People vs Baharan GR No 188314 10 January 

2011

KEY POINTS IN EVIDENCE:

 A repetition of statement in court after an extrajudicial confession results to a judicial
admission
 In People vs Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial
confession becomes a judicial admission — making the testimony admissible as to both
conspirators
 An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence against the confessant but not
against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him
 A judicial confession is admissible against a declarant’s co-accuse since the latter are
afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former
 Section 30 of Rule 130 only applies to extrajudicial admission and not testimony

Facts: Trinidad and Baharan were trained by Abu Sayyaf group and bombed a bus
on 2005 Valentines. After the bombing, Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News
Network an exclusive interview some time after the incident, confessing his
participation in the Valentines Day bombing incident. In another exclusive
interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the
bombing incident.

Only Baharan, Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other
accused remain at-large. They were then charged with multiple murder and
multiple frustrated murder. On arraignment they pleaded guilty on the
charge of multiple murder. On multiple frustrated murder, Trinidad and
Baharan pleaded not guilty.

In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused
Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing their not guilty pleas to
the charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled guilty to
the heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in
their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad
and explained to them the consequences of the pleas. The two accused
acknowledged the inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-
arraignment. After the Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad
pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated murder.

ISSUE .1: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in accepting Trinidad and
Baharan plea of guilt despite insufficiency of searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the said plea.

HELD .1: The Court observed that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled
guilty to another charge multiple murder based on the same act relied upon
in the multiple frustrated murder charge.

The Court further noted that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt,
accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt one
through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as
stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the other via judicial
admission (pre-trial stipulation).

It is true that under the rule, statements made by a conspirator against a co-
conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the
conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled in People v. Buntag, if the
declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession
becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as to both
conspirators. Thus, in People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:
…[W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial
confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence
against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are
deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial
confession is admissible against the declarant's co-accused since
the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the former.
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to
extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at trial
where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to
cross-examine the declarant . Mercene's admission implicating
his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in
evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several
accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a
co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence
against the latter.

Considering the foregoing circumstances, the Court deem it unnecessary to

rule on the sufficiency of the searching inquiry in this instance. Remanding
the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accused plea of guilt was
not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under consideration.