MAULA, Joshua Miguel R.

(2018110453) Administrative Law

2B2 Atty. Ryan Quilala

II. Powers of Administrative Agencies

c. Investigative, Fact-Finding, Rate-Fixing, and Licensing Powers

CASES:

1. Ruperto vs. Torres (unreported)

2. Secretary of Justice vs. Lantion (322 SCRA 160 [January 18,

2000])

Nature: Petition for Review of the Regional Trial Court Decision

Facts:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the
Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign
Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of incorporation
under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of
crime both in the state where it was committed and the state where
the criminal may have escaped; the extradition treaty with the
Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the Philippines to enter
into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need for
rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper
implementation of said treaties.

On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon

(petitioner) , representing the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government
of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US
Extradition Treaty).

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the

Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing
a request for the extradition of Mark Jimenez (private respondent) to
1
the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury
Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court,
Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for
said extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent
appears to be charged in the United States with violation of the
following provisions of the United States Code (USC):

A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United

States; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty — 5 years on each count);

B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum
Penalty — 5 years on each count);

C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts;

Maximum Penalty — 5 years on each count);

D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum

Penalty — 5 years on each count);

E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33]

counts; Maximum Penalty — less than one year).

On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249

designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of
and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree
No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the "technical evaluation
and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in
support thereof.

Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private

respondent, through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999
addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition
request from the U.S. Government, as well as all documents and
papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the
requested papers. Private respondent also requested that the
proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.

Later, private respondent requested that preliminary, he be given at

least a copy of, or access to, the request of the United States
Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a
period of time to amplify on his request.

2
In response, petitioner denied the requests for the following reasons:

1. They find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition

request and supporting documents from the United States
Government, pending evaluation by this Department of the
sufficiency of the extradition documents submitted in accordance
with the provisions of the extradition treaty and our extradition law.

Under the Extradition Treaty and Extradition Law (P.D No. 1069), it
is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person
sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of
the petition, request and extradition documents and this Department
will not pose any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate
said documents.

2. In this particular extradition request, the United States

Government requested the Philippine Government to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of the subject information. The
Department's denial of the request is consistent with Article 7 of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty which provides that the Philippine
Government must represent the interests of the United States in any
proceedings arising out of a request for extradition. The Department
of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the counsel of the foreign
governments in all extradition requests.

3. The Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance

proceedings in connection with an extradition request. Article 26 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party
provides that "[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool
of criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests for
extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons must be
processed expeditiously.

The petition was raffled to the Regional Trial Court presided over by
Judge Ralph C. Lantion (public respondent). Judge Lantion
subsequently ordered herein petitioners to maintain the status quo
by refraining from committing the acts complained of.

3
The Court required private respondent Jimenez to file his comment.
In addition, Jimenez was also issued a temporary restraining order
to cease and desist from requesting said documents.
Section 5 of the Extradition Law provides:
. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the request fails to meet
the requirements of this law and the relevant treaty or convention, he shall forward the
request together with the related documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall
immediately designate and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case.

In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that

"[e]xtradition shall not be granted if the executive authority of the
Requested State determines that the request is politically motivated,
or that the offense is a military offense which is not punishable under
non-military penal legislation."

Issue: Whether or not it is the powers of the Secretary of Justice is

limited to the release of requested extradition documents.

Held:

Yes.

Philippine Extradition Law defines extradition as "the removal of an

accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the
disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or
government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation
directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him
under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government."

Consistent with the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice has the
ministerial duty to file the extradition petition after the request and
all the supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs. The latter has the authority to evaluate the said
papers.

Hence, as far as the validity of the request is concerned, the Secretary

of Justice has no authority to exercise judicial functions in that
behalf since it is already discretionary in nature. At best, the same
has quasi-judicial functions.

4
 3. Department of Health vs. Camposano (457 SCRA 438 [April
27, 2005])

Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari of a Court of Appeals

decision.

Facts:
The challenged Decision was based on the granted petition wherein
the Department of Health was ordered to reinstate petitioners (herein
respondents).

Respondents are former employees of the Department of Health–

National Capital Region (hereinafter DOH-NCR).

On May 15, 1996, some concerned DOH-NCR employees filed a

complaint before the DOH Resident Ombudsman Rogelio A. Ringpis
(hereinafter the Resident Ombudsman) against Dir. IV Rosalinda U.
Majarais, Acting Administrative Officer III Horacio Cabrera, and
respondents, arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-
NCR of 1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B
Complex and Folic Acid capsules worth ₱330,000.00 from Lumar
Pharmaceutical Laboratory on May 13, 1996.

On August 6, 1996, the Resident Ombudsman submitted an

investigation report to the Secretary of Health recommending the
filing of a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct against respondents and their co-respondents.

On August 8, 1996, the Secretary of Health filed a formal charge

against the [respondents] and their co-respondents for Grave
Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019. On October 25,
1996, then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued
Administrative Order No. 298 (hereafter AO 298) creating an ad-hoc
committee to investigate the administrative case filed against the
DOH-NCR employees. The said AO was indorsed to the Presidential
Commission Against Graft and Corruption (hereafter PCAGC) on
October 26, 1996.

On December 2, 1996, the PCAGC took over the investigation from

the DOH. After the investigation, it issued a resolution on January
23, 1998 disposing respondents’ case guilty as charged. It is therefore

5
recommended to the President Ramos the penalty of dismissal from
service be imposed.

"On April 20, 1998, President Ramos issued [Administrative Order

No. 390 (hereinafter AO 390)] that reads:

‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Dr. Rosalinda U. Majarais is hereby

found guilty as charged and, as recommended by the Presidential Commission Against
Graft and Corruption, is meted the Penalty of dismissal from the service. The records of
the case with respect to the other respondents are remanded to Secretary Carmencita
N. Reodica, Department of Health for appropriate action.’

"Thereafter, on May 8, 1998, the Secretary of Health issued an Order

disposing of the case against [respondents] and [Horacio Cabrera].
The dispositive portion reads:

‘WHEREFORE, pursuant to the Resolution rendered by the Presidential Commission

Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) dated 23 January 1998 on the above-captioned
case, respondents Priscilla G. Camposano, Financial Management Chief II, Horacio D.
Cabrera, Acting Administrative Officer V, Imelda Q. Agustin, Accountant I and Enrique
L. Perez, Acting Supply Officer III, all of the Department of Health – NCR are hereby
DISMISSED from the service.

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the

Secretary of Health. The same motion was denied by the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). However, the Court of Appeals (CA) appeal was
granted.

The CA held that the PCAGC’s jurisdiction over administrative

complaints pertained only to presidential appointees. Thus, the CSC
had no power to investigate the charges against respondents.
Moreover, in merely relying on the PCAGC’s findings, the Secretary
of Health failed to comply with administrative due process.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the PCAGC did not
have jurisdiction to investigate the anomalous transaction involving
respondents; and

(2) Whether or not the CA erred in concluding that the authority to

investigate and decide was relinquished by the Secretary of Health.

6
Held:

(1) Yes.

E.O. 151, which authorizes PCAGC to investigate charges against

presidential appointees only, already includes investigatory powers
involving non-presidential appointees per E.O. No. 12, which created
the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission. Hence, non-presidential
appointees who may have acted in conspiracy, or who may been
involved with a presidential appointee, may now be investigated by
the PAGC.

(2) No.

The Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with

the authority to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary
actions for officers and employees under the former’s jurisdiction.
Thus, the health secretary had disciplinary authority over
respondents.

Note that being a presidential appointee, Dr. Rosalinda Majarais was

under the jurisdiction of the President, in line with the principle that
the "power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint." While the
Chief Executive directly dismissed her from the service, he
nonetheless recognized the health secretary’s disciplinary authority
over respondents when he remanded the PCAGC’s findings against
them for the secretary’s "appropriate action."

7
 4. Pantranco South Express , Inc. vs. Board of Transportation
(191 SCRA 581 [November 22, 1990])

Nature: Petition for Certiorari and/or Prohibition to Review the Order

of the Board of Transportation.

Facts:
In 1971, the then Public Service Commission granted certificates of
public convenience to private respondent Batangas Laguna Tayabas
Bus Co., Inc. (BLTB) for the operation of twelve (12) bus units on the
Pasay City — Legaspi City line six (6) bus units on the Pasay City —
Bulan, Sorsogon line , and ten (10) bus units on the Pasay City —
Sorsogon line.

In 1975, petitioner Pantranco South Express, Inc. (PANTRANCO) filed

a complaint against BLTB before public respondent Board of
Transportation (BOT), charging it with abandonment of services on
said lines and praying for the cancellation of BLTB’s certificates of
public convenience. BLTB did not file any written answer.

Rather, in a motion, BLTB, referring to hearings before the BOT on

alleging, in essence, the extreme condition of the whole land
transportation industry (i.e. gasoline crisis, big floods, martial law,
expensive parts).

In essence, respondent prayed that the condition be considered in

relation to the willingness to operate, current validity of its certificate
of public convenience, and capability of respondents to operate.

It rationalized the non-cancellation of BLTB’s certificates of public

convenience, as follows:

"Sec. 16 (n) of the Public Service Law empowers this Board ‘to suspend or revoke any
certificate . . . whenever the holder thereof has violated or wilfully (sic) and
contumaciously refused to comply with any order, rule or regulation of the Board or any
provision of this Act.’. . .

"Judged by the foregoing standards, this Board declares the evidence of the complainant
to be sadly lacking in elements that would qualify the respondent’s failure to operate as
wilful and contumacious… On September 2, 1972, the respondent justified its non-
operation by writing to the Board, that because of unfinished portions of the road it
could not render the service authorized by the Board to be rendered. The Board never
overruled the respondent. (Underline supplied)

8
In this petition, PANTRANCO imputes grave abuse of discretion,
acting without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the BOT
when it issued the questioned order, as indicated by several
circumstance that it enumerated. Among these, only the following
deserve discussion:

1) refusal to cancel the certificates of public convenience of BLTB

despite its abandonment and/or non-operation on the subject lines
since August 5, 1971 up to the present;

2) using as basis for its questioned order BLTB’s letter dated

September 2, 1972 (wherein it justified its non-operation on account
of unfinished portions of the road) which is not part of the records of
the case; and

3) resorting to extraneous facts not supported by competent evidence

as basis for its conclusion that the demand of public need would be
more paramount than the need to penalize BLTB.

For its part, BLTB contends that:

1) the cancellation or non-cancellation of its certificates of public

convenience is addressed to the sound discretion of the BOT;

2) its letter dated September 18, 1972 (erroneously referred to as the

letter dated September 2, 1972) forms part of the BOT’s records; and

3) the BOT acted correctly in the exercise of its sound discretion and
within its jurisdiction when it found that the demand of public need
would be paramount than the need to penalize it (BLTB).

Issue: Whether or not BOT has the power to take into consideration
the result of its own investigation of the matter submitted to it for
decision.

Held:
Yes. The BOT is particularly a fact-finding body whose decisions on
questions regarding certificates of public convenience are influenced
not only by the facts as disclosed by the evidence in the case before
it but also by the reports of its field agents and inspectors that are
periodically submitted to it.

9
There can be no dispute that the law (Section 16 (n) of the Public
Service Act) gives to the BOT (successor of the Public Service
Commission) ample power and discretion to decree or refuse the
cancellation of a certificate of public convenience issued to an
operator as long as there is evidence to support its action

Taking into consideration BLTB’s letter dated September 18, 1972, it

acted in good faith when it did not immediately operate on those lines
and not because of a design to prejudice public interest. Certificates
of public convenience involve investment of a big amount of capital,
both in securing the certificate and in maintaining the operation of
the lines covered thereby, and mere failure to operate temporarily
should not be a ground for cancellation, especially as when, in the
case at bar, the suspension of the service was directly caused by
circumstances beyond the operator’s control

In the exercise of its power to grant or cancel certificates of public

convenience, the BOT is guided by public necessity and convenience
as primary considerations.

10
 5. Masangcay vs. COMELEC (6 SCRA 27 [September 28, 1962])

Nature: Appeal from a decision of the Commission on Elections.

Facts:
Petitioner Benjamin Masangcay (Masangcay), with several others,
was charged before the Commission on Election (COMELEC) with
contempt for having opened three boxes with serial numbers
containing official and sample ballots for the municipalities of the
province of Aklan, in violation of the instructions of said Commission
embodied in its resolution promulgated September 2, 1957, and its
unnumbered resolution date March 5, 1957, inasmuch as he opened
said boxes not in the presence of the division superintendent of
schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized
representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the
Citizens' Party. These are required in the aforesaid resolutions, which
are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and Rule
64 of the Rules of Court.

Masangcay was then the provincial treasurer of Aklan designated by

the Commission in its resolution to take charge of the receipt and
custody of the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as
of their distribution, among the different municipalities of the
province.

In compliance with the summons issued to Masangcay and his co-

respondents to appear and show cause why they should not be
punished for contempt, they all entered a plea of not guilty.

Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising the

constitutionality of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and Rule
64 of the Rules of Court concerning contempt.

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC has the power to punish for

contempt.

Held:
No. The COMELEC, in the exercise of its ministerial functions, such
as the distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among
the different municipalities, has no power to punish for contempt,
because such power is inherently judicial in nature. Otherwise, the
COMELEC exceed its jurisdiction making its decision null and void.
11
6. Gaoiran vs. Alcala (444 SCRA 428 [November 26, 2004])

Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari of a Decision of the Court of

Appeals.

Facts:
On October 29, 1997, a letter-complaint was filed with the Comission
on Higher Education (CHED) against petitioner Florian R. Gaoiran
(Gaoiran), Head Teacher III in the High School Department of the
Angadanan Agro-Industrial College (AAIC), a state-supervised school
in Angadanan, Isabela. In his letter-complaint, respondent Edmond
M. Castillejo (Castillejo), Administrative Officer II, also of the same
school, charged the petitioner with mauling him while he was
performing his duties therein. The incident allegedly took place on
August 15, 1997 at 2:30 p.m. inside the school premises. Appended
to the letter-complaint were the verified criminal complaint filed by
Castillejo against the Gaoiran and the sworn statements of his
witnesses. The criminal complaint for assault to a person in authority
was filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

The letter-complaint was referred to CHED. Thereafter, Atty. Felina

S. Dasig, then Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Director III, Legal
Affairs Service, conducted a fact-finding investigation on the mauling
incident to determine the existence of a prima facie case against the
petitioner.

During the fact-finding investigation, Castillejo averred that at 2:30

p.m. on August 15, 1997, while he was performing his usual duties
as Administrative Officer II, the Gaoiran suddenly barged into his
office and, then and there, assaulted and boxed him. Gaoiran
delivered blows on Castillejo’s head, left eye, left eyebrow and lower
lip. Not content with the injuries he inflicted on Castillejo, the he tried
to throw him down the stairs but was prevented by the timely
intervention of Mr. Ismael Bautista (Bautista), Accountant I of the
same school. Bautista and other employees of the AAIC corroborated
respondent Castillejo’s statements. Moreover, the medical certificate
showed wounds Castillejo sustained on his left eye, left eyebrow and
lower lip.

For his part, the Gaoiran averred that at around 2:30 p.m. of August
15, 1997, he was about to leave the school premises. Suddenly,
respondent Castillejo shouted to the security guard to "punch out"
12
the petitioner’s attendance card. This irked the him because there
were students and other teachers in the vicinity. Gaoiran confronted
Castillejo and asked the latter why he had to embarrass him
(petitioner) in front of the students. Castillejo just turned his back
and proceeded to his office. Gaoiran followed him and later saw that
Castillejo was already holding a wrench. Inside Castillejo’s office, the
Gaoiran made a side step and just then, Castillejo slipped and fell
flat on the floor. The petitioner noticed that respondent Castillejo’s
left eyebrow was bleeding and he was putting up a struggle
(nagpupumiglas), so the Gaoiran held his feet. While going down the
stairs, the Gaoiran met Bautista and Henry Rupac, Watchman I of
the school.

After the fact-finding investigation was terminated, and upon finding

of a prima facie case against Gaoiran for grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, Atty. Dasig
issued the Formal Charge and Order of Preventive Suspension.

Gaoiran did not submit his written counter-affidavit or answer to the

charges against him. Instead, he filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) a petition for certiorari and prohibition to restrain the
enforcement of the said preventive suspension order. However,
considering that Gaoiran had already served the suspension, the
case was dismissed for being moot and academic.

Gaoiran sought reconsideration of the formal charge and preventive

suspension order, contending that the letter-complaint was not
under oath and that he was not informed nor apprised of the
complaint against him before, during and after the preliminary fact-
finding investigation.

Thereafter, Joel Voltaire V. Mayo (Director Mayo), who was later

appointed Director of the Legal Affairs Service of the CHED, issued
the Resolution dated February 20, 1999, dismissing the
administrative complaint against Gaoiran on the ground that the
letter-complaint of Castillejo was not under oath.

However, respondent Hon. Angel C. Alcala (Alcala), then Chairman of

the CHED, apparently unaware of the existence of Director Mayo’s
resolution, issued another Resolution dated June 3, 1999, finding
Gaoiran guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service and dismissing him therefrom.
13
When Director Mayo of the Legal Affairs Service, in his February 20,
1999 Resolution, dismissed the administrative complaint against the
petitioner on the ground that the letter-complaint was not under
oath, the formal investigation had not, as yet, been terminated. Such
dismissal, according to the RTC, put an end to the litigation.

The Court of Appeals (CA) declared as valid Alcala’s June 3, 1999

Resolution, dismissing Gaoiran from the service. On the other hand,
it declared as "without legal effect" Director Mayo’s February 20, 1999
Resolution, dismissing the administrative complaint against the
petitioner.

The CA also held that, contrary to Director Mayo’s ruling, the fact
that the letter-complaint was not under oath was not fatal. Even an
anonymous complaint may be acted upon by the authority concerned
provided that the same is verifiable, since under Section 48 of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, administrative proceedings may be
commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the
Secretary or head of office of equivalent rank, or head of local
government or chiefs of agencies, or regional directors.

Issue: Whether or not the letter-complaint not verified under oath

invalidates the effectivity of the former.

Held:
No.

It must be pointed out that, while the letter-complaint of respondent

Castillejo was not concededly verified, appended thereto were the
verified criminal complaint that he filed against the petitioner, as well
as the sworn statements of his witnesses. These documents could
very well be considered as constituting the complaint against the
petitioner.

In fact, this Court, through the Court Administrator, investigates and

takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but also even anonymous
complaints filed against court employees or officials for violations of
the Code of Ethical Conduct. Indeed, it is not totally uncommon that
a government agency is given a wide latitude in the scope and
exercise of its investigative powers. After all, in administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied.
14
In any case, contrary to the Gaoiran’s assertion, the letter-complaint
of Castillejo is not a "complaint" within the purview of the provisions
mentioned above. In the fairly recent case of Civil Service
Commission v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the "complaint"
under E.O. No. 292 and CSC rules on administrative cases "both refer
to the actual charge to which the person complained of is required to
answer and indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation
should his answer be deemed not satisfactory."

15
 7. Evangelista vs. Jarencio (68 SCRA 99 [November 27, 1975])

Nature: Original Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and

prohibition with preliminary injunction.

Facts:
This is an original action seeking to annul and set aside the order of
respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in
Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon
D. Bagatsing, etc.", which reads as follows:

IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the writ
of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be issued
restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives, attorneys
and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in
connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and
from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under
Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code. (Stress supplied).

Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the

Revised Administrative Code, then President Marcos created the
Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations
(PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966.
Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and
responsibilities:

b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices,

graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness,
subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the
government and the public interests, and to submit proper
recommendations to the President of the Philippines.

c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of

Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to
establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully
amassed wealth.

h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations

of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any
public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper
charges with the appropriate agency.

16
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested
in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under
Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including
the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces
tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the
investigation.

Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as

Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando
Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a
subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as
witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS
AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and
testify in a certain investigation pending therein."

Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas

filed on June 25, 1968 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an
Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order docketed as Civil
Case No. 73305 and assailed its legality.

Issue: Whether the Agency herein enjoys the authority to issue

subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.

Held:
Yes. An administrative agency may be authorized to make
investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial
nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain
information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial
nature may be taken.

Administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course

of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and
whether or not probable cause is shown. The purpose of the
subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but
upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. Its
obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony sought; it
is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized
purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to have
information that might shed some helpful light.

17
Administrative agency has power of inquisition. It can investigate
merely suspicion that law is being violated or because it wants
assurance that it is not.

The following are the requisites for a valid administrative subpoena.

It must be (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is
not too indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant.

In the present case, respondent Fernando Manalastas is not facing

any administrative charge. He is merely cited as a witness in
connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and
irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of
submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or
to file the corresponding charges. Since the only purpose of
investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any
unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be
unwise. Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas
may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard
his privilege against self-incrimination.

Any unnecessary extension of investigation would be unwise.

However, respondent may contest any attempt in the investigation
that tends to disregard his privilege against self-incrimination.

In the present case, respondent Fernando Manalastas is not facing

any administrative charge. He is merely cited as a witness in
connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and
irregularities in the City Government of Manila with the object of
submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or
to file the corresponding charges. Since the only purpose of
investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any
unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be
unwise. Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas
may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard
his privilege against self-incrimination.

18
8. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz
(G.R. No. 84818 [December 18, 1989]).

Nature: Petition to Review the Order of the National Bureau of

Telecommunications Commission.

Facts (Tempo)

19