The Family Code of The Philippines PDF

A Reviewer on Persons and Family Relations
from the lectures of Atty. Bruneson I. Alabastro, CPA

Prepared by: Karen B. Venzon – 1 Viada, 2020`
THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Took effect on August 3, 1988

TITLE I
MARRIAGE
Chapter 1
Requisites of Marriage
Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General, G.R. No. 217910, September 3, 2019
Evolution on the Concept of Marriage
When marriage was based in a formal contractual relationship among kinship groups
The right to own lad and pass it on to heirs meant that women’s childbearing abilities and male domination
became more important. Rather than kinship, marriage became the center of family life and was increasingly based on a
formal contractual relationship between men, women, and their kinship groups. The property and gender implications of
marriage are evident in the exchange of gifts between spouses and families and clearly defined rules about the rights and
responsibilities of each marital partner.
Women treaded as a form of property
During the Middle Ages, economic factors influenced marital choices more than affection, even among the poor,
and women’s sexuality was treated as a form of property.
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
Characteristics of Marriage
1. Special Contract of Permanent Union

❖ It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the
sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.
Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. [Alcazar v. Alcazar, G.R. No. 174451, October 13, 2009]
2. Legal Status
❖ According to Sempio-Diy: Marriage as a status carries with it implications with 2 aspects: (1) the aspect of personal
rights and obligations of the spouses [purely personal between them], and (2) the aspect of their property
relations [regulated by law and judicial sanctions as they may affect public interest].
❖ Article 2035 of the New Civil Code provides that “No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (1)
The civil status of persons xxx”
3. Foundation of the family

❖ Article II. Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
❖ Article XV. Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
❖ Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
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4. Inviolable Social Institution

❖ Article 1 of the Family Code provides that marriage is “an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences,
and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation.” It is an institution of public order or policy,
governed by rules established by law which cannot be made inoperative by the stipulation of the parties.
[Acebedo v. Arquero, A.M. No. P-94-1054, March 11, 2003]
❖ Article 2035 of the New Civil Code provides that “No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid: (2)
The validity of a marriage or a legal separation; (3) Any ground for legal separation; xxx”
REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE
Article 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
ESSENTIAL REQUISITES
1. Legal capacity of the contracting parties
✓ Substantive requirement as to the capacity of persons to enter into marriage.
➢ Article 5. Who may contract marriage?

1. Any male or female
❖ A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s
legal capacity and civil status.
❖ The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. [Silverio v. Republic G.R. No. 174689, October
19, 2007]
2. Of the age of eighteen years or upwards
❖ Below 18 years of age – the marriage is void, even with the consent of the parents (Article 35(1))
❖ 18-20 years of age – additional requirement of parental consent (Article 14)
❖ 21 – below 25 years of age – additional requirement of parental advice (Article 15)
3. Not under any of the impediments mentioned In Articles 37 (incestuous marriages) and 38 (marriages
against public policy)
❖ Applies Article 39 of the New Civil Code that one’s capacity to act is limited by family relations
2. Consent freely given

• “Freely given” consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.
o must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent
under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation or undue influence.
o must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding
the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding
should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism. [Republic v. Albios G.R. No. 198780,
October 16, 2013]
• Where given? Before the solemnizing officer
• How given? The parties must “appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age that they rake each other as husband and wife” (during the marriage
ceremony referred to in Art. 6)
• Defective marriages:
o Sta. Maria: Marriage by proxy solemnized here in the Philippines is likewise void because of the absence
of the essential requisite that consent freely given must be made in the presence of the solemnizing
officer and the absence of the formal requisite that the contracting parties must personally declare
before the solemnizing officer that they take each other as husband and wife.
o A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention
of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be
bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such relation. It
is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties
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whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for
vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence if consent. There is no genuine
consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in a way or for any purpose.
[Republic v. Albios G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013]
✓ Motives do not affect one’s consent.

✓ Rabuya: As a general rule, the law will not look behind the appearance of a consent which was clearly
manifested to determine its reality. Secret mental reservations of a party will not be inquired into, nor will the
motives inducing the apparent consent ordinarily be examined.
✓ Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the
kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of
their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows
married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to
have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that
they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage
contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly
support a marriage. [Republic v. Albios G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013]
Article 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A valid marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence
of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
FORMAL REQUISITES
1. Authority of the solemnizing officer
❖ Article 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious
sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted
him by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to
the solemnizing officer’s church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the cases mentioned in Article 31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a
military operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32; or
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the cases provided in Article 10.
❖ Article 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a
ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during
stopovers at ports of call.
❖ Article 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to
solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether
members of the armed forces or civilians.
❖ Article 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or
vice-consul of the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local
civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by
said consular official.
❖ Article 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be,
and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at the point of death or in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing
in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement
to that effect.
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CASE
JERRYSUS TILAR V. ELIZABETH TILAR 831 SCRA 116
Issue: Whether the courts have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of marriage pursuant to the provision of the Family Code.
Ruling: Yes. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. The State is mandated to protect marriage, being the foundation of the family, which
in turn is the foundation of the nation.
Our law on marriage, particularly the Family Code, restates the constitutional provision to protect the inviolability
of marriage and the family relations.
The Family Code also provides on who may solemnize and how marriage may be solemnized, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
xxxx
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious
sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church
or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's
church or religious sect;
xxxx
Thus, the contract of marriage is entered into by complying with the requirements and formalities prescribed by
law. The marriage of petitioner and respondent which was solemnized by a Catholic priest and was held in a church was
in accordance with the above-quoted provisions. Although, marriage is considered a sacrament in the Catholic church, it
has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code. As petitioner correctly pointed out, the instant
petition only seeks to nullify the marriage contract between the parties as postulated in the Family Code of the Philippines;
and the declaration of nullity of the parties' marriage in the religious and ecclesiastical aspect is another matter.17 Notably,
the proceedings for church annulment which is in accordance with the norms of Canon Law is not binding upon the State
as the couple is still considered married to each other in the eyes of the civil law. Thus, the principle of separation of the
church and state finds no application in this case.
➢ Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary, Supreme Court Administrative Order
No. 125-07, August 9, 2007
❖ Section 1. Authority of Solemnizing Officer. –
a. Incumbent Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax
Appeals have authority to solemnize marriages in any part of the Philippines, regardless of the
venue, provided the requisites of the law are complied with; and
b. Judges of the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have authority to solemnize marriages
within the court’s jurisdiction.
➢ Republic Act No. 7160 [Local Government Code]

❖ City mayors (Sec. 455) and municipal mayors (Sec. 444) are authorized to solemnize marriages.
Navarro v. Domagtoy, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996

Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of a marriage is the “authority of the solemnizing officer.” Under Article
7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, “any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.”
Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriages ceremony and does not alter or qualify
the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate
the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only
within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law
are complied with.
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However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in wedding only within said areas and
not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside of his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability.
Keuppers v. Hon. Murcia. A.M. No. MTJ-15-1860, April 3, 2018

Article 8 of the Family Code contains the limiting phrase “and not elsewhere,” which emphasizes that the place of
the solemnization of the marriage by a judge like him should only be in his office or courtroom. Indeed, the limiting phrase
highlighted the nature and status of the marriage of Rosalinda Keuppers and her husband as “a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman,” and as “the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation.
The only exceptions to the limitation are:
1. When the marriage was to be contracted on the point of death of one or both of Rosalinda Keuppers
and her husband in accordance with Article 29 of the Family Code; or
2. When the marriage was to be contracted in a remote place in accordance with Article 29 of the
Family Code; or
3. Where both of Rosalinda Keuppers and her husband had requested him as the solemnizing officer in
writing to solemnize the marriage at a house or place designated by them in their sworn statement to
that effect.
2. Authority of the solemnizing officer

❖ Article 9. A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the city or municipality where either
contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is required in accordance with
Chapter 2 of this title.
3. A marriage ceremony
❖ Article 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be
necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and
declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband
and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the
contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.
❖ In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage
certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party, which
fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer.
Kho v. Republic G.R. No. 187462, June 1, 2016

The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code (now, Family Code) is that
it is authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquire into their
capacity to contract marriage. Stated differently, the requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested.
CASES
REPUBLIC V. CA 236 SCRA 257
Issue: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are sufficient to
establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private
respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.
Ruling: At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New
Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil
registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab
initio.
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Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

29. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official record or by his
deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record
or entry.
The above rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular
document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register.
The certification of “due search and inability to find” issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he
being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate
of “due search and inability to find” sufficiently proved that his office did not issue a marriage license to contracting parties.
SY V. CA 330 SCRA 550
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of a
marriage license at the time of the ceremony.
Ruling: The pieces of evidence on record plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there
was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement. Its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. In
addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor
private respondent ever resided on Carmona.
From the documents presented, the marriage license was issued almost one year after the ceremony took place.
The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license. Article 80 of the Civil
Code is clearly applicable in this case. There being no claim of an exceptional character, the purported marriage between
the parties could not be classified among those enumerated in Articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The court thus concluded
that under Article 80 of CC, the marriage between the parties is void from the beginning.
SEVILLA V. CARDENAS 497 SCRA 428
Issue: Whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License as
appearing in the Marriage Contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void ab
initio.
Ruling: The certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not exist
in his office or the particularly entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search.
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the
logbook where the parties’ Marriage License may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of performance of
official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted.
• A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted and acted on
where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one which may be overcome
by other evidence.
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty.
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other
evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second
certifications.
In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence
of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
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Article 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as
stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible
for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
CASES
COSCA V. PALAYPAYON 237 SCRA 249
Issue: Whether or not the marriages solemnized by respondent Judge Palaypayon valid.
Ruling: On the charge regarding illegal marriages, the Family Code patiently provides that the formal requisites of marriage
are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the
absence of any of the essential requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while and irregularity
in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall
be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what the
court provides for pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility.
The Revised Penal Code provides that priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall
perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage
Law. This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
ARANES V. OCCIANO 380 SCRA 402
Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge Occiano may be held responsible for solemnizing the marriage of petitioner
Aranes without a duly issued Marriage License.
Ruling: Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges
of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines
Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and
subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized
the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In
People vs. Lara,4 we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the
subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases
provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent
judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has
consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of
exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well as the
discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.5 Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve purely private or
personal matters. They cannot be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or
another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a matter which involves
the Court's constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust
character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a disciplining authority.
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MORIGO V. PEOPLE 422 SCRA 376
Issue: Whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
Ruling: The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The
contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes,
petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the
validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the
instant charge.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage
contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without
more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy
unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused
and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the
circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy.
ALCANTARA V. ALCANTARA 531 SCRA 466
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent valid.
Ruling: The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which
renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases
where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-
cut.
Jurisprudence shows that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires
that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by
a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage
contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also
issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified
the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the
fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
The certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona enjoys the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business.
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
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duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of
the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officer's act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness. Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in
Carmona, Cavite.
Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and
issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for
publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the
formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.
NOLLORA V. PEOPLE GR No. 191452, September 7, 2011
Issue: Whether or not the second marriage is bigamous and void ab initio.
Ruling: Yes. Under Art 349 of the RPC, the marriage is bigamous and pursuant to Art 35of the Family Code, it is void ab initio.
Nollora’s religious affiliation is inapplicable here. Neither of his marriages were solemnized under the Muslim Law.
The SC ruled that his two marriages were not conducted according to the Code of Muslim. Hence, his religious affiliation
may not be used as a defense.
Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "in case of a marriage between a Muslim and a non-
Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order
No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.
" Nollora’s religious affiliation is not an issue here. Neither is the claim that Nollora’s marriages were solemnized
according to Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his professed religion, Nollora cannot claim exemption from liability for the
crime of bigamy.
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
REPUBLIC V. ALBIOS GR No. 198780, October 16, 2013
Issue: Whether or not a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent.
Ruling: No. Respondent’s marriage is not void.

Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides
that the absence of any essential requisite shall render marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be:
(1) freely given and
(2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer.
A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under
Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
9|P age
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication,
drugs, or hypnotism.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because
it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they
understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There
was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application
for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it
was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
• Marriage in jest - pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of entering
into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The
ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.
- It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever,
hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or
unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties
have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American
citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their objective, considering that only a valid
marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into the actual
marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
ABBAS V. ABBAS GR No. 183896, January 30, 2013
Issue: Whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued.
Ruling: No. Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage
contract as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was
issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was
shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as Marriage License No .
996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those
of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her
office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain
why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took
no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither
could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the
license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license, having
admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached
for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the
license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus
impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed
to present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license
were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured
from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that
there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.
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GO BANGAYAN V. BANGAYAN 700 SCRA 702
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between Sally and Benjamin valid.
Ruling: No. The marriage between Sally and Benjamin is not valid. Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on September 10, 1973
was duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time
Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on March 7, 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena
was valid and subsisting.
The court held that there was no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void
ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license,
except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be void from the beginning.” In this case, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage license
was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local
civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35which made
their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules
on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious
are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
KHO V. REPUBLIC and KHO GR No. 187462, June 01, 2016
Issue: Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued at the time of the celebration of the marriage between Raquel
and Veronica.
Ruling: No. The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential
requisites of marriage as a contract, to wit:
ART 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued
by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an
exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. Under the Civil Code, marriages of
exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title 111, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages
in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2) marriages in remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4)
ratification of marital cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages; and
(7) mixed marriages. Petitioner's and respondent's marriage do not fall under any of these exceptions.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage
license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the
essence of the marriage contract. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code
is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired
into their capacity to contract marriage. Stated differently, the requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State's
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested.
It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. In
addition, the Certificate of Marriage issued by the officiating priest does not contain any entry regarding the said marriage
license. Respondent could have obtained a copy of their marriage contract from the National Archives and Records
Section, where information regarding the marriage license, i.e., date of issuance and license number, could be obtained.
However, she also failed to do so. The Court also notes, with approval, the RTC's agreement with petitioner's observation
that the statements of the witnesses for respondent, as well as respondent herself, all attest to the fact that a marriage
ceremony was conducted but neither one of them testified that a marriage license was issued in favor of petitioner and
respondent. Indeed, despite respondent's categorical claim that she and petitioner were able to obtain a marriage
11 | P a g e
license, she failed to present evidence to prove such allegation. It is a settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.
Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with
respondent's failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that such license was
ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the
ruling of the CA, it cannot be said that there was a simple defect, not a total absence, in the requirements of the law which
would not affect the validity of the marriage. The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage
license was issued and the law is clear that a marriage which is performed without the corresponding marriage license is
null and void.
Article 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn
application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following:
(1) Full name of the contracting party;
(2) Place of birth;
(3) Age and date of birth;
(4) Civil status;
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled;
(6) Present residence and citizenship;
(7) Degree of relationship of the contracting parties;
(8) Full name, residence and citizenship of the father;
(9) Full name, residence and citizenship of the mother; and
(10) Full name, residence and citizenship of the guardian or person having charge, in case the contracting party has
neither father nor mother and is under the age of twenty-one years.
Article 12. The local civil registrar, upon receiving such application, shall require the presentation of the original birth
certificates or, in default thereof, the baptismal certificates of the contracting parties or copies of such documents duly
attested by the persons having custody of the originals. These certificates or certified copies of the documents by this Article
need not be sworn to and shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax. The signature and official title of the person
issuing the certificate shall be sufficient proof of its authenticity.
If either of the contracting parties is unable to produce his birth or baptismal certificate or a certified copy of either
because of the destruction or loss of the original or if it is shown by an affidavit of such party or of any other person tha t such
birth or baptismal certificate has not yet been received though the same has been required of the person having custody
thereof at least fifteen days prior to the date of the application, such party may furnish in lieu thereof his current reside nce
certificate or an instrument drawn up and sworn to before the local civil registrar concerned or any public official authorized
to administer oaths. Such instrument shall contain the sworn declaration of two witnesses of lawful age, setting forth the fu ll
name, residence and citizenship of such contracting party and of his or her parents, if known, and the place and date of birth
of such party. The nearest of kin of the contracting parties shall be preferred as witnesses, or, in their default, persons o f good
reputation in the province or the locality.
The presentation of birth or baptismal certificate shall not be required if the parents of the contracting parties appear
personally before the local civil registrar concerned and swear to the correctness of the lawful age of said parties, as stated
in the application, or when the local civil registrar shall, by merely looking at the applicants upon their personally appear ing
before him, be convinced that either or both of them have the required age.
Procedure:
1. Sworn application for marriage will be filed (Article 11)
2. Upon receiving of such application. The local civil registrar shall require the presentation of:
a. The original birth certificates of the contracting parties or copies of such documents duly attested by the
persons having custody of the originals, or
b. In default thereof, the baptismal certificates of the contracting parties or copies of such documents duly
attested by the persons having custody of the originals.
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Note: these certificates or certified copies of the documents required by this Article need not be sworn to and shall be exempt
from the documentary stamp tax. The signature and official title of the person issuing the certificate shall be sufficient proof
of its authenticity.
➢ What if either of the contracting parties is unable to produce his birth or baptismal certificate or a certified copy of
either?
❖ Reasons must be:
▪ Because of the destruction or loss of the original, or
▪ It is shown by an affidavit of such party or of any other person that such birth or baptismal certificate
has not yet been received though the same has been required of the person having custody thereof
at least fifteen days prior to the date of the application.
❖ Recourse? In lieu thereof, such party may furnish his current residence certificate or an instrument drawn
up and sworn to before the LCR concerned or any public official authorized to administer oaths.
o Such instrument shall contain the sworn declaration of two witnesses of lawful age, setting forth
the full name, residence and citizenship of such contracting party and of his or her parents, of
known, and the place and date of birth of such party.
o The nearest kin of the contracting parties shall be preferred as witnesses, or, in their default,
persons of good reputation in the province or the locality.
➢ When is the presentation of the birth or baptismal certificate shall not be required?
❖ If the parents of the contracting parties appear personally before the local civil registrar concerned and
swear to the correctness of the lawful age of said parties, as stated in the application, or
❖ When the local civil registrar shall, by merely looking at the applicants upon their personally appearing before
him, be convinced that either or both of them have the required age.
Article 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to
furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased
spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her
previous marriage.
In case the death certificate cannot be secured, the party shall make an affidavit setting forth this circumstance and
his or her actual civil status and the name and date of death of the deceased spouse.
Rule in case either of the contracting parties has been previously married
The applicant shall be required to furnish:

1. The death certificate of the deceased spouse, or
2. The judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or
3. The judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage.
What if the death certificate cannot be secured? The party shall make an affidavit setting forth:
1. His circumstances, and

2. His or her actual civil status, and
3. The name and date of death of the deceased spouse
Art. 14. In case either or both of the contracting parties, not having been emancipated by a previous marriage, are
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, they shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, exhibit to
the local civil registrar, the consent to their marriage of their father, mother, surviving parent or guardia n, or persons having
legal charge of them, in the order mentioned. Such consent shall be manifested in writing by the interested party, who
personally appears before the proper local civil registrar, or in the form of an affidavit made in the presence of t wo witnesses
and attested before any official authorized by law to administer oaths. The personal manifestation shall be recorded in both
applications for marriage license, and the affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be attached to said applicatio ns.
13 | P a g e
Effect of the marriage was solemnized without the requisite parental consent?
Article 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes existing at the time of the marriage:
1. That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but
below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person
having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order
Art. 15. Any contracting party between the age of twenty-one and twenty-five shall be obliged to ask their parents or
guardian for advice upon the intended marriage. If they do not obtain such advice, or if it be unfavorable, the marriage
license shall not be issued till after three months following the completion of the publication of the application therefor. A
sworn statement by the contracting parties to the effect that such advice has been sought, together with the written advice
given, if any, shall be attached to the application for marriage license. Should the parents or guardian refuse to give any
advice, this fact shall be stated in the sworn statement.
✓ Failure to obtain such parental advice will not have an effect as to the legal capacity of the parties; it will only affect
the issuance of the marriage license.
✓ If a marriage license is issued notwithstanding the absence of such parental advice or prior to the three-month
suspension period under Article 15 of the Family Code, the same shall be considered as a mere irregularity in the
issuance of the license and shall not affect the validity of the marriage.
Art. 16. In the cases where parental consent or parental advice is needed, the party or parties concerned shall, in addition
to the requirements of the preceding articles, attach a certificate issued by a priest, imam or minister authorized to solemn ize
marriage under Article 7 of this Code or a marriage counselor duly accredited by the proper government agency to the effect
that the contracting parties have undergone marriage counseling. Failure to attach said certificates of marriage counseling
shall suspend the issuance of the marriage license for a period of three months from the completion of the publication of the
application. Issuance of the marriage license within the prohibited period shall subject the issuing officer to administrativ e
sanctions but shall not affect the validity of the marriage.
Should only one of the contracting parties need parental consent or parental advice, the other party must be present
at the counselling referred to in the preceding paragraph.
✓ Talks about the effect of failure to attach said certificate of marriage counselling – suspends the issuance of such
marriage license.
Art. 17. The local civil registrar shall prepare a notice which shall contain the full names and residences of the applicants
for a marriage license and other data given in the applications. The notice shall be posted for ten consecutive days on a
bulletin board outside the office of the local civil registrar located in a conspicuous place within the building and accessi ble
to the general public. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the
local civil registrar thereof. The marriage license shall be issued after the completion of the period of publication.
Art. 18. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the
particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for marriage license, but shall nonetheless issue said licens e
after the completion of the period of publication, unless ordered otherwise by a competent court at his own instance or that
of any interest party. No filing fee shall be charged for the petition nor a corresponding bond required for the issuances of the
order.
Art. 19. The local civil registrar shall require the payment of the fees prescribed by law or regulations before the issuance
of the marriage license. No other sum shall be collected in the nature of a fee or tax of any kind for the issuance of said
license. It shall, however, be issued free of charge to indigent parties, that is those who have no visible means of income or
whose income is insufficient for their subsistence a fact established by their affidavit, or by their oath before the local c ivil
registrar.
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Art. 20. The license shall be valid in any part of the Philippines for a period of one hundred twenty days from the date of
issue, and shall be deemed automatically canceled at the expiration of the said period if the contracting parties have not
made use of it. The expiry date shall be stamped in bold characters on the face of every license issued.
✓ The effectivity of marriage license shall be valid only for 120 days from the date of issue
✓ Marriage license will be deemed automatically cancelled at the expiration
Art. 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be necessary for them before
a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective
diplomatic or consular officials.
Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity herein required,
submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to contract marriage.
Purpose and Effects

- Sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and
admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a
marriage license.
- In passing, we note that the absence of the said certificate is merely an irregularity in complying with the formal
requirement of procuring a marriage license. Under Article 4 of the Family Code, an irregularity will not affect the
validity of the marriage celebrated on the basis of a marriage license issued without that certificate.
Art. 22. The marriage certificate, in which the parties shall declare that they take each other as husband and wife, shall
also state:
(1) The full name, sex and age of each contracting party;
(2) Their citizenship, religion and habitual residence;
(3) The date and precise time of the celebration of the marriage;
(4) (4) That the proper marriage license has been issued according to law, except in marriage provided for in Chapter 2
of this Title;
(5) (5) That either or both of the contracting parties have secured the parental consent in appropriate cases;
(6) (6) That either or both of the contracting parties have complied with the legal requirement regarding parental advice
in appropriate cases; and
(7) (7) That the parties have entered into marriage settlement, if any, attaching a copy thereof.
Art. 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties the origina l
of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later
than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper rec eipts
shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The
solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the copy of the marriage
certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the
solemnization of the marriage in place other than those mentioned in Article 8.
Art. 24. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to administer
oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases. The documents and affidavits filed in connection with
applications for marriage licenses shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax.
Art. 25. The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all applications for marriage licenses filed with him in a registry book
strictly in the order in which the same are received. He shall record in said book the names of the applicants, the date on
which the marriage license was issued, and such other data as may be necessary.
15 | P a g e
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4),
(5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227)
RULES UINDER PARAGRAPH 1
General Rule: All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such (highlights marriage as a contract pursuant to the lex loxi celebritionis principle)
Exceptions: (highlights applicability of Philippine law pursuant to the nationality principle)
Article 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or
guardians;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contacting party as to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
Article 36. – psychological incapacity

Article 37. – incestuous marriages
Article 39. – marriages against public policy

Instances where foreign law will govern the status of persons (not Philippine law):
Article 35. xxx

(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages
were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had
the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter;
RULES UNDER PARAGRAPH 2
Situation:
✓ A marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
✓ It is validly celebrated and
✓ A divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad:
o By the alien spouse*
o Capacitating him or her to remarry
Rule? The Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law
CONCEPT OF DIVORCE
✓ In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But
divorces are of different types.
✓ The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The
first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. [Garcia v. Recio,
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001]
Public Policy on Divorce
✓ The non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the
marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be
grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided by law. For as long as this public
16 | P a g e
policy on marriage between Filipino exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be
given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction. [Lavadia v. Heirs of Luna, G.R. No. 171914, July
23, 2014]
✓ Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by
the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. [Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989]
Arreza v. Toyo G.R. No. 213198, July 1, 2019

The second paragraph was introduced as a corrective measure to resolve an absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to an alien spouse even after their marital bond had been severed by the divorce decree obtained
abroad. Through this provision, Philippine courts are given the authority “to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree
to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of marriage.” It bestowed upon the
Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage considered dissolved, granting him or her the capacity to
remarry.
Nonetheless, settled is the rule that in actions involving the recognition of a foreign divorce judgment, it is
indispensable that the petitioner prove not only the foreign judgment granting the divorce, but also the alien spouse’s
national law. This rule is rooted in the fundamental theory that Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
judgments and laws.
Both the foreign divorce decree and the foreign spouse’s national law, purported to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, can be established by complying with the mandate of Rule 132, Sections 24 45 and 25 of the Rules of Court:
Under Sections and of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either:
(1) An official publication or
(2) A copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document.
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
(a) Accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) Authenticated by the seal of his office.
Here, the RTC ruled that the documents Genevieve submitted to prove the divorce decree have complied with the
demands of Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25. However, it found the copy of the Japan Civil Code and its English translation
insufficient to prove Japan’s law on divorce. It noted that these documents were not duly authenticated by the Philippine
Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs.
However, the English translation submitted by Genevieve was published by Eibun-Horei-Sha. Inc., a private company
in Japan engaged in publishing English translation of Japanese laws, which came to be known as the EHS Law Bulletin
Series. However, these translations are “not advertised as a source of official translations of Japanese laws;” rather, it is in
the KANPO or the Official Gazette where all official laws and regulations are published, albeit in Japanese. Accordingly,
the English translation submitted by Genevieve is not an official publication exempted from the requirement of
authentication.
Recent cases that echo the Manalo ruling:
Nullada v. Civil Registrar of Manila G.R. No. 224548, January 23, 2019
In the Manalo decision, the Court went on to cite jurisprudence wherein the legal effects of a foreign divorce
decree, albeit obtained by a Filipino spouse, were acknowledged in our jurisdiction but limited on the issues of child custody
and property relations. In several other jurisprudence, recognition of the effects of a foreign divorce was also implied from
the Court’s disposition of the cases. The specific issue on the binding effect of a divorce decree obtained by a Filipino
spouse on one’s marital status was then expressly and directly tackled by the Court. In determining whether a divorce
decree obtained by a foreigner spouse should be recognized in the Philippines, it is immaterial that the divorce is sought
by the Filipino national.
While opposition to the foregoing interpretation is commonly raised on the basis of the nationality principle is not
an absolute unbending rule. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Cde should be deemed an exception to
the general rule.
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Here, Marlyn failed to satisfy the foregoing requirements. The records only include a photocopy of the excerpts of
The Civil Code of Japan, merely stamped LIBRARY, Japan Information and Culture Center, Embassy of Japan, 2627 Roxas
Boulevard, Pasay City 1300. This clearly does not constitute sufficient compliance with the rules on proof of Japan’s law on
divorce.
What if the divorce decree was acquired jointly by the Filipino and foreigner spouse?
Galapon v. Republic G.R. No. 243722, January 22, 2020

Pursuant to the majority ruling in Manalo, Article 26 (2) applies to mixed marriages where the divorce decree is:
(i) Obtained by the foreign spouse;
(ii) Obtained jointly by the Filipino and foreign spouse; and
(iii) Obtained solely by the Filipino spouse.
Based on the records, Cynthia and Park obtained a divorce decree by mutual agreement under the laws of South
Korea. The sufficiency of the evidence presented by Cynthia to prove the issuance of said divorce decree and the
governing national law of her husband Park was not put in issue.
May a foreign divorce decree be used as a defense in a Bigamy Case?
Sarto y Misalucha v. People G.R. no. 206284, February 28, 2018

For a person to be convicted of bigamy, the following elements must concur: (1) that the offender has been legally
married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case of an absentee spouse, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead according to the provisions of the Civil or Family Code; (3) that the offender contracts
a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisite for validity.
Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages. He, however, put forth the defense of the termination
of his first marriage as a result of the divorce obtained abroad by his alien spouse.
A divorce decree obtained abroad by an alien spouse is a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage.
As in any other foreign judgment, a divorce decree does not have an automatic effect in the Philippines. Consequently,
recognition by Philippine courts may be required before effects of a divorce decree could be extended in this jurisdiction.
Recognition of the divorce decree, however need not be obtained in a separate petition filed solely for that purpose.
Philippine courts may recognize the foreign divorce decree when such was invoked by a party as an integral aspect of his
claim or defense.
Before the divorce can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove it as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Proving the foreign law under which the divorce was secured is mandatory
considering that Philippine courts cannot and could not be expected to take judicial notice of foreign laws. For the purpose
of establishing divorce as a fact, a copy of the divorce decree itself must be presented and admitted in evidence. This in
consonance with the rule that a foreign judgment may be given presumptive evidentiary value only after it is presented
and admitted in evidence.
Aside from the testimonies of Redante and Maria Socorro, the only piece of evidence presented by the defense
to prove the divorce, is the certificate of divorce allegedly issued by the registrar of the Supreme Court of British Columbia.
This certificate of divorce, however is utterly insufficient to rebut the charge against Redante.
First, the certificate of divorce decree required by the rules and jurisprudence. As discussed previously, the divorce
decree to prove the fact of divorce is the judgment itself as rendered by the foreign court and not a mere certification.
Second, assuming the certificate of divorce may be considered as the divorce decree it was not accompanied
by a certification issued by the proper Philippine diplomatic or consular officer stationed in Canada, as required under
Section 24 of Rule 132.
Lastly, no copy of the alleged Canadian law was presented by the defense. Thus, it could not be reasonably
determined whether the subject divorce decree was in accord with Maria Socorro’s national law.
Further, since neither the divorce decree nor the alleged Canadian law was satisfactorily demonstrated, the type of divorce
supposedly secured by Maria Socorro – whether an absolute divorce which terminates the marriage or a limited divorce which merely
suspends it – and whether such divorce capacitated her to remarry could not also be ascertained. As such, Redante failed to prove his
defense that he had the capacity to remarry when he contracted a subsequent marriage to Fe. His liability for bigamy is, therefore, now
beyond question. The fact that Redante failed to prove the existence of the divorce and that it was validly acquired prior to the
celebration of the second marriage still subsists.
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CASES
REPUBLIC V. IYOY 470 SCRA 508
Issue: Whether or not Article 26 paragraph 2 of the Family Code applicable in this case.
Ruling: No. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines –
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a
Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the
said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained
her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer
filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in
1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an
American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and pursuant to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights
and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even
until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a
divorce from respondent Crasus.
REPUBLIC V. OBRECIDO III 472 SCRA 114
Issue: Whether or not respondent Cipriano Obrecido III can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
Ruling: On its face, Article 26 (2) does not appear to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply
only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The
instant case is one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the
wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and
indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the USA. However, taking into consideration the legislative intent
and applying the rule of reason, the Court held that Article 26 (2) should be interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed ro remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case
must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a
valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning
the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.13
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Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as
an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading
it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must
also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged
and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to
enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as
amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s bare allegations that his
wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that
respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission
of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
CORPUZ V. SANTO TOMAS GR No. 186571, August 11, 2010
Issue: Whether or not Article 26 (2) of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for
the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
Ruling: No. The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse.
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by
the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.
Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce,
whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article
17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated
in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception
to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her
alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the
courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose
status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In
other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse
can claim no right under this provision.
FUJIKI V. MARINAY GR No. 196049, June 26, 2013
Issue: Whether or not the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
Ruling: The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
20 | P a g e
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties
is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court.
To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family
Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of
the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the
trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, the service of
summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial, the trial and the judgment of the trial court. This
is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues." The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits.
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other
mandatory laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by
Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot
presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment
on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
KOIKE V. KOIKE GR No. 215723, July 27, 2016
Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.
Ruling: Under Article 26 (2), the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree
to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, the Court had the occasion to rule that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show
the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically
for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)
Thus, in Garcia v. Recio, it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized
in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Both the
divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.30 Since
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact.
REPUBLIC V. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO GR No. 221029, April 24, 2018
Issue: Whether or not under Article 26 (2), a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating
a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to
remarry.
21 | P a g e
Ruling: Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly
obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or
the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put
words in the mouth of lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words to have used words
advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words if a statute there should be departure.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce
proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do
so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of the act. Law have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such
ends and purposes.
NOTE:
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce
or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and
leaves the bond in full force. In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.
2. Consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage in
case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
REPUBLIC V. FLORIE GRACE COTE GR No. 212860, March 14, 2018
Issue: Whether or not the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies in a case involving recognition of a foreign decree of
divorce.
Ruling: The wordings of the second paragraph of Article 26 initially spawned confusion as to whether or not it covers even
those marriages wherein both of the spouses were Filipinos at the time of marriage and then one of them eventually
becomes a naturalized citizen of another country.
In the landmark case of Republic v. Orbecido III, the Court ruled that the reckoning point is not the citizenship of
the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Although the Court has already laid down the rule regarding foreign divorce involving Filipino citizens, the Filipino
spouse who likewise benefits from the effects of the divorce cannot automatically remarry. Before the divorced Filipino
spouse can remarry, he or she must file a petition for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce.
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not
take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment
and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim
or defense.
A decree of absolute divorce procured abroad is different from annulment as defined by our family laws. A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC only covers void and voidable marriages that are specifically cited and enumerated in the Family Code of
the Philippines. Void and voidable marriages contemplate a situation wherein the basis for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. It treats the marriage as if it never
22 | P a g e
existed. Divorce, on the other hand, ends a legally valid marriage and is usually due to circumstances arising after the
marriage.
It was error for the RTC to use as basis for denial of petitioner's appeal Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Since
Florie followed the procedure for cancellation of entry in the civil registry, a special proceeding governed by Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, an appeal from the RTC decision should be governed by Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court and
not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
DELA CRUZ – MORISONO V. RYOJI MORISONO GR No. 226013, July 2, 2018
Issue: Whether or not under Article 26 (2) of the Family Code, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine
law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who
is capacitated to remarry.
Ruling: Yes. According to Republic v. Orbecido III, the following elements must concur in order for Article 26 (2) to apply,
namely: (a) that there is a valid marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) that a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. In the same case, the Court also initially
clarified that Article 26 (2) applies not only to cases where a foreigner was the one who procured a divorce of his/her
marriage to a Filipino spouse, but also to instances where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding,
and obtained a favorable decree.
However, in the recent case of Republic v. Manalo (Manalo),20 the Court En Banc extended the application of
Article 26 (2) of the Family Code to further cover mixed marriages where it was the Filipino citizen who divorced his/her
foreign spouse. Pertinent portions of the ruling read:
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry
under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his
or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. x x x.
We rule in the affirmative.
xxxx
When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in likewise
acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to
remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage
tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both
of them are freed from the marital bond.
xxxx
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce
validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who
initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino
spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of
the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as
are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure."
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce
proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute
when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent
with the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to
defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. x x x.
xxxx
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it
23 | P a g e
was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an
anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws
of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the
Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding
is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated
proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a
means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien
spouses are severed by operation of the latter's national law.
xxxx
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen.
There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural, and religious
dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is
married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a
Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino
spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner.
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse. In the eyes
of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in an
alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still
married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between
them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly
unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Thus, pursuant to Manalo, foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages between a Filipino and an alien
citizen may already be recognized in this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses initiated the divorce;
provided, of course, that the party petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce decree – presumably the Filipino
citizen – must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
In this case, a plain reading of the RTC ruling shows that the denial of Luzviminda's petition to have her foreign
divorce decree recognized in this jurisdiction was anchored on the sole ground that she admittedly initiated the divorce
proceedings which she, as a Filipino citizen, was not allowed to do. In light of the doctrine laid down in Manalo, such
ground relied upon by the RTC had been rendered nugatory. However, the Court cannot just order the grant of
Luzviminda's petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree, as Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact of her. "Divorce
by Agreement" obtained, in Nagoya City, Japan and its conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce. Notably, the
RTC did not rule on such issues. Since these are questions which require an examination of various factual matters, a remand
to the court a quo is warranted.
STEPHEN JUEGO – SAKAI V. REPUBLIC GR No. 224015, July 23, 2018
Issue: Whether or not a divorce decree obtained by agreement of the parties may be recognized in the Philippines.
Ruling: Yes. In the Manalo case, the Court held that the fact that it was the Filipino spouse who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted should not affect the application nor remove him from the coverage of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code which states that "where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." We observed that to interpret the
word "obtained" to mean that the divorce proceeding must actually be initiated by the alien spouse would depart from
the true intent of the legislature and would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of Paragraph
2 of Article 26, which is, specifically, to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse. The subject provision, therefore, should not make a distinction for a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
initiated proceeding.
24 | P a g e
Applying the foregoing pronouncement to the case at hand, the Court similarly rules that despite the fact that
petitioner participated in the divorce proceedings in Japan, and even if it is assumed that she initiated the same, she must
still be allowed to benefit from the exception provided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently, since her marriage
to Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby
capacitating Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Nevertheless, as similarly held in Manalo, We cannot yet grant petitioner's Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment for she has yet to comply with certain guidelines before our courts may recognize the subject divorce decree
and the effects thereof. Time and again, the Court has held that the starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. This means
that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. Since both the foreign
divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official
acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court applies. Thus, what is required is proof, either by
(1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official
records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
RACHO V. TANAKA GR No. 199519, June 25, 2018 868 SCRA 25
Issue: Whether or not the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is sufficient to prove the fact that a divorce
between petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Racho and respondent Seiichi Tanaka was validly obtained by the latter according to
his national law.
Ruling: Yes. Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the admissibility of official records that are kept in a foreign
country requires that it must be accompanied by a certificate from a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consul, consular agent or any officer of the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in that foreign country.
The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was accompanied by an Authentication issued by Consul
Bryan Dexter B. Lao of the Embassy of the Philippines in Tokyo, Japan, certifying that Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular Service
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan was an official in and for Japan. The Authentication further certified that he was
authorized to sign the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce and that his signature in it was genuine. Applying
Rule 132, Section 24, the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is admissible as evidence of the fact of divorce
between petitioner and respondent.
The Regional Trial Court established that according to the national law of Japan, a divorce by agreement
"becomes effective by notification." Considering that the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was duly
authenticated, the divorce between petitioner and respondent was validly obtained according to respondent's national
law.
IN RE: PETITION FOR JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF DIVORCE BETWEEN MINURO TAKAHASHI AND JULIET RENDORA MORANA V.
REPUBLIC GR No. 227605, December 5, 2019
Issue: Whether or not the Divorce Report submitted by the petitioner spouses sufficient to prove that they were able to
obtain a divorce validly.
Ruling: Yes. Records show that the Divorce Report is what the Government of Japan issued to petitioner and her husband
when they applied for divorce. There was no "divorce judgment" to speak of because the divorce proceeding was not
coursed through Japanese courts but through the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City in Hiroshima Prefecture, Japan. In
any event, since the Divorce Report was issued by the Office of the Mayor of Fukuyama City, the same is deemed an act
of an official body in Japan. By whatever name it is called, the Divorce Report is clearly the equivalent of the "Divorce
Decree" in Japan, hence, the best evidence of the fact of divorce obtained by petitioner and her former husband.
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Notably, the fact of divorce was also supported by the Certificate of All Matters23 issued by the Japanese
government to petitioner's husband Minoru Takahashi, indicating the date of divorce, petitioner's name from whom he got
divorced and petitioner's nationality as well.
More, petitioner submitted below a duly authenticated copy of the Divorce Certificate24 issued by the Japanese
government.25 The fact alone that the document was submitted to the trial court without anyone identifying it on the
stand or making a formal offer thereof in evidence does not call for dismissal of the petition.
For one, the State did not question the existence of the Divorce Report, Divorce Certificate, and more importantly
the fact of divorce between petitioner and her husband. As Republic v. Manalo26 pronounced, if the opposing party fails
to properly object, as in this case, the existence of the divorce report and divorce certificate decree is rendered admissible
as a written act of the foreign official body.
For another, petitioner explained that despite repeated prompt requests from the Japanese Embassy, the latter
released the Divorce Certificate quite belatedly after petitioner had already terminated her testimony and returned to
Japan to care for her children.
Still, another, the Divorce Report, Certificate of All Matters, and Divorce Certificate were all authenticated by the
Japanese Embassy. These are proofs of official records which are admissible in evidence under Sections 19 and 24, Rule
132 of the Rules on Evidence.
Chapter 2
Marriages Exempt from License Requirement
Marriages Exempted from Marriage Licenses

Article 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage may be solemnized
without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives.
Article 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party
to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license.
Article 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit
executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was
performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is
no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that the officer to ok
the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment to
the marriage.
Article 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with the legible copy of the
marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the municipality where
it was performed within the period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage.
Article 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship
captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call.
Article 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize
marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or
civilians.
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Article 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed
validly without the necessity of marriage license, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or
practices.
Nollora, Jr. v. People G.R. No. 191425, September 7, 2011

Art. 14. Nature. – marriage is not only a civil contract but a civil institution. Its nature, consequences and incidents
are governed by this Code and the Shari’a and not subject to stipulation, except that the marriage settlements to a certain
extent fix the property relations of the spouses.
Art. 15. Essential Requisites. – no marriage contract shall be perfected unless the following essential requisites are
complied with:
(a) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(b) Mutual consent of the parties freely given;
(c) Offer (ijab) and acceptance (qabul) duly witnessed by at least two competent persons after the proper
guardian in marriage (wali) has given consent; and
(d) Stipulation of the customary dower (mahr) duly witnessed by two competent persons.
Art. 18. Authority to solemnized marriage. – Marriage may be solemnized:
(a) By the proper wali by the woman to be wedded;
(b) Upon the authority of the proper wali, by any person who is competent under Muslim law to solemnize
marriage; or
(c) By the judge of the Shari’a District Court or Shari’a Circuit Court or any person designated by the judge,
should the proper wali refuse without justifiable reason, to authorize the solemnization.
Art. 19. Place of solemnization. – Marriage shall be solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of the Shari’a judge,
office of the Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or her wall, or at any other suitable place agreed upon by the parties.
Art. 20. Specification of dower. – The amount or value of dower may be fixed by the contracting parties before,
during or after the celebration of a marriage. If the amount or the value thereof has not been so fixed, a proper dower
shall, upon petition of the wife, determined by the court according to the social standing of the parties.
Indeed, Article 13 (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that “in case of a marriage between a Muslim
and a Non-Muslim, solemnized not in accordance with Muslim law, the Family Code of the Philippines, or Executive Order
No. 209, in lieu of the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.”
Article 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state
under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Situation:
✓ A man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife (cohabitation)
✓ They have done so for at least five years and
✓ Without any legal impediment to marry each other.
Rules:
1. No license shall be necessary for the marriage.

2. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. [affidavit of cohabitation]
3. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties
and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Concepts
✓ The reason for the rule is “the publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such persons from legalizing
their status.” (Family Code Commission) “To preserve peace in the family and avoid the peeping and suspicious eye
of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it
wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.” (Albano)
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✓ Legal Impediment – pertain to the legal capacity of either of the contracting parties to marry (Article 2 (1) in relation
to Article 5); refers to any possible ground or basis under the Family Code, including non-age and the status of being
already married among others, to make a marriage infirm.
✓ Nature of cohabitation: There are two (2) divergent schools of thought:
1. Niñal, et al v. Badayog: cohabitation for 5 years under this Article should be in the nature of a perfect
union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract.
✓ Applicable to marriages celebrated under the New Civil Code
2. Manzano v. Sanchez: For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following
requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years
before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of
marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years
and are without legal impediment to marry each other; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
✓ Applicable to marriages celebrated under the Family Code
Status of Marriages
1. Valid
a. Completely Valid – one which has all the essential and formal requisites of marriage
b. Susceptible to Legal Separation – one which is valid but the spouses may be allowed to separate from bed
and board, and there will be a discontinuation of their property relations despite the subsistence of the
marriage
2. Voidable/Annullable – one which is valid until it is judicially annulled.
3. Void – one which is legally inexistent from the very beginning.
CASES
NIÑAL V. BADAYOG 328 SCRA 122
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between Pepito Niñal and Norma Badayog one exempt from marriage license
requirement.
Ruling: No. The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. A
valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58.
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with,
one of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and
exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication
of every applicant's name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage license may discourage such
persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public
exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve
their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
What nature of cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five-year
period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage license?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without
the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife"
where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year
common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of
legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before
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the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each
other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito
and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that
has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only
by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with
respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the
spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".
Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
MANZANO V. SANCHEZ 354 SCRA 1
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Judge Sanchez is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing the marriage
between Manzano and Payao in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, and despite the fact that the parties
have subsisting prior marriages.
Ruling: Yes. Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing
officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no
legal impediment to the marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without
legal impediment to marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties
and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits
executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were
separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which
would make the subsequent marriage null and void. 7 In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late
Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot
deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate
affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live
separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does
not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is
merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
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DE CASTRO V. DE CASTRO 545 SCRA 162
Issue: Whether or not the falsity of the affidavit rendered the marriage between Anthony and Anabelle void ab initio.
Ruling: Yes. Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void
ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In the instant case, it is clear
from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their
marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living together for more than five years. However,
respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination.
The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law
dispenses with the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim
of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous
cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license.
In the instant case, there was no "scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false
affidavit which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain
and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
DAYOT V. DAYOT 550 SCRA 435
Issue: Whether or not the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the
minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
Ruling: Yes. It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the
essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 58 makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil
registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character
authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. Article 80(3) of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage
performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the legitimate consequence
flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage
Law, whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory
character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting
parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles
72 to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2)
marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages, (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil
marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority
and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he
took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
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The reason for the law,35 as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license
may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal
requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but
reasonably construed. They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor
of the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established by statute with exceptions, the
court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication. For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua
non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is
plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a
minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language
of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of
the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied
in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that
Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state
in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found
no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed
their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in
June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony
that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution. The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to
live in her house.
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from
the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties’ affidavit will not
affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves
scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal
requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage
license.
SANTIAGO V. PEOPLE 763 SCRA 54
Issue: Whether or not for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second marriage must be proven by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt.
Ruling: Yes. Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent
marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she
can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. In this case,
petitioner has consistently questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages celebrated
without the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio.
Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not pass judgment on
the validity of the marriage. The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack her union with Santos was in vain.
On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts, and given that an appeal
in a criminal case throws the whole case open for review, this Court now resolves to correct the error of the courts a quo.
After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place without a
marriage license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals
that their union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads as follows:
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No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Therefore, the marriage of petitioner and Santos would have been exempted from a marriage license had they
cohabited exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years before their marriage.
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 1996 and that after six months of
courtship, she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that Santos had
frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with her, as she was
residing in the house of her in-laws, and her children from her previous marriage disliked him. On cross-examination,
respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an agent who sold her
piglets.
All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only less than
four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage.
Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the records do not show
that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the two of
them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before
they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, in which the
solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage was solemnized under
Article 34 of the Family Code.
The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation perpetrated by them
that they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner
seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite
knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less
than her marriage contract.
We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to
escape criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of
the permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond between spouses. In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, we had
the occasion to emphasize that the State’s penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals
“to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.”
Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner’s illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same
breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage.
Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will “lend its aid to x x x one who has consciously and
voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded.” If the cause of action appears to
arise ex turpi causa or that which involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. As a
result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue.
Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of bigamy, is that her
marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they
themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license
requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years
prior their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages, petitioner married Santos while knowing fully well that
they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently,
it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
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Chapter 3
Void and Voidable Marriages

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were
contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority
to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
1. Absence of Legal Capacity – Non-age or minority
2. Absence of Authority of solemnizing officer
✓ EXCEPTION: belief in good faith that the solemnizing officer had authority (not as to whether solemnizing
officer or not)
3. Absence of marriage license
✓ EXCEPTION: belief in good faith that the solemnizing officer had authority (not as to whether solemnizing
officer or not)
4. Absence of Legal Capacity – Bigamous or Polygamous Marriages
✓ EXCEPTION: subsequent marriage under Article 41 which is conditional
5. Absence of Consent Freely Given – mistake as to identity
6. Failure to comply with requirement under the law – Arts. 52 and 53
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
Santos v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995
Justice Sempio-Diy cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
➢ The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage;
➢ It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage;
➢ It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.0
The term “psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity”
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does
not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion
is implicit Article 54 of the Family code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the
void marriage to be “legitimate.”
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Psychological Incapacity Insanity
“the most serious cases of personality disorders SEMPIO-DIY: It is not insanity or mental incapacity, because insanity:
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
i. May be of varying degrees
inability to give meaning and significance to the
ii. Is curable, being an illness; hence, marriage can be ratified
marriage.”
iii. Has lucid intervals
iv. Is a ground only for annulment of marriage in many countries
Void – Article 36 Voidable – Article 45 (2)
Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 119190, January 16, 1997
“if a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations,
and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than
to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal
of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.”
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “to procreate children based on the
universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant non-
fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless
and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacit y.
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed
down for the guidance of the bench at bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the
fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our
Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It decrees
marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family
and the marriage are to be “protected” by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must
show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” the manifestation of the illness need
not be perceivable at such time, but the illness must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) The incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation
of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
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difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards
the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligations must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while
not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in
1983 and which provides:
“The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.”
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive
weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence –
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. This is one instance where, in
view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church – while remaining
independent, separate and apart from each other – shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the
same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall
discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
Marcos v. Marcos G.R. no. 136490, October 19, 2000

Totality of Evidence Rule – the Molina guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be “medically or clinically identified.” What is important is the
presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that Wilson failed to provide material support to the family and may
have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable.
CASES
SANTOS V. CA 240 SCRA 20, January 4, 1995
Issue: Whether or not Leouel sufficiently established Julia’s psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations.
Ruling: No. It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations
of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some
ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void
and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction
with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
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concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The
law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound
mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some
bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of
psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
DEDEL V. CA 421 SCRA 461
Issue: Whether or not Anti-Social Personality Disorder constitutes psychological incapacity to perform marital obligations.
Ruling: No. The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a very complex and elusive
phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, respondent’s sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as
being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.14 It appears that respondent’s promiscuity did not exist
prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its
celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children.
Respondent’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be
equated with psychological incapacity.15 It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality
which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to
her youth, immaturity16 or sexual promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Article 5517 of the
Family Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos18 that Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in
which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil
interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence
presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage
of petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman
Catholic Church.
TENEBRO V. CA 423 SCRA 272
Issue: Whether or not Tenebro can use psychological incapacity as ground for absolution of bigamy case against him.
Ruling: No. In invoking Article 36 of the Family Code, petitioner failed to realize that a declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are
concerned
The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not
retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an
individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for
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bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
The prosecution was able to establish the validity of the first marriage. As a second or subsequent marriage
contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be
null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage
contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se
an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes
“any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved,
or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings”. A plain reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting
a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
JARILLO V. PEOPLE 601 SCRA 236
Issue: Whether or not the Jarillo may be convicted for the crime of bigamy despite the supervening proof that her
marriage to Alocillo had been declared void.
Ruling: Yes. Jarillo’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of
her marriage to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted
a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was
already consummated. Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no bearing
upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for
the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Without a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, it is presumed to be subsisting. Any decision in the civil
action for nullity would not erase the fact that the guilty party entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a
first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore,
not a prejudicial question.
REPUBLIC V. HAMANO 428 SCRA 732, May 20, 2004
Issue: Whether or not Hamano was able to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital
obligations, despite Lolita’s failure to comply with the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.
Ruling: The guidelines in the Molina incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos:
"psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability."14 The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated.
In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.
The Court held that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically
incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was
never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological
disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped
respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done
through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation.16 There was no showing that the
case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological
defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled
in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential
that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of
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a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present
case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological
incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application
of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national.
The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human
behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person
regardless of nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca, this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and
protects. While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the
fitting denouement.
ANTONIO V. REYES 484 SCRA 353, March 10, 2006
Issue: Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family
Code and, generally, under the Molina guidelines.
Ruling: Yes. Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to a
mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony, presented a psychiatrist and clinical
psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and
corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.
The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding on the SC, owing to the great weight accorded to the
opinion of the primary trier of facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many
material aspects as to her character and personality. Her fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities
enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable
of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.
The root causes of Reyes’ psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently
proven by experts. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause
was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting
marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes’ case is incurable considering that
petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remains unchanged.
The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:
First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his wife;
Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified
that was sufficiently proven by experts, and was clearly explained in the trial court's decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before she married him prove that her psychological
incapacity was have existed even before the celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive
clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
from contracting marriage without their consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her unable to commit the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust, and respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage was
annulled by the Catholic Church. However, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not of
the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio tried to reconcile with her but her behavior
remains unchanged.
Hence, the court conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article
36 of the Family Code.
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NAJERA V. NAJERA 591 SCRA 542
Issue: Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling: No. The totality of the evidence submitted by petitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Republic vs CA laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. The
guidelines incorporate three basic requirements that psychological incapacity must be characterized by a) gravity; b)
juridical antecedence, and c) incurability. It is important that the presence of evidence can adequately establish the
party’s psychological condition. If the totality of evidence is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
In the case at bar, the root cause of Eduardo’s psychological incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or
shown to be medically or clinically incurable. Psychologist Gate’s conclusion that Eduardo was psychologically
incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by Digna and was not based on the evaluation of the respondent; thus,
her findings are unscientific and unreliable.
The court also agrees with CA that the evidence presented by Digna in regard to the physical violence and grossly
abusive conduct of Eduardo and his abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year are grounds for legal
separation only and not for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of FC.
Petitioner also argued that the Court of Appeals failed to consider the Decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal and failed to follow guideline no. 7 in Republic vs CA which states:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations
of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.
Petitioner’s argument is without merit. The basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by the NAMT is not
grounded on causes of psychological nature, but to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment
concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted.
Though the factual basis of the decision of the NAMT is similar to the facts established by petitioner, the decision
of the NAMT confirming the decree of nullity of marriage by the court a quo is not based on the psychological incapacity
of respondent. Petitioner, therefore, erred in stating that the conclusion of Psychologist Gates regarding the
psychological incapacity of respondent is supported by the decision of the NAMT.
FERRARIS V. FERRARIS 495 SCRA 542
Issue: Whether or not psychological Incapacity is attendant in the case at bar.
Ruling: The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. It is a well-established principle that factual
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on the SC save for the most compelling and cogent
reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of
the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion;
or when there is a misappreciation of facts, which are unavailing in the instant case.
The root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained,
which the petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate. The respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-
the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the
abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. A "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations and that a
mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons. It is essential that
they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness. The motion for
reconsideration denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court
of Appeals committed any reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
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PARAS V. PARAS 529 SCRA 81
Issue: Whether or not the totality of evidence in this case shows psychological incapacity on the part of the Justo as to
justify the declaration of nullity of marriage.
Ruling: A review of the complaint, as well as the testimonial and documentary evidence, shows that Rosa’s main grounds
in seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Justo are his infidelity, profligacy which includes the falsification of
her signature in one of the loan documents, failure to support the children, and abandonment of the family. Both the courts
below found the charges unsubstantiated and untrue.
While this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa, such as sexual infidelity, falsification of
her signature, abandonment and inadequate support of children, are true, nonetheless, there is nothing in the records
showing that they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part. In other words, the totality of the evidence is not
sufficient to show that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The records indicate that the marriage between the parties had a good start, resulting in the birth of their four (4)
children. The early days of their cohabitation were blissful and harmonious. Justo was deeply in love with Rosa, even
persuading his mother to give her a dowry. They were able to build a 10-room family home and acquire several properties,
thus, proving themselves to be responsible couple. Even Rosa admitted that Justo took care of their children when they
were young. Unfortunately, the passage of time appeared to have taken its toll on their relationship. The acts committed
by Justo appeared to have been the result of irreconcilable differences between them caused by the death of their two
(2) children and financial difficulties due to his failure to win the mayoralty election and to sustain his law practice.
Furthermore, the superior business acumen of Rosa, as well as the insolent attitude of her family towards Justo, busted his
ego and lowered his self-esteem.
There is no evidence that Justo’s "defects" were present at the inception of the marriage. His "defects" surfaced
only in the latter years when these events took place; their two children died; he lost in the election; he failed in his business
ventures and law practice; and felt the disdain of his wife and her family. Surely, these circumstances explain why Rosa
filed the present case only after almost 30 years of their marriage.
Equally important is that records fail to indicate that Justo’s "defects" are incurable or grave.
What is clear in this case is a husband who has gone astray from the path of marriage because of a conflicting
relationship with his wife and her family and repeated life’s setbacks. While these do not justify his sins, they are not sufficient
to establish that he is psychologically incapacitated.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and
assume the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse. As this Court repeatedly declares, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts
the marital bond at the time the causes thereof manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are
those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
sexual infidelity, and abandonment, and the like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for
legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
NGO TE V. TE 579 SCRA 193, February 13, 2009
Issue: Whether or not the contracted marriage is void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated.
Ruling: The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March,
exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both
parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by
a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the
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evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.
Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations
of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday
decisions without advice from others, and allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live). As
clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak
and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction
in life.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the
essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of
others without remorse, and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and
domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage
that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
HALILI V. HALILI (Recon) 589 SCRA 25
Issue: Whether or not a finding of dependent personality disorder constitutes psychological incapacity.
Ruling: Yes. In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines, this Court reiterated that courts should
interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-
case basis - guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of
church tribunals.
Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must consider as essential the expert opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of
the parties.
In this case, the testimony of petitioner's expert witness revealed that petitioner was suffering from dependent
personality disorder.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder as
[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals
usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by
others' comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for
overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals who have this disorder may be
unable to make everyday decisions without advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their
important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even when they believe they are wrong, have
difficulty starting projects or doing things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval
from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
In her psychological report, Dr. Dayan stated that petitioner's dependent personality disorder was evident in the
fact that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions. Petitioner's mother even
had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what action to take upon learning that his
marriage to respondent was for real.
Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons suffering from a dependent personality disorder, petitioner
typically acted in a self-denigrating manner and displayed a self-defeating attitude. This submissive attitude encouraged
other people to take advantage of him. This could be seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be dominated, first, by
his father who treated his family like robots and, later, by respondent who was as domineering as his father. When petitioner
could no longer take respondent's domineering ways, he preferred to hide from her rather than confront her and tell her
outright that he wanted to end their marriage.
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Dr. Dayan traced petitioner's personality disorder to his dysfunctional family life. Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded
that petitioner's personality disorder was grave and incurable and already existent at the time of the celebration of his
marriage to respondent.
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was grave and incurable
and had a deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case, recognized that individuals with diagnosable personality
disorders usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term. Particularly, personality disorders are "long-
standing, inflexible ways of behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of living. These
disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who display
them and for others."
TING V. VELEZ-TING 582 SCRA 694
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner Benjamin’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his
profession constitutes psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling: No. The totality of evidence presented by respondent was insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit
to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological
incapacity as of the date of the marriage 18 years ago.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an absolute insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a disorder so grave
and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about
to assume.
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s defects were present at the time of the celebration of their
marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and
gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the
part of her husband. Neither did the evidence presented prove such defects to be incurable. The evaluation of the two
psychiatrists should have been the significant evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage between the
parties null and void. Sadly, however, the Court was not convinced that the opinions proiced by these experts strengthened
respondent’s allegation of psychological incapacity. The two provided absolutely contradicting psychological
evaluations.
AZCUETA V. REPUBLIC 588 SCRA 196, May 26, 2009
Issue: Whether or not Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to justify a declaration that his marriage to Marrieta is void
ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling: Yes. Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties because of his Dependent Personality
Disorder. His marriage to Marietta was declared void ab initio.
Marietta sufficiently discharged her burden to prove her husband’s psychological incapacity. As held in Marcos
vs. Marcos [397 Phil. 840 (2000)], there is no requirement that the respondent spouse should be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. What matters is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. Marietta’s testimony was corroborated in material points by Rodolfo’s close relative, and supported by the
psychiatrist’s testimony linking the manifestations of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself. It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses
are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. Since the trial court itself
accepted the veracity of Marietta’s factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological
incapacity drawn therefrom by her expert witness.
The root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was alleged in the petition, medically or clinically identified,
sufficiently proven by testimony of an expert witness with more than 40 years experience in the field of psychology and
psychological incapacity, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. As held in Te vs. Te (G.R. No. 161793, 13 February
2009), “(b)y the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not
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discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.”
Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was also established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before
the celebration of marriage. Witnesses were united in testifying that from the start of the marriage, Rodolfo’s irresponsibility,
overdependence on his mother and abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. These manifestations of Rodolfo’s
Dependent Personality Disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being rooted in his early development and
a by-product of his upbringing and family life.
Furthermore, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity had been shown to be grave so as to render him unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. The Court of Appeals’ opinion that Rodolfo’s requests for financial assistance
from his mother might have been due to embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family coffers and that his motive
for not wanting a child was a “responsible” realization since he was unemployed, were dismissed by the High Court for
being speculative and unsupported by evidence. The Supreme Court likewise disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ finding
that Rodolfo’s irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother could be attributed to immaturity, noting that at the time
of his marriage, Rodolfo was almost 29 years old. Also, the expert testimony identified a grave clinical or medical cause
for Rodolfo’s abnormal behavior – Dependent Personality Disorder.
A person afflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions
without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree
with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are
demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often
preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. (Te vs. Te, supra)
One who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot independently make decisions regarding
even the most basic matters that spouses face every day; and one who cannot contribute to the material, physical and
emotional well-being of his spouse, is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations within the
meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.
This is not to say, however, that anyone diagnosed with Dependent Personality Disorder is automatically deemed
psychologically incapacitated to perform his/her marital obligations. The court must evaluate the facts, as guided by
expert opinion, and carefully examine the type of disorder and the gravity thereof before declaring the nullity of a marriage
under Article 36.
Finally, it has been established that Rodolfo’s condition is incurable, having been deeply ingrained in his system
since his early years.
KALAW V. FERNANDEZ GR. No. 166357, January 14, 2015 (Recon)
Issue: Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Ruling: YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed psychologically
incapacitated as they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.
Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just given much respect in this case.
Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE

The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid, such that their
application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection.
But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of
the drafters to adopt its enacted version of “less specificity” obviously to enable “some resiliency in its application.” Instead,
every court should approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations,
but according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity that no case would be on “all fours” with the next one in the
field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for
that of the trial court.
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the
courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions
of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious
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judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth
diagnosis by experts.
Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence must be considered
We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an
inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and
void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.
There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a
physician, because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological
incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.”
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition could
possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed
as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the causation.
Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative and
without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such
circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.
Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological and emotional temperaments
The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better position
to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in
the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be
accorded due importance and respect.
The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized
consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the
marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the
respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert
witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed
after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises.
The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental
state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family
Code the courts, “despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”
Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental duties
The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the presence
or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the
duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and
responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would
expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term effects
of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young children.
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her
neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing
her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of
subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development. This disregard
violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children.
REPUBLIC V. ROMERO II 785 SCRA 164
Issue: Whether or not Reghis’ Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder constitutes psychological incapacity.
Ruling: In Republic v. CA, the Court laid down definitive guidelines on the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code. Among others, it clarified that the illness must be grave enough to bring about the incapacity or inability of
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the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage such that "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court finds that the foregoing requirements do not concur.
As aptly pointed out by the petitioners, Reghis’ testimony shows that he was able to comply with his marital obligations
which, therefore, negates the existence of a grave and serious psychological incapacity on his part. Reghis admitted that
he and Olivia lived together as husband and wife under one roof for fourteen (14) years and both of them contributed in
purchasing their own house in Parañaque City. Reghis also fulfilled his duty to support and take care of his family, as he
categorically stated that he loves their children and that he was a good provider to them. That he married Olivia not out
of love, but out of reverence for the latter’s parents, does not mean that Reghis is psychologically incapacitated in the
context of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money,
status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal
consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage.
Moreover, the OCPD which Reghis allegedly suffered from was not shown to have juridical antecedence. Other
than Dr. Basilio’s conclusion that Reghis’ "behavioral disorder x x x existed even prior to the marriage or even during his
adolescent years," no specific behavior or habits during his adolescent years were shown which would explain his behavior
during his marriage with Olivia. Simply put, Dr. Basilio’s medical report did not establish that Reghis’ incapacity existed long
before he entered into marriage.
In like manner, Dr. Basilio simply concluded that Reghis’ disorder is incurable but failed to explain how she came
to such conclusion. Based on the appreciation of the RTC, Dr. Basilio did not discuss the concept of OCPD, its classification,
cause, symptoms, and cure, and failed to show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited this disorder in order to
create a necessary inference that Reghis’ condition had no definite treatment or is incurable. To the Court’s mind, this is a
glaring deficiency that should have prompted the RTC and the CA to be more circumspect and critical in the assessment
and appreciation of Dr. Basilio’s testimony.
Indeed, the standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports may be
deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity
of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital tie. After all, marriage is an inviolable institution protected by the State.
Accordingly, it cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties, especially where the pieces of evidence presented are
grossly deficient to show the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the condition of the party alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated to assume and perform the essential marital duties.
MATUDAN V. REPUBLIC 808 SCRA 480
Issue: Whether or not Nicolas sufficiently established Marilyn’s psychological incapacity.
Ruling: No. Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of his judicial affidavit and testimony; the judicial affidavits and testimonies
of his daughter Maricel and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological evaluation report on the psychological condition
both petitioner and Marilyn. The supposed evaluation of Marilyn's psychological condition was based solely on petitioner's
account, since Marilyn did not participate in the proceedings.
Indeed, "what is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological
condition." "The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage." Petitioner's judicial affidavit and testimony during trial, however,
fail to show gravity and juridical antecedence. While he complained that Marilyn lacked a sense of guilt and was involved
in "activities defying social and moral ethics," and that she was, among others, irrational, irresponsible, immature, and self-
centered, he nonetheless failed to sufficiently and particularly elaborate on these allegations, particularly the degree of
Marilyn's claimed irresponsibility, immaturity, or selfishness. This is compounded by the fact that petitioner contradicted his
own claims by testifying that he and Marilyn were happily married and never had a fight, which is why they begot four
children; and the only reason for his filing Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 was Marilyn's complete abandonment of the marriage
and family when she left to work abroad.
'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no
less than a mental-- not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
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expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
If any, petitioner's accusations against Marilyn are untrue, at the very least. At most, they fail to sufficiently establish
the degree of Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity.
On the other hand, Maricel cannot be of help either. She was only two years old when Marilyn left the family.
Growing up, she may have seen the effects of Marilyn's abandonment - such as the lack of emotional and financial
support; but she could not have any idea of her mother's claimed psychological incapacity, as well as the nature, history,
and gravity thereof.
Just as well, Dr. Tayag's supposed expert findings regarding Marilyn's psychological condition were not based on
actual tests or interviews conducted upon Marilyn herself; they are based on the personal accounts of petitioner. This fact
gave more significance and importance to petitioner's other pieces of evidence, which could have compensated for the
deficiency in the expert opinion which resulted from its being based solely on petitioner's one-sided account. But since
these other pieces of evidence could not be relied upon, Dr. Tayag's testimony and report must fail as well. In one decided
case with a similar factual backdrop and involving the very same expert witness, this Court held:
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or less seven years from 1999 to 2006.
The foregoing established fact shows that living together as spouses under one roof is not an impossibility. Mary Grace's
departure from their home in 2006 indicates either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with her
obligation to live with her husband.
Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater burden to
present more convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the former's condition.
Glenn, however, failed in this respect. Glenn's testimony is wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a
blood relative of Glenn. Glenn's statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both referred to
MaryGrace's traits and acts, which she exhibited during the marriage. Hence, there is nary a proof on the antecedence of
Mary Grace's alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that, six months before they got married, they saw each other almost
everyday. Glenn saw "a loving, caring and well-educated person" in Mary Grace.
Anent Dr. Tayag's assessment of Mary Grace's condition, the Court finds the same as unfounded. Rumbaua
provides some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for
the declaration of nullity of marriage, viz.:
We' cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's psychological incapacity
were based on the information fed to her by only one side - the petitioner - whose bias in favor of her cause cannot
be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report,
testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner
we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third-party
account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and
responded to the doctor's probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's narrations, and on this basis characterized the
respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who 'believes that the world revolves
around him'; and who 'used love as a . . . deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended
towards him.' x x x
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the
conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the
essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality
disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating
nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some
incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's
conclusion in her Report --i.e., that the respondent suffered 'Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial
Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable' -is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference
from her previous characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests administered on the
petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement
cannot be made with respect to the respondent's condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the
respondent's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different
from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
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CASTILLO V. REPUBLIC and IMPAS GR No. 214064, February 6, 2017
Issue: Whether or not the totality of evidence presented warrants, as the RTC determined, the declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Mirasol and Felipe on the ground of the latter's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling: No. Guided by the foregoing principles and after a careful perusal of the records, this Court rules that the totality of
the evidence presented failed to establish Felipe's psychological incapacity.
Time and again, it was held that "psychological incapacity" has been intended by law to be confined to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do
not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent’s unfaithfulness must be
established as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from discharging the
essential obligations of the marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with the obligation to be faithful to his spouse.
It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
As discussed, the findings on Felipe’s personality profile did not emanate from a personal interview with the subject
himself. Apart from the psychologist’s opinion and petitioner’s allegations, no other reliable evidence was cited to prove
that Felipe’s sexual infidelity was a manifestation of his alleged personality disorder, which is grave, deeply rooted, and
incurable.
The Court is not persuaded that the natal or supervening disabling factor which effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his obligation to be faithful to his wife was medically or clinically established.
Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere
allegations are not evidence.
DEL ROSARIO V. DEL ROSARIO GR No. 222541, February 15, 2017
Issue:
Ruling: In Santos v. CA, the Court declared that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
characterized by: (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be
incurable, or otherwise the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. The Court laid down more definitive
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 in Molina whose salient points are footnoted below, that
incorporated the basic requirements the Court established in Santos.
Notwithstanding the Molina guidelines, note, however, that an expert opinion is not absolutely necessary and may
be dispensed with in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of the evidence shows that psychological
incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. The evidence need not
necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse, but can come from persons intimately related to the spouses,
i.e., relatives and close friends, who could clearly testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse's condition at or about the
time of the marriage. In other words, the Molina guidelines continue to apply but its application calls for a more flexible
approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. To be clear,
however, the totality of the evidence must still establish the characteristics that Santos laid down: gravity, incurability, and
juridical antecedence.
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Based on the totality of the evidence presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that
Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, or infidelity amount to psychological incapacity.
Particularly, the Court notes that Rachel's evidence merely showed that Jose: (1) would often indulge in drinking
sprees; (2) tends to become violent when he gets drunk; (2) avoids discharging his duties as a father to Wesley and as a
husband to Rachel, which includes sexual intimacy; (3) flirts openly and represented himself as single; and (4) engaged in
an extra-marital affair with a bar girl who he brought to the conjugal dwelling on several occasions. Significantly, Rachel
admitted that their married life ran smoothly in its early years. Dr. Tayag's findings, on the other hand, simply summarized
Rachel and Wesley's narrations as she diagnosed Jose with APD and proceeded to conclude that Jose's "personality flaw
is deemed to be severe, grave, and have become deeply embedded within his adaptive systems since early childhood
years, thereby rendering such to be a permanent component of his life [and] [t]herefore x x x incurable and beyond repair
despite any form of intervention."
It should be pointed out that Dr. Tayag's Report does not explain in detail how Jose's APD could be characterized
as grave, deeply rooted in his childhood, and incurable within the jurisprudential parameters for establishing psychological
incapacity. Particularly, the Report did not discuss the concept of APD which Jose allegedly suffers from, i.e., its
classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, or show how and to what extent Jose exhibited this disorder or how and to what
extent his alleged actions and behavior correlate with his APD, sufficiently clear to conclude that Jose's condition has no
definite treatment, making it incurable within the law's conception. Neither did the Report specify the reasons why and to
what extent Jose's APD is serious and grave, and how it incapacitated him to understand and comply with his marital
obligations. Lastly, the Report hastily concluded that Jose had a "deprived childhood" and "poor home condition" that
automatically resulted in his APD equivalent to psychological incapacity without, however, specifically identifying the
history of Jose's condition antedating the marriage, i.e., specific behavior or habits during his adolescent years that could
explain his behavior during the marriage.
Moreover, Dr. Tayag did not personally assess or interview Jose to determine, at the very least, his background that
could have given her a more accurate basis for concluding that his APD is rooted in his childhood or was already existing
at the inception of the marriage. To be sure, established parameters do not require that the expert witness personally
examine the party alleged to be suffering from psychological incapacity provided corroborating evidence are presented
sufficiently establishing the required legal parameters. Considering that her Report was based solely on Rachel's side whose
bias cannot be doubted, the Report and her testimony deserved the application of a more rigid and stringent standards
which the RTC failed to apply.
In sum, Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when taken together with the various testimonies, failed to show that Jose's
immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the
parties' marriage. To reiterate and emphasize, psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other failed to meet the
responsibility and duty of a married person. There must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person -
an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage - which must be linked with the manifestations of the
DELA FUENTE V. DELA FUENTE GR No. 188400, March 8, 2017
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in denying the petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
Ruling: Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant
the nullity of petitioner's marriage with respondent. Petitioner was able to discharge the burden of proof that respondent
suffered from psychological incapacity. The Court of Appeals is mistaken when it chided the lower court for giving undue
weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez since he had no chance to personally conduct a thorough study and analysis of
respondent's mental and psychological condition.
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes states that the non-examination of one of the parties will not automatically render as
hearsay or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or psychologist, since "marriage, by its very definition,
necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is
generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other.
Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner and respondent may have lived together, but the
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facts narrated by petitioner show that respondent failed to, or could not, comply with the obligations expected of him as
a husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological incapacity were likewise discussed by Dr. Lopez. He
vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder would refuse to admit that there was something wrong and that
there was a need for treatment. This was corroborated by petitioner when she stated that respondent repeatedly refused
treatment. Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and suggested couples counseling to respondent;
however, respondent refused all of her attempts at seeking professional help. Respondent also refused to be examined by
Dr. Lopez.
Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's personality disorder, he is incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations of giving love, respect, and support to the petitioner. He recommends that the marriage be annulled.
Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her
family and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter lack of
comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that
petitioner should remain married to respondent. After she had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family,
respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything wrong in their marriage. This shows that respondent truly
could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations. This fact is persuasive enough for this Court to believe that
respondent's mental illness is incurable.
BAKUNAWA III V. BAKUNAWA GR No. 217993, August 9, 2017
Issue: Whether or not the totality of evidence presented by Manuel sufficient to prove that he and Nora are psychologically
incapacitated to perform their marital obligations.
Ruling: No. As the CA correctly ruled, the totality of evidence presented by Manuel comprising of his testimony and that of
Dr. Villegas, as well as the latter's psychological evaluation report, is insufficient to prove that he and Nora are
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Dr. Villegas' conclusion that Manuel is afflicted with Intermittent Explosive Disorder and that Nora has Passive
Aggressive Personality Disorder which render them psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family Code, is
solely based on her interviews with Manuel and the parties' eldest child, Moncho. Consequently, the CA did not err in not
according probative value to her psychological evaluation report and testimony.
In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside from Manuel for the spouses' psychological evaluation
was Moncho, who could not be considered as a reliable witness to establish the psychological incapacity of his parents in
relation to Article 36 of the Family Code, since he could not have been there at the time his parents were married.
The Court also notes that Dr. Villegas did not administer any psychological tests on Manuel despite having had the
opportunity to do so. While the Court has declared that there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician, much less be subjected to psychological
tests, this rule finds application only if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. In this case, the supposed personality disorder of Manuel could have been established by means of
psychometric and neurological tests which are objective means designed to measure specific aspects of people's
intelligence, thinking, or personality.
SINGSON V. SINGSON GR No. 210766, January 8, 2018
Issue: Whether or not a person diagnosed with Pathological Gambling is psychologically incapacitated to perfrom one’s
marital obligations.
Ruling: The Court held that petitioner failed to prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations because she failed to establish that such incapacity was grave and serious, and that it
existed at the time of the marriage, and that it is incurable.
At the outset, this Court is constrained to peruse the records because of the conflicting findings between the trial
court and the appellate court. We thus did peruse and review the records, and we are satisfied that the CA correctly found
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that respondent has the capability and ability to perform his duties as a husband and father as against the RTC' s rather
general statement that respondent's psychological or personality disorder hinders the performance of his basic obligations
as a husband and a father.
We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does not establish that respondent's psychological incapacity
was grave and serious as defined by jurisprudential parameters since "[respondent] had a job; provided money for the
family from the sale of his property; provided the land where the family home was built on; and lived in the family home
with petitioner-appellee and their children."
Upon the other hand, petitioner herself testified that respondent had a job as the latter "was working at a certain
point." This is consistent with the information in Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Clinical Summary and testimony, which were both
included in petitioner's formal offer of evidence, respecting the parties' relationship history that petitioner and respondent
met at the bank where petitioner was applying for a job and where respondent was employed as a credit investigator
prior to their courtship and their marriage.
It is significant to note moreover that petitioner also submitted as part of her evidence a notarized summary dated
February 18, 2010 which enumerated expenses paid for by the proceeds of respondent's share in the sale of his parents'
home in Magallanes, Makati City which amounted to around ₱2.9 million. Although petitioner was insinuating that this
amount was insufficient to cover the family expenses from 1999 to 2008, we note that she admitted under oath that the
items for their family budget, such as their children's education, the payments for association dues, and for electric bills
came from this money. And no less significant is petitioner's admission that respondent provided the land upon which the
family home was built.
What's more, petitioner and respondent likewise lived together as husband and wife since their marriage on July
6, 1974 (and in the company of their four children, too). In fact, shunting aside the time that respondent was under
treatment at the Metro Psych Facility, petitioner did not allege any instance when respondent failed to live with them.
To the foregoing, we ought to add the fact that petitioner herself admitted, that respondent likewise brought her
to the hospital during all four instances that she gave birth to their children. By contrast, petitioner did not proffer any
convincing proof that respondent’s mere confinement at the rehabilitation center confirmed the gravity of the latter’s
Neither does petitioner’s bare claim that respondent is a pathological gambler, is irresponsible, and is unable to
keep a job, necessarily translate into unassailable proof that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations. It is settled that "psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates
an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty,
refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will." "It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet
his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so
because of some psychological, not physical, illness."
Nor can Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony in open court and her Clinical Summary be taken for gospel truth in regard
to the charge that respondent is afflicted with utter inability to appreciate his marital obligations.
Furthermore, "habitual drunkenness, gambling and failure to find a job, while undoubtedly negative traits are
nowhere nearly the equivalent of ‘psychological incapacity’, in the absence of incontrovertible proof that these are
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness."
REPUBLIC V. TIONGLICO GR No. 218630, January 11, 2018
Issue: Whether or not a finding of Narcissistic Personality Disorder of Lawrence established that he is psychologically
incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations.
Ruling: Using these standards laid down in Santos and Manalo, the Court held that Katrina failed to sufficiently prove that
Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to discharge the duties expected of a husband.
Indeed, and the Court have oft-repeated held that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always
base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced
in the course of their proceedings. Here, the Court finds the totality of evidence clearly wanting.
First, Dr. Arellano's findings that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated were based solely on Katrina's
statements.1âwphi1 It bears to stress that Lawrence, despite notice, did not participate in the proceedings below, nor was
he interviewed by Dr. Arellano despite being invited to do so.
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The case of Nicolas S. Matudan v. Republic of the Philippines and Marilyn B. Matudan is instructive on the matter:
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using meager information coming from a
directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have
conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito's psychological condition. While the
report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn's psychological condition, this is not true
for Angelito's. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and
comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a
psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis for
the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.
The same could be said in this case, where the various tests conducted by Dr. Arellano can most certainly be
conclusive of the psychological disposition of Katrina, but cannot be said to be indicative of the psychological condition
of Lawrence. There was simply no other basis for Dr. Arellano to conclude that Lawrence was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations apart from Katrina's self-serving statements. To make conclusions
and generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side, as in the case
at bar, is, to the Court's mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of
such evidence.
Second, the testimony of Katrina as regards the behavior of Lawrence hardly depicts the picture of a
psychologically incapacitated husband. Their frequent fights, his insensitivity, immaturity and frequent night-outs can hardly
be said to be a psychological illness. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the "psychological incapacity" that
the law requires, and should be distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of
some marital obligations that characterize some marriages. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady
so grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond he or she was then about to assume.
Furthermore, the Court held that the totality of evidence is clearly lacking to support the factual and legal
conclusion that Lawrence and Katrina's marriage is void ab initio. No other evidence or witnesses were presented by Katrina
to prove Lawrence's alleged psychological incapacity. Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence,
are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence. Here, we reiterate that apart from the psychiatrist,
Katrina did not present other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Her
testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value.
DAN V. DAN GR No. 209031, April 16, 2018
Issue: Whether or not a finding of Dependent Personality Disorder constitutes psychological incapacity to perform one’s
marital obligation.
Ruling: Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of her judicial affidavit and testimony; the judicial affidavits and testimonies of
her mother and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological, evaluation report on the psychological condition of both
petitioner and respondent. The determination of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity was based solely on
petitioner's account and that of her mother, since respondent was presumably in Italy and did not participate in the
proceedings.
This is insufficient.
At some point in her accounts, petitioner admitted that before and during their marriage, respondent was working
and giving money to her; that respondent was romantic, sweet, thoughtful, responsible, and caring; and that she and
respondent enjoyed a harmonious relationship. This belies her claim that petitioner was psychologically unfit for marriage.
As correctly observed by the trial and appellate courts, the couple simply drifted apart as a result of irreconcilable
differences and basic incompatibility owing to differences in culture and upbringing, and the very short period that they
spent together prior to their tying the knot. As for respondent's claimed addiction to video games and cannabis, the trial
and appellate courts are correct in their ruling that these are not an incurable condition, and petitioner has not shown that
she helped her husband overcome them - as part of her marital obligation to render support and aid to respondent.
"What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition."
"The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the
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time of the celebration of the marriage" such that "if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."
With the declared insufficiency of the testimonies of petitioner and her witness, the weight of proving psychological
incapacity shifts to Dr. Tayag's expert findings. However, her determinations were not based on actual tests or interviews
conducted on respondent himself - but on personal accounts of petitioner alone. This will not do as well.
Concomitantly, the rulings of the trial and appellate courts - identical in most respects -are entitled to respect and
finality. The same being correct, this Court finds no need to disturb them.
To reiterate, psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. "The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved." Finally, the burden of proving psychological
incapacity is on the petitioner.
With petitioner's failure to prove her case, her petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage was correctly
dismissed by the courts below.
REPUBLIC V. JAVIER GR No. 210518, March 18, 2018
Issue: Whether or not the totality of evidence sufficiently established that both the spouses were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
Ruling: The Court ruled that the totality of evidence supports the finding that Martin is psychologically incapacitated to
perform the essential obligations of marriage. However, the Court disagrees with the CA’s findings that Michelle was
psychologically incapacitated.
The Court clarified in Marcos v. Marcos that for purposes of establishing the psychological incapacity of a spouse,
it is not required that a physician conduct an actual medical examination of the person concerned. It is enough that the
totality of evidence is strong enough to sustain the finding of psychological incapacity. In such case, however, the
petitioner bears a greater burden in proving the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of the other spouse's
Martin, as the petitioner in this case, submitted several pieces of evidence to support his petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. He testified as to his own psychological incapacity and that of his spouse, Michelle. The psychological
findings of Dr. Adamos were also presented in the trial court to corroborate his claim. Martin was also subjected to several
psychological tests, as a result of which, Dr. Adamos diagnosed him with Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Additionally, the
diagnosis was based on Dr. Adamos' personal interviews of Martin, who underwent several-or to be accurate, more than
10-counselling sessions with Dr. Adamos from 2008 to 2009. These facts were uncontroverted by the Republic.
These circumstances, taken together, prove the three essential characteristics of psychological incapacity on the
part of Martin. As such, insofar as the psychological incapacity of Martin is concerned, the CA did not commit a reversible
error in declaring the marriage of the respondents null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
With respect to Michele’s psychological incapacity, the Court disagrees with the CA's findings that Michelle was
psychologically incapacitated. We cannot absolutely rely on the Psychological Impression Report on Michelle. There were
no other independent evidence establishing the root cause or juridical antecedence of Michelle's alleged psychological
incapacity. While this Court cannot discount their first-hand observations, it is highly unlikely that they were able to paint
Dr. Adamos a complete picture of Michelle's family and childhood history. The records do not show that Michelle and Jose
Vicente were childhood friends, while Martin, on the other hand, was introduced to Michelle during their adulthood. Either
Martin or Jose Vicente, as third persons outside the family of Michelle, could not have known about her childhood, how
she was raised, and the dysfunctional nature of her family. Without a credible source of her supposed childhood trauma,
Dr. Adamos was not equipped with enough information from which he may reasonably conclude that Michelle is suffering
from a chronic and persistent disorder that is grave and incurable.
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REPUBLIC V. LIBERATO MOLA CRUZ GR No. 236629, July 23, 2018
Issue: Whether or not a finding of Histrionic Personality Disorder constitutes psychological incapacity.
Ruling: Yes. Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential premise, the Court holds that both the CA and the RTC did not err in
finding that the totality of evidence presented by respondent in support of his petition, sufficiently established the link
between Liezl's actions showing her psychological incapacity to understand and perform her marital obligations and her
histrionic personality disorder. The Court respects the RTC's appreciation of respondent's testimony during trial on what
transpired before and during the marriage, considering that "the totality of the behavior of one spouse during the
cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other." In addition, Dr. Tudla was able to
collect and verify largely the same facts in the course of her psychological evaluation of both spouses and her interview
of Liezl's sister. Dr. Tudla's report gave a description of histrionic personality disorder, and correlated the characteristics of
this disorder with Liezl's behavior from her formative years through the course of her marriage to petitioner. Indubitably, Dr.
Tudla's report and testimony enjoy such probative force emanating from the assistance her opinion gave to the courts to
show the facts upon which her psychological conclusion was based.
The fact that Liezl's disorder manifested itself through actions that occurred after the marriage was celebrated
does not mean, as, petitioner argues, that there is no psychological incapacity to speak of.
The CA explained that Liezl's histrionic personality disorder was the cause of her inability to discharge her marital
obligations to love, respect and give concern, support and fidelity to her husband. The CA also narrated how the disorder
was evidenced by Liezl's actions after the marriage was celebrated, starting from when she and petitioner lived together
in Japan. The gravity of her disorder is shown by appreciating the totality of her actions after she got married. Liezl was
unable to accommodate the fact that she was already married into the way she wanted to live her life, and essentially
treated petitioner as a manipulable inconvenience that she could ignore or threaten to accede to her desires. It is clear
that Liezl is truly incognitive of her marital responsibilities.
The disorder was found by the CA to have begun when Liezl was an adolescent and continued well into
adulthood. It fully appreciated Liezl's psychological evaluation that revealed her unconsciousness of her disorder. Together
with its rootedness in Liezl's personality since her teens, the CA came to agree with the expert findings that any medical or
behavioral treatment of her disorder would prove ineffective.
It is true that sexual infidelity and abandonment are grounds for legal separation. It may be noted, however, that
the courts a quo duly connected such aberrant acts of Liezl as actual manifestations of her histrionic personality disorder.
A person with such a disorder was characterized as selfish and egotistical, and demands immediate gratification.30 These
traits were especially reflected in Liezl's highly unusual acts of allowing her Japanese boyfriend to stay in the marital abode,
sharing the marital bed with his Japanese boyfriend and introducing her husband as her elder brother, all done under the
threat of desertion. Such blatant insensitivity and lack of regard for the sanctity of the marital bond and home cannot be
expected from a married person who reasonably understand the principle and responsibilities of marriage.
Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship between
the parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person’s spouse, or his or her own
spouse.
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Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. (As amended by
Executive Order 227 and Republic Act No. 8533; The phrase “However, in case of marriage celebrated before the effectivity
of this Code and falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this Code shall take eff ect”
has been deleted by Republic Act No. 8533 [Approved February 23, 1998]).
LEGAL CIVIL RELATIONSHIPS
1. Relationships by blood relations – by consanguinity

2. Relationships by legal fiction:
a. By affinity
b. By adoption
CIVIL RELATIONSHIPS by Consanguinity
➢ Article 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the number of generations. Each generation forms a degree.
➢ Article 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be either direct or collateral.
A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees among persons who are not ascendants and
descendants, but who come from a common ancestor.
➢ Article 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending.

The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends
➢ Article 966. In the lines, as many degrees are counted as there are generations or persons, excluding the progenitor.
In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus, the child is one degree removed from the
parent, two from the grandfather, and three from the great-grandparent.
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent is made to the person with
whom the computation is to be made. Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle,
who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin, and so forth.
➢ Article 963. Full blood relationship is that existing between persons who have the same father, but not the same
mother.
Half-blood relationship is that existing between persons who have the same father, but not the same mother,
or the same mother, but not the same father.
CIVIL RELATIONSHIPS by Affinity

✓ The word “step,” when used as a prefix in conjunction with a degree of kinship, is repugnant to blood
relationship and is indicative of a relationship by affinity. [People v. Mamac G.R. No. 130332, May 31, 2000]
✓ Affinity is the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse. It is a relationship by
marriage or a familial relation resulting from marriage. It is fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in connection
with the institution of marriage and family relations. [Intestate Estate of Vda. De Carungcong v. People G.R.
No. 181409, February 11, 2010]
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✓ Affinity denotes “the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse.” It is a relationship
by marriage or a familial relation resulting from marriage. It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in
connection with the institution of marriage and family relations. Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by
virtue of a legal bond such as marriage. Relatives by affinity, therefore, are those commonly referred to as “in-
laws,” or stepfather, stepmother, stepchild and the like.
✓ Affinity may also be defined as “the relation which one spouse because of marriage has to blood relatives of
the other. The connection existing in consequence of marriage between each of the married persons and the
kindred of the other. The doctrine of affinity grows out of the canonical maxim that marriage makes husband
and wide one. The husband has the same relation by affinity to his wife’s blood relatives as she has by
consanguinity and vice versa.”
✓ Indeed, “there is no affinity between the blood relatives of one spouse and the blood relatives of the other. A
husband is related by affinity to his wife’s brother, but not to the wife of his wife’s brother. There is no affinity
between the husband’s brother and the wife’s sister: this is called affinitas affinitatis.” [Tiggangay v. Wacas A.M.
OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ (Resolution), April 1, 2013]
If marriage gives rise to one’s relationship by affinity to the blood relatives o one’s spouse, does the extinguishment of the
marriage by the death of the spouse dissolve the relationship by affinity?
The fist view (the terminated affinity view) holds that relationship by affinity terminates with the dissolution of the marriage
either by death or divorce which gave rise to the relationship of affinity between the parties.
➢ Under this view, the relationship by affinity is simply coextensive and coexistent with the marriage that produced it. Its
duration is indispensable and necessarily determined by the marriage that created it. Thus, it exists only for so long as
the marriage subsists, such that the death of a spouse ipso facto ends the relationship by affinity of the surviving
spouse to the deceased spouse’s blood relatives.
➢ The first view admits of an exception. The relationship by affinity continues even after the death of one spouse when
there is a surviving issue. The rationale is that the relationship is preserved because of the living issue of the marriage
in whose veins the blood of both parties is commingled.
The second view (the continuing affinity view) maintains that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and
the kindred of the deceased spouse continues even after death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage
produced children or not.
➢ Under this view, the relationship by affinity endures even after the dissolution of the marriage that produced it as a
result of the death of one of the parties to the marriage. This view considers that, where statutes have indicated an
intent to benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the “the of affinity” between these people and their relatives-by-marriage
is not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties. [Intestate Estate of Vda. De
Carungcong v. People G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010]
CIVIL RELATIONSHIPS by Adoption
Adoption is a juridical act which creates between two person a personal relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation. Under the law, the adopted child is considered the legitimate son or daughter of the adopter
for all intents and purposes. It is for this reason that the law prohibits marriages between the adopter and the adopted child.
Art. 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.
GENERAL RULE: Only a judgment declaring a marriage VOID shall sever a void marriage.
❖ This provision highlights the requirement of the filing of an action for declaration of nullity of marriage; otherwise, the
party will be confronted with the threat of having committed bigamy if she contracts a subsequent marriage because
of the presumption that the former marriage subsists and is valid.
❖ Nullity of a marriage may be used as a defense, but it is one based on a judicial declaration.
EXCEPTION: To a limited degree, there will be no need for a judicial declaration

✓ Collateral attach upon the death of either spouses – inheritance issues (Carlos v. Sandoval)
✓ Subsequent marriage under Article 41 in relation to Article 42 – automatic termination
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Who may institute the action?
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare
the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
❖ The absence of a provision of the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of
marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it
is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest.
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or
judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One
having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When plaintiff is not
the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. [Carlos v. Sandoval G.R. No. 179922,
December 16, 2008]
SUMMARY
➢ AM 2-11-10-SC: Sec 2a (filed by spouse)
❖ Marriage celebrated under FC
❖ March 12, 2003
➢ Carlos v. Sandoval (collateral attack, real party in interest)
❖ Marriages under NCC
❖ Marriages under FC prior to March 15, 2003
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
De Guzman y Jumaquio v. People G.R. No. 224742, August 7, 2019

The law provides that a judicial declaration of nullity is indispensable for the purposes of remarriage. In Teves v. People:
• The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense.
Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
Prudencio cannot claim to have been in good faith in assuming that there was no legal impediment for him to remarry
based merely on the National Statistics Office’s issuance of a Certificate of No Marriage Record. Based on Prudencio and
Arlene’s Marriage Certificate, along with the photos of the wedding ceremony, they were married on April 8, 1994. Thus,
the Certificate of No Marriage Record is not enough for Prudencio to assume that his previous marriage with Arlene has
been voided.
TYPES OF VOID BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES
Bigamous Under Art. 35 (4) Bigamous Under Art. 40

✓ The subsequent marriage is void because of the failure
✓ The subsequent marriage is void because of the
to acquire the judicial declaration of the previous
subsistence of the prior marriage, and the prior
marriage, and such marriage is void
marriage is valid
✓ Property Regime is governed by Absolute Community of
✓ Property Regime is governed by limited co-ownership
Property or Conjugal Partnership of Gains (c.f. Art. 50)
under Art. 148
✓ Judicial declaration may be acquired for severance of
✓ Judicial declaration may be acquired for severance
the previous marriage with the purpose of remarrying
of the subsequent bigamous marriage
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DOMINGO V. CA 226 SCRA 572
Issue: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the
same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Ruling: According to the Family Code, a declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be free from
legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who,
believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her
first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration of absolute
nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case of Terre v. Terre. The Court, in turning
down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second
marriage and living with another woman other than complainant while his prior marriage with the latter remained
subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word "solely." As it is placed,
the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing the need for
careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally
emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .,"
in which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been such, the
interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other
instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage,
such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses,
as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latter’s presumptive
legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a
court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a
marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law
to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally
acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable?
As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect
to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect — and nothing
more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations
indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could
conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing less, will
satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm
the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to be contracted by one
of the parties may be gleaned from new information required in the Family Code to be included in the application for a
marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled."
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Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite
restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to enable her to
remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced
emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall provide for "the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children,
and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings."
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be
one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's
suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is
baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the
separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them.
CASTILLO V. CASTILLO GR No. 189607, April 18, 2016
Issue: Whether or not a judicial declaration in this case is necessary in order to establish the nullity of Lea’s marriage to
Benjamin.
Ruling: The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect at the time
of its celebration. In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The children
of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve
this case using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81, 82, and 83 (first
paragraph); and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph)0 85 and 86.
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways: (1) a void marriage is
nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until
annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by
cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be
collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal
fiction, while in voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the decree of
annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary,"
while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.
Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases of People v. Mendoza, People v. Aragon,
and Odayat v. Amante, that the Civil Code contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage.
In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941, and 1949. The second marriage
was contracted in the belief that the first wife was already dead, while the third marriage was contracted
after the death of the second wife. The Court ruled that the first marriage was deemed valid until annulled,
which made the second marriage null and void for being bigamous. Thus, the third marriage was valid, as
the second marriage was void from its performance, hence, nonexistent without the need of a judicial
decree declaring it to be so.
This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved substantially the same factual antecedents.
In Odayat (1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that no judicial decree was
necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages under Article 80 of the Civil Code.
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon
inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now
expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. A
second marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and void.
However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero and Ty v. Court of Appeals, the requirement of a judicial decree
of nullity does not apply to marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the
children of the parties were born while the Civil Code was in force. In Ty, this Court clarified that those cases continue to
be governed by Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At
that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being
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void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a
second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent's second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to
do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family
Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested
rights of petitioner and the children is patent x x x. (Citations omitted)
As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable to this case. The Court thus concludes
that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of
the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before
the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the
subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque City declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the
conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there
is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute
a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
REPUBLIC V. NOLASCO 220 SCRA 20
Issue: Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
Ruling: Article 41 of the Family Code provides that:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set
forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis
supplied).
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it superseded,7 the following crucial
differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years;
however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry. Also, Article
41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either
that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to
be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the
other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article
391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
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4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to
give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to
ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that
she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking
the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast
city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts doubt on his
supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the mistake is not well taken. There is no
analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as
pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking
into a major city like Liverpool or London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there —
which is in effect what Nolasco says he did — can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to her personal background
even after she had married respondent too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said
of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him.
Respondent said he had lost these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends of
her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled
that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by
its nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with credibility. As noted before, there are serious
doubts to respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely tended to show that the
missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in January 1983, he cut short his
employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months from January
1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when be finally reached San Jose. Respondent,
moreover, claimed he married Janet Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents and their place of residence. Also,
respondent failed to explain why he did not even try to get the help of the police or other authorities in London and
Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure and respondent's subsequent behavior
make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica was dead a well-founded one.
CALISTERIO V. CALISTERIO 330 SCRA 201, April 16, 2000
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between the deceased Teodorico and Marieta valid that in turn would determine her
right as surviving spouse.
Ruling: The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law
in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the
Family Code 5 itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such
person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage
without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until
declared null and void by a competent court.
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Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and
void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from the
above rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be held valid, the
spouse present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later marriage must have done so in good faith. 6 Bad faith
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong — it partakes of the nature of fraud, a
breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will. The Court does not find these circumstances to be here
extant.
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary8 as long as the prescribed period of
absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article
83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the burden of proof would be,
in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be
considered valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been
absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article
391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee
for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last
condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so
provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband, James William Bounds, had been
absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the
deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil Code, should
thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.
MANUEL V. PEOPLE 476 SCRA 461, November 29, 2005
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioner's first wife cannot
be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death
as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code.
Ruling: Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide'

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the absentee still lives, he shall
be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence
of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be
sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among
the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not
been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been
known for four years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any necessity of judicial declaration. However, Article 41 of the
Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set
forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
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For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
With the effectivity of the Family Code, the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil
Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he
or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without
prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse.
REPUBLIC V. CA and ALEGRO 477 SCRA 377, December 9, 2005
Issue: Whether or not respondent Alegro was able to sufficiently prove the well-founded belief that his wife Lea is
presumptively dead.
Ruling: No. In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by the Court in locating the whereabouts of a missing
spouse must be strictly complied with. It is the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
institution. Marriage is the foundation of the family. Since marriage is an inviolable social institution that the 1987 Constitution
seeks to protect from dissolution at the whim of the parties. For respondent’s failure to prove that he had a well-founded
belief that his wife is already dead and that he exerted the required amount of diligence in searching for his missing wife,
the petition for declaration of presumptive death should have been denied by the trial court and the Honorable Court of
Appeals. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding
as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse. The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and
that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that “es
menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales.” The Court finds and so holds that the respondent
failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition in the trial court, that his spouse Rosalia “Lea”
Julaton was already dead. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside.
Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording
of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or d eclaring
it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence
of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the
subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is
disputed.
Rules on Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death
GENERAL RULE: A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage is null and void.
EXCEPTION:
1. Before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
❖ In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions
of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
2. The spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
Recourse? The spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code (Art. 238) for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Remedies of the Reappearing Spouse
1. Execution and recording of the affidavit of reappearance:
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a. The subsequent marriage shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance
of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
b. A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of
the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due
notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage.
2. Judicial Determination of the fact of appearance – “without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially
determined in case such fact is disputed.”
Republic v. Quiñonez G.R. No. 237412, January 6, 2020

Culled from this provision, the essential requisites for a declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage
are:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance
occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
The petition is anchored on Remar’s alleged failure to prove compliance with the third requisite.
The law did not define what is meant by “well-founded belief.” It depends upon the circumstances of each particular
case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the
present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under circumstances, the absent spouse is
already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
Here, Remar’s efforts to locate Lovelyn are marked by the following acts:
1. Remar travelled to several places where his wife had been reportedly seen particularly, Bislig City and the
Municipality of Lingig in the province of Surigao del Sur, Metro Manila, Batangas and Cavite; and
2. Remar constantly communicated with Lovelyn’s relatives for a period of ten (10) years in order to ascertain
Lovelyn’s whereabouts.
Unfortunately, Remar failed to allege, much less prove, the extent of the search he had conducted in the places
where he claims to have gone. This leaves the Court with no way to ascertain the extent of Remar’s search.
Remar also failed to identify which of Lovelyn’s relatives he had communicated with, and disclose what he learned
from these communications. Again, this leaves the Court with no basis to determine whether the information Remar learned
is sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that Lovelyn is dead.
Moreover, much like the respondent in Cantor, Remar never sought the help of the authorities to locate Lovelyn in
the course of her 10-year disappearance. Remar was given ample opportunity to explain his failure to report Lovelyn’s
disappearance, considering that the Republic first noted such failure when it filed its Petition for Centiorari with the CA.
Curiously, however, Remar chose not to address the matter.
Finally, the allegations in Remar’s Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death suggest that he is aware of the true
cause of Lovelyn’s disappearance, thus:
In the first three months that his wife was in Manila, there was x x x constant communication through the cellphone
calls and texts. Remar relayed to Lovelyn that he is x x x working in Surigao City as a security guard in the Hall of Justice x x
x
Then the calls and texts got fewer and fewer until they stopped. He thought that the cellphone of his wife was just lost
so he started inquiries from his and her relatives in Bislig City. One confessed that his wife is now cohabitating with another
man and will not be going home because of shame. He could not believe and refused to believe the devastating news.
The Court commiserates with Remar’s plight. Nevertheless, the Court cannot uphold the issuance of a declaration of
presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage where there appears to be no well-founded belief of the absentee
spouse’s death, but only the likelihood that the absentee spouse does not want to be found.
Republic v. Estrada G.R. No. 214792 (Notice), March 18, 2015
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In this case, Diego’s absence for more than 30 years, which far exceeded the law required four years of absence, is
more than enough to declare him presumptively dead for all legal intents and purposes. Further, it can be clearly gleaned
from the totality of evidence that Diego had already died due to the prevalence of New People’s Army in Malaybalay. As
cited by the appellate court:
. . . It had been thirty-two years since the date of Diego Olembrio’s disappearance when Teresita seasonable filed her
petition with the RTC. The fact that Diego Olembrio would be seventy-five years old by now was reason enough to support
the presumption that he could be dead. To Teresita Olembrio, the acts of going to SSS to inquire on Diego’s remittances
and of going to the house of the parents of Diego to inquire as to his whereabouts, constitute diligent efforts sufficient to
support her belief that Diego is dead. It is the petitioner in a petition for declaration of presumptive death, and not the trial
court, who must possess a well-grounded belief of the death of his absent spouse. To the satisfaction of the trial court,
Teresita Olembrio was able to prove such belief. This Court is well aware that in the mountainous province of Bukidnon
where the Estradas resides, NPA occupation is prevalent. Thus, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of fact of
the trial court.
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate;
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there
are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith,
such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any
insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent
spouse by testate and intestate succession.
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all
donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation
of law.
Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below
twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having
substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party
freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity
continues and appears to be incurable; or
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(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.
Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article:
(1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude;
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband;
(3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or
(4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the
marriage.
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will
give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.
Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated
herein:
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent,
within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of
the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the other’s insanity;
or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either
party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the discovery of the fraud;
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the time the force,
intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;
(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the marriage.
SUMMARY
Article 45. A marriage may be annulled Article 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following
for any of the following causes, existing at persons and within the periods indicated herein:
the time of the marriage:
(1) That the: Who may institute?

❖ Party in whose behalf it is
sought to have the
marriage annulled was (1) For causes mentioned in number 1
eighteen years of age or of Article 45:
over but below twenty-
one, and ✓ By the party whose parent or
✓ Within five years after attaining
❖ The marriage was guardian did not give his or
the age of twenty-one;
solemnized without the her consent, or
✓ At any time before such party
consent of the parties, ✓ By the parent or guardian or
reaches the age of twenty-
guardian or person person having legal charge
one
having substitute of the minor
parental authority over
the party. In that order
EXCEPTION: After attaining the age of 21,

such party freely cohabited with the other
and both lived together as husband and
wife;
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(2) That either party was of unsound (2) For causes mentioned in number ✓ At any time before the death
mind. 2 of Article 45: of either party
✓ During a lucid interval or after
✓ By the sane spouse who had
regaining sanity
no knowledge of the other’s
EXCEPTION: unless such party, after
insanity; by any relative,
coming to reason, freely cohabited with
guardian or person having
the other as husband and wife;
legal charge of the insane
✓ By the insane spouse;
✓ Within five years after the

(3) That the consent of either party (3) For causes mentioned in number
discovery of the fraud
was obtained by fraud, 3 of Article 45:
✓ By the injured party
EXCEPTION: unless such party afterwards
1. Freely cohabited with the other
as husband and wife
2. With full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud
✓ Within five years from the time

(4) That the consent of either party (4) For causes mentioned in number
the force, intimidation or
was obtained by force, 4 of Article 45:
undue influence disappeared
intimidation or undue influence
or ceased
✓ By the injured party.

EXCEPTION: unless:
1. Such party thereafter freely
cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
2. The same having disappeared
or ceased
✓ Within five years after the

(5) That either party was physically (5) For causes mentioned in number 5
marriage.
incapable of consummating the and 6 of Article 45:
marriage with the other, and
such incapacity continues and
appears to be incurable; or ✓ By the injured party
(6) That either party was afflicted

with a sexually-transmissible
disease found to be serious and
appears to be incurable.
➢ NB: Whether concealed or not,

as long as present at the time of
the marriage
May the parents ratify this voidable marriage?
❖ Sempio-Diy: No, since the law requires mutual and free cohabitation of the spouses. The parents have no involvement.
❖ Tolentino: Yes
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1. Since parental consent is all that the law requires, so that it is immaterial whether the consent is given in
advance or after the marriage by ratification [BUT NOTE: “existing at the time of marriage” (Art. 45)
2. And the parents may waive the right to institute an action for annulment within the prescribed period. –
convalidation by prescription, not by ratification
CONCEPTS
➢ Article 1335. There is violence when in order to wrest consent, serious or irresistible force is employed.
There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-grounded fear of
an imminent and grave evil upon his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants
or ascendants, to give his consent.
To determine the degree of intimidation, the age, sex and condition of the person shall be borne in mind. XXX
➢ Article 1337. There is undue influence when a person takes improper advantage of his power over the will of another,
depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom of choice. The following circumstances shall be considered: the
confidential, family, spiritual and other relations between the parties, or the fact that the person alleged to have
been unduly influenced was suffering from mental weakness, or was ignorant or in financial distress.
Physical Incapacity
❖ Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act
of sexual intercourse. Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the husband or of the wife may be
caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it ma be due to chronic illness and
inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It may be cause by psychogenic causes,
where such mental block or disturbance has the result of making the spouse physically incapable of performing the
marriage act. [Alcazar v. Alcazar G.R. No. 174451, October 13, 2009]
❖ Under the doctrine of triennial cohabitation, the husband in this case is presumed to be impotent. The claim of the
husband that the wife did not want carnal intercourse is hard to believe. Such solicitation of a groom is noble; of a
husband, heroic. Men are still cavemen in the pleasures of the bed. The husband’s plea does not inspire confidence.
Common experience discredits it. And if in fact he had the physical power and refrained from sexual intercourse
during the five years he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of sympathy for her feelings, he deserves
too be doubted for not having asserted his rights, even though she balked. The presumption of impotency (because
of the doctrine of triennial cohabitation) has not been overcome, and the decree of annulment will be granted.
[Tompkins v. Tompkins (92 N.J. Eq. 113, 111 Atl. 599)]
DISTINCTIONS
VOID VOIDABLE
Nature Inexistent from the very beginning Valid and binding until annulled by a
competent court
Susceptibility to Convalidation Generally not susceptible, except Convalidated either by:

under Art. 35 (2)
✓ Cohabitation
✓ prescription
Effect upon property relations Generally governed by rules on co- Generally governed by the marriage
ownership (147 & 148), except void settlements or legal property regimes
marriages under Article 40
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Effect upon status of children Generally children are illegitimate, Conceived before the decree of annulment
except children of void marriages are considered legitimate
under Art. 35 (6) and Art. 36 in relation
to 54
How marriage may be impugned May be attacked either directly or Judicial declaration is necessary
collaterally
Who may impugn the marriage Anyone who may be an interested As a rule, only by the contracting parties,
party with a direct interest except in cases under Art. 45 (1)
When the marriage may be Not subject to prescription, and may be Subject to prescription, and must be assailed
impugned assailed even after death of either of during the lifetime of either of the
the contracting parties contracting parties
OVERVIEW OF PROCEDURE
1. Filing of the petition for declaration of nullity or annulment before the Family Courts (RTCs)
2. Summons will be served in the other spouse
3. The respondent-spouse will have 15 days from receipt of summons to file an Answer
4. The public prosecutor will investigate whether there was collusion between the parties
5. Pre-trial and Pre-trial Conference
6. Trial and submission of Memoranda
7. Decision will be rendered
Art. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession
of judgment.
COLLUSION is a situation where, for purposes of getting an annulment or nullity decree:
1. The parties come up with an agreement making it appear that the marriage is defective due to the existence of any
of the grounds for the annulment of marriage or the declaration of its nullity provided by law
2. Agree to represent such false or non-existent cause of action before the proper court
3. With the objective of facilitating the issuance of a decree of annulment or nullity of marriage.
Collusion implies a corrupt agreement between the husband and wife and therefore, renders dismissible any annulment or
nullity case initiated through the same.
Stipulation of facts v. Confession of judgment

The former is practically an admission by both parties made in court agreeing to the existence of the act constituting
the ground for annulment or for the declaration of nullity of marriage, while the latter is the admission made in court by the
respondent or defendant admitting fault as invoked by the plaintiff to sever the marriage ties.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the fact that the institutions of marriage and
of the family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern of the State as of the spouses; because the state and the
public have vital interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration by collusion
between the parties or by fabricated evidence.
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Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between
the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The
Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent
with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the othe r parent.
SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
➢ Article 194. Support compromises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his
schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall
include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work.
Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the
proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,
the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had
been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the
proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the
final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual
agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of
the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under
the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime.
Art. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties
of the spouses and the delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and
registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n)
Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately
preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
Art. 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article
36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subseq uent marriage
under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.
APPLICATION
➢ Article 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following
effects: XXX
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(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there
are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the done contracted the marriage in bad faith,
such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
(4) the innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in
any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherent from the
innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.
JUDICIAL DECLARATION
GENERAL RULE: The final judgment shall provide for:
1. The liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,
2. The custody and support of the common children, and
3. The delivery of their presumptive legitimes
EXCEPTION: unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
Note: All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the
proceedings for liquidation.
PARTITION
In the partition:
1. The conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of
Articles 102 and 129.
❖ Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the
lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouses with whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless
the court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into
consideration the best interests of said children.
2. The value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the
trial court, and shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities
❖ Unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters.
ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT

Who may ask for the enforcement of judgment?
➢ The children or their guardian, or the trustee of their property

The delivery of the presumptive legitimes:
✓ Shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both
of the parents;
✓ but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be
considered as advances on their legitimes.
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RECORDING
What shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property?
1. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage,

2. The partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and
3. The delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes.
Failure to record? The same shall not affect third persons.
Effect of compliance: Either of the former spouses may marry again after complying with the requirements of the immediately
preceding Article;
Failure to comply? The subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
What is a legitime?
➢ Article 886. Legitime is that part of the testator’s property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved
it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called compulsory heirs.
➢ Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children
and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Illegitimate children (as amended by Art. 175 of the Family Code)
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one
another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.

The father or mother of illegitimate of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the
extent established by this Code.
Presumptive Legitime
❖ That portion of the net assets of the absolute community of property or net profits of the conjugal partnership
of gains at the time of the final judgment decided by the trial court, which the law has set aside for the
common children of the spouses
❖ For purposes of computation, the law presumes “as if” both spouses died and that they both died with a last
will and testament
DETERMINATION OF THE PRESUMPTIVE LEGITIME

Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, “the legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists
of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother.” The children are therefore entitled to half of the share of
each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community, which shall be annotated in the titles/documents covering the
same, as well as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the
receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00. [Noveras v. Noveras G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014]
APPLICATION AND COMPUTATION
Procedure
1. Compute how much is the net assets of the absolute community of property or the net profits of the conjugal
partnership of gains
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2. Since the properties are common or conjugal properties, the former spouses get ½ share each to the entirety of the
net assets or net profits (as the case may be)
3. Each share of the former spouses will be halved:
a. ½ of the share – shall pertain to the presumptive legitimes of the common children (that portion which the law
has reserved for the common children)
b. ½ of the share – shall pertain to the free portion (that portion set aside for the former spouse which he/she
may dispose of as he/she deems fit)
4. Divide the portion allotted for the legitimes to the common children (the division shall depend on the status of the
common children – if they are all legitimate, all illegitimate or mixed)
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Share of Illegitimate Child

❖ Family Code, Art. 176. Xxx The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate
child.
Where will the legitime of illegitimate children be taken?
❖ New Civil Code, Art. 895. Xxx The legitime of the illegitimate children shall be taken from the portion of the estate at
the free disposal of the testator, provided that in no case shall the total legitime of such illegitimate children exceed
that free portion, xxx
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TITLE II
Legal Separation
Annulment vs. Legal Separation
ANNULMENT LEGAL SEPARATION
As to defects Marriage is defective Marriage is not defective
Existence of Grounds At the time or before the After the marriage

marriage
Effects The marriage is set aside and The marriage subsists and parties
parties can remarry cannot remarry
Ratification & Reconciliation Under specific grounds, the Regardless of the ground, the
parties may ratify their defective parties may reconcile;
marriage; ratification cleanses reconciliation merely restores the
the marriage of all of its defects right of the parties to cohabit as
husband and wife
LEGAL SEPARATION SEPARATION DE FACTO
As to nature of separation Effected only by court decree or Effected by the will of the parties
after court proceedings at any time or extrajudicially
As to effects Results in the dissolution of the Does not result in dissolution of

property relations, but the parties property relations and are
remain married considered husband and wife of
each other
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Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child
of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in
prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term “child” shall include a child by nature or by adoption.
SUMMARY
Subject Nature of Act Committed against… Remarks
Respondent spouse Repeated physical Directed against the

violence or grossly petitioner spouse, a
-
abusive conduct common child, or a
child of the petitioner
spouse
Respondent spouse Physical violence or The petitioner Not a ground if

moral pressure to committed against a
compel to change common child, or a
religious or political child of the petitioner
affiliation
Respondent spouse Attempt to corrupt or The petitioner spouse, a

induce to engage in common child, or a
prostitution, or child of the petitioner
connivance in such spouse
corruption or
inducement
Respondent spouse Final judgment - Even if pardoned

sentencing
imprisonment of more
than six years
Respondent spouse Drug addiction or - Compare with Arts. 36

habitual alcoholism and 45 with 46
Respondent spouse Lesbianism or - Compare with Arts. 36

homosexuality and 45 with 46
Respondent spouse Contracting a - Whether in the

subsequent bigamous Philippines or abroad
marriage
Respondent spouse Sexual infidelity or - Compare with Arts. 36

perversion and 45 with 46
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Respondent spouse Attempt against the life Petitioner spouse Not a ground if
committed against a
common child, or a
child of the petitioner
Respondent spouse Abandonment without Petitioner spouse For more than one year
justifiable cause
Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds:
(1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of;
(2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of;
(3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for
legal separation;
(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
(5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal separation; or
(6) Where the action is barred by prescription.
Distinctions
1. Condonation – forgiveness or pardon which happens after the commission of the act
2. Consent – prior acquiescence to the commission of the act
3. Connivance – luring or willingness of the spouse to the commission of the act
4. Mutual Guilt – both parties have given grounds for legal separation; clean hands doctrine
5. Collusion
6. Prescription – in relation to Art. 57
Art. 57. An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time of the occurrence of the cause.
Matters of Procedure
Overview
1. Filing of the Petition for Legal Separation

2. Summons will be issued by the Family Court and served on the other spouse
3. The respondent-spouse will be given 15 days from receipt of summons to file an Answer
4. The public prosecutor will conduct collusion investigation and make a report
5. Pre-trial and Pre-trial Conference
6. Trial and submission of Memoranda
7. Rendition of decision
Art. 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of
the petition.
Art. 59. No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has taken steps toward the reconciliation of the spouses
and is fully satisfied, despite such efforts, that reconciliation is highly improbable.
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
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Art. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other.
The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person
to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have
the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court.
Effects of filing the petition for legal separation
1. The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other.

2. The spouses may make a written agreement as to the administration or management of the absolute community or
conjugal partnership property, which shall be approved by the court
3. In the absence of a written agreement the spouses, the court shall designate either of them or a third person to
administer the absolute community or conjugal property
NOTE: The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the
Rules of Court.
Art. 62. During the pendency of the action for legal separation, the provisions of Article 49 shall likewise apply to the
support of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children.
Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed;
(2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall
have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which
shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2);
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213 of
this Code; and
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover,
provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of
law.
Custody of minor children

➢ Article 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by
the court. The court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise.
Art. 64. After the finality of the decree of legal separation, the innocent spouse may revoke the donations made by him
or by her in favor of the offending spouse, as well as the designation of the latter as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even
if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable. The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the registries of property
in the places where the properties are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the
recording of the complaint for revocation in the registries of property shall be respected. The revocation of or change in the
designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take effect upon written notification thereof to the insured.
The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be brought within five years from the time the decree of legal
separation become final.
Effects of finality of the decree of legal separation

The innocent spouse MAY revoke the following:
1. Donations made by him or her in favor of the offending spouse

❖ The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the registries of property in the places where the
properties are located.
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❖ Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the recording of the complaint for
revocation in the registries of property shall be respected.
❖ The action to revoke the donation must be brought within five years from the time the decree of legal
separation has become final.
2. The designation of the offending spouse as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be
stipulated as irrevocable.
❖ The revocation of or change in the designation of the insurance beneficiary
Reconciliation & Revival of Property Relations
Art. 65. If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding joint manifestation under oath duly signed by them shall be filed
with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation.
Art. 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences:
(1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and
(2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share
of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime.
The court’s order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries.
Art. 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding Article shall be executed under
oath and shall specify:
(1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime;
(2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse; and
(3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each.
The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal
separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors named therein. After due hearing, the court shall, in its order, t ake
measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties.
The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified, unle ss
the debtor-spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor’s claim.
SUMMARY
Reconciliation means the bilateral act of resuming marital cohabitation and marital relations.
✓ How manifested?
o Express or implied
o Requires the execution of a joint manifestation under oath to be filed in the court hearing the petition or issued
the decree of legal separation
✓ What are the effects of the reconciliation of the parties?

1. If the legal separation proceedings are still pending, it shall be terminated in whatever stage; and
2. If there is a final decree of legal separation issued, it shall be set aside, and the separation of property and any
forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist;
3. And foregoing decree of reconciliation shall be recorded in the proper civil registries (LCR) [Article 66 of FC]
✓ What if the reconciliation occurred after the rendition of the judgment granting the petition for legal separation but
before the issuance of the Decree?
o The spouses shall express in their manifestation whether or not they agree to revive the former regime of their
property relations or choose a new regime.
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o The court shall immediately issue a Decree of Reconciliation declaring that the legal separation proceeding
is set aside and specifying the regime of property relations under which the spouses shall be covered. (par.
C, Sec. 23, A.M. 2-11-11-SC)
✓ May the parties agree to revive their former property regime?

o Yes, upon the execution of an agreement to revive their former property regime under oath
✓ Formalities: The agreement to revive shall specify:

1. The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime;
2. Those to be retained as separate properties of each spouse; and
3. The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each.
✓ Procedure:
1. The agreement shall be executed by the parties and notarized
2. A verified motion for approval of the agreement of revival will be filed in court hearing the petition/issuing the
decree attaching a copy of the agreement itself and both shall be furnished to creditors named
3. A hearing on the motion will be undertaken
4. The court shall grant the motion and order the approval of the agreement of revival and take measures to
protect the interest of creditors
5. The said court order shall be recorded in the proper registries of property
✓ Effect of recording of the agreement of revival:

1. Creditors how have been informed are duly protected and acquire a lien to the properties
2. Any creditor not listed or not notified shall not be prejudiced – thus, may file an action against the spouses to
claim the common properties, unless debtor-spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor’s
claim
A.M. 2-11-11-SC ISSUE
✓ Upon reconciliation, may the parties agree to a NEW property regime?

o Yes, under pars. (c) and (d) of Sec. 23 of the A.M. 2-11-11-SC
o Section 24. Revival of Property Regime or Adoption of Another. –
(a) In case of reconciliation under Section23, paragraph (c) above, the parties shall file a verified motion for
revival of regime of property relations or the adoption of another regime of property relations in the same
proceeding for legal separation attaching to said motion their agreement for the approval of the court.
(b) The agreement which shall be verified shall specify the following:
(1) The properties to be contributed to the restored or new regime;
(2) Those to be retained as separate properties of each spouse; and
(3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses, and the amounts owing to each.
(c) The creditors shall be furnished with copies of the motion and the agreement.
(d) The court shall require the spouses to cause the publication of their verified motion for two consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
(e) After due hearing, and the court decides to grant the motion, it shall issue an order directing the parties
to record the order in the proper registries of property within thirty days from receipt of a copy of the
order and submit proof of compliance within the same period.
TITLE III
Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife
Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual
help and support.
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Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and
compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarity of the family.
Art. 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal
obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separat e
properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate
properties.
Art. 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such
management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.
SUMMARY of Rules on Expenses

Personal expenses shouldered from the personal assets of the respective spouses.
The expenses for family support, conjugal obligations and management of the household shall be paid from:
1. The community property
2. In the absence thereof, the income or fruits if their separate properties
3. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from their separate
properties – solidarily and personally liable
Art. 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring
danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief.
Available Reliefs
1. Petitioning the court of receivership,

2. Petitioning for judicial separation of property, or
3. Petitioning for authority to be the sole administrator of the community property or the conjugal partnership (c.f. Article
101 and 128)
Note: Distinguish with psychological incapacity and legal separation cases
Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the
other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:

(1) The objection is proper; and
(2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection,
the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith.
TITLE IV
PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
CHAPTER 1
General Provisions
ASPECTS OF MARRIAGE
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• Personal Aspects:
o Rights and Obligations between husband and wife
o Rights and Obligations between parents and children
• Property Aspects:
o Property relations between husband and wife
o Property relations between parents and children
o Rights and Obligations between the spouses and third persons
Art. 74. The property relationship between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order:
(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;

(2) By the provisions of this Code; and
(3) By the local custom.
Marriage Settlements/Pre-nuptial Agreement
• An agreement between spouses or two people engaged to be married concerning the division and ownership
of marital property during marriage or upon dissolution by death or divorce (Black’s Law Dictionary)
• It is a contract entered into by the future spouses fixing the matrimonial property regime that should govern during
the existence of the marriage. The provisions of the marriage settlement must not be contrary to law, good morals,
good customs, public order, and public policy. After all, the marriage settlement is still a contract. Said provisions
must not be derogatory to the dignity or authority of the husband and wife.
• If in the marriage settlement, one of the surviving spouse is prohibited in marrying another, such an agreement
would be void as against public policy. Furthermore, the marriage settlement must generally confine itself merely
to property relations.
Art. 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal
partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when
the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of property as established in this Code shall govern.
Contents of the Marriage Settlement

The future spouses may agree upon the following matters:
1. Regime of absolute community of property,

2. Conjugal partnership of gains
3. Complete separation of property, or
4. Any other regime.
Family Code Default Property Regime

The system of absolute community of property as established in this Code shall govern, if:
1. In the absence of a marriage settlement, or

2. When the regime agreed upon is void
❖ The parties cannot stipulate that the conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute community of property will
start at the time other than the precise moment of the celebration of marriage because such agreement is
void under Articles 88 and 107;
❖ If the marriage has been terminated by death of one spouse and there has been no liquidation of the
properties if the previous marriage, the surviving spouse, if he or she decides to remarry, cannot execute a
marriage settlement providing for a regime other than the complete separation of property regime (in the
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subsequent marriage) because Articles 103 and 130 specifically provide that, in such a remarriage, the
property regime governing the subsequent marriage must be the separation of property regime.
Art. 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made before the celebration
of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.
Modifications to Marriage Settlements

GENERAL RULE: Made before the celebration of the marriage
EXCEPTIONS:
- Article 66, 67 – Reconciliation and Revival of the former property regime
- Article 128 – Judicial Separation of Property or Sole Administration
- Article 135 – Judicial Separation of Property (for sufficient causes)
- Article 136 – Voluntary Dissolution/Judicial Separation of Property
Art. 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be in writing, signed by the parties and executed
before the celebration of the marriage. They shall not prejudice third persons unless they are registered in the local civil
registry where the marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper registries of properties.
SUMMARY
The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be:
1. In writing
2. Signed by the parties and
3. Executed before the celebration of the marriage
4. They shall not prejudice third persons unless they are registered in the local civil registry where the marriage contract
is recorded as well as in the proper registries of property.
Art. 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may also execute his or her marriage settlements, but
they shall be valid only if the persons designated in Article 14 to give consent to the marriage are made parties to the
agreement, subject to the provisions of Title IX of this Code.
Mirasol v. Lim G.R. No. 39389, March 16, 1934

In order that a minor may validly execute a deed of marriage settlements, it is indispensable that the person designated
by law to give consent to the marriage, consent to the execution of such deed (article 1318 of the Civil Code) and that such
marriage settlements be recorded in a public instrument executed before the celebration of the marriage (Article 1321, id).
In the case at bar, the alleged deed of marriage settlements was executed by Maria Lim when she was sixteen years of
age. Her mother, who is the person designated by law to give consent to her marriage by reason of the father’s death, was
present at the time the contract was executed before the justice of the peace of Apalit, Pampanga, who was not then
authorized to act as a notary public. Although the said justice of the peace, who authenticated the deed of marriage
settlements, may be considered a notary public de facto, however, the said deed cannot be considered legally valid on the
ground that it was not signed by the mother of Maria Lim, who was a minor at the time of the execution thereof (Article 1318,
Civil Code).
Art. 79. For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has
been pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a
competent court to be made a party thereto.
Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property relations of the spouses shall be
governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence.
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This rule shall not apply:
(1) Where both spouses are aliens;

(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the Philippines and executed in the
country where the property is located; and
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting property situated in a
foreign country whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic validity.
Basis of Incapacity
➢ Revised Penal Code. Article 31. Civil Interdiction. – Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his
sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital
authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any
conveyance inter vivos.
GENERAL RULE: the property relations between spouses are governed principally by the national law of Filipino spouses.
VITUG: The “contrary stipulation” referred to in Article 80 of the Family Code can include a foreign law governing the property
relations (property regimes) of the spouses other than as may be so excepted under the provisions of the third paragraph of
Article 17 of the Civil Code (relating to prohibitory laws) and to the extent that said parties are free to provide and cover
matters in their marriage settlement.
EXCEPTION: this rule shall not apply:

1. Where both spouses are aliens – lex nationalii principle
2. With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the Philippines and executed in
the country where the property is located – lex rei sitae principle
3. With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting property situated in a
foreign country whose laws require different formalities for their extrinsic validity – lex rei sitae principle
Doctrine of Immutability of the Matrimonial Regime
✓ The original property regime that prevailed at the start of the marriage prevails despite the change of nationality of
the husband, wife or both parties;
✓ Reasons:
1. Property relations are determined by the law in force at the time of the marriage
2. To protect the rights of interested 3rd persons or creditors
3. For the protection of the spouses themselves
Art. 81. Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts referred to in the preceding articles in consideration of a
future marriage, including donations between the prospective spouses made therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage
does not take place. However, stipulations that do not depend upon the celebration of the marriages shall be valid.
Marriage as a Legal Condition
Marriages constitutes a positive suspensive condition for the validity of the following:
1. Marriage Settlements
2. Contracts in consideration of a future marriage
3. Donations between the prospective spouses made in the marriage settlements or contracts
Note: Such stipulations that do not depend upon the celebration of the marriage shall be valid.
DONATION
New Civil Code:
➢ Article 725. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right of another in
favor of another, who accepts it.
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➢ Article 726. When a person gives to another a thing or right on account of the latter’s merits or of the services rendered
by him to the donor, provided they do not constitute a demandable debt, or when the gift imposes upon the done
a burden which is less than the value of the thing given, there is also a donation.
Chapter 2
Donations by Reason of Marriage

Art. 82. Donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its celebration, in consideration of the same,
and in favor of one or both of the future spouses.
Donations Propter Nuptias
Requisites:
1. They are made before the celebration of the marriage

2. They are in consideration of the same, and
3. They are made in favor of one or both of the future spouses
Art. 83. These donations are governed by the rules on ordinary donations established in Title III of Book III of the Civil
Code, insofar as they are not modified by the following articles.
Formalities for Donations

➢ Article 748. The donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing.
An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the document representing the right
donated.
If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance
shall be made in writing. Otherwise, the donation shall be void.
➢ Article 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall
not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form,
and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
Art. 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community of property, they cannot donate
to each other in their marriage settlements more than one-fifth of their present property. Any excess shall be considered void.
Donations of future property shall be governed by the provisions on testamentary succession and the formalities of wills.
(130a)
RULES
Situation:
✓ The future spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community of property in their marriage settlement
✓ Marriage settlement include donations to each other
Rule:
1. They cannot donate to each other more than one-fifth of their present property.
2. Any excess shall be considered void.
Application:
A and B execute a pre-nuptial agreement whereby they agree to have the conjugal partnership of gains as their
property regime during the marriage, and that all their separate properties acquired before the marriage shall remain
exclusive property to them.
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In the Agreement:
o A promises to donate P50,000.00, leaving P1,500,000.00 under her own name

o B promises to donate his house and lot valued at P5 Million, leaving properties amounting to P15 Million under
his own name.
Question: Are donations made in the Agreement valid?
Procedure:
1. Compute how much is the respective present property of the future spouses
2. Determine the ratio or portion of the property donated to the present property
3. Compare with the 1/5 or 20% threshold
4. The donation shall be valid, but any excess will be void.
❖ With respect to A:
1. Value of present property (P1,500,000.00 + 50,000.00) = P1,550,000.00
2. Ratio of donation to present property (P50,000.00/P1,550,000.00) = .03226
3. Less than 1/5 or 20% therefore, the donation its entirety is valid
❖ With respect to B:
1. Value of present property (P15 Million + 5 Million) = P20 Million in properties
2. Ratio of donation to present property (P5 Million/P20 Million) = ¼ or 25%
3. So, the donation is valid only to the extent of 1/5: (P20 Million/5) = P4 Million
4. As to the P1 Million excess: void for being inofficious
Donations for Future Property
GENERAL RULE: Article 751. Donations cannot comprehend future property.
By future property is understood anything which the donor cannot dispose of at the time of the donation.
EXCEPTION: Donations propter nuptias between spouses of future properties – donation mortis causa (effective upon the
death of the spouses)
- Intrinsic Validity: Governed by the provisions on testamentary succession and

- Extrinsic Validity: Governed by the formalities of wills
Formalities of Wills
Holographic Wills:
▪ Article 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of
the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed.
Notarized Wills:
▪ Article 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by
the testator’s name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
▪ The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign,
as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively on letters placed on the upper part of each page.
▪ The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed
the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in
the presence of the testator and of one another.
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▪ If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them
▪ Article 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public
shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of Court.
Art. 85. Donations by reason of marriage of property subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In case of foreclosure of
the encumbrance and the property is sold for less than the total amount of the obligation secured, the donee shall not be
liable for the deficiency. If the property is sold for more than the total amount of said obligation, the donee shall be entitled to
the excess.
Donations with Encumbrances

Status: Valid, and the encumbrances constituted thereon must be respected
In case of foreclosure of the encumbrance and the property is sold:
- If the selling price is < the total amount of the obligation secured:
o The donee shall not be liable for the deficiency
o Example: Upon foreclosure sale, the property was sold at public auction for P5 Million and the value of the
indebtedness is P10 Million. The donee is not liable for the P5 Million deficiency.
- If the selling price is > the total amount of the obligation secured:
o The donee is entitled to the excess
o Example: Upon foreclosure sale, the property was sold at public auction for P10 Million and the value of the
indebtedness is P5 Million. The donee is entitled to the P5 Million excess proceeds.
Art. 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor in the following cases:
(1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab initio except donations made in the marriage
settlements, which shall be governed by Article 81;
(2) When the marriage takes place without the consent of the parents or guardian, as required by law;
(3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad faith;
(4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse;
(5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied with;
(6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as specified by the provisions of the Civil Code on donations in
general.
1. If the marriage is not celebrated
Donations made in the marriage Donations propter nuptias

settlement
Nature Not necessarily donations propter By reason of marriage

nuptias
Limitation as to donation Subject to “not more than 1/5 value No limitation; except of inofficious
of present property” rule
(Art. 752 of the NCC)
Effect of non-celebration of the Automatically null and void No automatic; the donor must file an
marriage action to revoke
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Solis v. Barroso G.R. No. 27939, October 30, 1928
In donations propter nuptias, the marriage is really a consideration, but not in the sense of being necessary to give birth
to the obligation. This may be clearly inferred from Article 1333 (Spanish Civil Code), which makes the fact that the marriage
did not take place a cause for the revocation of such donations, thus taking it for granted that there may be a valid donation
propter nuptias, even without marriage, since that which has not existed cannot be revoked.
And such a valid donation would be forever valid, even without marriage, since that which has not existed cannot be
revoked. And such a valid donation would be forever valid, even if the marriage never took place, if the proper action for
revocation were not instituted, or if it were instituted after the lapse of the statutory period of prescription.
This is so, because the marriage in a donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which, as such, presupposes
the existence of the obligation which may be resolved and revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of the
obligation.
(1) Judicial Declaration of Void Marriage

GENERAL RULE: Donor has to file an action for revocation of the donation
EXCEPTION: When are donations propter nuptias automatically revoked or revoked by operation of law?
o Void marriage under Article 40, because of the effects under Article 50 in relation to Art. 43 (3) and the donee
acted in bad faith
▪ (3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the
marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
o Here, the donor is the innocent spouse and the donee is the guilty spouse
(2) Lack of Parental Consent

o Mere existence of the ground is basis for revocation
o It is not necessary the marriage is annulled before the donor may revoke
(2) and (3) Distinguished
Art. 86 (2) Art. 86 (3)
Ground for revocation of the Mere lack of parental or guardian’s Requires final judgment annulling the
donation consent to the marriage marriage
Condition of the donee Not necessary to be in bad faith Donee must be in bad faith
Status of the marriage and effect Marriage may subsist (although Voidable marriage must be annulled
on donation voidable) but the donation may be as a condition for the revocation of the
revoked donation
Effect of ratification on the Only the marriage is ratified, but the The marriage is ratified and the
voidable marriage & revocable donation may still be revoked donation cannot be revoked
donation
(3) Annulled Marriages & Donee in Bad Faith
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ARTICLE 45 in relation to 50 and 43 (3) & 44 ARTICLE 45 in relation to 86
BOTH MARRIAGES ARE VOIDABLE

If the marriage is annulled and the donee acted in bad
If the marriage is annulled and the donee acted in bad
faith:
faith:
➢ “donor may revoke”
➢ “revoked by operation of law”
Article 86 originated from Article 132 of the New Civil
Articles 43 and 44 are new provisions under the Family
Code
Code
How do we settle the conflict?

❖ Article 45 in relation to 50 and 43 (3) & 44 applies if the donor is the innocent spouse (so these provisions
contemplate donations propter nuptias between spouses)
❖ Article 45 in relation to 86 applies if the donor is a 3rd person (so these provisions contemplate donations propter
nuptias in favor of the spouses from 3rd persons)
Justifications
✓ The effects under Article 50 in relation to 43 (3) and 44 are under TITLE I MARRIAGE: Chapter 3. Void and Voidable
Marriages – specific to the parties to the marriage
✓ The effects under Article 86 are under TITLE IV PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE: Chapter 2.
Donations by Reason of Marriage – in general
(4) Legal Separation and Donee in Bad Faith

✓ Compare with Art. 64 (donations between spouses)
✓ After the finality of the decree of legal separation, the innocent spouse may revoke the donations made by
him or by her in favor of the offending spouse, as well as the designation of the latter as beneficiary in any
insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable.
✓ The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the registries of property in the places where the
properties are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the recording
of the complaint for revocation in the registries of property shall be respected. The revocation of or change
in the designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take effect upon written notification thereof to the
insured.
✓ The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be brought within five years from the time the decree
of legal separation become final.
(5) Compliance with A Resolutory Condition

✓ Conditional obligations – the acquisition of rights (suspensive condition), as well as the extinguishment or loss
of those already acquired (resolutory condition), shall depend upon the happening of the event which
constitutes the condition. (Art. 1181)
✓ Concept – uncertain event which wields an influence or a legal or juridical relationship

ii. Futurity
iii. Uncertainty of its occurrence
iv. It has an effect upon the efficaciousness of the obligation – meaning, when the obligation becomes
due and demandable
(6) Acts of Ingratitude
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❖ Article 765. The donation may also be revoked at the instance of the donor, by reason of ingratitude in the
following cases:
(1) If the donee should commit some offense against the person, the honor or the property of the donor,
or of his wife or children under this parental authority;
• Requisites:
1. Commission of the offense vs. donor, even without a conviction
2. Offense must be against the person, the honor or the property of the donor, or of
the spouse or children under his parental authority
(2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even
though he should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been committed against the donee himself,
his wife or children under his authority;
• Requisites:
1. Imputation to the donor of any criminal offense, or any act involving moral turpitude
2. It is immaterial that the donee can prove his accusation or substantiate his testimony
against the donor
(3) If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or morally bound to give support to the
donor.
• Requisites:
1. The refusal to support the donor must be undue, that is, without just reason; and
2. The donee must be legally or morally bound to support the donor.
When may the donor file the action to Revoke?
Grounds: Period to Revoke:
Art. 86 (1) to (5) Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (1) Upon
a written contract;
Article 1145. The following actions must be commenced

within six years: (1) Upon an oral contract;
Art. 86 (4) c.f. Art. 64***5 years from the finality of the decree of legal
separation
Art. 86 (6) Article 769. The action granted to the donor by reason of
ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance. This action
prescribes within one year, to be counted from the time the
donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible from
him to bring the action.
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage
shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The
prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.
Cohabitation
❖ In Bitangcor v. Tan, we held that the term “cohabitation” or “living together as husband and wife” means not only
residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse.
❖ Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and
may no linger be interested in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman
of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as
such.
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Prohibited Dealing During Marriage or Cohabitation

GENERAL RULE: Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage
or common law partners during their cohabitation shall be void.
EXCEPTION: Moderate Gifts – depends on the financial capacity of the Donor
Indirect Donations
Article 87 includes the following donations of a donor-spouse:

1. To a stepchild who has no compulsory and/or legal heirs, such as his or her children, other than the other spouse at
the time of the donation;
2. To a common child who has no compulsory and/or legal heirs other than the other spouse at the time of the donation;
(exception under Art. 94 and 121 of the Family Code)
3. To the parents of the other spouse;
4. To the other spouse’s adopted child who has no compulsory and/or heirs or, in cases when, at the time of the
donation, the only surviving relative of the adopted is the other spouse (parent of the adopted);
5. To a common adopted child who has no other compulsory and/or legal heirs.
✓ The above donations in favor of the said donees are indirect donations to the spouse of the donor-spouse
because, once they die, the spouse of the donor will inherit from the donee.
Grants of Gratuitous Advantage
1. Voluntary Usufructs (Art. 562 NCC)

2. Contracts of Commodatum (Art. 1933 NCC)
3. Gratuitous Simple Loan (Art. 1933 NCC)
4. Contracts of Deposit (Art. 1962 NCC)
5. Contracts of Guaranty (Art. 2047 NCC)
Prohibited Onerous Transactions
❖ Article 1490 NCC. The husband and the wife cannot sell property to each other, except:
(1) When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements; or
(2) When there has been a judicial separation of property under Article 191.
❖ Article 1646 NCC. The persons disqualified to buy referred to in Articles 1490 and 1491, are also disqualified to become
lessees of the things mentioned therein.
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A Reviewer on Persons and Family Relations

from the lectures of Atty. Bruneson I. Alabastro, CPA

THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Took effect on August 3, 1988

1. Special Contract of Permanent Union

3. Foundation of the family

4. Inviolable Social Institution

➢ Article 5. Who may contract marriage?

2. Consent freely given

✓ Motives do not affect one’s consent.

Article 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

JERRYSUS TILAR V. ELIZABETH TILAR 831 SCRA 116

➢ Republic Act No. 7160 [Local Government Code]

Navarro v. Domagtoy, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996

Keuppers v. Hon. Murcia. A.M. No. MTJ-15-1860, April 3, 2018

2. Authority of the solemnizing officer

Kho v. Republic G.R. No. 187462, June 1, 2016

REPUBLIC V. CA 236 SCRA 257

Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:

SY V. CA 330 SCRA 550

SEVILLA V. CARDENAS 497 SCRA 428

COSCA V. PALAYPAYON 237 SCRA 249

ARANES V. OCCIANO 380 SCRA 402

MORIGO V. PEOPLE 422 SCRA 376

ALCANTARA V. ALCANTARA 531 SCRA 466

NOLLORA V. PEOPLE GR No. 191452, September 7, 2011

REPUBLIC V. ALBIOS GR No. 198780, October 16, 2013

Ruling: No. Respondent’s marriage is not void.

ABBAS V. ABBAS GR No. 183896, January 30, 2013

Issue: Whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued.

GO BANGAYAN V. BANGAYAN 700 SCRA 702

KHO V. REPUBLIC and KHO GR No. 187462, June 01, 2016

The applicant shall be required to furnish:

1. His circumstances, and

Purpose and Effects

Exceptions: (highlights applicability of Philippine law pursuant to the nationality principle)

Article 36. – psychological incapacity

Article 39. – marriages against public policy

Article 35. xxx

RULES UNDER PARAGRAPH 2

Arreza v. Toyo G.R. No. 213198, July 1, 2019

Recent cases that echo the Manalo ruling:

Galapon v. Republic G.R. No. 243722, January 22, 2020

May a foreign divorce decree be used as a defense in a Bigamy Case?

Sarto y Misalucha v. People G.R. no. 206284, February 28, 2018

REPUBLIC V. IYOY 470 SCRA 508

REPUBLIC V. OBRECIDO III 472 SCRA 114

CORPUZ V. SANTO TOMAS GR No. 186571, August 11, 2010

FUJIKI V. MARINAY GR No. 196049, June 26, 2013

KOIKE V. KOIKE GR No. 215723, July 27, 2016

REPUBLIC V. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO GR No. 221029, April 24, 2018

REPUBLIC V. FLORIE GRACE COTE GR No. 212860, March 14, 2018

DELA CRUZ – MORISONO V. RYOJI MORISONO GR No. 226013, July 2, 2018

STEPHEN JUEGO – SAKAI V. REPUBLIC GR No. 224015, July 23, 2018

RACHO V. TANAKA GR No. 199519, June 25, 2018 868 SCRA 25

Marriages Exempt from License Requirement