Coherence äs a principle

in the Interpretation of discourse

M. CHAROLLES

Abstract

Coherence is a geneml principle in the Interpretation of human actions. It

is impossible to see someone accomplish two successive actions without
supposing that the two constitute a whole: we necessarily imagine that they
form pari of a single global intention justifying theirhaving been undertaken
one after the other. The principle of coherence applies to discourse in so far
äs this is a product of a series ofacts of enunciation. The principle is vital on
the level of the reception and the Interpretation of discourse. Since the
receiver considers that what is said to him shall be coherent, he will
manipulate the text in order to extract from it an Interpretation which agrees
with his own conception of a coherent text. Nothing other than a procedural
analysis permits us to account for his action. In his effort to calculate a satis-
factory formula of coherence, the receiver will take into account certain
markers of cohesion which are given in the texl. These markers of cohesion
only provide relational indications in the co- or context. The explanation of
a phrase construed äs being complemental ('besides') in the discourse does
not lead to the same understanding ofthe coherence, äs does that of a phrase
construed äs an explanation ('why').

l. Coherence äs a general principle in the Interpretation of human actions

Whenever we see a human-being making a gesture, we conclude that this

gesture has been accomplished for one of two reasons: either that the action
is motivated by an intention, e.g. 'x is lighting a flre to get warm', or that the
gesture is explained by a condition, e.g. 'x is crying because he's hurt himself

0165-4888/83/0003-0000 $ 2.00 Brought to 3you

Text (1)by | Nanyang
(1983), Technological Univer
pp. 071-097
©Mouton Publishers, Amsterdam. Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
72 M. Charolles

(c.f. in particular D. Davidson in A.R. White ed., 1968). Thus, the slightest
human action is construed äs a sign by those who witness it. It's necessary
and minimum significance lies in what the beholder supposes the action to
explain. For this reason, it should to be understood, i.e. interpreted äs
resulting from a certain state of affairs (a wish justifying it, or a physical
disposition implying it.) In short, it is sufficient for a man to see someone eise
do something, for him to immediately assume that there is a reason for the
action.
No human action is without a preceding action. Every action follows
another. Even, for example, if a motionless person should suddenly make an
elementary gesture in front of you, this gesture becomes signiflcant with
respect to the fact that it was not being made the moment before. However,
it is much more normal for us to see people going through a series of actions.
Someone may, for example, lay a piece of string out along the ground, then
bring up some stones and line them up along the string, before piling them up
on top of each other. We comprehend that there is a certain intelligibility in
the 'spectacle' that we are witnessing: even if the meaning escapes us, we
presume that each of the gestures we have just seen, and which we have
understood äs individual gestures ('He's moving a stone because he wants it
in a different place'), belongs to a sequence (a global project) within which it
takes on a different meaning ('He's moving a stone because he intends to
build a wall'). Understanding that a series of actions forms a coherent whole
is the same äs realizing that there is a global Intention which explains why
each of the constituent actions has been accomplished at a particular
moment.
In order to understand that a series of actions forms a coherent entity, we
merely need to associate some global Intention with it, that explains it äs
a unit.1 Yet though this explanation may be quite sufficient, it may not be
the ultimate one. Since every explanation of intention is itself liable to be
explained, we should always be able to go further back in the process of
explanation. So, if we come back to the example quoted above, by
understanding that the series of actions ('laying out a piece of string, moving
a stone'.. .) is part of a whole, we understand that the individual is intending
to build a wall — and this, in turn, we can explain by another intention:
wants to build a wall because he wants to enclose his gar den', which in turn
is explained by: wants to protect it from thieves', and so on. It is not
because we are capable of realizing that a series of actions is a coherent entity
that we are able to procede to several degrees of explanation of intentions: on

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
 Coherence äs a principle in the Interpretation ofdiscourse 73

the contrary, by going back too far in our interpretive analysis, we would
lose sight of what it is precisely that explains the sequence of actions. Under-
standing the coherence of a series of actions is thus not synonymous with
understanding all the possible meanings that it may have.
Once we understand what it is that causes the coherence of a series of
actions, we can anticipate how it is going to develop. For example, äs soon
äs a chess player realises what his Opponent is attempting to do, he assumes
that he will follow his plan through to its logical outcome. So, by imagining
what is going to happen,2 he will be able to counter it. In some ways,
there is nothing more difficult than playing chess with someone who doesn't
know the game very well, and cannot plan his moves in advance. How can
we attack a rival who doesn't know how to plan his moves? Or how can we
plan our own attacks when we don't know what our Opponent is going to do?
The starting point in the Interpretation ofany series of human actions is the
assumption that the actions form pari of a whole. Once he has worked out
what it is that is making a series of actions coherent, the observer who is
interpreting the actions can hypothesize that the person doing the actions is
going to carry through his series of actions until its logical conclusion
(without changing direction and without contradicting himself). The con-
clusion of an action is the moment at which the interpreting observer
estimates that a certain intention is no longer a valid explanation of a series
of actions following those which have just taken place. Supposing that the
observer-interpreter understands that this new series of actions implies a
different global intention from the preceding series, he then has to work out
a more global intention (macro-intention), to explain why the two series of
actions have been accomplishcd one aftcr the othcr.
Take, for example, a series of actions interpreted by an observer äs
being coherent. Thus, the observer understands that each action carried out
by the subject signifies a certain global intention which is, in his opinion, the
significance of the behavioral pattern observed. However, there is nothing to
stop the observer estimating that some or all of the actions are inconsistent
with the intention presumed by the füll behavioral sequence. Take for
instance a case that I witnessed recently: a little girl saw her mother tearing
up sheets of newspaper, rolling it into balls, and forcing it into shoes before
putting them away. The little girl said to me, 'Look at my mummy, she's
mad!'. Straight away, I realized that what the little girl was saying indicated
that she had failed to understand that her mother's gestures were part of a
whole, motivated by a single global intention. However, a moment later, she

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
74 M. Charolles

added: 'Yes, she wants to Stretch her shoes, but that's pointless, because she
can't change the length of the soles!' This remark is interesting for several
reasons. First, it demonstrates that the child fully understood what her
mother was trying to do: she had 'perceived' the underlying Intention in each
of her mother's gestures and thus had fully understood the coherence of her
mother's behavior. What she was criticizing was the apparent absurdity of the
intention implied by this series of actions. This intention seemed to her to be
inappropriate in relation to the physical reality of shoes. She might just äs
well have pointed out that one of the actions of her mother was inappropriate
with regard to the object of the exercise: she might, for example, have told
me that it was pointless to tear up the newspaper before crumpling it up.
There was nothing to stop her considering such and such an action äs being
relatively in-appropriate to the global object of the exercise. This example
goes to show that people are capable of interpreting certain actions äs
signifying what is to them an inappropriate intention. Although they are able
to estimate the 'senseless' nature of a project, they are able to work out what
the project is by simply analyzing the other person's convictions and manner
of thinking (and thus to understand the intelligibility of the actions which it
is provoking). Thus, to understand the coherence of a series of actions, it is
sufficient to find a global intention which, within the System of thought of
the person undertaking them, justifies his having undertaken them in a par-
ticular order. In the end, all we need in order to understand the coherence
of a series of actions, is to be able to fit it in with what we know about its
author. We simply need to conceive of a thought-system in which it can fit.
At this stage, we can see that if coherence is a general principle in the
Interpretation (or reccption) of human actions, i t is a rcsult of a hypoltiesis
made concerning the qualities of their production (or emission). Human
actions must be understood äs being coherent, because the people carrying
them out have a way of thinking which prevents them doing incoherent
things. In the end, this is the reason which explains why coherence is a
principle in the comprehension of human actions.

2. Coherence äs a general principle in the Interpretation of discourse

Following a conversation, listening to a talk, or reading a printed text is, in

a way, similar to witnessing an action. There is no primary difference between
watching a man building a wall, and listening to a man speaking, or to a man

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
 Coherence äs a principle in the Interpretation of discourse 75

who has had to write his speech before he delivers it. Therefore, there is
no reason why the principle of Interpretation set out above should not
apply to discourse, in so far äs any discourse is (the necessary result of)
a certain sort ofaction.
Whether it be visual or aural, discourse requires that we should compre-
hend it. We assume that it has a meaning which we have to work out. For this
reason, we might say that we are never mere observers of another person's
discourse: the receiver of a message always has to analyse — which may be a
simple or a not so simple task — what he is reading or hearing, in order to
comprehend the intention which is sufficient to explain to him why the
author has written or said what he has in the manner and Situation in which
he has done it.
Although one cannot think of discourse äs being anything other than a
form of action and, in particular, of interaction (c.f. L. Apostel, 1980),
the Interpretation of discourse is notably different from that of any other
form of human action. This is a result of the obligatorily public nature of all
discourse, which is formulated for the purpose of communicating. I shall not
go into this point, which has been the subject of numerous philosophic
works, but, nevertheless, I shall say a few words about it, in so far äs they
are significant to the understanding of what I have to say.
People do not usually do things in Isolation to create a mere spectacle for
others. What I mean is that - with the exclusion of verbal acts (i.e. speaking
and writing) - no-one, for example, builds walls with. the simple aim of
conveying a message to someone eise. Men do things because they have a
reason for doing them. X, who undertakes the actions p, q, and r, intends to
buüd a wall, and that is generally sufficient reason for him to buüd it. We
have no reason to imagine that X also intends that should see him building
the wall, and should react in consequence. Of course, it is possible that
certain actions may be undertaken for ostensive reasons, i.e. to demonstrate
the intention which is motivating them: but such actions are rather
exceptional, and they demand a more or less exceptional Interpretation. For
example, if my neighbour builds a wall around his gar den in an ostensive
manner, I will Interpret this action äs being significant to me (he wants me
to understand that my presence is disturbing or frightening him), äs well
äs signifying his intention to buüd a wall. On the contrary, discourse always
implies a public manifestation of intention, a conscious desire to signify
something to someone eise. If X teils that he has laid a piece of string out
along the ground, and then placed stones along the line of the string, and

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
76 M. Charolles

then , Υ will always understand that X is conveying a message spec-

ifically to him, Y. What X is deliberately telling Υ is that by doing p, q, and
r, he was intending to build a wall — and that this mtention was carried out in
the end (by the actual building of the wall), and that now he wishes to teil Υ
of the fact through his discourse. In other words, using the terminology of
H.P. Grice(1957andl969):

X signifies non-naturally that he had the intention of building a wall in

t 0 , by informing Υ in t χ (t0 < ti), if, and only if X has told him what he has
told him with the intentions:
11 = that Υ believes that he intended to build a wall in t0
12 = that Υ recognizes that X had the intention i χ
13 = that Υ believes that X had the intention to build a wall (in to)
basing his deduction in part, at least, on the fact that X's intention ii
is to make him believe it.

This manner of presenting the facts certainly needs to be adapted to what I

am saying (since it is a little too neutral with respect to the notions of
producer and receiver). I shall come back later to say a word about the
criticisms which have been voiced about Grice's article (especially his 1957
article): c.f. P.F. Stawson (1964), J. Searle (1969), F. Recanati (1981), and
B. Cornulier (1981). For the time being, I shall simply note that every verbal
action implies a deliberate wish to signify something. Whoever uses language
does so necessarily because he wishes to signify something to someone eise,
who will also assume that this is the case. Whatever marginal case one may
imagine (such s gossip, insigniiicant chatter — c.f. P. van der Heuvel (1981);
'collective monologue', — c.f. J. Piaget (1923), soliloquy, or overhead conver-
sations), one always comes back one way or another to the truism that who-
ever speaks or writes is necessarily doing so because he intends to signify,
however indirectly, something to an audience, be this apparently no more
than a single person.
Take now the fo owing little discourse:

(1) 'The moon is round. 2+2=4. All men are mortal'3

Let us suppose that someone, whom we shall call X, utters it all at once,
respecting such pauses s are customary. He will be presenting what he is
saying s an entity. Let us now suppose that Υ receives the message. Υ will
suppose that X, in uttering (1) s he does, intends to communicate to him

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
 Coherence äs a principle in the Interpretation ofdiscourse 77

something which is also an entity. Finally, let us consider that analyses the
utterance (1) äs being made up of three sub-utterances. As far äs he is
concerned, X is telling him three things (i) 'the moon is round', since (ii)
2+2=4, since (iii) all men are mortal. then has the problem of fmding a
global intention explaining why X uttered Statements (i), (ii), and (iii) one
after the other. It is much the same problem that he would have had if he
had seen someone laying a string out on the ground, then lining up stones,
- with the difference that with verbal communication, the communi-
cator demonstrates his deliberate intention of transmitting a message.
Whenever a discourse presents itself materially äs forming an entity, the
receiver of the message automatically supposes it to be coherent. Under-
standing it äs a globally coherent action will thus imply that the receiver of
the message will deduce an intention on the pari of the communicatory
justifying the order in which the basic utterances have been communicated
and implying the utterance ofa complete discourse.
If the production of discourse always implies a certain sort of action, we
must admit, nevertheless, that discourse is frequently used in place of action.
For example, we sometimes talk of gestures which are impossible or
inconvenient to do on the spur of the moment, in order to avoid doing them
(c.f. A. Berendonner, 1982). Besides, there is a certain substitute value in all
discourse, in so far äs one of its essential functions consists of describing
something which it has not produced, or which is not a result of its
production. Of course, one could argue until eternity on the question of the
role that should be given to description in the theory of language (c.f.
F. Recanati, 1981). In particular, there has been considerable emphasis in
recent years on certain indicative uses of language, though this has not led
to any fundamental reassessment of the conceptions of descriptive semantics
(c.f. A. Berrendonner, 1982). In any case, no-one will argue with me if I say
that if I teil a friend that the day before, I laid a piece of string on the
ground, then put down some stones along it, then , the (prime) func-
tion of my discourse will be to teil my friend what I had done the day before.
Now it would appear that the coherence of my discourse could be questioned
in a different way to the one outlined in the preceding paragraph. Let us
suppose that someone who has heard what I had to say then describes a
certain number of actions which I am supposed to have carried out. He will
Interpret, for example, each of the elementary utterances of my discourse
(äs he perceives them), äs reflecting an elementary action. He will also assume
that my discourse globally reflects the real world. For example, when I teil

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
78 M. Charolles

him that I have laid a piece of string down on the ground, my listener will
understand that on the one hand, I expect him to believe that I have done so
(etc. . ..) and, on the other hand, that the sequence of sounds that I have just
made (given that I have uttered this sequence of sounds and not another) is
intended to describe a very precise action: let us say p, and not q (it is on this
point, concerning the role of conventions and the linguistic code that
B. Cornulier, following J. Searle has criticized the conception of H.P. Grice
mentioned above). Now let us imagine that my listener, though he be capable
of understanding this, is nonetheless incapable of grasping what the coherence
of this series of actions, p, q, r. . . . is - to which my discourse seems to him
to refer. He cannot see what global intention these actions, which I say I
have undertaken, can signify. What, in all this, will appear incoherent to him:
my discourse (the fact that I first said that I laid a piece of string out on the
ground, then the fact that I said that I ) or my behavior (the
things that I claim to have done)?. This question is not only relevant to a
discourse describing a series of actions. It would occur in just the same way if
one agreed, with reference to certain texts, that they referred to ideas,
feelings or any other 'realities' about which one has precise ideas concerning
the way in which they should connect with or follow each other.
All this leads up to the Suggestion that maybe coherence is not funda-
mentally a typicaUy linguistic problem. There is certainly a linguistic
dimension to the problem, so that in some respects (about which I shall
shortly be talking) it is very much within the linguisfs field of study. It is
also important to judge how much it is linked to phenomena of comprehen-
sion and Interpretation which are not in the sole domain of the language
specialist.

3. Coherence äs a general principle in the Interpretation of phrasal and

textual Statements

Though coherence may not be a typically linguistic problem, it is not a

typicaUy textual problem either. Many articles have been written on the
question of whether specifically textual linguistics is defensible (c.f. J. Katz
and Fodor, 1963, M. Dascal and A. Margalit, 1974, F. Kiefer, 1977, J. Petofi,
1978, R. de Beaugrande, 1981), and some people have been maintaining for
a long time that a good sentence grammar is enough to deal with problems of
text. I do not wish to get mixed up in this problem, which of course is not

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
 Coherence äs a principle in the Interpretation ofdiscourse 79

without significance. I simply think that if we wish to establish that there are
questions which can only be dealt with in the context of text-theory, then
there is no real interest in talking about phenomena of coherence, since this
problem is not restricted to this domain. It may be that many of the mis-
understandings that haye fraught the discussions between the proponents of
text grammar and those of sentence grammar, comes from the fact that they
have both put forward questions which are of äs little fundamental concern
to the problem äs that of coherence.

3.1. Why is coherence not a typically and exdusively textual problem?

Let us look at the case of a linguist who considers the phrase

(2) The car is moving

to be a good example of a sentence. This should cause no controversy! This

linguist can doubtless say a lot of interesting things about sentence (2).
By having recourse to semantics and pragmatics, this linguist will certainly
point out that:
- the word 'car' in sentence (2) is used in such a way äs to designate a
single object which is identified with reference to the extra-linguistic
context in which (2) is said,
- that in (2) the car is asserted to be moving
- that (2) bears the marks of an assertion
- etc. . . .
This type of observation is commonplace in contemporary linguistics. Now
what is striking in this type of observation is that they bring closely together
analytic elements concerning what we traditionally accept äs constituting
language (e.g. the fact that 'the' is by convention a defmite determiner),
and observations on its usage. There is nothing either surprising or regrettable
in this, in so far äs certain linguistic marks have precisely that conventional
function in the System of language which allows them to relate a Statement to
an extra-linguistic Situation, or, more precisely, obüges the listener or reader
to form a mental image which conforms to the linguistic data of the state-
ment. This kind of observation leads us inevitably towards considerations of
the way in which language is put to use (and on the way in which language
contains instructions for its own application). However, we can also see how

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
80 M. Charolles

this sort of consideration can lead inevitably to the question of coherence.

To say that sentence (2) bears the marks of an assertion, is to say that the
person who states it is fulfilling a precise action. Thus we can also talk about
the sentence's appropriateness in the Situation, and about its pertinence to
the conversation.... in short about its coherence with respect to a
potentially empty action, or to a series of preceding actions. One may argue
that if a linguist begins to reason in this manner, he is no longer working
with phrasal linguistics, but with the linguistics of the Statement, or even
with textual linguistics. Perhaps this is true, although most writers who
engage in analyses of the type outlined above work solely on isolated
sentences. So be it! Let us imagine a linguist who is more of a purist than
the previous one: äs a semanticist, he refuses to do anything other than
describe the strictly propositional content of (2). He may still be able to say
an enormous number of interesting things about (2). Those who claim to be
föllowers of this line of conduct generally attach considerable importance to
questions of predication and reference. Without predication, there can be no
propositional content, and with no reference, there can be no way of
reasoning in terms of truth, thus no semantics in the sense in which it is
understood in this context (which is, basically speaking, that of C. Morris,
and A. Tarski, and many others). Now, talking of nothing but predication,
we can certainly make a strict use of it.4 For example, to say merely of (2)
that it is a predicate of the object 'car' that 'it moves', and not to observe, for
a number of reasons, that if this object has the predicate of motion, it is
precisely because someone has fulfilled this action and given the object
mobility. There is nothing to stop us restricting ourselves to this point of
view. But the moment we get away from it, äs soon äs, for cxamplc, wc
envisage a proposition äs resulting from the accomplishment of an act of
predication, we can argue about its coherence. We may say, for example,
that it is more coherent to attribute to a car the predicate of mobility, than
that of sneezing, barking, or cracking jokes . . . . assuming that we agree to
accept that there may or may not be situations in which it is possible to find
an intention liable to explain how someone has seen one or other of these
characteristics äs a predicate of the object 'car'. As far äs the reference is
concerned, there is nothing to stop us envisaging (within reason) anything
we like äs an Operation (an act). Suppose, for example, that I refer to an
object with the aid of the deflnite expression 'the car'. An outside observer
may very well contest the truth (the correctness, c.f. J. Lyons, 1978) of what
I say, pointing out that the object in question is not a car. But it is also

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
 Coherence äs a principle in the Interpretation ofdiscourse 81

extremely possible that he is quite unable to understand why I am referring

to the object äs 'a car' (why I am accomplishing this act of reference). This is
admittedly a rather extraordinary hypothesis, but it may occur under certain
conditions. Firstly, the observer must insist, äs before, that the object to
which I am referring is not a car, but, say, for example, a dog. He must also
believe that I too know that it is not a car, and that I am not systematically
using the word 'car' in place of the word 'dog'. If all these conditions are
brought together, we see that the observer will have to try and understand my
intention when I refer to an object which is a dog, but designate it with the
word 'car'. His problem will be that of explaining the coherence of the action
I have accomplished, in which I have referred to a dog, by using the word
'car'.
What I would wish t o point out in the end is that coherence has nothing
to do with the object. In particular, it has nothing to do with the dimension
of linguistic data: or with the fact that it is perceived äs a rnolecular or
atomic unit. Coherence is a matter of point of view, of method, or more
fundamentally of ontology. It is necessary merely for a series of sounds or
of written signs (however short) to be perceived äs having been produced,
äs the result of an action, for the question of their coherence to be raised.
This is what I meant earlier on when I said that the question of coherence
was not a typically textual problem.
Today there are many authors who define the text äs a unit of use or of
communication ('a unit of language in use', M.A.K. Halliday and R. Hasan,
1976, p.l; 'a text is an elementary unit of Speech communication', S.I.
Gindin, 1982, p. 107). They oppose the word text (some prefer the word
discourse*) äs a concretc and Singular unit inseparable from a communication
process, to the sentence äs an abstract unit produced in and by grammar.
Thereafter, it is of no surprise to find someone like H.H. Lieb (1982)
rejecting the very notion of textual grammar. His argument is, basically, äs
follows. H.H. Lieb first postulates that:

A conception of texts is useless for linguistics unless it can assume some or

all texts to be coherent (p. 136)

Next he introduces the idea that it is impossible to discuss problems of

coherence independently of a conception of the text:

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
82 M. Charolles

by which individual Speech objects or events figure among the constituent

partsof a text (p. 136).

Furthermore, H.H. Lieb perceives grammar äs something

(which) directly deals with abstract linguistic entities and their properties
regardless of specific 'utterances' (p.135),

from which we can understand that the very project of a textual grammar
seems to be a contradiction in terms (which of course does not signify that he
denies all possibility of studying texts).
Clearly, everything depends upon one's conception of what a grammar
can or ought to be. Personally, I do not believe that it is of any use for us
to get tied up for too long in discussions on this kind of question. Indeed,
it is certain that if one wishes to deal with the problem of textual coherence,
one cannot do so with the help of a theoretical framework alien to such
notions äs, for example, intention, action or cognitive temperament. . . .
Fortunately, none of the theoretical frameworks that we might imagine are of
this nature.

4. The procedural approach

A particular case in point is the procedural approach which has been

developed in recent years, notably äs a result of research on artificial
intelligence (c.f. E. Charniak and Y. Wilks ed., 1978). An approach of this
nature tries to elaborate models of the manipulations which users of a natural
language are led to apply in the process of communication.

In a procedural approach, all the aspects of language are to be described in

terms of their utilization. (p.31). . . . Here, the discovery of units and struct-
ural patterns, though still a central activity of investigation, is not a goal in
itself. Instead we are concerned with the operations which manipulate units
and patterns during the utilization of language Systems in application (R. de
Beaugrande and W. Dressler, 1981: 33, my underlining.)

A procedural model must be operational above all (i.e., it must respect the
criteria of 'efficacity', 'efficiency', and 'appropriateness' (c.f. R. de
Beaugrande and W. Dressler, 1981: 34). This operational requirement, which

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
 Coherence äs a principle in the Interpretation of discourse 83

may go so far äs to be a Simulation requirement (although Simulation

capacities are not a prerequirite for a procedural approach, c.f. in particular
the communication processing and text-processing model developed by
J.S. Petöfi in 1979) implies the consideration of all kinds of data (linguistic,
cognitive, etc.) and the ability to make use of the interaction of these data
(with the help of Systems of preference, balance, regulation . . . .) in order to
treat the text in a manner which is äs economic in time and means äs possible.
This procedural approach is the best available for the analysis of the
Problems of the coherence of discourse. Indeed, if we imagine coherence to
be one of the general principles in the Interpretation of discourse, and not äs
an intrinsic quality of the discursive utterance, it is evident that we will
be led to prefer an approach whose precise aim is to formalize the processing
operations which the receiver of a message is made to carry out to Interpret
discourse, and in particular to make it coherent. (I have developed this point
in Towards a heuristic approach to text-coherence', and in 'Heuristic
proceedings in the semantics of narratives').
The general scheme of application of this kind of approach to the problem
of coherence can be represented äs follows:

(evaluation)

'D' represents the data, and includes:

the input material of discourse: 'D'
Information Os' about the Situation in which 'D' is communicated,
notably:
situational Information about the communication (time, place... .)
dispositional Information on the people taking part in the process of
communication (cognitive, declarative and procedural disposition)

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
84 M. Charolles

'/)' is conceived äs a störe which can be enriched (a stock of possibilities).

During the processing phase, ' and T)s' may be modified äs necessary. Thus
the notion of data becomes relative at a certain point in the process. A state
ofdata '/V, 'D2\ ' ' ) thus corresponds to each operative procedure.
The complete System is governed by an imtruction (T). T defmes a
target to be reached, and äs far äs the point which we are dealing with at
the moment is concerned, this target is to ensure that the processing of
'£)' produces the correct figuration of 'D' — in the circumstances, a result
'R' — which is coherent. ' includes a theoretical (abstract) projection
of those qualities which determine whether a discourse is coherent or
not. T is a principle. 'R' must, by principle, be in accordance with 'B'.
Nevertheless, T is linked to 'D' in so far äs its application is a function
of 'D' (and in particular of 4DS'). If, for example, the Interpreter con-
siders that the material to be processed is of a type which does not
require it to be in total accordance with 'B', the instruction T may be
completely or partly suspended.
The application of T is thus liable to be modulated (for example in the
case of literary texts, jokes, and so on, which we may presume to be
deliberately incoherent.)
T is a factor of orientation. It guarantees the presence of a target at a
certain stage in the System.
T also determines the choice of processing formulae.
Evaluation. The result of the processing stage ('R') is evaluated in
relation to a '#(i/ in the state V, i.e. in relation to a target determined
by an instruction (i) received at a certain moment (n) in the process of
application of the System (T being liable to be modulated.) Any
unfavorable evaluation may:
either activate a new processing formula, in an attempt to reach a
new and more realistic 'R' (in this case ^B(i)X *s thus maintained)
or cause a revision of<^B0))> n (in the direction of O(i)^n+i)> i- e -> a
modulation of T^I^n-^I^n+j), and thus lead to: —
a different evaluation of ^R^>n
a revision of the data (proceding to a state of data n+1), and to
a new processing formula orientated towards an R which is
more in accordance with^B^^n+j
The complete System is thus cyclical As far äs the processing formulae
are concerned, we can imagine them äs having to operate a development
of 'D' (the word 'development' being employed in the sense used by J.B.

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
 Coherence äs a principle in the Interpretation of discourse 85

Grize et al. 1981), i.e. leading to a new ' formula which is compatible with*
certain elements present at an earlier stage of their application. Thus every
process adds something to the data, and, for this reason, is of a heuristic
nature. On this precise point of the general heuristic principles underlying
processing formulae, R. de Beaugrande and W. Dressler suggest that it should
be considered äs a problem-solving process, c.f. in particular pp. 37-38 for
a presentation of the general ideas of the problem-solver they suggest. (I
presented similar ideas - though more empirical ones - in 'Bouillir ou Perir').
Now, we must admit that there are still a lot of things left undone in
the system which we have just sketched out. In particular, one might begin
to question the inherently inventive capacities of the Systems which have
been proposed up till now (c.f. M. Charolles, 1980). The main danger to avoid
in this type of approach is to end up imagining that any manipulations can be
applied to a given discourse, and that any results can be accepted.

We must guard against allowing the text to vanish away behind mental
processes. Recent debates over the role of the reader point up the dangers
of assuming that text receivers can do whatever they like with a presentation.
If that notion was accurate, textual communication would be quite
unreliable, perhaps even solipsistic. There must be definitive, though not
absolute, controls on the variations among modes of utilising a text by
different receivers. (R.de Beaugrande and W. Dressler, 1981: 35).

Besides, this danger is not only present in fields of research where people
are trying to establish procedural formularization; it is a risk for any one
dealing with Interpretation (the same question might crop up again, for
example, in literature dealing with indirect speech-acts). On this point, the
discussions currently taking place about the distinction between cohesion and
coherence become particularly significant. This is why I would now like to
say a few words on the subject.

5. Concerning the distinction between cohesion and coherence

The distinction between cohesion and coherence was flrst made by M.A.K.
Halliday and R. Hasan (1976):

A text is a passage of discourse which is coherent in these two regards: it is

coherent with respect to the context of Situation and therefore consistent in

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
86 M. Charolles

register, and it is coherent with respect to itself and therefore cohesive,

(P.23).

The word 'register' is defined by these authors äs:

The set of semantic configurations that is typically associated with a particu-

lar class of contexts of situations and which defines the substance of the
text — what it means in the broadest sense, including all the components
of its meaning — social, expressive, communicative and so on, äs well äs
representational. (p.26)

This distinction has been widely adopted in writings on textual coherence

(c.f. in French, D. Slatka, 1975; J.M. Adam, 1977, and L. Lundqvist, 1980);
but some writers have, in my opinion, taken insufficient precautions when
using it, and have tended to somewhat over-estimate the features which, in
their opinion, are the typically cohesive phenomena of a text. The distinction
proposed by M.A.K. Halliday and R. Hasan is not so clear. I cannot see how
it enables us to make a precise distinction between those elements of a text
which are to do with cohesion, and those which are a matter of coherence
(I believe that L. Lundqvist (1980) trips up on the same problem). This is
all the more the case, in so far äs M.A.K. Halliday and R. Hasan consider äs
cohesive certain phenomena (such äs ellipsis, lexical Substitution, and others),
the processirig of which is largely a question of register. The crux of the
problem boils down to the following question.
What, in a text, shows intrinsically that it is a sequential whole?
Or, to express the question in another way:
To what extent is the producer of a text responsible for its coherence,
and how much, inversely, is construed (or induced) by the receiver?
No-one will contest the fact that language contains a certain number of
terms whose function is precisely to indicate how the constituent elements
of the text are linked together. These organizational marks (such äs link-
words, morphemic marks, and temporal or spatial marks or articulation. . .)
serve to indicate to the receiver a particular relationship between the different
components of the text. These marks, which we can call, in effect, cohesion
marks, are explicit Signals (or, äs M. Langleben, 1981, puts it, signs of
'internal coherence') given by the producer of a discourse for the benefit of
the receiver. These marks have no value äs Signals unless they are perceived,
which is not a trivial point. Furthermore, and above all, they are valueless
äs Signals if the receiver is forced to apply further knowledge than that

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
 Coherence äs a principle in the Interpretation ofdiscourse 87

implied by a basic mastery of the language, in order to comprehend their

relational function. This again is not directly obvious, and makes the validity
of the distinction between cohesion and coherence a distinctly relative affair.
Let us say, for example, that we accept an anaphora äs being a mark of
cohesion, and that we say that a particular series of two sentences is cohesive
because the first one is taken up by a co-referent pronoun in the second.
Is this sequence of two sentences cohesive in its own right, or is it coherent
by virtue of a certain Operation which we must presume the receiver to carry
out? It is an embarrassing question. On the one hand we are tempted to reply
that the sentence is only comprehensible to the receiver who is able to
Interpret the anaphora correctly - which will not always be the case (c.f.
young children who are learning their mother tongue, or adults learning a
foreign language). On the other hand, we are inclined to consider that the
anaphoric relationship is an integral part of the data, because if we start
making it relative to a receiver interpreting it, then we might äs well consider
everything äs relative, and there will no longer be any data at all and
thus nothing left to say. Without making a death-wish, I don't see that any
linguist could feasibly subscribe to this second viewpoint. As soon äs we start
looking at things from the angle of usage, everything in language becomes a
matter of procedure. But no science of language is possible unless one agrees
to consider (at least for the time being) that there is a certain usage which
presupposes a mastery of the elementary conventions which form a language
äs an Instrument of social communication.
That having been said, the problem remains of how to ascertain what part
of coherence belongs to the fleld of the data (understood in the sense of the
basic data), and what part of it is construed (i.e. is an aspect of coherence in
the strict sense). The idea which emerges when one envisages the question in
this light is to suppose that certain tools exist in language which indicate a
purely abstract relationship (which is in a certain sense empty) between the
component parts of a text. For example, the only bit of true data, äs far äs
coherence is concerned, in:

(3) Paul is a vegetarian. The poor guy has got constant toothache.

is that the word 'poor' designates a precise and predetermined individual. This
is the only function of the defmite article which precedes this word: it merely
indicates that 'poor' designates a single individual who has been totally
defmed within the context (in the broad sense, c.f. below). The presence of

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
88 M. Charolles

'the' before 'poor' is deemed conventionally to demand a certain type of

procedure: 'the' indicates (which is in itself a major point) that we are
required to pick out in the context a particular individual deemed to be
a suitable co-referent. That is all.
De Beaugrande and Dressler (1981) are defending such a principle, I
believe, when they take up Halliday and Hasan's (1976) point concerning the
distinction between cohesion and coherence, in a procedural perspective.
Now, even in such a perspective, I believe that we must pay attention to
certain difficulties.
In (3) the determiner 'the' is a mark of cohesion. It does not indicate, äs
we have already shown, between which individuals there is identity; it simply
implies that the word 'poor' refers to another person. Let that be. But this
relational value is not unequivocal. In French, for example, the article 'le' is
only occasionally a mark of cohesion. The presence of a deflnite determiner
can also, for instance, be used to express a generic notion, äs in

(4) Pierre fume trop. Le tabac, c'est du poison!

In this example, the determiner preceding 'tabac' is not an indicator of

referential identity. It does not serve to designate a pre-mentioned individual,
äs in:

(5) Prenez une pincoe de tabac et une feuille de papier ä cigarette. Roulez
la feuille dans le sens de la longeur, et disposez le tabac au milieu . . .

Supposing, moreover, that we consider (4) to be an ellipsis (c.f. Haliiday and

Hasan), and equivalent to:

(6) Pierre fume trop de tabac. Le tabac, c'est du poison,

the word 'tabac' is still referring to a generic notion, and is not in the least
referential in the way it is in (5).
Concerning deflnite articles, another problem arises with respect to their
ability to refer endophorically or exophorically. Take this example:

(7) I went to the cinema. The beer was good.

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
 Coherence äs a principle in the Interpretation ofdiscourse 89

The use of 'the' in front of 'beer' is (in theory at least) an ambiguous

instruction. For a potential receiver, the word 'the' indicates no more than
that he must look for something justifying the fact that the producer of (7)
has qualified 'beer' with a deflnite article. The context could designate two
possibilities:
an implicit previous cotextual allusion:

(8) I went to the cinema. [I drank some beer during the film or at the
interval.] The beer [which I drank then] was good.

a contextual allusion, referring to the Situation in which (7) is produced:

(9) I went to the cinema. [Now] the beer [that you have just poured out
for me and which I have drunk] was good

(8) and (9) explicate a determined semantic Interpretation which is not

formally indicated in (7). This Interpretation consists of the manifestation of
a relationship leading to the explication of a word-chain through the
reiteration of a term (c.f. Langleben, 1981). Establishing this relational
chain (which is similar to a sort of proof, c.f. Langleben, 1981, and Van de
Velde, 1981,) amounts to solving the problem. In the circumstances, finding
something or someone capable offulfilling the defining instruction contained
in the use ofthe determiner.
The theoretical process involved in the solving of this problem can be
'formalized' within the general scheme presented in the previous section.
D — (Data) implies:
^'Di' 'beer' is designated in a definite manner.^ General instruction T is
thus specified 'ID l ' in such a way that 'B' becomes 'BiD 1': 'find an which is
capable of defining beer'
Given 'Bj Dl ', the process of searching for a suitable candidate is set in
motion. This process can lead either to a simple exploitation of the
initial 'Ds', or to their enrichment, according to whether the receiver/
Interpreter knows whether or not one can drink beer in the cinema,
or whether or not he remembers the fact that someone has just given the
producer of (7) a drink. Procedurally speaking, those cases in which there
is enrichment of 'Ds' by abduction of data are the more interesting and
more complex.

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
90 M. Charolles

Let us imagine, for instance, a receiver/interpreter for whom:

(a) One can drink beer at the cinema' is not in the initial data. Supposing
he at first considers the definite determiner to be exophoric (i.e. he
imagines a certain solution within the context of 7). He reaches a result
'R' which is judged relative to 'Ds'. If, in effect,
(b) 'the person who says "I" has just drunk a beer' seems to him to be
able to fit in with 'Ds' (a case of post-processing enrichment), the result
will be accepted, and the search-process will stop. If, on the other hand,
(b) does not seem to him to be compatible with 'Ds', another process
will begin, and he will go on to a higher level of T and '£)' ('£)' is
enriched by the failure of the process previously tried out). Consider-
ing that the problem in hand only allows two types of solution (by
an endophoric or an exophoric Interpretation), one must suppose that
there is, at this stage in the process, a presentation of an Intermediate
Result, such äs:
(c) 'There must be some beer at the cinema' (at least for the producer of 7).
According to whether this Result is or is not accepted positively
by the receiver/interpreter äs:
(d) 'we are dealing with beer served in the cinema or at the cinema bar', the
Definitive Result will differ.
Empirical studies (c.f. Charolles, 1982) have shown that the subject does
not generally reach a direct conclusion about incoherence or nonsense, for
which reason it is necessary to anticipate an intermediate level in the result
(with an internal evaluation at T)s'): and this, it should be said, confirms
the significance of T which stipulates, on a very general level, that every
enunciation must, äs a principle, be coherent.
Thus we can see how important procedural aspects are whenever we are
dealing with coherence. Certain terms in language play a cohesive role,
however, äs we have already noted on the subject of definite deterrniners,
these terms:
are not reliable marks (they may have other functions)
are not unequivocal marks (they may have different cohesive values).
In any case, these marks of cohesion never provide more than relational
indications. They signal that a certain type of relationship exists between the
different constituent elements of a text, but that this relationship has no
effect on the level of coherence, until such time äs it has been solved
semantically by the receiver/interpreter. Furthermore, this explains why the
presence of a cohesive word in a textual sequence is no guarantee of cohesion.

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
 Coherence äs a principle in the Interpretation ofdiscourse 91

On the contrary, it frequently happens that an enunciation is problematical

from the point of view of its coherence, because it contains a cohesion-
indicator. This, for example, is the case with (7), which might cause problems
for the very reason that there is a definite determiner in front of the word
'beer'.
In the end, the above observations lead us to reflect on the text in so far
äs it is always communicated by a producer for a receiver. In actual fact,
every text is the result of a certain formulation, carried out by the producer
for the benefit of the receiver. In so far äs the producer wishes, normally, to
be understood, this formulation is essentially aimed at facilitating the task.
The producer's task is to avoid confusing the receiver more than necessary,
and to give him all the elements necessary to help him make the correct
calculations, and indeed to provide him with the maximum of data, so that
he is required to do äs little äs possible. The aim being that, äs an end result,
the producer will link things together in a way that the receiver expects and
believes them to be linked. The production of discourse thus implies a
projection of the way in which its coherence and its significance will be
elaborated. Depending on whether or not this projection is in accordance
with the real interpretive capacities ofthe receiver, the latter will find it more
or less easy to grasp its coherence and significance. Thus the production of
discourse theoretically supposes that the producer places himself at a distance
from his own point of view (i.e. from his own personal way of linking things),
in order to make it accessible to others. This is not always easy, if only
because our thoughts (our subjective discourse) move very rapidiy, and at
any rate too rapidiy to be interpreted by anyone eise. The same is true of the
following text, in which it is clcar that the child writing it has forgottcn, at
one point, that he has not yet used the word 'unemploymenf, although he
refers to it at the start of his penultimate sentence:

Following the world crisis of 1929, 10% of the active population in several
countries were out of work; the same is tnie in the inter-war years. During the
crisis, 20 to 30% of the active population of the world were out of work.
Jt caused misery, the stopping of technical Innovation, and low productivity.
The second world war was a result of unemployment (my underlining)

This kind of example is interesting in so far äs it allows us to grasp the way in

which any production of discourse implies the Job of pt'eparing material for
the receiver (or for the idea that one has of him). It shows, by default, how

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
92 M. Charolles

we set about adapting for the benefit of other people our manner of con-
ceiving that certain facts are linked and form an entity.

6. Supplemental and explanatoty coherence

It is not because one manages to calculate what it is that renders a discourse

coherent, that one is able to understand it fully. Someone who is able to
calculate that

(7) I went to the cinema. The beer was good.

in fact means

(10) that he went to the cinema, and that the beer that he drank there was
good.

certainly manages to understand (7) in a certain way. This understanding is

sufficient in so far äs it permits anyone who gets there to affirm seriously
that he has understood. At any rate, it is hard to imagine that anyone who
was incapable of deducing that (7) meant (10) could claim to understand
(7). The level of understanding attained by anyone capable of solving (7)
by deducing (10) is not, however, the ultimate that one might conceive of
for this Statement. Indeed, consider the following Interpretation:

(11) the person who says T says

that he went to the cinema
that the film that he saw was bad - so bad that the only good
thing he can find to say about it is that the beer he drank there
was good.

(11) is a perfectly classic conversational implication of (7); of course, this

does not imply that any receiver of (7) is sensitive to it (c.f. Charolles, 1981).
Firstly, (11) is only accessible to a receiver/interpreter capable of calculating
(10) under (7) — it should be noted in passing that (11) is also compatible
with (8), (10), and (9). Thus (11) is second to (10) (or to (8)). Now, anyone
solving (7) by deducing (10) reaches an Interpretation of (7) which provides

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
 Coherence äs a principle in the Interpretation ofdiscourse 93

the Statement with a minimal coherence, which I shall call a supplemental

coherence. Let me explain this terminology. Anyone who manages to
calculate that (7) is coherent by using (10) (or (8)), understands that the
producer of (7) accomplishes in succession the actions ofsaying
that he has been to the cinema
that he has drunk a beer.
Besides that, he interprets that the person who enunciates (7) says, without
actually sayingso:
that he drank a beer at the cinema
a beer, which he declares furthermore (äs well äs, besides . . .) to have
been good.

Whoever understands (11) beneäth (7) also reaches a global explication of

the fact that the producer of (7) is saying all this. The thing that distinguishes
complemental interpretations from global explicative interpretations (or
explanatory interpretations) is that the former never lead to the explication
of a thematic continuity, (they indicate that an element is repeated from one
segment to another), whereas the latter justify this continuity (they lead to
the manifestation of the reason why a certain thing is said supplementally
about an element).
Let me briefly return to (3) to illustrate again what I have just said.

(3) Paul is a vegetarian. The poor guy has got constant toothache.

To widerstand that Hhe poor guy' in (3) designates 'Paul* is to undcrstand

that the producer of (3) carries out the actions of saying of Paul
(i) that he is a vegetarian,
and that complimentally
(11) he is 'poor' and has constant toothache.
Let us suppose now that a certain receiver/interpreter goes one stage
further, and understands not only that (3) says (i) and (ii), but also:
(iii) that Paul has got toothache because he is a vegetarian. This receiver/
Interpreter would manage to understand more easily in what way (7) is
coherent. The proof is that if one compares (8) and (12)

(12) Paul is a vegetarian. He speaks fluent English

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
94 M. Charolles

for which the only Interpretation possible seems to be a complemental one,

one will find it difficult to accept that (12) is really coherent. (Numerous
writers, c.f. Kalliday and Hasan, (1976) observe that the repetition of an
individual is not sufficient to make a sequence of two sentences coherent).
This is even more obvious in the case of contradictions such äs

(13) Paul is a vegetarian. He eats meat every day.

where the insufficiency of a 'complemental solution' is quite clear. We will

need a fairly complex manoeuvre to render (13) coherent. One way to do
so might be, for instance (and indeed, I do not know if there are any other
ways) to say that the producer of (13) 'says' of Paul

(14) that he Claims to be a vegetarian (because he is a snob, or he wants to

stand out), but that in actual fact he eats meat seven days a week.

The fact that it is difficult to arrive at (14) from (13) explains precisely why
(13) is very unlikely to occur in 'normal' communication. Anyone saying
(13) without taking the necessary precautions would be highly likely to be
misunderstood. For this reason, we do not often meet Statements such äs
(13) in everyday speech, unless they are accompanied by explicit indications
(such äs gestures, mimicry, correctors such äs 'but in fact . ..'), aimed at
helping potential receivers see why they are not really contradictory.
It is very difficult to theorize the idea that a sequence of discourse may be
more or less coherent. I do not think it is possible to get round the problem
by arguing in terms of the number of rulcs transgresscd (c.f. Charollcs, 1978),
or of the number of blanks in the discourse. The solution I am recommending
arises from reflecting on the Interpretation of discourse in so far äs it is the
product of a series of acts of enunciation. The two degrees that I have
proposed reflect two ways of seeing how a series of actions can form a whole.
Complemental Interpretation boils down more or less to
it is coherent because says P about x, and complementally q about X
whereas the explanatory Interpretation is more or less of the form:
it is coherent because says P about and complementally Q about x,
because says (or rather believes) that Q is related in such and such a
way to P.
From this distinction (which cannot be reduced to: continuity of the
arguments —VS — relationship of predicates), I believe that it would be of

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
 Coherence äs a principle in the Interpretation of discourse 95

interest to return to the question of cohesion markers to find out which ones
contribute to the establishment of complemental coherence, and which ones
favour explanatory linkages.

7. Conclusion

No text is inherently coherent or incoherent. In the end, it all depends on

the receiver, and on his ability to Interpret the indications present in the
discourse so that, finally, he manages to understand it in a way which seems
coherent to him — in a way which corresponds with his idea of what it is
that makes a series of actions into an integrated whole.

Notes

What is usually understood by 'explication of intent', when we say that it is neces-

sary to have access to such an explication in order to be able to say flegitimately)
that we understand a human action, does not necessarily have much to do with
considerations of 'high psychology'. This point deserves to be stressed, since the
reader might think there is a contradiction between what I say in the first paragraph
(i.e., to understand that is making fire, is to understand why he is doing so),
and what I say later on about building a wall. The difference lies in the fact that
neither of these actions are elementary (in the eyes of the beholder), and, on the
other hand, in our propensity to read äs 'intention' something which necessarily
belongs to one of the domains of affectivity, emotion or volition . . . . (which I
would call 'high psychology'). In fact, the intention necessary for accounting for
comprehension may consist of no more than 'psychological trivialities'.
Suppose, for example, that I see someone breaking twigs and setting light to
them. I merely understand that he is making fire. This simple recognition may be
sufficient for me to declare that I understand what is happening. I do not need to
know why the person is making fire to feel I have the right to say that I understand
his action. This is in accordance with the way we usually use the verb *understand':
however,, it does not contradict what I said in the first paragraph (i.e. that
understanding that is making fire = understanding why he is doing so). Indeed,
stating that one understands that is making fire, when one sees him picking up
twigs and then setting light to them, presumes that one has understood the series
of actions undertaken by äs signifying his intention to make fire. (The fact that
this intention operates on a more primary level than that 'he wants to get warm', in
no way lessens its value äs an intention.) Now, if the act of making fire is
considered äs an elementary act (i.e. it is interpreted straightaway globally äs
signifying an intention to make fire), it can only be understood relatively:—
- to another action which follows (i.e. holds his hands over the fire )
- and/or to the context in which it occurs (i.e. 'it is cold')

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
96 M. Charolles

äs a result of which, we resort to a further Intention ('x wants to get warm') to

understand the whole context to which 'x is making fire' belongs.
2. In trThe Blue Book', L. Wittgenstein quotes a case which is similar to that of the
chess-player who tries to work out his opponent's moves. Wittgenstein's example
clearly shows the relationship there is between understanding a series of actions,
and the fact of being capable or incapable of 'continuing' it. Here is the start of
L. Wittgenstein's note (62).

Imagine the following game. A writes a number of figures one after the other; B,
who is watching him, tries to discover a System which logically justifies the series
of numbers. When he flnds it, he says: "Now I can continue."

We could also quote numerous psychological tests based on this ability to prölong
a series of represented actions (or, slightly differently, a series of forms or of
letters )
3. This classic example is taken from L. Apostel, 1980: 221.
4. J. Lyons, 1978, clearly shows the two ways in which reference can be conceived.

As far äs I am concerned (J.L.), when someone asks "What does the expression 'x'
refer to?", he is asking the same question äs "What is the Speaker referring to by
'x'" (by saying such and such a sentence).

It is nevertheless possible to define the reference in such a way äs to distinguish

between these two uses, and to allow an expression to have a reference which is
independent of the use which can be made of it to refer to a given entity.
5. text,' write Halliday and Hassan (1976), 'is not something that is like a sentence
only bigger, it is something that differs from a sentence in kind' (p.2). E. Benveniste
(1966) says much the same.

References

Adam, J.M. (1977). Ordre du texte, ordre du discours. Pratiques 13,103-112.

Apostel, L. (1980). Pragmatique praxeologique : communication et action. In: Le
langage en contexte, H. Parret (ed.). Amsterdam: John Benjamins,
de Beaugrande, R. (1981). Linguistic theory and metatheory for a science of texts.
Text 1(2), 113-163.
de Beaugrande, R and Dressler, W. (1981). Introduction to Text Linguistics. London:
Longman.
Benveniste, E. (1966). Problemes de linguistique gendrale. Paris: Gallimard.
Berrendonner, A. (1981). Elements de pragmatique linguistique. Paris: Minuit.
Charniak, E, and Wilks, Y. (eds.) (1976). Computational Semantics. Amsterdam: North
Holland.
Charolles, M. (1981a). 11 fallait un President ä la France. Pratiques 30.
- (1982b). Bouillir ou perir. Cahiers du Centre de Recherches Somiologiques. Neuchätel.
- (forthcoming, c). Towards an heuristic approach to text. In: Aspects of Coherence of
Discourse, F. Neubouer (ed.). Hamburg: Buske Verlag.

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
 Coherence äs a principle in the Interpretation ofdiscourse 97

- (Unpublished, d). Necessite d'un modele heuristique de la coherence discursive et

limites des systemes existants.
de Cornulier, B. (1981). Signification reflexive et non-natural meaning. Cahiers de
Linguistique Frangaise 2, 5-23.
Dascal, M. and Margalit, A. (1974). A new revolution in linguistics? — 'text grammars*
versus 'sentence grammars'. TheoreticalLinguistics l, 195-213.
Davidson, D. (1968). Actions, Reasons and Causes. In: The Philosophy ofAction, A.R.
White (ed.). (Oxford Readings in Phüosophy), 79-95. Oxford: O.U.P.
Gindin, S. (1982). What is a text äs a basic notion of textlinguistics. In: Text vs Sentence
Continued, Petöfi (ed.), 107-112. Hamburg: Buske Verlag.
Grice,H.P. (1957). Meaning. The Philosophical Review 66, 377 - 389.
Grize, J.B. (ed.) (1981). L'Explication: approche semiologjque. Revue Europdenne des
Seien ces Sociales 19,56.
Halliday, M.A.K., and Hasan, R. (1976). Cohesion in English. London: Longman.
Van den Heuvel, P. (1981). Le potin journalistique. Pratiques 30.
Katz, J. and Fodor, J.A. (1964). The structures of a semantic theory. In: The Structure
of Language. Readings in the Philosophy of Language, J.A. Fodor and J. Katz,
(eds.), 479-518. New York: Prentice Hall.
Kiefer, F. (1977). Review of Studies in Text Grammar, J. Petöfi, and H. Rieser. In:
Journal ofPragmatics 1(2), 177-193.
Langleben, H. (1981). Latent coherence, contextual meanings, and the Interpretation of
the text. Text 1(3) 279-313.
Lieb, H-H. (1982). A text: what is it? A neglected question in textlinguistics. In: Text
vs. Sentence continued, J. Petöfi, (ed.), 134-159. Hamburg: Buske Verlag.
Lundqvist, L. (1980). La coherence textuelle. Kobenhavn: Nyt Nordisk Forlag, Arnold
Busck.
Lyons, J. Linguistic Semantics. Cambridge University Press.
Morris, C.W. (1946). Signs, Language and Behaviour. New York: Prentice Hall.
Petöfi, J. (1978a). A few comments on the methodology of text theoretical research in
response to Kiefer's review of 'Studies in Text Grammar.' Journal of Pragmatics
2(4), 361-365.
- (1979b). Natural, theoretical and automatic text processing. In: Representation des
connaissances et raisonnement dans les sciences de l'homme, Mario Borülo (ed.),
2-22. Le chesnay: Institute de National de Recherche en Informatique et Auto-
matique.
Piaget, J. (1923). Le langage etla pemae chez l'enfant. Neuchätel: Delachaux et Niestle.
Recanati, F. (1981). Les ononces performatifs. Paris: Minuit.
Searle, J. (1969). Speech Acts. Cambridge University Press.
Slakta, D. (1975). L'ordre du texte. Etudes de Linguistique Appliquee 19, Paris: Didier.
Strawson, P.F. (1964). Intention and convention in speech acts. The Philosophical
Review 73,439-460.
Tarski, A. (1956). Logic, Semantics, and Mathematics, Papers 1923-1938. Eng. transl.
by I.H. Woodger. Oxford: Clarendon.
Van de Velde, R.G. (1981). Textuality and human reasoning. Text 1(4), 385-407.
Wittgenstein, L. (1934). The Blue Book. New York: Harper & Row.

M. Charolles is studying linguistics and the semiotics of literature at the University oi

Franche-Comte (Besanqon, France) and has recently presented a Doctorat D'Etat on the
coherence of discourse. His major research interests are the Interpretation of h'terary
or ordinary texts, the comprehension of natural language, text-grammar and text-theory.

Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer

Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM
Brought to you by | Nanyang Technological Univer
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/3/15 10:11 AM