1

G.R. No. 127240             March 27, 2000

ONG CHIA, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
1 

Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato2 admitting petitioner Ong Chia to Philippine citizenship.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of
Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and
eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age
of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the
Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required in §2, and lack of the
disqualifications enumerated in §3 of the law, stated —

17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of Instruction No.
270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as SCN
Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on
Naturalization was not reconstituted after the February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for
naturalization by administrative process was suspended;

During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate his
testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being
asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness present any witness against him, he
remarked:

Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in the sense that
he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on our part, we are
convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the
Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the
testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself.
3

Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship.
The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed all the names by which he is or had been
known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has no
known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in
contravention of §2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. 4

Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by petitioner with the
Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767, in which petitioner stated that in addition to his
5 

name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however,
failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition for naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail. The
6 

state also annexed income tax returns allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income
7 

could hardly support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that, although petitioner claimed that
he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in 1953, and then again in church in 1977,
petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was
alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a copy
of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract and a Joint-Affidavit executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents
8  9 

show that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been required
in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been living together as
husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This, according to the State, belies his claim that when
he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been married.

The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence,  petitioner resided at "J.M.
10 

Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in the petition.

On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted, reversed the trial court
and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance naturalization cases, the
State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on
appeal.  The appellate court held:
11 
2

As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to state in this present
petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his previous
application under Letter of Instruction No. 270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated in the petition for
naturalization and failure to include the same militates against a decision in his favor. . . This is a mandatory
requirement to allow those persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to come forward and inform
the authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect his application for citizenship.

Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he formerly resided in "J.M.
Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires the applicant to
state in his petition "his present and former places of residence." This requirement is mandatory and failure
of the petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for the
provision is to give the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the government, upon the publication
of the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their objections against the petitioner. By
failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner is depriving the public and said agencies of such
opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law. . .

Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner when he lived-in with his
wife for several years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the consistent ruling that the
"applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of clergy and begetting by her three children
out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper and irreproachable as required by the Revised
Naturalization Law", and therefore disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines by
naturalization . . .

Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of bonuses,
commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to file an income tax return "because he is
not liable for income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . . "It is not only that the person having the
employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one
an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over expenses as to be able to provide for
an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one's
becoming the object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that they are in their old age, petitioner Ong Chia
and his wife are living on the allowance given to them by their children. The monthly pension given by the
elder children of the applicant cannot be added to his income to make it lucrative because like bonuses,
commissions and allowances, said pensions are contingent, speculative and precarious. . .

Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN

NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND
NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.

II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN KNOWN BY SOME
OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER STATED IN HIS
PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE.

IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO CONDUCT
HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD.

Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely
been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's
decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of
any evidentiary value,"  so it was argued, because under Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the
12 

court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.

The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143  of the Rules of Court which provides that —
13 

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added).

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by petitioner is
clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules
may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the
case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to
3

be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are
not covered by the rule on res judicata.  Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from
14 

later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.

Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence
before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his
fundamental right to procedural due process.  We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the
15 

admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to
their admissibility.  Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the
16 

documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did,
in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. thus:

The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was supposedly filed
by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case number of the alleged petition for
naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case number of the petition actually filed by the appellee is 031776.
Thus, said document is totally unreliable and should not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving
the instant appeal.  17

Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as a
typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of which was annexed to
the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet  of the Special Committee on
18 

Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence
to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented by the State.

Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents — namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner's
marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income tax returns — are all
public documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to
make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it
is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon them.

One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle all the issues
raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his
petition, in accordance with §7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of
Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner
admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of
Residence containing it had been fully published,  with the petition and the other annexes, such publication
19 

constitutes substantial compliance with §7.  This is allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the
20 

objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the government the
opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and prevent suppression of information regarding any
possible misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have lived at one time or another.  It is settled,
21 

however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and
against the applicant.  As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization
22 

shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of residence.  This provision and the rule of strict
23 

application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the
requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied. 1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

ONG CHIA v. REPUBLIC, GR No. 127240, 2000-03-27

Facts:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the
port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found
employment and eventually started his own business, married a
Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be
admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended.
petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So
impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked
4

by the court whether the State intended to... present any witness against him, he remarked:... we are
convinced, Your Honor Please, that... petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the
Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the
testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself.
on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship.
The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed contending that petitioner: (1)
failed to state all the names by which he is or had... been known; (2) failed to state all his former places of
residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or
occupation... and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of §2;
and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by petitioner
with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767,[5] in which petitioner stated that
in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he... had likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia
Ong."
The state also annexed income tax... returns[7] allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that
his net income could hardly support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines,... the State contended
that, although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a
judge in 1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of
marriage from 1953 until they were married in

1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any.
The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract[8] and a Joint-Affidavit[9]
executed by petitioner and his wife.

These documents show that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage
license had been required in accordance with Art.76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona
Villaruel had been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the... benefit of marriage. This,
according to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already
been married.
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence,[10] petitioner
resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in his petition.
the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which... reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's
application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance of naturalization cases, the State is not
precluded from raising... questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on
appeal.
Issues:
the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its
appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having
been presented and... formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any
evidentiary value,"... because under Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally... offered.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary
evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively
depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due... process.
the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance
with §7, C.A. No.

473.

Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the
Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published,[19] with the petition and the
other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance with §7.
Ruling:
5

The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143[13] of the Rules of Court which provides
that -
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient.
the rule on formal offer of evidence... is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for
naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in... such
cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the
documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical
and convenient course of action considering that decision in... naturalization proceedings are not covered
by the rule on res judicata.[14] Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from
later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same... documents.
We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not
been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility.[16]
Petitioner... cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents
submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in
the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals
, thus:
The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was supposedly
filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case number of the alleged petition
for naturalization... is 031767 while the... case number of the petition actually filed by the appellee is
031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and should not be considered by the Honorable Court in
resolving the instant appeal.
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as a
typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of which was
annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed... by the Evaluation Sheet[18] of the
Special Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than
this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents - namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767,
petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income tax
returns - are all public documents. As such, they have been executed... under oath. They are thus reliable.
Since petitioner failed to make satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the
authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon
them.
naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against
the applicant.[22]
As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth
in the petition his present and former places of residence.[23] This provision and the rule of strict
application of the law in naturalization... cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance"
with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition
ought to be denied.
Principles:
[G.R. NOS. 140538-39 : June 14, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. GODOFREDO B. ADOR and DIOSDADO B. ADOR III, Appellants.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:
6

The quiescence of the fading day was shattered by bursts of gunfire, startling the otherwise tranquil but sanguine folks
of Pacol, Naga City.As the fusillade of shots ceased and the wisp of smoke cleared, frolicking promenaders stumbled
upon Ompong Chavez who was gasping his last, clutching his intestines which had spewed out from his bloodied
stomach.He did not in fact reach the hospital alive.A breath away, Abe Cuya lay lifeless on the pavement.He died on the
spot.For the twinned deaths, the Adors, six (6) of them, were haled to court.

In two (2) separate informations,1 Diosdado Sr.,2 Diosdado Jr., Diosdado III, Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan, all surnamed
Ador, were charged with the murder of Absalon Abe S. Cuya III and Rodolfo Ompong S. Chavez.The Informations in Crim.
Cases Nos.97-6815 and 97-6816 identically read:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

That on or about March 10, 1997, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with
treachery and the aid of armed men, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot ABSALON ABE CUYA
III (RODOLFO OMPO CHAVEZ y SAN ANDRES3 for Crim. Case No. 97-6816) with firearms, inflicting upon him multiple and
mortal gunshot wounds which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

With the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and nighttime.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

However, only four (4) of the six (6) Adors, namely, Diosdado Sr., Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan, were taken into
custody.The two (2), Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III, remained at large.Trial thus proceeded only against Diosdado Sr.,
Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan who all pleaded not guilty.Diosdado Sr. is the father of Diosdado Jr., Diosdado III and
Godofredo, while Rosalino is the father of Allan.Diosdado Sr. and Rosalino are brothers.4 ςrνll

In its effort to secure the conviction of the accused, the prosecution presented a total of sixteen (16) witnesses: Mercy
Beria, Larry Cado, Medico-Legal Officer of Naga City Dr. Joel S. Jurado, Police Inspector Ma. Julieta Razonable, SPO1
Benjamin Barbosa, SPO3 Augusto Basagre, Major Ernesto Idian, Inspector Reynaldo F. Fulgar, SPO1 Noli Reyes Sol, SPO3
Eduardo C. Bathan, Inspector Vicente C. Lauta, Ernani Castillo, PO3 Augusto I. Nepomuceno, Absalon Cuya Sr., Efren
Chavez and Pablo Calsis.

From the evidence of the prosecution, it appears that on March 10, 1997, at around seven-thirty in the evening, while
Mercy Beria, Larry Cado and some eleven (11) others were leisurely walking along Kilometer 11 on their way to Zone 1,
Kilometer 10, Pacol, Naga City, to attend a wedding anniversary, they heard several gunshots.Shortly after, they met a
certain Pablito Umali who told them that Ompong Chavez had been shot.They ran to Chavez straight off and saw him
already lying on the ground, about 1 meters away from a lighted electric post, holding on to his intestines which were
starting to come out.Beria shook Chavez and asked him what had happened.Chavez replied tinambangan kami na Ador
(We were ambushed by the Adors) and requested that he be brought to the hospital as he was dying.About eight (8)
meters from where Chavez was, in a dark spot, lay Abe Cuya, dead.5 ςrνll

Upon learning of the shooting incident through their radio communication, SPO1 Benjamin Barbosa, together with PO2
Alexander Diaz, immediately proceeded to the crime scene to conduct an investigation.SPO3 Eduardo Bathan and SPO1
Wilfredo Fernandez, among others, were already there.6 SPO1 Barbosa collected some pieces of evidence, took some
pictures and made some sketches.7 SPO1 Fernandez on the other hand interviewed one Cresenciana Mendoza in her
house which was nearby, and when he heard people shout that Chavez was still alive, he brought Chavez to the hospital
but the latter expired on the way.8 ςrνll

That same evening, upon being informed that the Adors had a long-standing grudge against the Cuyas, SPO1 Barbosa
sought the help of then Barangay Captain Josue Perez to accompany him to the residence of the Adors.They arrived at
the Adors at around ten oclock that evening and spoke with their patriarch, Diosdado Ador Sr. SPO1 Barbosa looked for
the other male members of the Ador family but was told by Diosdado Sr. that they were already asleep.Diosdado Sr.
nevertheless promised to present them the following day.9 ςrνll

The following morning, March 11, 1997, Barangay Captain Perez accompanied the Adors, namely, Diosdado Sr.,
Diosdado III, Godofredo, Rosalino, Allan and Reynaldo, to SPO1 Barbosa at the PNP Central Police Headquarters.The
Adors were informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to choose their own counsel.They were then
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the Provincial Headquarters and subjected to paraffin tests.10 On the way to
7

the crime laboratory, Godofredo told his police escort that he had been entrusted with a handgun which he kept in his
residence.11 The information was relayed to Major Ernesto Idian, then Deputy Chief of Police of Naga City, who ordered
PO3 Augusto I. Nepomuceno to accompany him in recovering the gun because Godofredo said that he would turn in the
gun only to PO3 Nepomuceno.Thus, Major Idian, PO3 Nepomuceno and some others accompanied Godofredo to the
latters residence.

Upon reaching the Ador residence, Godofredo, together with PO3 Nepomuceno, went to their backyard, retrieved the
gun from under a fallen coconut trunk and turned it in to the latter.Godofredo allegedly told the police that he fired the
said gun outside their house on the night of March 10 after he heard several gunshots.12 PO3 Nepomuceno identified
the gun as a caliber .38 paltik handgun which had no serial number.13 PO3 Nepomuceno then turned over the handgun
to Major Idian14 who likewise identified it as a .38 caliber revolver.Major Idian returned the handgun to PO3
Nepomuceno for ballistic and paraffin examination.15 Thereafter, PO3 Nepomuceno placed his initials on the gun and
put it in his private locker while preparing the documents for the examinations and the possible filing of a case for Illegal
Possession of Firearm.16 ςrνll

Also, on the same day, March 11, 1997, Dr. Joel S. Jurado, Medico-Legal Officer of Naga City, conducted an autopsy on
the bodies of Chavez and Cuya.Based on the autopsy reports, Dr. Jurado testified that Cuya sustained five (5) gunshot
wounds and died from cardio-pulmonary arrest, massive intra-thoracic, intra-abdominal, intra-cranial hemorrhage
secondary to multiple gunshot wounds penetrating the heart, brain, lungs and digestive tract.17 Chavez on the other
hand had three (3) gunshot wounds and died from traumatic shock and massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage secondary
to multiple gunshot wounds penetrating the right kidney and the internal abdominal organs.18 Dr. Jurado further
testified that that he recovered a slug from Cuyas head three (3) days after he conducted the autopsy - after Cuyas
relatives called his attention to a protruding mass in Cuyas head.Thus, he had Cuyas cadaver sent back to the funeral
parlor, opened it and was able to extract a deformed .38 caliber slug which he thereafter submitted to the City
Prosecutors Office.19 ςrνll

Police Inspector Reynaldo Fulgar, Chief of the Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Ola,
Legaspi City, testified that based on the ballistic examination he conducted on the bullets submitted to his office, the .38
caliber slug recovered from Cuyas head matched the three (3) .38 caliber test bullets which were test-fired from the
suspected firearm surrendered by Godofredo.He however averred that the .38 caliber bullets were actually fired from a .
357 Smith and Wesson Magnum homemade revolver without serial number, and not from a .38 caliber revolver.20 ςrνll

The paraffin casts taken from the Adors were also transmitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory Services for examination and
yielded the presence of gunpowder nitrates, thus

(1) Diosdado A. Ador both hands, positive;

(2) Diosdado B. Ador III right hand, positive; left hand, negative;

(3) Godofredo B. Ador right hand, positive; left hand, negative;

(4) Rosalino A. Ador both hands, positive;

(5) Reynaldo T. Ador both hands, negative;21

(6) Allan T. Ador both hands, positive.22 ςrνll

Absalon Cuya Sr., father of deceased Cuya III, said that the killing of his son was driven by the long-standing feud
between the Adors and his family.He said that Diosdado Jr. had earlier accused his other son Liberato of frustrated
homicide for allegedly stabbing him (Diosdado Jr.). 23 Then, Adelina, a daughter of Diosdado Sr., filed a case for
abduction with multiple rape against him, Absalon III, Rayne and Josephine, all surnamed Cuya, after the romantic
relationship between Adelina and his deceased son Absalon III turned sour.24 He also presented official receipts of the
funeral and burial expenses which amounted to P10,230.00.25 ςrνll

Efren Chavez, brother of deceased Chavez, likewise spoke of the animosity between the Chavez and the Ador families.He
produced a certification from the PNP Naga City Police Station that on February 17, 1997, a blotter was entered in the
Daily Record of Events showing that deceased Chavez reported a certain Ricardo Ador who while under the influence of
8

liquor caused him physical injury.26 The witness likewise presented an official receipt showing that the family spent
P3,500.00 for the funeral of the deceased Chavez.27 After presenting Chavez, the prosecution rested its case.

On April 7, 1998, the four (4) accused filed a demurrer to evidence for utter lack of evidence.28 On May 13, 1998, the
trial court dismissed the cases against Diosdado Sr., Rosalino and Allan but denied the demurrer to evidence against
Godofredo

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the demurrer to evidence to be justified for the accused Diosdado A. Ador, Allan T. Ador
and Rosalino Ador, hence, the same is hereby granted insofar as these accused are concerned.Said accused therefore,
namely: Diosdado A. Ador, Allan T. Ador and Rosalino Ador are ACQUITTED in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816.The
bailbonds posted for their provisional liberty are hereby cancelled.

Trial of the case insofar as Godofredo B. Ador is concerned shall proceed.

SO ORDERED.29 ςrνll

Thus, trial proceeded against Godofredo.

For his defense, Godofredo denied any participation in the killings of Cuya and Chavez.He said that on March 10, 1997,
at aroundseven oclock in the evening, he heard several gunshots while he was having dinner with his wife and four (4)
children in their house in Pacol,NagaCity.Since his wife advised him not to go out anymore, he slept after dinner.The
following day, while he was gathering pili nuts, his long-time friend Dominador Bautista arrived and asked him to go
down from the tree.Bautista wanted to borrow money and on his way to see him, found a gun by the footpath.Bautista
gave the gun to him.It was his first time to hold a gun.He tried it out and fired three (3) times.After firing the gun, he
removed the empty shells from its chambers and threw them away.He then wrapped the gun with plastic and hid it
under a coconut trunk.Bautista left when he told him that he had no money.He then continued to gather pili nuts until
Major Idian and three (3) other policemen came.

Godofredos father told him that they were being suspected of killing Chavez and Cuya the night before.Thus, they went
to the provincial headquarters, were subjected to paraffin testing and made to sign a blank bond paper.After that, they
went back to the central police station.At the central police station, Godofredo narrated to a certain Calabia that that
morning, his friend Bautista found a gun along the road and gave it to him.He hid the gun under a coconut trunk.Calabia
relayed the information to Major Idian who directed PO3 Nepomuceno to go with Godofredo to get the gun.Godofredo
led PO3 Nepomuceno to where he hid the gun, retrieved it and handed it to the latter.They then returned to the police
headquarters where he was jailed.He asserted that the gun presented in court is different from the gun he surrendered
to the police.30 ςrνll

Bautista corroborated Godofredos story.He testified that he found the gun which Godofredo yielded to PO3
Nepomuceno.He said that he was on his way to see Godofredo to borrow money when he chanced upon the handgun
on the pathway.He gave the gun to Godofredo and the latter tested it by pulling its trigger.After firing the gun,
Godofredo removed the empty shells and threw them.Godofredo then wrapped the gun with plastic and hid it under a
fallen coconut trunk.31 ςrνll

Meanwhile, Diosdado Jr. was arrested on October 9, 1998, at Barangay Doa, Orani,Bataan, and committed to the Naga
City Jail on November 17, 1998, while Diosdado III surrendered to the court and was committed to the same city jail on
November 22, 1998.On November 23, 1998, both Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III were arraigned and entered a plea of not
guilty.Hence, trial against them commenced and proceeded jointly with the case of the remaining accused, Godofredo.

The prosecution presented Pablo Calsis32 as a witness against Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III.Calsis testified that on
March 10, 1997, at around 7:30 in the evening, he dropped by the house of Cresenciana Mendoza whom he fondly
called Lola Kising at Kilometer 10, Pacol, Naga City, before going home from work.After asking permission from her to go
home and while about to urinate outside her house, he heard several gunshots.He ducked by a sineguelas tree at a
nearby flower plantation.As he was about to stand up, he saw Disodado Jr., Diosdado III, Godofredo and another
unidentified man run away.Godofredo was carrying a short firearm while Diosdado Jr. had a long firearm.33 He saw
Chavez and Cuya lying on the road.Chavez was about five (5) meters away from where he stood while Cuya was ten (10)
meters away.The place was illuminated by a bright light from an electric post.There were no other people around.Calsis
9

ran away for fear that he might be identified by the assailants.He heard Chavez mumbling but shirked nevertheless.34
ςrνll

Calsis narrated to Absalon Cuya Sr. what he saw only after about one (1) year and nine (9) months.Fear struck him.35 He
maintained that he knew the assailants because he and his wife lived in the house of Lola Kising after they got
married.36 Immense fear prevented him from attending to Chavez, even while he heard him murmuring, and from
informing the families of the victims of the incident that very same night.He was about to tell the Chavez family the
following morning but was counseled by his Lola Bading, the sister of his Lola Kising, against getting involved in the
case.37 Calsis and his family left their residence in Pacol one (1) month after the incident because he was afraid the
assailants might have identified him.38 Even Lola Kising left her residence two (2) months after the incident.39 It was
only after he learned from Absalon Cuya Sr.that the trial court dismissed the cases for lack of evidence insofar as some
of the original accused were concerned that he took pity on the respective families of the victims who have failed to get
justice for the death of their loved ones.40 ςrνll

In defense, Diosdado Jr. testified that on March 10, 1997, he was in Marikina City working as a warehouseman and
timekeeper of the Consuelo Builders Corporation.He was there the whole time from February 15, 1997, until March 24,
1997.41 Pablo Aspe, a co-worker of Diosdado Jr., corroborated the latters testimony.He said that on February 15, 1997,
he and Diosdado Jr. left Pacol, Naga City, together to work in Consuelo Construction in Marikina City.They were with
each other in Marikina City the whole time from February 15, 1997, until he (Aspe) went home to Naga City on March
22, 1997.While in Marikina City, they resided and slept together in their barracks at the construction site.42 ςrνll

Diosdado III also took the witness stand.On March 10, 1997, at around seven oclock in the evening, he was at their
house at Zone 1, Pacol, Naga City, watching television with his parents and cousins Reynaldo and Allan when they heard
gunshots.They ignored the gunshots, continued watching television and slept at eight oclock.The following day, at
around six oclock in the morning, while he was fetching water, four (4) policemen arrived at their house and talked to his
father.Thereafter, his father called him, his brother Godofredo, uncle Rosalino and cousins Allan and Reynaldo.The
policemen then requested all of them to go to the PNP Central Police Headquarters for investigation regarding the
killings of Chavez and Cuya.Upon reaching the police headquarters, they were interviewed by the media and afterwards
brought to the provincial headquarters where they were subjected to paraffin tests.They were then brought back to the
Central Police Headquarters and later allowed to go back home to Pacol.

Then, sometime in October, 1997, his father was arrested by the police.Diosdado III was at their residence when his
father was picked up.Only his father was taken by the police.He continued to reside in their house until April, 1998,
when he transferred to Sagurong, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay, to work as a fisherman.On November 21, 1998, he
received a letter from his father telling him to come home.Thus, he went home the following day.On November 23,
1998, he surrendered to the court.43 ςrνll

The defense also presented Barangay Captain Josue Perez and an uncle of Diosdado Jr. and Disodado III, Jaime
Bobiles.Perez testified that he was the barangay captain of Pacol from 1982 until May, 1997.In 1996, Cresenciana
Mendoza left their barangay permanently to live with her children in Manila because she was sickly and alone in her
house.He said that Mendoza never came back.He does not know any Pablo Calsis and the latter could not have talked to
Mendoza on March 10, 1997, because at that time, Mendoza was not there and her house was already abandoned.44
Similarly, Bobiles confirmed the testimony that Diosdado III worked as a fisherman in Tabaco and stayed in his residence
from May 1, 1998, until November 1998 when Diosdado III received a letter from his father and had to go home.45 ςrνll

In rebuttal however, prosecution witness SPO1 Fernandez asserted that he interviewed Cresenciana Mendoza that
fateful night of March 10, 1997.46 After the rebuttal witness was presented, the cases were finally submitted for
decision.47 ςrνll

On August 2, 1999, the trial court held that a chain of circumstances x x x lead to a sound and logical conclusion that
indeed the accused (Diosdado III and Godofredo) committed the offense charged48 and as such rendered judgment

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds the accused Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, defined and penalized under the provisions of Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659 in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816, hereby sentences
the said accused Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA in Criminal
Case No. 97-6815; RECLUSION PERPETUA in Criminal Case No. 97-6816, to pay the heirs of Absalon Abe Cuya III P25,000
10

each by way of actual damages andP50,000 in each criminal case by way of indemnity.To pay the heirs of Rodolfo
Ompong Chavez the sum of P50,000 in each criminal case by way of indemnity, such accessory penalties as provided for
by law and to pay the cost.For insufficiency of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused Diosdado B. Ador, Jr.
beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby ACQUITTED in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816.

The Jail Warden of the Naga City District Jail is hereby ordered to forthwith release from its custody the accused
Diosdado B. Ador, Jr., unless his further detention is warranted by any other legal cause or causes.

SO ORDERED.49 ςrνll

Hence, this joint appeal interposed by Disodado III and Godofredo.They maintain that the trial court gravely erred in
convicting them of murder based on circumstantial evidence.The testimony of prosecution witness Pablo Calsis that he
saw them running away from the scene of the crime was concocted.The handgun turned in by Godofredo was not the
same gun presented by the prosecution during the trial.The unusual discovery of a slug from the head of the deceased -
three (3) days after the autopsy was conducted and after the cadaver was turned over to the family of the victim - was
quite doubtful.Even the supposed dying declaration of the victim specifically pointed to neither Diosdado III nor
Godofredo.And, the trial court erred in admitting in evidence those taken against them in violation of their constitutional
rights to counsel during custodial investigation.50 ςrνll

The rules of evidence allow the courts to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt.51 It may be
the basis of a conviction so long as the combination of all the circumstances proven produces a logical conclusion which
suffices to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.52 All the circumstances must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the theory that all the accused are guilty of the offense charged, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that they are innocent and with every other possible, rational hypothesis except that of
guilt.53 The evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis which may be consistent with their innocence.54 Also, it
should be acted on and weighed with great caution.55 Circumstantial evidence which has not been adequately
established, much less corroborated, cannot by itself be the basis of conviction.56 ςrνll

Thus, for circumstantial evidence to suffice, (1) there should be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.57 Like an ornate tapestry created out of interwoven fibers which cannot be
plucked out and assayed a strand at a time apart from the others, the circumstances proved should constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.58 The test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record are
sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of the circumstances proved must be consistent with the guilt of the
accused and inconsistent with his innocence.59 Accordingly, we have set guidelines in appreciating circumstantial
evidence:(1) it should be acted upon with caution; (2) all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of
guilt; (3) the facts must exclude every theory but that of guilt; and (4) the facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of
the accused as to convince the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who committed the
offense.60 ςrνll

Measured against the guidelines set, we cannot uphold the conviction of the accused based on the circumstantial
evidence presented.

The first circumstance which the prosecution sought to prove is that the accused were supposedly seen fleeing from the
locus criminis, armed with their respective weapons.Thus, the trial court, gleaning from the evidence presented, found
that [w]hen about to stand, Calsis saw Godofredo B. Ador, Diosdado B. Ador, Jr. and Diosdado B. Ador III, and a person
going to the direction of the house of the Adors which is about 500 meters away.61 In fact, prosecution witness Calsis
allegedly even saw Diosdado Jr. carrying a long firearm but x x x could not determine what kind of gun it was.62
However, the trial court acquitted Diosdado Jr.But only rightly so.For, Calsis had difficulty in identifying the Adors
notwithstanding his assertion that he knew and saw them personally.We defer to his direct examination

ATTY. TERBIO (Private Prosecutor) :ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Q.You said you recognized the persons running, could you tell us their names?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
11

PABLO CALSIS:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

A.Yes sir.

Q.Name them?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A.Godofredo Ador, Jr., Sadang III.

Q.How about the others?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A.I could not tell his name but if I see him I could identify him.

Q.The 4 persons whom you saw that night, if they are present in court, please point them out?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A.Yes sir.

Q.Point particularly Godofredo Ador, Jr.?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A.(Witness pointed or tapped the shoulder of a person inside the courtroom who answered by the name Diosdado Ador,
Jr.)

Q.How about this Sadang III?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A.(Witness tapped the shoulder of a man who answered by the name of Diosdado Ador III.)

Q.Likewise, point to the third person?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A.(Witness pointed to a man)

COURT:

Delete that portion from the record, he is not on trial.

ATTY TERBIO:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Q.You said you saw 4 persons, is the fourth one inside the courtroom?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A.None sir.

Q.But if you saw that person, will you be able to recognize him?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A.Yes sir.

Q.Why do you know these persons whom you just tapped the shoulder?

x x xx x xx x x

A.I know these persons having lived in the house of Lola Kising.

Q.How far?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A.Around 100 meters.

Q.On the said date and time and place, you said you saw them running, how far were you from them?
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A.Around 10 meters. (Emphases supplied)63 ςrνll

The testimony of Calsis, if at all, could hardly be used against Diosdado III whom he miserably failed to positively identify
during trial.In fact, the acquittal of Diosdado Jr. by the trial court renders the entire testimony of Calsis in serious
doubt.Calsis was presented to positively identify the assailants who were supposedly personally known to him and were
just ten (10) meters away from him.It puzzles us no end why he cannot even identify the Adors in open court.
12

Thus, despite Calsis assertion that Diosdado Jr. was one of the assailants, the trial court doubted him and gave credence
to the alibi of Diosdado Jr. that the latter was in Nangka, Marikina, when the killings took place.The trial court favored
the unbiased testimony of Aspe who said that Diosdado Jr. worked as a timekeeper and warehouseman with him at the
Consuelo Construction at Nangka, Marikina, from February 15, 1997, until March 22, 1997, and went home to Pacol only
on May 27, 1997.This ruling is strengthened by the fact that on the morning following the killings, all the male members
of the Ador family were brought to the police headquarters for paraffin examination and Diosdado Jr. was not among
them.64 We thus respect the finding of the trial court that indeed Diosdado Jr. was not at the scene of the crime absent
any indication that the lower court overlooked some facts or circumstances which if considered would alter the outcome
of the case.65 ςrνll

While it is true that the courts are not bound to accept or reject an entire testimony, and may believe one part and
disbelieve another,66 our Constitution and the law mandate that all doubts must be resolved in favor of the
accused.Calsis committed an obvious blunder in identifying the supposed assailants which this Court cannot simply let
go.On the contrary, it creates reasonable doubt in our minds if Calcis really saw the persons he allegedly saw or if he was
even where he said he was that evening.For, it is elementary that the positive identification of the accused is crucial in
establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.That is wanting in the instant case.

What is more, Calsis asseverations, at the outset, could no longer be used against Godofredo since both the prosecution
and the defense have already rested and the case against Godofredo was already submitted for decision when Calsis
was presented.67 Neither can they still be used against Diosdado Jr. who was already acquitted by the trial court.

Both Diosdado III and Godofredo denied the charges hurled against them.But, while it is true that alibi and denial are the
weakest of the defenses as they can easily be fabricated,68 absent such clear and positive identification, the doctrine
that the defense of denial cannot prevail over positive identification of the accused must yield to the constitutional
presumption of innocence.69 Hence, while denial is concededly fragile and unstable, the conviction of the accused
cannot be based thereon.70 The rule in criminal law is firmly entrenched that verdicts of conviction must be predicated
on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense.71 ςrνll

The second circumstance is the handgun turned in by Godofredo.But this was bungled by the prosecution.Major Idian,
Deputy Chief of Police of the Naga City Police Station, to whom the handgun was turned over after Godofredo
surrendered it, identified it as a caliber .38 revolver, thus

ATTY TERBIO (Private Prosecutor) :ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Q.What kind of firearm was it?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

MAJOR IDIAN:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

A.Revolver handgun, caliber .38 with 6 rounds ammunition.

Q.What is the caliber?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A..38 caliber.72 ςrνll

Similarly, PO3 Nepomuceno who then had been with the PNP for eight (8) years already and to whom Godofredo turned
in the handgun, likewise identified it as a caliber .38, thus

ATTY TERBIO (Private Prosecutor) :ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Q.What is the caliber of that gun?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

PO3 NEPOMUCENO:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

A..38 caliber.73 ςrνll

However, Insp. Fulgar, Chief of the Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified that [t]he
indorsement coming from the City Prosecutors Office x x x alleged that the .38 caliber live bullet was fired from a .38
caliber revolver.But our office found out that the firearm was not a .38 caliber revolver but a .357 caliber revolver.74
ςrνll
13

Could it be that the handgun was replaced before it was turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory?While the
prosecution traced the trail of police officers who at every stage held the gun supposedly recovered from Godofredo, it
never clarified this discrepancy which is quite glaring to ignore.It is difficult to believe that a Deputy Chief of Police and a
police officer of eight (8) years will both mistake a .357 caliber for a .38 caliber handgun.Likewise, a Chief of the Firearm
Identification Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory cannot be presumed not to know the difference between the two (2)
handguns.Suffice it to say that the prosecution failed to clear up the variance and for this Court to suggest an
explanation would be to venture into the realm of pure speculation, conjecture and guesswork.Thus, faced with the
obvious disparity in the suspected firearm used in the crime and that which was turned over by Godofredo, his
declaration that the handgun presented in court was different from the gun he gave to the police deserves serious, if not
sole consideration.

Consequently, even the third circumstance, the .38 caliber slug supposedly recovered from the head of the victim three
(3) days after the autopsy was conducted loses evidentiary value as its source is now highly questionable.It has become
uncertain whether the deformed slug was fired from the .38 caliber revolver turned in by Godofredo or from a .357
caliber handgun as attested to by the Chief of the Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory.

Neither can this Court rely on the dying declaration of the dying Chavez nor on the results of the paraffin tests to convict
either Diosdado III or Godofredo or both.To refute these, we need not go far and beyond the 13 May 1998 Order of the
trial court partially granting the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused

The only direct evidence introduced by the prosecution is the testimony of Mercy Beria, that she heard Rodolfo Ompong
Chavez say tinambangan kami na Ador (We were ambushed by the Adors) .Sad to say, no specific name was ever
mentioned by the witness.Neither was she able to tell how many (persons) Adors were involved.This testimony if it will
be given credence may inculpate any person with the family name Ador as assailant.The prosecution therefore was not
able to establish with moral certainty as to who of the Adors were perpetrators of the offense x x x x Paraffin tests are
not conclusive evidence that indeed a person has fired a gun.

The fact that the accused-appellants tested positive of gunpowder nitrates does not conclusively show that they fired
the murder weapon, or a gun for that matter, for such forensic evidence should be taken only as an indication of
possibility or even of probability, but not of infallibility, since nitrates are also admittedly found in substances other than
gunpowder. (People v. Abellarosa, G.R. No. 121195, 27 November 1996; People v. de Guzman, 250 SCRA 118; People v.
Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283)75 ςrνll

Thus, while a dying declaration may be admissible in evidence, it must identify with certainty the assailant.Otherwise, it
loses its significance.Also, while a paraffin test could establish the presence or absence of nitrates on the hand, it cannot
establish that the source of the nitrates was the discharge of firearms a person who tests positive may have handled one
or more substances with the same positive reaction for nitrates such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers,
pharmaceuticals, tobacco and leguminous plants.76 In People v. Melchor, 77 this Court acquitted the accused despite
the presence of gunpowder nitrates on his hands

[S]cientific experts concur in the view that the result of a paraffin test is not conclusive.While it can establish the
presence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand, it does not always indubitably show that said nitrates or nitrites were
caused by the discharge of firearm.The person tested may have handled one or more of a number of substances which
give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, pharmaceuticals and leguminous
plants such as peas, beans and alfalfa.A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands
since these substances are present in the products of combustion of tobacco.The presence of nitrates or nitrites,
therefore, should be taken only as an indication of a possibility but not of infallibility that the person tested has fired a
gun.

In fine, the admissions made by Godofredo to Major Idian and PO3 Nepomuceno including the gun in question cannot
be considered in evidence against him without violating his constitutional right to counsel.Godofredo was already under
custodial investigation when he made his admissions and surrendered the gun to the police authorities.The police had
already begun to focus on the Adors and were carrying out a process of interrogations that was lending itself to eliciting
incriminating statements and evidence: the police went to the Ador residence that same evening upon being informed
that the Adors had a long-standing grudge against the Cuyas; the following day, all the male members of the Ador family
were told to go to the police station; the police was also informed of the dying declaration of deceased Chavez pointing
14

to the Adors as the assailants; the Adors were all subjected to paraffin examination; and, there were no other suspects
as the police was not considering any other person or group of persons.The investigation thus was no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime as the Adors were already being held as suspects for the killings of Cuya and Chavez.

Consequently, the rights of a person under custodial investigation, including the right to counsel, have already attached
to the Adors, and pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 12(1) and (3), 1987 Constitution, any waiver of these rights should be in
writing and undertaken with the assistance of counsel.Admissions under custodial investigation made without the
assistance of counsel are barred as evidence.78 The records are bare of any indication that the accused have waived
their right to counsel, hence, any of their admissions are inadmissible in evidence against them.As we have held, a
suspects confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when taken without the assistance of counsel without a valid waiver
of such assistance regardless of the absence of such coercion, or the fact that it had been voluntarily given, is
inadmissible in evidence, even if such confession were gospel truth.79 Thus, in Aballe v. People,80 the death weapon, a
four-inch kitchen knife, which was found after the accused brought the police to his house and pointed to them the pot
where he had concealed it, was barred from admission as it was discovered as a consequence of an uncounseled
extrajudicial confession.

With hardly any substantial evidence left, the prosecution likewise played up the feud between the Adors on one hand
and the Chavezes and the Cuyas on the other hand, and suggested that the Adors had an axe to grind against the
Chavezes and the Cuyas.For sure, motive is not sufficient to support a conviction if there is no other reliable evidence
from which it may reasonably be adduced that the accused was the malefactor.81 Motive alone cannot take the place of
proof beyond reasonable doubt sufficient to overthrow the presumption of innocence.82 ςrνll

All told, contrary to the pronouncements of the trial court, we cannot rest easy in convicting the two (2) accused based
on circumstantial evidence.For, the pieces of the said circumstantial evidence presented do not inexorably lead to the
conclusion that they are guilty.83 The prosecution witness failed to identify the accused in court.A cloud of doubt
continues to hover over the gun used and the slug recovered.The dying declaration and paraffin examination remain
unreliable. Godofredos uncounseled admissions including the gun he turned in are barred as evidence.And, the
supposed motive of the accused is simply insufficient.Plainly, the facts from which the inference that the accused
committed the crime were not proven.Accordingly, the guilt of the accused cannot be established, more so to a moral
certainty.It is when evidence is purely circumstantial that the prosecution is much more obligated to rely on the strength
of its own case and not on the weakness of the defense, and that conviction must rest on nothing less than moral
certainty.84 ςrνll

Consequently, the case of the prosecution has been reduced to nothing but mere suspicions and speculations.It is
hornbook doctrine that suspicions and speculations can never be the basis of conviction in a criminal case.85 Courts
must ensure that the conviction of the accused rests firmly on sufficient and competent evidence, and not the results of
passion and prejudice.86 If the alleged inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two (2) or more explanations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence
is not adequate to support conviction.87 The court must acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the
test of moral certainty and is therefore insufficient to support a judgment of conviction.88 Conviction must rest on
nothing less than a moral certainty of the guilt of the accused.89 The overriding consideration is not whether the court
doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.90 It is thus apropos to
repeat the doctrine that an accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt the prosecution
must overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.The prosecution has failed
to discharge its burden.Accordingly, we have to acquit.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Br. 25, in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-
6816 dated August 2, 1999, finding accused-appellants Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder and imposing on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Accused-appellants Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III are ACQUITTED on reasonable
doubt and their IMMEDIATE RELEASE is hereby ORDERED unless they are being held for some other legal cause.

SO ORDERED.
15

Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and TINGA, JJ., concur.

People v. Ador
432 SCRA 1
June 14, 2004
Second Division: Puno, J.
Facts:
In convicting accused of murder, the trial court relied on the circumstances, namely:
1. that he was seen fleeing from the crime scene,
2. that he allegedly surrendered a handgun,
3. that the slug taken from the head of the victim was fired from the gun he surrendered,
4. that the victim made a dying declaration identifying him, and
5. that paraffin test showed that he was positive for gun powder.
Issue:
Is the conviction proper?
Held:
No. For circumstantial evidence to suffice,
1. there should be more than one circumstance;
2. the facts from which the inference are derived are proven and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, the following are the guidelines in appreciating circumstantial evidence:
1. it should be acted upon with caution;
2. all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt;
3. the facts must exclude every theory but that of guilt; and
4. the facts must establish such certainty of guilt as to convince the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt that
the accused is the one who committed the offense.
Measured against these guidelines, the conviction cannot stand for the following reasons:
1. the testimony of the prosecution witness that he saw accused fleeing from the crime scene is doubtful;
2. the gun surrendered by the accused does not appear to be the same gun presented during trial;
3. if the gun is not the same, it is uncertain where the slug taken from the head of the victim came from;
4. the dying declaration which mentioned only the "Adors" can refer to anyone with that family name; and
5. scientific experts concur in the view that the result of a paraffin test is not conclusive.
Plainly, the facts from which the inference that the accused committed the crime were not proven. Accordingly,
the guilt of the accused was not established with moral certainty.

G.R. No. 140679             January 14, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
MANNY A. DOMINGCIL, appellant.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

For the sale and delivery of one (1) kilo of marijuana to a poseur-buyer, the appellant Manny Domingcil was charged
before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16, for violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425 in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 12th day of August, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, not authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell and deliver mixed dried marijuana leaves, tops and seeds in brick form, wrapped with paper
placed in a plastic bag, a prohibited drug, weighing 800 grams, to a poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation
conducted by Police Officers of Laoag City, in violation of the aforesaid law.1

Upon arraignment on August 29, 1994, the appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged.2 The case thereafter proceeded to trial.

The Case for the Prosecution

On August 12, 1994, at around 11:00 a.m., Belrey Oliver, an employee of Ferd’s Upholstery Shop located in
Barangay 2, Laoag City, arrived at the Laoag Police Station. He reported to Chief Investigator SPO4 Rodrigo
16

Ventura that the appellant went to their shop looking for a buyer of marijuana. Oliver recounted telling the appellant
that he knew of someone who was interested and ready to buy marijuana, and instructing him to bring one (1) kilo of
the substance to a store located in front of the Divine Word College of Laoag at General Segundo Avenue, Laoag
City at around 1:30 p.m. of that same day.3

Acting on the said report, SPO4 Ventura formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation against the appellant. He
assigned SPO1 Orlando Dalusong as the poseur-buyer, and SPO2 Marlin Ramos, SPO2 Warlito Maruquin, SPO1
Rovimanuel Balolong, SPO1 Loreto Ancheta, and SPO2 Rosemarie Agustin, all assigned at the Investigation
Section of the Laoag Police Station as back-up. The marked "buy-money" consisting of one P500-bill bearing Serial
No. G-242745 was recorded in the police blotter in accordance with standard operating procedure.4

Except for SPO1 Dalusong and Oliver, the rest of the team left the precinct on board two (2) owner-type jeeps and
posted themselves near the Macmac Store, across the gate of the Divine Word College. Five minutes later, SPO1
Dalusong and Oliver arrived at General Segundo Avenue.5 Oliver immediately approached the appellant, who was
then standing between the Macmac Store and a xerox center, and introduced poseur-buyer SPO1 Dalusong, who
was sporting casual clothes and slippers: "Pare, daytoy tay gumatangen" ("Friend, this is the buyer"). At this point,
the appellant who was carrying an orange plastic bag, brought out a brick-like item wrapped in newspaper. He
handed the item to SPO1 Dalusong, who forthwith checked the same by making a small hole through it. Convinced
that the brick-like item was indeed marijuana, SPO1 Dalusong handed the P500 bill to the appellant. He thereupon
scratched his head, a signal to the back-up men that the transaction had been consummated.6 Momentarily, the
back-up officers, who had earlier positioned themselves separately in different strategic locations near the poseur-
buyer, rushed to the scene and arrested the appellant. SPO1 Dalusong then handed the orange plastic bag
containing the suspected marijuana to SPO4 Ventura. SPO2 Ramos frisked the appellant and recovered the buy-
money from the latter’s pocket. Thereafter, the appellant was brought to the headquarters where he was booked,
and the incident was recorded in the police blotter.7 The suspected marijuana was brought to and initially examined
by Dr. Joseph Adaya, an accredited physician of the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB), who certified that the item
comprised of three genuine mixture of marijuana leaves with seeds.8

On September 5, 1994, SPO4 Ventura sent a letter to the Commanding Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory
Service, Camp Diego Silang, San Fernando, La Union, requesting for the examination of samples of the suspected
marijuana taken from the appellant.9 On September 6, 1998, SPO1 Loreto Ancheta, evidence custodian of the
Laoag City, PNP, delivered the orange plastic bag containing the suspected marijuana to the PNP provincial crime
laboratory service in Camp Juan, Laoag City. The bag, together with SPO4 Ventura’s letter-request, was received
by SPO3 Diosdado Mamotos.10 On September 8, 1994, SPO3 Mamotos forwarded the laboratory request and the
confiscated item, and were duly received by SPO4 Tampos.11 The latter, in turn, handed the item to Police
Superintendent Theresa Ann B. Cid, Forensic Chemist of the Crime Laboratory Center, Region I, Camp Diego
Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union, who conducted an examination of representative samples extracted from
the suspected marijuana confiscated from the appellant.12 On the basis of her examination, Superintendent Cid
issued Chemistry Report No. D-074-94 with the following findings:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

One (1) block of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing eight hundred grams (800) wrapped with
newspaper pages contained in an orange plastic bag.

...

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of marijuana on the above-mentioned specimen.

F I N D I N G S:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen prove POSITIVE result to the
test for marijuana, a prohibited drug.13

The Case for the Appellant

The appellant interposed the twin defenses of denial and alibi. He testified that sometime in the first week of August
1994, he and Ernesto Gamiao went to the City of Laoag to canvass the price for the repair of the upholstery of a
passenger jeepney. On that occasion, they befriended a certain Belrey Oliver who was an employee of the Ferd’s
Upholstery Shop. In the course of their conversation, Oliver asked the appellant where he came from and what his
occupation was. Upon being told that he helped in harvesting mangoes in Cagayan, Oliver immediately offered
refreshments to Gamiao and the appellant. While taking their snacks, Oliver inquired whether they wanted to back
up the promotion of certain policemen who, in the future, might be able to return the favor to them. When the
appellant asked in what way they could extend help, Oliver suggested that they look for somebody in Cagayan from
whom they could buy one (1) kilo of marijuana. He agreed to Oliver’s suggestion. The latter handed to him the
17

amount of P700.00 to cover the purchase of the marijuana. The appellant immediately went to the terminal bound
for Cagayan to look for somebody from that province who could be of help. When he could not find anyone, he
decided to personally take the trip. He then instructed Gamiao to just go home to Vintar and inform his mother that
he was going to Cagayan.

The appellant thereafter took a bus bound for Tuguegarao, Cagayan. After three (3) days, he was able to buy one
kilo of marijuana for P300.00. When he returned to Laoag City on August 12, 1994, he went to Ferd’s Upholstery
Shop at 11:30 a.m. to inform Oliver that he had procured the order. After seeing the marijuana, Oliver instructed him
to take it and meet him at about 12:30 p.m. of the same day in front of the Divine Word College where they would
hand over the marijuana to the policemen they intended to help.

At about 12:00 noon, the appellant arrived at Macmac’s Store and took his merienda. Momentarily, Oliver arrived
alone on a tricycle. Oliver summoned him and they walked southward, away from the Macmac’s Store, looking for
the policemen to whom they would deliver the marijuana. They walked back northward, at which point they
encountered an owner-type jeep which suddenly stopped. He was nonplussed when Oliver grabbed him by the
neck, seized his knapsack containing the marijuana, and pushed him inside the jeep. He was made to sit beside the
driver with another policeman, while Oliver seated himself at the back seat with another policeman. The jeep they
were riding was followed by a patrol car. Still dazed at the sudden turn of events, he asked Oliver four times, "Why
is it that this is now happening to me(?)," but Oliver did not respond. At the police station, he was immediately
locked up. That afternoon, SPO4 Ventura and SPO2 Ramos, accompanied by Oliver, brought him to the City
Fiscal’s Office. He was later brought to the provincial hospital where he was subjected to a physical check-up. That
was the last time he saw or heard of Oliver.14

On July 9, 1999, the court a quo rendered judgment,15 the dispositive portion of which reads :

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court is morally convinced beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused Manny Domingcil is GUILTY under Sec. 4 of Art. II, RA No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The quantity of marijuana involved is more than 750 grams; hence, in
accordance with Sec. 20, the penalty provided for in Sec. 4, shall be applied. The accused is hereby
sentenced to reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties and to pay the costs.

Hence, the present appeal.

The appellant submits the following assignment of errors:

1. The lower Court erred in finding that the accused was not instigated in looking for marijuana and bringing
it to Laoag.

2. The lower Court erred in finding that the accused received the FIVE HUNDRED PESO bill, despite his
denial that he received the same and that his denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of the police
officers who are presumed to be regularly performing their official duties, there being no improper motive
attributed to them.

3. The lower Court erred in convicting the accused.16

The appellant contends that contrary to the collective testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Oliver instigated him
to buy marijuana. The trial court erred in not giving credence and probative weight to his testimony and in
considering the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution.

The appeal has no merit.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to
the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. The reason for this rule is that the trial court is in a better
position to decide thereon, having personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.17 After a thorough and careful review of the records of this case, we find that the guilt of the
appellant was sufficiently established by the evidence, and the trial court’s judgment is well-supported by law and
jurisprudence.

What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.18 In this case, the prosecution adduced proof
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant sold one (1) kilo of marijuana to poseur-buyer SPO1 Orlando Dalusong
in the entrapment operation.

Q   How has the case involving drug or marijuana involving the accused brought to your attention or to your
office, for that matter?
18

A   Our informant by the name of Belrey Oliver tipped of (sic) to us that he met Manny Domingcil at the
Upholstery Shop along Ablan Avenue and he also informed us that he ordered P500.00 worth of marijuana.

Q   Who ordered from whom?

A   Belrey Oliver from Manny Domingcil, sir.

Q   By the way, who was the chief of the Intelligence Section of Laoag City PNP, at that time?

A   SPO4 Ventura, sir.

Q   Was he present when the informant Belrey Oliver tipped you of (sic) about this matter?

A   Yes, sir.

Q   And because of that information from Belrey Oliver, what did your Chief, SPO4 Ventura do?

A   SPO4 Ventura made or designed a plan purposely to conduct a buy-bust operation, sir.

Q   Where will the operation take place?

A   In front of Macmac Store, particularly, in front of the Divine Word College of Laoag, sir.

Q   And did you have any participation in that operation?

A   Yes, sir, I acted as the poseur buy (sic).

Q   At what time was the operation scheduled to be executed?

A   1:30 P.M. of August 12, 1994, sir.

Q   For the said operation, what preparations, if any, did your group take?

A   Our Chief of Intelligence made a plan, sir.

Q   What was the plan?

A   To conduct the buy-bust operation, sir.

Q   And you said that you were to act as poseur buyer, anything was given to you in connection with your
specific participation?

A   I was given the buy-bust money in the amount of P500.00, sir.

Q   And what will you do with that P500.00?

A   The Chief of Intelligence, SPO4 Ventura directed me to reflect the serial number of the money in the
police blotter, the P500.00 to be used as marked money.

Q   And after the serial number was entered in the police blotter, what next did you do?

A   Before we went out of the station, the team or companions of SPO4 Ventura went ahead to the place
where the transaction will take place, sir.

Q   And who were the companions of SPO4 Ventura who went ahead?

A   Rosemarie Agustin, SPO2 Marlin Ramos and SPO4 Balolong, sir, while Oliver and myself were the ones
who went together.

Q   Who went ahead to the place where the sale will take place?

A   The team of SPO4 Ventura, sir.

Q   And did you reach the place where the transaction will take place?
19

A   Yes, sir.

Q   Before you started to the place where the transaction will take place in front of the Divine Word College
of Laoag, did you know then the face of Manny Domingcil?

A   No, sir.

Q   How did you know his face then?

A   Belrey Oliver, the informant, informed me that the person is Manny Domingcil.

Q   So, what you are saying is: when you arrived at the scene where the transaction would take place,
Manny Domingcil was already there and that Belrey Oliver pointed him to you?

A   Yes, sir.

Q   After that, what did you do with Belrey Oliver?

A   We went near Manny Domingcil, sir.

Q   And after or as soon as you were near him, what happened next?

A   Belrey Oliver introduced Manny Domingcil to me as the buyer, sir.

Q   What did Oliver say?

A   "Pare, daytoy tay gumatangen", (which when translated into english[sic] means): "Pare, this is the
buyer."

Q   And so, what was the reaction of Manny Domingcil?

A   Before that I asked Manny Domingcil if he has the stuff that was ordered.

Q   And what did he say?

A   Manny Domingcil said: "There is, Pare."

Q   By the way, who ordered the stuff from Manny Domingcil?

A   Belrey Oliver, sir.

Q   Did you ask Oliver where he ordered that from Manny Domingcil?

A   Yes, sir.

Q   Where?

A   At the Upholstery Shop at Ablan Avenue, sir.

Q   That was what Oliver told you when he ordered the stuff?

A   Yes, sir.

Q   When Manny Domingcil said: "There is, pare," what transpired next, if any?

A   I told him: "Can I look at it" and he brought out a wrapped brick-type form wrapped in a newspaper inside
an orange plastic bag.

Q   And after he had brought out the said thing, what did you do with it?

A   I checked the contents if it is real marijuana, sir.

Q   You said the thing was wrapped with newspaper and you said you checked its contents?
20

A   Yes, sir, I opened the wrapper, by making a small hole at the side.

Q   And what was the result of your inspection?

A   I found out that it was real marijuana, sir.

Q   And, so what did you do then?

A   After I found out that it was marijuana I handed to Manny Domingcil the P500 peso bill, sir.

Q   And as soon as you have handed the P500.00 bill, what did you do next?

A   I gave the signal to my companions, sir.

Q   And what did your companions do when you gave the signal?

A   They apprehended Manny Domingcil, sir.

Q   What was your signal?

A   I scratched my head, sir.

Q   And, what was your attire at that time you bought the brick-type marijuana from Manny Domingcil?

A   Ordinary clothes, sir, wearing slippers.

Q   And all the time during your transaction with Manny Domingcil, where was Belrey Oliver?

A   At my side, sir.

Q   And during the transaction, did Belrey Oliver say anything?

A   None, sir.

Q   And after giving your signal to your companion police officers who were nearby and they rushed to your
place where you were, what happened?

A   They apprehended Manny Domingcil, sir.

Q   And what about the marijuana which you said Manny Domingcil sold to you?

A   I handed it to SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura, sir.

Q   And what about the P500 peso bill, do you know what happened to it?

A   SPO2 Marlin Ramos recovered the P500 peso bill from the pocket of Manny Domingcil.

Q   And after arresting Manny Domingcil where did your group go?

A   To the police station, sir.

Q   Do you know if any records were made to your police station when you returned or arrived there?

A   Yes, sir.

Q   What for example?

A   They made a request ... we reflected in the police blotter the apprehension of Manny Domingcil, the
confiscation of the marijuana and the recovery of the marked money in the amount of P500.00.

Q   Was the serial number of the P500 bill you recovered from the pocket of Manny Domingcil recorded?

A   Yes, sir.
21

Q   And do you know what happened to the stuff later on after you returned to the police station?

A   They made a request to Dr. Adaya to conduct an initial examination on the confiscated marijuana, sir.19

The foregoing testimony of SPO1 Orlando Dalusong was corroborated on material points by SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura,
then Chief of the Intelligence Section of the PNP of Laoag City who organized and conducted the operation and was
part of the buy-bust team itself.20 SPO4 Ventura remained steadfast and unwavering on cross-examination despite
intense grilling by the defense counsel.21

Police Superintendent Theresa Ann Cid, the Forensic Chemist assigned at the PNP Crime Laboratory Center at San
Fernando, La Union, confirmed22 Dr. Joseph Adaya’s initial finding23 that the substance seized from the appellant
was indeed marijuana, a prohibited drug.

It was also fairly established by SPO3 Diosdado Mamotos24 and SPO1 Loreto Ancheta25 that the confiscated
marijuana was the same substance examined by the forensic chemist and later presented as evidence in court.

The testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses complement each other, giving a complete picture of how the
appellant’s illegal sale of the prohibited drug transpired, and how the sale led to his apprehension in flagrante
delicto. Their testimonies establish beyond doubt that dangerous drugs were in the possession of the appellant who
had no authority to possess or sell the same. More importantly, all the persons who obtained and received the
confiscated stuff did so in the performance of their official duties. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that
the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty,
their testimonies on the buy-bust operation deserve full faith and credit.26

The appellant’s bare denial of the crime charged and his barefaced claim that he was merely instigated by Oliver
into procuring the marijuana cannot prevail over the straightforward and positive testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. It is incredible that the appellant, who had just met Belrey Oliver in the course of his canvass for the
upholstery of his brother’s jeepney, would readily leave his errand behind and allow a stranger to talk him into
buying a prohibited drug, a known criminal activity for which he could be prosecuted, and if convicted, sentenced
to reclusion perpetua. All this he was willing to risk, in exchange for an empty promise of alleged future favors from
another who was also unknown to the appellant. The appellant supposedly traveled to and spent almost three days
in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, just to be able to accommodate a newly found acquaintance, who handed the appellant
the meager sum of P700.00 for the intended purpose. The Court cannot give credence to such a preposterous
stance as advanced by the appellant and confirmed by his supposed corroborative witness, Ernesto Gamiao.

It is axiomatic that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but must also be credible in itself such that common experience and observation of mankind lead to the
inference of its probability under the circumstances. In criminal prosecution, the court is always guided by evidence
that is tangible, verifiable and in harmony with the usual course of human experience and not by mere conjecture or
speculation. Testimonies that do not adhere to this standard are necessarily accorded little weight or
credence.27 Besides, instigation, or the appellant’s claim of a frame-up, is a defense that has been invariably viewed
by this Court with disfavor because the same can easily be concocted and is a common standard defense ploy in
most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.28 Thus, in People vs. Bongalon,29 the Court held:

As we have earlier stated, the appellant’s denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. We are not unaware of the perception that, in some instances, law enforcers resort
to the practice of planting evidence to extract information or even to harass civilians. However, like alibi,
frame-up is a defense that has been viewed by the Court with disfavor as it can easily be, concocted, hence,
commonly used as a standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. We realize the disastrous consequences on the enforcement of law and order, not to mention the
well-being of society, if the courts, solely on the basis of the policemen’s alleged rotten reputation, accept in
every instance this form of defense which can be so easily fabricated. It is precisely for this reason that the
legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed exists.

The failure of the prosecution to present Oliver, the police informant, does not enfeeble the case for the
prosecution. Informants are almost always never presented in court because of the need to preserve their
invaluable service to the police. Their testimony or identity may be dispensed with inasmuch as his or her
narration would be merely corroborative, especially so in this case, when the poseur-buyer himself testified
on the sale of the illegal drug.30

The appellant’s claim that the prosecution offered in evidence a mere xerox copy of the P500.00 buy money and did
not account for its failure to adduce in evidence the original copy thereof is not supported by the records. The
records show that the original, and not merely a xerox copy of the marked money, was in fact offered in evidence by
the prosecution.31 The appellant would surely have objected if the prosecution had offered in evidence a mere xerox
copy of the bill. The appellant did not do so. The only ground for his objection to the admission of the marked money
was that it was self-serving.
22

Even if the xerox copy of the P500.00 bill was erroneously admitted in evidence by the trial court, the absence of the
original of the marked money is inconsequential. The marked money used in the buy-bust operation is not
indispensable in drug cases;32 it is merely corroborative evidence. Moreover, the appellant was charged not only for
the sale of marijuana but also for the delivery thereof, which is committed by the mere delivery or transfer of the
prohibited drug. The consideration for the transaction is of no moment.33

The law defines deliver as "a person’s act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another with or without
consideration."34 Considering that the appellant was charged with the sale and the delivery of prohibited drugs, the
consummation of the crime of delivery of marijuana may be sufficiently established even in the absence of the
marked money. The erasures and alterations in the Joint Affidavit of the policemen involved in the buy-bust
operation did not debilitate the case of the prosecution. First. The Joint Affidavit of the policemen was not admitted
in evidence for any party. Second. The investigator who prepared the "Joint Affidavit" erroneously stated that the
two P500.00 bills were used by the policemen who conducted the buy-bust operation bearing Serial Numbers
AA823675 and G242745. As shown by the prosecution’s evidence the policemen used only the P500.00 bill bearing
Serial No. G242745 for the purchase of the drug. Hence, the "Joint Affidavit" of the policemen had to be corrected to
reflect the truth.

All told, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty is, in this case, uncontradicted by evidence to the
contrary and, therefore, stands. This is bolstered by the fact that the prosecution’s evidence fully shows and
confirms such regularity. Accordingly, there exists no cogent reason to reverse or even modify the findings of the
trial court giving credence to the evidence of the prosecution.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16, in
Criminal Case No. 7079, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

BRIG. GEN. LUTHER A. CUSTODIO* v. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR NOS. 96027-28, 2005-03-08

Facts:
a Motion To Re-Open Case With Leave Of Court filed by petitioners who were convicted and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua by the Sandiganbayan... for the double murder of Senator Benigno Aquino,... Jr. and
Rolando Galman on August 21, 1983.
Petitioners were members of the military who acted as Senator Aquino's security detail upon his arrival in
Manila
They were charged,... for the killing of Senator Aquino who was fatally shot as he was coming down from
the aircraft of China Airlines at the Manila International Airport.  Petitioners were also indicted for the
killing of Rolando Galman who was also gunned down at the airport... tarmac.
Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision... acquitting all the accused
However, the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan were later found by this Court to be a sham trial. 
The Court thus... nullified said proceedings, as well as the judgment of acquittal, and ordered a re-trial of
the cases.
A re-trial ensued before the Sandiganbayan.
In its decision
Sandiganbayan,... found the petitioners guilty as principals of the crime of murder in both Criminal Cases
The judgment became final after this Court denied petitioners' petition for review... as well as their
subsequent motion for... reconsideration.
petitioners,... assisted by the Public Attorney's Office, now want to present the findings of the forensic
group... to... ask the Court to allow the re-opening of the cases and the holding of a third trial to determine
the circumstances surrounding the death of
Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman.
Petitioners invoke... grounds for the re-opening of the case:
23

I
Existence of newly discovered pieces of evidence that were not available during the second trial of the
above-entitled cases which could have altered the judgment of the Sandiganbayan, specifically:
A) Independent forensic evidence uncovering the false forensic claims that led to the unjust conviction of
the petitioners-movants.
B) A key defense eyewitness to the actual killing of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr.
Petitioners seek to present as new evidence the findings of the forensic group
Their report essentially concludes that it was not possible, based on the forensic study of the evidence in
the double murder case, that C1C Rogelio
Moreno fired at Senator Aquino as they descended the service stairway from the aircraft.
They posit that Senator Aquino was shot while he was walking on the airport tarmac
This is contrary to the finding of the Sandiganbayan in the second trial that it was C1C Moreno, the
security escort positioned behind Senator Aquino, who shot the latter.
Petitioners submit that the review by the forensic... group of the physical evidence in the double murder
case constitutes newly discovered evidence which would entitle them to a new trial under Rule 121 of the
2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Sandiganbayan decision... shows a thorough study by the court of the forensic evidence presented during
the trial
Issues:
whether petitioners are entitled to a third trial under Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Ruling:
Under the Rules, a person convicted of a crime may avail of the remedy of new trial before the judgment
of conviction becomes final.  Petitioners admit that the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases...
became final and executory
Nonetheless, they maintain that equitable considerations exist in this case to justify the... relaxation of the
Rules and re-open the case to accord petitioners the opportunity to present evidence that will exonerate
them from the charges against them.  We do not find merit in their submission.
on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
Court has repeatedly held that before a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, it must be shown (1) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that such evidence could...
not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that
it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight
that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.
If the... alleged newly discovered evidence could have been very well presented during the trial with the
exercise of reasonable diligence, the same cannot be considered newly discovered.
We have held that in order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded as newly
discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence offered first
sprang into existence nor the time... when it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it;
what is essential is that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such
evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.
we find that petitioners' purported evidence does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that would
justify the re-opening of the case and the holding of a third trial.
The report of the forensic group may not be considered as newly discovered evidence as petitioners failed
to show that it was impossible for them to secure an independent forensic study of the physical evidence
during the trial of the double murder case.  It appears... from their report that the forensic group used the
same physical and testimonial evidence proferred during the trial, but made their own analysis and
interpretation of said evidence.
These materials were available to the parties during the trial and there was nothing that prevented the
petitioners from using them at the time to support their theory that it was not the military, but Rolando
Galman, who killed Senator Aquino. Petitioners, in their present... motion, failed to present any new
24

forensic evidence that could not have been obtained by the defense at the time of the trial even with the
exercise of due diligence.
there was ample opportunity for them to do so before the case was finally submitted and decided.
If at all, it only serves to discredit the version of the prosecution which had already been weighed and
assessed, and thereafter upheld by the Sandiganbayan.
claim that they were denied due process because they were deprived of adequate legal assistance by
counsel.
it has been held that mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy,
materiality, or immateriality of a certain evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof are not
proper grounds for a new trial; and in general the client is... bound by the action of his counsel in the
conduct of his case, and can not be heard to complain that the result of the litigation might have been
different had counsel proceeded differently.
The report of the forensic group essentially reiterates the theory presented by the defense during the trial
of the double murder case.  Clearly, the report is not newly discovered, but rather recently sought, which
is not allowed by the Rules.
Certainly, a new trial will only be allowed if the new... evidence is of such weight that it would probably
change the judgment if admitted
Also, new trial will not be granted if the new evidence is merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching.
Principles:
the remedy of new trial has been described as "a new invention to temper the severity of a judgment or
prevent the failure of... justice."
Rules allow the courts to grant a new trial when there are errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused committed during the trial, or when there exists newly discovered
evidence.  In the... proceedings for new trial, the errors of law or irregularities are expunged from the
record or new evidence is introduced.  Thereafter, the original judgment is vacated and a new one is
rendered.
Due diligence contemplates that the defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in
light of the totality of the circumstances and the facts known to him.

G.R. Nos. 96027-28. March 08, 2005

BRIG. GEN. LUTHER A. CUSTODIO*, CAPT. ROMEO M. BAUTISTA, 2nd LT. JESUS D. CASTRO, SGT. CLARO L.
LAT, SGT. ARNULFO B. DE MESA, C1C ROGELIO B. MORENO, C1C MARIO E. LAZAGA, SGT. FILOMENO D.
MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO C. DE GUZMAN, SGT. ERNESTO M. MATEO, SGT. RODOLFO M. DESOLONG, A1C
CORDOVA G. ESTELO, MSGT. PABLO S. MARTINEZ, SGT. RUBEN AQUINO, SGT. ARNULFO ARTATES, A1C
FELIZARDO TARAN, Petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

Puno, J.:

Before us is a Motion To Re-Open Case With Leave Of Court filed by petitioners who were convicted and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 for the double murder of
Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman on August 21, 1983.[1]

Petitioners were members of the military who acted as Senator Aquino's security detail upon his arrival in Manila from
his three-year sojourn in the United States. They were charged, together with several other members of the military,
before the Sandiganbayan for the killing of Senator Aquino who was fatally shot as he was coming down from the
aircraft of China Airlines at the Manila International Airport. Petitioners were also indicted for the killing of Rolando
Galman who was also gunned down at the airport tarmac.

On December 2, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010-10011 acquitting all the
accused, which include the petitioners. However, the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan were later found by this
Court to be a sham trial. The Court thus nullified said proceedings, as well as the judgment of acquittal, and ordered a
re-trial of the cases.[2]

A re-trial ensued before the Sandiganbayan.

In its decision dated September 28, 1990, the Sandiganbayan, while acquitting the other accused, found the
petitioners guilty as principals of the crime of murder in both Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011. It sentenced
25

them to reclusion perpetua in each case.[3] The judgment became final after this Court denied petitioners' petition for
review of the Sandiganbayan decision for failure to show reversible error in the questioned decision,[4] as well as
their subsequent motion for reconsideration.[5]

In August 2004, petitioners sought legal assistance from the Chief Public Attorney who, in turn, requested the
Independent Forensic Group of the University of the Philippines to make a thorough review of the forensic evidence in
the double murder case. The petitioners, assisted by the Public Attorney's Office, now want to present the findings of
the forensic group to this Court and ask the Court to allow the re-opening of the cases and the holding of a third trial
to determine the circumstances surrounding the death of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman.

Petitioners invoke the following grounds for the re-opening of the case:

Existence of newly discovered pieces of evidence that were not available during the second trial of the above-entitled
cases which could have altered the judgment of the Sandiganbayan, specifically:

A) Independent forensic evidence uncovering the false forensic claims that led to the unjust conviction of the
petitioners-movants.

B) A key defense eyewitness to the actual killing of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr.

II

There was a grave violation of due process by reason of:

A) Insufficient legal assistance of counsel;

B) Deprivation of right to counsel of choice;

C) Testimonies of defense witnesses were under duress;

D) Willful suppression of evidence;

E) Use of false forensic evidence that led to the unjust conviction of the petitioners-movants.

III

There was serious misapprehension of facts on the part of the Sandiganbayan based on false forensic evidence, which
entitles petitioners-movants to a re-trial.[6]

Petitioners seek to present as new evidence the findings of the forensic group composed of Prof. Jerome B. Bailen, a
forensic anthropologist from the University of the Philippines, Atty. Erwin P. Erfe, M.D., a medico-legal practitioner,
Benito E. Molino, M.D., a forensic consultant and Human Rights and Peace Advocate, and Anastacio N. Rosete, Jr.,
D.M.D., a forensic dentistry consultant. Their report essentially concludes that it was not possible, based on the
forensic study of the evidence in the double murder case, that C1C Rogelio Moreno fired at Senator Aquino as they
descended the service stairway from the aircraft. They posit that Senator Aquino was shot while he was walking on
the airport tarmac toward the waiting AVSECOM van which was supposed to transport him from the airport to Fort
Bonifacio. This is contrary to the finding of the Sandiganbayan in the second trial that it was C1C Moreno, the security
escort positioned behind Senator Aquino, who shot the latter. The report also suggests that the physical evidence in
these cases may have been misinterpreted and manipulated to mislead the court. Thus, petitioners assert that the
September 28, 1990 decision of the Sandiganbayan should be voided as it was based on false forensic evidence.
Petitioners submit that the review by the forensic group of the physical evidence in the double murder case
constitutes newly discovered evidence which would entitle them to a new trial under Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. In addition to the report of the forensic group, petitioners seek to present the testimony of an
alleged eyewitness, the driver of the waiting AVSECOM van, SPO4 Ruben M. Cantimbuhan. In his affidavit submitted
to this Court, SPO4 Cantimbuhan states that he saw a man in blue uniform similar to that of the Philippine Airlines
maintenance crew, suddenly fire at Senator Aquino as the latter was about to board the van. The man in blue was
later identified as Rolando Galman.

Petitioners pray that the Court issue a resolution:

1. [a]nnulling and setting aside this Honorable Court's Resolutions dated July 23, 1991 and September 10, 1991;

2. [a]nnulling and setting aside the Decision of the Sandiganbayan (3rd Division) dated September 28, 1990 in People
vs. Custodio, et al., Case No. 10010-10011[;]

3. [o]rdering the re-opening of this case; [and]

26

4. [o]rdering the Sandiganbayan to allow the reception of additional defense evidence/re-trial in the above entitled
cases.[7] '

The issue now is whether petitioners are entitled to a third trial under Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

The pertinent sections of Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:

Section 1. New Trial or reconsideration. ' At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, the court
may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the consent of the accused, grant a new trial or
reconsideration.

Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. ' The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:

(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been committed during
the trial;

(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably
change the judgment.

xxx

Sec. 6. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. ' The effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration
are the following:

(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities committed during the trial, all the
proceedings and evidence affected thereby shall be set aside and taken anew. The court may, in the interest of
justice, allow the introduction of additional evidence.

(b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the evidence already adduced shall stand
and the newly-discovered and such other evidence as the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced
shall be taken and considered together with the evidence already in the record.

(c) In all cases, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the original judgment shall be set aside or vacated
and a new judgment rendered accordingly. (emphasis supplied)

In line with the objective of the Rules of Court to set guidelines in the dispensation of justice, but without shackling
the hands that dispense it, the remedy of new trial has been described as 'a new invention to temper the severity of a
judgment or prevent the failure of justice.[8] Thus, the Rules allow the courts to grant a new trial when there are
errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused committed during the trial, or when
there exists newly discovered evidence. In the proceedings for new trial, the errors of law or irregularities are
expunged from the record or new evidence is introduced. Thereafter, the original judgment is vacated and a new one
is rendered.[9]

Under the Rules, a person convicted of a crime may avail of the remedy of new trial before the judgment of conviction
becomes final. Petitioners admit that the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011
became final and executory upon denial of their petition for review filed before this Court and their motion for
reconsideration. Entry of judgment has in fact been made on September 30, 1991.[10] Nonetheless, they maintain
that equitable considerations exist in this case to justify the relaxation of the Rules and re-open the case to accord
petitioners the opportunity to present evidence that will exonerate them from the charges against them. We do not
find merit in their submission.

Petitioners anchor their motion on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Courts are generally reluctant in
granting motions for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence for it is presumed that the moving party
has had ample opportunity to prepare his case carefully and to secure all the necessary evidence before the trial. Such
motions are treated with great caution due to the danger of perjury and the manifest injustice of allowing a party
to allege that which may be the consequence of his own neglect to defeat an adverse judgment. Hence, the moving
party is often required to rebut a presumption that the judgment is correct and that there has been a lack of due
diligence, and to establish other facts essential to warrant the granting of a new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence.[11] This Court has repeatedly held that before a new trial may be granted on the ground of
newly discovered evidence, it must be shown (1) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) that such
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3)
that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it
would probably change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged newly discovered evidence could have been very well
presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the same cannot be considered newly discovered.
[12]

These standards, also known as the 'Berry rule, trace their origin to the 1851 case of Berry vs. State of
Georgia [13] where the Supreme Court of Georgia held:
27

Applications for new trial on account of newly discovered evidence, are not favored by the Courts. x x x Upon the
following points there seems to be a pretty general concurrence of authority, viz; that it is incumbent on a party who
asks for a new trial, on the ground of newly discovered evidence, to satisfy the Court, 1st. That the evidence has come
to his knowledge since the trial. 2d. That it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not come sooner.
3d. That it is so material that it would produce a different verdict, if the new trial were granted. 4th. That it is not
cumulative only ' viz; speaking to facts, in relation to which there was evidence on the trial. 5th. That the affidavit of
the witness himself should be produced, or its absence accounted for. And 6th, a new trial will not be granted, if the
only object of the testimony is to impeach the character or credit of a witness. (citations omitted)

These guidelines have since been followed by our courts in determining the propriety of motions for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence.

It should be emphasized that the applicant for new trial has the burden of showing that the new evidence he seeks to
present has complied with the requisites to justify the holding of a new trial.

The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is whether the
proferred evidence is in fact a 'newly discovered evidence which could not have been discovered by due diligence. The
question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the
evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it have been discovered. It is to the latter that
the requirement of due diligence has relevance.[14] We have held that in order that a particular piece of evidence
may be properly regarded as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the
evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party now
submitting it; what is essential is that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate
such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.[15]

The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the movant has exercised due diligence
depends upon the particular circumstances of each case.[16] Nonetheless, it has been observed that the phrase is
often equated with reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the defendant. In other words, the concept of due
diligence has both a time component and a good faith component. The movant for a new trial must not only act in
a timely fashion in gathering evidence in support of the motion; he must act reasonably and in good faith as well. Due
diligence contemplates that the defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in light of the
totality of the circumstances and the facts known to him.[17]

Applying the foregoing tests, we find that petitioners' purported evidence does not qualify as newly discovered
evidence that would justify the re-opening of the case and the holding of a third trial.

The report of the forensic group may not be considered as newly discovered evidence as petitioners failed to show
that it was impossible for them to secure an independent forensic study of the physical evidence during the trial of the
double murder case. It appears from their report that the forensic group used the same physical and
testimonial evidence proferred during the trial, but made their own analysis and interpretation of said
evidence. They cited the materials and methods that they used for their study, viz:

MATERIALS AND METHODS

MATERIALS:

a. Court records of the case, especially photographs of: a) the stairway where the late Sen. Aquino and his
escorts descended; b) the part of the tarmac where the lifeless bodies of the late Sen. Aquino and Galman
fell; and c) the autopsy conducted by the NBI Medico-legal team headed by Dr. Mu[]oz; and the autopsy
report of the late Sen. Benigno Aquino[,] Jr. signed by Dr. Mu[]oz and Dr. Solis;

b. The gun and live ammunitions collected at the crime scene;

c. A reference human skull photos and X-rays of the same to demonstrate wound location and bullet trajectory;

d. The reports of interviews and statements by the convicted military escorts, and other witnesses;

e. Re-enactment of the killing of Aquino based on the military escorts[] version, by the military escorts
themselves in the Bilibid Prison and by volunteers at the NAIA Tarmac;

f. Various books and articles on forensic and the medico-legal field[;]

g. Results of Forensic experiments conducted in relation to the case.

METHODS:

a. Review of the forensic exhibits presented in the court;

b. Review of TSNs relevant to the forensic review;

c. Study of and research on the guns, slugs and ammunitions allegedly involved in the crime;
28

d. Interviews/re-enactment of the crime based on the military's accounts, both in the Bilibid Prison where the
convicts are confined and the MIA (now NAIA) stairway and tarmac;

e. Conduct of ocular inspection and measurements on the actual crime scene (stairway and tarmac) at the old
Manila International Airport (now NAIA);

f. Retracing the slug's trajectory based on the autopsy reports and experts' testimonies using an actual human
skull;

g. X-rays of the skull with the retraced trajectory based on the autopsy report and experts' testimonies;

h. Evaluation of the presented facts and opinions of local experts in relation to accepted forensic findings in
international publications on forensic science, particularly on guns and [gunshot] wound injuries;

i. Forensic experiments and simulations of events in relation to this case.[18]

These materials were available to the parties during the trial and there was nothing that prevented the petitioners
from using them at the time to support their theory that it was not the military, but Rolando Galman, who killed
Senator Aquino. Petitioners, in their present motion, failed to present any new forensic evidence that could not have
been obtained by the defense at the time of the trial even with the exercise of due diligence. If they really wanted to
seek and offer the opinion of other forensic experts at the time regarding the physical evidence gathered at the scene
of the crime, there was ample opportunity for them to do so before the case was finally submitted and decided.[19]

A reading of the Sandiganbayan decision dated September 28, 1990 shows a thorough study by the court of the
forensic evidence presented during the trial, viz:

COURT FINDINGS

As to the physical
evidence

Great significance has to be accorded the trajectory of the single bullet that penetrated the head and caused the
death of Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. Basic to the question as to trajectory ought to be the findings during the autopsy.
The prosector in the autopsy, Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, reported in his Autopsy Report No. N-
83-22-36, that the trajectory of the gunshot, the wound of entrance having been located at the mastoid region, left,
below the external auditory meatus, and the exit wound having been at the anterior portion of the mandible, was
'forward, downward and medially. (Autopsy Report No. N-83-22-36, Exhibit 'NNNN-2-t-2')

A controversy as to this trajectory came about when, upon being cross-examined by counsel for the defense, Dr.
Bienvenido Muoz made a significant turn-about by stating that the correct trajectory of the fatal bullet was 'upward,
downward, and medially. The present position of Dr. Muoz is premised upon the alleged fact that he found the petrous
bone fractured, obviously hit by the fatal bullet. He concluded, in view of this finding, that the fatal bullet must have
gone upward from the wound of entrance. Since the fatal bullet exited at the mandible, it is his belief that the petrous
bone deflected the trajectory of the bullet and, thus, the bullet proceeded downwards from the petrous bone to the
mandible.

This opinion of Dr. Bienvenido Muoz in this regard notwithstanding, We hold that the trajectory of the fatal bullet
which killed Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. was, indeed, 'forward, downward and medially. For the reason that the wound of
entrance was at a higher elevation than the wound of exit, there can be no other conclusion but that the trajectory
was downward. The bullet when traveling at a fast rate of speed takes a straight path from the wound of entrance to
the wound of exit. It is unthinkable that the bullet, while projected upwards, would, instead of exiting to the roof of
the head, go down to the mandible because it was allegedly deflected by a petrous bone which though hard is in fact a
mere spongy protuberance, akin to a cartilage.

Clear is proof of the downward trajectory of the fatal bullet; First, as Dr. Pedro Solis and Dr. Ceferino Cunanan, the
immediate superiors of Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, manifested before the Court, that, since the wound of entrance appeared
ovaloid and there is what is known as a contusion collar which was widest at the superior portion, indicating an acute
angle of approach, a downward trajectory of the bullet is indicated. This phenomenon indicates that the muzzle of the
fatal gun was at a level higher than that of the point of entry of the fatal bullet.

There was no showing as to whether a probe could have been made from the wound of entrance to the petrous bone.
Out of curiosity, Dr. Juanito Billote tried to insert a probe from the wound of exit into the petrous bone. He was
unsuccessful notwithstanding four or five attempts. If at all, this disproves the theory of Dr. Muoz that the trajectory
was upward, downward and medially. On the other hand, Dr. Juanito Billote and photographer Alexander Loinaz
witnessed the fact that Dr. Muoz[s] understudy, Alejandrino Javier, had successfully made a probe from the wound of
entrance directly towards the wound of exit. Alejandrino Javier shouted with excitement upon his success and
Alexander Loinaz promptly photographed this event with Alejandrino Javier holding the protruding end of the probe at
the mandible. (Exhibit XXXXX-39-A')

To be sure, had the main bullet hit the petrous bone, this spongy mash of cartilage would have been decimated or
obliterated. The fact that the main bullet was of such force, power and speed that it was able to bore a hole into the
mandible and crack it, is an indication that it could not have been stopped or deflected by a mere petrous bone. By its
29

power and force, it must have been propelled by a powerful gun. It would have been impossible for the main bullet to
have been deflected form an upward course by a mere spongy protuberance. Granting that it was so deflected,
however, it could not have maintained the same power and force as when it entered the skull at the mastoid region so
as to crack the mandible and make its exit there.

But what caused the fracture of the petrous bone? Was there a cause of the fracture, other than that the bullet had hit
it? Dr. Pedro Solis, maintaining the conclusion that the trajectory of the bullet was downward, gave the following
alternative explanations for the fracture of the petrous bone:

First, the petrous bone could have been hit by a splinter of the main bullet, particularly, that which was found at the
temporal region; and,

Second, the fracture must have been caused by the kinetic force applied to the point of entrance at the mastoid
region which had the tendency of being radiated towards the petrous bone.

Thus, the fracture in the occipital bone, of the temporal bone, and of the parietal bone, Dr. Pedro Solis pointed out,
had been caused by the aforesaid kinetic force. When a force is applied to the mastoid region of the head, Dr. Pedro
Solis emphasized, a radiation of forces is distributed all over the cranial back, including, although not limited to, the
parietal bone. The skull, Dr. Solis explains, is a box-like structure. The moment you apply pressure on the portion, a
distortion, tension or some other mechanical defect is caused. This radiation of forces produces what is known as the
'spider web linear fracture which goes to different parts of the body. The so-called fracturing of the petrous portion of
the left temporal bone is one of the consequences of the kinetic force forcefully applied to the mastoid region.

The fact that there was found a fracture of the petrous bone is not necessarily indicative of the theory that the main
bullet passed through the petrous bone.

Doubt was expressed by Dr. Pedro Solis as to whether the metal fragments alleged by Dr. Bienvenido Muoz to have
been found by him inside the skull or at the wound of exit were really parts of the main bullet which killed the
Senator. When Dr. Pedro Solis examined these fragments, he found that two (2) of the fragments were larger in size,
and were of such shapes, that they could not have gone out of the wound of exit considering the size and shape of the
exit wound.

Finding of a downward
trajectory of the
fatal bullet fatal
to the credibility
of defense witnesses.

The finding that the fatal bullet which killed Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. was directed downwards sustains the allegation
of prosecution eyewitnesses to the effect that Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. was shot by a military soldier at the bridge
stairs while he was being brought down from the plane. Rebecca Quijano saw that the senator was shot by the
military man who was directly behind the Senator while the Senator and he were descending the stairs. Rebecca
Quijano's testimony in this regard is echoed by Jessie Barcelona, Ramon Balang, Olivia Antimano, and Mario Laher,
whose testimonies this Court finds likewise as credible.

The downward trajectory of the bullet having been established, it stands to reason that the gun used in shooting the
Senator was fired from an elevation higher than that of the wound of entrance at the back of the head of the Senator.
This is consistent with the testimony of prosecution witnesses to the effect that the actual killer of the Senator shot as
he stood at the upper step of the stairs, the second or third behind Senator Aquino, while Senator Aquino and the
military soldiers bringing him were at the bridge stairs. This is likewise consistent with the statement of Sandra Jean
Burton that the shooting of Senator Aquino occurred while the Senator was still on the bridge stairs, a conclusion
derived from the fact that the fatal shot was fired ten (10) seconds after Senator Aquino crossed the service door and
was led down the bridge stairs.

It was the expert finding of Dr. Matsumi Suzuki that, as was gauged from the sounds of the footsteps of Senator
Aquino, as the Senator went down the bridge stairs, the shooting of the Senator occurred while the Senator had
stepped on the 11th step from the top.

At the ocular inspection conducted by this Court, with the prosecution and the defense in attendance, it should be
noted that the following facts were established as regards the bridge stairs:

Observations:

The length of one block covering the ' tarmac ' 196;
The width of one block covering the tarmac ' 10;
The distance from the base of the staircase leading to the emergency tube to the Ninoy marker at the
tarmac ' 126;
There are 20 steps in the staircase including the landing;
The distance from the first rung of the stairway up to the 20th rung which is the landing of stairs ' 208;
Distance from the first rung of the stairway up to the 20th rung until the edge of the exit door ' 2311;
Distance from the 4th rung up to the exit door ' 21;
Distance from the 5th rung up to the exit door ' 1911;
30

Length of one rung including railpost ' 34;

Space between two rungs of stairway ' 9;
Width of each rung ' 11-1/2;
Length of each rung (end to end) ' 29:
Height of railpost from edge of rung to railing ' 25.

(underlining supplied)[20]

The Sandiganbayan again exhaustively analyzed and discussed the forensic evidence in its resolution dated November
15, 1990 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the convicted accused. The court held:

The Autopsy Report No. N-83-2236, Exhibit 'NNNN-2-t-2 indicated a downward trajectory of the fatal bullet when it
stated that the fatal bullet was 'forward, downward, and medially . . .

xxx

II

The wound of entrance having been at a higher elevation than the wound of exit, there can be no other conclusion but
that the trajectory was downward. The fatal bullet, whether it be a Smith and Wesson Caliber .357 magnum revolver
or a .45 caliber, must have traveled at a fast rate of speed and it stands to reason that it took a straight path from the
wound of entrance to the wound of exit. A hole indicating this straight path was proven to have existed. If, as
contended on cross-examination by Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, that the bullet was projected upwards, it ought to have
exited at the roof of the head. The theory that the fatal bullet was deflected by a mere petrous bone is inconceivable.

III

Since the wound of entrance appeared ovaloid and there is what is known as a contusion collar which was widest at
the superior portion, indicating an acute angle of approach, a downward trajectory of the fatal bullet is conclusively
indicated. This phenomenon indicates that the muzzle of the fatal gun was at a level higher than that of the point of
entry of the fatal bullet.

IV

There was no hole from the petrous bone to the mandible where the fatal bullet had exited and, thus, there is no
support to the theory of Dr. Bienvenido Muoz that the fatal bullet had hit the petrous bone on an upward trajectory
and had been deflected by the petrous bone towards the mandible. Dr. Juanito Billote's testimony in this regard had
amplified the matter with clarity.

xxx

These physical facts, notwithstanding the arguments and protestations of counsel for the defense as now and
heretofore avowed, compel the Court to maintain the holding: (1) that the trajectory of the fatal bullet which hit and
killed Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. was 'forward, downward and medially; (2) that the Senator was shot by a person
who stood at a higher elevation than he; and (3) that the Senator was shot and killed by CIC Rogelio Moreno on the
bridge stairs and not on the tarmac, in conspiracy with the rest of the accused convicted herein.[21]

This Court affirmed said findings of the Sandiganbayan when it denied the petition for review in its resolution of July
25, 1991. The Court ruled:

The Court has carefully considered and deliberated upon all the contentions of the petitioners but finds no basis for
the allegation that the respondent Sandiganbayan has gravely erred in resolving the factual issues.

The attempt to place a constitutional dimension in the petition is a labor in vain. Basically, only questions of fact are
raised. Not only is it axiomatic that the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are final unless they fall within
specifically recognized exceptions to the rule but from the petition and its annexes alone, it is readily apparent that
the respondent Court correctly resolved the factual issues.

xxx

The trajectory of the fatal bullet, whether or not the victim was descending the stairway or was on the tarmac when
shot, the circumstances showing conspiracy, the participants in the conspiracy, the individual roles of the accused and
their respective parts in the conspiracy, the absence of evidence against thirteen accused and their co-accused Col.
Vicente B. Tigas, Jr., the lack of credibility of the witnesses against former Minister Jose D. Aspiras, Director Jesus Z.
Singson, Col. Arturo A. Custodio, Hermilo Gosuico, Major General Prospero Olivas, and the shooting of Rolando
Galman are all factual matters w[h]ich the respondent court discussed with fairness and at length. The petitioners'
insistence that a few witnesses in their favor should be believed while that of some witnesses against them should be
discredited goes into the question of credibility of witnesses, a matter which under the records of this petition is best
left to the judgment of the Sandiganbayan.[22]
31

The report of the forensic group essentially reiterates the theory presented by the defense during the trial
of the double murder case. Clearly, the report is not newly discovered, but rather recently sought, which is not
allowed by the Rules.[23] If at all, it only serves to discredit the version of the prosecution which had already been
weighed and assessed, and thereafter upheld by the Sandiganbayan.

The same is true with the statement of the alleged eyewitness, SPO4 Cantimbuhan. His narration merely corroborates
the testimonies of other defense witnesses during the trial that they saw Senator Aquino already walking on the
airport tarmac toward the AVSECOM van when a man in blue-gray uniform darted from behind and fired at the back of
the Senator's head.[24] The Sandiganbayan, however, did not give weight to their account as it found the testimonies
of prosecution eyewitnesses Rebecca Quijano and Jessie Barcelona more credible. Quijano and Barcelona testified that
they saw the soldier behind Senator Aquino on the stairway aim and fire a gun on the latter's nape. As earlier quoted,
the Sandiganbayan found their testimonies to be more consistent with the physical evidence. SPO4 Cantimbuhan's
testimony will not in any way alter the court's decision in view of the eyewitness account of Quijano and Barcelona,
taken together with the physical evidence presented during the trial. Certainly, a new trial will only be allowed if
the new evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. [25] Also,
new trial will not be granted if the new evidence is merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching.

As additional support to their motion for new trial, petitioners also claim that they were denied due process because
they were deprived of adequate legal assistance by counsel. 'We are not persuaded. The records will bear out that
petitioners were ably represented by Atty. Rodolfo U. Jimenez during the trial and when the case was elevated to this
Court. An experienced lawyer in criminal cases, Atty. Jimenez vigorously defended the petitioners' cause throughout
the entire proceedings. The records show that the defense presented a substantial number of witnesses and exhibits
during the trial. After the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision, Atty. Jimenez filed a petition for review with this
Court, invoking all conceivable grounds to acquit the petitioners. When the Court denied the petition for review, he
again filed a motion for reconsideration exhausting his deep reservoir of legal talent. We therefore find petitioners'
claim to be unblushingly unsubstantiated. We note that they did not allege any specific facts in their present motion to
show that Atty. Jimenez had been remiss in his duties as counsel. Petitioners are therefore bound by the acts and
decisions of their counsel as regards the conduct of the case. The general rule is that the client is bound by the action
of his counsel in the conduct of his case and cannot be heard to complain that the result of the litigation might have
been different had his counsel proceeded differently.[26] We held in People vs. Umali:[27]

In criminal as well as civil cases, it has frequently been held that the fact that blunders and mistakes may have been
made in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court, as a result of the ignorance, inexperience, or incompetence
of counsel, does not furnish a ground for a new trial.

If such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for reopening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as
new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or
experienced, or learned.

So it has been held that mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy,
materiality, or immateriality of a certain evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof are not proper grounds
for a new trial; and in general the client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of his case, and can not
be heard to complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had counsel proceeded
differently. (citations omitted)

Finally, we are not moved by petitioners' assertion that the forensic evidence may have been manipulated and
misinterpreted during the trial of the case. Again, petitioners did not allege concrete facts to support their crass claim.
Hence, we find the same to be unfounded and purely speculative.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the motion is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,

Corona, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.

G.R. No. 174472              June 19, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff- Appellee,

vs.
BENIGNO FETALINO y GABALDON, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For Review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 31 May 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02162
entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Benigno Fetalino y Gabaldon," affirming, with modification, the
32

Judgment2 dated 29 July 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, in Criminal Cases No.
MC-99-1445, MC- 99-1446, MC-99-1447-H, MC 99-1448-H, and MC-99-1449-H.

Appellant stood charged with two counts of acts of lasciviousness and three counts of rape allegedly committed
against the person of his own daughter, AAA.3 The Informations, all signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Carlos A.
Valenzuela, state:

In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1445

That on or about the 21st day of March 1999, in the City of XXX, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by force and intimidation, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon the person of [his] daughter AAA, a girl
sixteen (16) years of age, and subjected to sexual abuse, by inserting his finger into her vagina against her will and
consent.4

In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1446

That on or about the 22nd day of March 1999, in the City of XXX, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by force and intimidation, did, then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit acts of lasciviousness upon the person of [his] daughter, AAA, a girl
sixteen (16) years of age, and subjected to sexual abuse, by inserting his finger into her vagina against her will and
consent.5

In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1447-H

That on or about the 23rd day of March 1999, in the City of XXX, Philippines, a place [within] the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of [his] daughter AAA, a girl sixteen years of age,
and subjected to sexual abuse, all against her will and consent.6

In Criminal Case No. MC 99-1448-H

That on or about the 24th day of March 1999, in the City of XXX, Philippines, a place [within] the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of [his] daughter AAA, a girl sixteen years of age,
and subjected to sexual abuse, all against her will and consent.7

In Criminal Case No. MC 99-1449-H

That on or about the 25th day of March 1999, in the City of XXX, Philippines, a place [within] the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of [his] daughter AAA, a girl sixteen years of age
and subjected to sexual abuse, all against her will and consent.8

On 20 April 1999, the arraignment for Criminal Cases No. MC-99-1445 and MC-99 99-1446 was held at which time
appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges of acts of lasciviousness.9 On 10 February 2000, he entered a similar
plea to the three counts of rape in Criminal Cases No. MC-99-1447-H, MC-99-1448-H, and MC-99-1449-H.10 Joint
trial of the five cases thereafter ensued with the prosecution presenting five witnesses, namely: AAA, the private
complainant; BBB, AAA’s mother and appellant’s live-in partner; Dr. Winston S. Tan (Dr. Tan), Medico-Legal Officer
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City; SPO4 Julieta Espiritu
(SPO4 Espiritu), Chief of the Women’s Desk of the PNP, XXX City; and POS Rolando Tejada (POS Tejada).

AAA was called to the witness stand as a hostile witness by the prosecution. The reason behind this unusual move
was explained by the prosecutor during the offer of AAA’s testimony:

Before we proceed your honor, may we manifest that we are presenting this witness as our hostile witness in view of
her declaration before this representation that she is no longer interested in prosecuting this case against the
accused your honor, and in view likewise, of the manifestation given before this honorable court by the counsel for
the accused that the victim and the mother of the victim came to see him to ask her (sic) to desist.11

AAA testified that appellant raped her on three separate instances in March 1999. She recalled that the events
transpired in their house which was then undergoing renovation.12 Appellant allegedly undressed her and inserted
his private organ into her vagina for which she felt pain and cried. She claimed that she tried to resist appellant’s
bestial attack and that she struggled with him by trying to remove his hands. She could not shout for help as
appellant threatened her with harm. After satisfying his lust, appellant told her not to report the incident to anybody
or else he would kill her and her mother. She, however, finally revealed her sad experiences to her mother
33

sometime in 1999. Thereafter, she was brought to the crime laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City for a medical
examination. The physical examination was conducted by Dr. Tan whose test confirmed that AAA was already in a
non-virgin state physically. The pertinent portion of Dr. Tan’s medico-legal report states:

GENITAL:

There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with the pinkish brown labia minora
presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with deep healed
lacerations at 7 and 9 o’clock and shallow healed laceration at 6 o’clock positions. External vaginal orifice offers
strong resistance to the introduction of the examining index finger. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent
rugorsities. Cervix is firm and closed.13

Dr. Tan confirmed having performed the medical examination on the person of AAA. According to him, their office
received a request from the XXX Police Station for the conduct of a "medico-legal/physical examination" on AAA
who was a victim of an "alleged sexual abuse/molestation perpetrated by her biological father."14 AAA and BBB were
then subjected to a brief interview after which they both signed the consent form for the said examination.15 Dr. Tan
likewise explained that the most common cause of a hymenal laceration is the insertion into the vagina of an erect
male genitalia or any other object of the same consistency.16

BBB, AAA’s mother, stated that she and appellant were engaged in a common law relationship and together they
begot five children17 including AAA. On the evening of 25 March 1999, BBB came home from Divisoria where she
earned a living as a vendor. When she reached their house, a certain Paul Quiambao, a carpenter she hired to do
some minor repairs in their abode, came to see her and informed her that he saw appellant on top of AAA. In the
vernacular, Paul allegedly told BBB that AAA was "ginagalaw" by appellant. Immediately after Paul left, BBB talked
to AAA to confirm the harrowing news that she had just received. AAA finally had the courage to reveal to her
mother that her predicament in the hands of her own father started on 22 March 1999 and it occurred everyday
thereafter until 25 March 1999. She and AAA then proceeded to the barangay hall to report the misdeeds of
appellant. After this, their barangay captain and members of the police came to their house to look for appellant who
allegedly tried to flee after seeing the authorities. He was eventually arrested and taken to the police station. The
barangay officials then instructed her and AAA to go to the police station in order for them to file a complaint against
appellant.

In the police station, she and AAA gave their respective sworn statements to the investigating officer.18

SPO4 Espiritu testified that she was the investigator assigned to the case. During her investigation, AAA complained
that in the afternoon of 21 March 1999, when the latter arrived home from school, appellant entered her room and,
at knife point, embraced and kissed her. Unsatisfied with these initial condemnable acts, appellant thereafter
inserted his finger into AAA’s vagina. This incident would be repeated the following day, 22 March 1999.

Unfortunately for AAA, her ordeal would even take a turn for the worse for on 23 March 1999, appellant apparently
became more emboldened and could no longer contain his bestial desires; thus, he proceeded to have carnal
knowledge of AAA. AAA had to suffer such abuse on two more separate instances which occurred on 24 and 25
March 1999.

The prosecution presented, as its last witness, POS Tejada, who was a member of the team which responded to the
complaint of AAA and BBB on 26 March 1999. His turn at the witness stand was brief, as appellant’s counsel
admitted the substance of POS Tejada’s would-be testimony which pertained mainly to the circumstances
surrounding the arrest of appellant.

For his part, appellant offered the hackneyed defense of denial to refute the charges brought against him. Appellant
narrated that he and BBB had been live-in lovers for almost 25 years. He admitted that AAA was indeed one of their
children.19 In 1977, he was imprisoned for murder and was ordered released from detention on 23 February 1996.
From the time he regained freedom, he allegedly stayed in the house of one of his legitimate children located
somewhere in Paco, Manila. During the time material to the case, however, he was at the house he used to share
with BBB and their children located at No. XXX St., XXX Drive, XXX City. Said house was undergoing renovation at
that time.

Appellant claimed that the present criminal charges were brought against him in retaliation for the physical injuries
he inflicted upon BBB during one of their heated arguments which became frequent as he wanted BBB and her new
live-in partner to move out of their house in XXX St. In fact, according to appellant, BBB even charged him with
physical injuries which was raffled off to a different branch of the court.

To bolster appellant’s claim of innocence, the defense presented CCC, another one of his children with BBB. In
CCC’s recollection, at the time the criminal acts complained of took place, she was in their house together with AAA,
their brother DDD, and appellant. She, however, insisted that nothing unusual happened during those dates. She
remembered that although appellant was in their house, he spent most of his time inside his room fixing his
belongings.
34

As for its last witness, the defense recalled BBB to the witness stand in order to prove that the only reason she
executed her sworn statement before the police was because she was angry with appellant for having stabbed her
during one of their fights.

After trial, the court a quo found appellant guilty as charged in all the cases filed against him. The dispositive portion
of the trial court’s judgment states:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case Nos. MC-99-1445 and MC-99-1446,
finding the accused BENIGNO FETALINO Y GABALDON, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt of Acts of
Lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article III, Section 5[b] of Republic Act 7610, and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer for each of the two (2) charges, the penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14)
years of reclusion temporal, as minimum and maximum, respectively.

Decision is also hereby rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. MC-99-1447-H, MC-99-1448-H and MC-99-1449-H finding
the accused, BENIGNO FETALINO Y GABALDON, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of RAPE
defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by the Republic Act 7659 and
R.A. 8353. Finding the victim to be under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, and
that the offender is the father, this court imposes upon same BENIGNO FETALINO Y GABALDON, for EACH
charge, the supreme penalty of DEATH through lethal injection, as provided for in R.A. 8177, amending Section 24,
of R.A. 7659 in the manner and procedure therein provided.

Moreover, pursuant to [A]rticle 100 in relation to Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, governing civil indemnity,
accused is furthermore ordered to indemnify the minor victim, AAA, the amount of Php50,000.00, by way of moral
damages in line with the reward made under the case of People vs. Bonday (222 SCRA 216) and another
Php25,000.00 for exemplary damages to deter other sexual perverts or two legged-beast from sexually assaulting
or molesting hapless and innocent girls.

As the penalty imposed is [TRIPLE] DEATH, the City Jail Warden is directed to immediately commit the person of
BENIGNO FETALINO Y GABALDON to the National Prisons at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.20

In view of the death penalty imposed by the trial court, the cases were automatically elevated to this Court for
review. However, in our Resolution dated 13 December 2005,21 we ordered the remand of these cases to the Court
of Appeals pursuant to our holding in People v. Mateo.22

In its assailed Decision, the appellate court modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting appellant of the two
charges of rape and by downgrading the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. MC-99-1447-H from death
to reclusion perpetua –

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 213 of Mandaluyong City convicting accused-
appellant Benigno Fetalino of the crime of two (2) counts of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case Nos. MC-99-
1445 and MC-99-1446 and for rape in Criminal Case No. MC-99-1447-H is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the penalty of death imposed by the trial court for the crime of rape should be reduced
to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant is ordered to pay complainant AAA the following amounts:

1. the total amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;

2. ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and

3. ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

As regards Criminal Case Nos. MC-99-1448-H and MC-99-1449-H, accused is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.23

Once again, appellant’s case is before us for our consideration raising the following errors:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR
THE [CRIMES] CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE
TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

III
35

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE SUPREME
PENALTY OF DEATH AS THE AGE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAS NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTYLY
PROVED.24

The appeal is partly meritorious.

At the outset, we would like to impart our observation as regards the proper charge that should have been filed
against appellant for the incidents that transpired on 21 and 22 March 1999, during which he inserted his finger into
the vagina of AAA. For these acts, which spawned Criminal Cases No. MC-99-1445 and MC-99-1446, appellant
was indicted merely for two counts of acts of lasciviousness when the appropriate charges should have been two
separate counts of rape under Article 266-A(2) of the Revised Penal Code. It must be remembered that Articles 266-
A and 266-B are the amendments introduced to the Revised Penal Code by Republic Act No. 8353 or the "The Anti-
Rape Law of 1997," which took effect on 22 October 1997. With these amendments, rape was reclassified as a
crime against person and not merely a crime against chastity. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code states:

Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed:

1) By a man who [shall] have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the
genital or anal orifice of another person.

The first paragraph of Article 266-A refers to the traditional concept of rape; that is, having sexual intercourse with a
woman against her will. The second paragraph, on the other hand, is categorized as rape by sexual assault.25

In the case of People v. Soriano,26 appellant therein was charged with 13 counts of rape by sexual assault for having
inserted his finger inside the private organ of his minor daughter. After reviewing the records of said case, we
adjudged appellant therein guilty of 12 counts rape by sexual assault, bearing in mind the expanded definition of
rape under Republic Act No. 8353.

Subsequently, in People v. Palma,27 appellant therein was charged with six counts of qualified rape committed
between the second week of October 1997 and the first week of November 1997. This case was brought before us
on automatic appeal in view of the death sentence imposed by the trial court. It must be noted that two of the
charges arose from appellant’s acts of inserting his finger into the vagina of his victim. The first of such incidents
happened during the second week of October 1997 when appellant inserted his thumb into the victim’s vaginal
orifice. Then, sometime during the first week of November 1997, appellant inserted his middle finger into the vagina
of the private complainant. In disposing said case, we declared –

x x x In Criminal Case No. 8177, the first incident of insertion of appellant’s finger into the victim’s vagina during the
second week of October 1997 could only render appellant guilty of an act of lasciviousness. The second incident of
the insertion of appellant’s middle finger, however, during the first week of November 1997, constituted
consummated rape through sexual assault under Republic Act No. 8353 or the "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997," which
took effect on 22 October 1997 x x x."28

With these precedents, it is clear that the insertion of one’s finger into the genital or anal orifice of another person
constitutes rape by sexual assault and not merely an act of lasciviousness like what was erroneously charged in this
case. Much as we want to punish appellant for his appalling acts toward AAA in Criminal Cases Nos. MC-99-1445
and MC-99-1446, we are enjoined by our primordial duty to observe appellant’s constitutionally guaranteed right to
be informed of the charges against him. Certainly, we cannot allow ourselves to be the ones to perpetrate the denial
of appellant’s right to due process. He cannot be punished for an offense graver than that with which he was
charged.29

In his Brief, appellant invokes the settled rule that under our jurisdiction, an accused is presumed innocent until
proven guilty and to overcome this presumption, the prosecution must establish the guilt of an accused beyond
reasonable doubt. He contends that in this case, the fact that the prosecution presented AAA as a hostile witness
36

casts doubt as to the culpability of appellant. He also insists that the testimony of AAA was unconvincing and vague
and points to the following portions of her statement in the witness stand:

Q. Who was raped by Benigno Fetalino?

A. Me, ma’am.

Q. When was (sic) you raped by Benigno Fetalino?

A. I cannot recall anymore, ma’am.

Q. Could it be in the year 1999?

A. Yes, ma’am.

Q. Could it be in the month of March?

A. Yes, ma’am.

Q. Where did the alleged raping incident took place?

A. In our house.

Q. Where is your house located?

A. XXX Street, XXX City.

Q. How many times were you raped in March 1999?

A. Three (3) times.

Q. Is it on the same date or on different dates of March 1999?

A. Same dates, ma’am.

Q. Are you sure of that?

A. Yes, ma’am.

PROS. SILAO:

I would like to remind you again Madam Witness that you are under oath and you can be held liable for telling a lie.

Q. What time was the first rape committed?

A. It was then in the afternoon after my mother arrived.

Q. What time did your mother arrived on that afternoon?

A. 5:00 p.m.

Q. What about the second rape, what time was it?

A. I cannot recall the time anymore.

Q. What about the third rape?

A. I cannot recall anymore, ma’am.

Q. But all in the year 1999 of March?

A. Yes, ma’am.30
37

The seeming reluctance of AAA, as punctuated by appellant, is precisely one of the principal motivations which
propelled our legislature to reclassify the crime of rape as a crime against person. As explained by Congresswoman
Luz Reyes Bakunawa during her sponsorship speech of the House Bill No. 6265 which eventually became Republic
Act No. 8353 –

This reclassification is necessary because under the existing law, only the victim can file a complaint, if she wishes,
or her parents, or grandparents in that order, which is very restrictive. The bill now prescribes that any citizen can
file a complaint, even if the complainant may not be the victim, or close relative of the victim. This is the significance
of the change that intends to bring the criminal to the bar of justice even if the victim may not decide to complain due
to fear, shame, or for other reasons. 31

Thus, despite the claimed disinterest of AAA in pursuing the charges against appellant, the choice of whether the
cases would prosper was no longer hers alone. Besides, at the time AAA was presented as a witness, almost three
years had already lapsed. Events must have taken place or influence might have been exerted upon her that could
have weakened her resolve to seek justice for what was done to her. However, the fact remains that AAA never
categorically denied in open court the charges she hurled at appellant. On the contrary, when AAA was subjected to
cross-examination, she affirmed that appellant had indeed raped her, thus:

COURT:

Q. Do you know why you were (sic) here, Madam Witness?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why?

A. Because we have a hearing.

Q. Do you know for a fact that you filed a rape case against the accused in this case?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Tell us the reason why you filed this case?

A. Because he raped me.

Q. Did anyone forced (sic) you to file a case against the accused herein?

A. None, sir.

Q. In what part of your house were you raped?

A. Inside my father’s bedroom.

Q. How many bedrooms do you have in your house?

A. Two only, sir.

Q. So, at the time you were rape you were inside your father’s bedroom?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You will agree with me that the door of the room has a lock, Madam Witness?

A. None sir, it was open because our house was under renovation then.

Q. When the accused inserted his penis into your vagina, you did not resisted (sic)?

A. I resisted.

Q. How did you resisted (sic), Madam Witness?

A. I struggled.

Q. In what way?
38

A. I remove (sic) his hands.

Q. Did the accused likewise, undress himself?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. He was totally naked then?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you have a neighbor, Madam Witness?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. It happened at about 1:00 to 2:00 in the afternoon, Madam Witness?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You did not shout for help, Madam Witness?

A. No, sir.

Q. Why?

A. I was afraid because he threatened me.

Q. How did he threaten you?

A. He told me not to report the matter to anybody.

Q. When did you finally decide to disclose what happened to you to anyone, Madam Witness?

A. It was on (sic) 1999, to my mother, but I cannot recall the date.

Q. Why did you disclose the same to your mother?

A. I was afraid of my father.

Q. When you stated in your statement that a certain Paul witnessed the incident, when was that?

A. March 1999.

Q. While your father was raping you?

A. He saw the incident because he was then working at our house.

Q. You stated in your affidavit that your father was on top of you when Paul see (sic) you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. But at the time when Paul saw your father on top of you, his penis was not yet inserted in to your vagina?

A. Not yet, sir.32

Complementary to AAA’s oral testimony, she confirmed the sworn statement which she executed before SPO4
Espiritu on 26 March 1999 upon redirect examination by the prosecutor. As we had elucidated in the case of People
v. Servano,33 the evidence which should be considered by the court in criminal cases need not be limited to the
statements made in open court; rather, it should include all documents, affidavits or sworn statements of the
witnesses, and other supporting evidence. We explained –

x x x [W]hen a sworn statement has been formally offered as evidence, it forms an integral part of the prosecution
evidence which should not be ignored for it complements and completes the testimony on the witness stand. A
sworn statement is a written declaration of facts to which the declarant has sworn before an officer authorized to
administer oaths. This oath vests credibility and trustworthiness on the document. The fact that a witness fails to
39

reiterate, during trial, the contents of his sworn statement should not affect his credibility and render the sworn
statement useless and insignificant, as long as it is presented as evidence in open court. This is not to say,
however, that the sworn statement should be given more probative value than the actual testimony. Rather, the
sworn statement and the open court declarations must be evaluated and examined together in toto so that a full and
thorough determination of the merits of the case may be achieved. Giving weight to a witness’ oral testimony during
the trial should not mean being oblivious to the other pieces of available evidence such as the sworn statement. In
like manner, the court cannot give probative value to the sworn statement to the exclusion of the oral testimony. In
every case, the court should review, assess and weigh the totality of the evidence presented by the parties. x x x.34

In this case, AAA’s sworn statement which forms part of the records of this case supplied the details of the incidents
she experienced during those fateful days in March 1999, thus:

T : Ano ang dahilan at narito ka ngayon sa aming tanggapan at nagbibigay ng isang malayang salaysay?

S : Para po isumbong at ipakulong ang tatay ko na tatlong beses akong ni-rape at dalawang beses na ipinasok and
daliri niya sa ari ko.

T : Sino ba ang tatay mo na sinasabi mo na nag-rape sa iyo ng tatlong beses?

S : Siya po si Benigno Fetalino y Gabaldon, 62 taong gulang, walang trabaho at nakatira din po sa XXX St., XXX
City.

T : Kailan, saan at anong oras nangyari ang sinasabi mong pangre-rape na ginawa sa iyo ng tatay mo?

S : Noon pong March 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 1999, lahat po ay mga ala-una hanggang alas dos ng hapon, sa mismo
pong bahay namin sa XXX St., XXX City.

T : Tunay mo bang ama ang sinasasabi mong tatay mo na nag-rape sa iyo ng maraming beses?

S : Opo.

T : Maari mo bang ituro sa akin ang sinasabi mong tatay mo na nag-rape sa iyo?

S : Siya po. (Affiant pointing to ne Benigno Fetalino y Gabaldon, 62 years old, jobless of XXX St., XXX City.)

T : Maari mo bang isalaysay ang buong pangyayari?

S : Noon nga pong March 21, 1999, pagdating ko po galing sa eskwela at nasa loob ako ng kwarto at gumagawa po
ako ng assignment ng bigla pong pumasok ang tatay ko at agad akong tinutukan ng balisong at sinabing huwag
akong maingay, niyakap po ako at hinalikan, tapos po ay ipinasok ang kamay niya sa loob ng short ko at ipinasok
ang daliri niya sa ari ko, umiiyak po ako at nakikiusap ng huwag niyang gawin, pero ang sabi lang po niya "HUWAG
KANG MAINGAY, PAPATAYIN KITA" at pagkatapos po ay sinabihan din niya ako ng "HUWAG KANG
MAGSUSUMBONG, PAPATAYIN KITA, PATI NA ANG NANAY MO." Noon pong March 22, 1999, pagdating ko po
uli galing eskwela, ay ganon po ulit ang ginawa niya, ipinasok po uli ang daliri niya sa ari ko, natatakot po ako kaya
hindi po ako sumisigaw at hindi rin po ako nagsusumbong, kasi baka nga patayin niya kaming lahat. Ng pangatlong
araw po, March 23, 1999 ay ganon po uli ang ginawa niya, pinasok po niya ako sa kwarto at tinutukan ng balisong,
pero hinubad na po niya ang short ko at inihiga ako sa papag at naghubad din po siya at pumatong sa akin at
ipinasok ang ari niya sa ari ko, hindi po ako pumapalag dahil natatakot po ako dahil may hawak siyang balisong
habang gumagalaw siya sa ibabaw ko. Wala po akong nagawa kundi ang umiyak, hindi po ako makapagsumbong
dahil sa pananakot niya na papatayin kami. Tapos po ng March 24, 1999 uli ng hapon ay pinasok ulit niya ako at
ganon po ulit, inalis niya ang short ko at pumatong sa akin, ng nakapatong po siya ay biglang pumasok si Kuya Pol,
iyon po yong karpintero na gumagawa ng bahay naming at nakita kami, kaya po biglang tumigil ang tatay ko, at
lumabas na siya pero sinabihan ako ulit na huwag magsusumbong dahil papatayin kami. Hindi pa rin po ako
nagsumbong, kaya kahapon po, March 25, 1999 ay inulit na naman niya ang ginagawa niyang pangre-rape sa akin.
Tapos kagabi nga po ng wala ang tatay ko ay nagpunta sa amin si Kuya Pol at kinausap ang nanay ko at narinig ko
ng sabihin niya sa nanay ko na nakita niya ang tatay ko na nakapatong sa akin sa kwarto. Pag-alis po ni Kuya Pol
ay agad akong kinausap ng nanay ko at tinanong, kaya po sinabi ko na sa kanya, pero ang sinabi ko po ay daliri
lang ang ginagamit ng tatay ko, natatakot po kasi ako na baka patayin kami ng tatay ko. Agad pong pumunta ang
nanay ko sa Barangay at nagsumbong, kaya po hinuli siya ng Barangay at dinala kami dito sa pulis.35

Against the categorical statements of AAA, appellant could only offer the defense of denial and point to BBB as the
brains behind the institution of these criminal charges against him. Such bare-faced defense is obviously insufficient
to overcome AAA’s categorical claim of being raped and sexually molested by appellant. The rule is settled that
against the positive identification by the private complainant, the mere denials of an accused cannot prevail to
overcome conviction by the trial court.36
40

Indeed, appellant could not offer any plausible reason which could have impelled AAA to bring these serious
charges against him. All he could muster was to claim in the trial court that BBB was furious at him and that the two
of them engaged in frequent fights. To our mind, such contention is unavailing. Although BBB admitted that she was
mad at appellant for the physical injuries he inflicted upon her, still, she stated that what drove her to issue her
sworn statement on 26 March 1999 was appellant’s rape of AAA. Furthermore, a mother like BBB certainly would
not expose her own daughter to the ignominy of a rape trial simply to retaliate against her husband for the
transgressions, knowing fully well the life-long stigma and scars that such a public trial could bring.37 Such selfish
motive on the part of a mother runs counter to her natural instinct to protect her offspring from all kinds of harm and
to safeguard the latter’s well-being.

We, however, sustain the appellate court’s acquittal of appellant in Criminal Cases No. MC-99-1448-H and MC-99-
1449-H. It must be remembered that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime so that each of
the other rape charges should be proven beyond reasonable doubt.38 Thus, it is incumbent on the prosecution to
present the quantum of proof necessary for the conviction of an accused.

In this case, we have gone over the testimony of AAA and her sworn statement and cannot agree in the trial court’s
conclusion that appellant’s guilt had been sufficiently established. AAA’s testimony pertaining to the second and
third incidents of rape merely consists of the following:

Q. What about the second rape, what did he do to you?

A. The same.

Q. Meaning he undressed you and he inserted his private organ to your private organ?

A. Yes, ma’am.

Q. What about the third rape, how did he did (sic) it to you?

A. The same procedure, ma’am.39

Such laconic responses on the part of AAA to the prosecutor’s queries are grossly inadequate to sustain appellant’s
conviction. Her answers during the prosecutor’s examination are utterly lacking in material details that would warrant
a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.40 As we have held in the case of People v. Marahay –

When prodded to specify the acts done to her, she stated that her father "used her." No other detail was evoked
from her to show the attendant elements that constitute rape, the crime charged. Such bare statements cannot
suffice to establish accused-appellant’s guilt with the required quantum of evidence.41

In this regard, we cannot overemphasize the need for the prosecution to ask the necessary probing questions in
order to elicit from a witness crucial details to establish the elements of the crime charged.

Likewise, AAA’s sworn statement cannot be the basis for appellant’s conviction for the second and third incidents of
rape. To recall, AAA declared in said statement that the rape which allegedly occurred on 24 March 1999 was the
one witnessed by their carpenter Quiambao. However, on the witness stand, she declared that when Quiambao saw
appellant on top of her, appellant had not yet inserted his penis into her vagina. In fact, her testimony does not even
state whether appellant’s penis even touched her vagina at all. In the absence of a statement that appellant’s penis
touched even just her labia majora, we have to acquit him for the 24 March 1999 incident.

As regards the rape purportedly committed on 25 March 1999, AAA’s sworn statement, like her testimony, contained
a mere conclusion that she was raped by appellant on that day which we find insufficient to support a finding of
appellant’s guilt.

We now turn to the appropriate penalties that should be imposed upon appellant for the two counts of acts of
lasciviousness and one count of rape. Appellant contends, and the Court of Appeals and the Office of the Solicitor
General agree with him, that the trial court erred in appreciating AAA’s minority in determining the imposable
penalties on him. We find merit in this contention.

While it is alleged in the Informations that AAA was only 16 years old at the time the crimes charged were
committed, nevertheless, the prosecution failed to substantiate said allegation. In establishing the minority of the
alleged victim, the courts are to be guided by our pronouncement in the case of People v. Pruna,42 to wit:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of
live birth of such party.
41

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school
records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or
consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following
circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years
old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years
old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18
years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives
concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted
by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to
object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. 43

In the case at bar, we cannot simply rely on BBB’s unsubstantiated claim with regard to AAA’s age, particularly
since the loss of her birth certificate was not sufficiently established. We cannot overemphasize the importance of
fixing with exactitude AAA’s age, for under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, rape by sexual intercourse is
punishable by the supreme penalty of death in case "the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim." The severity, permanence and irreversible nature of the penalty
prescribed by law makes the decision-making process in capital offenses, such as qualified rape, subject to the
most exacting rules of procedure and evidence.44

On the other hand, the alternative circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code should
be considered against appellant since in crimes against chastity, like acts of lasciviousness, relationship is
considered aggravating.45 In this case, as it was clearly mentioned in the Informations and admitted by appellant that
AAA is his daughter, their relationship aggravated the two charges of acts of lasciviousness.

Acts of lasciviousness is punished under the Revised Penal Code by prision correccional. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and taking into consideration the aggravating circumstance of relationship, appellant
should be made to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6)
years of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, appellant is to pay the amount of ₱30,000.00 as moral
damages for each count of acts of lasciviousness.46

With respect to Criminal Case No. M-99-1447-H, because of the prosecution’s failure to establish with certainty that
AAA was still a minor at the time the incestuous rape was committed by appellant, the appropriate penalty should
only be reclusion perpetua in accordance with the first sentence of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code which
states that rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, or rape by sexual intercourse, shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua. In addition to this, and consistent with the prevailing jurisprudence,47 appellant is also held liable to AAA in
the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 31 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS:

A. Appellant Benigno Fetalino y Gabaldon is hereby found GUILTY:

1. In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1445, of acts of lasciviousness and he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
prison term of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum
and to pay AAA the amount of Thirty Thousand (₱30,000.00) Pesos as moral damages;

2. In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1446, of acts of lasciviousness and he is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
prison term of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum
and to pay AAA the amount of Thirty Thousand (₱30,000.00) pesos as moral damages;
42

3. In Criminal Case No. MC-99-1447-H, of rape through sexual intercourse, and he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amount of fifty thousand (₱50,000.00) pesos as civil indemnity,
fifty thousand (₱50,000.00) pesos as moral damages, and twenty-five thousand (₱25,000.00) pesos as exemplary
damages.

B. Appellant is ACQUITTED of the charges in MC-99-1448-H and MC-99-1449-H on grounds of reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 107383             February 20, 1996

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's
clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the
clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's
secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of
private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries,
Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for
legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner.
The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3
of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta
and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00,
as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of
preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and
representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in
question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.

There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin,
and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the
trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return
them to private respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's decision, petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix,
Jr., this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in that
1 

case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did not constitute
malpractice or gross misconduct, For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things,
private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in
evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial
court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix;
Jr. which it found to be "impressed with merit:"2

On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:

....
43

4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial Court, there
was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents
Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a
petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set
aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's request
for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as
malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned
annexes, At that point in time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use petitioner's admission
as evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati?
Respondent submits it is not malpractice.

Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under oath,
Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him.
Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission and use
the same in her action for legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.

Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration that his use of
the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's admission as to their genuiness and authenticity
did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case
establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in question.

It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents and papers, enforcement
of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually
lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the
prohibition against the further use of the documents and papers became effective again.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring
"the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the
3 

wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from
a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision
4 

renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."  5

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the
other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does
not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to
him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband
nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence
6 

by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
7 

communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 150224             May 19, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, sentencing
appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide, and ordering him to
pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in the
44

amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of
P186,410.00, or total damages amounting to P511,410.00, and costs of litigation.1

Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information:

That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused, in order to have carnal knowledge of a certain KATHYLYN D. UBA, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with use of a bladed weapon stab the latter inflicting
upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death of the victim, and on the occasion or by reason thereof,
accused, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of force and violence had carnal knowledge of
said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

The facts are:

On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn Uba, were
on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They
were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, appellant Joel Yatar, through
Kathylyn’s friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed the letter to appellant earlier that morning.3

At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in
Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that she
intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to leave, she would just stay home and wash
her clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in the house.4

Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel. They saw
appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the house through the back door of the kitchen to have a drink
of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the
house of his mother.5

At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the ladder from the
second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the house.6 She later noticed appellant,
who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back and forth at the back of the house. She did
not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang.7

At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was wearing a black
shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the lumber he had stacked, and
that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellant’s eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her where her
husband was as he had something important to tell him. Judilyn’s husband then arrived and appellant immediately
left and went towards the back of the house of Isabel.8

In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house were off. She
called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open. She noticed that the water
container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She went up the ladder to the second floor of
the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a
knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.9

Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of her granddaughter,
Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a flashlight by Judilyn. She focused
the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines protruding out of her stomach.
Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police.10

At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found in Isabel Dawang’s
house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and found the naked body of Kathylyn Uba
with multiple stab wounds.

The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the ladder of the house of
Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.

The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her naked cadaver at
the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters from the house of
Isabel.

When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylyns’s death,11 however, he was
placed under police custody.
45

On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar Abagan
accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police station. They suddenly heard
someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (He’s running away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited
through the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running away. Appellant was approximately 70 meters
away from the station when Police Officer Abagan recaptured him.12 He was charged with Rape with Homicide.
When he was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty."

After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was
accordingly, sentenced to Death.

Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In his Brief, appellant
assigns the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY
THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.

II

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT.

Appellant’s contentions are unmeritorious.

The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against appellant. This Court will
not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears in the
record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which
has been misinterpreted.13 Well-entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses
are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the
disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the
witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.14 Absent any showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the
case, the trial judge’s assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court’s highest respect.15 Where there is
nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are
entitled to full faith and credit.16

The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which provides that an
accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial evidence is
presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.17

Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5) incised, were found on
the victim’s abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small intestines to spill out of her body.18 Rigor mortis of the
vicitm’s body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998. According to him,
the time of death may be approximated from between nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of rigor
mortis.19 In other words, the estimated time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30,
1998. This was within the timeframe within which the lone presence of appellant lurking in the house of Isabel
Dawang was testified to by witnesses.

It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo,
indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on the victim,20 Dr. Bartolo discovered
the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the
introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be done through sexual intercourse with the victim.21 In
addition, it is apparent from the pictures submitted by the prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim was
manifested by a bruise and some swelling in her right forearm indicating resistance to the appellant’s assault on her
virtue.22

Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen from the
vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene type.

DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms.23 A person’s DNA is the same in
each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is the same as the
DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and
rectal cells.24 Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the
same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.25
46

DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime,
or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal
investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist
immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the
guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.

DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in the
same principle as fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as
hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber
from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the victim’s body during the
assault.27 Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a
victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to
place the suspect at the scene of the crime.28

The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this case, used the
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR testing,
tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for
analysis has become much easier since it became possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR
method.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.29

In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness
on DNA print or identification techniques.30 Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was determined that the gene type
and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination.31 The blood sample taken
from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and
CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victim’s vaginal canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists
between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course
of the trial.

Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the Philippine criminal
justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can
benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the
prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used
as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony
they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such
novel procedure.

Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence
or non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing
and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is
reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.

Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal, the trial court
appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba;
(2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the
victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen
by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel
Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the
ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a
black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan
saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was
found dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The
victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of
the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery; (10)
Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white
shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared
with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but
was subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt.35
47

Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair
and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine
whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.36

In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him as well as
the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination
under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.

This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination
but as part of object evidence.

We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from
him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair samples may be
admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence
communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.

Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is
no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,39 where immediately after the incident, the police
authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the
right against self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his
involvement in an offense of which he is accused.

It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was conducted in open
court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.

Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional on the
ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law.

This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing involves
the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post
facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the probative weight
of the evidence presented.

Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and bloodied shirt,
notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawang’s house during the time when the crime
was committed, undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998 incident. Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and
convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two places at the same time, especially in this case where the two
places are located in the same barangay.40 He lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the
crime, and requires a mere five minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact severely weakens his alibi.

As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a quo committed reversible error in convicting
him of the crime charged. He alleges that he should be acquitted on reasonable doubt.

Appellant’s assertion cannot be sustained.

Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere conjectures or
suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something more than a minimum of probative value,"
suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a "plus value."41 This may be necessary to preclude the trial
court from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty
conclusions. Evidence without "plus value" may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is
incumbent upon the trial court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that would
result from its admission.

The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which the court can
properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires
moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces and
directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously
upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable doubt.42 This requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of
a conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one
else, committed the offense charged.43 In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus far, we rule that the
present case passes the test of moral certainty.
48

However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond reasonable
doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit.44

Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she last saw the victim alive in
the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang.45 She witnessed the appellant running down the stairs
of Isabel’s house and proceeding to the back of the same house.46 She also testified that a few days before the
victim was raped and killed, the latter revealed to her that "Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she came from the
school."47 The victim told Judilyn about the incident or attempt of the appellant to rape her five days before her
naked and violated body was found dead in her grandmother’s house on June 25, 1998.48 In addition, Judilyn also
testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated from her husband, "this Joel Yatar
threatened to kill our family."49 According to Judilyn, who was personally present during an argument between her
aunt and the appellant, the exact words uttered by appellant to his wife in the Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I
will kill all your family and your relatives x x x."50 These statements were not contradicted by appellant.

Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case. It is a rule in criminal
law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the
accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may express it or from
which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred.51

Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or on the occasion thereof, in order
to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed the victim’s lips by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her
untimely demise.

The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a
woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason
or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, appellant killed the
woman.52 However, in rape committed by close kin, such as the victim’s father, step-father, uncle, or the common-
law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed.53 Moral influence or
ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.54 The fact that the victim’s hymen is intact does not negate
a finding that rape was committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female genital organ, even without
rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction of rape.55 The strength and dilatability of the hymen are
invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations
does not disprove sexual abuse especially when the victim is of tender age.56

In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victim’s aunt. He is seven years older than the victim Kathylyn
Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his mother-in-law, together with the victim
and his wife. After the separation, appellant moved to the house of his parents, approximately one hundred (100)
meters from his mother-in-law’s house. Being a relative by affinity within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal
contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the victim.

Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed when by reason or on the occasion
of the rape, homicide is committed. Although three (3) Justices of this Court maintain their position that R.A. 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, they nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that
the law is not unconstitutional, and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00,57 actual damages incurred by the family of the victim that
have been proved at the trial amounting to P93,190.00,58 and moral damages of P75,000.0059 should be awarded in
the light of prevailing law and jurisprudence. Exemplary damages cannot be awarded as part of the civil liability
since the crime was not committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.60

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25 in Criminal
Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with
Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED to pay the family of the victim Kathylyn Uba
civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral
damages. The award of exemplary damages is DELETED.

Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 25
of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the
possible exercise of the pardoning power.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE v. JOEL YATAR alias “KAWIT”, GR No. 150224, 2004-05-19

49

Facts:
Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide
Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in Nagbitayan some two
kilometers away.
Kathylyn was left alone in the house.
Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house were off. She called out for her
granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open. She noticed that the water
container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that... day was still empty. She went up the ladder to the
second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a rope, so
she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.
She found out that it was the naked body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the ladder of the
house of Isabel Dawang
When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylyns's death...
appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar Abagan accompanied
him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police station. They suddenly heard someone
shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (He's... running away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited
through the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running away. Appellant was approximately 70
meters away from the station when Police Officer Abagan recaptured him.[12] He was charged with
Rape... with Homicide. When he was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty."...
appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide... and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.
Issues:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED
BY THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT.
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him
as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right
against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the
Constitution.
Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional
on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law.
Ruling:
Appellant's contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against appellant. This
Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless
there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of... weight and influence which has been
overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.[13] Well-entrenched is the rule that the
findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent...
reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the reason being
that the former is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their
deportment, conduct and attitude.[14] Absent... any showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the
case, the trial judge's assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court's highest respect.[15]
Where... there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper
motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.[16]
The weight of the prosecution's evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which
provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient
circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt... that the accused
committed the crime.
Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5) incised,
were found on the victim's abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small intestines to spill out of her
50

body.[18] Rigor mortis of the... vicitm's body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00
a.m. on July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of death may be approximated from between nine (9) to
twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of rigor mortis.[19] In other... words, the estimated time of death
was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the timeframe within
which the lone presence of appellant lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was testified to by witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej Evan C.
Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on the victim,[20] Dr.
Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the... vaginal canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr.
Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be done through sexual
intercourse with the victim.[21] In addition, it is apparent from the pictures submitted by the... prosecution
that the sexual violation of the victim was manifested by a bruise and some swelling in her right forearm
indicating resistance to the appellant's assault on her virtue.
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen
from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant's gene type.
because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the
notable exception of identical... twins.
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect
to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been left. For
purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source... of both inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion
in the same principle as fingerprints are used.
If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples
to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors:
how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples,
the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether... the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an
expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques.[30] Based on Dr. de Ungria's testimony, it was
determined that the gene type and DNA profile of... appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of
examination.
Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the
appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,[33] it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles
could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater
discretion over which testimony they would... allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of
scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-
existence.[34] Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR
testing and... utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable
since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellant's semen found in the victim's vaginal canal, the trial
court appreciated... circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which leads
to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the
crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial... evidence, three requisites must concur: (1)
there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion.[37] The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from
the lips of the accused an admission of... guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be
excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
51

Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA,
as there is no testimonial compulsion involved.
The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an
offense of which he is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was
conducted in open court... in the presence of counsel.
This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing
involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court.
Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a... question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual
determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.
Appellant's twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and bloodied
shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawang's house during the time
when the crime was committed, undeniably link him to the... incident. Appellant did not demonstrate with
clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two places at the same time, especially in this case
where the two places are located in the same barangay.[40] He lives within a one hundred (100) meter...
radius from the scene of the crime, and requires a mere five minute walk to reach one house from the
other. This fact severely weakens his alibi.
Appellant's assertion cannot be sustained.
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere
conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something more than a minimum of
probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a
"plus value."[41] This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight
value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without "plus value"
may be logically relevant but not legally... sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court to
balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that would result from its admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which the court
can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable
doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a... conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of
certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those
who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable doubt.[42] This requires
that... the circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the
whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no one else, committed the offense charged.[43]
In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus... far, we rule that the present case passes the test of
moral certainty.
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit.
Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she last saw the
victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang.[45] She witnessed the
appellant running down the stairs of Isabel's... house and proceeding to the back of the same house.[46]
She also testified that a few days before the victim was raped and killed, the latter revealed to her that
"Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she came from the school."[47]
The victim told Judilyn about the incident or attempt of the appellant to rape her five days before her
naked and violated body was found dead in her grandmother's house on June 25, 1998.[48] In addition,
Judilyn also testified that when her auntie Luz
Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated from her husband, "this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our
family.
Thus, appellant's motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case. It is a rule in
criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or
statements of the accused before or immediately after... the commission of the offense, deeds or words
that may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred.
Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide.

G.R. No. 97525. April 7, 1993.

52

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOEL SARTAGODA y BOCANEGRA, JIMMY BASCUÑA y LAZARTE, VICENTE STA. ANA y GUTIERREZ and
JOHN DOE, accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Ernesto M. Maiquez for accused-appellants.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINGERPRINTS; ABSENCE THEREOF DOES NOT ELIMINATE POSSIBILITY
THAT ACCUSED COULD HAVE BEEN AT SCENE OF THE CRIME. — Although We agree with their opinion that a
positive finding of matching fingerprints has great significance, We cannot sustain their theory that from the negative
findings in the fingerprint examination conducted in the course of the investigation in the instant case, it must be
concluded that they could not have been at the scene of the crime. Negative findings do not at all times lead to a
valid conclusion for there may be logical explanations for the absence of identifiable latent prints other than their not
being present at the scene of the crime. Only latent fingerprints found on smooth surface are useful for purposes of
comparison in a crime laboratory because prints left on rough surfaces result in dotted lines or broken lines instead
of complete and continuous lines. Such kind of specimen cannot be relied upon in a fingerprint examination. The
latent fingerprints are actually oily substance adhering to the surfaces of objects that come in contact with the
fingers. By their very nature, oily substances easily spread such that when the fingers slide against the surface they
touch, no identifiable latent print is left, only smudges instead. Not all police investigators are aware of the nature of
latent fingerprints so as to be guided accordingly in deciding which objects to submit for fingerprint lifting and
examination. Noting the interplay of many circumstances involved in the successful lifting and identification of proper
latent fingerprints in a particular crime scene, the absence of one does not immediately eliminate the possibility that
the accused-appellants could have been at the scene of the crime. They may be there yet they had not left any
identifiable latent fingerprint. Besides, in the case at bar, only ten latent fingerprints are involved. The findings in this
particular fingerprint examination are not sufficient to case even just a reasonable doubt in their finding of guilt for
the crime charged.

2. ID.; ID.; IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED; POLICE LINE-UP NOT REQUIRED BY LAW FOR PROPER
IDENTIFICATION; FACE AND BODY MOVEMENT OF ASSAILANT CREATE LASTING IMPRESSION ON VICTIM.
— Whether or not there was a previous police line-up, the fact is that they were positively identified at the trial.
There is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. The complainant's recognition of the
accused-appellants as her attackers cannot be doubted for she had during the carnal acts ample opportunity to see
the faces of the men who ravaged her. It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see
the looks and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the
face of the assailant and body movement thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot easily be erased from
their memory.

3. ID.; ID.; NON-FLIGHT NOT PROOF OF INNOCENCE; CASE AT BAR. — They claim that the fact that Vicente
Sta. Ana and Jimmy Bascuña did not flee, even when they had all the opportunities to do so, prove their innocence.
When they were allowed to go home after Vilma failed to identify them during the first confrontation at the police
station, they stayed home and did not flee until they were again required to appear at the police station for the
second time. The accused-appellants in effect posit that if flight is an indication of guilt, non-flight or the decision not
to flee, having the opportunity to do so, is a sign of innocence. We do not agree. Although it is settled that
unexplained flight indicates guilt, it does not necessarily follow that absence thereof proves innocence, specially so
when there is overwhelming evidence to establish their guilt.

4. ID.; APPEAL; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL JUDGE ENTITLED TO HIGHEST RESPECT; EXCEPTION. —
this Court finds no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in convicting the three accused-
appellants for the crime of robbery with multiple rape under Article 294 par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. We affirm
its findings of fact which are firmly grounded on the evidence presented at the trial. We reiterate our ruling thus:
"There is need to stress anew that this Court has long been committed to the principle that the determination by a
trial judge who could weigh and appraise the testimony as to the facts fully proved is entitled to the highest respect,
unless it could be shown that he ignored or disregarded circumstances of weight or influence sufficient to call for a
different finding."

5. CRIMINAL LAW; CIVIL LIABILITY OF PERSONS GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY; INDEMNITY TO
VICTIM FOR MULTIPLE RAPE ATTENDED BY CONSPIRACY; ACCUSED SOLIDARILY LIABLE THEREFOR. —
With regard to the indemnity to Vilma de Belen for multiple rape, there having been evidence of conspiracy, the act
of one being the act of all, each must be liable for all the three rapes committed, they must be held solidarily liable
for said indemnity which the trial court fixed at P30,000.00 for each offender or a total of P90,000.00.

6. ID.; ID.; IN MULTIPLE RAPE ACCUSED NOT REQUIRED TO RECOGNIZE OFFSPRING. — This Court cannot
uphold the trial court's ruling ordering each of the accused to "recognize the offspring if there by any." In multiple
53

rape, not one maybe required to recognized the offspring of the offended woman. In a case where three persons,
one after another, raped a woman, neither of the accuse was ordered to recognize the offspring simply because it
was impossible to determine the paternity thereof.

DECISION

CAMPOS, JR., J p:

The Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 36, Calamba, Laguna convicted all three accused-
appellants in its decision ** dated November 7, 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused Joel Sartagoda y Bocanegra, Jimmy Bascoña (sic) y Lazarte
and Vicente Sta. Ana y Gutierrez all guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of the crime of Robbery With
Rape, defined and penalized in Article 294, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code; there being two aggravating
circumstances without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same, hereby sentences each of the said accused
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with the accessories provided for by the law.

Each of the three accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party Vilma de Belen the sum of P30,000.00, and
each of them shall recognize the offspring if there be any.

The said accused are likewise ordered to return the personal properties stolen or pay its equivalent amount of
P17,490.00 to Rogelio de Belen, the lawful owner thereof.

SO ORDERED." 1

The facts of the case may be summarized as follows:

It was the evening of July 2, 1988 while Rogelio de Belen, his two daughters and his sister Vilma de Belen were
sleeping in their house at Calamba, Laguna, when appellant broke in and woke him up, poking a knife at him. They
tied up his hands and made him lie flat on his stomach and asked for the key to his cabinet. Fearing for his life and
that of his companions, he reluctantly told them where the key was kept.

Just on the other room was Vilma, who heard whispers (kaluskos) but simply played possum. When the three saw
her on the bed, they approached her. One covered her mouth as another poked a knife at her neck. They
threatened to kill her if she should make an outcry.

They raised her blouse and removed her underwear. They tied both her hands so that she could offer no resistance.
She was at such a pitiful state when the accused Jimmy Bascuña went on top of her, kissing her on different parts of
her body, while Vicente Sta. Ana held her legs apart. Jimmy finally inserted his sex organ inside her and satisfied his
bestial desire. After Jimmy was over, Vicente took his turn and then Joel. After the three of them had successfully
deflowered Vilma, they left, carrying with them the money and other personal belongings of the de Belen family.

After the three men left, Rogelio, with his hands and feet still tied up, tried to get up from the bed and switched the
lights on and called to his neighbors for help. Vilma, meanwhile, had lost consciousness due to shock.

Meanwhile, Petra Lamire, his sister-in-law who lives right next to his house responded to his cry for help. She went
to their house and untied Rogelio. She saw Vilma with her upper body naked and sobbing so she covered Vilma
with a blanket. Soon after, his other sister-in-law also arrived. They reported the incident to the Barangay Captain.

They had Vilma examined by Dr. Danilo A. Ramirez at Dr. Jose Rizal Memorial Hospital at about 10:00 that same
morning. He conducted external and internal examinations. His external examination showed no physical injuries
except that he noted several abrasions at the genital area. His internal examination showed fresh lacerations of the
hymen at 9:00 and 4:00 positions. The vagina admitted two fingers with ease.

In the present appeal the lone assigned error is:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING (THAT) THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION UTTERLY
FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT HENCE, THEIR
ACQUITTAL IS INEVITABLE.

This appeal has no merit.

The accused-appellants fault the trial court of ignoring the fingerprint examination report submitted by the Crime
Laboratory of the PC/INP Camp Crame which stated that none of the specimen latent fingerprints were found to be
positive. It is their contention that since their fingerprints were not found in the objects found in the scene of the
crime they cannot be held guilty of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.
54

Although We agree with their opinion that a positive finding of matching fingerprints has great significance, We
cannot sustain their theory that from the negative findings in the fingerprint examination conducted in the course of
the investigation in the instant case, it must be concluded that they could not have been at the scene of the crime.
Negative findings do not at all times lead to a valid conclusion for there may be logical explanations for the absence
of identifiable latent prints other than their not being present at the scene of the crime.

Only latent fingerprints found on smooth surface are useful for purposes of comparison in a crime laboratory
because prints left on rough surfaces result in dotted lines or broken lines instead of complete and continuous lines.
Such kind of specimen cannot be relied upon in a fingerprint examination. The latent fingerprints are actually oily
substances adhering to the surfaces of objects that come in contact with the fingers. By their very nature, oily
substances easily spread such that when the fingers slide against the surface they touch, no identifiable latent print
is left, only smudges instead. Not all police investigators are aware of the nature of latent fingerprints so as to be
guided accordingly in deciding which objects to submit for fingerprint lifting and examination. Noting the interplay of
many circumstances involved in the successful lifting and identification of proper latent fingerprints in a particular
crime scene, the absence of one does not immediately eliminate the possibility that the accused-appellants could
have been at the scene of the crime. They may be there yet they had not left any identifiable latent fingerprint.
Besides, in the case at bar, only ten latent fingerprints are involved. The findings in this particular fingerprint
examination are not sufficient to cast even just a reasonable doubt in their finding of guilt for the crime charged.

The accused-appellants likewise contend that the police line-up had been irregularly conducted revealing
suggestibility to their prejudice. They accused Pat. Reyes of coaching complainant Vilma de Belen when she
identified her three assailants. They claim that it was Pat. Reyes' fault that "they were not allowed to select their
positions at the line-up; that they were not placed in line under a numeral against a wall marked to indicate their
respective height in feet and inches; that there was no record made of their descriptions and physical
characteristics; that the witness/victim was not out of view of the three (3) accused lined-up for identification
purposes." 2

We find these claims of irregularities of little if not, of no significance at all when considered in the light of the natural
desire in the victim to seek retribution not simply from anybody who may be put before her but from the very same
offenders who actually did violence against her. It would be most illogical for an outraged victim to direct her anger
against anyone other than her three offenders. We cannot accept the accused-appellants' claim that it was on Pat.
Reyes' suggestion that the victim pointed to the accused-appellants as her assailants. No amount of coaching will
be sufficient to counter the natural outrage of a rape victim against her abuser when said abuser is presented before
her in a police line-up. The outrage displayed by the rape victim was a spontaneous reaction. She identified her
assailants because of no other reason except to let people know who hurt her.

Whether or not there was a previous police line-up, the fact is that they were positively identified at the trial. There is
no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. 3 The complainant's recognition of the
accused-appellants as her attackers cannot be doubted for she had during the carnal acts ample opportunity to see
the faces of the men who ravaged her. It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see
the looks and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the
face of the assailant and body movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot easily be erased from
their memory. 4

The accused-appellants further claim that "the Medical Findings of Dr. Danilo Ramirez concludes that the alleged
victim of rape, Vilma de Belen must have had sexual experienced (sic) five (5) to six (6) days before the alleged
incident happened on July 2, 1988 at about 3 to 4 o'clock in the morning". 5 There is no truth to this claim. In fact,
there was no categorical or positive assertion on the part of Dr. Ramirez that the sexual intercourse with Vilma was
committed on the very date when the alleged "robbery with rape" took place on July 2, 1988.

This is a clear distortion of the testimony of Dr. Ramirez who on cross-examination testified as follows:

"ATTY. MAIQUEZ:

Q You cannot also determine when was the first and when was the last intercourse as per your examination?

FISCAL

Objection, witness is incompetent.

COURT

Witness may answer.

A The findings suggest that because of hymenal laceration the injuries was (sic) recent not more than one week, sir.

Q When you say it is not more than one week, could it be 6 or 5 days?
55

A Possible, sir.

Q When you say it is possible that the victim could have experienced sexual intercourse 6 to 5 days that was
indicated in your examination marked as Exh. A, can you determine as per your finding?

A Well, yes, sir, I placed fresh hymenal laceration because laceration will determine whether it is fresh or old
because of the characteristice (sic) of the laceration, sir.

Q At the time you examined the patient in your medical opinion it could have been 5 or 6 days had elapsed?

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. MAIQUEZ:

That will be all." 6

The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion to seek clarification in witness' testimony proceeded as follows:

"COURT:

Q Doctor, in your findings you noted that there was an abrasion?

A Yes, your Honor.

Q Is that more than one abrasion?

A I found 3 mm., your Honor.

WITNESS (continuing):

— and on the lower opening of the vagina on the right side, that is the only place, sir.

COURT:

Q Aside from that injury or rater (sic) that portion there is no other injury which you found?

A None, your Honor.

Q Because laceration stated in your medicolegal certificate that there was fresh hymenal laceration noted at 9 and 4
o'clock on the face of the clock?

A Yes, your Honor.

Q Do we gather it right when you stated in your medicolegal certificate fresh it is not yet healed?

A Yes, your Honor.

Q From that finding of yours regarding the existence of fresh hymenal laceration you said that it least one or 2 days
had elapsed before you have conducted the physical examination?

A Yes, your Honor.

Q In other words from one to 5 days?

A Yes, your Honor.

COURT:

Q But it is possible that it could be more than one or two days?.

WITNESS:

A Yes, your Honor." 7

56

It is evident that Dr. Ramirez never categorically concluded that the sexual intercourse causing the fresh hymenal
lacerations took place five to six days before the date of her examination. The accused-appellants' claim that the
sexual intercourse took place on June 26 or 27, 1988 is conjectural and without factual basis.

The claim of the accused-appellants that the prosecution failed to present rebuttal evidence to refute the averments
of Joel Sartagoda that they tried in vain to persuade him to admit the charge against him and to implicate his two (2)
co-accused did not deserve the attention of the trial court nor does it deserve Ours, being per se unacceptable and
unbelievable in the light of human experience.

Finally, they claim that the fact that Vicente Sta. Ana and Jimmy Bascuña did not flee, even when they had all the
opportunities to do so, prove their innocence. When they were allowed to go home after Vilma failed to identify them
during the first confrontation at the police station, they stayed home and did not flee until they were again required to
appear at the police station for the second time. The accused-appellants in effect posit that if flight is an indication of
guilt, non-flight or the decision not to flee, having the opportunity to do so, is a sign of innocence.

We do not agree. Although it is settled that unexplained flight indicates guilt, it does, not necessarily follow that
absence thereof proves innocence, specially so when there is overwhelming evidence to establish their guilt.

This Court finds no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in convicting the three accused-
appellants for the crime of robbery with multiple rape under Article 294 par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. We affirm
its findings of fact which are firmly grounded on the evidence presented at the trial. We reiterate our ruling thus:

"There is need to stress anew that this Court has long been committed to the principle that the determination by a
trial judge who could weigh and appraise the testimony as to the facts duly proved is entitled to the highest respect,
unless it could be shown that he ignored or disregarded circumstances of weight or influence sufficient to call for a
different finding." 8

We are for the affirmance of the conviction of the three accused-appellants. With regard to the indemnity to Vilma de
Belen for multiple rape, there having been evidence of conspiracy, the act of one being the act of all, each must be
liable for all the three rapes committed, they must be held solidarily liable 9 for said indemnity which the trial court
fixed at P30,000.00 for each offender or a total of P90,000.00. 10

However, this Court cannot uphold the trial court's ruling ordering each of the accused to "recognize the offspring if
there be any". In multiple rape, not one maybe required to recognized the offspring of the offended woman. In a
case 11 where three persons, one after another, raped a woman, neither of the accused was ordered to recognize
the offspring simply because it was impossible to determine the paternity thereof.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
accused-appellants are held jointly and severally liable to indemnify Vilma de Belen for multiple rape in the amount
of P90,000.00, and that none of the accused is required to recognize the offspring.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (plaintiff-appellee) vs. JOELSARTAGODA y BOCANEGRA, JIMMY BASCUÑA yLAZARTE,
VICENTE STA. ANA y GUTIERREZ and JOHNDOE, accused-appellants.G.R. No. 97525; April 7, 1993FACTS:All the three
accused-appellants were convicted by theTrial Court as the latter found all guilty beyond reasonabledoubt as co-
principals of the crime of Robbery with Rape, andeach sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetuawith the
accessories provided for by the law.The accused-appellants fault the trial court of ignoringthe fingerprint examination
report submitted by the CrimeLaboratory of the PC/INP Camp Crame which stated that noneof the specimen latent
fingerprints were found to be positive. It is their contention that since their fingerprints were notfound in the objects
found in the scene of the crime theycannot be held guilty of the crime charged beyondreasonable doubt.They claim that
the fact that Vicente Sta. Ana and JimmyBascuña did not flee, even when they had all theopportunities to do so, prove
their innocence.
57

A.M. NO. 01-7-01-SC.- RE: RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

EN BANC
RESOLUTION

Acting on the Memorandum dated 18 June 2001 of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court to Draft the rules
on E-Commerce Law [R.A. No. 8792] submitting the Rules on Electronic Evidence for this Court’s consideration and
approval, the Court Resolved to APPROVED the same.

The Rules on Electronic Evidence shall apply to cases pending after their effectivity. These Rules shall take effect on the
first day of August 2001 following their publication before the 20th of July in two newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines.
17th July 2001.

RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

RULE 1: COVERAGE

Section 1. Scope. – Unless otherwise provided herein, these Rules shall apply whenever an electronic data message, as
defined in Rule 2 hereof, is offered or used in evidence.
Section 2. Cases covered. – These Rules shall apply to all civil actions and proceedings, as well as quasi-judicial and
administrative cases.
Section 3. Application of the other rules on evidence. – In all matters not specifically covered by these Rules, the
Rules of Court and pertinent provisions of statues containing rules on evidence shall apply.

RULE 2: DEFINITION OF TERMS AND CONSTRUCTION

Section 1. Definition of Terms. – For purposes of these Rules, the following terms are defined, as follows:

(a) “Asymmetric or public cryptosystem” means a system capable of generating a secure key pair, consisting of a private
key for creating a digital signature, and a public key for verifying the digital signature.

(b) “Business records” include records of any business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit, or for legitimate purposes.

(c) “Certificate” means an electronic document issued to support a digital signature which purports to confirm the identity
or other significant characteristics of the person who holds a particular key pair.

(d) “Computer” refers to any single or interconnected device or apparatus, which, by electronic, electro-mechanical or
magnetic impulse, or by other means with the same function, can receive, record, transmit, store, process, correlate,
analyze, project, retrieve and/or produce information, data, text, graphics, figures, voice, video, symbols or other modes of
expression or perform any one or more of these functions.

(e) “Digital Signature” refers to an electronic signature consisting of a transformation of an electronic document or an
electronic data message using an asymmetric or public cryptosystem such that a person having the initial untransformed
electronic document and the signer’s public key can accurately determine:

(i) whether the transformation was created using the private key that corresponds to the signer’s public key; and

(ii) whether the initial electronic document had been altered after the transformation was made.

(f) “Digitally signed” refers to an electronic document or electronic data message bearing a digital signature verified by the
public key listed in a certificate.

(g) “Electronic data message” refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar
means.

(h) “Electronic document” refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other modes
of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or
by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored processed, retrieved or
produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any print-out or output, readable by sight or other
means, which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules, the
term “electronic document” may be used interchangeably with electronic data message”.

(i) “Electronic key” refers to a secret code which secures and defends sensitive information that crosses over public
channels into a form decipherable only with a matching electronic key.
58

(j) “Electronic signature” refers to any distinctive mark, characteristics and/or sound in electronic form. Representing the
identity of a person and attached to or logically associated with the electronic data message or electronic document or any
methodology or procedure employed or adopted by a person and executed or adopted by such person with the intention
of authenticating, signing or approving an electronic data message or electronic document. For purposes of these Rules,
an electronic signature includes digital signatures.

(k) “Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text messages, chatroom sessions,
streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or
retained.

(l) “Information and Communication System” refers to a system for generating, sending, receiving, storing or otherwise
processing electronic data messages or electronic documents and includes the computer system or other similar devices
by or in which data are recorded or stored and any procedure related to the recording or storage of electronic data
message or electronic document.

(m) “Key Pair” in an asymmetric cryptosystem refers to the private key and its mathematically related public key such that
the latter can verify the digital signature that the former creates.

(n) “Private Key” refers to the key of a key pair used to create a digital signature.

(o) “Public Key” refers to the key of a key pair used to verify a digital signature.

Section 2. Construction. – These Rules shall be liberally construed to assist the parties in obtaining a just, expeditious,
and inexpensive determination of cases.

The Interpretation of these Rules shall also take into consideration the international origin of Republic Act No. 8792,
otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act.

RULE 3: ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

Section 1. Electronic documents as functional equivalent of paper-based documents. – Whenever a rule of

evidence refers to the term of writing, document, record, instrument, memorandum or any other form of writing, such term
shall be deemed to include an electronic document as defined in these Rules.
Section 2. Admissibility. – An electronic document is admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility
prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by these Rules.

Section 3. Privileged communication. – The confidential character of a privileged communications is not solely on the
ground that it is in the form of an electronic document.

RULE 4: BEST EVIDENCE RULE

Section 1. Original of an electronic document. – An electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an
original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to
reflect the data accurately.
Section 2. Copies as equivalent of the originals. – When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the
same time with identical contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same
matrix, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which
is accurately reproduces the original, such copies or duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the
original.Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or duplicates shall not be admissible to the same extent as the original if:

(a) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original; or

(b) in the circumstances it would be unjust or inequitable to admit a copy in lieu of the original.

RULE 5: AUTHENTICATION OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal
proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.
Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:

(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;

(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by
law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document; or

(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.
59

Section 3. Proof of electronically notarized document. – A document electronically notarized in accordance with the
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court shall be considered as a public document and proved as a notarial document
under the Rules of Court.

RULE 6: ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES

Section 1. Electronic signature. – An electronic signature or a digital signature authenticate din the manner prescribed
hereunder is admissible in evidence as the functional equivalent of the signature of a person on a written document.
Section 2. Authentication of electronic signatures. – An electronic signature may be authenticate in any of the
following manner:

(a) By evidence that a method or process was utilized to establish a digital signature and verity the same;

(b) By any other means provided by law; or

(c) By any other means satisfactory to the judge as establishing the genuineness of the electronic signature.

Section 3. Disputable presumptions relation to electronic signature. – Upon the authentication of an electronic
signature, it shall be presumed that:

(a) The electronic signature is that of the person to whom it correlates;

(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of authenticating or approving the electronic
document to which it is related or to indicate such person’s consent to the transaction embodied therein; and

(c) The methods or processes utilized to affix or verity the electronic signature operated without error or fault.

Section 4. Disputable presumptions relating to digital signatures. – Upon the authentication of a digital signature, it
shall be presumed, in addition to those mentioned in the immediately preceding section, that:

(a) The information contained in a certificate is correct;

(b) The digital signature was created during the operational period of a certificate;

(c) The message associated with a digital signature has not been altered from the time it was signed; and

(d) A certificate had been issued by the certification authority indicated therein

RULE 7: EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT OF ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS

Section 1. Factors for assessing evidentiary weight. – In assessing the evidentiary weight of an electronic document,
the following factors may be considered:

(a) The reliability of the manner or method in which it was generated, stored or communicated, including but not limited to
input and output procedures, controls, tests and checks for accuracy and reliability of the electronic data message or
document, in the light of all the circumstances as well as any relevant agreement;

(b) The reliability of the manner in which its originator was identified;

(c) The integrity of the information and communication system in which it is recorded or stored, including but not limited to
the hardware and computer programs or software used as well as programming errors;

(d) The familiarity of the witness or the person who made the entry with the communication and information system;

(e) The nature and quality of the information which went into the communication and information system upon which the
electronic data message or electronic document was based; or

(f) Other factors which the court may consider as affecting the accuracy or integrity of the electronic document or
electronic data message.

Section 2. Integrity of an information and communication system. – In any dispute involving the integrity of the
information and communication system in which an electronic document or electronic data message is recorded or stored,
the court may consider, among others, the following factors:

(a) Whether the information and communication system or other similar device was operated in a manner that did not
affect the integrity of the electronic document, and there are no other reasonable grounds to doubt the integrity of the
information and communication system;
60

(b) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored by a party to the proceedings with interest adverse to that of
the party using it; or

(c) Whether the electronic document was recorded or stored in the usual and ordinary course of business by a person
who is not a party tot he proceedings and who did not act under the control of the party using it.

RULE 8: BUSINESS RECORDS AS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE

Section 1. Inapplicability of the hearsay rule. – A memorandum, report, record or data compilation of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made by electronic, optical or other similar means at or near the time of or from
transmission or supply of information by a person with knowledge thereof, and kept in the regular course or conduct of a
business activity, and such was the regular practice ot make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation by
electronic, optical or similar means, all of which are shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witnesses,
is excepted from the rule or hearsay evidence.
Section 2. Overcoming the presumption. – The presumption provided for in Section 1 of this Rule may be overcome by
evidence of the untrustworthiness of the source of information or the method or circumstances of the preparation,
transmission or storage thereof.

RULE 9: METHOD OF PROOF

Section 1. Affidavit of evidence. – All matters relating to the admissibility and evidentiary weight of an electronic
document may be established by an affidavit stating facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiant or based on
authentic records. The affidavit must affirmatively show the competence of the affiant to testify on the matters contained
therein.
Section 2.  Cross-examination of deponent. – The affiant shall be made to affirm the contents of the affidavit in open
court and may be cross-examined as a matter of right by the adverse party.

RULE 10: EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES

Section 1. Electronic testimony. – After summarily hearing the parties pursuant to Rule 9 of these Rules, the court may
authorize the presentation of testimonial evidence by electronic means. Before so authorizing, the court shall determine
the necessity for such presentation and prescribe terms and conditions as may be necessary under the circumstance,
including the protection of the rights of the parties and witnesses concerned.
Section 2.  Transcript of electronic testimony. – When examination of a witness is done electronically, the entire
proceedings, including the questions and answers, shall be transcribed by a stenographer, stenotypes or other recorder
authorized for the purpose, who shall certify as correct the transcript done by him. The transcript should reflect the fact
that the proceedings, either in whole or in part, had been electronically recorded.
Section 3. Storage of electronic evidence. – The electronic evidence and recording thereof as well as the stenographic
notes shall form part of the record of the case. Such transcript and recording shall be deemed prima facie evidence of
such proceedings.

RULE 11: AUDIO, PHOTOGRAPHIC. VIDEO AND EPHEMERAL EVIDENCE

Section 1. Audio, video and similar evidence. – Audio, photographic and video evidence of events, acts or transactions
shall be admissible provided is shall be shown, presented or displayed to the court and shall be identified, explained or
authenticated by the person who made the recording or by some other person competent to testify on the accuracy
thereof.
Section 2.  Ephemeral electronic communication. – Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof. In the absence or unavailability of
such witnesses, other competent evidence may be admitted.A recording of the telephone conversation or ephemeral
electronic communication shall be covered by the immediately preceding section.If the foregoing communications are
recorded or embodied in an electronic document, then the provisions of Rule 5 shall apply.

RULE 12: EFFECTIVITY

Section 1. Applicability to pending case. – These Rules shall apply to cases pending after their effectivity.
Section 2. Effectivity. – These Rules shall take effect on the first day of August 2001 following their publication before
the 20th day of July 2001 in two newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.