G.R. Nos.

92191-92             July 30, 1991 2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was,
JR., respondents. however, denied by the HRET in its resolution dated February 22, 1989.

G.R. Nos. 92202-03             July 30, 1991 Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner, We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION
JR., respondents.
The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.
Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.
Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. (See Article
VI, Section 17, Constitution)

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether
or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was
held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative
district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar.
The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the
word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under
the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz:
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred (Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162). The exercise of power
by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as
"intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the
legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier this grant of power to the legislature was
characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of
Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935
Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it
remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the Legislature and
the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be
said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987
Constitution. (p. 401)

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the
following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to
be the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of
the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its
jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the
Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the
part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." (pp.
403-404)
When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional
grants of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that
the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of
this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's
decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or
upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp.
785-786)
In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of
the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear
showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due
process." The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived
errors of independent branches of the Government, It comes in only when it has to vindicate
a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than
the Constitution calls for remedial action.
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so
to speak, to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to
determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article
VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental
branch or agency has gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred
or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET
alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look
into what it thinks is apparent error.
As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although
not powers in the tripartite scheme of the government, are, in the exercise of their functions
independent organs — independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power granted
to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of
powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign
authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886
[1919])
It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation
may exist as it exists today where there is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the
two Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the HRET
because of its composition any less independent from the Court or its constitutional functions
any less exclusive. The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how
many legislative members of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test remains the
same-manifest grave abuse of discretion.
In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on
the part of the HRET which will necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the
Supreme Court.
ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived
in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang,
Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then
Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was
brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to
establish an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into
the community.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed
Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed,
Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and,
thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.
The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a
hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in
Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal
status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision
of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath
of Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a
certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years
was finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the
records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the
local populace were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was
burned to the ground.
Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in
place of their ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang was their
abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better
education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted
their second house in Laoang, Samar. The respondent's family constructed still another
house, this time a 16-door apartment building, two doors of which were reserved for the
family.
The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA
Board Examinations.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here.
He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he
worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was
elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born
citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution
removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's
citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural
born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born
citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and
spent his childhood days.
In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang,
Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during those elections.
The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their
family business decided to be of greater service to his province and ran for public office.
Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the
second district of Northern Samar.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative
in Congress. Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead
the two by more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those
who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of
Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates
against Filipino women. There is no ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, viz:
Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to those
who elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would
it also cover those who elected it under the 1973 Constitution?
Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of
the provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the election was done before or after
January 17, 1973. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228;
Emphasis supplied)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and
Obligations and Human Rights has more or less decided to extend the interpretation
of who is a natural-born citizen as provided in section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by
adding that persons who have elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935
Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding Officer?
Fr. Bernas: yes.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well
written book, he said that the decision was designed merely to accommodate former
delegate Ernesto Ang and that the definition on natural-born has no retroactive effect.
Now it seems that the Reverend Father Bernas is going against this intention by
supporting the amendment?
Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in my
thinking. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his election of
Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino
citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . .
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it to
the body to approve that provision of section 4.
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as
unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born a day before January 17, 1973 cannot be
a Filipino citizen or a natural-born citizen. (Records of the Constitutional Commission,
Vol. 1, p. 231)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable
situation.1avvphi1 Between 1935 and 1973 when we were under the 1935
Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born
Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect,
they become Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records of the
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision
prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable
situation. It must also be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the
literal meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter,
especially where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v.
Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])
A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and
suppress the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should
prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)
In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:
To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is
not to be construed narrowly or pedantically for the prescriptions therein contained, to
paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their essence in
their form but are organic living institutions, the significance of which is vital not
formal. . . . (p. 427)
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of
a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born
citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect
Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status
of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers
with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born
citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the
fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same
similarly situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this
accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution
and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was
meant to correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render
those acts valid which would have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative
provisions. (See Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342
[1980])
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her
marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose
to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural
born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if
they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of
age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a
citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized
when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came
of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed
a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen
since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise
of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52; emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has
established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected
citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien
enclaves and no racial distinctions. The respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth.
His father applied for naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman
Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession requires
citizenship for taking the examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political
exercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing
in the records to show that he does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to
indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to show that this country is not his natural homeland.
The mass of voters of Northern Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should
know him better than any member of this Court will ever know him. They voted by
overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress. Because of his acts since
childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to
elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of
deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos,
serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running
for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal
manifestations of choice for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his
status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case
about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent
would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How
can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?
The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It
observed that "when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan
became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies
its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law
itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such."
(Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen
because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his
citizenship after his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son.
The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can
not be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through
a direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])
To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and
void would run against the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to
rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To
quote the words of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his
demise and obviously he could not use beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend
himself were this matter to be made a central issue in this case."
The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our
function is to determine whether or not the HRET committed abuse of authority in the
exercise of its powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through
his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant
only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of
age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent
Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine
citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of
election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen.
There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest
grave abuse of discretion. The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been
decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened
by authority of the Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the
respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.
Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the
Batasang Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a difference could only be
characterized as error. There would be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary and
whimsical as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born
citizen?
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on
the 11th day of April 1899 and then residing in said islands and their children born
subsequent thereto were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.
Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?
Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish
Subjects, viz:
ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:
1. Persons born in Spanish territory.
2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of
Spain.
3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.
4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the
Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)
The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once
established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768
[1949])
As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895.
Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then issued to him by virtue of his being a
resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of
the 1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)
The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went
beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also in this place were Ong Te set-up his business
and acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-
paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.
Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the
Philippines. The fact that he died in China, during one of his visits in said country, was of no
moment. This will not change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines
and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish subject.
If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town
under the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines
for an inhabitant has been defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who
has a domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) A priori, there can be no other
logical conclusion but to educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions
of section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent
was a natural-born Filipino.
The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove it were
not in compliance with the best the evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private
respondent failed to present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence
and of the transcript of the proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971
Constitutional Convention was predicated.
On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions
to the best evidence rule.
It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee
Report No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on
November 28, 1972 cannot be found.
This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty.
Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P Law Center, in their respective testimonies given
before the HRET to the effect that there is no governmental agency which is the official
custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988,
pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February
6, 1989, pp. 28-29)
The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant
Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was the proper party to testify to such
execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)
The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by
Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law
does not require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown
that after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v.
Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 [1918])
Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately
established, the contents of the questioned documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by
the recollection of witnesses.
Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the
Committee Report, the former member of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo,
when he was presented as a witness in the hearing of the protest against the private
respondent, categorically stated that he saw the disputed documents presented during the
hearing of the election protest against the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, February
1, 1989, pp. 8-9)
In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional
Convention, states that he was presiding officer of the plenary session which deliberated on
the report on the election protest against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of
delegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr.
The petitioners could have presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's
having been declared a natural-born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the
contents of the documents presented by the private respondent. They merely relied on the
procedural objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence presented.
The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a
member of that body. The HRET by explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of
the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at
length on the controversies over which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only
after a full presentation of all relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even
assuming that we disagree with their conclusions, we cannot declare their acts as committed
with grave abuse of discretion. We have to keep clear the line between error and grave
abuse.
ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE
The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.
The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term
"residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous
Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-
a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of
domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual
residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, and
a resident thereof, that is, in the district, for a period of not less than one year
preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution,
the interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional
Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner
Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a
matter of intention rather than actual residence.
 Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go
back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that
a provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living
abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that
it should be by domicile and not physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p. 110)
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence"
which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business
or pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The
absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it
continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized
by animus revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is
fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never
abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that after
the fire that gutted their house in 1961, another one was constructed.
Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door
apartment was built by their family, two doors of which were reserved as their family
residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)
The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang,
Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said place is misplaced.
The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents.
Upon the demise of his parents, necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of
succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these
were still in the names of his parents.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the
Supreme Court in the case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not
required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and
domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a
friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress
would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the
candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it
required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be
qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965])
It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a
profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not
constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])
As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his
studies and later to practice his profession, There was no intention to abandon the residence
in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal
that he always had the animus revertendi.
The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an interracial
evolution. Throughout our history, there has been a continuing influx of Malays, Chinese,
Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to
our country.
Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person, for
there is none. To mention a few, the great Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the late Chief Justice
Claudio Teehankee was part Chinese, and of course our own President, Corazon Aquino is
also part Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese
than the private respondent.
Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special
privilege which one must forever cherish.
However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too
harsh an interpretation, have to unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its
richness.
Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the
very affluent backed by influential patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a
lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearances by minor
bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical traps of the
judicial process were able to acquire citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be
revised to enable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful examination of an applicant's
suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to
citizenship problems is essential.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
SO ORDERED. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree
and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live
Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur. at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Gancayco, JJ., took no part.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005 Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent. In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:

DECISION WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE

FAMILY CODE4
QUISUMBING, J.:
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a
between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a
foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the
petition for annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law
Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not
of judicial determination.6
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on
this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists
that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002, of remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the
the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution2 dated Constitution.7
July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein
respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court
Decision reads:
actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court provides:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family
Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the
RULE 63
petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES

IT IS SO ORDERED.3

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with
a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few
years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an
action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3)
that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue
is ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between two
Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and
remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent,
a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for
relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into
question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come
about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26
thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No.
227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A
second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by the
case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at
the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the
wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the
U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops’
Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of
Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos who
divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the
spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens.
For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to be
validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law
only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code
Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn  case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is
valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under
Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship by
naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals.11 In Quita,
the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became a
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court
therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold
that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice.
Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A
statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long
as they come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within
the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a
valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the
naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry.
Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in
this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse
is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be
a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the
marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal
separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the
legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is
settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not
evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife
was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also be
proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws
must be alleged and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce
decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise,
there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another
marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino
citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and
remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on
respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had
obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now
capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court
of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-83882 January 24, 1989
IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner,
vs.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN,
DELEO HERNANDEZ, BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN ESPIRITU
SANTO, respondent.
Pelaez, Adriano and Gregorio and Bonifacio A. Alentajan for petitioner.
Chavez, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioner.
Augusto Jose y. Arreza for respondents.
PADILLA,  J.:
The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court on 4
July 1988 seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner. 1 After manifestation and
motion of the Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from filing a return of the writ on
behalf of the CID, respondent Commissioner thru counsel filed the return. 2 Counsel for the
parties were heard in oral argument on 20 July 1988. The parties were allowed to submit
marked exhibits, and to file memoranda. 3 An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred
the case to the Court en banc. In its 10 November 1988 resolution, denying the petition
for habeas corpus, the Court disposed of the pending issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over
a naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of warrantless arrest and detention of the same
person.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order dated 24
November 1988. 4 On 29 November 1988, the Court resolved to deny with finality the
aforesaid motion for reconsideration, and further resolved to deny the urgent motion for
issuance of a restraining order dated 28 November 1988. 5
Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order on 5
December 1988.
Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court on 7 December
1988. 6 Respondent Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO on 13 December 1988, the basis
of which is a summary judgment of deportation against Yu issued by the CID Board of
Commissioners on 2 December 1988. 7 Petitioner also filed a motion to set case for oral
argument on 8 December 1988.
In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention 8 was filed by petitioner
on 13 December 1988. A memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14
December 1988 was filed on 15 December 1988 together with a vigorous opposition to the
lifting of the TRO.
The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 7 December 1988 is
urgently sought by respondent Commissioner who was ordered to cease and desist from
immediately deporting petitioner Yu pending the conclusion of hearings before the Board of
Special Inquiry, CID. To finally dispose of the case, the Court will likewise rule on petitioner's
motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order dated 5 December 1988, 9 urgent
motion for release from arbitrary detention dated 13 December 1988, 10 the memorandum in
furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December 1988, 11 motion to set case for oral
argument dated 8 December 1988. 12
Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order (issued on 7 December 1988)
dated 9 December 1988, 13 and the vigorous opposition to lift restraining order dated 15
December 1988, 14 the Court resolved to give petitioner Yu a non-extendible period of three
(3) days from notice within which to explain and prove why he should still be considered a
citizen of the Philippines despite his acquisition and use of a Portuguese passport.15
Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15 December 1988 on 20 December
1988 16 followed by an earnest request for temporary release on 22 December 1988.
Respondent filed on 2 January 1989 her comment reiterating her previous motion to lift
temporary restraining order. Petitioner filed a reply thereto on 6 January 1989.
Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in
1971, 17 valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon presentment before the
proper Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10
February 1978, on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport
No. 35/81 serial N. 1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo.
Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. 18 While
still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and
forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and
pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," 19 he
declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the
Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. 20 filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.
To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express
renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of
Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, 21 express renunciation was held to mean a
renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or
implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced
Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen 22 resumed or reacquired
his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese
passport 23 and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become
a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is
grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.
This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special
Inquiry, CID. However, pleadings submitted before this Court after the issuance of said TRO
have unequivocally shown that petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship.
The material facts are not only established by the pleadings — they are not disputed by
petitioner. A rehearing on this point with the CID would be unnecessary and superfluous.
Denial, if any, of due process was obviated when petitioner was given by the Court the
opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine citizenship, but he has failed.
While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine
citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has
become unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look into
the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine
citizenship is meritorious.
Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when
required and suppressed when convenient. This then resolves adverse to the petitioner his
motion for clarification and other motions mentioned in the second paragraph, page 3 of this post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested office
Decision. has occurred"?

WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release from detention is In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation,
DENIED. Respondent's motion to lift the temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on citizenship and elections, and upholds
Decision is immediately executory. the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.

SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 123755

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and
and Regalado, JJ., concur. preliminary injunction to review and annul a Resolution of the respondent Commission on
Elections (Comelec), First Division,1 promulgated on December 19, 19952 and another
G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996 Resolution of the Comelec en banc promulgated February 23, 19963 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs. The Facts
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
G.R. No. 123755 June 28, 1996 the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995,
petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA
No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner,
position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of
vs.
Candidacy be canceled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
Resolution5 granting the petition with the following disposition6:
 
WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares
that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor of
PANGANIBAN, J.:p Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines.
Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is canceled.
The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared
the rightful governor of Sorsogon - The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8,
1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued and he was voted for during the elections held
(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc7 affirmed the aforementioned
successive elections but who was twice declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such Resolution of the Second Division.
office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine
citizenship thru repatriation; The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a
Certificate of Votes8 dated May 27, 1995 was issued showing the following votes obtained by
(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
cast in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void; that the electorate should be deemed to
have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
of valid votes; or
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the
position of governor, but who according to prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said
Raul R. Lee 53,304
 Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition 9 praying for his
proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June
29, 1995," the Comelec en banc directed "the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to
reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning gubernatorial
candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29, 1995 . . ." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the
evening of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, 11 docketed as SPC No. 95-
317, praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own
proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of
allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725
which he filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been
granted". As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) . . . was
released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was
no more legal impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . . ." In the alternative,
he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-Governor - not Lee
- should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed
Resolution13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered the highest number of votes," was not
legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered
the highest number of votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of
Sorsogon"; thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore
RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition.
Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul
R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled, being contrary
to law, he not having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his
proclamation.
Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately reconvene and, on
the basis of the completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as
the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having garnered the highest number
of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on
June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus,
qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.
Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881),
the Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His Excellency the President
of the Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Sorsogon of this resolution immediately upon the due
implementation thereof.
On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Comelec en banc in its Resolution 14 promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26,
1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order,
this Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to
maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."
The Issues in G.R. No. 123755
Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand may briefly be capsulized in the following
propositions"15:
First -- The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and
substance to warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction with
the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of and deciding said petition;
Second -- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a
continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be elected to
and to hold the Office of Governor;
Third -- The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the
effect thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the
Office of Governor; and
Fourth -- Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the
validity of petitioner's proclamation as duly elected Governor of Sorsogon.
G.R. No. 120295
This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which
are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as follows:
1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995,
disqualifying Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in the May 8,
1995 elections "on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines";
2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and
 3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en banc, promulgated also on May 11, 1995
suspending the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.
The Facts and the Issue
The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However,
Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions on a different ground: that under Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. --
A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election. (Emphasis supplied.)
the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not
rendered "within the period allowed by law" i.e., "not later than fifteen days before the
election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for
disqualification within the period of fifteen days prior to the election as provided by law is a
jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755
since they are intimately related in their factual environment and are identical in the ultimate
question raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them
thereafter to file simultaneously their respective memoranda.
The Consolidated Issues
From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of
citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may
it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing
bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?
3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317
considering that said petition is not "a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo
warranto  case"?
4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing
jurisprudence?
5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the
assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of
Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within the period referred to in Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?
The First Issue:  Frivaldo's Repatriation
The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in
this case. All the other matters raised are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a
qualification for elective local officials, including that of provincial governor, thus:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province
or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be
elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice
mayor or member of the sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of
age on election day.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore
incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the
qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).
Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654 22 and during the
oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress,
but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement
of several members of the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the
"maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was
rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by
the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in
1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially
declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular
mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon
and a favorable decision from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts
of having successfully passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by
repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than the Solicitor General himself, who was the
prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent
Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S.
Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00
p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists that he -- not Lee -- should have
been proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of
Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly and unquestionably, he garnered
the highest number of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already reacquired his
citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted with serious defects, which we
shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed", asserting that "then
President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative powers under the Transitory Provisions of
the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive
Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion, should best leave to the
judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution", adding that in her memorandum
dated March 27, 1987 to the members of the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted
for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725, President Aquino directed them "to cease and
desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility
as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended."23
This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be
construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed
only by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no
express repeal  was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum -- based on
the copy furnished us by Lee -- did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was
being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even
mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory
construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed
"unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly
repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist".26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative
enactment, for not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive even under the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-
making powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special
Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of applications for repatriation pending
whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other
words, the former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress -- once
created -- to deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal such law, she should have
unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully
couched her presidential issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present
government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave the matter of repeal
to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as
is now being proffered to the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon
statutory construction but on common sense as well.
Second, Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation
proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 . . .
(and) was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 . . .", which "prevented a judicious
review and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for
repatriation with the Office of the President in Malacañang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is
confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee was reactivated only on
June 8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee started processing his application. On
June 29, 1995, he filled up and re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required. Under
these circumstances, it could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in the processing of
his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on
Naturalization was intended solely for the personal interest of respondent," 27 the Solicitor
General explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply
baseless as there were many others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list
of whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a Manifestation28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty and the presumption of legality in the repatriation of
Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings
were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily
tainted. After all, the requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to
comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D.
72529 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to
implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This is not
unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a  first-time entry into Philippine
political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely
seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a
natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his
naturalization in the United States -- a naturalization he insists was made necessary only to
escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience embrace
-- and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted
no time in returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and services to his
people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted
repatriation argues convincingly and conclusively against the existence of favoritism
vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's
repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the
Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third, Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it
could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification
prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his election, if not when
the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R. 104654 30 which held that "both
the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run
and be elected to public office." Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue
in said case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not -- and NOT the effective
date thereof. Since the Court held his naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an
aspirant for public office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court. Which
question we shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province . . . where
he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor . . . must be at least
twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when
the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at
least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty
three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public
office,31 and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that no
alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our
country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his
functions only upon his proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to
begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995 -- the very day32 the term
of office of governor (and other elective officials) began -- he was therefore already qualified
to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities
thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native
Sorsogon. This is the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law
on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was enacted. So too, even
from a literal  (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of
the Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS", not of
candidates. Why then should such qualification be required at the time of election or at the
time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications
-- unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence -- should thus
be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is
proclaimed and  at the start of his term -- in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this
Court's ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap & Sons, 33 if the purpose of the
citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being
governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose
would not be thwarted but instead achieved  by construing the citizenship qualification as
applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument 34 to the
effect that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for
that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from requiring
the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a
"registered voter". And, under the law35 a "voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So
therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter -- much less a validly  registered one -- if he
was not a citizen at the time of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law
intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent with the
requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a
SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the
law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a
voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was
included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for
nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR
TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized
that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered voter. It does
not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration -- not the actual voting -- is the core of
this "qualification". In other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure
that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks to govern -- and not
anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasized -- and Lee has not disputed -- that he
"was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and his registration as a voter has been sustained
as valid by judicial declaration . . . In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995."36
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel steadfastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has
always been a registered voter of Sorsogon. He has voted in 1987, 1988, 1992, then he
voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed
(sic) his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous
elections including on May 8, 1995."3 7
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be
elected.
There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the
date of proclamation, not necessarily the date of election or date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code 38 gives any voter, presumably
including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the
disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of the Code that authorizes a remedy on
how to contest before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the
qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy
of Quo Warranto  can be availed of "within ten days after proclamation" of the winning
candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken
cognizance of by the Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30
p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a citizen, having taken his
oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the
candidate proclaimed as he unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the
immediately preceding elections and such oath had already cured his previous "judicially-
declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo
RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, 39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions 40 to this general rule, such
as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW
RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and
irregularities, thereby validating judicial or administrative proceedings, acts of public officers,
or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended
consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical
requirement. They operate on conditions already existing, and are necessarily retroactive in
operation. Agpalo,42 on the other hand, says that curative statutes are
"healing acts . . . curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations . . .
(and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain
evils. . . . By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive . . . (and) reach back to past
events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which
would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or
modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within the
legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective
operation of statutes.43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a
new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725
expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C.A. No. 63, as
amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their husbands or the termination of
their marital status" and who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new
provision allowing "a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship .
. ." because "such provision of the new Constitution does not apply to Filipino women who
had married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to
these women -- the right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture,
which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said statute also provided
a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their
Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the
promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and
cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-
acquire their Philippine citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General44 argues:
By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA
342), since they are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in
existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil.
119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14 SCRA 1041).
In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing
naturalization law, specifically C.A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino women
are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-
born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by naturalization and other causes
faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by naturalization.
Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal
aberrations and thus its provisions are considered essentially remedial and
curative.
In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable
that the legislative intent was precisely to give the statute retroactive operation. "(A)
retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should so
operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms
thereof."45 It is obvious to the Court that the statute was meant to "reach back" to those
persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence.
And inasmuch as it has been held that citizenship is a political and civil right equally as
important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the
legislative intent to give retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect
possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as to make it effect
the evident purpose for which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to
past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it will be so applied although the
statute does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate
some constitutional guaranty."46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify
any restrictions on or delimit or qualify the right of repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit
Frivaldo considering that said law was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost his
Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later,
on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an
American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given
retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30,
1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17,
1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative
authority that the law should apply to past events -- i.e., situations and transactions existing
even before the law came into being  -- in order to benefit the greatest number of former
Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed
right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and
expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or
retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage of
such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be
made to take effect as of date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the
law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative
authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or
injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that
there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right
or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now
be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to
applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee
decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of
time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo -- having already renounced
his American citizenship -- was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This
should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed
that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.4 7
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant
applications for repatriation within relatively short spans of time after the same were
filed.48 The fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of
prejudice to the government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the
mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the government is possible only where a person's
repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in
connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum
between application and approval, a situation that is not present in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should
now prevail. Under the circumstances, there is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating
Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on
August 17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality
qualification -- whether at the date of proclamation (June 30, 1995) or the date of election
(May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become
moot.
Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would
also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is considered as having been repatriated -- i.e., his
Filipino citizenship restored -- as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is
likewise deemed validated as of said date.
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of
the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local
position?"49 We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that
Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before
that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long
renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship -- long before May 8, 1995. At
best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim -- when he abandoned and renounced his US
citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."50
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:51
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American
citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government
 when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of
candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government."
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of
1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of
the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or
arbitrariness or
abuse.52
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship
a Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No.
95-028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became
final and executory after five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no restraining order having been
issued by this Honorable Court.54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected governor
on June 30, 1995, there was already a final and executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo.
Lee adds that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct")
declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become final and executory way before the 1995
elections, and these "judicial pronouncements of his political status as an American citizen
absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in
the Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered
in connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with
the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be
changed. In the words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed
Resolution:55
The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that
Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the
1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no record of any "final judgment"
of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, 1995
elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995
(implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the proclamation of Raul R. Lee,
was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen "having been declared by the
Supreme Court in its Order dated March 25, 1995, not a citizen of the
Philippines." This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in
connection with the 1992 elections.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's
future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that
matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.
Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,56 we held:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial
or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not
considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as
the occasion demands.
The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction
Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC
No. 95-317 because the only "possible types of proceedings that may be entertained by the
Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case". Again,
Lee reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-
317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July 6, 1995 -- "beyond the 5-day
reglementary period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an
election protest or a quo warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has given the Comelec ample power to
"exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective . . . provincial . . . officials." Instead of dwelling at length on the
various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may
entertain, suffice it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's authority
to hear and decide petitions for annulment of proclamations -- of which SPC No. 95-317
obviously is one.58 Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we ruled:
The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-
proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are aware of cases
holding that pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by
the COMELEC after the winning candidate has been proclaimed.
(citing  Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170
SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.) This rule, however, is
premised on an assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all
and the proclaimed candidate's assumption of office cannot deprive the
COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of nullity. (citing  Aguam
vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883; Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done within
ten (10) days following the proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six
(6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly acquired
jurisdiction over the same.
The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid?
Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 "the fact remains that he (Lee) was
not the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is "a second
placer, . . . just that, a second placer."
In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this Court
in the aforesaid Labo62 case, as follows:
The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in
law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the
realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the
validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise
or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining
the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.
But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:
But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been
shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as
an ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such
fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was even allowed by no less than the
Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office
of the city Payor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992 denying due course to
petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and
subject to the final outcome of this case.
The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case
because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the
Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election day as
there was in both cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec
issued an (omnibus) resolution declaring that Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others
can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of
Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring
such awareness within the realm of notoriety;" in other words, that the voters intentionally
wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has
any relevance at all, it is that the vice-governor -- and not Lee -- should be pro- claimed, since
in losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of the
people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo:
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes
does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably reacquired his citizenship
and inasmuch as he obtained the highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, he -- not Lee
-- should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now
be corrected.
The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the
Election Code Mandatory?
In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second
Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995
disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were rendered
beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78, of the Omnibus Election Code
which reads as follows:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. --
A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five
days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election. (Emphasis supplied.)
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed
superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on December
19, 1995, affirmed en banc63 on February 23, 1996; which both upheld his election. At any
rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes
the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even after the elections, thus:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. -- Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (emphasis
supplied)
Refutation of
Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent
In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that
President Aquino's memorandum dated March 27, 1987 should be viewed as a suspension
(not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal
is a purely academic distinction because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or
abrogate an existing law.
The existence and subsistence of P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case;64 viz.,
"(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship
maybe reacquired by . . . repatriation". He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register
and to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery"
of our two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or
mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured whatever
defects there may have been in his registration as a voter for the purpose of the 1995
elections. Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which
were the subjects of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the
ineligibility of a candidate, citing the Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false
material representation therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his
disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is merely directory. We really have no quarrel.
Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec
Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were invalid because they were
issued "not later than fifteen days before the election" as prescribed by Section 78. In
dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave
abuse of discretion because "Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and
decide disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of his disagreement with us on this
point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory", we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide
nonetheless votes to "DISMISS G.R. No. 120295". One other point. Loong, as quoted in the
dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section 78 must be  filed  within
the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the period during
which the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after
the  fifteen day  period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision  promulgated by
the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a petition  filed beyond the
25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual
circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be given retroactive effect. He argues that such
retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second
Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we
may repeat, there is no question that Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining
his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening
repatriation has changed his political status -- not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995
elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his
repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation or abandonment is not a ground to lose
American citizenship". Since our courts are charged only with the duty of determining who are
Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not
Americans. It is basic in international law that a State determines ONLY those who are its
own citizens -- not who are the citizens of other countries.65 The issue here is: the Comelec
made a finding of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been shown by
Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law, such finding is binding and
final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all
three previous elections, should be declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being
an American was publicly known". First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence for such
"public" knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only of
the last two previous elections. Third, even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still
deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then can there
be such "public" knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the
qualifications of elective local officials, i.e., candidates, and not elected officials, and that the
citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by candidates, not
merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it
differently. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of "elective local official" while par. (b) to (f)
refer to "candidates". If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates"
and not elected officials, the legislature would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a)
from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if Congress had meant that the citizenship
qualification should be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically
stated such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) far other qualifications of candidates
for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on
the ground, among others, that the law specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath
of allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. We
do not question what the provision states. We hold however that the provision should be
understood thus: that after taking the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have
reacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all
purposes and intents to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument reg