3

Jaina Psychology

JAGDISH PRASAD JAIN

The central concept of Jaina psychology is jtva (self), a living organism, a biological being, a
conjoint psycho-somatic, psycho-physical, conscious entity. Every organism is an organic unity
of two distinct entities jtva and pudgal (matter), soul and body. The two are distinct entities
because the nature of consciousness or soul is radically different from matter and the two
entities have opposite qualities. Jtva or soul is sentient, non-corporeal, conscious entity,
possessing subjective attributes of cognition, feeling and volition, while matter or body is non-
sentient, corporeal, inanimate entity possessing characteristic sense qualities of touch, taste,
smell and colour.
Although quite a number of scientists in the West tend to make a distinction between self
and non-self based on body/non-body distinction, their framework and conception differ in
important respects from Jaina thought. Thus, Gerald Edelman's "biological individuality" and
Antonio Damasio's "conscious self are not quite the same as Jaina conscious entity. Damasio's
so-called "conscious self or "core consciousness" is merely "the critical biological function"
or "organism's private mind" which together with its external behaviour is said to be "closely
correlated with the functions of the brain" (Damasio, 1999, pp. 12-13,15,347). According
to Jainism, the nature of Jtva is chetand (sentiency or consciousness). Life and consciousness
are co-extensive. Wherever there is life, there is consciousness. Even in the lowest class of
organisms, we have to posit existence of a certain degree of consciousness, howsoever latent
or implicit it might be. The inner, subjective, qualitative, spiritual reality of jtva is consciousness,
also called soul, while the physical, objective, external manifestations of jtva are known as
dravya pranas (the physical insignia of life). These pranas (bio-eneigies or physical/body
characteristics) are ten, viz, five senses, three energies of mind, body and speech, life duration
and respiration. The material nature of breath is proved by the fact that it can be obstructed by
material objects. These primes not only help jiva in performing necessary functions of life, but
also account for their fuller development (paryaptl) including physical and structural aspects
of mind i.e., nervous system and brain processes. The physical mind is an essential aid to the
conscious entity's potential for awareness, sensation, attention, etc. The concept of paryapta
(developed state or condition) and aparyapta (incomplete development) is probably meant to
explain abnormalities and deformities in living beings.

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 56 Handbook of Indian Psychology

Howsoever important and useful these physical pranas are they are not fundamental;
consciousness is fundamental. Chetana (consciousness or sentiency) is the essence, the internal
life source, inalienable psychic or conscious vital force (bhava prana) of jlva. In the absence
of consciousness, the physical body of Jlva is unable to perform its biological functions such as
respiration, digestion, secretion of bile, neuronalfiringsin the brain, etc. Consciousness animates
a particular organism and infuses life into the body, the senses and all the other bio-energies.
Just as electric gadgets or machines do not function in the absence of energy, so also all the
bio-energies remain inactive and lifeless without consciousness.
Viewed from the subjective, internal aspect of consciousness, which is imperceptible to
the senses, jlva is non-corporeal (amurta), but when considered from the point of view of
external, objective aspect of the body, it is described as corporeal. The dual aspect of things or
entities i.e., internal and external, does not present any contradiction or problem for a Jaina
because of the Jaina concept of anekdnt (many-sidedness of reality). According to this concept,
any real object or entity is not only multifaceted in nature i.e., having a number of qualities or
characteristics and multifarious aspects but is also endowed with traits, characteristics or
modes, which appear to be mutually contradictory or opposed to each other, though co-existing
in the same object as inalienable parts thereof. Anekant, thus, reconciles seeming differences
and conflicting views (for fuller discussion of anekant, see Jain, 2005a, Chapter 5, pp. 113—
144).
The dual nature of reality or the strand of duality (that of internal and external or psychic
and physical aspects) runs throughout the Jaina system, including Jaina psychology. For instance,
not only Jlva is both incorporeal and corporeal, having both internal and external pranas, but
also the senses, mind, karma, etc. have both physical as well as psychic aspects. That the
accomplishment of any task or deed requires or depends on coordination of both internal and
external causes (the intrinsic cause is regarded as primary and substantial cause, while the
extrinsic cause is considered as secondary or auxiliary cause) is said to be in the very nature of
things (dravyagatah svabhavah) (Samantabhadra, Svayambhu Stotra, verse 60).
In recognizing that there are two realities in the world - the reality of jlva or consciousness
and the reality of inanimate matter (ajlva), which lacks consciousness, the Jaina worldview is
based on realistic considerations and is quite natural and logical. It helps us to avoid the
shortcomings and weaknesses of one-sided views of both mentalist or idealist and materialist
monisms. The former, represented in Advaita Vedanta concept of Brahman (conceived as the
Absolute, one without a second, and as a cosmic principle), assigns "unreality" to the objective
reality of the world consisting of individual selves and material objects. The latter i.e.,
materialism, which is the "religion of our time, at least among most of the professional experts
[in the West] in the fields of philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and other disciplines
that study the mind" (Searle, 2004, p. 48), holds the view that the only reality that exists is
material or physical reality and consequently either the conscious states or mental events do
not exist at all or even if they are acknowledged to exist they must in some sense be reducible
or identical to physical states. Non-acknowledgement of the two co-existing, non-identical,
interactive realities of consciousness and matter creates many difficult problems e.g., "how
does something as unconscious, inanimate matter give rise to something immaterial as
consciousness?" and "how does consciousness create matter?"
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 Jaina Psychology 57

Consciousness and Conscious Attentiveness (Upayoga)

Although several features such as existence, substantiality or functionality, change-ability,
know-ability, etc. are shared by jiva in common with physical objects or matter, consciousness
remains the defining characteristic, which distinguishes jiva or soul from inert, inanimate matter.
The number of bio-energies (physical pranas) may be more or less in different living organisms
and the psychic potentialities may also differ from one living being to another. But consciousness
remains the essential ground condition, feature or characteristic of life, which remains throughout
the entire journey of life and without which the existence of living organism is inconceivable.
In Jaina texts, the conscious entity is described as svaparaprakasham (Kundakunda,
Niyamsar, verse 161) or svaparavabhaskam (Samantabhadra, Svayambhu Stotra, verse 63)
i.e., that which illumines itself as well as other objects. Consciousness is, thus, an awareness of
one's own self as well as awareness of the objects of the world. The simple and standard
dictionary definition of consciousness states that it is an organism's awareness of its own self
and surroundings. Neurologist Benjamin Libet also observes that the essence of conscious
experience is being aware of something. The content of awareness can be anything. But "being
aware is a unique phenomenon in itself, independent of the nature of the particular content in
awareness" (Libet, 2004, pp. 188-189).
According to Jainism, consciousness is the substratum, the essence of life and the ground
condition of all its physical, vocal and psychic activities, viz, feelings, volition and different
forms of cognition. It is the essence and intrinsic nature of jiva and as such it is said to be the
definition (laksana) of jiva as also the definee i.e., consciousness itself is jiva. Consciousness
is called the internal, psychic vitality (bhavendriya), which has two aspects or facets: as capacity
or power (labdhi) and as function or manifestation {upayoga). The capacity or power of
consciousness is known only through its application or function i.e., upayoga (conscious
attentiveness or manifestation of consciousness). Moreover, upayoga represents the most
significant function of the conscious entity (chetana dravya ox jiva). Hence upayoga serves as
a better definition or defining characteristic (laksana) of jiva or soul than consciousness, and
for that matter it is mentioned as such in most Jaina texts (Umasvami or Umasvati, Tattvartha
Sutra, 2.8). It must, however, be noted that upayoga is not the same as consciousness. Upayoga
is of two kinds, viz, darsana (intuitive awareness) andjnana (cognition).
Upayoga is defined by Akalanka as bahya-abhyantara hetu dvaya sannidhane
yathasambhdvam uplabdhyu chaitanya anuvidhayi parinam upayogah, (Akalanka,
Tattvarthavartika: Rajavartika, 2.8.1) i.e., conscious attentiveness is the modification of
consciousness resulting from "available" two types of external and two kinds of internal causes
being placed together as far as possible in the vicinity or close proximity of one another. The
two types of external, auxiliary causes are: (1) atma-bhuta (intrinsic) i.e., eye, ear, etc. senses,
which are formed or developed in the body and associated with consciousness; and (2) anatma-
bhuta (extrinsic) i.e., lamp, sunlight, electricity, etc. The two kinds of internal causes of upayoga
are: (1) anatma-bhuta (extrinsic) i.e., vibrations in the soul resulting from the material clusters
(vargana) suitable for constituting body (gross and subtle), speech, and mind (i.e., structural
aspects of physical mind, such as nervous system and brain); and (2) atma-bhuta (intrinsic)
i.e., cognition, etc. mental states dependent on external or internal factors, personal experiences,
and the inner capacity and vigor of soul. The word "available" in this definition indicates
conditioned state of consciousness, implying thereby that consciousness-as-such is the state of
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 58 Handbook of Indian Psychology

only consciousness, which is the very nature of soul and the substratum of all forms of conscious
activity, pure or impure.

Evolvent Nature of Conscious Reality

According to the Jaina concept of dravya (thing, substance or entity), the nature of sat or
existent reality is evolvent or dynamic. That which has characteristic qualities or attributes
{guna) and that which is undergoing constant change or modification {paryaya) is what is
called dravya (For detailed discussion, see Jain, 2005b, Appendix 1, pp. 90-99; Jain, 2006).
The very term "dravya" signifies dravyatva i.e., "that which by nature,flowstowards its modes."
Hence, dravya is considered evolvent (parindmi) in nature i.e., subject to change. The evolvent
nature of jtva or conscious entity and unconscious matter endows them with the characteristics
of both bhava parinama (modifications of substance or entity) and kriya parinama, having the
characteristic of parispandan i.e., activity reflected in electromagnetic vibrations or bio-photons,
which make association or interaction betweenjTva and unconscious neurobiological processes
or karma possible. Space and time undergo only bhava parindmas (Kundakunda, Pravachansara,
Amrtachandra's commentary on Verse 11.37). Modifications in the condition or state of quality
of a substance are called guna paryaya (modification in an attribute) of a substance, while the
modifications in the material, structural forms are called dravya paryaya (modifications in the
physical forms) of a thing or just paryaya (mode or modification), though the substance remains
the same.
The full or complete comprehension of reality should recognize that though there is a logical
and conceptual distinction between substance, quality and modification, they must necessarily
be taken together as they are inseparably rolled into one. Any separation {prathdkatva) between
them would suggest a cleavage between the evolutes and the evolvent reality, which will reduce
each one of them into non-existent entity (Jain, 2006). The qualities and modifications are both
distinct {bhinna) as well as not distinct {abhinna) from the substance. "Metaphysically, they
are non-distinct from or identical with the dravya (substance), but logically they are distinct
from it", for without this logical distinction there is no other way of apprehending the substance
as substance, qualities as such, &n& paryaya (modification) per se (Mitra, 1939, pp. 322-323).
In other words, substance and attributes are inseparable and yet the substance is not the
same as its attributes nor the attributes same as the substance (the difference between the two
is only a difference of reference, not difference of existence), though it is a fact that it is the
substance which manifests this nature through its attributes. Substance without attributes and
attributes dissociated from the underlying substance would all be meaningless abstractions.
Attributes cannot exist apart from the substance or the substance apart from the attributes.
Hence in the world of reality, there can be no separate existence either of substance or attributes
from each other (Chakravarti, 1971, p. 92). Likewise, "There is no substance that is devoid of
modification, nor is there any modification without an abiding something, a substance"
(Siddhasen, Sanmatisutra, chapter 1, verse 12).
Thus, in spite of its constant change, the substance or entity "keeps up its stability or character
as an identical substance in and through its changes or parindmas" (Bhattacharya, 1999,
p. 93). In other words, it is characterized by permanence or continuity and change. Accordingly,
conscious entity or soul (the knower) and consciousness (the knowing capacity) cannot be
separated from one another and consciousness cannot be dissociated from its manifestations or
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 Jaina Psychology 59

modes of cognition, feeling and willing, which are considered inalienable attributes of conscious
entity. In fact, the self or conscious entity realises its nature in and through its modifications, its
cognitions, emotions and conations. The same self is running through different modes or forms
of cognition and preserving its identity i.e., the vertical identity or the unity of cognition, while
passing through different modes or forms of cognition in succession. According to Jainism, the
cognizer (the cognizing agent i.e., the conscious entity), the cognition (the quality or attribute
of conscious entity), and the cognized content (the mental image or the form of the object of
cognition), which is a mode or modification of consciousness, are three distinct facts inseparably
rolled into one (Jain, 1964, p. 39).
In this way, consciousness-as-such and the mental image or the form of the object of cognition
are not two separate entities, but they are two different forms or aspects of one and the same
thing, viz, consciousness. This division into two forms of consciousness differs from the Vedanta
view, which holds consciousness as "real" while the other "unreal, merely an illusion" (Shastri,
1990, pp. 155-157), and the Samkhya view which assigns consciousness to the soul and ascribes
cognitive acts to buddhi (intelligence), an evolute of the unconscious principle of prakrti (Tatia,
1975, p. 16). This difference is basically due to the fact that unlike Jainism, the Samkhya and
the Vedanta consider soul as an absolutely unchangeable entity, which is as much violative of
the causal efficacy as the Buddhist "theory of flux" or discrete moments which are lacking a
binding nexus, the substratum or an abiding agency of the self underlying momentary conscious
states (Jain, 2005b, pp. 10-13).
Knowledge (cognition) to be of real significance "must be regarded as identical with the
soul," i.e., the conscious entity, which in knowing only modifies itself into knowledge; there is
no separation possible of any kind between the knower and its knowledge, the soul which is
parinami cannot be regarded as something different from its parinama (evolution, change or
modification). "Knowledge as parinama is the soul knowing" (Bhattacharya, 1999, p. 93).
Consequently, the Jaina view does not differentiate the metaphysical soul (jiva) from the
epistemic subject (jhata) as is done in Samkhya-Yoga and monistic Vedanta (Tatia, 1975,
p. 16). John Searle also seems to differentiate between "subjective, first-person ontology" of
consciousness and "epistemic objectivity" (Searle, 1998, pp. 1 and 7), though in the framework
of causal reduction of conscious states to neurobiological processes in the brain (Searle, 2004,
p. 113).
The Jaina view also differs from the Mimamsa and Vaisesika systems of Indian philosophy,
which maintain that jnana or knowing-capacity and soul are two different entities and that the
knowing capacity is not the nature of the soul, but is an adventitious quality, occasionally or
accidentally brought together by extraneous circumstances i.e., its contact with body, mind and
the sense-organs (For details, see Jain, 2005b, pp. 5-6). Furthermore, the Jaina view differs
from John Searle's contention that consciousness is causally supervenient on the brain processes
and "totally dependent" on them and that conscious states are "higher-level features" of physical
processes and "realized in the brain as features of the brain system" (Searle, 2004, pp. 148-
149 and 113-114).
Unlike Charles Darwin's theory of evolution, which adopts consistent materialist view of
the world and speaks of consciousness having been evolved out of inanimate matter, the Jaina
concept of evolution maintains that changes or modifications take place within respective entities
or substances. As a result, neither the conscious mental states are reduced to matter or physical
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 60 Handbook of Indian Psychology

processes and events nor the physical changes taking place in material entity or brain processes
get transformed into conscious states. The term "evolution" means "unfolding" and the unfolding
of something that already exists is not the same process as the production of something that is
new. Criticizing Darwin's view, Toynbee (1979, p. 306) remarks, "To date, alleged cases of
inanimate matter generating life have been proved by scientific investigation to be spurious.
Invariably, life has been found to have been generated by pre-existing life. Nor has any human
being succeeded, so far, in transforming inanimate matter into live matter in a laboratory."
John Searle's "biological naturalism" with regard to the study of the mind, based as it is on
Darwin's evolutionist background, as also Max Velmans' "biological determinism" based on
determinate physical principles, is quite different from the Jaina viewpoint. Jaina psychology,
though anchored in biology, is not a psychology without a soul. Although Velmans points out
that physical reductionism, which proposes that conscious experience is identical with neural
activity is not acceptable, yet he assumes that the processes giving rise to conscious experience
"follow deterministic physical laws" (cf. Libet, 2003, p. 27). Similarly, neuroscientist Antonio
Damasio (1999, pp. 4, 12-13) describes consciousness as merely "the critical biological
function" that allows us to know sorrow, joy, etc. and "entirely private,first-personphenomenon,
which occurs as part of the private, first-person process" called mind, and yet it is said to be
"closely tied to external behaviours that can be observed by third persons" and "closely correlated
with the functions.. .of the brain".
Likewise, while Searle (2004, pp. 209, 113) claims himself to be vehemently opposed to
materialism and speaks of conscious states being subjective states and "ontologically
irreducible", he yet adopts the untenable position akin to materialists and violative of the law
of causality when he asserts that the subjective states of feeling and thinking are produced or
caused by brain processes, which are objective, third person, biological, chemical and electrical
processes, that conscious states are "causally reducible to neurobiological processes", and that
they are realized in the brain and have "absolutely no life of their own, independent of the
neurobiology (i.e., brain states)."
Jaina philosopher Vidyananda's (Jain, 1964, pp. 35-36,29) remarks in this regard are quite
pertinent. He states:
The materialist's denial of soul as an independent principle of consciousness goes against the
law of causality. The nature of consciousness is radically different from matter and so it
cannot be the product of material elements. The effect must be essentially homogeneous with
the cause and reducible to the latter in turn. The law of causality demands that the cause and
its effect must be mutually reducible. Consciousness is not reducible to matter and hence
cannot be a material product. Moreover, the existence of soul is proved by self-intuition
(svasamvedana). We feel pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow, which presuppose a conscious
substance as their substratum. The materialist cannot deny self-intuition. He must accept
cognition as self-cognized in order to cognize the object. It cannot be admitted that the
cognition is cognized by another cognition, because the second cognition would require a
third, the third a fourth, and so on ad infinitum, leaving the object uncognized forever.
Vidyananda further states:
Consciousness is its own guarantor and proof of its own reality. As regards unconscious
matter, its existence is established by means of consciousness. It cannot be asked why
consciousness should be self-evidenced and matter be dependent upon consciousness for the
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 Jaina Psychology 61

proof of its existence. The question is a question of fact, and not of reason. The nature of
thing is inalienable and must be accepted to be what it is. Can anybody answer why fire
should be hot and water cold, and not vice versa? No, because it is a question of fact. Similarly
the nature of reality is to be deduced from the testimony of experience. The existence of
things which are experienced is obvious and self-evident.

Jaina Concept of Self

It is said that substance possesses the nature, properties or traits of that through which it
evolves during the time of evolution (Kundakunda, Pravachanasara, 1.8). In other words,
whatever substance evolves or undergoes modifications at a certain time through a certain
form of existence or process takes at that time the nature of that existence, (Amrtachandra's
commentary on Pravachanasara, 1.8) i.e., it identifies itself with that. When consciousness
manifests itself in the psychic activity of apprehending or comprehending i.e., perceiving and
cognizing of objects, it is called conscious attentiveness or cognition. When it reacts to the
objects or situations with psychic dispositions of agreeable or disagreeable, likes and dislikes,
it is described as feeling or emotion; and when it results in activity it takes the form of willing
or conation. The individual self is, thus, knower, enjoyer or experiencer and active agent.
These three forms of psychic activity which are also recognized in modern psychology as
three functions or faculties of psyche, viz, knowing, feeling and willing, are closely interrelated
and inter-active. They are, in fact, considered as different aspects of consciousness and treated
together as integral parts of the organic whole, viz, of the same conscious entity or purely
consciousness-as-such (Kundakunda, Samayasara, verse 7). Neurologist Antonio Damasio
(1994) has presented a clear view of how reason and emotions/feelings interact to produce our
decisions, our beliefs, our plans for action and that reason is not entirely independent from
emotions, as was generally presumed, but inseparably linked with emotions. Moreover, all
mental modifications and states of consciousness, such as sensations of pleasure and pain and
the like, pre-suppose a subject to which they belong. A feeling necessarily implies a being who
feels. "Cognitions and emotions cannot inhere in nothing, nor can volition be the function of a
pure non-entity. Hence, they must be the states of a something which exists, consequently, of a
substance" (Jain, 1917, pp. xi-xii).
According to Jainism, the conscious entity or self (Jain, 2005a, pp. 19-52; Jain, 2005b,
pp. 1-67) is the substratum or abiding agency underlying the course of psychic events, which
happen in different times. It differs from Buddhists, Hume, Damasio and Searle, who deny the
existence of such a self. According to the Buddhists and Hume, consciousness consists of only
discrete impressions, ideas or experiences and "the bundle of perceptions", to use Hume's
words. These discrete experiences, being basically disconnected and lacking any abiding agency
of the self as substratum, cannot account for "real" self-identity and is also inconsistent with
causal efficacy {arthakriyakaritva) (Jain, 2005b, pp. 10-13, 44-45).
Damasio (1999, p. 10) points out that besides the sensory images of what you perceive
externally and the related images you recall, occupy most of the scope of your mind, but not all
of it, there is also the presence of mind that signifies "you as observer of the things imaged,
owner of the things imaged, potential actor on the things imaged." In this way, Damasio refers
to "the transient self (that is continuously generated as a result of one's ongoing experiences of
the sensory world (i.e., the mental images or the forms of things imaged) as a 'core self". But
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 62 Handbook of Indian Psychology

Libet (2004, p. 204) rightly "prefers to reserve the term 'core self for an enduring aspect of
self, the personal identity one feels even when there are significant and even extreme changes
in the content of one's capacities for conscious experience" or changes in the content (mental
images or impressions of objects or things) of one's cognition.
John Searle speaks of consciousness as "ontologically irreducible". But since he is
vehemently opposed to both substance dualism and property dualism, he emphasizes that
conscious states are "causally reducible to neurobiological processes". Thus, Searle, Damasio
and most others in the West do not accept the independent existence of the conscious entity or
self (jiva), or regard it as different kind of entity or category, independent of the brain states or
mental images (i.e., things imaged). The conscious states are said to be "ontologically irreducible"
(Searle) or belonging to the "private mind" (Damasio) only because they are subjective i.e.,
first-person experiences, accessible to the experiencer alone. Damasio's so-called 'core self is
actually "private mind", as he himself acknowledges, and this mind is "private" only in the
sense that it represents "entirely first-person phenomenon" or "process", and not because it
has a mind of its own i.e., one which can transcend, veto or act independently of the mental
images, brain states, or subconscious motivations. Hence, Damasio, etc. speak of "a brain and
its self, to use Libet's (2004, p. 204) phrase, instead of The Self and Its Brain, the title of the
book by Karl Popper and John C. Eccles (1981, p. viii), who boldly assert that they "are dualists
. . . and interactionists."
While Searle states that Hume is "absolutely right" in holding that "there is no experience
of this entity" called self, he yet is dissatisfied with his atomistic conception of experiences
i.e., of consciousness consisting of only discrete "impressions" and "ideas" or mere sequence
of experiences, which are lacking in necessary connection and causation. He, therefore,
recognizes the absolute necessity of postulating a self, "in addition to our bodies and the sequence
of our experiences." But his "self is merely "a formal principle" and "a purely formal notion."
His characterization of the self as "a purely formal or logical requirement," signifies that he is
accepting this notion of the self only because he finds no other alternative.
Searle (2004, pp. 113, 292-299) acknowledges that he remains "very dissatisfied" because
"the existence of the sense of self does not solve the problem of personal identity". He continues
to entertain "two related worries": (1) how to account for a "total unified conscious field" in
which "our experiences are organized both at any given point and across time into quite orderly
and complex structures"; and (2) how to account for the "sense of self that solves "the problem
of personal identity." Searle's worries can only be set at rest by his acceptance of the independent
existence of consciousness or conscious entity i.e., jiva or self, which is evolvent in nature and
is the substratum or the abiding agency underlying all forms of psychic or conscious activity
and different forms of cognition, including changing ideas, impressions, images and expressions.
A more comprehensive description or enumeration of the characteristics of individual self
or person (jiva) (Kundakunda, Panchastiykayasara, verse 27; Jain, 2005a, pp. 44-46) is stated
as follows:
1. Jiva has bio-energies or external manifestations of life.
2. Jiva is endowed with consciousness, which is the essence and internal life source of
jiva.
3. Upayoga (conscious attendveness, psychic exertion, function or manifestation of
consciousness) is the characteristic of jiva, which distinguishes living from non-living.
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 Jaina Psychology 63

4. The self is the lord or architect of his own destiny (prabhu), who through his own
efforts obtains full freedom bearing all the while full moral responsibility for conduct.
He is responsible for his rise and fall. He is neither helpless in the hands of external
environment nor a slave to his internal, subconscious compulsions, instinctive urges
and impulsive drives or the neurobiological processes or brain states. Jainism lays great
emphasis on self-restraint and self-discipline, which are the foundation of the Jaina
code of moral conduct and ensure peace, happiness and freedom of the individual as
well as social well-being (For a detailed discussion, see Jain, 2005c, pp. 1-153).
There is now increasing awareness in the world that self-imposed limitations can help
to free us. A renowned heart specialist of America points out: "What appears like self-
restraint can be self-empowerment." Ultimately, it is a choice between "true freedom or
slave to our compulsions" (Ornish, 2001, pp. 73-74). The characteristic of prabhu,
thus, accounts for freedom of action or free will, as it is called in modern psychology.
The existence of 'conscious free will', that can block or 'veto' the process initiated
unconsciously, resulting in no motor act is conclusively proved by the experiments of
neurologist Benjamin Libet (2003, pp. 24-25). "Conscious will", Libet adds, "can stop
or veto the process so that no act occurs". In such a case, free will could control the
outcome. "That fits with our feeling that we can control ourselves, something that ethical
systems urge us to do" (Libet, 2004, p. 197).
5. Unlike the passive spectator (purusa) of Samkhya, the Jaina self is an active agent
(karta). He is responsible for all his actions, good and bad, physical and mental.
6. Jtva is the enjoyer or the experiencer (bhokta) of the fruits of his own actions. If he is
not held responsible for the consequences of his actions, there will be no need of moral
and spiritual discipline and the quest for liberation. It is quite untenable to hold that the
responsibility of doing actions lies with some person and the obligation of experiencing
the consequences thereof lies with some other individual. Unlike the Samkhya viewpoint
which holds that the soul is an inactive entity but is an enjoyer in an indirect manner i.e.,
through intellect which is an evolute of unconscious prakrti, Jaina affirms that activity
and enjoyment i.e., the feelings of pleasure and pain, are the functions of the same
conscious entity.
7. Being embodied, the jtva (self) is said to be of the same dimensions as the body, large or
small, in which it resides with the result that sensation (samvedana) is felt in all parts of
the body. It resembles a lamp which illumines the whole of the space enclosed in a small
or big room in which it happens to be placed. The Jaina concept of jtva or consciousness,
being equal in extent to its body ensures that subjective experience of a person is his
own personal experience and not of any third person.
The Jaina doctrine that self is co-extensive with the body appears to anticipate the modern
somatic philosophers such as Mareleau-Ponty, Gabriel Marcel and Michael Polanyi. However,
unlike the Jaina view that the body can only have physical qualities, the somatic philosophers
hold the opinion that the body is constitutive of the emotions, which seems contrary to common
experience. The Samkhya position is also untenable because in its view "unconscious prakrti
carries both psychological and physical qualities" while the purusa (self) remains "totally
isolated" (Gier, 1996, pp. 152-153) because its involvement in matter is illusory (Gier, 1995,
pp. 72-73).
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 64 Handbook of Indian Psychology

8. Jiva is non-corporeal (amurta) because its nature or the essence is the spiritual reality of
consciousness. It is amurta inspite of its being associated with karmic matter.
9. In its corporeal existencejTva is associated with karmas (karma-sanyukta). The conscious
entity's involvement with karma is merely an "association" (ekaksetravagaha, literally,
occupying the same locus), but there is no direct or actual contact between them (For
detailed discussion of the doctrine of karma, see Jain, 2005a, Chapter 10, pp. 242-264).
In Jaina thought "action" (karma) does not mean only those things which are physically
and ostensibly done but also includes crystallized effects of past activities of energies.
These energies are the potentialities, latent in the organisms which are lying in our
deeper level of subconscious, much below the threshold of conscious awareness. A
great portion of our personality, thus, lies hidden in the depth of subconscious or
unconscious (ajhata) (Umasvami or Umasvati, Tattvartha Sutra, 6.6), and what we are
aware of (jnata) and to which we pay conscious attention is but a fractional aspect
thereof. These karmas naturally affect our psychic dispositions and thought activities.
They account not only for differences in the physical forms, features, and biological
structures, including possession of few or more bio-energies andparyapti i.e., complete
or incomplete development of its various capacities, but also for differences in mental
and psychological make-up.
These karmas, though primarily material in nature, are not "purely material", as the
oriental scholar H. Jacobi mistakenly believed and for that matter assumed that the soul
is of some subtle matter thus making the combination between the two possible (cf.
Chakravartinayanar, 1975, p. xxvii). The karmas are also not mere traces, or psychic
impressions or tendencies (satnskaras) as other systems of Indian philosophy maintain.
Jaina thought divides karmas into physical karma and psychic karma. The physical karma
is material in nature and can be equated with neurobiological processes, brain states or
neuronal firings, while psychic karma comprises psychic dispositions and mental states.
The mental states are conditioned or caused by physical karma. The two are mutually
related as cause and effect, each of the other, and interact with one another, each acting
as indirect, extrinsic, auxiliary or subsidiary cause (nimitta karana) of the other (See
Jain, 2005a, pp. 24-41).

Cognition
As already stated, upayoga (conscious attentiveness) is of two kinds: darsana andjnana.
Although apprehension of an object or sensation (avagraha) is thefirststage of sensory cognition
and is described as indefinite but distinct apprehension of the object, it is preceded by darsana,
which signifies a feeling of awareness or psychic disposition indicative of interest and attention.
It is stepping into conscious attentiveness; without this stage there can be no cognition of or
about the object. It is indeterminate prehension of mere presence of something, devoid of any
kind of distinctness and details or particularities, such as shape, size, colour, etc., of the object
and is not describable (Gommatsara Jiva kanda, p. 482-483). It is not conceptual and has no
form (nirakara), while jnana is said to be sakara (having form). What distinguishes darsana
from cognition, including avagraha, is the absence of akdra i.e., some form or mental image of
the object of cognition, called jneyakara by Akalanka (Tattvarthavartika Rajavartika, 1.6, p.
34). In the cognition of "this is jar", the jar stands as an external, material object, but the
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 Jaina Psychology 65

cognition of jar is a mental phenomenon i.e., mental image or concept. Damasio explains: "A
theory of consciousness should not be just a theory of how the brain (mind) attends to the
image of an object". As he sees it, "natural low-level attention precedes consciousness
(cognition), while focused attention follows the unfolding of consciousness." Attention, he
adds, "is as necessary to consciousness as having images" (Damasio, 1999, p. 18).
Avagraha is divided into two stages: vyanjan avagraha and artha avagraha. The former is
the stage of indistinct sensation or apprehension consequent upon physiological stimulus, leading
to artha avagraha (distinct apprehension), the real sensation stage i.e., the immediacy of psychic
experience. This continues throughout all the four stages of sensory cognition, viz, apprehension
(avagraha), specific enquiry, cogitation or striving of the mind (Jha) towards associative integration
of the sense impressions with a view to arrive at determinate cognition, judgment or ascertained
cognition (avaya), and imprint or retention (dhdrana) of the identification of the object, creating
an impression in the mind which is experienced as memory. Dharana is defined as absence of
forgetting of what has been cognized (Akalanka, Tattvarthavartika Rajavartika, 1.15.4).
Sensory cognition is produced by, arises from, or gained through the senses alone (as in the
case of lower organisms), the sense(s) and the mind acting together (e.g., the cognition that
"this is a table" is produced by the collaboration of the sense of sight and the mind i.e., the
mind's ability to comprehend what is sensed), and the mind alone (remembering what the table
looks like requires only the mind to act). There is also a form of cognition which is instinctive
such as the ability of a plant to grow towards light or a creeper towards support. According to
Jainism, the sense organs and the mind act as nimitta karana (auxiliary or subsidiary cause) of
sensory cognition while the intrinsic or primary cause of any form of cognition is consciousness
or the knowing capacity of jiva or self. Mere presence of the stimuli which comes into contact
with the sense organs may not be effective to produce a psychic state of cognition. The presence
of a psychic element like selective attention is the determining factor (Kalghatgi, 1961, p. 37).
Unlike mind, awareness or apprehension of objects by sense organs is specific, having a
limited range and lasting for a long time. We are conscious of one sensory modality at a time -
one kind of sense: hearing, seeing, feeling, or tasting. Mental cognition is not limited to a
particular sphere. Being a continuous flow of thought processes, the mental attitude is unstable
and changes quickly. In remembrance, etc., the mind is not dependent on the senses. Unlike the
sense organs such as the eyes and ears, the mind does not have any outward, external insignia.
It is, therefore, called antahkarana (internal mechanism indicative of its internal character).
Mind plays a significant role in life; it assists in executing the will of consciousness. When
consciousness seeks to establish contact with the outside world, it does so with the help of
mind. Without the mind, the senses cannot function properly in their respective domains.
Moreover, the articulate cognition (literary or verbal knowledge) is the domain of mind and
cannot be acquired without the instrumentality of mind. Hence, it is invariably preceded by
sensory cognition. Cognition is not a simple process nor is it merely the sense datum. It involves
both emotional or intuitive awareness and apprehension of object called sensation. It also
consists in the organization and interpretation of sensations, which requires thinking and
reflection. As William James said, it is "knowledge about" and not merely "knowledge of
acquaintance" (cf. Kalghatgi, 1961, p. 81).
Although sensory cognition, memory or remembrance of a thing cognized before, recognition,
reasoning, and inference have their own etymological meanings, they are described as synonyms
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 66 Handbook of Indian Psychology

(Umasvami or Umasvati, Tattvartha Sutra, 1.13) and considered as different aspects of sensory
cognition. All of them are generated in the mind and each one of them is said to be based upon
the one preceding it. Retention is a condition of memory or remembrance because the mental
trace retained in the mind makes remembrance or recollection possible when it is aroused and
revived. Since retention is part of sensory cognition, memory is said to be based on sensory
cognition. Recognition, in turn, is based on memory or remembrance. Similarly, recognition
forms the basis of reasoning, and inference is drawn on the basis of reasoning.
Sensory awareness is the direct and immediate cognition {sanvyavaharika pratyaksa)
(Akalanka, LaghiyastrayU v. 3) of the object when the object is presented to the senses. Memory
plays a significant role in life. It contains a record of our past experiences, including emotional
preferences such as likes and dislikes, attachment and aversion, and instinctive urges, which
are lying in our deeper level of subconscious mind. These subconscious emotional preferences
and biases color or distort our mental images or impressions of objects, which the mind begins
to construct after sensation. Such mental images are then retained in memory with the result
that in recollection we do not necessarily get the exact or dependable reproduction of what was
experienced in the past. Cogitation of the mind (iha) in search of similarity and dissimilarity
facilitates this recollection which also depends on internal preparedness, such as interest,
volition, conative urge or attention and absence of emotional, psychic impediments such as
aversion to the object or event, fear and other painful experiences associated with it.
Recollection is the emergence of the mental trace to the level of consciousness. When
sensory awareness and recollection are combined in a particular form to produce synthetic
judgment or coherent experience, we get recognition. This recognition is not just sensory
awareness or recollection; it is a synthesis and as such gives the additional quality judgment of
the identity of the present datum with that which was experienced in the past (Kalghatgi, 1961,
pp. 106-107, 110). Retention, memory, recollection and recognition are all functions of the
mind.
Unlike present-day psychologists and neuroscientists, Jaina thought does not seem to
distinguish between short-term memory and long-term memory. However, the memory which
remains in a dormant state and lies buried as stored impressions may be called long-term memory.
But when these past impressions and experiences are resurrected in recollection and recognition
and as such are in a position to be accessed by conscious entity, they may be termed as short-
term memory.

Jaina Concept of Mind

The Jaina concept of mind differs from other systems of psychology or philosophy, both
Western and Eastern. It maintains that mind has dual nature or two aspects i.e., it is a vehicle or
an instrument of conscious entity as also of unconscious brain processes. A distinction is also
made between physical mind and psychic mind. According to Jainism, mind does not have an
independent existence and is not a separate entity. It is not the same as consciousness and it is
not an attribute of consciousness either. It coordinates the work of all the senses, including
sense of touch, which is experienced throughout the body. Its sphere of activity is not limited to
a particularfield.While the psychic mind emphasizes functional and mental aspects, the physical
mind signifies structural and material aspect. The psychic mind has no fixed place, position or
location in the body. The location of the mind changes with the location of psychic attention
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 Jaina Psychology 67

(Akalanka, Tattvarthavartika Rajavartika, 5.19). However, the physical mind is located in the
body. In modern parlance, the physical mind is the brain, including the nervous system.
The physical mind is, thus, the structural base or the substrate of physical karma i.e.,
neurophysiological processes. The physical mind is also an essential aid to conscious entity's
potential for discrimination, memory and attention, etc. Defect or deformity in brain adversely
affects psychic capacity. That mental states are liable to be affected by the material things is
evident from the fact that jiva (conscious entity) is frightened by thunder and lightning and
maddened by alcohol. Moreover, material things provide nourishment that sustain life, and are
also the auxiliary cause of the sensations of pleasure and pain (Tattvartha Sutra, 5.20). Virtually
all our sensorimotor activities, such as breathing, etc., which constitute 98 per cent of what the
brain does, are "outside of conscious awareness" (Gazzaniga, 1998, p. 21). Moreover, people
act from motives of which they are unconscious and the presence of which they would sincerely
deny.
Unlike most Western philosophers, psychologists and neuroscientists, including Max Velmans
and John Searle, who postulate only a single substrate (brain states) for mental states and lay
emphasis on the neural correlates of consciousness, Jaina thought recognizes two substrates of
psychic mind or mental states. The bible of the Jainas specifically states: adhikarnam jiva
ajiva, (Umasvami or Umasvati, Tattvartha Sutra, 6.7) i.e., the substrata of karma including
psychic karma i.e., mental states, are both sentient and non-sentient entities. In other words,
mental states are anchored on and have their base, substrate or support {adhikarnam) in (1)
jiva (soul or consciousness) and (2) ajiva (inanimate, physical body, its neurophysiological
structures and processes or brain states).
In the former case, the mind acts as a vehicle or instrument for the execution or implementation
of the decisions of consciousness such as intention to act, preparation for act, and commission
of act, and three types of acts, viz, those done by oneself, those in which one convinces others
to undertake the act, and approval of acts done by others. This kind of mental activity is
undertaken buddhi-purvaka i.e., with conscious awareness and sense of responsibility, in contrast
to mental functions performed abuddhi-purvak i.e., without conscious attentiveness, say under
subconscious motivated compulsions, such as instinctive urges, drives or propensities, etc.
When mind has its substrate in brain states, it acts as a vehicle or instrument for giving vent
to instinctive urges, primarily the survival instinct concerned with acquiring food, resorting to
fight or flight syndrome, sexual activity and provision for future subsistence (possessiveness).
(For detailed discussion on the Jaina concept of instincts and their comparison with William
McDougall's enumeration, see Jain, 2005a, pp. 53-75.) More than anything else, these
subconscious motivations, having emotional preferences, determine the conduct of the individual
and contribute to his worth.
These subconscious motivations may be considered as constituting derived intentionality
i.e., mental wish to act which has its own unconscious antecedents or preceding unconscious
processes, reflected in the onset of electrically observable cerebral processes, called readiness
potential (RP), noticed in Libet's experiments i.e., in tejas sarira (electric body) of the Jainas.
This wish to act is not to be confused with the true or real intentionality, the conscious will,
representing conscious entity's "censor" potentiality which could block or "veto" the volitional
processes initiated unconsciously by at least 350 msecs of RP, resulting in no motor act. Libet
observes: "The conscious veto is a control function, different from simply becoming aware of
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 68 Handbook of Indian Psychology

the wish to act". The "conscious decision to veto could be made without direct specifications
for that decision by the preceding unconscious processes." Such a view, Libet states, "allows
genuine conscious free will to be a controlling agent in the performance of a voluntary act"
(Libet, 2003, pp. 24-25).
The "wish to act" is the psychic karma type of mental state which is the product or result of
unconscious processes i.e., physical karma, while the "conscious free will" is the decision of
conscious entity or soul, which is not conditioned, affected or caused by physical karma i.e.,
unconscious processes or brain states. The "wish to act" is the psychic disposition of the
conditioned mind, while "conscious free will" is an act of conscious entity, unconditioned
mind or consciousness-as-such. It is not without purpose that the phrase "conscious free will"
is qualified by Libet with the adjective "genuine" so as to highlight the distinction between two
kinds of psychic states: conscious entity or self and conditioned mind. But, no distinction is
made in the West between consciousness and mind, so the words "mental", "psychic" and
"conscious" have become synonymous in English language and Western tradition and are used
interchangeably without any thought of distinction between them.
The mental activities, that have their substrate in brain states, are "unconsciously planned
and executed" and are primarily the result of neurophysiological processing of data in the
brain, including past memory, by the so-called "interpreter", the special device (cortex) in our
left brain, and hence are naturally full of "telling errors of perception, memory and judgment"
(Gazzaniga, 1998, p. xiii). These are obviously lacking in coherence, balanced and detached
view, discriminative insight and unity of conscious experience, which are the prerogatives of
conscious entity and the domain of conscious attentiveness (upayoga).
Jainism recognizes that physical karma i.e., the neurophysiological processes and brain
states, has the power (sakti) to operate as bhava karma (psychic karma i.e., mental states)
{Gommatsara Karmakanda, verse 6). This may be said to be the nearest Jaina equivalent of
neural correlates of "mental states." It should, however, not be forgotten that in Jainism these
physical karma type of neural correlates are not deterministic in nature unless consented to and
not vetoed by the conscious entity. They only act as indirect, auxiliary cause of mental states.
Likewise, mental states have the power to indirectly cause changes in neurophysiological
processes or brain states.
Jaina thought makes a distinction between those "mental states", psychological conditions
or events (psychic karma), which are conditioned, affected or indirectly caused by brain states
i.e., contaminated or polluted by the physical karma (neurophysiological processes) and whose
substrate is the physical mind or brain, and those "conscious states" which are the result of
conscious attentiveness and conscious decision-making and whose substrate is conscious entity.
The former type of "mental states" are modifications of consciousness and represent the states
of conditioned mind, while the latter are not stained/tinged by karma i.e., conditioned by
unconscious brain processes, but represent or reflect decisions of conscious entity or soul,
taken consciously or with conscious attentiveness. Since there are no such concepts as
"consciousness-as-such" and "conditioned mind" in Western psychology, the two types of
psychic states are often invariably used interchangeably with the result that the entire subjective
experience is correlated and considered dependent on brain states or neuronal firings.
If mind is considered to have only a single substrate i.e., only neural correlates of
consciousness, then one could perhaps ungrudgingly settle for a mechanistic and reductionist
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 Jaina Psychology 69

conception of conscious states, but that is not the case. The attempts by Damasio, Searle,
Velmans and others to explain conscious experience on the basis of "a single substrate" (the
brain) are quite inadequate to explain how both the "inner qualities" (accessible only to the
individual) and the "outer quality" (observable physically to an external observer) "can be
exhibited by the same substrate" (Libet, 2003, p. 26). Velmans tries to solve the paradox of
first-person introspective subjective experience based fully on the external observations of the
physical brain by invoking a principle of complementarity. But as Libet points out: "In this the
mind is not either physical or conscious experience; it is at once physical and conscious
experience" (Libet, 2003, p. 26).
Searle argues that conscious states are states of the brain and "causally reducible to
neurobiological processes," but, at the same time, he acknowledges that "for the most part we
do not yet know" "how it actually works in the neurobiology" (Searle, 2004, p. 210). His
confidence, like those of others, that "completely adequate correlations will eventually be
discovered" remains "a theoretical belief because there is "some evidence that a full correlation
may not occur; i.e., there may be conscious mental events that appear to occur not tied or based
upon neural events" (Libet, 2003, p. 26).
This remark of Benjamin Hibet is indicative of the fact that subjective conscious experience
is not fully explainable merely on the basis of neural activities in the brain alone and hence Libet
appears to hint at the need to reconsider the option of dualism, though certainly not the option of
disjunctive dualism of Descartes (Libet, 2003, p. 28). Given his considered opinion that subjective
mental states cannot be described "as physical or physically constituted" and that "mental-
physical distinction cannot be abolished by fiat," Thomas Nagel is drawn towards "some kind
of property dualism." But since properties or qualities "cannot be conceived apart from
substances" (Jain, 1974, p. 150) and since two radically different properties or opposite qualities
cannot inhere at the same time in one substance or entity, property dualism without some kind of
substance dualism is implausible. Nagel himself is not quite confident that property dualism can
itself be considered a satisfactory or viable solution of the psycho-physical nexus (Nagel, 2002).
While John Searle finds it rather easy to refute materialism, because it denies the existence
of "ontologically irreducible" subjective states of consciousness, he thinks refutation of dualism
is "harder". He acknowledges that his arguments against dualism "still leave dualism as a
logical possibility". His main objection against dualism is that "no one has ever succeeded in
giving an intelligible account of the relationships between the two realms", the mental and the
physical (Searle, 2004, pp. 131-132). Karl Popper and John Eccles (1981, p. vii) are self-
proclaimed dualists and interactionists, yet they consider it improbable that the problem of
psycho-physical interaction would ever be solved in the sense that we shall really understand
this relation. The Jaina approach to this intricate relationship between the mental and the physical,
given below, explains it in a satisfactory way.

Mind-Body Interaction
While recognising that consciousness and matter are two distinct entities, Jaina dualism
holds that the causal relationship between the two is of indirect, extrinsic, auxiliary kind and
that this interaction is a two-way process, not a one-way correlation between physical and
mental states. There is now increasing awareness in the West that not only mental states have
their correlation in the neural activities in the brain, but that the brain's biology is also moulded
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 70 Handbook of Indian Psychology

and "influenced by what we feel, think or do" (Robertson, 2000; Ratey, 2001, p. 340). Recent
pioneering experiments in neuroplasticity have shown that the hardware of the brain is not
fixed and immutable, that the brain and the mind interact, and that "mental training can also
change the brain" (See Begley, 2007, p. viii).
How changes or modifications in the material objects affect the feelings (bhava) or the
attitudes of persons because of their intense attachment to them is aptly described by
Samantabhadra in these words: "Persons desirous of a pot, a crown and gold become sad,
happy and indifferent at the destruction (of the pot), origination (of the crown), and persistence
(of gold) on account of their causes" (Samantabhadra, Apta-Mimansa, verse 59). The
psychological states of sadness, happiness, and indifference, though generated in the Self,
have their causes in the modifications taking place in the material object existing in the external
world.
Thus, changes in the conscious mental states and changes in material objects or the
neurophysiological states or processes are determined by and linked with their own antecedent
or preceding states or events. And yet each one of them acts as the indirect, extrinsic, subsidiary
or auxiliary cause (nimitta karana) of the corresponding changes in the other. As already stated,
it is in the very nature of things that only the intrinsic cause or internal factors can alone be
regarded as the direct or substantial cause (upadana karana) of changes or modifications within
their own respective entities, while the extrinsic cause or external factors can be considered
only as indirect or subsidiary cause of changes in the other.
The extrinsic, indirect and auxiliary kind of causal interaction does not violate in any way
either the principle of classic physics that "the physical realm is causally closed in the sense
that nothing non-physical can enter into it and act as a cause" (Searle, 2004, p. 207), and that
"each physical event lay in an unbroken series of antecedent physical events," or William
James' principles of psychology that "psychological events never take place in a vacuum without
some reference to the preceding events" (cf. Craighead and Nemeroff, 2001, p. 357). (For
detailed discussion on mind-body interaction, see Jain, 2005a, Chapter 2, pp. 24-41).
The Jaina contention that the two events - brain states and mental states - while interacting
with one another, remain quite distinct processes and independent series or sequences (physical
and psychic) seems to suggest a kind of psycho-physical parallelism. But this parallelism is not
"merely a temporal correspondence of the two series, but transcended and reconciled by the
Jaina concept of nimitta karana" (each one acting as an extrinsic, indirect, auxiliary or subsidiary
cause of the other) (Chakravartinayanar, 1975, p. 54). Jaina parallelism is, thus, quite different
from other parallelist theories based on "divine intervention" (Malebranche) and mysterious
"pre-established harmony" (Leibniz), which speak only of co-occurrences and never of
interaction or causal relationship between the mental and physical realms (Jain, 2005a, pp. 40-
41). The Jaina view differs not only from other systems of Indian philosophy but also from the
disjunctive substance dualism of Descartes, property dualisms of David Chalmers and Thomas
Nagel, John Searle's "causal reduction", and Max Velman's so-called "complementarity", which
is based on deterministic physical laws or processes.
In this way, the Jaina concepts of jiva, the evolvent nature of reality, the dual nature or two
aspects of mind, and nimitta karana (the conscious states and brain activities acting as extrinsic,
indirect, auxiliary cause of each other) provides "the correct approach to the mind-body problem"
which Thomas Nagel has been aspiring for, viz, that it should preserve the mental-physical
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 Jaina Psychology 71

distinction, must be "essentially biological, not functional or computational," and "necessarily

both subjectively mental from the inside and objectively physical from the outside -just as we
are" (Nagel, 2002).

References
Akalanka. (1998). Laghiyastriya (S.Sagar, Trans.). Bareili (M.P.): Digambara Jain Panchayat
Committee. (Original work written in AD 800).
Akalanka. (1993). Tattvarthavartika: Rajavartika, 2 Vols. (M.K. Jain, Hindi Trans.). New Delhi:
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