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A Decade of Feminist Critiques of The Natural Sciences
A Decade of Feminist Critiques of The Natural Sciences
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access to Signs
Introduction
[Sigtts: Journal of Womten itn Culture and Society 1988, vol. 14, no. 1]
? 1988 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0097-9740/89/1401-1111$01.()00
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2 R. Bleier, L. Houston, and W. Byne, "Can the Corpus Callosum Predict Gend
Age, Handedness, or Cognitive Differences?" Trends in NeuroSciences 9 (19
391-94.
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4 The series of papers is available for sale from the Women's Studies Research
Center, 209 N. Brooks Street, Madison, Wisconsin, 53706. The other essays are "Ten
Years of Research on the History of Women and Health" by Judith Walzer Leavitt;
"Ten Years of Research on Women and Politics" by Virginia Sapiro; and "New
French Feminisms Ten Years Later" by Elaine Marks.
5 Bleier, "History of the Association of Faculty Women at Madison," 19-20.
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* * *
RUTH BLEIER
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chapter of Science for the People, and they began to publish articles
and collections in 1977. Several papers and edited books appeared
in the following years, including Alice through the Microscope by
the Brighton (England) Women and Science Group in 1980 and the
psychologist Janet Sayers's Biological Politics in 1982. The first
book-length feminist critical analysis of science by a scientist was
my Science and Gender, which appeared in 1984. It was only in
the course of writing that book, beginning in 1980, that I began to
understand what I had been doing in a piecemeal fashion for the
previous eight years. Other books appeared in 1985, 1986, and 1987-
by Evelyn Fox Keller, Anne Fausto-Sterling, and Sandra Harding.
These four books, each in its own way, challenged the gendered
nature and structure of science as the embodiment of the male
mind-rigorous, objective, value-free-and the identity of scientists
as quintessentially masculine, that is, objective and tough in how
they think and practice science. The authors question, to differen
degrees, the possibility of objectivity in the scientific method and
the view of science as the progressive discovery or uncovering of
the truths of nature. As have other critics of science, they see a
problematical the relationship of knowledge claims to nature. In
short, feminist critics challenge the very foundations and basic as-
sumptions of Western science and epistemology and their concept
of positivism and rationality. They also reveal the gendered natur
of the body of knowledge we call science and the preoccupation o
scientists since the time of Aristotle with establishing the reality of
gender differences and the natural, biological inferiority of Woman.
In the 1980s, as in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the most
publicized arena for demonstrating women's inferiority is once again
in my own area of research-the neurosciences. Specifically, the
effort has been to demonstrate that sex differences in the structure
and function of the brain underlie presumed gender differences in
cognitive abilities.
As one might expect, of the four authors under discussion, the
two biologists-Anne Fausto-Sterling and I-have presented our
critiques within the context of dominant issues in science, while
the other two-philosophers of science-have placed theirs within
the context of dominant issues in philosophy and psychology. My
own motivation has been the conviction that science creates awe
in many people and that even the bold, questioning, and critica
minds of feminist scholars have sometimes been mystified and in
timidated by the authority and proclaimed objectivity of the sci
entific voice. I see it as an important task for feminist scientists to
demystify science and undermine the authority of its voice, to mak
science with its gendered subjectivities accessible to the critical
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minds of women. It is clear that the work of the few feminist scholars
in the field has opened science as an important area of education
and exploration by many women's studies programs in the United
States in the last few years.
What I have said so far raises at least three questions concerning
the peculiarity of the field of science with respect to feminist crit-
icisms. First, why the intensity of the resistance of the sciences to
feminist criticisms? Second, why so few women scientists engaged
in feminist theory in science or feminist critiques of science? Third,
why is the field so little advanced in comparison with other fields
in women's studies?
To begin with the first question: Why the intense resistance of
mainstream science to feminist criticism-in fact, worse than resis-
tance, the complete ignoring of feminist criticism, with rare excep-
tions ? For example, though Science reviews many books in the areas
of philosophy and sociology of science, it has yet to review any of
the feminist works on science, though three of the four I've dis-
cussed were reviewed by the New York Times. The only two fem-
inist books that Science has reviewed were Margaret Rossiter's
history, Women Scientists in America, reviewed in 1982, and Judy
Leavitt's book, Brought to Bed, reviewed in 1987.
My own misadventures may provide another example of the
resistance of science to feminist criticism and viewpoints.
Around the time Daniel Koshland became the editor of Science,
I submitted a review article describing conceptual, methodological,
and interpretive flaws in several important and widely accepted
areas of gender-differences research. One reviewer recommended
publication, the other reviewer wrote, "While many of Bleier's points
are valid, she tends to err in the opposite direction from the re-
searchers whose results and conclusions she criticizes. While Bleier
states, toward the end of her paper, that she does not 'deny the
possibility of biologically based structural or functional differences
in the brain between women and men,' she argues very strongly
for the predominant role of environmental influences." This is meant
to be an indictment of a completely untenable position. There is,
in short, only one direction in which one may err and still be pub-
lished in Science and other journals, since clearly those studies I
had criticized for their sloppy methods, inconclusive findings, and
unwarranted interpretations and conclusions about the biological
determinants of human behaviors, had all been published in Science
and elsewhere-and, of course, continue to be published.
In 1982, Science published a report (C. DeLacoste-Utamsing
and R. L. Holloway, "Sexual Dimorphism in the Human Corpus
Callosum," Science 216 [1982]: 1431-32), which claimed to provide
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original study), who said he "felt horrible" about using such a small
sample. "But it was so intriguing we decided to publish. I didn't think
it was premature at all; I felt it was damned important to get it out
right away." He didn't want "to wait and wait like Darwin did-and
almost lose [credit for] the whole thing" (February 22, 1987).
I believe that the resistance of science is a response to a number
of interrelated challenges posed by feminist criticisms. First are the
challenges to positivism, a bedrock principle of Western episte-
mology, and to the objectivity and value neutrality that make of
science, in our society, the best if not the only route to knowledge.
Moreover, unlike the analyses of traditional sociologists of scientific
knowledge, feminist analyses are formulated in gendered terms.
These have implications for the gendered identity, structure, and
content of science, as well as implications for science's role in legiti-
mating society's most cherished gendered beliefs and structures,
namely, that hierarchical gendered social structures are based in
differently gendered human natures. I believe there is a relation-
ship between "scientific" theories of gender differences and of the
inferiority of women and the virtual exclusion of women as col-
leagues and equals from most science departments and other sci-
ence institutions.
Science has been defined at least from the time of Francis Bacon
as a masculine pursuit, as a manifestation of the male mind: tough,
rational, rigorous, objective, free of emotion and subjectivities-the
latter being the province of women and the presumed character-
istics of the female mind. Science is "inextricably intertwined with
the issue of men's gender identities," wrote Sandra Harding (The
Science Question in Feminism [Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1986], 63). If women can do science as well as men, then
what does this say about deeply held beliefs concerning the male
mind, male gender identity, the female mind, and science itself?
Further, in science, as in most of life, the work of an army of women
of subordinate status-as wives, research assistants, technicians,
graduate students, and secretaries-has made possible the success
of men who have risen to the top. The overeager and uncritical
acceptance by scientists and the press of scientific theories of wom-
en's inferiority allows scientists-as well as the public-to believe
that women's absence or subordinate status reflects their lack of
drive and intellectual rigor and imagination.
Finally, let's face the fact that science doesn't have to pay any
attention to feminist commentary. It is huge, powerful, rich, and so
multifaceted in its approaches and goals, so lacking in a tradition
of self-scrutiny and self-criticism, that neither intellectual integrity
nor economic need makes it permeable to criticism of any kind.
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