SECTION 1.

The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

IN RE JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO. [Resolution] (1995) Judicial Power and Judicial

Function – Definition and Scope (Contempt Power)

Facts:

- Joaquin Borromeo is not a lawyer but has apparently read some law books, and
ostensibly come to possess some superficial awareness of a few substantive legal
principles and procedural rules.
- Although not a lawyer and equipped with nothing more than a smattering of learning,
Borromeo, has for 16 years, been instituting and prosecuting legal proceedings in
various courts (50 original or review proceedings, civil, criminal, administrative),
dogmatically pontificating on errors supposedly committed by the courts, including
the Supreme Court.
- His incursions into lawyering were generated by transactions with 3 banks--Traders
Royal Bank(TRB), United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Security Bank & Trust Co
(SBTC)--which came to have calamitous consequences for him chiefly because of his
failure to comply with his contractual commitments and his stubborn insistence on
imposing his own terms and conditions for their fulfillment.
- Borromeo obtained loans or credit accommodation from them, instituting immovables
belonging to him or his family, or third persons as security (mortgage).
- When he failed to pay these obligations, demands were made for him to do so;
however, he refused and laid down his own terms for their satisfaction which were
inconsistent with those agreed upon with his loan agreements or what was prescribed
by law.
- When the banks refused him to have his way, he filed suits against the banks, its
officers, the lawyers of the bank, the public prosecutors, the judges of the trial courts,
and the justices of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, as well as the Clerks
of Court and other Court employees.

Origins of Cases:

1. Cases Involving Traders Royal Bank (TRB) – Borromeo obtained a loan of P45k
from TRB and secured a real estate mortgage over two parcels of land, then
obtained another loan of P10k, securing another parcel of land as security. He then
obtained a Letter of Credit from the TRB in the sum of 80k. Borromeo failed to
pay these debts, hence, the properties he mortgaged were foreclosed and sold to
 TRB as the highest bidder. When he moved to re-acquire the properties, TRB
informed him that he must first pay his obligations. Borromeo demurred and
started filing civil and criminal lawsuits.
2. Cases involving UCPB – Borromeo obtained a loan from UCPB and executed a
real estate mortgage to secure repayment. The mortgage was constituted over a
122-square meter commercial lot in Borromeo’s name. This lot was later sold to
Samson Lao for P170k without the knowledge and consent of UCPB. When
Borromeo couldn’t pay, UCPB moved to foreclose the property, igniting legal
proceedings between Borromeo and the bank.
3. Cases Involving Security Bank and Trust Com (SBTC) – Borromeo obtained 5
loans in the aggregate sum of P189k. Borromeo once more failed to discharge his
contractual obligations. Hence, SBTC brought action against Borromeo, with
Borromeo not giving up even when the lower courts ruled against him.
(There were also other cases involving Philippine Bank of Communications)
- After his losses, he started distributing scurrilous writings, in which he calls judges
and lawyers ignorant, corrupt, oppresssors, violators of the Constitution and the laws,
etc. He also circulated an “OPEN LETTER TO SC justices, Fernan,” declaring that he
had “suffered injustice after injustice from you who are sworn to render true justice
but done the opposite…while failing to refute irrefutable evidences.”
- He also stated in another letter to CJ Fernan that 3 years after EDSA, pledges (of
justice) have not been fulfilled and that injustice continues and that the courts are still
agents of oppression, instead of being saviours and defenders of the people.
- He also distributed another flyer entitled in big bold letters, “A Gov’t That Lies!
Blatant attempt to fool people!” in which he accused the SC and CA to support the
landgrabbing by Traders Royal Bank of Borromeos’ lands. There was also another
flyer with a caricature of a person seated on a throne labeled (Traders Royal Bank),
surrounded by statements such as , “Sa TRB, para kami ay royalty. Nakaw at Nakaw!
Kawat Kawat! TRB WILL STEAL!” etc.
- He also called SC, Nand CJ Narvasa, tyrants, coddlers of crooks, violator of laws, that
Narvasa’s SC has been a despot and that it has been shielding crooks in the judiciary.
He also called for his impeachment, arguing that CJ Narvasa had gross ignorance of
the law, among others.
- The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Cebu City Chapter, after reading the circulars of
Borromeo, recommended action against him. Acting on the letter (recommendation of
IBP) the court cited him in contempt through a resolution.
- Borromeo responded that the CJ and other members of the court should inhibit
themselves because they would not be impartial and that he was using his
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech and expression.

Issue:

W/N the Supreme Court can cite Borromeo in contempt (YES)

- There can scarecely be any doubt of Borromeo’s guilt of contempt, for abuse of and
interference with judicial rules and processes, gross disrespect to courts and judges
and improper conduct directly impeding, obstructing and degrading the administration
of justice. (for his insults and his insistence on applying his own legal rules based on
his own erroneous understanding of the Constitution and the law).
- The power or duty of the court to institute a charge for contempt against itself,
without the intervention of the fiscal or prosecuting officer, is essential to the
preservation of its dignity and of the respect due it from litigants, lawyers and
the public.
- His claims of using freedom of speech and expression receive no merit because they
afford no justification for repetitious litigation of the same causes and issues and his
insults and disrespect towards lawyers and the courts.
- The Supreme Court then entered into a discussion of the hierarchy of courts and the
proper remedy against decisions of lower courts.

Borromeo is found guilty of constructive contempt.

ECHEGARAY V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE (Power to Delay Execution of Sentence)

Facts:
1. The Secretary of Justice filed for Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of the Supreme Court dated January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining Echegaray’s
execution and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
2. The Secretary of Justice claims that the decision of the case having become final and
executory, it’s execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority.
The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching of that sphere of executive authority.
It further included in its position a copy of the HOR’s resolution, which advised the branches
of government to immediately implement the re-imposition of the death penalty.

Issue/s:
1. Whether the Court lost it’s jurisdiction at the case at bar and hence can no longer
restrain the execution of Echegaray? ​NO
2. Whether after the decision has become final and executory, the execution enter the
exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department? ​NO

Ratio:
1. The important part of litigation is the process of execution of decisions where
supervening events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts to
intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of the
unforeseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceeded the inherent and
necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and
justice. It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its
own decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in
Congress as alleged by petitioner. The court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not
restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress. In criminal cases after the sentence has
been pronounced and the period for reopening the same cannot change or alter its judgment.
But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference
to the ending of the cause that judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely
to the Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always
included in the judgement and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control
of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict
except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.
2. The court does not lose jurisdiction over a case event after the decision has become
final and executory. The SOJ uses Sec 19 Art VII of the Constitution which grants the
President the power of pardon and amnesty. The provision however cannot be interpreted as
denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights
and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. The suspension of the death
sentence is an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of
reprieve though its effects are the same -- the temporary suspension of the execution of the
death convict.
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Re: UP Law Faculty (contempt power)

Facts
Attys. Harry Roque and Romel Bagares accused Justice Mariano del Castillo of plagiarism
for lifting sections from the articles of Criddle and Fox-Decent, Tams, and Ellis in his
discussion of jus cogens and erga nomes in the April 10, 2010 decision for the case of Vinuya
vs Executive Secretary.

Atty. Marvic Leonen, dean of UP Law, together with his colleagues, called for the resignation
of Justice del Castillo in light of these allegations against him through a letter they published.
According to the Supreme Court, while the statement was meant as an opinion expressing
their disdain, the UP Law faculty treated what was just an allegation as a binding truth.

The faculty also accused the Supreme Court of committing injustice by: 1. Dismissing the
petition of the comfort women, 2. Deliberately delaying the resolution of the case, 3.
Dismissal on the basis of polluted sources, 4. Alleged indifference to the cause of the
petitioners, and 5. Alarming lack of concern for the most basic values of decency and respect.

Issue
Was the statement of the UP Law faculty contemptuous? YES

Ratio
The SC held that the publication was unnecessary and was a misplaced act of vigilance as
investigations on the accusation of plagiarism against Justice del Castillo were ongoing.

The court sees the UP Law faculty’s purpose was to discredit the April 10, 2010 decision in
the Vinuya case.

Harmful and irresponsible attacks against the Court can threaten the independence of the
judiciary. Such statements can interfere with the Court’s duty to the disposition of justice in
an orderly manner.

Held
The UP Law faculty, headed by Dean Leonen, were directed to SHOW CAUSE as to why
they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violating multiple Canons and Rules
of the Code for Professional Responsibility.
 G.R. No. 179003 : January 9, 2013
ANTONIO L. TAN, JR., ​Petitioner​, ​v.​ ​YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA and CAROLINA
TANJUTCO,​​Respondents​.
FACTS:
On March 31, 1998, Tan filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Makati City a
Complaint-Affidavit​5​ charging the respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura (Matsuura), Atty.
Carolina Tanjutco (Tanjutco) and Atty. Julie Cua (Cua) of the crime of falsification under the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Tan alleged that Matsuura ​had stolen company properties.
Among those stolen was a pre-signed DEED OF TRUST, whose date and number of shares,
and the item witnesses were all in BLANK. The ​entries as to the number of shares and the
date of the instrument were then inserted, that is, 28,500 as shares and 20th day of January,
and the signatures of Hiroko Matsuura and Lani C. Camba appeared in the item WITNESS,
all without Tan’s participation whatsoever, or without his consent and authority. ​Cua, a
Notary Public for and in the City of Makati, notarized it,

Matsuura denied Tans charges. He countered that the filing of the complaint was merely a
scheme resorted to by Tan following their dispute in TF Ventures, Inc.

Tanjutco ​argued that Tan failed to present any proof of her participation in the deeds
falsification, and explained that she had not yet known Matsuura at the time of the supposed
notarization.

Cua said ​Tan presented his community tax certificate (CTC) as indicated in the subject deed
of trust, then was sworn in by Cua as a notary public. Cua claimed to have conducted her
duty in utmost good faith, with duplicate copies of the notarized deed reported to the Clerk of
Court of Makati City.

The Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution ​dismissing for lack of probable cause
the complaint against Matsuura and Tanjutco. It considered the fact that Tan had voluntarily
signed the subject deed, and "whether or not the same document is notarized, the deed has the
effect of a binding contract between the parties. The element of damage has not been
sufficiently shown." The ​complaint against Cua was also dismissed as Tan failed to overturn
the presumption of regularity attached to the notary publics performance of her official duty.
Tans motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file a petition for review ​with
the Department of Justice (DOJ)

The ​Secretary of Justice Simeon A. Datumanong issued a resolution ​denying the petition. He
ruled that no evidence was presented to show that the date, the number of shares and the
witness’s signatures appearing on the subject deed were merely inserted therein by the
respondents.

Tan ​filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by then Acting Secretary of Justice
Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez in a Resolution​.​.

DOJ Undersecretary Ernesto L. Pineda, signing on behalf of the Secretary of Justice, issued a
resolution ​affirming the presence of probable cause against Matsuura and Tanjutco, but
ordering the exclusion of Cua from the filing of information. He ruled that Cua had exercised
due diligence as a notary public by requiring from the person who appeared before her a
proof of his identification.

The DOJs review of its resolution on Cuas case continued with Tans filing of a motion for
partial reconsideration. Finding merit in the motion, the DOJ again reversed itself ​to ​include
Atty. Julie O. Cua in the information for violation ​Cuas motion for reconsideration was
denied, prompting her to file with the CA the petition for certiorari.

CA granted both petitions questioning the Secretary of Justices resolutions. ​CA held that
given the elements of the crime, the actual participation of respondents Matsuura and
Tanjutco was not sufficiently alleged, and the element of damage was not sufficiently
shown. Tans motion for reconsideration was denied as ​Tan also failed to discharge the burden
of proving probable cause against Cua.

ISSUES:

(a) Whether or not the CA erred in taking cognizance of the two petitions filed
before it, assuming the role of a reviewing authority of the Secretary of Justice -
NO
Tan contends that the CA should not have taken cognizance of the petitions for certiorari
filed before it because criminal proceedings shall not be restrained once probable cause has
been determined and the corresponding information has been filed in courts.

Judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution covers the courts power
to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government in the discharge
of its functions. Although policy considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to the
prosecutor’s findings, courts should not shirk from exercising their power, when the
circumstances warrant, determining whether the prosecutor’s findings are supported by the
facts or by the law. In so doing, courts do not act as prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary
that are exercising their mandate under the Constitution, relevant statutes, and remedial rules
to settle cases and controversies.

The appellate courts exercise of its power to review was also the proper and most prudent
course to take after the Secretary had successively issued several resolutions with varying
findings of fact and conclusions of law on the existence of probable cause, even contrary to
the own findings of the OCP that conducted the preliminary investigation. Although by itself,
such circumstance was not indicative of grave abuse of discretion, there was a clear issue on
the Secretary of Justices appreciation of facts, which commanded a review by the court to
determine if grave abuse of discretion attended the discharge of his functions.

(b) Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the finding of the OCP that there
exists no probable cause to indict Matsuura, Tanjutco and Cua for the crime of
falsification. - NO
There is no probable cause for falsification against Matsuura, Tanjutco and Cua. SC agrees
with the CA that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion when the latter
ruled in favor of Tan, in his complaint against the respondents. ​There is emphasis in the
nature, purpose and amount of evidence that is required to support a finding of probable
cause in preliminary investigations. Probable cause, for purposes of filing criminal
information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is the
existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty
of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest
on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was
committed by the accused.
SC possesses the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary investigations. Tan
was not able to establish when and how the alleged unauthorized insertions in the subject
document were effected, and that Matsuura and Tanjutco should be held liable therefor. To
warrant an indictment for falsification, it is necessary to show during the preliminary
investigation that the persons to be charged are responsible for the acts that define the crime.
Garcia v. Drilon – Art 8, Sec 1; power granted to Punong Barangay/Kagawad to issue TPO
not judicial but executive function

Background Facts:

On March 8, 2004, congress enacted R.A. No. 9262 entitled “An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes”.

The law:
o ​Defines and criminalizes ​the acts of violence against women and children, perpetrated by
women’s
intimate partners: (1) husband, (2) former husband, (3) any person who has or had a sexual or
dating
relationship, or (4) with whom the woman has a common child;
o ​Provides for protection orders ​from the barangay and the courts;
o ​Outlines the duties and responsibilities ​of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors
and court personnel etc.
• In this case, a husband is before the court assailing the Constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as
being violative of (1)the equal protection clause, (2) due process clause, and (3) ​undue
delegation of judicial power to barangay​​ ​officials.

General Facts:
● Rosalie Jaype-Garcia, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, filed a petition
before the RTC of Bacolod for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
against Jesus Garcia.
• NOTE: Protection orders that may be issued are (1) the barangay protection
order,
• (2) temporary protection order, and (3) permanent protection order.
● Rosalie claimed to be a victim of physical abuse and emotional, psychological, and
economic violence as a result of marital infidelity.

• ​CLAIM of ROSALIE:
● Garcia spouses married in 2002 and had three children together.
● Rosalie described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife whose life revolved around her
husband.
● Jesus, on the other hand, is of Filipino-Chinese descent and is dominant and
controlling.
• He forbid Rosalie to pray and isolated her from her friends.
• Jesus trivialized her ambitions and persuaded her to just stay at home.
● Jesus then had an affair with a bank manager of Robinson’s Bank, who is a
godmother of one of their sons.
● This resulted in a series of fights which left Rosalie physically and emotionally
wounded.
• During those times, Rosalie even attempted suicide by cutting her wrist.
During her time in the hospital, Jesus never visited her.

RTC of Bacolod:
 • Issued a TPO effective for thirty days, stating among others that Jesus:
● Remove his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling within 24 hours;
● Stay away from Rosalie and their children from a distance of 1,000 meters;
● Surrender all his firearms;
● Pay full financial support including the rental of the house and educational and
medical expenses;
● Give a bond to keep the peace in the amount of 5 million pesos.
• Amended TPO effective for 30 days:
● Use of the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van
● Monthly support for the sum of 150k per month plus rental expenses of 50k per
month until the matter of support is resolved.

TPO was amended and renewed again:

● Jesus return the clothes and other personal belongings of Rosalie
● Deliver full financial support
● Pay the educational expenses of the children
Issue: ​1. Constitutionality of RA 9262; ​2. Alleged undue delegation of judicial power to
barangay officials
Held:
1. No. RA 9262 is not unconstitutional. It does not violate the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose
of the law, which is to address violence committed against women and children.
2. (MAIN ISSUE RELATING TO ART 8) There is no undue delegation of judicial
power to barangay officials. As clearly delimited by Sec. 14 of Barangay Protection
Orders, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or in his unavailability by any
available Barangay Kagawad merely orders the perpetrator to desist from a) causing
physical harm to the woman or child; b) threatening to cause physical harm. Such
function of the Punong Barangay is purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his
duty under the Local Government Code to enforce all laws and ordinances, and to
maintain public order in the Barangay.
City of Manila v Grecia-Cuerdo (2014) CTA has appellate jurisdiction
FACTS:
● Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed
taxes for the taxable period from January to December 2002 against the private
respondents. ​SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Watsons, Ace Hardware and other
affiliates of SM.
● In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Section
14, 15, 16, 17 of the ​Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM),​ the assessment
covered the local business taxes and private respondents were constrained to pay the P
19,316,458.77 assessment but made so under protest.
● On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed [with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City] the complaint denominated as one for "Refund or Recovery of Illegally
and/or Erroneously-Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. "
● RTC granted private respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
● City of Manila then filed a special civil action for ​certiorari ​with the CA but the CA
dismissed petitioners’ petition for ​certiorari h​ olding that it has no jurisdiction over the
said petition.
● The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for
tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282),
it follows that a petition for ​certiorari s​ eeking nullification of an interlocutory order
issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA and not the CA.
● Their subsequent MR was also denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case? ​YES

HELD:

● Court finds that the instant petition should be denied for being moot and academic.
Upon perusal of the original records of the instant case, this Court discovered that a
Decision​9​ in the main case had already been rendered by the RTC on August 13, 2007
enjoining City of Manila from collecting taxes from respondent and to grant the tax
refund of ​P 19,316,458.77
● However despite the mootness, the Court will still decide the main issue in this case.
● Sec. 7 of RA 9282 (expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA) states its jurisdiction. It
states that it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, which includes
decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases
originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction.
● It can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling
within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the
CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari
in these cases.
● While Republic Act 9282 does not contain a categorical statement which vests to the
CTA jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari on orders by the RTC on local tax cases,
the grant of appellate jurisdiction on local tax cases leads to an assumption that the
law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary if not indispensable
in aid of such appellate jurisdiction.
● The Court pointed out that to confer the power over certiorari petitions to the Court of
Appeals would create a “split-jurisdiction” situation, which is anathema to the orderly
administration of justice.
● Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same level as the CA and
shall possess all the inherent powers of a court of justice.
● Thus, the power of the CTA to rule on petitions for certiorari on interlocutory orders
issued by the RTC in local tax cases is included in the powers granted by the
Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
NOBLEJAS VS. TEEHANKEE
G.R. No. L-28790. April 29, 1968.
Syllabus topic​​: No power to discipline officers in other branch with equivalent rank of judge

Petitioner​​: Antonio H. Noblejas, ​Commissioner of Land Registration

Respondent​​: Claudio Teehankee, ​Secretary of Justice​ and Rafael Salas, ​Executive Secretary

FACTS​​:
● Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and qualified Commissioner of
Land Registration.
● Position was created by Republic Act No. 1151
o Section 2 of RA 1151 states that Commissioner is “entitled to the same
compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of
First Instance.”
o Appropriation laws settling the salary of said officer prices it at PHP 19,000.
(As per R.A. Nos. 4642, 4856 and 5170)
● March 7, 1968: Secretary of Justice Claudio Teehankee wrote to Noblejas, requiring
him to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against his “approving or
recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidation-subdivision
plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by original titles”.
● Noblejas replied by saying that he can only be investigated and suspended in the same
manner as a Judge of the CFI.
o Therefore papers regarding his case should be submitted to the SC for action
in accordance to Sec. 67 of the Judiciary Act (R.A. No. 296) and Revised Rule
140 of the Rules of Court.
● March 17, 1968​: Noblejas received a communication from Executive Secretary Rafael
Salas suspending him based on “a prima facie case… for gross negligence and
conduct prejudicial to the public interest”.

ISSUE​​:
W/N THE COMMISSIONER OF LAND REGISTRATION MAY ONLY BE
INVESTIGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT

HELD​​:
NO.
● “If the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges"
or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First Instance" the right to be
investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only upon
recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be
unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of
powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory control
over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the
Chief Executive over such officials.”
o Noblejas’ theory that the “privileges of a Judge of First Instance” implies the
right that only the SC and to be suspended or removed, upon its
recommendation, would necessarily result to the same right being possessed
by ​of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately
conferred the same privileges.
 o Said officials include:
▪ Judicial Superintendent of the DOJ
▪ Assistant Solicitors General
▪ City Fiscal of Quezon City
▪ City Fiscal of Manila
▪ SEC Commissioner
● A Commissioner of Land Registration is not a District Judge, nor a member of the
Judiciary
o Noblejas claims that Sec. 67 of the Judiciary Act provides for the
investigation, suspension or removal of Judges.
o “No District Judge shall be separated or removed from office by the President
of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the
Supreme Court."
● It has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should
not and can not be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to
assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial
functions
Director of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio
Syllabus Topic: ​Advisory opinions – no power to give advisory opinions or recommend
executive action

Respondents: Director of Prisons, Executive Secretary

Petitioner: Ang Cho Kio (alias “Ang Ming Huy”) – deported alien from Taipeh

FACTS:
● Respondent Ang Cho Kio (alias “Ang Ming Huy”) had been charged, tried and
convicted of various offenses committed in the PH and was sentenced to a total of 45
years, 10 months, and 21 days of imprisonment, P6,000 indemnity, and P5,000 moral
damages, plus life imprisonment and P6,000 indemnity.
● After serving 6 ½ years of his sentence, respondent was granted conditional pardon by
the President
o “On condition that he will voluntarily leave the PH upon his release and
never return to this country”
o Should he violate or refuse, “he shall continue serving his sentence”, and
“shall be [eventually] deported”
● He accepted the conditions and left the PH for Taipeh, Nationalist China, July 28,
1959
● In June 26, 1966, he arrived in Manila Int’l Airport, travelling under the name “Ang
Ming Huy” (with roundtrip tickets to Honolulu, SFO, LA, Chicago, Washington,
NYC, Vancouver, Tokyo, Seoul, Osaka, Bangkok, Saigon, HK, and back to Taipei).
He had a 72-hour stopover in Manila before leaving for Honolulu (on June 29, 6:30
pm) – READ: ​He violated the terms of his pardon.
● He left his luggage and passport at the airport, booked a 3-day stay in a hotel, and
contacted some friends who invited him to stay longer. His friend Lim Pin signed a
letter addressed to 'the Commissioner of Immigration requesting for a 14-day
extension for him.
● Because Ang Cho Kio was identified by an immigration inspector as having been
previously deported, he was arrested.
● The Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, ordered him recommitted to
prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence for violating the condition of his
pardon.
● Respondent filed for a writ of ​habeas corprus​, but petition was denied by CFI Rizal
stating that it is the Executive’s prerogative to do so under Section 64(i) of the
Revised Admin Code
● IMPT: ​He appealed to the CA, and the CA (special division of 5 justices) ruled:
o CA agreed that the courts of justice may not interfere in the exercise of the
president of his administrative power of recommitment.
o However, the majority opinion also included the ​recommendation​​ stating that
Ang Cho Kio be sent out from this country and that he be allowed to leave
Muntinlupa Prisons under guard only when he has been booked for
outward flight at the Manila Int’l Airport so as to avoid the possibility of
any further violation of his conditional pardon xxx Let a copy of this
decision be furnished to the Executive Secretary.
 ● SolGen filed MoR to SC praying for the ​deletion from the majority opinion of the
recommendation to allow Ang Cho Kio to leave the country on the first available
transportation abroad.
o Recommendation is not part of the decision binding upon parties, and is
uncalled for
o It gives the decision a political complexion
o Courts are not empowered to make such a recommendation, nor is it inherent
or incidental in the exercise of judicial powers
o Deportation of aliens is an act of state exercised solely in the discretion of the
Chief Executive

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA had the authority to recommend the deportation of Ang Cho
Kio, and include such opinion in the ​ponencia​ – NO

● The only question that the CA should have resolved was whether or not the CFI was
correct in dismissing the petition for writ of ​habeas corpus​ (they were)
● The majority opinion should have been limited to the affirmation of the decision
of the lower court, and no more
● The recommendatory power of the courts in this jurisdiction are limited to those
1
expressly provided in the law, specifically Section 5 of the RPC
● It was not proper that the majority of the justices in the special decision make a
recommendation that would suggest a modification or a correction of the act of the
Chief Executive, after having said in their opinion “that the Chief Executive may
determine, alone and by himself, whether the condition attached to a pardon given by
him had been violated; and in the exercise of his prerogative, the courts may not
interfere, however erroneous the findings may be”.
● Under the principle of separation of powers, it is not within the province of the
judiciary to express an opinion, or express a suggestion that would reflect on the
wisdom or propriety of the action of the Chief Executive on matters purely political in
nature.
● The better practice should be that the decision of a court should contain only opinion
that is relevant to the question that is before the court for decision. After all, courts are
not concerned with the wisdom or morality of laws, but only in the interpretation and
application of the law.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
● Of the 10 members of the SC, only 5 voted to delete the recommendation from the
decision of the CA (need majority, or 6) because 2 are of a different opinion and 3 did
not take part because they had official actuations relative to the case.
● Thus, petition for writ of certiorari is denied; CA special division decision still stands
1
Art. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive
penalties —

Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the
proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe
that said act should be made the subject of legislation.

In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper,
without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of
a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.
SBMA v. COMELEC (1996) – ​no controversy when resolution is at proposal stage

FACTS:

o In 1992, Congress enacted R.A. 7227 or also known as the Bases Conversion and
Development Act (BCDA) This act provided for the creation of the Subic Special
Economic Zone.
o The Sangguinian Bayan of Morong expressed their absolute concurrence to Morong’s
inclusion in the Economic Zone by passing Resolution No. 10 (Pambayang
Kapasyahan Bilang 10)
o Garcia et. al. (Couldn’t find background on Garcia. He filed with other more
and Calimbas, Mayor of Morong) are assailing Reso. No. 10 and file a petition
to annul. The prayer was to annul and/or concurrence be passed with
conditions specified by them to Morong’s inclusion in the Zone. Some of
these conditions were;
▪ To revert back to Bataan the Virgin Forests and the Grande Island
▪ Include the areas within the SBMA in the computation of the Internal
Revenue Allotment (IRA)
▪ Base the allocation of employment opportunities on respective land
areas
o After said petition, the SB of Morong promulgated Reso. 18 which requested
congress to amend certain provisions of RA 7227 in accordance with the
mentioned conditions. While some of the conditions were already favorably
acted upon by the BCD Authority and the Office of the President. These
conditions were:
▪ Allow each town in Morong, Hermosa, and Dinalupihan to establish its
own “special eco zones”
▪ SBMA to open its gates to other towns in Bataan
o Although, within 30 days of filing of their Petition, Garcia resorted to their
power of initiative under Section 122 of the Local Government Code (LGC)
▪ COMELEC en banc denied their petition for local initiative on the
ground that the subject of the initiative was merely a resolution
and not an ordinance.
▪ Another ground directed the Provincial Election Supervisor to hold
action on the authentication of signatures being solicited by Garcia et
al.
o In 1996, COMELEC issued Reso 2848 which included providing for the rules and
guidelines on the conduct of the Referendum to annul or repeal Reso 10
o Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition contesting the
validity of Reso 2848 invalid for as this “intent on proceeding with a local initiative
that proposes an amendment of a national law”

ISSUES: (relevant for syllabus, justiciable controversy)

Is the proposition sought to be submitted in the plebiscite ​ultra vires​ (means beyond the
powers) of the SB to enact? ​Because under the LGC, the subject of local initiative shall
cover only matters within the legal powers of the SB to enact – ​Remanded to COMELEC

o Petitioner insists that the creation of the SSEZ is now a ​fait accompli​ (accomplished
fact, already been decided on cannot be changed) for the benefit of the entire nation.
 Morong cannot unilaterally withdraw its concurrence or impose new conditions for
such concurrence to be effective.
o Garcia argues that such argument is premature and conjectural because at this
point, the resolution is just a proposal. If people rejected the proposal, there is
nothing even to declare illegal it being a mere proposal.
o SC Agreed with Garcia
o Courts may only decide on actual controversies.
o Also, the SC is a review court. Passes upon errors of law, as well as
determines GADALEJ on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Therefore, SC can review Reso 2848. However, it does not have
the same authority with “regards to the proposed initiative since it has not
been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any branch or
instrumentality.”
o The matters in the proposed initiative are within the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC to determine and decide upon. So, COMELEC first should
pass upon the proposal in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
o Accordingly, the question of w/n the subject of the initiative is within the
capacity of the Mun. of Morong to enact may be ruled upon by the
COMELEC.
o Hence, the SC remanded the matter to the COMELEC.
In re Save the Supreme Court (2015) - SC can’t declare a proposed bill unconstitutional

FACTS:

● This case involves the proposed bills abolishing the ​Judiciary Development Fund
and replacing it with the ​"Judiciary Support Fund”
○ Funds collected from the proposed Judiciary Support Fund shall be remitted to
the national treasury and Congress shall determine how the funds will be used
● Rolly Mijares prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus​​ ​in order to compel the
SC to exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the act of
Congress
○ Mijares wrote a letter to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices
○ He alleges that he is a Filipino Citizen and a concerned tax payer and that he
filed this petition as part of his continuing crusade to defend and uphold the
Constitution (wow okay)
● Procedural History of the proposed bill​​ (not really important but sir might ask)
○ July 2014 Ilocos Norte Representative Rodolfo Farinas filed House Bill No.
4690 that requires the SC to remit its Judiciary Development Fund to the
national treasury
○ A week later Iloilo rep Niel Tupas Jr., filed House Bill No. 4738 titled “The
Act Creating the Judicial Support Fund under the National Treasury repealing
for the purpose Presidential Decree No. 1949
○ Same day President Noynoy Aquino addressed the nation hoping that the
Supreme Court Justices consider their decision on Disbursement Acceleration
Program (please read Araullo v Aquino) (dab)

ISSUES/HELD:

● Whether or not Mijares has sufficiently shown grounds for the SC to grant the
petition and issue a writ of Mandamus---NO (Petitioner fails to comply with the
first two requisites of Judicial review
○ Petitioner argues that the Congress “​gravely abused its discretion with a
blatant usurpation of judicial independence and fiscal autonomy of the
SC”
■ Congress is exercising its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion or personal hostility by abolishing the Judiciary
Development Fund of the SC
○ Congress should not act as “​wreckers of law​​” by threatening “​to clip the
powers of the High Tribuna​​l”
○ Congress committed a ​“blunder of monumental proportions”
○ SC should exercise its powers to REVOKE/ABORGATE and EXPUNGE
whatever irreconcilable contravention of existing laws affecting the judicial
 independence and fiscal autonomy as mandated under the Constitution to
better serve public interest and general welfare of the people
○ SC held that the power of judicial review is subject to certain limitations
■ (1) There must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exeercise of judicial power

■ (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise
stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result
of its enforcement

■ (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest

opportunity

■ (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota (legal
motivation) of the case
○ Petitioner’s failure to comply with the first two requisites warrants the outright
dismissal of the petition
○ IMPT ​One of the requirements of the court to exercise is power of judicial
review is the ​existence of an actual controversy.
■ There must be an existing case or controversy​​ that is appropriate or
ripe for determination, ​not conjectural or anticipatory​​, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion

● (Main Issue under the topic) Can the Supreme Court declare proposed bills
unconstitutional?---NO, the SC is not empowered to review proposed bills
because a bill is not a law
○ The SC must act only within the powers granted under the Constitution
■ This means that the SC can only rule on enacted LAWS and not on
proposed BILLS
○ In Montescarlos vs COMELEC which involved the postponement of the 2002
Sangguiniang Kabataan Elections and lowering the age requirement in the SK
to atleast 15 but not more than 18
■ Petitioners prayed to prevent Congress from enacting into law a
proposed bill lowering the age in Sk does not present an actual
justiciable controversy
■ A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a
law
■ A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally
enforceable by the Court
 ■ A proposed bill has no legal effect and violates no constitutional
right or duty
○ IMPT ​There can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality
of a proposed bill
■ Judicial review only takes into effect after a law is enacted and not
before
■ The Court cannot restrain Congress from passing any law or from
setting into motion the legislative mill according to its internal rules.

● NOTES of the ponencia (Leonen)

○ Judiciary is the weakest branch of government
■ They have the power to declare what law is given a set of facts, it does
not have an army to enforce its writs
■ Courts do not have power of the purse (except for the consti provision
that requires the budget of the judiciary should not go below the
appropriation for the previous year)
■ Funds given by the GAA is not enough to meet the expenses of the
lower courts and guarantee credible compensation for their personnel
■ Courts cannot lobby for more allocations as it is not constitutionally
built for such purpose
○ The SC appreciates the concern but the proper remedy would be for the
petitioner to lobby a change to the legislative
(Tano v Socrates)-Hierarchy of Courts

Facts:
● There are two sets of petitions in this Case
● Background:
o On December 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa
City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which took effect on January 1, 1993 entitled
"ANORDINANCE BANNING THE SHIPMENT OF ALL LIVE FISH AND
LOBSTER OUTSIDE
PUERTO PRINCESA CITY FROM JANUARY 1, 1993 TO JANUARY 1, 1998 AND
PROVIDING EXEMPTIONS; PENALTIES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES THEREOF"
o To implement the said city ordinance, the acting City Mayor Amado L Lucero
issued Office Order No. 23
o Feb. 19 1993 The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of
Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33 Prohibiting the catching, possessing,
buying, selling and shipment of live marine corals for a period of 5 years in
and coming from Palawan Waters
● Petitioners were criminally charged for violation of the aforementioned ordinances
● The allege that
o the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and
unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2,
Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.
o Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which
the Mayor's permit could be granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the
absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue the permit.
o as Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan "altogether prohibited the
catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine
coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or
gathered through lawful fishing method," the Ordinance took away the right of
petitioners- fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways; and insofar as
petitioners-members of Airline Shippers Association are concerned,
o Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null and void, the
criminal cases based thereon against petitioners Tano and the others have to be
dismissed.
● Respondents stand by the validity of Ordinance No. 2
o The ordinance is a valid exercise of the Provincial Government under the
general welfare clause, and its specific power to protect the environment and
impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment
o They maintain that there is was no violation of due process and equal
protection clauses

IS ORDINANCE No. 2 UNCONSTITUTIONAL?-No

● The SC found that the assailed Ordinances and Office Orders did violate any
constitutional provision
● As a general rule, laws are presumed to be constitutional, there must be a clear
violation of constitution to prove otherwise
● In this case, the LGC gave the authority to the LGU of Puerto Princesa to regulate
 fishing activities to promote the general welfare of the community, and that in case of
doubt the presumption is in favor of devolution of authority to the Local Government
Even if there is a valid course of action for the filed petitions, can the heard?-No. (but
the court still resolved it based on the merits)
● ​The first petition must fail on the ground of prematurity amounting to lack of cause
of action
o Even if they had a cause of action, they must fall for disregarding the
hierarchy of courts
o There was no special or important reason or exceptional and compelling
circumstance has been adduced why direct recourse to us (SC) should be
allowed
▪ Even if the court has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and CA to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, manadamus, quo warranto ,
hebeas corpus, and injunction, such concurrence does not give
petitioners unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum
▪ (People v Cuaresma) This is established policy. It is a policy necessary
to ​prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and
attention​​ which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to ​prevent further over-crowding of the Court's
docket
▪ XPN: ​A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are
special and important reasons therefor
● The second petition is obviously one of DECLARATORY RELIEF (i.e. for a
declaration that the ordinances in question are a nullity for being unconstitutional)
o This must fail because this court is not possessed of the original jurisdiction
over petitions for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.
o This court is only given appellate jurisdiction over such petitions
● Notwithstanding the foregoing procedural obstacles against the first set of petitioners,
we opt to resolve this case on its merits considering that they life-time of the
challenged Ordinances is about to end (since the ordinance was only effective for 5
years)
Maria Malaga v. Manuel Penachos (1992) – Power of Legislature to Apportion Jurisdiction
2
(injunctions against infrastructure projects)

Sec 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction
of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases
enumerated in section 5 hereof.

No law shall be passed reorganizing the judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure
of its members.

Facts:

- The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and
Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the publication, in the Western Visayas Daily, an
invitation to Bid for the construction of Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF.
- The notice announced that the deadline for the submission of pre-qualification
requirements (PRE-C1) was December 2, 1998, and that bids would be received and
opened on Dec 12, 1988.
- Malaga and Najarro (another petitioner) of the BE Construction and Best Built
Construction submitted their pre-qualification documents at 2pm on December 2. Jose
Occena (another petitioner) submitted his documents on December 5. All three of
them were considered late and were not allowed to participate in the bidding, having
been submitted after the cut-off time of 10am on December 2.
- Petitioners filed a complaint with the Iloilo RTC against the chairman and members
of PBAC, claiming that although they submitted the documents on time, the PBAC
refused without just cause to accept them. As a result, they were not allowed to bid.
- Judge Lebaquin (RTC) ssued a restraining order to stop the bidding of the project.
- Defendants (PBAC members) filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the
ground that the Court was prohibited from issuing restraining orders,
3
preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by PD 1818.
- Arguments of PBAC
o PD 1818 should be applied. Members of the board of trustees of the ISCOF
are all government officials, and ISCOF is covered by the General
Appropriations Law. (PD1818 applies to government institutions)
o Question of the propriety of a preliminary injunction had become moot and
academic because the restraining order was received at 2pm of December 12,

2
Preliminary Injunction – an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order,
requiring a party to an administrative case or any third person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the
performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as preliminary mandatory injunction.

3
PD1818, Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction,
or preliminary infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the
government, or any public utility operated by the government, including among others public utilities for the transport of the
goods and commodities, stevedoring and arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official
from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such public
utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.
 AFTER the bidding had been conducted and closed at 11:30am of December
12.
- Arguments of Petitioners
o ISCOF had its own charter and separate existence and was not part of the
national government or of any local political subdivision. (hence PD 1818
cannot be applied)
o PD 1818 cannot be applied because the project at hand is tainted with
irregularities
▪ The invitation did not indicate the time of the deadline.
▪ The bidding was held at 10am, but the time and date of bidding was
published at 3pm (Dec 12).
▪ Notice of Pre-qualification (as required by law) was not properly
submitted to potential bidders. (This contains vital information about
the project so that bidders would be informed of the nature and
specifics of the project) – required by PD1594 to protect bidders and
make sure they are well-informed before making a decision.
- On January 2, Trial Court lifts the restraining order and denied the petition for
preliminary injunction, agreeing with PBAC’s argument.

Issues/Ruling:

Whether or not the court can issue a preliminary injunction on the bidding project (YES).

- ISCOF is a chartered institution which is considered a government instrumentality

4
according to the 1987 Admin Code , and is covered by PD 1818; It is also a
government instrumentality because:
o It was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy to
improve the socio-economic life of the nation.
o The Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines is the ex-officio treasurer of
the state college and its financial accounts are audited by the Commission on
Audit.
o It is funded by the General Appropriations Law.
- HOWEVER, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the
prohibition in the said decree.
- IMPT: Citing ​DATILES and CO. v SUCALDITO--a​ similar case involving a statute
which contains prohibition on the courts--the court said that it is only prohibited from
issuing injunctions against ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS in controversies involving
facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. The Court observed that to allow

4
1987 Admin Code: Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations.
Chartered Institution – refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with
functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges, and
the monetary authority of the state.
 courts to judge these matters would disturb the smooth functioning of the
administrative machinery. Justice Padilla (in that case) makes it clear, however, that
issues definitely outside of its dimension and involving questions of law, courts could
not be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative
acts.
- In this case, SC sees no reason why the ruling in Datiles could not be applied to the
present case, due to the following irregularities:
o PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 documents and the bids and
then changed these deadlines without prior notice to prospective participants..
o PBAC was required to issue pre-qualified applicants the plans, specifications
and proposal book forms for the project to be bid 30 days before the date of
bidding. PBAC issues these only ten days before the bidding.(The Notice of
Qualification required by PD1594). The court emphasized that this
requirement is of utmost important to protect bidders.
- It is apparent that the present controversy did not arise from discretionary acts of the
administrative body nor does it involve merely technical matters. What is involved
here is non-compliance with the procedural rules on bidding which required strict
observance by law. The purpose of the rules is to secure competitive bidding and to
prevent favoritism, collusion, and fraud in the award of these contracts to the
detriment of the public. THIS PURPOSE WAS DEFEATED by the irregularities
committed by PBAC.
Petition Granted – Restraining Order Upheld.
DE CASTRO V JBC

FACTS:

This is a consolidated case regarding the appointment of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

to Associate Justice Renato Corona as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
All the petitions to the Court pose as the principal legal question whether the incumbent
President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. The question
is undoubtedly impressed with transcendental importance to the nation because the
appointment of the Chief Justice is any President’s most important appointment. The
conflicting provisions are Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII, Sec. 9.

ART. VII, SEC. 15. TWO MONTHS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE NEXT
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND UP TO THE END OF HIS TERM, A PRESIDENT
OR ACTING PRESIDENT SHALL NOT MAKE APPOINTMENTS, EXCEPT
TEMPORARY APPOINTMENTS TO EXECUTIVE POSITIONS WHEN CONTINUED
VACANCIES THEREIN WILL PREJUDICE PUBLIC SERVICE OR ENDANGER
PUBLIC SAFETY.

ART. VIII, SEC. 9. THE MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDGES OF THE
LOWER COURTS SHALL BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT FROM A LIST OF AT
LEAST THREE NOMINEES PREPARED BY THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL FOR
EVERY VACANCY. SUCH APPOINTMENTS NEED NO CONFIRMATION.

ISSUE:
Whether the prohibition against presidential appointments under Art. VII, Sec. 15 (Midnight
Appointment Ban), does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary? YES

HELD:
Prohibition under Art. VII, Sec.15 does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the
Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it
lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of
appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Article VIII is dedicated to
the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme
Court, among others. Sec. 4(1) and Sec. 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically
providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Sec. 9 states that the
appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the
submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Sec. 4(1) of the Article mandates
the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Art. VII, Sec. 15 to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. That such specification was
not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of
the President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme
Court.

Taken into consideration also that the appointment of the next Chief Justice by the incumbent
President is preferable to having the Associate Justice who is first in precedence take over.
Under the Constitution, the heads of the Legislative and Executive Departments are popularly
elected, and whoever are elected and proclaimed at once become the leaders of their
respective Departments. However, the lack of any appointed occupant of the office of Chief
Justice harms the independence of the Judiciary, because the Chief Justice is the head of the
entire Judiciary. The Chief Justice performs functions absolutely significant to the life of the
nation. With the entire Supreme Court being the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the Chief
Justice is the Chairman of the Tribunal. There being no obstacle to the appointment of the
next Chief Justice, aside from its being mandatory for the incumbent President to make
within the 90-day period from May 17, 2010, there is no justification to insist that the
successor of Chief Justice Puno be appointed by the next President.
Fortich vs. Corona (involves “matters”)

Article 8 Section 4 Paragraph 3: ​Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or

resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case without the
concurrence of at least three of such Members. ​When the required number is not obtained,
the case shall be decided​​ en banc:​ ​Provided​, that no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the court in a decision rendered​​ en banc​ or in division may be modified or
reversed except by the court sitting ​en banc.​

Facts

Respondents and intervenors in this case filed separate Motions for Reconsideration of the
November 17,1998 resolution of the Second Division of the Supreme Court for the Fortich
case.Respondents pray that the matter be referred to the court sitting en banc for failure to
reach the 3 required votes to resolve the matter

Issue
Whether or not the matter should have been referred to the Supreme Court sitting en
banc? NO

Ratio
Article 8 Section 4 Paragraph 3 reveals the intention of the framers wherein ​cases ​are are
decided while ​matters​​ are resolved. Having said that, only ​cases ​are referred to en banc for
failure to meet the majority vote required.

The three vote rule does not apply to the present case where it is the resolution of a Motion
for Reconsideration that is called for. This is because in cases, a tie would mean that there is
no decision, thus the need for the Court to sit en banc. However, in Motions for
Reconsideration, the case already has a decision and a tie in the voting does not leave the case
undecided, thus negating the need for an en banc session. If there is a tie in the voting for a
Motion for Reconsideration, the Motion is considered lost and the assailed decision is upheld

Second MRs are allowed if the reasons are extraordinarily persuasive and if the movants
obtain an express leave of court. However, the movants in this case failed to obtain such
leave of court and that their contentions have already been dismissed by the court prior in
their first MR.

Held
The motions filed by respondents and intervenors are all denied with finality and any further
motion, pleading or paper would not be entertained by the Court.