A Rough Glossary of Some Philosophical Terms

Note: There is also a brief glossary in the back of Problems in Mind.

A-E | F-J | K-O | P-T | U-Z

a posteriori
Posterior to and dependent on sensory or introspective experience. See a
priori.
a priori
Logically prior to or independent of experience. Depending on reason alone,
self-evident. A belief or claim may be said to be justified or known a priori
(or a posteriori). Beliefs or claims which are supposed to be justifiable or
knowable a priori are sometimes called a priori claims. Note that the priority
claimed is logical or epistemological, not psychological or generative. It is a
question of justification, not acquisition of the concepts involved in making
or understanding the claim; thus experience may be necessary to
understand the claim (one must learn a language), yet be unnecessary for
its justification. This last point, and the question of whether there is any
such thing as a priori justification/knowledge is debatable.
artificial intelligence
 
behaviorism
Behaviorism is usefully split into two kinds, with the first further split into
two sub-kinds:
 philosophical behaviorism: the view that, strictly speaking, our
folk psychological terms refer not to mental states, events, or
properties, but to behaviors and dispositions to behave; talk of
mental states/properties is to be redefined in terms of complex input-
output relations where inputs and outputs are described physically; in
principle, all talk of mental states disappears. This can further be
divided into two cases. The purely semantic point, which we may call
semantic or logical behaviorism, is consistent with dualism and
materialism (though most adherents were materialists), and to some
extent avoids the ontological problem by not committing on the
nature of mental states. The stronger position which includes the
semantic point and takes the further step of denying the existence of
mental states may be called ontological behaviorism.
 methodological behaviorism: the view that any new terms in
theoretical psychology be operationally defined in terms of publicly
observable circumstances and behaviors.

disposition
 
dualism
Most generally, the view that there are two basic ontological categories. In
the philosophy of mind this is a family of positions regarding the ontological
problem dividing roughly as follows:
 substance dualism
o Cartesian dualism: mind a separate and distinct substance
from material, not spatially extended, not subject to causal
laws
o popular dualism: mind is an as yet undiscovered kind of
spiritual substance, a sort of ghostly, spatially extended
substance which can interact with physical substance
 property dualism
 o epiphenomenalism: all stuff is physical, but certain physical
systems display emergent and irreducible non-physical
properties, these properties play no causal role in the
system’s behavior
o interactionist property dualism: as above, but mental
properties do play a causal role in the system's behavior
o elemental property dualism: as interactionist, but mental
properties are not emergent, they are basic

See also monism, materialism, minimal physicalism.

eliminative materialism
A non-reductive materialism. See materialism.
emergent
 
epistemology
The study of the nature knowledge and justification and the extent to which
we have either.
 
folk psychology
The common-sense, pre-theoretical, “person in the street” understanding of
our mental lives and outward behavior, which also forms the starting point
of just about all scientific psychology. Though this is controversial in certain
ways, folk psychology can be considered a sort of folk theory containing (on
the one hand) propositional attitude or belief-desire psychology—relating
beliefs and desires to actions; and (on the other hand) the common
introspective vocabulary for qualitative mental states (qualia), such as
sensation and emotion.
functionalism
Though consistent with dualism and idealism, this usually takes the form of
a non-reductive materialism. See materialism.
identity theory
Type identity theory is an alternate name for reductive materialism. See also
token identity.
intensional fallacy
 
intentionality
 
materialism
Most generally, the view that the one basic ontological category is material
substance or physical substance (for most of our purposes ‘material’ and
‘physical’ will be used equivalently, though the latter connotes some sort of
priviledged status for current scientific methodology, whereas the former
does not). In the philosophy of mind this is a family of positions regarding
the ontological problem dividing roughly as follows:
 philosophical behaviorism: See behaviorism.
 reductive materialism/type identity theory: mental states exist
and each (type of) mental state is identical to a specifiable (type of)
physical state of the brain; talk of mental states/properties can, in
principle, be redefined in terms of talk of brain states/properties; i.e.,
mental states/properties are reduced to or identical to brain
states/properties.
 functionalism: mental states are not reducible to physical states
(thus, this is a form of non-reductive materialism); instead, they are
computational and/or causal states of a system; the nature of a
mental state is determined by its computation and/or causal relation
to i) environmental stimuli, ii) other mental states, iii) behavioral
 outputs; one difference from behaviorism is that functionalism admits
mental states as part of understanding behaviors; one difference
from reductive materialism is that mental states are not identified
with brain states, but with computational/causal roles, which may be
differently instantiated in the same brain at different times or
differently instantiated in different brains (including different
species); e.g., pain may be defined (roughly) as the mental state
brought on by tissue damage, which gives rise to states of fear,
anxiety, and aggression, and gives rise to grimacing and avoidance
or attack behavior-such a definition could supposedly apply to a
human, a non-human animal, or a silicon-based alien, despite
differences in physical structure; in various forms, currently the most
widely held view.
 eliminative materialism: our common-sense mentalistic, folk
psychological understanding of ourselves and much of the scientific
psychology based upon it are radically false; a proper theory of mind
will be developed by advancing neuroscience, and will no longer
contain common-sense mentalistic categories, but will introduce a
radically new theory of our cognitive architecture and activities (thus,
this is a form of non-reductive materialism).

metaphysics
The study of the fundamental nature of being and reality; supposedly
distinct from physics, as it attempts to consider issues concerning the
existence and nature of non-physical entities, or the nature of being and
reality as such (in itself). See ontology, epistemology.
minimal physicalism
According to Jaegwon Kim minimal physicalism is comprised of three claims:
 mind-body supervenience: the mental supervenes on the physical
in that any two systems exactly alike in all physical respects cannot
differ in any mental respects; no mental difference without a physical
difference (this does allow for physical difference without a mental
difference-i.e., the same type of mental property can be associated
with different physical states or systems).
 anti-Cartesian principle: there are no purely mental creatures, if x
has mental property, then x has a physical property (M-B
supervenience technically allows for one purely mental creature).
 mind-body dependence: the mental properties of x are determined
by x s physical properties (M-B supervenience only states a
correlation, it does not give ontological or explanatory priority to
either the mental or the physical).

See also dualism, materialism.

monism
Most generally, the view that there one basic ontological category. In the
philosophy of mind this encompasses two positions regarding the ontological
problem, idealism, and materialism.
nomological danglers
 
non-reductive materialism
A subset of materialist positions which, in various ways, deny that mental
states are reducible to or identical to physical states. Most non-reductive
materialists, while denying type identity of mental states and physical
states, assert token identity of mental states and physical states.
Ockham’s razor
 Methodological principle which favors simpler theories over more complex
theories. The question of what counts as simplicity and in what aspect a
theory ought to enjoy it is a difficult one; the number of types of entities the
theory posits (don't posit more types of things than you need) or the
number of basic assumptions it involves (simplify the inferential base) are
two places one might require simplicity. Named for William of Ockham
(c.1285-1347), English Scholastic philosopher, the principle dates back to
Aristotle (384-322 BCE).
ontological problem
Also called the mind-body problem, this is the problem of determining the
fundamental nature of mental states and processes as well as their relation
to physical/material states and processes. See dualism, monism,
materialism.
ontology
Metaphysics, or a subdiscipline of metaphysics which investigates the
fundamental kinds of entities and relations which hold between them. The
ontological commitments of a theory—i.e., what kinds of entities a theory
assumes to exist; e.g., the ontology of Cartesian dualism is different from
that of eliminative materialism.
operational definition
This form of definition defines a term via the intersubjectively observable
tests we could carry out in order to determine whether the term applies. A
slightly oversimplified example is ‘x is soluble’ is equivalent to ‘if x were put
in unsaturated water, x would dissolve. This style of definition is important
to, among other things, behaviorism and behaviorist semantics.
ostensive definition
 
phenomenology
 
physicalism
See materialism.
prima facie
at first glance, on the first appearance. In legal contexts prima facie
evidence is considered sufficient to establish a claim in the absence of
counter-evidence; hence, in this context prima facie evidence is relatively
strong. In much philosophical writing, however, it is most often the case
that reasons or evidence is called prima facie as a rhetorical preamble to
presenting counter-evidence or counter-argument. Thus, in philosophical
contexts ‘prima facie’ carries the connotation not of strength, but of
weakness.
propositional attitudes
(PAs) Attitudinal states of persons which can be expressed in the form X
verbs that P, where X designates a person, verb is an attitudinal verb such
as ‘believes’, or ‘desires’, or ‘fears’, and P is a sentence or proposition. This
is a large part of folk and scientific psychology, as belief-desire explanations
appear to be the way we predict and explain people’s (including our own)
behavior. Example: Fred believes that there is a wasp buzzing about him; he
wants to avoid getting stung (Fred desires that Fred does not get stung);
Fred is afraid that he will have an allergic reaction to the sting of a wasp;
Fred runs through the yard shrieking and waving his arms wildly. The last
one is not a PA, but a description of behavior which (as lightly illustrated)
could be explained/predicted by folk psychological propositional attitude
ascriptions.
qualia
(QUAIL-yuh or QUAL-yuh singular: quale, QUAL-ee or -ay). Often referred to
a “raw feels”, qualia are those subjective, qualitative properties of mental
states such as sensations and emotions—the “what it is like” to see red, feel
 pain, be angry. Such mental states are thought to have intrinsic qualitative
features by which we identify them through introspection.
reduction, intertheoretic
One theory and/or domain of theoretical entities is said to reduce to (or be
identifiable with) a second theory or domain of entities if, loosely speaking,
the second theory captures all that the former does (and more); e.g.,
Newtonian physics may be said to reduce to the more encompassing Special
& General Relativity. But making this idea precise is problematic: classical
views of the reduction relation between scientific theories are often too
restrictive, requiring full translation of one theory into another, true identity
claims regarding entities in the reduced and reducing domain, or that the
reduced theory be implied by the reducing theory (with additional
assumptions). Churchland analyzes the relation differently: T-old reduces to
T-new just in case T-new implies a set of sentences which is smoothly
isomorphic with T-old; only then are we warranted in making identity claims
or claims of reduction. Note that smoothness is a matter of degree, and that
at the opposite end of the continuum from reduction is elimination—T-new
takes over, and T-old is rejected as radically false (as opposed to false in the
way in which Newtonian physics is false).
reductive materialism
See materialism.
scientific realism
 
solipsism
 
supervene, supervenience
See minimal physicalism.
Turing machine
 
Turing, A.
 
 
token identity theory
A weaker position than type identity/reductive materialism, this position
holds that every particular mental state (e.g., the pain in my left ankle the
instant after I first sprained it) is identical to some particular physical state,
but that mental state types (e.g., pains in general, or even ankle-sprain
pains in general) are not identical to physical state types. See non-reductive
materialism.
type identity theory
Alternate name for reductive materialism.