Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Property 51 To 71
Property 51 To 71
Property 51 To 71
Facts:
petitioner Lily Sy (petitioner) claimed that in the morning of December 16, 1999,
respondents Benito Fernandez Go (Benito) and Glenn Ben Tiak Sy (Glenn), together with
"Elmo," a... security guard of Hawk Security Agency, went to petitioner's residence at the
10th Floor, Fortune Wealth, 612 Elcano St., Binondo, Manila and forcibly opened the door,
destroyed and dismantled the door lock then replaced it with a new one, without...
petitioner's consent.
as a diversionary ruse, respondent Jennifer Sy (Jennifer) was at the lobby of the same
building who informed petitioner's helper Geralyn Juanites (Geralyn) that the elevator was
not working.
Glenn and Benito's act of replacing the door lock appeared to be authorized by a resolution
of Fortune Wealth Mansion Corporation's Board of Directors, namely, respondents Glenn,
Jennifer, William Sy (William), Merlyn Sy (Merlyn), and Merry Sy (Merry).
In the evening of the same date, petitioner supposedly saw Benito, Glenn, Jennifer, Merry
and respondent Berthold Lim (Berthold) took from her residence numerous boxes
containing her personal belongings without her consent and, with intent to gain, load them
inside a... family-owned van/truck named "Wheels in Motion."
Respondents Benito and Berthold denied the accusations against them.
They explained that petitioner made the baseless charges simply because she hated their
wives Merry and Jennifer due to irreconcilable personal differences on how to go about the
estates of their deceased... parents
They also manifested their doubts on petitioner's capability to acquire the personal
belongings allegedly stolen by them.
Merry, Glenn, and Jennifer, on the other hand, claimed that petitioner's accusations were
brought about by the worsening state of their personal relationship because of
misunderstanding on how to divide the estate of their deceased father.
They also... pointed out that the whole condominium building where the alleged residence
of petitioner is located, is owned and registered in the name of the corporation.
They explained that the claimed residence was actually the former residence of their family
(including petitioner).
After their parents' death, the corporation allegedly tolerated petitioner to continuously
occupy said unit while they, in turn, stayed in the other vacant units leaving some of their
properties and those of the corporation in... their former residence.
They explained that they changed the unit's door lock to protect their... personal belongings
and those of the corporation as petitioner had initially changed the original lock.
They supported their authority to do so with a board resolution duly issued by the directors.
They questioned petitioner's failure to report the... alleged incident to the police, considering
that they supposedly witnessed the unlawful taking.[16] They thus contended that
petitioner's accusations are based on illusions and wild imaginations, aggravated by her ill
motive, greed for money and... indiscriminate prosecution.[17]
Assistant City Prosecutor Jovencio T. Tating (ACP Tating) recommended that respondents
Benito, Berthold, Jennifer, Glenn and Merry be charged with Robbery In An Uninhabited
Place
When elevated before the Secretary of Justice, then Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong (the
Secretary) reversed and set aside[25] the ACP's conclusions and the latter was directed to
move for the withdrawal of the Information against respondents.
The Secretary stressed that the claimed residence of petitioner is not an uninhabited place
under the penal laws, considering her allegation that it is her residence.[27] Neither can it
be considered uninhabited under Article 300 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), since it is located in a populous place.[28] The Secretary
opined that the elements of robbery were not present, since there was no violence against
or intimidation of persons, or force upon things, as the replacement of the door... lock was
authorized by a board resolution.[29] It is likewise his conclusion that the element of taking
was not adequately established as petitioner and her helper were not able to see the taking
of anything of value. If at all there was taking, the
Secretary concluded that it was made under a claim of ownership
Aggrieved, petitioner went up to the Court of Appeals (CA) in a special civil action for
certiorari
The CA held that petitioner had sufficiently shown that the Secretary gravely abused her
discretion in reversing the OCP's decision.
Issues:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRIEVOUS ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT A CORPORATION MAY ARBITRARILY TAKE THE LAW INTO THEIR OWN
HANDS BY MEANS OF A MERE BOARD RESOLUTION.
Ruling:
Admittedly, the subject 10th floor unit is owned by the corporation and served as the family
residence prior to the death of petitioner and respondents' parents. The 10th floor unit,
including the personal properties inside, is the... subject of estate proceedings pending in
another court and is, therefore, involved in the disputed claims among the siblings
(petitioner and respondents). Respondents admitted that armed with a Board Resolution
authorizing them to break open the door lock system of said unit and... to install a new door
lock system, they went up to the subject unit to implement said resolution. The said
corporate action was arrived at because petitioner had allegedly prevented prospective
buyers from conducting ocular inspection.
Petitioner, however, claims that on December 16, 1999 and sometime in January 2000,
respondents brought out from the unit 34 boxes containing her personal belongings worth
more than P10 million. We cannot, however, fathom why petitioner did not immediately
report the first... incident and waited for yet another incident after more or less one month. If
the value involved is what she claims to be, it is contrary to human nature to just keep silent
and not immediately protect her right. Her general statement that she was intimidated by
Benito who was... known to be capable of inflicting bodily harm cannot excuse her inaction.
Petitioner, therefore, failed to establish that there was unlawful taking.
Assuming that respondents indeed took said boxes containing personal belongings, said
properties were taken under claim of ownership which negates the element of intent to gain.
In this case, it was shown that respondents believed in good faith that they and the
corporation own not only the subject unit but also the properties found inside. If at all, they
took them openly and avowedly under that claim of ownership.[56] This is... bolstered by the
fact that at the time of the alleged incident, petitioner had been staying in another unit
because the electric service in the 10th floor was disconnected. We quote with approval the
CA conclusion in their Amended Decision, thus:
Hence, even if we are to assume that private respondents took the said personal properties
from the 10th floor of the Fortune Wealth Mansion, they cannot be charged with robbery
because again, the taking was made under a claim of ownership x x x
Facts:
Aurora Engson Fransdilla (
Fransdilla
)
, the lone appellant,... seeks to reverse the decision... whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed her conviction and that of her co-accused for robbery on the basis of conspiracy...
private complainant
Lalaine... saw appellant
Upon noticing
Aurora, Lalaine went to the gate and asked Aurora what is their purpose, as there were four
(4) of them. Aurora then inquired about
Lalaine's sister. The latter replied that Cynthia was in the Japanese Embassy and asked
Aurora if there was any other person whom... she wanted to talk to. It was then that Aurora
told Lalaine that she was from
POEA
. It was upon said pretension that Lalaine offered herself to instead talk to her and allowed
her to enter their house. When they were already having a... conversation, Aurora asked
Lalaine if she could use the telephone, which the latter acceded to and handed her a
cordless telephone. Lalaine noticed that Aurora seemed to keep on dialing the telephone
and even said that the person she was calling did not know how to use the... telephone. But
still, Aurora kept on dialing the telephone.
Thereafter, appellant... asked for a cigarette. After Lalaine gave Aurora the cigarette, the
four (4) other men outside the gate, who were with Aurora, suddenly came inside the house.
The four (4) men stood behind Aurora who was still dialing the telephone. When Aurora
told... that she could not contact the person she was calling, she asked Lalaine if she could
use the comfort room, which the latter again permitted.
When Aurora came back, she sat down again but in... crossed-legs as she said she was
having a menstrual period. Upon saying that, Lalaine's attention was focused on her. At this
juncture, accused Edgardo Cacal poked a gun at Lalaine's neck and announced that it was
a hold-up. While appellant Edgardo Cacal was poking a gun at
Lalaine's neck, accused Danilo Cuanang and the two (2) other men proceeded to the
kitchen. In the kitchen, Danilo and his two (2) other companions herded their maids, private
complainant's niece and cousin inside the bodega.
Cacal looked around the room and when he spotted upon the vault... opened the door and
called for his companions to come along. Accused Cuanang came up and the two (Cacal
and Cuanang) carried the vault and brought it downstairs. But before they went downstairs,
they threatened Lalaine not to follow them and to just stay in the room,... but Lalaine
opened the door and followed them.
When Lalaine was halfway downstairs, accused Cacal turned his back and saw her.
Accused Cacal then brought her inside her room.
Appellants and their co-accused then left the house on board two (2) cars that were
waiting... for them just outside the house
At this point, Lalaine shouted for help, thereafter, a relative came by to help and untied her.
Lalaine then called her sister Cynthia and related the incident. Cynthia reported the incident
to the police authorities. Not too long thereafter, the police investigated the... incident
Lalaine inquired on Cuanang about their lady companion (herein appellant Fransdilla), but
the latter just bowed his head. When Lalaine threatened him that if he would not tell the
whereabouts of their lady companion (herein appellant Aurora)... he would be answerable
for all the things stolen, the latter replied that they had no share in the stolen items. Lalaine
then asked the name of their lady companion and the latter said that her name was Jessica
Engson (also known as Aurora Engson Fransdilla) and she was living... in Antipolo Street,
Sampaloc, Manila. Cuanang also volunteered himself to accompany them to Aurora's
house provided that they should not hurt him. Agreeing thereto, the group of Lalaine,
accompanied by Cuanang, proceeded to Aurora's house at the given address. Upon
arrival... thereat, Lalaine inquired from a child if Aurora was awake, and upon asking, she
saw appellant Aurora who was trembling at that time. Lalaine noticed that Aurora was
nervous and even told her that Lalaine was able to remember her face. Appellant even
voluntarily told Lalaine... that she would tell her the whole truth. She (Aurora) told that she
was instructed by her companions Edgar (Silao), Sonny (Manuel Silao) and Danilo Cacal.
Lalaine even confronted her when she implicated her cousins (Sonny and Edgar).
Fransdilla and her co-accused were eventually charged with robbery... ook, rob, and carried
away the following items therefrom, to wit:... nine (9) pieces of expensive jewelry .... P1 .5 M
$30,000.00 (U.S. Dollars equivalent to ... 900,000.00... belonging to CYNTHIA YREVERRE
Y PANGANIBAN.
two (2) pairs of gold earings
P 10,000.00
... one (1) gold necklace with pendant
180,000.00
... one (1) Louie Viton Brown Leather (sic)...
11,000.00
... one (1) Gucci Ladies watch
13,000.00
... two (2) gold earrings w/diamond pendant...
80,000.00
CASH MONEY
7,000.00
... belonging to LALAINE YREVERRE Y Panganiban, all in the total amount of
PhP2,701,000.00, Philippines Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended
party in the aforementioned sum and in such other amounts as maybe awarded under the
provisions of the Civil Code
RTC convicted Fransdilla and her co-accused of robbery
As to Fransdilla, the RTC ruled that several facts and circumstances either proved by the
Prosecution or admitted by the Defense established her having conspired with her co-
accused in committing the offense charged.
CA affirmed the conviction
Issues:
The accused still insists on her innocence, protesting that the CA erred in affirming the
conviction despite the failure to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt as a co-
conspirator in robbery.
Ruling:
In the eyes of the law, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it.
The overt acts of each of the conspirators must tend to execute the offense agreed upon,
for the merely passive conspirator cannot be held to be still part of the conspiracy without
such... overt acts, unless such conspirator is the mastermind. Here, Fransdilla was
satisfactorily shown not to have been a mere passive co-conspirator, but an active one who
had facilitated the access into the house by representing herself as an employee of the
POEA. In that respect,... it is not always required to establish that two or more persons met
and explicitly entered into the agreement to commit the crime by laying down the details of
how their unlawful scheme or objective would be carried out.
In establishing conspiracy, the State could rely on direct as well as circumstantial evidence.
Lalaine's testimony against Fransdilla constituted both kinds of evidence. Lalaine's direct
testimony showed the latter's overt participation in the execution of the robbery, while the...
following circumstances indicated the unity of action and common purpose or design to
commit the robbery among Fransdilla and her co-accused, specifically: (1) Fransdilla and
her co-accused went together to the complainants' house
(2) she talked to Joel to solicit information on the whereabouts of Cynthia; (3) upon learning
that Cynthia was not home, she stepped outside the gate and talked to two men sitting
inside a vehicle parked outside the house; (4) she pretended to be an employee of the
POEA... in order to gain entry into the house; (5) she performed acts purposely aimed to
distract Lalaine in order to give her cohorts the opportunity to enter the house and commit
the robbery; (5) during the robbery, she was not tied up like the household members, but
moved freely... around the house, and at one point Lalaine spotted her peeping into the
bedroom where Lalaine was then being held; and (7) she and the others fled together in two
separate vehicles after the robbery.
In light of the foregoing, the CA justly concluded that the State established beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt for of all the accused, including Fransdilla, for the robbery.
Crime committed was the complex crime of... robbery in an inhabited house by armed
men... under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and... robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons... under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code
CA ruled that all the accused, including Fransdilla, were guilty of committing the complex
crime of robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299, Revised Penal Code, and robbery
with intimidation... or violence under Article 294, Revised Penal Code.
We concur with the CA.
In Napolis v. Court of Appeals, the Court abandoned the doctrine adopted in United States
v. De los Santos[19] that when the felonies of robbery in an inhabited house under Article
299 of the Revised Penal Code and robbery with violence... against or intimidation of a
person under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code are committed, the penalty for the
latter crime (although the lighter one) should be imposed because the violence against or
intimidation of a person was the "controlling qualification," on... the theory that "robbery
which is characterized by violence or intimidation against the person is evidently graver than
ordinary robbery committed by force upon things, because where violence or intimidation
against the person is present there is greater disturbance of the order... of society and the
security of the individual.
Napolis v. Court of Appeals is controlling in this case. To start with, the information fully
alleged the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299, Revised
Penal Code, and robbery with intimidation or violence under Article 294, Revised Penal
Code... by averring that "the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with
and mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to gain, and by means of violence and intimidation upon person rob the residence x
x... x." And, secondly, the Prosecution competently proved the commission of the complex
crime by showing during the trial that the accused, after entering the residential house of the
complainants at No. 24-B Mabait St., Teacher's Village, Quezon City, took away
valuables,... including the vault containing Cynthia's US dollar currencies, and in the
process committed acts of violence against and intimidation of persons during the robbery
by slapping and threatening Lalaine and tying her up, and herding the other members of the
household inside the... bodega of the house.
Relevant are paragraph (a)4 (because Fransdilla pretended to be from the POEA) and
paragraph (b)2 (because the accused brought the vault down from Cynthia's upstairs
bedroom and forced it open outside the place where the robbery was committed), supra.
The penalty for the... crime is reclusion temporal.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the complex crime is that for the
more serious felony, which, in this case, was the robbery in an inhabited house by armed
men punishable by reclusion temporal, to be imposed in the maximum period
(i.e., 17 years, four months and one day to 20 years). Hence, the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four
months of reclusion temporal, must be corrected to 17 years, four months and one day... of
reclusion temporal.
Principles:
The complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by armed persons and robbery with
violence against or intimidation of persons was committed when the accused, who held
firearms, entered the residential house of the victims and inflicted injury upon the... victims
in the process of committing the robbery. Hence, the penalty is that imposed for the robbery
in an inhabited house, the more serious crime. All the accused are liable because the act of
one is the act of all.
Facts: Appellant and his co-accused, Marvin Belmonte, Enrile Gabay, and Noel Baac
were charged with Robbery with Rape in an Information which alleges that the above
accused, armed with a gun, conspiring with one Noel Baac and all of them mutually
helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, feloniously take, steal, and divest from complainants some valuable items
and on the occasion thereof said Noel Baac, by means of force, threats and intimidation
and with the use of a gun, willfully, have carnal knowledge with AAA, against her will
and consent, which is aggravated by the circumstances of nighttime and dwelling, to the
damage and prejudice of the said victim.
Accused-appellant and Marvin, on the other hand, proffered alibi and claimed that they
were sleeping in their house when the alleged crime was committed.
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling: Yes. Robbery with Rape is a special complex crime under Article 294 of the
RPC. It contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take,
with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the
occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime.
Here, the prosecution witnesses' positive identification of the accused-appellant as one
of the malefactors in the robbery defeats accused-appellant's lone defense of alibi.
Absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the witnesses, a categorical, consistent,
and positive identification of the accused-appellant shall prevail over the latter's alibi and
denial. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, alibi and denial are
negative, self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law.
The trial court correctly convicted accused-appellant Marlon Belmonte of the special
complex crime of robbery with rape even if he did not rape AAA, as accused-appellant
Marlon Belmonte had the opportunity but did not endeavor to stop accused Noel Baac
from raping AAA.
Facts:
factual scenario... the eyewitness account of Albert M. Arca (Arca),... May 16, 2006, about
one o'clock in the afternoon, he went to the store of Lourdes Yap (Yap) at Purok 4,
Barangay Rawis, Legazpi City. He was buying ice but it was not yet hardened (frozen) so
he went home.
After purchasing the ice, he noticed there was a verbal tussle between Yap and two male
customers... arguing that they were given insufficient change and insisting they gave a
P500 bill and not P100.
From outside the store and thru its open window grills, he saw one of the men placed his
left arm around the neck of Yap and covered her mouth with his right hand while the other
man was at her back restraining her hands. He... recognized the man who was holding the
hands of Yap as Charlie Orosco... stabbed Yap at the center of her chest.
his defense, appellant testified that on the date and time of the incident, he was at his house
in Bigaa taking care of his three-year-old child while his wife was washing clothes. He
stayed in the house
Issues:
it should only be robbery and not the complex crime of robbery with homicide considering
the fact that it was not him who stabbed Yap.
Ruling:
the homicide was committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery as appellant
and John Doe had to kill Yap to accomplish their main objective of stealing her money. The
earlier verbal tussle where the two pretended to have paid a greater amount and asked for
the... correct change was just a ploy to get inside the store where the victim kept her
earnings.
The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly showed that appellant acted in
conspiracy with his co-accused.
It must be stressed that appellant played a crucial role in the killing of the victim to facilitate
the robbery. He was behind the victim holding her hands while John Doe grabbed her at
the neck. His act contributed in rendering the victim without any means of defending...
herself when John Doe stabbed her frontally in the chest. Having acted in conspiracy with
his co-accused, appellant is equally liable for the killing of Yap.
Principles:
courts found the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Arca, convincing notwithstanding that he
was quite slow in narrating the incident to the court and that he initially desisted from
physically pointing to appellant as the one who held
Yap's hands from behind and took her money at the store after she was stabbed by
appellant's cohort (John Doe).
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties. Any person
guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
The elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are: (1) the taking of personal property
is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to
another; (3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi; and (4) by reason of the robbery... or on
the occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is committed.[16] Homicide is
said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if it is committed (a)
to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to... preserve the possession by the
culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to
eliminate witnesses to the commission of the crime.[17] In robbery with homicide, the
original criminal design of the malefactor... is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated
on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the
taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery.
Facts:
Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police District in Metro
Manila, an old hand at dealing with suspected criminals. A recipient of various awards and
commendations attesting to his competence and performance as a police officer, he could not therefore
imagine that one day he would be sitting on the other side of the investigation table as the suspected
mastermind of the armed hijacking of a postal delivery van. Filoteo admitted involvement in the crime
and pointed to three other soldiers, namely ,Eddie Saguindel, Bernardo Relator and Jack Miravalles (who
turned out to be adischarged soldier), as his confederates. At 1:45 in the afternoon of May 30,
1982,petitioner executed a sworn statement in Tagalog before M/Sgt. Arsenio C. Carlos and Sgt. Romeo P.
Espero. Peitioner however sought later that his confession be inadmissible evidence, saying that the law
should favour him as an accused.
Issue:
Whether or not Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution shall be given a retroactive effect
and petitioner’s extrajudicial confession be held as inadmissible evidence.
RULING:
No, since what he did was not a penal offense. Under the penal law, a person guilty of felony who
is not a habitual criminal may be given favour by the law.
10. Laurel vs Hon. Zeus Abrogar - G.R. No. 155076; February 27, 2006
11. Eduardo Magsumbol vs People - G.R. No. 207175; November 26, 2014
Facts:
On August 30,2002, Eduardo Magsumbol with Erasmo Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria, and Bonifacio
Ramirez were charged with Theft filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 55.
On or about February 1, 2002, at around 11:00 in the morning, at Barangay Kinatihan I in
Candelaria, Quezon, Magsumbol alongside with seven men who, up to the time being are still
unidentified and are still at large, conspired to unlawfully and feloniously cut, take, steal, and carry
away Menandro Avanzado’s thirty three coconut trees from the latter’s coconut plantation. The
stolen goods are valued at Php 44,400.00. Later, the said men turned the coconut tress into coco
lumber.
Ernesto Caringal, overseer of Avanzado’s one-hectare unregistered parcel of land did not attempt to
stop the men from their crime as he feared being outnumbered. He, instead, left the plantation and
made his way to San Pablo City to inform Avanzado about the thievery.
On February 3, Avanzado and Caringal reported the crime to the police. The two, accompanied by a
certain SPO 1 Manalo, visited the coconut plantation and were faced with the reality of thirty three
coconut trees cut down. Photographs were taken as evidence.
All the accused in the case vehemently denied the charges against them. Ramirez and Magsumbol
claimed that only the coconut trees which stood within the land owned by Atanacio, a relative of the
private complainant, were cut down on that morning of February 1, 2002. Ramirez added that he was
a coco lumber trader and that Atanacio offered to sell the coconut trees planted on his lot.
Magsumbol claimed that he took no part in the felling of the coconut trees but merely supervised the
same. He claimed that he did not receive any remuneration for the service he rendered or a share
from the proceeds of the coco lumbers sale. Inanoria likewise denied participation in the cutting
down of the coconut trees but confirmed the presence of Magsumbol and Magsino at the site to
supervise the accomplishment of the work being done thereat. Atanacio later testified on behalf of
the accused Ramirez and Magsumbol, and claimed that he authorized them—his brothers-in-law—to
cut down the coconut trees within the boundary of his property which was adjacent to the land co-
owned by Avanzado. Defense witness Brgy. Captain Arguelles testified that on January 28, 2002,
Magsumbol, Magsino, Ramirez, and Inanoria came to his office seeking permission to cut down the
coconut trees planted on the land of Atanacio.
Magsumbol and his co-accused, nonetheless, were convicted of the crime of theft.
Issue:
Whether or not malice, as an element of the crime of theft, is present in the case at hand.
Held:
No. Malice and intent are not present in this case.
The criminal mind is, of no doubt, absent. It should be considered that Magsumbol and his co-
accused even sought the permission of the Barangay Captain prior to the cutting down of the coconut
trees and the act was done openly, in broad daylight.
Actus Non Facit Reum Nisi Mens Sit Rea—The act itself does not make a man guilty unless his
intention were so. The fact that Magsumbol and his co-accused veered away from the usual modus
operandi of criminals of carrying out their crime covertly to avoid being discovered substantiate the
absence of criminal intent or malice.
12. Ryan Viray vs People - G.R. No. 205180; November 11, 2013
13. People vs Hon. David Alfeche - G.R. No. 102070; July 23, 1992
14. Cherry Benabaye vs People - G.R. No. 203466; February 25, 2015
FACTS:
Petitioner Benabaye was the Loans Bookkeeper of Siam Bank and was authorized to collect
and/or accept loan payments of Siam Bank’s clients and issue provisional receipts therefor,
accomplish a cash transfer slip at the end of each banking day detailing the amounts of money
that she has received, and remit such payments to Tupag, her supervisor.
Sometime in 2001, Siam Bank conducted an audit investigation of its loan transactions and
found out that fraud and certain irregularities attended the same. It discovered the non-remittance
of some loan payments received from its clients based on the provisional receipts issued by its
account officers, as well as the daily collection reports corresponding to the said provisional
receipts.
Siam Bank directed Benabaye to explain the discrepancies between the provisional receipts she
had issued and the unremitted money involved, and made a final demand upon her to return the
amount of the money involved. In her written explanation, Benabaye claimed that the
discrepancies could be clarified by her supervisor, Tupag, to whom she had submitted her daily
cash transfer slips together with the corresponding provisional receipts.
Tupag admitted his accountability and, while claiming that some of his co-employees were privy
to the acts which resulted in the discrepancies, he did not disclose their identities.
Siam Bank terminated the employment of both Benabaye and Tupag and subsequently filed a
criminal case for Estafa.
The RTC found both Benabaye and Tupag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b).
The CA affirmed Benabaye’s conviction in toto, similarly finding that all the elements of Estafa
through misappropriation have been established.
The CA ruled that conspiracy between Benabaye and Tupag was sufficiently established,
considering that both had access and facility to determine if payments made by Siam Bank’s
clients were properly remitted.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining Benabaye’s conviction for the crime of Estafa
through misappropriation.
2. What is the effect of the perfected appeal of Benabaye on her co-accused Tubag?
RULING:
1. The first element of Estafa through misappropriation has not been established.
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, as amended, under which Benabaye was charged and
prosecuted, states:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned
herein below shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if
such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be[.]
xxxx
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even
though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having
received such money, goods, or other property[.]
(a) the offender’s receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the
same;
(b) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial
of receipt of the money or property;
(d) demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or property received.
Under the first element, when the money, goods, or any other personal property is received by
the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration,
the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing
received. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the
thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner.
Hence, conversion of personal property in the case of an employee having mere material
possession of the said property constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both
material and juridical possession have been transferred, misappropriation of the same property
constitutes Estafa.
In this case, Benabaye maintains that the first element of Estafa through misappropriation has not
been established, insisting that her possession of the collected loan payments was merely
material and not juridical; therefore, she cannot be convicted of the said crime.
Records show that Benabaye was merely a collector of loan payments from Siam Bank’s clients.
At the end of every banking day, she was required to remit all cash payments received together
with the corresponding cash transfer slips to her supervisor, Tupag. As such, the money merely
passes into her hands and she takes custody thereof only for the duration of the banking day.
Hence, as an employee of Siam Bank, specifically, its temporary cash custodian whose tasks are
akin to a bank teller, she had no juridical possession over the missing funds but only their
physical or material possession.
As a bank cash custodian, the Court ruled that she had no juridical possession over the missing
funds. Relative thereto, in Guzman v. CA,where a travelling sales agent was convicted of the
crime of Estafa for his failure to return to his principal the proceeds of the goods he was
commissioned to sell, the Court had occasion to explain the distinction between the possession of
a bank teller and an agent for purposes of determining criminal liability for Estafa, viz.:
There is an essential distinction between the possession of a receiving teller of funds received
from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of
merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the former case, payment by third
persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the
funds received, and has no independent right or title to retain or possess the same as against the
bank. An agent, on the other hand, can even assert, as against his own principal, an independent,
autonomous, right to retain the money or goods received in consequence of the agency; as when
the principal fails to reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages
suffered without his fault.
Thus, being a mere custodian of the missing funds and not, in any manner, an agent who could
have asserted a right against Siam Bank over the same, Benabaye had only acquired material and
not juridical possession of such funds and consequently, cannot be convicted of the crime of
Estafa as charged. In fine, the dismissal of the Estafa charge against Benabaye should come as a
matter of course, without prejudice, however, to the filing of the appropriate criminal charge
against her as may be warranted under the circumstances of this case.
2. Separately, in light of the foregoing, Benabaye’s supervisor and co-accused in this case,
Tupag, who likewise was not appointed as an agent of Siam Bank and thus had no juridical
possession of the subject sums, must also be discharged of the same Estafa charge in view of
Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which states:
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
While it is true that only Benabaye was able to successfully perfect her appeal, the rule is that an
appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its aspects,
including those not raised by the parties.
Considering that under Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as
above-quoted, a favorable judgment, as in this case, shall benefit the co-accused who did not
appeal or those who appealed from their judgments of conviction but for one reason or another,
the conviction became final and executory, Benabaye’s discharge for the crime of Estafa is
likewise applicable to Tupag. Note that the dismissal of the Estafa charge against Tupag is
similarly without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charge against him as may be
warranted under the circumstances pertinent to him.
The criminal charges against petitioner Benabaye and her co-accused Tupag are DISMISSED
without prejudice.
15. Norma Gamaro vs People - G.R. No. 211917; February 27, 2017
Facts:
petitioners were charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a)... private
complainant
Fineza... engaged in a business venture with... petitioner Norma
Gamaro... and her daughters... and accused Rowena Gamaro Fineza would buy any
foreclosed pieces of jewelry from M. Lhuillier Pawnshop whenever informed by Umali who
was then the manager of the said pawnshop
The pieces of jewelry would then be sold for profit by Norma Gamaro to her co-employees
at the
SSS... he proceeds of the sale would then be divided among them in the following manner:
fifty percent (50%) would go to Fineza, while the other fifty percent (50%) would be divided
among Umali, Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro. As security for the pieces of jewelry
which were placed in the possession of Norma Gamaro and her daughter Rowena Gamaro,
the two would issue several checks drawn from their joint bank account in favor of Fineza
reflecting the appraised amount of the pieces of jewelry.
The business venture was initially successful. However, when Fineza discovered that
Norma Gamaro, together with her daughters Rowena Gamaro and Umali, also engaged in a
similar business with other suppliers of pieces of jewelry, she decided to terminate the
business... wind up the business, it was agreed that Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro
would just dispose or sell the remaining pieces of jewelry in their possession. But when
Fineza tried to encash the checks which were issued to her by Rowena Gamaro, the same
were dishonored because the account of the Gamaros had been closed.
. Fineza then confronted petitioner Norma Gamaro about the dishonored checks, and the
latter confessed that she did not have enough money to cover the amount of the checks.
Fineza also learned that the pieces of jewelry were pawned to several pawnshops and
private individuals contrary to what they had agreed upon. Petitioner Norma Gamaro
furnished Fineza with a list of the pawnshops, such that, the latter was compelled to redeem
the pieces of jewelry with her own money. It appeared in the pawnshop tickets that it was
the nephew of Norma Gamaro named Frederick San Diego who pledged the pieces of
jewelry.
To settle the matter, Fineza asked Norma Gamaro to return the remaining pieces of jewelry
in her possession but the latter failed to do so, and instead, offered her house and lot as
payment for the pieces of jewelry. Fineza, however, did not accept the said offer.
A demand letter was then sent by Fineza to Umali, Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro,...
asking for the return of the amount of P2,292,519.00 as payment for all the pieces of jewelry
which were not returned to her, including the cash given by Fineza for the rediscounting
business. The demand letter was left unanswered.
For her part, Norma Gamaro, averred that she had no involvement in the jewelry business
of her daughters. Umali likewise denied having any business dealings with her sister
Rowena Gamaro and with Fineza. While admitting that there were pieces of jewelry pledged
by her cousin, Frederick San Diego, in the pawnshop where she was the manager, Umali
denied that she knew where those pieces of jewelry came from
RTC
Norma Gamaro... estafa
Section 1 (b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal before the C
DENIED
Issues:
whether a conviction for the crime of Estafa under a different paragraph from the one
charged is legally permissible.
Ruling:
In the instant case, the crime of estafa charged against petitioners is defined and penalized
by Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Code, viz.:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:(a) By using fictitious name, or
falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
The elements of the said crime are as follows: (1) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent
acts or fraudulent means; (2) such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must
be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (3) the
offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means
and was thus induced to part with his money or property; and (4) as a result thereof, the
offended party suffered damage.
However, the crime petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted of is estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code:Article 315. Swindling (estafa).
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any
other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or
by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.
The elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) are as follows: (1) that money,
goods, or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or
to return, the same; (2) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or a denial of the receipt thereof; (3) that the misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a demand made by
the offended party on the offender.
was the RTC correct in convicting her of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) instead of
paragraph 2(a)?
A reading of the Information yields an affirmative answer. The Information filed sufficiently
charges estafa through misappropriation or conversion. Fineza entrusted petitioner Norma
Gamaro with the pieces of jewelry amounting to P2,292,519.00 on the condition that the
same will be sold for profit. Petitioner Norma Gamaro was under obligation to turn over the
proceeds of the sale to Fineza. However, instead of complying with the obligation, she
pawned the pieces of jewelry to M. Lhuillier Pawnshop where petitioner Umali worked as
Branch Manager and kept the proceeds thereof to the damage and prejudice of Fineza.
Paragraph 1(b) provides liability for estafa committed by misappropriating or converting to
the prejudice of another money, goods, or any other personal property received by the
offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though that obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods,
or other property. This, at least, is very clearly shown by the factual allegations of the
Information.
Also, the prosecution was able to prove the crime of estafa under paragraph 1(b). As held
by the CA, Fineza positively and categorically testified on the transaction that transpired
between her and petitioners and accused Rowena Gamaro. The failure to account upon
demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
As mentioned, petitioner Norma Gamaro failed to account for, upon demand, the jewelry
which was received by her in trust. This already constitutes circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation or conversion to petitioner's own personal use. The failure to return upon
demand the properties which one has the duty to return is tantamount to appropriating the
same for his own personal use.[25] As in fact, in this case, Fineza, herself redeemed the
pieces of jewelry using her own money.
The essence of this kind of estafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or property
received to the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made. The words convert
and misappropriate connote the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were
one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To
misappropriate for one's own use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage,
but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right. In proving the
element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation arises
when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold
and fails to give an account of their whereabouts
Thus, petitioners having been adequately informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them, petitioner Norma Gamaro could be convicted of the said offense,
the same having been proved.
We agree with the findings of the RTC and the CA that petitioner Norma Gamaro was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of estafa. The CA ruled that the prosecution's evidence showed
that Fineza entrusted the possession of the jewelry to petitioner. The CA observed that the
prosecution duly proved petitioner's misappropriation by showing that she failed to return
the diamond ring upon demand. That misappropriation took place was strengthened when
petitioner Norma Gamaro informed Fineza that they pawned the jewelry, an act that ran
counter to the terms of their business agreement.
16. Anita Capulong vs People - G.R. No. 199907; February 27, 2017
FACTS:
Petitioner Anita Capulong (Anita) and her husband, Fernando Capulong (Fernando) were accused
of the crime of Estafa. Private complainant Francisca P. de Guzman (De Guzman) testified that
Anita obtained from her an amount of ₱700,000.00. As a security for the loan, the Spouses
Capulong executed a Chattel Mortgage with Power of Attorney over their cargo truck, the original
Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration (OR-CR) of which were likewise delivered to De
Guzman. On a later date, Anita requested to borrow the OR-CR for a week, excusing that she would
apply for the amendment of the registration certificate to increase the weight or load capacity of
the truck and show it to a prospective buyer. De Guzman was hesitant at first since the chattel
mortgage was not yet registered, but she later on acceded. As proof of receipt, Anita issued a
handwritten note. Despite the expiration of the one-week period and De Guzman's repeated
demands, the documents were not returned by Anita who countered that the loaned amount was
already paid. Only Anita was convicted of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 3 (c) of RPC. Anita
contends that
there is no competent proof that she actually removed, concealed or destroyed any of the papers
contemplated in Article 315, paragraph 3 (c) of the RPC. Allegedly, the document removed,
concealed or destroyed must contain evidence of indebtedness so as to cause prejudice, and the
OR-CR are not of this nature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Anita is guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 3 (c) of RPC.
RULING:
Contrary to Anita's supposition, neither Article 315, paragraph 3 (c) of the RPC nor Article 535,
paragraph 9 of the old penal code requires that the documents or papers are evidence of
indebtedness. Notably, while the old provision broadly covered "any process, record, document, or
any other paper of any character whatsoever," the new provision refers to "documents or any other
papers." Indeed, there is no limitation that the penal provision applies only to documents or papers
that are evidence of indebtedness.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Article 315, paragraph 3 (c) of the RPC merely penalizes
the removal, concealment or destruction of documents or papers that are evidence of indebtedness,
still Anita cannot be acquitted. In a chattel mortgage of a vehicle, the OR-CR should be considered
as evidence of indebtedness because they are part and parcel of the entire mortgage documents,
without which the mortgage's right to foreclose cannot be effectively enforced.
In case of default in payment, the mortgaged property has to be sold at public auction so that its
proceeds would satisfy, among others, the payment of the obligation secured by the mortgage.
Prior to the foreclosure, however, the encumbrance must be annotated in the Chattel Mortgage
Registry of the Register of Deeds and the LTO, where the OR-CR must be presented. The LTO
requires, among others, not just the original copy of the CR and the latest OR of the payment of
motor vehicle user's charge and other fees but even the actual physical inspection of the motor
vehicle by the District Office accepting the annotation. As a businesswoman, Anita knows or is
expected to know these procedures. In fact, the Spouses Capulong initially surrendered the OR-CR
of the cargo truck precisely to give effect to the chattel mortgage they executed in favour of De
Guzman.
Fraudulent intent, being a state of mind, can only be proved by unguarded expressions, conduct
and circumstances, and may be inferred from facts and circumstances that appear to be
undisputed. For failure to comply with her promise to return the original OR-CR, or even furnish
new ones in lieu thereof, and in misrepresenting that she already gave De Guzman the subject
documents, Anita's intent to defraud is shown beyond question. Such malicious intent was even
made more prominent with the replacement of the truck's engine without De Guzman's knowledge
and the unknown whereabouts of the vehicle.
With the concealment of the OR-CR, Anita's act certainly caused a positive injury to De Guzman.
The absence of the OR-CR practically rendered useless the chattel mortgage. Since the mortgage
could not be properly registered with the LTO, the right to foreclose the truck could not be
exercised. Anita made it difficult for De Guzman to collect the unpaid debt as the latter would be
forced to file a collection suit instead of conveniently going through the foreclosure proceedings. It
is of judicial notice that, as opposed to a civil case for sum of money, a foreclosure of mortgage
involves much less time, effort and resources.
For the purpose of proving the existence of injury or damage, it is unnecessary to inquire whether,
as a matter of fact, the unpaid debt could be or had been successfully collected. The commission of
the crime is entirely independent of the subsequent and casual event of collecting the amount due
and demandable, the result of which, whatever it may be, can in no wise have any influence upon
the legal effects of the already consummated concealment of documents
17. Clarita Mainar vs People - G.R. No. 184320; July 29, 2015
19. Robert Taguinod vs People - G.R. No. 185833; October 12, 2011 • B.P. No. 22 – Bouncing Checks
Law
20. Betty King vs People - G.R. No. 131540; December 2, 1999
21. Nieva vs. Court of Appeals - G.R. Nos. 95796-97; May 02, 1997