Party Politics: Comparative Perspective Determinants of Candidate Selection: The Degree of Centralization in

Party Politics
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Determinants of Candidate Selection: The Degree of Centralization in

Comparative Perspective
Krister Lundell
Party Politics 2004 10: 25
DOI: 10.1177/1354068804039119
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DETERMINANTS OF CANDIDATE
SELECTION
The Degree of Centralization in Comparative
Perspective
Krister Lundell
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this article is to examine whether party characteristics

and contextual variables explain varying degrees of centralization of
intra-partisan candidate selection methods. By means of statistical
analyses and a larger dataset than in earlier studies, possible associations
are studied. In order to carry out the study, an index of the degree of
centralization is constructed. Of the party characteristics, only party size
affects the dependent variable: large parties tend to apply more central-
ized selection methods than small parties. None of the institutional
variables determines the degree of centralization of candidate selection.
For instance, earlier assertions about the importance of the electoral
system and territorial organization are falsified. However, some distinct
regional patterns emerge: Southern European parties apply centralized
selection methods, whereas candidate selection in Nordic countries is
decentralized.
KEY WORDS candidate selection centralization decentralization selection

methods
Introduction
Recruitment to legislative office is one of the core functions of political

systems. A great deal of attention is paid to parliamentary elections, the
preceding election campaign and the subsequent process of government
formation (in parliamentary democracies). The selection of candidates, on
the other hand, usually takes place far away from the glare of public scrutiny.
Nevertheless, it is a crucial part of the political process with far-reaching
1354-0688[DOI: 10.1177/1354068804039119]
PA RT Y P O L I T I C S 1 0 ( 1 )
consequences. According to Gallagher (1988b: 1), the quality of candidates

selected determines the quality both of the deputies elected, of the resultant
legislature, and sometimes also of a country’s politics, especially if drastic
changes in the parties’ selection procedures are in hand. Endorsing these
statements, Bille (2001: 364) says that we can hardly classify a regime as
democratic if the organizational structure of the parties lacks mechanisms
for civic participation and influence. The decision-making process reflects
the internal democracy of a party and, among these processes, candidate
selection is one of the most important.
The importance of candidate selection has been well acknowledged ever
since democratic politics began to flourish. A hundred years ago, Ostro-
gorski (1902) pointed out that the distribution of power within the party is
highly affected by the methods of candidate selection. Several authors,
among them Michels (1915: 183–4), Schattschneider (1942), Kirchheimer
(1966: 198), Jupp (1968: 58) and Ranney (1981: 103), have later stressed
the centrality of candidate selection in the life of any political party. Candi-
date selection is, in Katz’s (2001: 278) words, ‘one of the central defining
functions of a political party in a democracy’.
Much research on candidate selection has dealt with the distribution of
power within party organizations, the selecting organs and formal rules
governing the process (Katz and Mair, 1992; Lovenduski and Norris, 1993;
McKenzie, 1955; Panebianco, 1988; Ranney, 1965; Rush, 1969; Sjöblom,
1968; Ware, 1996). Another major stream of literature has been concerned
with understanding the consequences of the composition of elites for
political representation and decisive criteria in selecting candidates (Esaias-
son and Holmberg, 1996; Eulau and Wahlke, 1978; Narud and Johansson,
2001; Norris, 1997; Pitkin, 1967; Putnam, 1976).
However, surprisingly few authors have been interested in why control
over candidate selection varies between parties and countries. Some
authors have argued that the degree of centralization is affected by the elec-
toral system (Czudnowski, 1975: 221; Epstein, 1980: 225–6; Hermens,
1972: 51–8; Matthews, 1985: 35–7). Candidate selection in plurality
systems with single-member districts tends to be decentralized, whereas
large multi-member districts require more centralized selection methods.
Territorial organization is another influential factor; federalism is, accord-
ing to Epstein (1980: 31–4) and Harmel (1981: 86), related to decentral-
ized candidate selection. One of the most comprehensive studies of
candidate selection is Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective
(Gallagher and Marsh, 1988). In this volume, both determinants (legal
provisions, governmental organization, the electoral system, political
culture and the nature of the party) and effects of candidate selection in
nine countries are studied. As to determinants, the only strong association
is found between federalism and decentralized candidate selection. The
reasons why candidate selection methods vary are, on the whole, still
wrapped in mystery. By means of statistical analyses and a larger dataset
26
L U N D E L L : D E T E R M I N A N T S O F C A N D I D AT E S E L E C T I O N
than in previous studies, I therefore re-examine determinants of candidate

selection methods.
Purpose and Method
The purpose of this study is to examine whether party characteristics and

the political context explain differences between parties and countries on
one central dimension of candidate selection methods: territorial central-
ization versus decentralization. I apply a mixed strategy of both induction
and deduction, which enables an examination of a rather large set of inde-
pendent variables – important factors emphasized by other scholars as well
as possible determinants not previously observed. Strengths of associations
are measured mostly by correlation and regression analysis. As for the quali-
tative variables, mean values are compared. In order to carry out the study,
candidate selection methods prior to parliamentary elections (the lower
chamber in bicameral assemblies) are classified according to a scale that
measures the degree of centralization. Another minor purpose is to observe
candidate selection in some Western democracies that have, to my knowl-
edge, been previously ignored, namely Switzerland, Luxembourg, Malta
and Cyprus.
Selection methods are observed at different points in time. The earliest
data included in the study are from 1981 and the latest data concern candi-
date selection prior to the last elections. Measuring all selection processes
at a specific point in time is not necessary because selection procedures in
political parties tend to be stable over time and radical changes are rare
(Bille, 2001: 365–8).
A general view of candidate selection practices reveals that selection
methods vary considerably between countries, which suggests that contex-
tual factors might determine varying degrees of centralization. Conse-
quently, a mainly contextual approach, including several aspects of the
political system as well as other country characteristics, is applied. Calcu-
lation of specific values of centralization for each country is precluded,
however, given that there is substantial variation of the dependent variable
within countries. The selection process is the unit of analysis in this study.
In addition to contextual variables, some party characteristics are included.
Primary as well as secondary data are used. The former consist of corre-
spondence with party officials, party statutes and other formal rules govern-
ing the selection process. The most frequently used secondary sources are
Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective (Gallagher and Marsh,
1988) and Party Organizations – A Data Handbook on Party Organiz-
ations in Western Democracies, 1960–1990 (Katz and Mair, 1992). In some
cases, several sources have been available, and they do not always corre-
spond with each other. In these cases, I have given precedence to the volumes
mentioned above.
27
PA RT Y P O L I T I C S 1 0 ( 1 )
The Dataset
The dataset is determined by several factors. First, only democratic coun-

tries are included. Formal rules governing the selection process cannot be
regarded as important and reliable in parties operating in undemocratic
systems. There are, however, different levels of democracy. In order to avoid
a biased collection of parties and countries, I limit the dataset to advanced
democracies in the developed world. The long-term democracies in Patterns
of Democracy (1999) by Lijphart constitute a point of departure for select-
ing countries. His study of government forms and performance consists of
36 countries that in 1996 had been democratic for at least 19 years. In
deciding which countries qualify as democracies, he relies to a great extent
on Freedom House’s ratings since 1972 (http://www.freedomhouse.org). In
these surveys, all countries are rated as free, partly free or not free, and
Lijphart regards the ‘free’ countries as democratic countries (1999: 50).
Eleven of these are developing countries in Latin America, the Caribbean,
Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and are consequently excluded from my
dataset.1
Furthermore, parties without parliamentary representation are omitted.
My ambition is to include parties that seriously struggle for parliamentary
mandates. Candidate selection is not necessarily one of the core functions
in parties without realistic chances of winning any seat. In addition, parties
without parliamentary representation are often new, and so may lack
established selection procedures. By excluding marginal and recently formed
parties, we have a good sample of the main relevant cases.
I also exclude Germany, Finland, Norway and the United States, because
candidate selection in these countries is legally regulated (Gallagher, 1988a:
257). If the constitution or other specific laws determine the selection
process, the political system or party characteristics cannot affect the selec-
tion process. The exclusion of these countries may seem contradictory,
considering that most of the independent variables included in the study
assume that parties are capable, more or less rationally, of adapting to their
environments. The notion of political parties as rational actors implies that
they might pass laws according to their candidate selection preferences,
which, in turn, means that the law cannot be a decisive and independent
influence on parties’ behaviour. However, after having noticed that all these
four countries apply decentralized selection methods, Gallagher (1988a:
257) points out that:
Once a law exists, the process it prescribes may come to acquire a
certain legitimacy, and the parties in each of these countries would court
unpopularity if they attempted to change the law to permit a more
centralized . . . form of candidate selection.
Hence, legal provisions affect parties’ behaviour as well as being affected

by it, and the exclusion of the countries mentioned above seems justifiable.
28
Of the remaining countries, Portugal is omitted, since detailed infor-

mation on candidate selection in any Portuguese party is lacking. On the
other hand, Cyprus has been rated as ‘free’ by Freedom House since 1981,
and is therefore included in the dataset, which thereby embodies 21 devel-
oped countries with a minimum of two decades of democratic experience.
The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark,
France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta,
The Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom.
Data on every significant party in each country have not been accessible.
Some countries, e.g. Australia, Luxembourg and Malta, are represented by
only one or two parties, whereas others, such as Sweden and Belgium, are
represented by practically all parliamentary parties. In most countries, the
major parties are included, and this sample of countries and parties may to
a large extent be regarded as a representative collection for the purpose of
the study. Nevertheless, some caution is needed – interpretation of the results
must be carried out in a Western context. The dataset consists of a total of
94 candidate selection processes in 90 parties. In New Zealand, a mixed elec-
toral system is used, which implies that two separate selection processes are
carried out – one for single-member districts in the plurality (nominal) tier
and the other for national party lists in the proportional (list) tier.2
Classifying Candidate Selection Methods
In the present study I am concerned with one central dimension of intra-

partisan candidate selection: territorial centralization versus decentraliza-
tion, i.e. the question of where selection takes place in the party hierarchy.
According to Gallagher (1998b: 4), candidates might, at one extreme, be
selected in primaries open for all eligible voters; at the other, they can be
picked by the party leader alone. Other possibilities are selection by all party
members in the constituency; by delegates at local conventions; by a
constituency committee; by the regional organization; by national organs
or by a few national faction leaders (1988b: 4; Norris, 1996: 202).
There are, however, other dimensions as well. Rahat and Hazan (2001:
297–9) present four dimensions: candidacy, i.e. possible restrictions on the
eligibility for candidacy; party selectorates, i.e. inclusiveness versus
exclusiveness of the selectorate in the selection process; decentralization, i.e.
the locus of control; and voting/appointment systems, i.e. how candidates
are nominated. Norris gives due attention to still another dimension: the
degree of institutionalization (formal/informal) in the selection process
(1993: 321–7). In formal systems, the selection process is characterized by
detailed, explicit and standardized rules which are relatively clear to outside
observers, whereas an informal selection process is less bureaucratic and
rarely made explicit.
29
PA RT Y P O L I T I C S 1 0 ( 1 )
Considering the four elements discussed by Rahat and Hazan, party selec-
torates and decentralization are directly concerned with the distribution of
power within the party, and may in this respect be regarded as more import-
ant than the other two elements. The candidacy dimension is mainly
relevant to those applying for candidacy rather than the selecting body. The
distinction between voting systems and appointment systems, notwith-
standing, bears some relevance to the distribution of power, since appoint-
ment probably implies a higher level of party control over candidate
selection than voting. However, I believe that party selectorates and
appointment/voting systems to a great extent overlap – a voting system is
most likely more inclusive than an appointment system.
The dimensions of centralization versus decentralization and inclusive-
ness versus exclusiveness also to some extent overlap. A more centralized
process often implies more exclusive candidate selection. However, this is
not always the case. For instance, a system in which 1000 party members
select the candidates nationally is, of course, more centralized than a system
in which each candidate is selected by one local leader. At the same time,
the former is probably more inclusive than the latter. On the other hand, a
system in which a few national leaders select candidates on the basis of
proposals from party members is, in my opinion, not particularly inclusive,
because the decision is made by a few. In this sense, I regard these two
dimensions as somewhat overlapping.
A bird’s-eye view of the literature on candidate selection indicates that
these are the most frequently discussed and, consequently, most important
dimensions of candidate selection (e.g. Bille, 2001; Epstein, 1980; Gallagher
and Marsh, 1988; Gallagher et al., 1992; Hopkin, 2001; Katz, 2001;
Pennings and Hazan, 2001; Ranney, 1981). In this study, I prefer decen-
tralization to party selectorates, because I regard the first mentioned as a
more straightforward tool for classifying candidate selection methods.
Moreover, I focus exclusively on the territorial dimension of decentraliza-
tion. Inclusion of the functional dimension, which is concerned with
ensuring representation for groups such as trade unions, women and
minorities, would render the classification of selection methods more
complex.
The primary selecting agency may often be difficult to locate, because
several organs are often involved in the selection process. The final selec-
tion may be the result of interaction between several party agencies. By
using an index of the degree of centralization, this task does not, however,
constitute an insurmountable problem. The classification of candidate selec-
tion methods presented below is based mainly on Bille’s categorization
(2001: 365–7). He measures the level of final decision regarding candidate
selection in 57 Western European parties around 1960 and 71 parties
around 1990. His analysis refers to the stipulations in the formal rules for
candidate selection described in Katz and Mair (1992). He is actually
concerned with democratization rather than decentralization, but his
30
categorization measures the level of decentralization as well. In addition, an

element of inclusiveness of the selectorate is included, since the sixth
category notes whether a membership ballot is applied or not.3
A fundamental distinction in his classification is drawn between national
party organs and subnational organs. At one extreme, national organs
completely control the selection process (category 1); at the other, sub-
national organs are in charge of the process and make the final decision
(category 5). Different forms of interaction between national and sub-
national organs constitute the intermediate categories. My classification
differs in some respect from that of Bille. First, I do not include his third
category ‘national organs provide list, subnational organs decide’, since this
category consists of only one case at the latter point of time. In my classifi-
cation, this selection method is placed on a level with selection by district
organs under the influence of regional or national organs. Second, a primary
distinction is drawn here between the district level and the national level.
The classification of selection controlled by regional organs depends on
what other organs are involved in the process.4 Third, local candidate selec-
tion, either at local party meetings or by membership ballot, represents the
lowest degree of centralization, whereas national primaries imply a central-
ized form of candidate selection. This measure is taken in order to avoid
the fusion of decentralization and inclusiveness of the selectorate. Finally,
my index runs in the opposite direction, because I measure the degree of
centralization, whereas Bille is more interested in democratization (and the
extent of inclusiveness). The dependent variable of the present study is oper-
ationalized on an ordinal scale and consists of five categories. The meanings
of the values are as follows:
1 Selection at local party meetings, by local selection committees or by
primaries open for all party members.
2 Selection at the district level by a selection committee, by the executive
district organ or at a convention (congress, conference) by delegates from
the local parties.
3 The same as 1 or 2 but regional or national organs exercise influence over
the selection process, e.g. add names to the lists or have veto power. The
decision, however, is taken at the district level. Formal approval by
regional or national organs without actual involvement in the process
belongs to the second category.
4 The same as 5, but local, district or regional organs exercise influence
over the selection process, e.g. party members, the local parties or
committees at the constituency or the regional level propose candidates.
The decision, however, is taken at the national level.
5 Selection by the party leader, by the national executive organ, by a
national selection committee, or by primaries at the national level.
The indices of all parties are given in the appendix.
31
PA RT Y P O L I T I C S 1 0 ( 1 )
The Independent Variables
In this section, the independent variables and their operationalizations are

presented. Altogether nine variables are included. Three of them are party
characteristics: ideology, size and age. The effective number of parties
represents varying degrees of party system fragmentation. Two variables
characterize the electoral system: district magnitude and preferential voting.
Another three variables at the macro-level are included: territorial organiz-
ation (federalism versus unitarism), area and region.
Ideology
First, I distinguish between right, centre and left parties, according to
following categories: far right, conservative, Christian-democratic, centre/
liberal/agrarian, green, social-democratic, socialist and communist parties.
One may assume that extreme parties are more ‘authoritarian’ and there-
fore apply more centralized selection methods than other parties.
Party Size
Vote share in the preceding parliamentary elections determines the size of a
party. I consider vote share a better measure of size than seat share, because
the former reflects the relative party size according to the opinion of the
electorate. Small parties may apply more decentralized selection methods
than large parties, because the appeal of a small party is so limited that it
has to rely on the drawing power of local notables. Consequently, local and
district organs are probably best placed to select candidates. The complex-
ity of large party organizations might have a centralizing effect on candi-
date selection.
Party Age
The age of a party is measured at the time of elections following the candi-
date selection observed. For each party, I try to determine the birth of the
party organization. A renovation of the ‘old’ party organization or a change
of party name is not considered a birth of a new party. Secessionist parties
from larger party organizations, on the other hand, are regarded as new
parties, because the party of origin is still in existence. Concerning the
association between age and centralization, contrary assumptions can be
found. Younger parties might respect internal democracy to a greater extent
than older ones, and might thus apply more decentralized selection
methods. However, one can also expect old parties to be more ready to open
up to member participation, on the one hand, and decentralization, on the
other, as they have a more solid support base, and might therefore be less
afraid of losing control of the party organization.
32
The Effective Number of Parties

The most widely used measure of party system fragmentation is the effec-
tive number of parties, created by Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera
(1979). The index is calculated according to the following formula:
1
N = ——
∑si2
where si refers to the seat proportion of the ith party.
Political parties may be in need of different strategies in different party
systems. Stiff competition for the power positions among the parties may
have a decentralizing effect on candidate selection, because every single
‘surplus’ vote is needed. A party system with only a few parties and fairly
stable positions might, on the other hand, mean that there is little need for
the national party organization to worry too much about the district and
local branches in selecting candidates. The effective number of parties is
calculated on the basis of the results of the preceding elections.
District Magnitude
The electoral system is often held to exert great influence on many features
of a country’s politics – candidate selection is one of them. In this respect,
the common distinction between majoritarian, proportional and inter-
mediate forms of electoral systems is not necessarily the crucial point, but
rather the number of candidates running for election and the number of
representatives in a constituency. Besides, most countries in the dataset
apply proportional electoral systems. We may assume that candidate selec-
tion is decentralized in electoral systems with small constituencies because
of the local knowledge of potential winners needed. According to the same
logic, the central party organization can be expected to have a greater influ-
ence on the selection process in large multi-member constituencies – partly
due to the coordination needed in compiling party lists, partly because
voters are not expected to have as good a personal knowledge of the candi-
dates as in small constituencies. I use the same index of district magnitude
as Lijphart (1994), i.e. the average district magnitude calculated by dividing
the total number of seats in the legislature by the number of districts.
Preferential Voting
Concerning the ballot structure, the crucial point is whether the voters can
choose between several candidates of the same party or not, i.e. preferen-
tial or non-preferential voting. There are, however, different kinds of pref-
erential voting, and I apply an ordinal scale with three categories: (1)
non-preferential voting, (2) preferential voting without rank-ordering and
cumulation, and (3) preferential voting with rank-ordering or cumulation.
33
PA RT Y P O L I T I C S 1 0 ( 1 )
Non-preferential voting takes place in electoral systems with closed party

lists (e.g. Iceland, Israel and Spain); in most systems with single-member
districts (Canada and the United Kingdom); and in mixed systems (which
in the only relevant case, New Zealand, implies a mixture of closed lists and
single-member districts). The second category consists of list systems where
preference votes are the sole basis on which candidates are elected (e.g.
Cyprus, Greece and Finland) and list systems where the election of candi-
dates is determined by both list order and preference voting (e.g. Belgium,
Denmark and The Netherlands). The single non-transferable system in
Japan until 1995 also belongs here. I regard list systems that, in addition to
preferential voting, allow cumulation, i.e. to cumulate two personal votes
on one candidate, as a stronger kind of preferential voting. These systems
(Luxembourg and Switzerland), along with the alternative vote (Australia)
and the single transferable vote (Ireland and Malta), constitute the third
category.
Preferential voting is assumed to have a decentralizing effect on candi-
date selection. In picking candidates, local knowledge of potential winners
may be needed. Local agencies can argue that the party ticket must be
assembled carefully, with sensitivity to the voters’ opinions, and that only
the local organization is in a position to know what ticket will be of most
appeal to voters in the constituency. In electoral systems without preferen-
tial voting, the national party organization may want to exert influence on
the compilation of party lists and perhaps guarantee some candidates
representation by placing them at the top of the list. There is also a contrary
hypothesis. Parties in non-preferential systems might actually be more open
to decentralization and participation as ‘compensation’ for the lack of
voters’ influence in the elections.
Territorial Organization
Several authors have argued that general party decentralization, and conse-
quently decentralized candidate selection, is quite strongly related to decen-
tralization of power within the polities where the parties operate. In federal
systems, the national party organization often plays an insignificant role in
the selection process, compared to parties in unitary systems. In this study,
the territorial organization variable is trichotomized on an ordinal scale: (1)
federal states, (2) unitary states with decentralized features, and (3) unitary
states.
Area
The importance of physical size in explaining political phenomena is well
known (e.g. Anckar, 1998; Dahl and Tufte, 1973; Lijphart, 1977: 68). Both
area and population are indicators of size. A high degree of multicollinear-
ity between them implies that only one of them should be chosen. As for
34
population, any realistic assumption of possible effects on selection methods

is hard to think of. Concerning area, on the other hand, two opposite
assumptions are made. First, a large territory requires an extensive party
organization, often characterized by hierarchy, complexity and bureaucracy,
which might have a centralizing effect on candidate selection. Second, candi-
date selection at the local or district level might be a simpler solution for
the national party organization rather than centralized selection methods,
which in large territories require extensive arrangements and knowledge of
potential winners in a large number of districts.
Region
Since 16 of 21 countries in the dataset are European countries, and the other
5 belong to 4 different continents, I deal primarily with Europe. Three
European regions are distinguished: Nordic countries (Denmark, Iceland
and Sweden), Central Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxem-
bourg, The Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom), and
Southern Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta and Spain). The second
category is, nevertheless, miscellaneous in terms of tradition, diffusion and
political culture. In Vesteuropeisk politikk (1998), Heidar and Berntzen
regard the United Kingdom and Ireland as a distinct region, brought
together by the Westminster model. The Westminster category can here be
enlarged with Australia, Canada and New Zealand, not on grounds of
regional affiliation but of political culture and imitation, which are the main
reasons for classifying countries on the basis of regional division. I there-
fore analyse two slightly different models of regional division.
Empirical Findings
By way of introduction, I examine the dispersion of all parties along the

scale of centralization of selection methods. The results are given in Table 1.
The value 5 denotes the highest degree of centralization, whereas 1 denotes
extreme decentralization. As we can see, a normal distribution is formed,
and the arithmetical average is close to the centre of the scale.
Bivariate Patterns
We are now ready to proceed with the empirical analysis of the associations
between the independent and the dependent variables. In Table 2, parties
are classified according to ideology. No substantial differences exist between
right, centre and left parties. A detailed classification, on the other hand,
indicates that parties at both extremes of the ideological scale apply central-
ized selection methods. The differences between other ideologies are small,
however, and the model is not statistically significant.
35
PA RT Y P O L I T I C S 1 0 ( 1 )
Table 1. The degree of centralization of 94 candidate selection processes

Index of Selection processes Dispersion
centralization (N) (%)
1 10 10.6
2 19 20.2
3 36 38.3
4 22 23.4
5 7 7.4
Note: Arithmetical average: 2.97. Standard deviation: 1.08.
Sources: Bille (2001); Gallagher and Marsh (1988); Gallagher et al. (1992); Katz and Mair
(1992); Norris (1996); Norris (1997); Rahat and Hazan (2001).
Table 2. Ideology and average degree of centralization

Average degree of
Ideology centralization N Std. dev.
Right 2.86 28 1.05
Centre 2.57 23 1.08
Left 3.17 35 1.12
Eta2 0.042
Sign. 0.112
Far-right 4.00 1
Conservative 2.88 17 1.22
Christian-democratic 2.70 10 0.48
Centre (liberal, agrarian) 2.59 17 1.18
Green 2.50 6 0.84
Social-democratic 2.86 21 1.11
Socialist 3.33 9 1.00
Communist 4.20 5 0.84
Eta2 0.142
Sign. 0.090
Sources: Heidar and Berntzen (1998); Political Resources on the Net [http://www.
politicalresources.net/].
In Table 3, effects of party size and age as well as institutional determi-

nants are studied. Of all seven independent variables, only party size affects
the degree of centralization. Large parties tend to apply more centralized
selection methods than small parties. Furthermore, the degree of central-
ization seems to be slightly higher in younger parties, in party systems with
few parties and in small countries. However, these associations are not
36
Table 3. Associations between party size, party age, party system (effective number of parties), district magnitude, preferential voting,
territorial organization, area and the degree of centralization
Party Party Party District Preferential Territorial
size age system magnitude voting (a) organization (a) Area
Degree of centralization 0.214* –0.147 –0.192 0.057 0.063 0.022 –0.121
Party size 0.357** –0.310** 0.006 –0.162 –0.104 0.128
Party age 0.083 –0.221* 0.061 0.082 0.231*
37
Party system 0.044 0.092 0.166 –0.283**

District magnitude 0.096 0.083 –0.159
Preferential voting 0.173 –0.137
Territorial organization 0.481**
Note: Pearson’s r except for (a): Spearman’s rho. * Significant at the 0.05 level. ** Significant at the 0.01 level.
Sources: Anckar (2002); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections; CIA World Factbook 2002 [http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html];
Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1999); Inter-Parliamentary Union [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp]; Karvonen (2000).
PA RT Y P O L I T I C S 1 0 ( 1 )
Table 4. Region and average degree of centralization

Average degree of
Region centralization N Std. dev.
Nordic countries 2.12 17 0.70
Central Europe 2.87 38 0.91
Southern Europe 3.81 16 0.66
Eta2 0.348
Sign. 0.000
statistically significant.5 With reference to earlier statements concerning the

effects of federalism and the electoral system, the lack of correlation is
surprising.
The last variable, region, is qualitative and needs to be treated in the same
way as ideology. As can be seen in Table 4, there are large differences
between different parts of Europe. Southern European parties apply central-
ized selection methods, in Nordic countries the selection process is
decentralized, and the Central European parties are found in the middle of
the centralization scale. The Eta2 value is as high as 0.348 and the model
is significant at the 0.01 level. Moreover, the Nordic and the Southern
European regions are distinguished by small standard deviations, i.e. vari-
ations within these groups are small in comparison to Central European
parties. In the alternative model with four regions (Nordic countries,
Central Europe, Southern Europe and Westminster countries), the explained
variance (Eta2) is smaller (27 percent compared with 35 percent in the
former model) and the average degree of centralization in Westminster
countries is 2.88. This group is fairly heterogeneous – both decentralized
and centralized selection methods are frequently represented. The model is
nonetheless significant at the 0.01 level.
When all regions are transformed into dummy variables, Nordic parties
correlate negatively (–0.396), and Southern European parties positively
(0.378), with the degree of centralization. Both associations are significant
at the 0.01 level. In this respect, Central European parties and ‘Westmin-
ster’ parties are of no importance.
Multivariate Patterns
The correlation analyses suggested that only party size and region (Nordic
parties and Southern European parties) affect the dependent variable. No
other significant interactions between determinants and the degree of central-
ization of candidate selection methods were found. These three variables are
consequently included in the regression. The results are given in Table 5.
The model indicates that the importance of party size is considerably
38
Table 5. Party size, two regions and the degree of centralization. Multiple
regression analysis
Independent variables Degree of centralization
Party size 0.138 (1.475)
Nordic countries –0.290** (–3.047)
Southern Europe 0.278** (2.945)
Adjusted R2 0.211
Sign. 0.000
Note: Standardized beta-coefficients. T-values in parentheses. ** Significant at the 0.01 level.
smaller than that of the Nordic and Southern European regions in explain-
ing different candidate selection methods. If we exclude party size, the
explained variance decreases by only 1 percent, from 21.1 to 20.1, and the
F-value increases from 9.28 to 12.67. The importance of party size is, on
the other hand, strengthened when several variables are included in the
regression analysis, but the general picture is not altered. Accordingly,
region is the most important determinant of the degree of centralization of
candidate selection. However, in statistical analysis, region is marred by a
serious problem. I return to this matter in the discussion below.
Conclusions
In this study, I have examined determinants of candidate selection methods

put forward by other authors as well as some variables not recently studied
in this context. According to the statistical analyses, region is the most
important determinant of candidate selection in the developed world. Two
regions distinguish themselves: Nordic parties apply decentralized selection
methods, whereas candidate selection in Southern Europe is centralized.
The Nordic countries have to a great extent a similar historical develop-
ment; they introduced parliamentarianism and universal suffrage about the
same time, and they have all been democratic for almost a century. They
have a long tradition of participation, and local government is regarded as
a fundamental part of democracy. Although the Nordic countries are
unitary states, the principle that decisions should be made at the lowest
possible level has often been the practice (Petersson, 1995: 13–15).6
The Southern European countries also have a number of important
cultural, social and historical characteristics in common, and their political
systems are often regarded as a ‘Mediterranean model of democracy’
(Heidar and Berntzen, 1998: 245). Contrary to the Nordic countries, they
have experienced serious setbacks on their road to stable democracy. Italy
has been democratic since World War II, but the transition from dictatorship
39
PA RT Y P O L I T I C S 1 0 ( 1 )
to democracy in Portugal, Spain and Greece did not occur until the 1970s.7
Compared to Scandinavia, politics in Southern Europe is characterized by
strong and charismatic leadership, centralization and authority.
These characteristics may explain the differences between candidate selec-
tion methods in Nordic parties, on the one hand, and Southern European
parties, on the other. The influence of religion on political culture might also
be of some importance in this respect. The Catholic Church, which is
predominant in Southern Europe (with the exception of Greece), is said to
be more dogmatic, hierarchical and powerful than Protestantism.
Perhaps the foremost reason for studying region is to bring closely located
countries with common political traditions and political culture together.
However, classification on the basis of region also implies the inclusion of
other elements that these countries have in common. The problem in
studying region as a separate variable is, accordingly, that it consists of
several values that together explain more than variables representing
separate characteristics. Hence, the importance of region must not be over-
emphasized at the expense of other determinants.
In the following, I briefly discuss some of the other independent variables.
Concerning party ideology, far-left and far-right parties apply, as expected,
centralized selection methods, but the model is not significant. The
categories at both extremes of the ideological scale consist of only a few
parties; a more even distribution of parties might have reinforced the
importance of ideology. There are several dimensions of party type as well.
One could consider a distinction between ‘catch-all’ parties (see Kirch-
heimer, 1966), ‘horizontal’ parties (Seiler, 1986), ‘programmatic’ parties
(Wolinetz, 1991), ‘modern cadre’ parties (Koole, 1994), ‘cartel’ parties
(Katz, 2001), and so on. However, such a classification would require neat
descriptions of how they differ from each other and to what extent they
overlap.
Party size appears to be a variable of some significance for the degree of
centralization of selection methods. In general, large parties apply more
centralized methods than small parties. One reason for the decentralized
pattern among small parties might, as already mentioned, be that because
of their smaller popularity, they have to rely on the drawing power of well-
known aspirants at the local level, which, in turn, calls for local knowledge.
Moreover, small party organizations are often characterized by open and
flexible political processes, which offer better opportunities for partici-
pation. Large organizations, on the other hand, are often marked by
complexity, hierarchy and bureaucracy, which is associated with a higher
degree of centralization.
Perhaps the most frequently mentioned determinant of candidate selec-
tion is the electoral system. The statistical analysis suggests, however, that
the electoral system in terms of district magnitude does not affect the degree
of centralization. Nor does preferential voting have a decentralizing effect
40
on candidate selection. Several authors have emphasized territorial organiz-

ation as a decisive factor – federalism is said to coincide with a low degree
of centralization. Again, the assumption is proven wrong. The degree of
centralization in federal states is practically the same as in unitary states.
The party system seems to affect selection processes to some extent.
Candidate selection is more centralized in party systems with few parties
than in countries with a fragmented party system. However, the association
is not statistically guaranteed. Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind
that party size correlates positively with the degree of centralization, and
that there is naturally always a positive association between large parties
and a small number of effective parties. The higher degree of centralization
in systems with few parties might thus be explained by the presence of large
parties.
By way of conclusion, there are no really strong associations between
explanatory variables and the degree of centralization. The regional factor
is of some importance but it is only relevant in those regions where selec-
tion methods are noticeably centralized or decentralized, that is, the Nordic
countries and Southern Europe, respectively. As a determinant, region does
not explain different selection processes in general. On the basis of this
study, there are no contextual determinants or party characteristics that
would, to any great extent, explain varying degrees of centralization. One
could argue that the theoretical basis for examining the effects of insti-
tutional determinants on candidate selection is weak. Notwithstanding,
some of the theoretical assumptions are rather far-fetched. On the other
hand, several of these variables have been discussed before, and one inter-
esting finding is that the earlier assertions concerning the impact of federal-
ism and the electoral system on the degree of centralization are, in the light
of statistical evidence, not true.
Considering the use of statistical analyses, it would have been desirable
to operate with a larger number of cases than has been available. A dataset
of, for instance, all significant parties at a given point of time in all
advanced democracies in the developed world would perhaps have
produced different, and more reliable, results but I do not think that the
overall pattern would have changed much. A contextual approach does not
seem fruitful in explaining why candidate selection methods vary between
parties and countries. While the regional factor offers some explanation at
the macro-level, a different approach, mainly based on party character-
istics, might shed some more light on relevant determinants of candidate
selection methods.
41
PA RT Y P O L I T I C S 1 0 ( 1 )
Appendix. Countries, parties, election year and index of the degree of

centralization
Country Party Election year Index
Australia Labor Party* 2001 4
Liberal Party* 2001 3
Austria SPÖ* 1999 4
ÖVP 1990 3
FPÖ 1990 3
Grüne 1990 3
Belgium CVP 1991 3
PSC 1991 3
PS 1985 1
SP 1985 1
PRL 1991 2
PVV 1991 2
PCB 1981 5
Agalev 1991 4
VU 1991 3
Ecolo 1991 2
Canada LPC* 2000 3
NDP 1993 3
PC* 2000 1
Reform Party 1993 1
Cyprus AKEL* 2001 4
DISI* 2001 3
Denmark SF 1990 3
SD 1990 3
RV 1990 1
Venstre 1990 2
CD 1990 3
KF* 1998 1
KrF* 1998 3
FrP* 1998 3
France RPR 1986 4
UDF 1986 4
PS 1986 3
PCF 1986 4
Greece ND 1985 5
PASOK 1985 5
Iceland SDP 1991 1
FSF* 1999 2
Ireland FF 1989 3
FG 1989 3
PD 1989 3
WP 1989 2
Lab 1989 3
42
Appendix continued
Israel Meretz 1999 5
Likud 1999 5
Labour 1999 1
Italy DC 1987 3
PCI 1987 3
PSI 1987 4
MSI 1987 4
PR 1987 4
DP 1987 4
PSDI 1987 4
PRI 1987 3
PLI 1987 3
Japan LDP 1993 3
SDPJ 1986 3
DSP 1986 3
Komei-to 1986 5
JCP 1986 5
Luxembourg DP* 1999 3
CSV* 1999 3
Malta MLP* 1998 4
Netherlands CDA 1989 3
PvdA 1989 3
VVD 1989 4
D66 1989 1
GL 1994 2
New Zealand NP, nom. tier* 1999 2
NP, list tier* 1999 4
NZLP, nom. tier* 1999 4
NZLP, list tier* 1999 4
ACT, nom. tier* 1999 1
ACT, list tier* 1999 4
NZFP, nom. tier* 1999 3
NZFP, list tier* 1999 4
Alliance 1993 2
Spain PSOE* 2000 4
CDC* 2000 4
Sweden Vp* 1998 2
S* 1998 2
C* 1998 2
M* 1998 2
FpL 1988 2
MP 1988 2
KD 1988 2
43
PA RT Y P O L I T I C S 1 0 ( 1 )
Appendix continued
Switzerland CVP* 1999 2
SPS* 1999 4
GPS* 1999 2
EVP* 1999 2
United Kingdom Conservative Party 1987 3
Labour Party 1987 3
Liberal Party 1987 3
SDP 1987 3
Note: *Analysis of candidate selection methods is based on party statutes and/or correspon-
dence with party officials. The abbreviations are similar to those in Political Resources on
the Net [http://www.politicalresources.net/], Katz and Mair (1992) and/or Gallagher and
Marsh (1988).
Sources: Bille (2001); Gallagher and Marsh (1988); Gallagher et al. (1992); Katz and Mair
(1992); Norris (1996); Norris (1997); Rahat and Hazan (2001).
Notes
I thank David M. Farrell and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments
on an earlier draft of this article. They are not responsible for any faults that remain.
1 A practical reason for limiting the dataset to the developed world is the relative
inaccessibility of data on candidate selection in other parts of the world. Among
Third World countries, my correspondence with party officials resulted in data on
candidate selection in PRI, PAN and PRD from Mexico, DP from Ecuador, NE
from Uruguay, RN from Chile, PL and PCC from Colombia, ANC from South
Africa, NNP from Grenada and PNM from Trinidad and Tobago.
2 Nowadays, Italy and Japan also use mixed systems, but data on candidate
selection in these countries belong to the period prior to the electoral reforms.
3 Bille does not, however, mix the elements of decentralization and inclusiveness,
since all parties that apply membership ballots are also found in one of the
categories (1–5) that determine the level of decentralization.
4 In none of my units of analysis is the selection process completely controlled by
regional party organs.
5 The negative relationship (–0.283) between area and the effective number of
parties suggests that this dataset is, as far as these variables are concerned, not
representative of the entire democratic world. Anckar (1998: 292) has proved that
the larger the size of a country, the higher the number of parties. Some possible
effects of the party system and/or area on candidate selection methods may thus
be blurred by these conditions.
6 Candidate selection in Norway and Finland, which are not included in the study,
is also decentralized.
7 According to Gallagher et al. (1992: 131), the national executive is the most
important selecting body in Portuguese parties, which are not included in the
study.
44
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KRISTER LUNDELL is a doctoral candidate at Åbo Akademi University in Finland.

His research interests include democratization, candidate selection and electoral
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ADDRESS: Department of Political Science, Åbo Akademi University, Biskopsgatan
15, FIN-20500 Åbo, Finland. [email: krister.lundell@abo.fi]
Paper submitted 27 September 2002; accepted for publication 29 April 2003.
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Copyright © 2004 SAGE Publications London Thousand Oaks New Delhi

The purpose of this article is to examine whether party characteristics

KEY WORDS candidate selection centralization decentralization selection

Recruitment to legislative office is one of the core functions of political

consequences. According to Gallagher (1988b: 1), the quality of candidates

than in previous studies, I therefore re-examine determinants of candidate

Purpose and Method

The purpose of this study is to examine whether party characteristics and

The dataset is determined by several factors. First, only democratic coun-

Hence, legal provisions affect parties’ behaviour as well as being affected

Of the remaining countries, Portugal is omitted, since detailed infor-

Classifying Candidate Selection Methods

In the present study I am concerned with one central dimension of intra-

categorization measures the level of decentralization as well. In addition, an

The Independent Variables

In this section, the independent variables and their operationalizations are

The Effective Number of Parties

Non-preferential voting takes place in electoral systems with closed party

population, any realistic assumption of possible effects on selection methods

By way of introduction, I examine the dispersion of all parties along the

Table 1. The degree of centralization of 94 candidate selection processes

Table 2. Ideology and average degree of centralization

In Table 3, effects of party size and age as well as institutional determi-

Party system 0.044 0.092 0.166 –0.283**

Table 4. Region and average degree of centralization

statistically significant.5 With reference to earlier statements concerning the

In this study, I have examined determinants of candidate selection methods

on candidate selection. Several authors have emphasized territorial organiz-

Appendix. Countries, parties, election year and index of the degree of

Putnam, Robert D. (1976) The Comparative Study of Political Elites. Englewood

KRISTER LUNDELL is a doctoral candidate at Åbo Akademi University in Finland.

Paper submitted 27 September 2002; accepted for publication 29 April 2003.

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