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al senor Obispo de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia
Catolica, apostolica, Romana, que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu, y en su defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.

Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio  until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May 1931 and
the second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of controversies and court litigations ensued concerning the
position of administrator, to which, in so far as they are pertinent to the present case, reference will be made later in this decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Do �a Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent
administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his
oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand not having been
complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders
of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred
pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea
titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."chanrobles virtual law library

The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not
having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated
by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donation and considering the
function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by
the defendant and by the intervenor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission
thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as "testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua Espa �ola, Real
Academia Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y
tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o puntos legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its
holder to exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license
officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and
receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence
of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For
this purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code of
Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of
"the necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from
some law school or university.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or
a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of
the Hospicio  shall "make regulations for the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute"
(Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer properties of considerable value - for all of which work, it is to be
presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless
disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the administrator may be removed on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound
moral character. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was reinstated on 10
February 1960, before he assumed the office of administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts.

Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public interest in the
orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar,
satisfy the court that he is a person of good moral character - a fit and proper person to practice law. The court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature
and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301,
p. 443) chanrobles virtual law library
Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the requirements for reinstatement have been held
to be the same as for original admission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.) chanrobles virtual law library

The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is "of good moral character" in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper person
to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney, and whether his mental qualifications are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to the public, and the moral attributes are to be regarded
as a separate and distinct from his mental qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816).

As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for
the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped
out.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting the prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section 216 of Act 190), this kind
of action must be filed within one (1) year after the right of plaintiff to hold the office arose.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago as 1932. On January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in  quo warranto  against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed the administration
of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father and Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer by the defendant there to the
complaint and complaint in intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of dismissal, the case was remanded for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not
prosecute the case as indicated in the decision of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui continued as administrator, Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui
accepted a position as assistant administrator.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial maneuvers. First he informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1 February 1950, that as of the previous 1 January he had
"made clear" his intention of occupying the office of administrator of the Hospicio." He followed that up with another letter dated 4 February, announcing that he had taken over the administration as of 1 January
1950. Actually, however, he took his oath of office before a notary public only on 4 March 1950, after receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the Social Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he
had already assumed the position as stated in his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather muddled situation was referred by the Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3 April 1950
(op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting another opinion previously given, in effect ruled that the plaintiff, not beings lawyer, was not entitled to the administration of the  Hospicio.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library

Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4 March 1950, the  Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ. No. R-
1216) because the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's  deposits therein. The Bank then filed a third-party complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had, as stated above, taken oath as administrator.
On 19 October 1950, having been deprived of recognition by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the
administration of the Hospicio. The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February 1954 he was able to take another oath of office as administrator before President Magsaysay, and soon
afterward filed a second motion to dismiss in Civil case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a case was pending in Court, stated in a telegram to his Executive Secretary that "as far as (he)
was concerned the court may disregard the oath" thus taken. The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and the other parties in the case filed their notice of appeal from the order of dismissal. The plaintiff then
filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as party in the appeal and the trial Court again granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954. Appellants thereupon instituted a  mandamus proceeding in the Supreme
Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which was decided on 28 May 1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the appeal. That appeal, however, after it reached this Court was dismiss upon motion of the parties,
who agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee of the Hospicio  ... should be ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the incumbent by whomsoever is not occupying the office but
believes he has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of dismissal was issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action in  quo warranto  was filed against him
by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the aforesaid motion for dismissal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as member of the Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as administrator in his favor, pursuant to the
"convenio" between them executed on the same date. The next day Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided the first case of  Cui v. Cui  in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for further proceedings; his acceptance instead of the
position of assistant administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue as administrator and his failure to file an action in quo warranto  against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216
of the Cebu Court was dismissed upon motion of the parties precisely so that the conflicting claims of the parties could be ventilated in such an action - all these circumstances militate against the plaintiff's present
claim in view of the rule that an action in quo warranto must be filed within one year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose. The excuse that the plaintiff did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui
after 31 July 1956 because of the latter's illness did not interrupt the running of the statutory period. And the fact that this action was filed within one year of the defendant's assumption of office in September 1960
does not make the plaintiff's position any better, for the basis of the action is his own right to the office and it is from the time such right arose that the one-year limitation must be counted, not from the date the
incumbent began to discharge the duties of said office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the  Hospicio  mentioned by them in the deed of donation. He is
further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. The deed of donation provides: "a la muerte o incapacidad de estos administradores
(those appointed in the deed itself) pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui,
Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado ... En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administration." Besides being a nearer descendant than
Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by
line and successively to the descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the
next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs equally against plaintiff-
appellee and intervenor-appellant.

3.RE: REPORT ON THE A.M. No. P-06-2177

FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED (Formerly A.M. No. 06-4-268-RTC)
ON THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS
OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO,
CLERK OF COURT IV,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
ORAS, EASTERN SAMAR Present:
 
RESOLUTION

In our resolution dated June 27, 2006, we found Atty. Raquel G. Kho, former clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern Samar, guilty of gross misconduct for his failure to make a timely

remittance of judiciary funds in his custody as required by OCA Circular No. 8A-93. [1] We ordered him to pay a fine of P10,000 for his transgression. The matter did not end there, however. Because his

malfeasance prima facie contravened Canon 1, Rule 1.01[2] of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we ordered him to show cause why he should not be disciplined as a lawyer and as an officer of the court. Atty.

Kho submitted his explanation in compliance with our directive. We shall now resolve this pending matter and bring to a close this regrettable chapter in his career as a government lawyer.
  

In his explanation, Atty. Kho admitted that his failure to make a timely remittance of the cash deposited with him was inexcusable. He maintained, however, that he kept the money in the courts safety vault

and never once used it for his own benefit.

 

Atty. Khos apparent good faith and his ready admission of the infraction, although certainly mitigating, cannot negate the fact that his failure to remit  P65,000 in judiciary funds for over a year was contrary

to the mandatory provisions of OCA Circular 8A-93. That omission was a breach of his oath to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities [3] and of his duties under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility:

 
CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
 
RULE 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

It is no accident that these are the first edicts laid down in the Code of Professional Responsibility for these are a lawyers foremost duties. Lawyers should always keep in mind that, although upholding the

Constitution and obeying the law is an obligation imposed on every citizen, a lawyers responsibilities under Canon 1 mean more than just staying out of trouble with the law. As servants of the law and officers of the

court, lawyers are required to be at the forefront of observing and maintaining the rule of law. They are expected to make themselves exemplars worthy of emulation. [4] This, in fact, is what a lawyers obligation to

promote respect for law and legal processes entails.

 

The least a lawyer can do in compliance with Canon 1 is to refrain from engaging in unlawful conduct. [5] By definition, any act or omission contrary to law is unlawful. [6] It does not necessarily imply the

element of criminality although it is broad enough to include it. [7] Thus, the presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential in order to bring his act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01 which

specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.

 Atty. Khos conduct was not only far from exemplary, it was unlawful as well. For this, he must be called to account. However, his candid and repentant admission of his error, his lack of intent to gain and the
fact that this is his first offense should temper his culpability considerably. Under the circumstances, a fine of P5,000 should suffice.
 

WHEREFORE, Atty. Raquel G. Kho is hereby found GUILTY of unlawful conduct in violation of the Attorneys Oath, Section 20(a), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility. He is ordered to pay a FINE of P5,000 within ten days from receipt of this resolution.
 
 The Financial Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, is hereby DIRECTED to deduct from Atty. Khos accrued leave credits as a former clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Oras,

Eastern Samar the fines imposed in this resolution and in the resolution dated June 27, 2006.
 

4. ROSAURA P. CORDON, complainant, vs.  JESUS BALICANTA, respondent.

On August 21, 1985, herein complainant Rosaura Cordon filed with this Court a complaint for disbarment, docketed as Administrative Case No. 2797, against Atty. Jesus Balicanta.After respondents comment to
the complaint and complainants reply thereto, this Court, on March 29, 1995 referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP, for brevity) for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days
from notice. Commissioner George Briones of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline was initially tasked to investigate the case.Commissioner Briones was later on replaced by Commissioner Renato
Cunanan. Complainant filed a supplemental complaint which was duly admitted and, as agreed upon, the parties filed their respective position papers.

Based on her complaint, supplemental complaint, reply and position paper, the complainant alleged the following facts:

When her husband Felixberto C. Jaldon died, herein complainant Rosaura Cordon and her daughter Rosemarie inherited the properties left by the said decedent.  All in all, complainant and her daughter inherited
21 parcels of land located in Zamboanga City. The lawyer who helped her settle the estate of her late husband was respondent Jesus Balicanta.

Sometime in the early part of 1981, respondent enticed complainant and her daughter to organize a corporation that would develop the said real properties into a high-scale commercial complex with a beautiful
penthouse for complainant. Relying on these apparently sincere proposals, complainant and her daughter assigned 19 parcels of land to Rosaura Enterprises, Incorporated, a newly-formed and duly registered
corporation in which they assumed majority ownership. The subject parcels of land were then registered in the name of the corporation.

Thereafter, respondent single-handedly ran the affairs of the corporation in his capacity as Chairman of the Board, President, General Manager and Treasurer.  The respondent also made complainant sign a
document which turned out to be a voting trust agreement. Respondent likewise succeeded in making complainant sign a special power of attorney to sell and mortgage some of the parcels of land she inherited from
her deceased husband. She later discovered that respondent transferred the titles of the properties to a certain Tion Suy Ong who became the new registered owner thereof. Respondent never accounted for the
proceeds of said transfers.

In 1981, respondent, using a spurious board resolution, contracted a loan from the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP, for brevity) in the amount of Two Million Two Hundred Twenty Pesos (P2,220,000) using as
collateral 9 of the real properties that the complainant and her daughter contributed to the corporation. The respondent ostensibly intended to use the money to construct the Baliwasan Commercial Center (BCC, for
brevity). Complainant later on found out that the structure was made of poor materials such as  sawali, coco lumber and bamboo which could not have cost the corporation anything close to the amount of the loan
secured.

For four years from the time the debt was contracted, respondent failed to pay even a single installment. As a result, the LBP, in a letter dated May 22, 1985, informed respondent that the past due amortizations
and interest had already accumulated to Seven Hundred Twenty-nine Thousand Five Hundred Three Pesos and Twenty-five Centavos (P729,503.25). The LBP made a demand on respondent for payment for the tenth
time. Meanwhile, when the BCC commenced its operations, respondent started to earn revenues from the rentals of BCCs tenants.On October 28, 1987, the LBP foreclosed on the 9 mortgaged properties due to non-
payment of the loan.

Respondent did not exert any effort to redeem the foreclosed properties. Worse, he sold the corporations right to redeem the mortgaged properties to a certain Hadji Mahmud Jammang through a fake board
resolution dated January 14, 1989 which clothed himself with the authority to do so.  Complainant and her daughter, the majority stockholders, were never informed of the alleged meeting held on that date.  Again,
respondent never accounted for the proceeds of the sale of the right to redeem. Respondent also sold to Jammang a parcel of land belonging to complainant and her daughter which was contiguous to the foreclosed
properties and evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 62807. He never accounted for the proceeds of the sale.

Sometime in 1983, complainants daughter, Rosemarie, discovered that their ancestral home had been demolished and that her mother, herein complainant, was being detained in a small nipa shack in a place
called Culianan. Through the help of Atty. Linda Lim, Rosemarie was able to locate her mother.  Rosemarie later learned that respondent took complainant away from her house on the pretext that said ancestral home
was going to be remodeled and painted. But respondent demolished the ancestral home and sold the lot to Tion Suy Ong, using another spurious board resolution designated as Board Resolution No. 1, series of
1992. The resolution contained the minutes of an alleged organizational meeting of the directors of the corporation and was signed by Alexander Wee, Angel Fernando, Erwin Fernando and Gabriel
Solivar. Complainant and her daughter did not know how these persons became stockholders and directors of the corporation. Respondent again did not account for the proceeds of the sale.

Complainant and her daughter made several demands on respondent for the delivery of the real properties they allegedly assigned to the corporation, for an accounting of the proceeds of the LBP loan and as
well as the properties sold, and for the rentals earned by BCC. But the demands remained unheeded. Hence, complainant and her daughter, in a letter dated June 4, 1985, terminated the services of respondent as
their lawyer and repeated their demands for accounting and turn-over of the corporate funds, and the return of the 19 titles that respondent transferred to the corporation.  They also threatened him with legal action
in a letter dated August 3, 1985.

Soon after, complainant found out from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, for brevity) that Rosaura Enterprises, Inc., due to respondents refusal and neglect, failed to submit the corporations annual
financial statements for 1981, 1982 and 1983; SEC General Information Sheets for 1982, 1983 and 1984; Minutes of Annual Meetings for 1982, 1983 and 1984; and Minutes of Annual Meetings of Directors for 1982,
1983 and 1984.

Complainant also discovered that respondent collected rental payments from the tenants of BCC and issued handwritten receipts which he signed, not as an officer of the corporation but as the attorney-at-law
of complainant. Respondent also used the tennis court of BCC to dry his palay and did not keep the buildings in a satisfactory state, so much so that the divisions were losing plywood and other materials to thieves.

Complainant likewise accused respondent of circulating rumors among her friends and relatives that she had become insane to prevent them from believing whatever complainant said.According to
complainant, respondent proposed that she legally separate from her present husband so that the latter would not inherit from her and that respondent be adopted as her son.

For his defense, respondent, in his comment and position paper, denied employing deceit and machination in convincing complainant and her daughter to assign their real properties to the corporation; that
they freely and voluntary executed the deeds of assignment and the voting trust agreement that they signed; that he did not single-handedly manage the corporation as evidenced by certifications of the officers and
directors of the corporation; that he did not use spurious board resolutions authorizing him to contract a loan or sell the properties assigned by the complainant and her daughter; that complainant and her daughter
should be the ones who should render an accounting of the records and revenues inasmuch as, since 1984 up to the present, the part-time corporate book-keeper, with the connivance of the complainant and her
daughter, had custody of the corporate records; that complainant and her daughter sabotaged the operation of BCC when they illegally took control of it in 1986; that he never pocketed any of the proceeds of the
properties contributed by the complainant and her daughter; that the demolition of the ancestral home followed legal procedures; that complainant was never detained in Culianan but she freely and voluntarily lived
with the family of P03 Joel Constantino as evidenced by complainants own letter denying she was kidnapped; and that the instant disbarment case should be dismissed for being premature, considering the pendency
of cases before the SEC and the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga involving him and complainant.

Based on the pleadings and position papers submitted by the parties, Commissioner Renato Cunanan, in his report [1] dated July 1, 1999, recommended respondents disbarment based on the following findings:

A. The complainant, Rosaura Jaldon-Cordon and her daughter, Rosemarie were stockholders of a corporation, together with respondent, named Rosaura Enterprises, Inc.

Per the Articles of Incorporation marked as Annex A of Complainants Position Paper, complainants subscription consists of 55% of the outstanding capital stock while her daughters consists of 18%, giving them a total
of 73%. Respondents holdings consist of 24% while three other incorporators, Rosauro L. Alvarez, Vicente T. Maalac and Darhan S. Graciano each held 1% of the capital stock of the corporation.

B. On April 5, 1981, complainant and her daughter Rosemarie Jaldon executed two Deeds of Transfer and Assignment conveying and transferring to the corporation 19 parcels of land in exchange for shares of stock in
the corporation.

xxx xxx xxx

C. Both Deeds of Assignment particularly page 3 thereof indicate that respondent accepted said assignment of properties and titles in behalf of the corporation as Treasurer. The deeds were signed on April 5, 1981.

xxx xxx xxx
Together, therefore, complainant and her daughter owned 1,711 shares of the 1,750 shares comprising the authorized capital stock of the corporation of 97% thereof.

No increase in capitalization was applied for by the corporation.

F. Respondent claims in his Comment, his Answer and his Position Paper that on April 4, 1981 he was elected as Chairman and Director and on April 5, 1981 he was elected President of the corporation.Respondents
own Annexes marked as G and G-1 of his Comment show that on April 4, 1981 he was not only elected as Chairman and Director as he claims but as Director, Board Chairman and President. The purported minutes
was only signed by respondent and an acting Secretary by the name of Vicente Maalac.

Said Annex does not show who was elected Treasurer.

Respondents Annex H and H-1 shows that in the alleged organizational meeting of the directors on April 5, 1981 a certain Farnacio Bucoy was elected Treasurer.  Bucoys name does not appear as an incorporator nor a
stockholder anywhere in the documents submitted.

The purported minutes of the organizational meeting of the directors was signed only by respondent Balicanta and a Secretary named Verisimo Martin.

G. Since respondent was elected as Director, Chairman and President on April 4, 1981 as respondents own Annexes G to G-1 would show, then complainants claim that respondent was likewise acting as Treasurer of
two corporations bear truth and credence as respondent signed and accepted the titles to 19 parcels of land ceded by the complainant and her daughter, as Treasurer on April 5, 1981 after he was already purportedly
elected as Chairman, President and Director.

H. Respondent misleads the Commission into believing that all the directors signed the minutes marked as Exhibit H to H-1 by stating that the same was duly signed by all the Board of Directors when the document
itself shows that only he and one Verisimo Martin signed the same.

He also claims that all the stockholders signed the minutes of organizational meeting marked as Annexes G and G-1 of his Comment yet the same shows that only the acting Chairman and acting Secretary signed.

I. Respondent claims that the Board or its representative was authorized by the stockholders comprising 2/3 of the outstanding capital stock, as required by law, to mortgage the parcels of land belonging to the
corporation, which were all assigned to the corporation by complainant and her daughter, by virtue of Annex I and I-1: attached to his Comment.

The subject attachment however reveals that only the following persons signed their conformity to the said resolution: respondent Balicanta who owned 109 shares, Vicente Maalac (1 share), Daihan Graciano (1
share).

Complainants who collectively held a total of 1,711 shares out of the 1,750 outstanding capital stock of the corporation were not represented in the purported stockholders meeting authorizing the mortgage of the
subject properties.

The 2/3 vote required by law was therefore not complied with yet respondent proceeded to mortgage the subject 9 parcels of land by the corporation.

J. Respondent further relies on Annex J of his Comment, purportedly the minutes of a special meeting of the Board of Directors authorizing him to obtain a loan and mortgage the properties of the corporation dated
August 29, 1981. This claim is baseless. The required ratification of 2/3 by the stockholders of records was not met. Again, respondent attempts to mislead the Commission and Court.
K. Further, the constitution of the Board is dubious. The alleged minutes of the organizational meeting of the stockholders electing the members of the Board, have not been duly signed by the stockholders as shown
in respondents annex G which was purportedly the organizational meeting of the stockholders.

L. Also, Annex J of respondents Comment which purportedly authorized him to obtain a loan and to mortgage the 9 parcels of land was only signed by himself and a secretary.

M. In said Annex 'J' of respondents Comment he stated that complainant Rosaura Cordon was on leave by virtue of a voting trust agreement allegedly executed by complainant in his favor covering all her shares of
stock. The claim is baseless. The voting trust referred to by respondent (annex D of his Comment), even if it were assumed to be valid, covered only 266 shares of complainants yet she owned a total of 1,039 shares
after she and her daughter ceded in favor of the corporation 19 parcels of land.

Being a former lawyer to complainant, respondent should have ensured that her interest was safeguarded. Yet, complainant was apparently and deliberately left our (sic) on the pretext that, she had executed a voting
trust agreement in favor of respondent.

It is suspicious that complainant was made to sign a voting trust agreement on 21 August 1981 and immediately thereafter, the resolutions authorizing respondent to obtain a loan and to mortgage the 9 parcels of
land were passed and approved.

N. It is also highly irregular for respondent who is a lawyer, to allow a situation to happen where, with the exclusion of complainant as director the result was that there remained only 4 members of the Board,.

O. Respondents own pleadings submitted to the Commission contradict each other.

1. For instance, while in his Comment respondent DENIES that he employed deceit and machination in convincing the complainant and her daughter to sign the articles of incorporation of Rosaura Enterprises and in
ceding to the corporation 19 parcels of land in Zamboanga City, because they freely, intelligently and voluntarily signed the same, yet, in his Position Paper, respondent took another stance.

In paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 of his Position Paper which was submitted 12 years later, respondent claimed that it was actually the idea of Atty. Rosaura L. Alvarez that a corporation be put up to incorporate the estate of
the late Felixberto D. Jaldon.

2. Likewise, respondent claimed that complainant and her daughter were not directors, hence they were not notified of meetings, in paragraph 2-6 (c) of his Comment he blamed the other stockholders and directors
for the corporations inability to comply with the Land Banks demands saying that they have consistently failed since 1982 to convene (1.) for the annual stockholders meetings and (i.i) for the monthly board meeting.

His own pleadings claim that he had been the Chairman/President since 1981 to the present. If (sic) so, it was his duty to convene the stockholders and the directors for meetings.

Respondent appeared able to convene the stockholders and directors when he needed to make a loan of p2.2 million; when he sold the corporations right of redemption over the foreclosed properties of the
corporation to Jammang, when he sold one parcel of land covered by TCT 62,807 to Jammang in addition to the 9 parcels of land which were foreclosed, and when he sold the complainants ancestral home covered by
TCT No. 72,004.

It is thus strange why respondent claims that the corporation could not do anything to save the corporations properties from being foreclosed because the stockholders and directors did not convene.

This assertion of respondent is clearly evident of dishonest, deceitful and immoral conduct especially because, in all his acts constituting conveyances of corporate property, respondent used minutes of stockholders
and directors meetings signed only by him and a secretary or signed by him and persons who were not incorporators much less stockholders.
It is worthy of note that in respondents Exhibits 15, 16, 17 and 18 of his position paper, there were 7 new stockholders and complainant appeared to have only 266 shares to her name while her daughter Rosemarie
had no shares at all. Respondent did not present any proof of conveyance of shares by complainant and her daughter.

It is further worth noting that complainants voting trust (annex D of respondents Comment) where she allegedly entrusted 266 shares to respondent on August 21, 1981 had only a validity of 5 years.  Thus, she should
have had her entire holdings of 1,283 shares back in her name in August 1986.

Respondents purported minutes of stockholders meeting (Exhs. 15 and 17) do not reflect this.

There was no explanation whatsoever from respondent on how complainant and her daughter lost their 97% control holding in the corporation.

3. As a further contradiction in respondents pleadings, we note that in paragraph 2.7.C of his Comment he said that only recently, this year, 1985, the complainant and her aforenamed daughter examined said
voluminous supporting receipts/documents which had previously been examined by the Land Bank for loan releases, during which occasion respondent suggested to them that the corporation will have to hire a full-
time book-keeper to put in order said voluminous supporting receipts/documents, to which they adversely reacted due to lack of corporate money to pay for said book-keeper. But in respondents Position Paper par.
6.3 he stated that:

Anyway, it is not the respondent but rather the complainant who should render a detailed accounting to the corporation of the corporate records as well as corporate revenues/income precisely because  since
1994 to the present:

(a). The corporate part-time book-keeper Edilberto Benedicto, with the indispensable connivance and instigation of the complainant and her daughter, among others, has custody of the corporate records, xxx

4. In other contradictory stance, respondent claims in par. 7.3 of his position paper that complainant and her daughter sabotaged the BCC operations of the corporation by illegally taking over actual control and
supervision thereof sometime in 1986, xxx

Yet respondents own exhibits in his position paper particularly Exhibit 15 and 16 where the subject of the foreclosed properties of the corporation comprising the Baliwasan Commercial Center (BCC) was taken up,
complainant and her daughter were not even present nor were they the subject of the discussion, belying respondents claim that the complainant and her daughter illegally took actual control of BCC.

5. On the matter of the receipts issued by respondent evidencing payment to him of rentals by lessees of the corporation, attached to the complaint as Annexes H to H-17, respondent claims that the receipts are
temporary in nature and that subsequently regular corporate receipts were issued. On their face however the receipts clearly appear to be official receipts, printed and numbered duly signed by the respondent
bearing his printed name.

It is difficult to believe that a lawyer of respondent stature would issue official receipts to lessees if he only meant to issue temporary ones.

6. With regard to respondents claim that the complainant consented to the sale of her ancestral home, covered by TCT No. T-72,004 to one Tion Suy Ong for which he attached as Exhibit 22 to his Position Paper the
minutes of an annual meeting of the stockholders, it behooves this Commission why complainants signature had to be accompanied by her thumb mark. Furthermore, complainants signature appears unstable and
shaky. This Office is thus persuaded to believe complainants allegation in paragraph 3b of her position paper that since  September 1992 up to March 1993 she was being detained by one PO# (sic) Joel Constantino
and his wife under instructions from respondent Balicanta.

This conclusion is supported by a letter from respondent dated March 1993, Annex H of complainants position paper, where respondent ordered Police Officer Constantino to allow Atty. Linda Lim and Rosemarie
Jaldon to talk to Tita Rosing.
The complainants thumb mark together with her visibly unstable shaky signature lends credence to her claim that she was detained in the far flung barrio of Culianan under instructions of respondent while her
ancestral home was demolished and the lot sold to one Tion Suy Ong.

It appears that respondent felt compelled to over-ensure complainants consent by getting her to affix her thumb mark in addition to her signature.

7. Respondent likewise denies that he also acted as Corporate Secretary in addition to being the Chairman, President and Treasurer of the corporation.  Yet, respondent submitted to this commission documents which
are supported to be in the possession of the Corporate Secretary such as the stock and transfer book and minutes of meetings.

The foregoing findings of this Commission are virtual smoking guns that prove on no uncertain terms that respondent, who was the legal counsel of complainant in the latter part of the settlement of the estate of her
deceased husband, committed unlawful, immoral and deceitful conduct proscribed by Rule 1.01 of the code of professional responsibility.

Likewise, respondent clearly committed a violation of Canon 15 of the same code which provides that A lawyer should observe candor fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client.

Respondents acts gravely diminish the publics respect for the integrity of the profession of law for which this Commission recommends that he be meted the penalty of disbarment.

The pendency of the cases at the SEC and the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga filed by complainant against respondent does not preclude a determination of respondents culpability as a lawyer.

This Commission cannot further delay the resolution of this complaint filed in 1985 by complainant, and old widow who deserves to find hope and recover her confidence in the judicial system.

The findings of this office, predominantly based on documents adduced by both parties lead to only one rather unpalatable conclusion. That respondent Atty. Jesus F. Balicanta, in his professional relations with herein
complainant did in fact employ unlawful, dishonest, and immoral conduct proscribed in no uncertain terms by Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In addition, respondents actions clearly violated
Canon 15 to 16 of the same Code.

It is therefore our unpleasant duty to recommend that respondent, having committed acts in violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, thereby causing a great disservice to the profession, be meted the
ultimate sanction of disbarment.[2]

On September 30, 1999, while Commissioner Cunanans recommendation for respondents disbarment was pending review before Executive Vice-President and Northern Luzon Governor Teofilo Pilando,
respondent filed a motion requesting for a full-blown investigation and for invalidation of the entire proceedings and/or remedial action under Section 11, Rule 139-B, Revised Rules of Court, alleging that he had
evidence that Commissioner Cunanans report was drafted by the lawyers of complainant, Attys. Antonio Cope and Rita Linda Jimeno. He presented two unsigned anonymous letters allegedly coming from a
disgruntled employee of Attys. Cope and Jimeno. He claimed to have received these letters in his mailbox. [3]

Respondents motion alleging that Attys. Antonio Cope and Rita Linda Jimeno drafted Commissioner Cunanans report was accompanied by a complaint praying for the disbarment of said lawyers including
Commissioner Cunanan. The complaint was docketed as CBD Case No. 99-658. After Attys. Cope and Jimeno and Commissioner Cunanan filed their answers, a hearing was conducted by the Investigating Committee of
the IBP Board of Governors.

On May 26, 2001, the IBP Board of Governors issued a resolution [4] dismissing for lack of merit the complaint for disbarment against Attys. Cope and Jimeno and Commissioner Cunanan.  And in Adm. Case No.
2797, the Board adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Cunanan, and meted against herein respondent Balicanta the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for 5 years for
commission of acts of misconduct and disloyalty by taking undue and unfair advantage of his legal knowledge as a lawyer to gain material benefit for himself at the expense of complainant Rosaura P. Jaldon-Cordon
and caused serious damage to the complainant.[5]
 To support its decision, the Board uncovered respondents fraudulent acts in the very same documents he presented to exonerate himself.  It also took note of respondents contradictory and irreconcilable
statements in the pleadings and position papers he submitted. However, it regarded the penalty of disbarment as too severe for respondents misdeeds, considering that the same were his first offense. [6]

Pursuant to Section 12 (b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, [7] the said resolution in Administrative Case No. 2797 imposing the penalty of suspension for 5 years on respondent was automatically elevated to this
Court for final action. On the other hand, the dismissal of the complaint for disbarment against Attys. Cope and Jimeno and Commissioner Cunanan, docketed as CBD Case No. 99-658, became final in the absence of
any petition for review.

This Court confirms the duly supported findings of the IBP Board that respondent committed condemnable acts of deceit against his client.  The fraudulent acts he carried out against his client followed a well
thought of plan to misappropriate the corporate properties and funds entrusted to him.  At the very outset, he embarked on his devious scheme by making himself the President, Chairman of the Board, Director and
Treasurer of the corporation, although he knew he was prohibited from assuming the position of President and Treasurer at the same time. [8]As Treasurer, he accepted in behalf of the corporation the 19 titles that
complainant and her daughter co-owned. The other treasurer appointed, Farnacio Bucoy, did not appear to be a stockholder or director in the corporate records.  The minutes of the meetings supposedly electing him
and Bucoy as officers of the corporation actually bore the signatures of respondent and the secretary only, contrary to his claim that they were signed by the directors and stockholders.

He likewise misled the IBP investigating commission in claiming that the mortgage of 9 of the properties of the corporation previously belonging to complainant and her daughter was ratified by the stockholders
owning two-thirds or 67% of the outstanding capital stock when in fact only three stockholders owning 111 out of 1,750 outstanding shares or 6.3% assented thereto.  The alleged authorization granting him the power
to contract the LBP loan for Two Million Two Hundred Twenty Pesos (P2,220,000) was also not approved by the required minimum of two-thirds of the outstanding capital stock despite respondents claim to the
contrary. In all these transactions, complainant and her daughter who both owned 1,711 out of the 1,750 outstanding shares of the corporation or 97.7% never had any participation. Neither were they informed
thereof.

Clearly, there was no quorum for a valid meeting for the discussion and approval of these transactions.

Respondent cannot take refuge in the contested voting trust agreement supposedly executed by complainant and her daughter for the reason that it authorized respondent to represent complainant for only
266 shares.

Aside from the dishonest transactions he entered into under the cloak of sham resolutions, he failed to explain several discrepancies in his version of the facts.  We hereby reiterate some of these statements
noted by Commissioner Cunanan in his findings.

First, respondent blamed the directors and the stockholders who failed to convene for the required annual meetings since 1982.  However, respondent appeared able to convene the stockholders and directors
when he contracted the LBP debt, when he sold to Jammang the corporations right of redemption over the foreclosed properties of the corporation, when he sold one parcel of land covered by TCT No. 62807 to
Jammang, when he mortgaged the 9 parcels of land to LBP which later foreclosed on said mortgage, and when he sold the complainants ancestral home covered by TCT No. 72004.

Second,  the factual findings of the investigating commission, affirmed by the IBP Board, disclosed that complainant and her daughter own 1,711 out of 1,750 shares of the outstanding capital stock of the
corporation, based on the Articles of Incorporation and deeds of transfer of the properties. But respondents evidence showed that complainant had only 266 shares of stock in the corporation while her daughter had
none, notwithstanding the fact that there was nothing to indicate that complainant and her daughter ever conveyed their shares to others.

Respondent likewise did not explain why he did not return the certificates representing the 266 shares after the lapse of 5 years from the time the voting trust certificate was executed in 1981. [9]

The records show that up to now, the complainant and her daughter own 97% of the outstanding shares but respondent never bothered to explain why they were never asked to participate in or why they were
never informed of important corporate decisions.

Third, respondent, in his comment, alleged that due to the objection of complainant and her daughter to his proposal to hire an accountant, the corporation had no formal accounting of its revenues and
income. However, respondents position paper maintained that there was no accounting because the part-time bookkeeper of the corporation connived with complainant and her daughter in keeping the corporate
records.
 Fourth, respondents claim that complainant and her daughter took control of the operations of the corporation in 1986 is belied by the fact that complainant and her daughter were not even present in the
alleged meeting of the board (which took place after 1986) to discuss the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. The truth is that he never informed them of such meeting and he never gave control of the
corporation to them.

Fifth, Commissioner Cunanan found that:

5. on the matter of the receipts issued by respondent evidencing payment to him of rentals by lessees of the corporation, attached to the complaint as Annexes H to H-17, respondent claims that the receipts are
temporary in nature and that subsequently regular corporate receipts were issued.  On their face however the receipts clearly appear to be official receipts, printed and numbered duly signed by the respondent
bearing his printed name.

It is difficult to believe that a lawyer of respondents stature would issue official receipts to lessees if he only meant to issue temporary ones. [10]

Sixth,  respondent denies that he acted as Corporate Secretary aside from being the Chairman, President and Treasurer of the corporation. Yet respondent submitted to the investigating commission documents
which were supposed to be in the official possession of the Corporate Secretary alone such as the stock and transfer book and minutes of meetings.

Seventh,  he alleged in his comment that he was the one who proposed the establishment of the corporation that would invest the properties of the complainant but, in his position paper, he said that it was a
certain Atty. Rosauro Alvarez who made the proposal to put up the corporation.

After a thorough review of the records, we find that respondent committed grave and serious misconduct that casts dishonor on the legal profession.  His misdemeanors reveal a deceitful scheme to use the
corporation as a means to convert for his own personal benefit properties left to him in trust by complainant and her daughter.

Not even his deviousness could cover up the wrongdoings he committed. The documents he thought could exculpate him were the very same documents that revealed his immoral and shameless ways.  These
documents were extremely revealing in that they unmasked a man who knew the law and abused it for his personal gain without any qualms of conscience. They painted an intricate web of lies, deceit and
opportunism beneath a carefully crafted smokescreen of corporate maneuvers.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society, the obligation to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Specifically, he is
forbidden to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. [11] If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its
tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. [12] Thus, the requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the
possession of legal learning. [13] Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain ones good standing in that
exclusive and honored fraternity. [14] Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the
pleasant thing if it is wrong.[15] This must be so because vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his clients property, reputation, his life, his all. [16]

Indeed, the words of former Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals Pompeyo Diaz cannot find a more relevant application than in this case:

There are men in any society who are so self-serving that they try to make law serve their selfish ends. In this group of men, the most dangerous is the man of the law who has no conscience. He has, in the arsenal of
his knowledge, the very tools by which he can poison and disrupt society and bring it to an ignoble end. [17]

Good moral standing is manifested in the duty of the lawyer to hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. [18] He is bound to account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client. [19] The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature.  Thus, lawyers are bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on
behalf of their clients and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. [20]

This Court holds that respondent cannot invoke the separate personality of the corporation to absolve him from exercising these duties over the properties turned over to him by complainant. He blatantly used
the corporate veil to defeat his fiduciary obligation to his client, the complainant. Toleration of such fraudulent conduct was never the reason for the creation of said corporate fiction.
 The massive fraud perpetrated by respondent on the complainant leaves us no choice but to set aside the veil of corporate entity.  For purposes of this action therefore, the properties registered in the name of
the corporation should still be considered as properties of complainant and her daughter. The respondent merely held them in trust for complainant (now an ailing 83-year-old) and her daughter.  The properties
conveyed fraudulently and/or without the requisite authority should be deemed as never to have been transferred, sold or mortgaged at all.Respondent shall be liable, in his personal capacity, to third parties who
may have contracted with him in good faith.

Based on the aforementioned findings, this Court believes that the gravity of respondents offenses cannot be adequately matched by mere suspension as recommended by the IBP.Instead, his wrongdoings
deserve the severe penalty of disbarment, without prejudice to his criminal and civil liabilities for his dishonest acts.

WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Jesus T. Balicanta is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.

5. G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994

JON DE YSASI III, petitioner, 

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and JON DE YSASI, respondents.

The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case, notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It would indeed have been the better part of reason if
herein petitioner and private respondent had reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of familial amity and with the grace of reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted instead for judicial
intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and negative publicity. Albeit with distaste, the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve their dispute with the same reasoned detachment accorded any judicial
proceeding before it.

The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein private respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. Prior
thereto, he was successively employed as sales manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as operations manager of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as farm administrator was on a
fixed salary, with other allowances covering housing, food, light, power, telephone, gasoline, medical and dental expenses.

As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily activities and operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third
persons in all matters relating to the hacienda  and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper floor of the house there.

Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his wife and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August,
1982. In November, 1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which lasted over four months, he was under the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In
June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.

During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of his medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However, in April, 1984, without due notice, private
respondent ceased to pay the latter's salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's auditor and
legal adviser, as well as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands, however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC, for brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984, docketed therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84,
against private respondent for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages, thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees.

On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the NLRC, 1 holding that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his employment was for a valid cause, but ordering private
respondent to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said termination of employment to the Department of Labor and Employment as required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130
and consonant with this Court's ruling in Wenphil Corporation vs.  National Labor Relations Commission, et al.2 On appeal to the Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto.3

His motion for reconsideration 4 of said decision having been denied for lack of merit, 5 petitioner filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution: (1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally
dismissed; (2) whether or not he is entitled to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these issues will necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private respondent, such as the exact date when petitioner ceased to function
as farm administrator, the character of the pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from private respondent, that is, whether the same are in the nature of salaries or pensions, and whether or not there was
abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator.

In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended a modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings and conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in
RAB Case No. 0452-84,6 for which reason the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. In compliance with the Court's resolution of November 16, 1992, 7 NLRC filed its comment on February 12,
1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of the findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter. 8

Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor arbiter is worth noting:

This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the fact that because of the special relationship of the parties and the nature of the action involved, this case could very well go down (in)
the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of its kind. For this case is an action filed by an only son, his father's namesake, the only child and therefore the only heir against his own father. 9

Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:

. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2) observations were noted that may justify why this labor case deserves special considerations. First, most of the complaints that petitioner and
private respondent had with each other, were personal matters affecting father and son relationship. And secondly, if any of the complaints pertain to their work, they allow their personal
relationship to come in the way.10

I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of want of just cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due process. He also charges the NLRC with grave abuse of
discretion in relying upon the findings of the executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the hearings thereof.

Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions as farm administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a ground to terminate his employment at Hacienda
Manucao. It is also contended that it is wrong for petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor arbiter and the NLRC as only questions of law may be appealed for resolution by this Court.
Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of the instant petition, private respondent faults herein petitioner for failure to refer to the corresponding pages of the transcripts of stenographic notes, erroneously citing
Sections 15(d) and 16(d), Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d], 
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of page references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code that technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling, and that every and all reasonable means
to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts in each case shall be availed of, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure in the interest of due process.

It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be rendered by a judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who conducted the hearing. The fact that the judge who
heard the case was not the judge who penned the decision does not impair the validity of the judgment, 11 provided that he draws up his decision and resolution with due care and makes certain that they truly and
accurately reflect conclusions and final dispositions on the bases of the facts of and evidence submitted in the case. 12

Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T. Octavio, who conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11, 1985, and was later transferred to Executive Labor
Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who eventually decided the case, presents no procedural infirmity, especially considering that there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of a public officer's functions, 13 which
petitioner has not successfully rebutted.

We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due process, ever mindful of the long-standing legal precept
that rules of procedure must be interpreted to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot indulge private respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to boost his arguments. The
strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere procedural niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence.

The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due process. 14 Article 282 of the Labor Code
enumerates the causes for which an employer may validly terminate an employment, to wit:  
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud
or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.

The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment
or undertaking, unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one
(1) month before the intended date thereof, with due entitlement to the corresponding separation pay rates provided by law. 15Suffering from a disease by reason whereof the continued employment of the employee
is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his co-employee's health, is also a ground for termination of his services provided he receives the prescribed separation pay. 16 On the other hand, it is well-settled that
abandonment by an employee of his work authorizes the employer to effect the former's dismissal from employment. 17

After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent gravely erred in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that petitioner abandoned his employment and was not
illegally dismissed from such employment. For want of substantial bases, in fact or  
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded to the factual findings of an administrative agency, such as herein public respondent NLRC, 18 as even decisions of administrative
agencies which are declared "final" by law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. 19

The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve acceptance:

It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work from October 1982 to December 1982, cannot be construed as abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse. Petitioner was
suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-anal around the anus and fistula under the medical attention of Dr. Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan,
February 19, 1986 at 20-44).

This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by medical bills sent to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
 During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner stayed in Bacolod City upon the instruction(s) of private respondent to recuperate thereat and to handle only administrative matters of the
hacienda in that city. As a manager, petitioner is not really obliged to live and stay 24 hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao.

xxx xxx xxx

After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special circumstances involved and basic human experience, petitioner's illness and strained family relation with respondent Jon de Ysasi II
may be considered as justifiable reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence from work during the period of October 1982 to December 1982. In any event, such absence does not warrant
outright dismissal without notice and hearing.

xxx xxx xxx

The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an employee are as follows:

(1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) clear intention to sever the employer-employee tie (Samson Alcantara,  Reviewer in Labor and
Social Legislation, 1989 edition, p. 133).

This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what constitute abandonment. In Dagupan Bus Company v.  NLRC  (191 SCRA 328), the Court rules that for abandonment to arise, there must be a
concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt act from which it may be inferred that the employee has no more interest to work. Similarly, in  Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative,
Inc. v.  NLRC  (184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his
employment. . . Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore.

There are significant indications in this case, that there is no abandonment. First, petitioner's absence and his decision to leave his residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is justified by his illness and
strained family relations. Second he has some medical certificates to show his frail health. Third, once able to work, petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing private respondent of his
intention to assume again his employment. Last, but not the least, he at once instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal when he realized he was unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that
petitioner had no intention to abandon his employment.20

The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's confinement in the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical treatment. Neither can it be denied that private respondent
was well aware of petitioner's state of health as the former admittedly shouldered part of the medical and hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit to work again. The
disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so serious as to necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation is beside the point. The fact remains that on account of said
illnesses, the details of which were amply substantiated by the attending physician, 21 and as the records are bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner, there was justifiable cause for petitioner's
absence from work. We repeat, it is clear, deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence that is required to constitute abandonment as a valid ground for termination of
employment.22

With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner unmistakably may be classified as a managerial employee 23 to whom the law grants an amount of discretion in the discharge of his duties. This
is why when petitioner stated that "I assigned myself where I want to go," 24 he was simply being candid about what he could do within the sphere of his authority. His duties as farm administrator did not strictly
require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office premises at all times, or to be subjected to specific control from his employer in every aspect of his work. What is essential only is that he runs the farm as
efficiently and effectively as possible and, while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a model employee, in this regard he proved to be quite successful, as there was at least a showing of increased production during
the time that petitioner was in charge of farm operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the years 1983 to 1984, this is because that was the period when petitioner was recuperating from illness and on account of which his
attendance and direct involvement in farm operations were irregular and minimal, hence the supervision and control exercisable by private respondent as employer was necessarily limited. It goes without saying that
the control contemplated refers only to matters relating to his functions as farm administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal affairs and activities.

While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm administrator, petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was no explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no
formal employment contract to begin with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that any transfer of residence would justify the termination of his employment. That petitioner changed
his residence should not be taken against him, as this is undeniably among his basic rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence per se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-employee relationship.

Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his son's intention of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept petitioner on the payroll, reported him as an
employee of the haciendafor social security purposes, and paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions therefrom until the end of December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983 when he became
convinced that petitioner would no longer return to work that he considered the latter to have abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer listed him as an employee. According to private respondent,
whatever amount of money was given to petitioner from that time until 
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles from a father to a son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions were made therefrom. It was only in April, 1984 that
private respondent completely stopped giving said pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard petitioner had been saying about sending him to jail.

Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on oral deposition regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him, " (h)e quemado los (p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges
with Manucao") as expressive of petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In addition to insinuations of sinister motives on the part of petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter abandoning the job upon
accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent takes the novel position that the agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the administration of the farm legally converts the initial abandonment
to implied voluntary resignation.25

As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew about petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The assertion regarding abandonment of work,
petitioner argues, is further belied by his continued performance of various services related to the operations of the farm from May to the last quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's accountant and
legal adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was discontinued since April, 1984, and his indication of having recovered and his willingness and capability to resume his work at the farm as expressed in
a letter dated September 14, 1984. 26 With these, petitioner contends that it is immaterial how the monthly pecuniary amounts are designated, whether as salary, pension or allowance, with or without deductions, as
he was entitled thereto in view of his continued service as farm administrator. 27

To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may justly be made there must be a concurrence of two elements,  viz.: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Such intent we find
dismally wanting in this case.

It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's plans of returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982, prolonged though it may have been, was not
without valid causes of which private respondent had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to believe that petitioner was no longer returning to work, private respondent neither explains nor substantiates
by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.

Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as even after January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced" that petitioner would no longer work at the
farm, the latter continued to perform services directly required by his position as farm administrator. These are duly and correspondingly evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm machinery/equipment from
G.A. Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and paying for additional farm equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to Bacolod through Zip Forwarders, 29 getting the payment of the additional cash advances
for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities, Inc., 30 and remitting to private respondent through 
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil. 31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to the normal activities and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to request or even command his child to run errands
for him. In the present case, however, considering the nature of these transactions, as well as the property values and monetary sums involved, it is unlikely that private respondent would leave the matter to just
anyone. Prudence dictates that these matters be handled by someone who can be trusted or at least be held accountable therefor, and who is familiar with the terms, specifications and other details relative thereto,
such as an employee. If indeed petitioner had abandoned his job or was considered to have done so by private respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of place, to expect or to oblige petitioner to concern
himself with matters relating to or expected of him with respect to what would then be his past and terminated employment. It is hard to imagine what further authority an employer can have over a dismissed
employee so as to compel him to continue to perform work-related tasks:

It is also significant that the special power of attorney 32 executed 

by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating —

xxx xxx xxx

That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a resident of Hda. Manucao, hereinafter called and referred to as PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill District, and a duly
accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-ISABELA PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;

That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks with BIPA representing payment for all checks and papers to which I am entitled to (sic) as such planter-member;

That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these presents 

I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT

JON de YSASI III

whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR ME and in my name, place and stead, my check/checks aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given the power and
authority to sign for me and in my name, place and stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said check/checks. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said
check/checks, but to turn the same over to me for my proper disposition.

That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my 

Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing the receipts therefor.

That I further request that my said check/checks be made a "CROSSED CHECK".

xxx xxx xxx

remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been terminated by reason of abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous requests for an explanation regarding the stoppage of
his salaries and benefits,33 the issuance of withholding tax reports, 34 as well as correspondence reporting his full recovery and readiness to go back to work, 35 and, specifically, his filing of the complaint for illegal
dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his work.

We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for private respondent, ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the latter's intention to abandon his work. We
perceive the irregularity in the taking of such deposition without the presence of petitioner's counsel, and the failure of private respondent to serve reasonably advance notice of its taking to said counsel, thereby
foreclosing his opportunity to 
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof on the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by Administrative Assistant Celestina G. Ovejera of said
office.36 Fair play dictates that at such an important stage of the proceedings, which involves the taking of testimony, both parties must be afforded equal opportunity to examine and cross-examine a witness.

As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as salary, pension, allowance or  ex gratia handout, there is no question as to petitioner's entitlement thereto inasmuch as he continued
to perform services in his capacity as farm administrator. The change in description of said amounts contained in the pay slips or in the receipts prepared by private respondent cannot be deemed to be determinative
of petitioner's employment status in view of the peculiar circumstances above set out. Besides, if such amounts were truly in the nature of allowances given by a parent out of concern for his child's welfare, it is rather
unusual that receipts therefor 37 should be necessary and required as if they were ordinary business expenditures.

Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of the father's agreement to support his son after the
latter abandoned his work. As we have determined that no abandonment took place in this case, the monthly sums received by petitioner, regardless of designation, were in consideration for services rendered
emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were not of a character that can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental duty and solicitude. We are also hard put to imagine how
abandonment can be impliedly converted into a voluntary resignation without any positive act on the part of the employee conveying a desire to terminate his employment. The very concept of resignation as a
ground for termination by the employee of his employment 38 does not square with the elements constitutive of abandonment.

On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of notice and hearing. 39 Private respondent, in
opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to cases where the employer seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of the grounds
enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the situation obtaining in this case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner on any ground since it was petitioner who allegedly abandoned his
employment.40

The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are set out in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in this wise:

Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission(s) constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In
cases of abandonment of work, notice shall be served at the worker's last known address.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the allegations as stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall
afford the worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.

Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.

Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint
with the Regional Branch of the Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

 Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a monthly report to the Regional Office having jurisdiction over the place of work at all dismissals effected by him during the month,
specifying therein the names of the dismissed workers, the reasons for their dismissal, the dates of commencement and termination of employment, the positions last held by them and such other
information as may be required by the Ministry for policy guidance and statistical purposes.

Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that petitioner was denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice about his impending dismissal and the grounds
therefor, much less a chance to be heard. Even as private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory twin requirements of procedural due process in this particular case, he in effect admits that no
notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by the certification issued on September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI of the Department of Labor that no notice of termination of the
employment of petitioner was submitted thereto. 41

Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot be denied that notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be dismissed, as the second sentence of Section 2 of the
pertinent implementing rules explicitly requires service thereof at the employee's last known address, by way of substantial compliance. While it is conceded that it is the employer's prerogative to terminate an
employee, especially when there is just cause therefor, the requirements of due process cannot be lightly taken. The law does not countenance the arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative when it has the
effect of undermining the fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in favor of the employee. 42

On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the Solicitor General rejoins as follows:

The Labor Arbiter held thus:

While we are in full agreement with the respondent as to his defense of implied resignation and/or abandonment, records somehow showed that he failed to notify the
Department of 
Labor and Employment for his sons' (sic)/complainants' (sic) aba(n)donment as required by BP 130. And for this failure, the other requisite for a valid termination by an employer
was not complied with. This however, would not work to invalidate the otherwise (sic) existence of a valid cause for dismissal. The validity of the cause of dismissal must be
upheld at all times provided however that sanctions must be imposed on the respondent for his failure to observe the notice on due process requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 80587). (Decision Labor Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C" Petition), . . .

This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation v.  NLRC, 170 SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the rule applied to the facts is: once an employee is dismissed for just cause, he must not be rewarded  
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to observe procedural due process. The public policy behind this is that, it may encourage the employee to do even worse and render a
mockery of the rules of discipline required to be observed. However, the employer must be penalized for his infraction of due process. In the present case, however, not only was petitioner
dismissed without due process, but his dismissal is without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his employment because he has a justifiable excuse. 43

II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the mandatory provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally dismissed employee to reinstatement and back wages and,
instead, affirmed the imposition of the penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the due process requirements. Private respondent, for his part, maintains that there was error in imposing the fine
because that penalty contemplates the failure to submit the employer's report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office, as required under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the implementing rules,
and not the failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be dismissed by the employer.

Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right of every worker to security of tenure. 44 To give teeth to this constitutional and statutory mandates, the Labor Code spells out the
relief available to an employee in case of its denial:
 Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee
who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits of their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of actual reinstatement.

Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in the absence of just cause for dismissal. 45 The Court, however, on numerous occasions has tempered the rigid application of said
provision of the Labor Code, recognizing that in some cases certain events may have transpired as would militate against the practicability of granting the relief thereunder provided, and declares that where there are
strained relations between the employer and the employee, payment of back wages and severance pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement, 46 and more particularly when managerial employees are
concerned.47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer possible, it is therefore appropriate that the dismissed employee be given his fair and just share of what the law accords him. 48

We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination, to wit:

As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to his backwages computed from the time his
compensation was withheld up to the time of his reinstatement. (Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But in  Pacific Cement Company, Inc.  vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this Honorable Court held that
when it comes to reinstatement, differences should be made between managers and the ordinary workingmen. The Court concluded that a company which no longer trusts its managers cannot
operate freely in a competitive and profitable manner. The NLRC should know the difference between managers and ordinary workingmen. It cannot imprudently order the reinstatement of
managers with the same ease and liberality as that of rank and file workers who had been terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement may not be appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or
antagonism between the parties (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295).

In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not be reinstated as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao. The present relationship of petitioner and private respondent (is) so
strained that a harmonious and peaceful employee-employer relationship is hardly possible. 49

III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his dismissal from employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted oppression, or was contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. He further prays for exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust dismissal by other employers.

Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, and social humiliation, provided that
such injuries spring from a wrongful act or omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause thereof. 50 Exemplary damages, under Article 2229, are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. They are not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left to the court to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated. 51

We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing recovery of moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive
to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, 52 and of exemplary damages if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner. 53 We do not feel,
however, that an award of the damages prayed for in this petition would be proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify their allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and
exemplary damages were awarded, the dismissed employees were genuinely without fault and were undoubtedly victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power.

In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally be faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating a
peaceful settlement of their disparate claims. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual antagonism and the undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that either of them acted in
good faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for damages against the other. For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary damages can rightfully be awarded to petitioner.

On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following recommendation of the Solicitor General:
 The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should be modified. There was no voluntary abandonment in this case because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his absence, or such
absence does not warrant outright dismissal without notice and hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is guilty of illegal dismissal. He should be ordered to pay backwages for a period not
exceeding three years from date of dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement, petitioner may be paid separation pay equivalent to one (1) month('s) salary for every year of service, a fraction of six
months being considered as one (1) year in accordance with recent jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims for damages should be dismissed, for both parties are equally at
fault.54

The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records, sorely disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent
their clients with 
zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out
of court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to conduct litigation but to avoid
it whenever possible by advising settlement or withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation. 56

Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a) lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement." On this point, we find that
both counsel herein fell short of what was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. The records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward effecting a
rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their
respective clients.

In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards
the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction." 57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the
same.

One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been obliged to make. The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a family leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an aversion
in the mind, for no truly meaningful and enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations. While we are convinced that we have adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the bases of law and
jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by the thought that we may have failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and son who figured as parties to this dispute, and that our adherence here
to law and duty may unwittingly contribute to the breaking, instead of the strengthening, of familial bonds. In fine, neither of the parties herein actually emerges victorious. It is the Court's earnest hope, therefore,
that with the impartial exposition and extended explanation of their respective rights in this decision, the parties may eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their differences on more convivial
terms.

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without
qualification or deduction,58 and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.

6. TEODORO R. RIVERA, ANTONIO D. AQUINO and FELIXBERTO D. AQUINO, complainants, vs. ATTY. SERGIO ANGELES, respondent.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On March 25, 1983, complainants filed a Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Sergio Angeles on the grounds of Deceit and Malpractice. The Affidavit-Complaint[1] reads as follows:
 1.....The undersigned are plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. Q-12841 and Q-13128 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V at Quezon City;

2.....Atty. Sergio Angeles is their counsel of record in the said cases and his office is located at Suite 335, URC Building, 2123 Espaa, Manila;

3.....That after receiving favorable decision from the CFI on May 21, 1973 and sustained by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court an alias writ of execution was issued in said cases;

4.....That in the first week of January 1983 we obtained from the CFI a sheriffs return, dated November 10, 1982, stating that no leviable property can be found in the premises of the defendants;

5.....That on or before January 13, 1983, we learned that Mr. Rodolfo M. Silva, one of the defendants in said cases had already given Atty. Angeles a partial settlement of the judgment in the amount of
P42,999.00 (as evidenced by xerox copies of Partial Settlement of Judgment dated September 21, 1982 and Receipt of Payment dated September 22, 1982, hereto attached as Annexes A and B,
respectively), without our knowledge.

6.....That Atty. Sergio Angeles never informed the undersigned of the amount of P42,999.00 he received from Mr. Silva nor remitted to them even a part of that amount;

7.....That a demand letter was sent to Atty. Sergio Angeles which was received by him on February 17, 1983, but as of this date the undersigned have not yet received any reply. (See Exhibit C and D
attached).

In his Comment filed on June 21, 1983, respondent denied the accusations and stated that he has the right to retain the said amount of P42,999.00 and to apply the same to professional fees due him
under the subsequent agreement first with complainant Teodoro Rivera and later with Mrs. Dely Dimson Rivera as embodied in the Deed of Assignment (Annex 8) [2] or under the previous agreement of
P20% of P206,000.00.

Complainants, in their Reply,[3] vehemently denied the assignment of their rights to respondent.

Thereafter, this case was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation in our Resolution dated November 21, 1983.  The Office of the Solicitor General considered
this case submitted for resolution on April 30, 1985 by declaring respondents right to present evidence as considered waived due to the latters failure to appear on the scheduled hearings.  However, the
records from said Office do not show any resolution.

In October 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued an Order requiring the parties to manifest whether or not they are still interested in prosecuting this case, or whether supervening events
have transpired which render this case moot and academic or otherwise. The copy of said Order sent to the complainants was received by their counsel on October 30, 1998 while the copy to the
respondent was returned unclaimed.

Investigating Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo submitted his report on April 29, 1999 finding respondent Atty. Sergio Angeles guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically Rule
1.01, Canon 16 and Rule 16.01 thereof and recommends his indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on June 19, 1999, issued a resolution, the decretal portion of which reads:

RESOLUTION NO. XIII-99-151

Adm. Case No. 2519
Teodoro R. Rivera, et al. vs.
Atty. Sergio Angeles

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,  with an amendment that Atty. Sergio Angeles is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR for his having been found guilty of practicing deceit in dealing with his client.
 The Court finds merit in the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Respondents act of deceit and malpractice indubitably demonstrated his failure to live up to his sworn duties as
a lawyer. The Supreme Court repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and good moral character as part of a lawyers equipment in the practice of his profession. [4] For it cannot be denied that the
respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their trust and confidence. [5]

The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client but such right should not be exercised whimsically by appropriating to himself the
money intended for his clients. There should never be an instance where the victor in litigation loses everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sergio Angeles, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR for having been found guilty of practicing deceit in dealing with his client.

This Resolution shall take effect immediately and copies thereof furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the Philippines and appended to respondents personal record.

SO ORDERED.

7. AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant, vs.  ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and LIGAYA P. SALAYON, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyers oath in connection with the discharge
of their duties as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995 elections.  Salayon, then election officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), was designated chairman of said Board, while
Llorente, who was then City Prosecutor of Pasig City, served as its ex oficio vice-chairman as provided by law.[1] Complainant, now a senator, was also a candidate for the Senate in that election.

Complainant alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b), [2]respondents tampered with the votes received by him, with the result that, as shown in the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and Certificate of Canvass
(CoC) pertaining to 1,263 precincts of Pasig City, (1) senatorial candidates Juan Ponce Enrile, Anna Dominique Coseteng, Gregorio Honasan, Marcelo Fernan, Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo Biazon were credited with votes
which were above the number of votes they actually received while, on the other hand, petitioners votes were reduced; (2) in 101 precincts, Enriles votes were in excess of the total number of voters who actually
voted therein; and (3) the votes from 22 precincts were twice recorded in 18  SoVs. Complainant maintains that, by signing the SoVs and CoC despite respondents knowledge that some of the entries therein were
false, the latter committed a serious breach of public trust and of their lawyers oath.

Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the preparation of the SoVs was made by the 12 canvassing committees which the Board had constituted to assist in the canvassing.  They
claimed that the errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue.

In his Consolidated Reply, complainant counters that respondents should be held responsible for the illegal padding of the votes considering the nature and extent of the irregularities and the fact that the
canvassing of the election returns was done under their control and supervision.

On December 4, 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which this matter had been referred pursuant to Rule 139-B, 13, in relation to 20 of the Rules of Court, recommended the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit. [3] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 11, 1999, but his motion was denied in a resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated April 22, 1999.  On June 4, 1999, he filed
this petition pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(c).

It appears that complainant likewise filed criminal charges against respondents before the COMELEC (E.O. Case No. 96-1132) for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b).  In its resolution dated January 8, 1998, the
COMELEC dismissed complainants charges for insufficiency of evidence. However, on a petition for certiorari filed by complainant,[4] this Court set aside the resolution and directed the COMELEC to file appropriate
criminal charges against respondents. Reconsideration was denied on August 15, 2000.

Considering the foregoing facts, we hold that respondents are guilty of misconduct.
 First. Respondent Llorente seeks the dismissal of the present petition on the ground that it was filed late.  He contends that a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139-B, 12(c) [5] and,
therefore, the filing of such motion before the IBP Board of Governors did not toll the running of the period of appeal. Respondent further contends that, assuming such motion can be filed, petitioner nevertheless
failed to indicate the date of his receipt of the April 22, 1999 resolution of the IBP denying his motion for reconsideration so that it cannot be ascertained whether his petition was filed within the 15-day period under
Rule 139-B, 12(c).

The contention has no merit. The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading or not under Rule 139-B, 12(c) has been settled in Halimao v. Villanueva,[6] in which this Court held:

Although Rule 139-B, 12(c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests that such motion is prohibited.  It may therefore be filed within 15 days from notice to a
party. Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to
correct any error it may have committed through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidence. [7]

On the question whether petitioners present petition was filed within the 15-day period provided under Rule 139-B, 12(c), although the records show that it was filed on June 4, 1999, respondent has not shown
when petitioner received a copy of the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors denying his motion for reconsideration.  It would appear, however, that the petition was filed on time because a copy of the resolution
personally served on the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court was received by it on May 18, 1999. Since copies of IBP resolutions are sent to the parties by mail, it is possible that the copy sent to petitioner was
received by him later than May 18, 1999. Hence, it may be assumed that his present petition was filed within 15 days from his receipt of the IBP resolution.  In any event, the burden was on respondent, as the moving
party, to show that the petition in this case was filed beyond the 15-day period for filing it.

Even assuming that petitioner received the IBP resolution in question on May 18, 1999, i.e., on the same date a copy of the same was received by the Office of the Bar Confidant,  the delay would only be two
days.[8] The delay may be overlooked, considering the merit of this case. Disbarment proceedings are undertaken solely for public welfare. The sole question for determination is whether a member of the bar is fit to
be allowed the privileges as such or not. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the Court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. [9] For this reason, laws dealing with double jeopardy [10] or prescription[11] or with procedure like verification of pleadings [12] and prejudicial
questions[13] have no application to disbarment proceedings.

Even in ordinary civil actions, the period for perfecting appeals is relaxed in the interest of justice and equity where the appealed case is clearly meritorious.  Thus, we have given due course to appeals even
though filed six,[14] four,[15] and three[16] days late. In this case, the petition is clearly meritorious.

Second. The IBP recommends the dismissal of petitioners complaint on the basis of the following: (1) respondents had no involvement in the tabulation of the election returns, because when the Statements of
Votes (SoVs) were given to them, such had already been accomplished and only needed their respective signatures; (2) the canvassing was done in the presence of watchers, representatives of the political parties, the
media, and the general public so that respondents would not have risked the commission of any irregularity; and (3) the acts dealt with in R.A. No. 6646, 27(b) are  mala in se and not mala prohibita, and petitioner
failed to establish criminal intent on the part of respondents. [17]

The recommendation is unacceptable. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability. [18] As long as the evidence presented by
complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the Court [19] is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto, [20] the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified.

In this case, respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the canvassing of the Pasig City election returns.  The only explanation they could offer for such irregularities is that the same
could be due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the part of the members of the canvassing committees who prepared the SoVs.

This is the same allegation made in Pimentel v. Commission on Elections.[21] In rejecting this allegation and ordering respondents prosecuted for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b), this Court said:

There is a limit, We believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, in the performance of official duty.  The sheer magnitude of the error, not only in the total number of votes
garnered by the aforementioned candidates as reflected in the CoC and the SoVs, which did not tally with that reflected in the election returns, but also in the total number of votes credited for senatorial candidate
Enrile which exceeded the total number of voters who actually voted in those precincts during the May 8, 1995 elections, renders the defense of honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply
unacceptable.[22]

Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per precinct as reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures in one or two
SoVs[23] but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense of petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns.  A cursory look at the evidence submitted
by petitioner reveals that, in at least 24 SoVs involving 101 precincts, the votes for candidate Enrile exceeded the number of voters who actually voted in the said precincts and, in 18 SoVs, returns from 22 precincts
were tabulated twice. In addition, as the Court noted in Pimentel, the total number of votes credited to each of the seven senatorial candidates in question, as reflected in the CoC, markedly differ from those indicated
in the SoVs.[24]Despite the fact that these discrepancies, especially the double recording of the returns from 22 precincts and the variation in the tabulation of votes as reflected in the SoVs and CoC, were apparent on
the face of these documents and that the variation involves substantial number of votes, respondents nevertheless certified the SoVs as true and correct. Their acts constitute misconduct.

Respondent Llorentes contention that he merely certified the genuineness and due execution of the SoVs but not their correctness is belied by the certification which reads:

WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Statement of Votes by . . . [p]recinct is true and correct. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we sign these presents at the City/Municipality of ___________ Province of ____________
this _______ day of May, 1995. (Emphasis added)

Nor does the fact that the canvassing was open to the public and observed by numerous individuals preclude the commission of acts for which respondents are liable.  The fact is that only they had access to the
SoVs and CoC and thus had the opportunity to compare them and detect the discrepancies therein.

Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. [25] However, if the misconduct also
constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyers oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be
disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct. [26]

Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to do no falsehood.

Nowhere is the need for lawyers to observe honesty both in their private and in their public dealings better expressed in Sabayle v. Tandayag[27]  in which this Court said:

There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers . . . to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. It is important that the common caricature that lawyers by and large do not
feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly, should not become a common reality. . . . [28]

It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service, respondents were under greater obligation to observe this basic tenet of the profession because a public office is a public trust.

Third. Respondents participation in the irregularities herein reflects on the legal profession, in general, and on lawyers in government, in particular.  Such conduct in the performance of their official duties,
involving no less than the ascertainment of the popular will as expressed through the ballot, would have merited for them suspension were it not for the fact that this is their first administrative transgression and, in
the case of Salayon, after a long public service.[29] Under the circumstances, a penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 for each of the respondents should be sufficient.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon GUILTY of misconduct and imposes on each of them a FINE in the amount of  P10,000.00 with a WARNING that commission of
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

8. IN RE: VICENTE Y. BAYANI.

RESOLUTION

The case before us arose when Atty. Vicente Y. Bayani failed to submit proof of service of the appellant’s brief on the Solicitor General in G. R. No. 115079 1 and the consequent inability of the latter to file the
appellee’s brief.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On August 09, 1999, the Supreme Court referred Atty. Bayani’s failure to submit the procedural requirement to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. 2  
On September 27, 1999, IBP Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De Los Reyes sent a letter to Atty. Bayani requiring him to submit his comment within five (5) days from receipt of the letter. 3  

However, the letter was returned to the IBP with the notation "Return to Sender-Moved." 4 

Thus, in her report and recommendation dated January 25, 2000, Commissioner Gonzalez-De Los Reyes recommended Atty. Bayani’s suspension as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the undersigned Commissioner recommends that Atty. Vicente Bayani, for his violation of Rule 18.03 of the Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, be SUSPENDED from the
practice of the law profession for a period of three (3) months and until the time he complies with the Order of the Supreme Court." 5 

On March 18, 2000, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a resolution adopting and approving the report and recommendation of the investigating commissioner. 6  

We concur.

A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him as his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. 7 

Atty. Bayani’s failure to submit proof of service of appellant’s brief on the Solicitor General in G. R. No. 115079 and his failure to submit the required comment manifest willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the
Supreme Court, a clear violation of the canons of professional ethics.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

It appears that Atty. Bayani has fallen short of the circumspection required of a member of the Bar. A counsel must always remember that his actions or omissions are binding on his clients. 8 A lawyer owes his client
the exercise of utmost prudence and capability in that representation.

Further, lawyers are expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and anyone who deals with them has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and
competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to his client’s cause. 9 

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Vicente Y. Bayani remiss in his sworn duty to his client, to the Court and the Bar. He is thus SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months and until the time he
complies with the Order of the Supreme Court to submit the required proof of service in G. R. No. 115079.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent as an attorney and as a member of the Integrated Bar, and furnish the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, with copies
thereof and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

9. [A.M. NO. P-06-2261 : October 30, 2006]

[OCA-IPI No. 04-1905-P]

ELPIDIO SY, President, Systems Realty Development Corporation, Complainant, v. EDGAR ESPONILLA, Legal Researcher and Officer-In-Charge, and JENNIFER DELA CRUZ-BUENDIA, Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio
Sheriff, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila, Respondents.

DECISION
 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In a verified Complaint1 dated March 30, 2004, Elpidio Sy, President of Systems Realty Development Corporation, charged Edgar Esponilla, Legal Researcher and Officer-In-Charge of Branch 54 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, and Atty. Jennifer Dela Cruz-Buendia, Clerk of Court and Ex-officio Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court of Manila with Gross Misconduct, Negligence and Dishonesty in connection with the withdrawal of
the deposits in the form of monthly rentals in Civil Case No. 90-55003, entitled Maria Gagarin, et al. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands and Systems Realty Development Corporation.2

Records show that upon motion by counsel for plaintiffs, Judge Hermogenes R. Liwag, issued an Order dated November 11, 1994 allowing the withdrawal of the deposits in the concept of rentals amounting to
P260,000.00 more or less, based on the finding that a sufficient supersedeas bond was already posted in a related case pending before Branch 32.

The November 11, 1994 Order reads:

Finding the Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw Rental Deposits filed by plaintiffs, thru counsel, to be well-taken, the same is hereby GRANTED, and the Clerk of Court, or her duly authorized representative, is hereby
ordered to release to plaintiffs, or their duly authorized representative, the deposits made by such parties in the concept of rentals from May, 1989 to August, 1994 in the estimated aggregate sum of P260,000.00.

It is well to emphasize here that such deposits were made in the concept of monthly rentals for the plaintiffs' occupancy of the premises in controversy, here and in the ejectment suit now on appeal with Branch 32 of
this same Court. It would appear, however, from the attachments to the Motion to Withdraw Rental Deposits that sufficient supersedeas bond was already posted in that appealed ejectment case by the plaintiffs
hereto, defendants therein, in the total sum of P260,000.00. Surely, the rental deposits made in this case become superfluous and serve no legal purpose. It is actually duplicitous and its non-release would actually
prejudice the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.3

Thereafter, Jaime Ang, one of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 90-55003, withdrew the amount of P256,000.00 from the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.

Complainant averred that the withdrawal of the deposits was irregular because the allegation by plaintiffs' counsel, Atty. Walfredo Bayhon, in the ex-parte motion that the amount sought to be withdrawn from Branch
54 was superfluous and duplicitous as there is already a sufficient supersedeas bond posted with Branch 32, is false. 4 He claimed that the rental deposits made in Branch 54 covered the period from June 30, 1989 to
August 5, 1994 while those in Branch 32 were for September 30, 1994 to January 3, 1997. Complainant also alleged that Judge Liwag granted plaintiffs' false motion without ascertaining the veracity of the allegations
therein; and that complainant was not furnished a copy of the said motion to withdraw nor was the same set for hearing.

Complainant alleged that the purported motion and Order of Judge Liwag do not appear in the records of Civil Case No. 90-55003, as such, respondent Dela Cruz-Buendia, who was then the Assistant Clerk of Court, is
guilty of negligence and connivance with the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 90-55003 for allowing and facilitating the release of the deposits without verifying the authenticity of the motion and Order. Complainant also
claimed that respondent Esponilla is guilty of gross negligence for failing to safeguard vital case records and conniving with the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 90-55003.

Respondent Dela Cruz-Buendia denied the charges against her. She maintained that her function as a clerk of court is purely ministerial in nature. She does not exercise any discretion except to follow orders of the
court; neither is she bound to determine the propriety or impropriety of the orders of the court.

Respondent Esponilla alleged that he was not the Officer-In-Charge of Branch 54 when the purported Order granting the ex-parte motion to withdraw rental deposits was allegedly issued on November 11, 1994 by
Judge Liwag as he was only designated as such in March 1995. He thus prayed that the complaint against him be dismissed. 5

On November 9, 2004, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) referred the instant complaint to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for investigation, report, and recommendation.
On February 1, 2006, Executive Judge Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr. submitted his Report and Recommendation, 6 the pertinent portions of which read:

Respondent Edgar Esponilla cannot be faulted for any of the acts complained of as he was appointed officer-in-charge of Branch 54 only in March 1995 and the questioned order was issued by Pairing Judge
Hermogenes Liwag on November 11, 1994. Nor did he have a hand in the preparation and release of the check to the plaintiffs on November 14, 1994 or sometime thereafter.

xxx

As to respondent Clerk of Court, we likewise find her explanations meritorious. In the instant case, the duty of the Clerk of Court and/or respondent Buendia xxx is ministerial.

Upon receipt of an order from a court, the Clerk of Court's duty is to make sure that the order is complied with. xxx For a Clerk of Court to question a ruling or order of a judge is an invitation for contempt.

xxx

The pivotal issue that should be addressed is why Atty. Walfredo Bayhon filed the motion in the first place and why then Pairing Judge Hermogenes Liwag favorably acted on it without looking into the truth of the
allegation of "duplicity and superfluity."

xxx

Accordingly, it is respectfully submitted that the administrative complaint filed against respondents Edgar Esponilla and Jennifer de la Cruz-Buendia be dismissed for lack of merit.

It is further recommended that Atty. Walfredo Bayhon be asked to explain the circumstances behind his filing of the Ex-Parte Motion and to provide the Supreme Court with a true copy of the motion. 7

On June 5, 2006, the OCA submitted its Evaluation Report, 8 adopting the findings and recommendation of Judge Eugenio, thus:

In view of the foregoing discussions, it is respectfully submitted that the administrative complaint filed against respondents Edgar Esponilla and Atty. Jennifer Dela Cruz-Buendia be DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Consequently, it is further recommended that Atty. Walfredo Bayhon be asked to EXPLAIN the circumstances behind his filing of the Ex-Parte Motion and to provide the Court with a true copy of the motion. 9

Indeed, clerks of court are officers of the law who perform vital functions in the prompt and sound administration of justice. Their office is the hub of adjudicative and administrative orders, processes and concerns.
They perform delicate function as designated custodians of the court's funds, revenues, records, properties and premises. As such they are generally also treasurer, accountant, guard and physical plant manager
thereof. They are liable for any loss, shortage, destruction or impairment of such funds and property. 10

The duties of Clerks of Court as defined in the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court are as follows:

Adjudicative Support Functions:

A. Prepares and signs summonses, subpoenas and notices, writs of execution, remittances, and releases of prisoners;
b. Certifies true copies of decisions, orders, and other processes, letters of administration and guardianship; transmittals of appealed cases, indorsements and communications; andcralawlibrary

c. Prepares and signs monthly reports of cases.

Non-Adjudicative Functions:

A. Plans, directs, supervises and coordinates the activities of all divisions/sections/units in the Office of the Clerk of Court;

b. Controls and manages all court records, exhibits, documents, properties and supplies;

c. Acts on applications for leave of absence and signs daily time records;

d. Determines the docket fees to be paid by the parties-litigants as provided in the Rules of Court;

e. Issues clearances in appropriate cases;

f. Provides information services to the public and private agencies including bar associations;

g. Prepares cases for raffle;

h. Safekeeps and maintains a judgment book and execution book;

i. Studies and recommends to the Executive Judge ways and means to improve both adjudicative and support functions;

j. Performs special functions as ex-officio municipal sheriff;

k. Implements all orders and policies of the court in connection with the speedy administration of justice;

l. Performs other duties that may be assigned to him.

As may be gleaned above, the functions of a Clerk of Court do not involve the use of mental processes in the determination of law or fact nor do they involve discretion on the use of judicial powers. The functions
are generally administrative in nature. 11 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

In the instant case, while it is true that the duty of respondent Dela Cruz-Buendia is purely ministerial, ordinary prudence calls for her to at least verify the authenticity and origin of the alleged Order of Judge Liwag
because from the copies on record, 12 we note that the same does not bear the seal of the Court nor the standard certification by the branch clerk of court. She should have been vigilant considering that the Order
dealt with withdrawal of deposits.
We therefore find respondent Dela Cruz-Buendia guilty of simple negligence, for which she should pay a fine of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction will
be dealt with more severely.

Regarding respondent Esponilla, we find that he cannot be faulted for the missing documents in the folio of Civil Case No. 90-55003 as he was not the Officer-In-Charge when the said papers were allegedly with
Branch 54. Further, there is no proof that he participated in the preparation and release of the check to the plaintiffs on November 14, 1994 or sometime thereafter.

We are not convinced that either respondent connived with the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 90-55003 or with one another to perpetuate fraud against the complainant in the instant case. No evidence was presented to
prove this allegation. We have ruled many times in the past that the complainant bears the onus of establishing, by substantial evidence, the averments of his/her administrative complaint. 13 This Court has always
been punctilious over and over again that it will never tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that would violate the norm of public accountability or diminish the people's faith in the judiciary. However,
when administrative charges against court personnel hold no basis whatsoever in fact or in law, this Court will not hesitate to protect the innocent court employees against any groundless accusation that trifles with
judicial process.14

Regarding the missing documents in the folio of Civil Case No. 90-55003, the Evaluation Report of the OCA stated that as per the investigation 15 of Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas, the purported Order of Judge Liwag was
actually prepared in Branch 55 by one Baby Manalastas. This finding does not fully explain why the said Order or the plaintiffs' motion were not filed in the folio of Civil Case No. 90-55003. Thus, the OCA is directed to
conduct an investigation against the then clerks of court of Branches 54 and 55 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, during the period material to this case, to explain the circumstances behind their improper
management of court records and documents.

We likewise agree with the observation of the OCA that there is a necessity for Atty. Walfredo Bayhon to submit an explanation on why he filed the Ex-Parte Motion and to submit a copy of the same to the Court
within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision, in order to shed light on the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the November 11, 1994 Order and the release of the rental deposits.

WHEREFORE, the administrative case against respondent EDGAR ESPONILLA, Legal Researcher and Officer-In-Charge of the RegionalTrial Court of Manila, Branch 54is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Respondent JENNIFER DELA CRUZ-BUENDIA, Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff, Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Manila isfound GUILTY of simple negligence in the performance of her duties,
for which she should pay a fine of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00), with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. ATTY. WALFREDO BAYHON is ORDERED to
explain within ten (10) days from receipt of the Decision the circumstances behind the filing of the Ex-Parte Motion and to provide the Court with a true copy of the motion. The OFFICE OF THE COURT
ADMINISTRATOR is DIRECTED to conduct an investigation regarding the improper management of court records and documents by the then clerks of court of Branches 54 and 55 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
during the period material to this case.

SO ORDERED.

10. A.C. No. 5044

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution is an administrative complaint [1] filed by complainant Felipe C. Dagala (complainant) against respondents Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. (Atty. Quesada) and Atty. Amado T. Adquilen (Atty.
Adquilen), charging them for gross negligence in handling his labor complaints.
 The Facts

On November 8, 1994, complainant, assisted by Atty. Quesada, filed before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. I, San Fernando City, La Union (NLRC-RAB) a
Complaint[2] for illegal dismissal, overtime pay, separation pay, damages and attorney's fees against Capitol Allied Trading & Transport (Capitol), and its owner and General Manager, Lourdes Gutierrez, as well as its
Personnel Manager, Joseph G. De Jesus, docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-I-11-1123-94. The said case was, however, dismissed without prejudice, through an Order [3] dated December 13, 1994 (December 13, 1994
Order), for failure of complainant and Atty. Quesada to appear during the two (2) scheduled mandatory conference hearings despite due notice.

Thereafter, complainant engaged the services of Atty. Adquilen, a former Labor Arbiter (LA) of the NLRC-RAB, who re-filed his labor case, re-docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-I-10-1091-95 (LU). [4] Similarly, the case was
dismissed without prejudice on June 28, 1996, this time due to the parties' failure to submit their respective position papers. [5]

Complainant and Atty. Adquilen re-filed the case for a third time on August 27, 1996, docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-I-08-1191-96 (LU). [6] During its pendency, the representative of Capitol purportedly offered the
amount of P74,000.00 as settlement of complainant's claim, conditioned on the submission of the latter's position paper. [7] Atty. Adquilen, however, failed to submit one, resulting in the dismissal of the complaint "for
lack of interest and failure to prosecute" as stated in an Order [8] dated February 27, 1997 (February 27, 1997 Order). Atty. Adquilen and complainant received notice of the said order on March 11, 1997 and March 24,
1997,[9] respectively.

On July 11, 1997, complainant this time assisted by Atty. Imelda L. Picar (Atty. Picar) filed a motion for reconsideration [10] from the February 27, 1997 Order, which was treated as an appeal and transmitted to the
NLRC-National Capital Region (NLRC-NCR).[11]However, the NLRC-NCR dismissed the same in a Resolution [12] dated June 17, 1998 for having been filed out of time, adding that the negligence of counsel binds the client.
[13]

Due to the foregoing, Atty. Picar sent separate letters [14] dated November 18, 1998 to respondents, informing them that complainant is in the process of pursuing administrative cases against them before the Court.
Nevertheless, as complainant remains open to the possibility of settlement, respondents were invited to discuss the matter at Atty. Picar's office. Only Atty. Quesada responded to the said letter and subsequently,
through a Memorandum of Agreement[15] dated December 5, 1998 (December 5, 1998 MoA), undertook to compensate the damages sustained by complainant in consideration of the non-filing of an administrative
complaint against him. Atty. Quesada, however, reneged on his promise, thus prompting complainant to proceed with the present complaint. [16]

In a Resolution[17] dated June 21, 1999, the Court directed respondents to comment on the Complaint within ten (10) days from notice. However, despite notices [18] and the extension granted,[19] Atty. Adquilen failed to
comply with the directive and the subsequent show-cause resolutions. [20]  Accordingly, a fine in the amount of P500.00 was imposed [21] against him, which he duly paid on September 19, 2005. [22]

On the other hand, Atty. Quesada, in his Comment,[23] admitted having accepted and filed the initial labor case for complainant. He, however,  explained that he was unable to file the required position paper due to
complainant's failure to furnish him with the employment records and other relevant documents. He also claimed that when he was informed of the dismissal of the case without prejudice, he advised complainant to
re-file the case with the assistance of another lawyer as he had to attend to his duties as Chairman of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino for the Second District of La Union Province. [24] Anent the December 5, 1998
MoA, Atty. Quesada alleged that he was merely prevailed upon to sign the same for fear of losing his means of livelihood and license to practice law, and that he had no intention of reneging on his promise to pay.
Nonetheless, despite earnest efforts, he still failed to come up with the agreed-upon amount. [25]

In a Resolution[26] dated March 27, 2006, the Court resolved to refer the instant administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for evaluation, report and recommendation or decision.

The Proceedings Before the IBP

The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) set the case for mandatory conference on August 25, 2006 and required the parties to submit their respective briefs. [27] Complainant was duly represented[28] by his
counsel at the hearing,[29] while respondents filed separate motions to reset, only to subsequently waive their respective appearances. Atty. Adquilen attributed the waiver to his medical condition; [30] on the other
hand, in a complete turnaround, Atty. Quesada denied the existence of any lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant. [31]
On March 25, 2009, Investigating IBP Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. issued a Report and Recommendation, [32] finding that respondents were grossly negligent in handling complainant's case in violation of Rule
18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code). As such, he recommended that each of them be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Moreover, Atty. Quesada was
directed to comply with his undertaking under the December 5, 1998 MoA to pay the amount of P68,000.00, with legal interest from January 20, 1999 until fully settled; while Atty. Adquilen was ordered to pay the
amount of P6,000.00, representing the difference between the P74,000.00 settlement offered by Capitol and the above-stated settlement amount, with legal interest from date of notice of the order of dismissal on
March 25, 1997[33] until fully paid.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the afore-stated report and recommendation in Resolution No. XX-2011-262 dated November 19, 2011 (November 19, 2011 Resolution), finding the same to be fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules. Consequently, it directed respondents to pay complainant the total amount of P74,000.00 within thirty (30) days from notice. [34]

In a Resolution[35] dated September 12, 2012, the Court noted the Notice [36] of the IBP's November 19, 2011 Resolution, and thereafter sent notices to the parties as well as the IBP-CBD, the Office of the Bar Confidant
and the Public Information Office. However, the notice sent to Atty. Adquilen was returned unserved with the notation "Return to Sender, Deceased." [37] Thus, in the Resolutions dated February 20, 2013[38] and June
10, 2013, the IBP was required to furnish the Court with the death certificate of Atty. Adquilen.

On August 30, 2013,[39] the IBP filed its compliance,[40] attaching therewith the Certificate of Death[41] of Atty. Adquilen which indicates that the latter passed away on June 22, 2008 due to cardiac arrhythmia. In view of
Atty. Adquilen's death prior to the promulgation of this Decision, [42] the Court, bearing in mind the punitive nature of administrative liabilities, [43] hereby dismisses the case against him. Hence, what is left for resolution
is the complaint against Atty. Quesada.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not Atty. Quesada should be held administratively liable for gross negligence in handling complainant's labor case.

The Court's Ruling

The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP anent Atty. Quesada's administrative liability, but deems it proper to delete the recommended order for the return of the amount of P74,000.00.

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful
of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is required to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his full
attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. [44] He is likewise expected to act with honesty in all his dealings, especially with the courts.
[45]
 These principles are embodied in Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code which respectively read as follows:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCEDURES.

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by
any artifice.

xxxx

CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
In the present case, the Court finds Atty. Quesada to have violated the foregoing Rules and Canons.

Primarily, Atty, Quesada failed to exercise the required diligence in handling complainant's case by his failure to justify his absence on the two (2) mandatory conference hearings in NLRC Case No. RAB-I-11-1123-94
despite due notice, which thus resulted in its dismissal. It bears stressing that a retained counsel is expected to serve the client with competence and diligence and not to sit idly by and leave the rights of his client in a
state of uncertainty. To this end, he is oblige to attend scheduled hearings or conferences, prepare and file the required pleadings, prosecute the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urge their termination
without waiting for the client or the court to prod him or her to do so. [46] Atty. Quesada's failure to attend the scheduled conference hearings, despite due notice and without any proper justification, exhibits his
inexcusable lack of care and diligence in managing his client's cause in violation of Canon 17 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code.

Moreover, Atty. Quesada acted with less candor and good faith in the proceedings before the IBP-CBD when he denied the existence of any lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant, and claimed that
the labor case was handled by another lawyer,[47] despite his previous admission[48] before the Court of having accepted complainant's case. To add, a perusal of the complaint [49] dated November 8, 1994 in NLRC Case
No. RAB-I-11-1123-94 reveals that Atty. Quesada signed the same as counsel for complainant. [50] While the IBP-CBD is not a court, the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary
action being in reality an investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its officers or an examination into his character. [51] Besides, Atty. Quesada failed to rebut the allegation that complainant's corresponding
failure to appear during the mandatory conference hearings in NLRC Case No. RAB-I-11-1123-94 was upon his counsel's advice. [52] Under the premises, it is therefore reasonable to conclude that Atty. Quesada had
indulged in deliberate falsehood, contrary to the prescriptions under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code. [53]

The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. [54] In Conlu v. Aredonia, Jr.,[55] a lawyer was suspended from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year for inexcusable negligence that resulted in the dismissal of complainant's appeal and for misrepresentations committed before the CA, in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Rule 10.01, Canon 10
and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code. In the cases of Cheng v. Atty. Agravante[56] and Perea v. Atty. Almadro,[57]respondent-lawyers were similarly punished for their negligence in the discharge of their duties to their
client and for misrepresentation committed before the Court, in violation of Rule 10.01, Canon 10 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code. Hence, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court adopts the penalty
recommended by the IBP and accordingly suspends Atty. Quesada for a period of one (1) year.

The Court must, however, clarify that the foregoing resolution should not include a directive to return the amount of P74,000.00 as ordered by the  IBP in its November 19, 2011 Resolution which represents the
settlement initially offered by Capitol in the dismissed labor case. The return of the said amount partakes the nature of a purely civil liability which should not be dealt with during an administrative-disciplinary
proceeding such as this case. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,[58] the Court recently illumined that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are only confined to the issue of whether or not the respondent-lawyer is still fit to
be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar and that the only concern is his administrative liability. Thus, matters which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's professional engagement, such as the liabilities of the
parties which are purely civil in nature, should be threshed out in a proper proceeding of such nature, and not during administrative-disciplinary proceedings, as in this case.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Jose C. Quesada, Jr. is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, Canon 17, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is
accordingly SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

On the other hand, the administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Amado T. Adquilen is hereby DISMISSED in view of his supervening death.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED

11. A.C. No. 9401, October 22, 2013

JOCELYN DE LEON, Complainant, v. ATTY. TYRONE PEDRENA, Respondent.

A lawyer who commits overt acts of sexual harassment against a female client is guilty of reprehensible conduct that is unbecoming of a member of the Bar, and may be condignly punished with suspension from the
practice of law.

Antecedents

Jocelyn de Leon filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law against Atty. Tyrone Pedreña, a Public Attorney. She averred in her complaint
affidavit that Atty. Pedreña had sexually harassed her as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. On January 30, 2006, at about 10:00 in the morning, I went to the Public Attorney’s Office in Parañaque City, in order to inquire from ATTY. TYRONE PEDRENA about the status of my case for support for my two
minor children against my husband, which case is being handled by Atty. Pedreña;

2. At that time, said Atty. Pedreña was at a court hearing, so I waited at his office until he arrived at about II :45 a.m. Atty. Pedreña told me to go ahead to Tita Babes Restaurant so we could take our lunch together
and to talk about my said case;

3. While we were eating at the said restaurant, he asked me many personal matters rather than to discuss my said case. But still, I answered him with respect, for he was my lawyer;

4. After we took our lunch, he told me to just go back on February I, 2006 at 10:00 a.m. because according to him, my said case was quite difficult, that he needed more time to study;

5. Since Atty. Pedreña was also already going home then, he told me then to ride with him and he would just drop me by the jeepney station;

6. Although I refused to ride with him, he persistently convinced me to get in the car, and so I acceded to his request so as not to offend him;

7. Right after we left the parking lot and not yet too far from the City Hall, Atty. Pedreña immediately held my left hand with his right hand, insisted me to get closer with him and laid me on his shoulder;

8. I immediately responded by saying "AYOKO HO!" But he persisted in trying to get hold of my hand and he also tried very hard to inserting (sic) his finger into my firmly closed hand. Thus, I became very afraid and at
the same time offended for his lack of respect for me at that moment;

9. Despite my resistance, he continued rubbing my left leg. I was then attempting to remove his hand on my leg, but he grabbed my hand and forced it to put (sic) on his penis;

10.  Because I was already really afraid at that moment, I continued to wrestle and struggle, and as I saw that we were already approaching the 7-Eleven Store, the place where I was supposed to get off, Atty. Pedreña
made another move of pressing his finger against my private part;

11. I thereafter tried at all cost to unlock the car’s door and told him categorically that I was getting off the car. But because the traffic light was on green, he accelerated a bit more instead, but sensing my insistence to
get off, he stopped the car, and allowed me to get off. He then reminded me to see him on February 1, 2006 at 10:00 a.m. for the continuation of hearing of my case;

12. That on February 1, 2006, I had to come for my case, but this time, I brought with me my five-year-old child to avoid another incident. I was not able to see Atty. Pedreña then, so I just signed some documents;  1

In his answer, Atty. Pedreña averred that De Leon’s allegations were unsubstantiated; that entertaining such a complaint would open the gates to those who had evil desires to destroy the names of good lawyers; that
the complaint was premature and should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping because De Leon had already charged him with acts of lasciviousness in the Parañaque City Prosecutor’s Office; and that he had
also filed a complaint for theft against De Leon.2

Attached to Atty. Pedreña’s answer were his counter-affidavit in the criminal case for acts of lasciviousness and his complaint-affidavit for theft. In his counter affidavit, Atty. Pedreña admitted giving a ride to De Leon,
but he vehemently denied making sexual advances on her, insisting that she had sat very close to him during the ride that even made it hard for him to shift gears, and that the ride had lasted for only two to three
minutes.3 He claimed that De Leon was allowing herself to be used by his detractors in the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) after he had opposed the practice of certain PAO staff members of charging indigent clients for
every document that they prepared. In his complaint affidavit for theft, he stated that he had another passenger in his car at the time he gave a ride to De Leon, who did not notice the presence of the other passenger
because the ride lasted for only two to three minutes; and that the other passenger was Emma Crespo, who executed her own affidavit attesting that she had witnessed De Leon’s act of taking his (Pedreña) cellphone
from the handbrake box of the car.4

Only De Leon appeared during the hearing. 5 Hence, Atty. Pedreña was deemed to have waived his right to participate in the proceedings. 6

Thereafter, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of Atty. Pedreña and the striking off of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. 7 Holding that a disbarment case was sui generis and could
proceed independently of the criminal case that was based on the same facts; and that the proceedings herein need not wait until the criminal case for acts of lasciviousness brought against Atty. Pedreña was finally
resolved, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Pedreña. had made sexual advances on De Leon in violation of Rule 1.01 8 and Rule 7.039 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In its Resolution No. XVIII-2007-83 dated September 19, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the report and recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, and
imposed upon Atty. Pedreña suspension from the practice of law for three months. 10

Atty. Pedreña filed a motion for reconsideration with the IBP,11 which adopted and approved Resolution No. XX-2012-43 dated January 15, 2012, denying the motion and affirming with modification its Resolution No.
XVIII-2007-83 by increasing the period of suspension to six months. 12

On February 28, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors transmitted to the Court Resolution No. XX-2012-43 and the records of the case for final approval. 13

In the Resolution dated April 24, 2012, the Court noted the IBP Board of Governors’ notice ofResolution No. XX-2012-43. 14chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Ruling

The report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner stated thusly:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

There is no doubt that Complainant was able to prove her case against the Respondent. During the clarificatory hearing, she was straightforward and spontaneous in answering the questions propounded on her. Her
account of the incident that happened on 30 January 2006 was consistent with the matters she stated in her Complaint and Verified Position Paper.

On.the other hand, Respondent’s defenses are not credible enough to rebut the claims of Complainant. His defenses are replete with inconsistencies and his actuations in the entire proceedings show lack of integrity
in his dealings with both the Complainant and this Commission.

xxxx

We find no merit at all in the defenses put forth by Respondent. The Theft case filed by Respondent is a mere afterthought on his part. We note that such criminal complaint hinged on a claim that there was another
person during that incident who allegedly saw Complainant stealing Respondent’s mobile phone. Yet, in Respondent’s Position Paper and in his Counter-Affidavit to the Acts of Lasciviousness case, which was executed
after the institution of the criminal complaint for Theft, Respondent never mentioned anything about a third person being present during the incident. If the presence of this third person was crucial to prove his case
against herein Complainant, there is no reason why this allegation would be omitted in his Position Paper and Counter-Affidavit to at least support his defense.

Furthermore, Respondent’s contention that Complainant is being used by his detractors is self-serving. His memo regarding the amount of RATA he receives is a relatively harmless query to a higher authority, which
could not possibly motivate his colleagues to prod other people to file cases against Respondent. 15

We adopt the findings and conclusions of the Investigating Commissioner, as sustained by the IBP Board of Governors, for being substantiated by the evidence on record.

The records show that Atty. Pedreña rubbed the complainant’s right leg with his hand; tried to insert his finger into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed his
finger against her private part. Given the circumstances in which he committed them, his acts were not merely offensive and undesirable but repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral. They constituted misconduct on
the part of any lawyer. In this regard, it bears stressing that immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. 16

The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the Legal Profession. Members of the Bar are clearly
duty bound to observe the highest degree of morality and integrity in order to safeguard the reputation of the Bar. Any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer that tends to expose a deficiency in moral character,
honesty, probity or good demeanor, be it in the lawyer’s public or private activities, is sufficient to warrant the lawyer’s suspension or disbarment. 17 Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, provides that a member
of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended for grossly immoral conduct, or violation of his oath as a lawyer. Towards that end, we have not been remiss in reminding members of the Bar to live up to the standards and
norms of the Legal Profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the  Code of Professional Responsibility.

Atty. Pedreña’s misconduct was aggravated by the fact that he was then a Public Attorney mandated to provide free legal service to indigent litigants, and by the fact that De Leon was then such a client. He also
disregarded his oath as a public officer to serve others and to be accountable at all times, because he thereby took advantage of her vulnerability as a client then in desperate need of his legal assistance.

Yet, even as we agree with the findings of the IBP, we consider the recommended penalty of suspension for six months not commensurate with the gravity of the offensive acts committed.

Verily, the determination of the penalty to impose on an erring lawyer is within the Court’s discretion. The exercise of the discretion should neither be arbitrary nor despotic, nor motivated by any animosity or
prejudice towards the lawyer, but should instead be ever controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the Bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties
to the Court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession, and to the general public. 18

In determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed on Atty. Pedreña, therefore, we take into consideration judicial precedents on gross immoral conduct bearing on sexual matters. Although most of the judicial
precedents dealt with lawyers who engaged in extramarital affairs, or cohabited with women other than their wives, 19 they are nonetheless helpful in gauging the degree of immorality committed by the respondent.

In Advincula v. Macabata,20 the Court held that the errant lawyer’s acts of turning his client’s head towards him and then kissing her on the lips were distasteful, but still ruled that such acts, albeit offensive and
undesirable, were not grossly immoral. Hence, the respondent lawyer was merely reprimanded but reminded to be more prudent and cautious in his dealings with clients.

In Barrientos v. Daarol,21 the respondent lawyer was disbarred, but the severest penalty was imposed not only because of his engaging in illicit sexual relations, but also because of his deceit. He had been already
married and was about 41 years old when he proposed marriage to a 20-year-old girl. He succeeded in his seduction of her, and made her pregnant. He not only suggested that she abort the pregnancy, but he also
breached his promise to marry her, and, in the end, even deserted her and their child.

In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,22 the Court adjudged the respondent lawyer, a married man with children, highly immoral for having taken advantage of his position as the chairman of the College of Medicine of his school in
enticing the complainant, then a student in the college, to have carnal knowledge with him under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects should she refuse. The respondent was disbarred for grossly
immoral conduct.

Without diminishing the gravity of the complainant’s sad experience, however, we consider the acts committed by Atty. Pedreña to be not of the same degree as the acts punished under the cited judicial precedents.
Neither did his acts approximate the act committed by the respondent lawyer in Calub v. Suller,23 whereby we disbarred the respondent lawyer for raping his neighbor’s wife notwithstanding that his guilt was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt in his criminal prosecution for the crime. We further note that, unlike in Barrientos where there was deceit and in Delos Reyes where there were threats and taking advantage of the
respondent lawyer’s position, Atty. Pedreña did not employ any scheme to satiate his lust, but, instead, he desisted upon the first signs of the complainant’s firm refusal to give in to his advances.

In view of these considerations, the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years is fitting and just.

WHEREFORE, the Court SUSPENDS ATTY. TYRONE PEDRENA from the practice of law for two years effective upon receipt of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the
country.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

12. A.C. No. 6732, October 22, 2013

ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WESTERN VISAYAS, REGIONAL OFFICE (NBI-WEVRO), FOR SAN PEDRO, ILOILO CITY, Complainant, v. ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE,
JR., ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, SAN JOSE, ANTIQUE, Respondent.

DECISION

A lawyer who forges a court decision and represents it as that of a court of law is guilty of the gravest misconduct and deserves the supreme penalty of disbarment.

The Case

Before this Court is the complaint for disbarment against Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr. (respondent) of San Jose, Antique for his having allegedly falsified an inexistent decision of Branch 64 of
the Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique (RTC) instituted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas Regional Office, represented by Regional Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido.

Antecedent

On July 7, 2004, Atty. Ronel F. Sustituya, Clerk of Court of the RTC, received a written communication from Mr. Ballam Delaney Hunt, a Solicitor in the United Kingdom (UK). The letter requested a copy of the decision
dated February 12, 1997 rendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna, whose petitioner was one Shirley
Quioyo.1
On September 9, 2004, the RTC received another letter from Mr. Hunt, reiterating the request for a copy of the decision in Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled  In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive
Death of Rey Laserna.2

Judge Penuela instructed the civil docket clerk to retrieve the records of Special Proceedings Case No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. It was then discovered that the
RTC had no record of Special Proceedings No. 084 wherein Shirley Quioyo was the petitioner. Instead, the court files revealed that Judge Penuela had decided Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the
Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria,  whose petitioner was one Serena Catin Austria.

Informed that the requested decision and case records did not exist, 3 Mr. Hunt sent a letter dated October 12, 2004 attaching a machine copy of the purported decision in Special Proceedings No. 084 entitled  In the
Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna that had been presented by Shirley Quioyo in court proceedings in the UK. 4

After comparing the two documents and ascertaining that the document attached to the October 12, 2004 letter was a falsified court document, Judge Penuela wrote Mr. Hunt to apprise him of the situation. 5

The discovery of the falsified decision prompted the Clerk of Court to communicate on the situation in writing to the NBI, triggering the investigation of the falsification. 6

In the meanwhile, Dy Quioyo, a brother of Shirley Quioyo, executed an affidavit on March 4, 2005, 7wherein he stated that it was the respondent who had facilitated the issuance of the falsified decision in Special
Proceedings No. 084 entitled In the Matter of the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna for a fee of P60,000.00. The allegations against the respondent were substantially corroborated by Mary Rose
Quioyo, a sister of Shirley Quioyo, in an affidavit dated March 20, 2005. 8

The NBI invited the respondent to explain his side,9 but he invoked his constitutional right to remain silent. The NBI also issued subpoenas to Shirley Quioyo and Dy Quioyo but only the latter appeared and gave his
sworn statement.

After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas the records of the investigation, with a recommendation that the respondent be prosecuted for falsification of public
document under Article 171, 1 and 2, of the Revised Penal Code, and for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).10 The NBI likewise recommended to the Office of the
Court Administrator that disbarment proceedings be commenced against the respondent. 11Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now a Member of the Court) officially endorsed the recommendation to
the Office of the Bar Confidant.12

Upon being required by the Court, the respondent submitted his counter-affidavit, 13 whereby he denied any participation in the falsification. He insisted that Dy Quioyo had sought his opinion on Shirley’s petition for
the annulment of her marriage; that he had given advice on the pertinent laws involved and the different grounds for the annulment of marriage; that in June 2004, Dy Quioyo had gone back to him to present a copy
of what appeared to be a court decision; 14 that Dy Quioyo had then admitted to him that he had caused the falsification of the decision; that he had advised Dy Quioyo that the falsified decision would not hold up in
an investigation; that Dy Quioyo, an overseas Filipino worker (OFW), had previously resorted to people on Recto Avenue in Manila to solve his documentation problems as an OFW; and that he had also learned from
Atty. Angeles Orquia, Jr. that one Mrs. Florencia Jalipa, a resident of Igbalangao, Bugasong, Antique, had executed a sworn statement before Police Investigator Herminio Dayrit with the assistance of Atty. Orquia, Jr.
to the effect that her late husband, Manuel Jalipa, had been responsible for making the falsified document at the instance of Dy Quioyo. 15

Thereafter, the Court issued its resolution16 treating the respondent’s counter-affidavit as his comment, and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation 

In a report and recommendation dated June 14, 2006, 17 Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, found the respondent guilty of serious misconduct and violations of the Attorney’s Oath
and Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one year. She concluded that the respondent had forged the purported decision of Judge Penuela by making it
appear that Special Proceedings No. 084 concerned a petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rey Laserna, with Shirley Quioyo as the petitioner, when in truth and in fact the proceedings related to the
petition for declaration of presumptive death of Rolando Austria, with Serena Catin Austria as the petitioner; 18 and that the respondent had received P60,000.00 from Dy Quioyo for the falsified decision. She
rationalized her conclusions thusly:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Respondent’s denials are not worthy of merit. Respondent contends that it was one Manuel Jalipa (deceased) who facilitated the issuance and as proof thereof, he presented the sworn statement of the widow of
Florencia Jalipa (sic). Such a contention is hard to believe. In the first place, if the decision was obtained in Recto, Manila, why was it an almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision on file in Judge Penuela’s
branch except for the names and dates? Respondent failed to explain this. Secondly, respondent did not attend the NBI investigation and merely invoked his right to remain silent. If his side of the story were true, he
should have made this known in the investigation. His story therefore appears to have been a mere afterthought. Finally, there is no plausible reason why Dy Quioyo and his sister, Mary Rose Quioyo would falsely
implicate him in this incident.19

In its Resolution No. XVII-2007-063 dated February 1, 2007,20 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with modification, the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner by suspending
the respondent from the practice of law for six years.

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-709 21 denying the respondent’s motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVII-2007-063. The IBP Board of
Governors then forwarded the case to the Court in accordance with Section 12(b), Rule 139-B 22 of the Rules of Court.

On January 11, 2011, the Court resolved: (1) to treat the respondent’s comment/opposition as his appeal by petition for review; (2) to consider the complainant’s reply as his comment on the petition for review; (3) to
require the respondent to file a reply to the complainant’s comment within 10 days from notice; and (4) to direct the IBP to transmit the original records of the case within 15 days from notice.

Ruling

We affirm the findings of the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for falsifying a court decision in consideration of a sum of money.

The respondent’s main defense consisted in blanket denial of the imputation. He insisted that he had had no hand in the falsification, and claimed that the falsification had been the handiwork of Dy Quioyo. He
implied that Dy Quioyo had resorted to the shady characters in Recto Avenue in Manila to resolve the problems he had encountered as an OFW, hinting that Dy Quioyo had a history of employing unscrupulous means
to achieve his ends.

However, the respondent’s denial and his implication against Dy Quioyo in the illicit generation of the falsified decision are not persuasive. Dy Quioyo’s categorical declaration on the respondent’s personal
responsibility for the falsified decision, which by nature was positive evidence, was not overcome by the respondent’s blanket denial, which by nature was negative evidence. 23 Also, the imputation of wrongdoing
against Dy Quioyo lacked credible specifics and did not command credence. It is worthy to note, too, that the respondent filed his counter-affidavit only after the Court, through the en banc  resolution of May 10,
2005, had required him to comment.24 The belatedness of his response exposed his blanket denial as nothing more than an afterthought.

The respondent relied on the sworn statement supposedly executed by Mrs. Jalipa that declared that her deceased husband had been instrumental in the falsification of the forged decision. But such reliance was
outrightly worthless, for the sworn statement of the wife was rendered unreliable due to its patently hearsay character. In addition, the unworthiness of the sworn statement as proof of authorship of the falsification
by the husband is immediately exposed and betrayed by the falsified decision being an almost verbatim reproduction of the authentic decision penned by Judge Penuela in the real Special Proceedings Case No. 084.

In light of the established circumstances, the respondent was guilty of grave misconduct for having authored the falsification of the decision in a non-existent court proceeding. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility demands that all lawyers should uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal Profession. Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.” Lawyers are further required by Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.

Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyer’s disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. 25 Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the
court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the
falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.

It then becomes timely to remind all members of the Philippine Bar that they should do nothing that may in any way or degree lessen the confidence of the public in their professional fidelity and integrity. 26 The Court
will not hesitate to wield its heavy hand of discipline on those among them who wittingly and willingly fail to meet the enduring demands of their Attorney’s Oath for them to: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x support [the] Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; xxx do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; x x x not wittingly or willingly
promote or sue on groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; x x x delay no man for money or malice, and x x x conduct [themselves as lawyers] according to the best of [their] knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [their] clients x x x.

No lawyer should ever lose sight of the verity that the practice of the legal profession is always a privilege that the Court extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the privilege to him
who fails to observe and respect the Lawyer’s Oath and the canons of ethical conduct in his professional and private capacities. He may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law not only for acts and
omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional dealings, but also for gross misconduct not directly connected with his professional duties that reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of
the principles that the privilege to practice law confers upon him. 27 Verily, no lawyer is immune from the disciplinary authority of the Court whose duty and obligation are to investigate and punish lawyer misconduct
committed either in a professional or private capacity. 28 The test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders
the lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court. 29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND PRONOUNCES ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the  Code of Professional Responsibility,
and DISBARS him effective upon receipt of this decision.

The Court DIRECTS the Bar Confidant to remove the name of ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR. from the Roll of Attorneys.

This decision is without prejudice to any pending or contemplated proceedings to be initiated against ASST. PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR SALVADOR N. PE, JR.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the country, and to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

13. A.C. No. 7922               October 1, 2013

MARY ANN T.MATTUS, Complainant, 

vs.
ATTY. ALBERT T. VILLASECA, Respondent.

Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Mary Ann T. Mattus against Atty. Albert T. Villaseca for gross and inexcusable negligence in handling Criminal Case No. 10309-02.

Background Facts
The complainant, German Bernardo D. Mattus and Dexter Aligan were the accused in Criminal Case No. 10309-02 – a case for estafa thru falsification of public document filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
20, Imus, Cavite. The complainant and her husband, German, engaged the services of Atty. Villaseca to represent them in the proceedings. The complainant maintained that she and German were convicted due to
Atty. Villaseca’s gross and inexcusable negligence in performing his duties as their counsel.

In her complaint-affidavit,1 the complainant alleged, among others, that Atty. Villaseca: (1) was often absent during court hearings but still collected appearance fees; (2) frequently sought the postponement of trial
when he was present; (3) failed to ask the RTC to direct a National Bureau of Investigation expert to examine the signatures of the spouses Leslie and Zuraida Porter 2 in the special power of attorney (SPA); (4) failed to
file a demurrer to evidence despite having been granted sufficient time by the RTC to submit one; (5) failed to present evidence on behalf of the defense, and only filed a memorandum; (6) did not inform her and
German of the dates of the presentation of defense evidence and the promulgation of judgment; and (7) erroneously indicated the wrong case number in the notice of appeal. According to the complainant, Atty.
Villaseca’s negligence in handling the case resulted in her own and her husband’s conviction.

In the Court’s Resolution3 of July 16, 2008, we required Atty. Villaseca to comment on the complaint.

On September 10, 2008, Atty. Villaseca filed his comment, 4 refuting the allegations against him. Atty. Villaseca explained that he made known to the complainant that the testimony of a handwriting expert was
necessary only if the prosecution would be able to produce the original copy of the SPA. Atty. Villaseca also claimed that his absences during the hearings, as well as his numerous motions for postponement, were
justified and were never intended for delay. He denied having collected appearance fees when he did not attend the scheduled hearings, and maintained that the fees he received were intended to compensate him
for his services in the other cases filed by the complainant. Atty. Villaseca further claimed that he immediately corrected the case number in the notice of appeal when he discovered this error.

In a Resolution5dated October 15, 2008, we referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBPs’ Report and Recommendation

In his Report and Recommendation6 dated September 16, 2009,Investigating Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag recommended that Atty. Villaseca be suspended for six (6) months from the practice of law.

Commissioner Hababag ruled that Atty. Villaseca’s reckless and gross negligence deprived his clients of due process; his actuations in the criminal case showed utter disregard for his clients’ life and liberty.
Commissioner Hababag explained that Atty. Villaseca failed to file a demurrer to evidence despite the sufficient length of time that had been given to him by the RTC to submit this pleading, and waived his right to
present evidence for the defense, opting instead to file a memorandum only. Commissioner Hababag concluded that Atty. Villaseca’s failure to properly attend to the interests of his clients led to their conviction.

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-2517 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, but increased Atty. Villaseca’s period of suspension from the
practice of law from six (6) months to one (1) year.

Our Ruling

After a careful review of the records, the Court finds the evidence on record sufficient to support the IBP’s findings. We, however, increase Atty. Villaseca’s period of suspension from the practice of law from one (1)
year to five (5) years.

We stress at the outset that a lawyer "is expected to exert his best efforts and ability to preserve his client's cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his client likewise serves the ends of justice." 8 Once a lawyer
agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in
maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. A lawyer who
performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.9

The records of the present case show that Atty. Villaseca had been grossly remiss in handling Criminal Case No. 10309-02. To recall, Atty. Villaseca requested for time to file demurrer to evidence after the prosecution
had rested its case. In its order 10 of July 1, 2004, the RTC gave him 20 days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes within which to file a demurrer to evidence. Atty. Villaseca, however, did not file a
demurrer to evidence, without offering any explanation why he failed to do so. As a result, the RTC issued an order 11 stating that Atty. Villaseca "is deemed to have waived his right to file the said pleading."

To our mind, Atty. Villaseca’s failure to submit a demurrer to evidence to explain such omission constitutes inexcusable negligence; it showed his lack of devotion and zeal in preserving his clients’ cause. We point out
that nine months had lapsed from the time the RTC granted Atty. Villaseca 20 days to file the demurrer to the time it ruled that he was deemed to have waived his right to file this pleading. Clearly, Atty. Villaseca’s
actuations violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so."

The records further disclosed that after Atty. Villaseca’s failure to file a demurrer to evidence, the RTC set the initial presentation of defense evidence on May 9, 2005. However, this hearing was postponed thrice: the
May 9, 2005 hearing was reset to August 8, 2005 due to Atty. Villaseca’s failure to appear; 12 the August 8, 2005 hearing was reset to November 17, 2005 upon Atty. Villaseca’s motion; 13 and the November 17, 2005
hearing was reset to March 1, 2006 because of Atty. Villaseca’s manifestation that his intended first witness was unavailable. 14 During the March 1, 2006hearing, the respondent manifested that the defense would no
longer present any evidence, and moved that he be given time to file a memorandum. 15

We point out that the prosecution rested its case on July 1, 2004; yet Atty. Villaseca waited until March 1, 2006 only to manifest that he would no longer present any evidence. We are at a loss why Atty. Villaseca
chose not to present any evidence for the defense, considering that the accused wanted and were ready to take the witness stand. As a result, the testimony of the lone prosecution witness remained uncontroverted.
To make matters worse, Atty. Villaseca directed German to attend the hearing on June 6, 2007without informing him that it was already the date of the promulgation of judgment. 1âwphi1

The Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." 16 It further mandates that "a lawyer shall serve
his client with competence and diligence."17 It also states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." 18

Atty. Villaseca’s failure to present any testimonial, object or documentary evidence for the defense reveals his lack of diligence in performing his duties as an officer of the Court; it showed his indifference towards the
cause of his clients. Considering that the liberty and livelihood of his clients were at stake, Atty. Villaseca should have exerted efforts tore but the presented prosecution evidence. He could have presented the
complainant and/or her husband to the witness stand, instead of just opting to file a memorandum. Or, at the very least, the reason for this move should have been fully explained to the clients, and later to the IBP
and to this Court. But no such explanation ever came. We are thus left with the stark reality that Atty. Villaseca failed to file, despite the promise made to the lower court, a demurrer to evidence. After failing in this
first line of defense for his clients, it should have been incumbent upon Atty. Villaseca to present evidence for the defense, but again, he unexplainably failed to do this, leaving the lower court with no evidence to
appreciate except that of the prosecution, to the detriment of his clients’ cause.

We emphasize that while a lawyer has complete discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him, he must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law to support his client’s
cause. A memorandum, no matter how lengthy, should not be made a substitute for testimonial, object or documentary evidence, more so in a criminal case where a conviction could lead to dire consequences. In
saying so, we are not insinuating that the RTC decision would have tilted in favor of the defense had Atty. Villaseca presented evidence; we simply stress that utmost fidelity and attention are demanded once counsel
agrees to take the cudgels for his client's cause.

We again remind members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms expected of the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. A lawyer
engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the latter's interest with utmost diligence. It is his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and he should exert his best efforts to
protect, within the bounds of the law, the interests of his client. 19 A lawyer’s diligence and vigilance is more imperative in criminal cases, where the life and liberty of an accused is at stake. Verily, the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the corresponding duties, not only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the public. As we explained in Spouses Bautista v. Atty. Arturo Cefra: 20
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess the legal qualifications for it. Lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency and
morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession
as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

"The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts." 21 Under the circumstances, we find that the IBP’s recommended penalty of one
year’s suspension from the practice of law is not commensurate to Atty. Villaseca’s transgressions. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his client, the courts and society indicate a high degree of
irresponsibility that casts dishonor on the legal profession.

The present case finds a close forerunner in Santeco v. Atty. Avance,22 where we suspended Atty. Luna B. Avance from the practice of law for five(5) years for being grossly remiss in the performance of her duties as
counsel. In this cited case, the civil case entrusted to Atty. Avance was dismissed for failure to prosecute. During the pendency of her motion for reconsideration (which she had filed way beyond the reglementary
period), she told her client that she would file a petition for certiorari before the CA to assail the dismissal of the civil case. She did not file this petition, but failed to inform her client of this omission. Moreover, Atty.
Avance stopped appearing as counsel for her client without notifying the latter.

Atty. Villaseca’s negligence in the present case had much graver implications, as the legal matter entrusted to him involved not merely money or property, but the very liberty and livelihood of his clients. We stress
that the moment Atty. Villaseca agreed to handle the complainant’s criminal case, he became duty-bound to serve his clients with competence and diligence, and to champion their cause with whole-hearted fidelity.
By failing to afford his clients every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law, Atty. Villaseca fell short of what is expected of him as an officer of the Court. We cannot overstress the duty of a lawyer to uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.

All told, Atty. Villaseca showed a wanton and utter disregard to his clients’ cause; his failure to exercise due diligence in attending to their interest in the criminal case caused them grave prejudice. Under the
circumstances, we find a five-year suspension from the practice of law to be a sufficient and appropriate sanction against him. The increased penalty serves the purpose of protecting the interest of the Court, the legal
profession and the public.

WHEREFORE premises considered, we find Atty. Albert T. Villaseca guilty of negligence, in violation of Rules 12.03 and 18.03 and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for five (5) years, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

14. A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014

NESTOR B. FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR., Complainants, v. ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

Before us is a petition for review filed by Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez assailing the February 19, 2009 Resolution 1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) suspending him from the practice
of law for a period of six months for breach of Rule 12.03, 2 Canon 12,3 Canon 17,4 Rule 18.03,5 and Canon 186 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He likewise assails the June 26, 2011 Resolution 7 of the IBP
Board of Governors denying his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the affairs of the homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City.  On January 7, 1993, the Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander
filed a civil suit for damages against the Association and Ely Mabanag 8  before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104 for building a concrete wall which abutted their property and denied them of
their right of way. The spouses Santander likewise alleged that said concrete wall was built in violation of Quezon City Ordinance No. 8633, S-71 which prohibits the closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise
refusing to the public or vehicular traffic the use of or free access to any subdivision or community street. 9  The Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel for the Association, with
respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer.  After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a decision10 on October 4, 1996 in favor of the Spouses Santander. The Association, represented by said law firm,
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On February 5, 1999, the CA issued a Resolution 11 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577 dismissing the appeal on the ground that the original period to file the appellant’s brief had expired 95
days even before the first motion for extension of time to file said brief was filed. The CA also stated that the grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the six subsequent motions for extension of time to file
brief were not meritorious.  The CA resolution became final.

Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr., as members of the Association, filed a Complaint 12 for Disbarment against respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline (CBD) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation of
his duties as an officer of the court.

In his Verified Answer with Counter Complaint, 13 respondent denied administrative liability. He claimed that although his law firm represented the homeowner’s association in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577, the case was
actually handled by an associate lawyer in his law office.  As the partner in charge of the case, he exercised general supervision over the handling counsel and signed the pleadings prepared by said handling lawyer.
Upon discovery of the omissions of the handling lawyer, appropriate sanctions were imposed on the handling lawyer and he thereafter personally took responsibility and spent personal funds to negotiate a settlement
with Federico Santander at no cost to the Association. No damage whatsoever was caused to the Association.

Respondent likewise alleged that after he defeated complainant Figueras in the election for President of the homeowner’s association in 1996, Figueras and his compadre, complainant Victoria, stopped paying their
association dues and other assessments. Complainants and other delinquent members of the association were sanctioned by the Board of Directors and were sued by the association before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). In retaliation, complainants filed the present disbarment case against him and several other cases against him and other officers of the association before the HLURB to question, among
others, the legitimacy of the Association, the election of its officers, and the sanctions imposed by the Association. Thus, he concluded that the disbarment case was filed to harass him. Respondent added that
complainants have no personality to file the disbarment complaint as they were not his clients; hence, there was likewise no jurisdiction over the complaint on the part of the IBP-CBD.

As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the disbarment case for lack of merit, the imposition of sanctions on complainants, and the payment of damages for the filing of the baseless complaint
for disbarment.

On October 3, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found respondent liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03 of Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and
Canon 18 thereof, and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three to six months, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.14crallawlibrary

On February 19, 2009, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2009-14 15adopting the recommendation with modifications as follows:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution [as] Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s breach of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17,
Rule 18.03 and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.  The Warning imposed against respondent is hereby
deleted.

Respondent sought reconsideration of the resolution but his motion was denied in IBP Resolution No. XIX-2011-480 dated June 26, 2011. 16  The IBP Board of Governors noted that respondent’s motion was a mere
reiteration of matters already discussed and there were no substantial grounds to disturb the February 19, 2009 Resolution.
Respondent now comes to this Court essentially raising the issue whether the IBP correctly found him administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the  Code of
Professional Responsibility.

After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds that the suspension of respondent from the practice of law is proper.

The Court finds no merit in respondent’s contention that complainants have no personality to file a disbarment case against him as they were not his clients and that the present suit was merely instituted to harass
him.

The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases.  In fact, the person who called the attention of the court
to a lawyer’s misconduct “is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the outcome.” 17crallawlibrary

In Heck v. Judge Santos,18 the Court held that “[a]ny interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings.”  The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it
necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing.  Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the
charges.

The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in the performance of his duties as counsel for Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. Records show that respondent filed the first motion
for extension of time to file appellant’s brief 95 days after the expiration of the reglementary period to file said brief, thus causing the dismissal of the appeal of the homeowner’s association. To justify his inexcusable
negligence, respondent alleges that he was merely the supervising lawyer and that the fault lies with the handling lawyer. His contention, however, is belied by the records for we note that respondent had filed with
the CA an Urgent Motion for Extension, which he himself signed on behalf of the law firm, stating that a previous motion had been filed but “due to the health condition of the undersigned counsel…he was not able to
finish said Appellants’ Brief within the fifteen (15) day period earlier requested by him.” 19  Thus, it is clear that respondent was personally in charge of the case.

A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf of his client, respondent had fallen far
short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04,20 Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it
his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.  Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the same Code also states that:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Canon 18—A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03.—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

In In Re: Atty. Santiago F. Marcos21 the Court considered a lawyer’s failure to file brief for his client as amounting to inexcusable negligence. The Court held:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes
inexcusable negligence on his part. (People vs. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in
the speedy administration of justice. (Canons 21 and 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).

It has been stressed that the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion. 22  The penalties for a lawyer’s failure to file a
brief or other pleading range from reprimand, 23 warning with fine,24 suspension25 and, in grave cases, disbarment.26  In the present case, we find too harsh the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months.  Under the circumstances, we deem the penalty of suspension for one month from the practice of law to be more commensurate with the
extent of respondent’s violation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is found administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.04, Canon 12 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  He is
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month effective from finality of this Resolution, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar violation shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the courts in the Philippines, and spread on the personal record of respondent lawyer in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.

15. A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014

NESTOR B. FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR., Complainants, v. ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review filed by Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez assailing the February 19, 2009 Resolution 1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) suspending him from the practice
of law for a period of six months for breach of Rule 12.03, 2 Canon 12,3 Canon 17,4 Rule 18.03,5 and Canon 186 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He likewise assails the June 26, 2011 Resolution 7 of the IBP
Board of Governors denying his motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the affairs of the homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon City.  On January 7, 1993, the Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander
filed a civil suit for damages against the Association and Ely Mabanag 8  before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104 for building a concrete wall which abutted their property and denied them of
their right of way. The spouses Santander likewise alleged that said concrete wall was built in violation of Quezon City Ordinance No. 8633, S-71 which prohibits the closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise
refusing to the public or vehicular traffic the use of or free access to any subdivision or community street. 9  The Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel for the Association, with
respondent as the counsel of record and handling lawyer.  After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a decision10 on October 4, 1996 in favor of the Spouses Santander. The Association, represented by said law firm,
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On February 5, 1999, the CA issued a Resolution 11 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577 dismissing the appeal on the ground that the original period to file the appellant’s brief had expired 95
days even before the first motion for extension of time to file said brief was filed. The CA also stated that the grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the six subsequent motions for extension of time to file
brief were not meritorious.  The CA resolution became final.

Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr., as members of the Association, filed a Complaint 12 for Disbarment against respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline (CBD) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation of
his duties as an officer of the court.

In his Verified Answer with Counter Complaint, 13 respondent denied administrative liability. He claimed that although his law firm represented the homeowner’s association in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577, the case was
actually handled by an associate lawyer in his law office.  As the partner in charge of the case, he exercised general supervision over the handling counsel and signed the pleadings prepared by said handling lawyer.
Upon discovery of the omissions of the handling lawyer, appropriate sanctions were imposed on the handling lawyer and he thereafter personally took responsibility and spent personal funds to negotiate a settlement
with Federico Santander at no cost to the Association. No damage whatsoever was caused to the Association.

Respondent likewise alleged that after he defeated complainant Figueras in the election for President of the homeowner’s association in 1996, Figueras and his compadre, complainant Victoria, stopped paying their
association dues and other assessments. Complainants and other delinquent members of the association were sanctioned by the Board of Directors and were sued by the association before the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). In retaliation, complainants filed the present disbarment case against him and several other cases against him and other officers of the association before the HLURB to question, among
others, the legitimacy of the Association, the election of its officers, and the sanctions imposed by the Association. Thus, he concluded that the disbarment case was filed to harass him. Respondent added that
complainants have no personality to file the disbarment complaint as they were not his clients; hence, there was likewise no jurisdiction over the complaint on the part of the IBP-CBD.

As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the disbarment case for lack of merit, the imposition of sanctions on complainants, and the payment of damages for the filing of the baseless complaint
for disbarment.

On October 3, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found respondent liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 12.03 of Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and
Canon 18 thereof, and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three to six months, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.14crallawlibrary

On February 19, 2009, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2009-14 15adopting the recommendation with modifications as follows:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution [as] Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s breach of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17,
Rule 18.03 and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.  The Warning imposed against respondent is hereby
deleted.

Respondent sought reconsideration of the resolution but his motion was denied in IBP Resolution No. XIX-2011-480 dated June 26, 2011. 16  The IBP Board of Governors noted that respondent’s motion was a mere
reiteration of matters already discussed and there were no substantial grounds to disturb the February 19, 2009 Resolution.

Respondent now comes to this Court essentially raising the issue whether the IBP correctly found him administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the  Code of
Professional Responsibility.

After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds that the suspension of respondent from the practice of law is proper.

The Court finds no merit in respondent’s contention that complainants have no personality to file a disbarment case against him as they were not his clients and that the present suit was merely instituted to harass
him.

The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment cases.  In fact, the person who called the attention of the court
to a lawyer’s misconduct “is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the outcome.” 17crallawlibrary

In Heck v. Judge Santos,18 the Court held that “[a]ny interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings.”  The right to institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it
necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing.  Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the
charges.

The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in the performance of his duties as counsel for Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. Records show that respondent filed the first motion
for extension of time to file appellant’s brief 95 days after the expiration of the reglementary period to file said brief, thus causing the dismissal of the appeal of the homeowner’s association. To justify his inexcusable
negligence, respondent alleges that he was merely the supervising lawyer and that the fault lies with the handling lawyer. His contention, however, is belied by the records for we note that respondent had filed with
the CA an Urgent Motion for Extension, which he himself signed on behalf of the law firm, stating that a previous motion had been filed but “due to the health condition of the undersigned counsel…he was not able to
finish said Appellants’ Brief within the fifteen (15) day period earlier requested by him.” 19  Thus, it is clear that respondent was personally in charge of the case.
A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the appellant’s brief on behalf of his client, respondent had fallen far
short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04,20 Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it
his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.  Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the same Code also states that:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Canon 18—A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03.—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

In In Re: Atty. Santiago F. Marcos21 the Court considered a lawyer’s failure to file brief for his client as amounting to inexcusable negligence. The Court held:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159) A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes
inexcusable negligence on his part. (People vs. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in
the speedy administration of justice. (Canons 21 and 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).

It has been stressed that the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion. 22  The penalties for a lawyer’s failure to file a
brief or other pleading range from reprimand, 23 warning with fine,24 suspension25 and, in grave cases, disbarment.26  In the present case, we find too harsh the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months.  Under the circumstances, we deem the penalty of suspension for one month from the practice of law to be more commensurate with the
extent of respondent’s violation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.  Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is found administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.04, Canon 12 and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  He is
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month effective from finality of this Resolution, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar violation shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the courts in the Philippines, and spread on the personal record of respondent lawyer in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.