ADMINISTRATION

Frederickson / CONFUCIUS& SOCIETYAND BUREAUCRACY

/ January 2002
The moral justification for bureaucracy in systems of democratic self-government is stronger
in Eastern thought than in Western philosophy and practice. In East Asia, moral justification
for bureaucracy is broadly understood to be based on the work of Confucius and his follow-
ers. Modern scholars confirm that the primary countries of East Asia have distinctive bu-
reaucratic cultures tracing to Confucian ideology. Distinctive elements of Confucian
ideology include rule of man versus rule of law, distinctive characteristics of good public
officials, the nature of moral conventions and practices in governing, the importance of
education and merit for public officials, how good officials should deal with those in politi-
cal power, the logic of civil reciprocity, and the nature of order in society. Following descrip-
tions of each of these elements of Confucian moral justification for bureaucracy, the article
closes with a comparison of Western and East Asian approaches to the moral justification for
bureaucracy.

CONFUCIUS AND THE MORAL BASIS

OF BUREAUCRACY

H. GEORGE FREDERICKSON
University of Kansas

There is little foundation in Western thought on which the moral justifi-

cation of bureaucracy might rest.1 There have been attempts to build a
public administrative morality on constitutional, legal, economic, politi-
cal, and professional foundations, but as a moral basis of bureaucracy, all
are weak.2 In Eastern thought, by comparison, there is an ancient, robust,
and durable moral justification for public administration.
The sociology of bureaucracy will be found in Weber’s ideal type,
which is still remarkably accurate (Weber, 1947). But, the moral justifica-
tion for bureaucracy cannot be found in the West; it can be found in East
Asia. The larger countries of East Asia—China, Japan, Taiwan, Singa-
pore, and Korea—are often referred to as having bureaucratic cultures—
cultures particularly influenced by the thought of Confucius.
Confucius is to the ethic of bureaucracy as Weber is to the structure and
behavior of bureaucracy. The paragraphs that follow present evidence that
the moral basis of public administration can be found in the thinking of
ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY, Vol. 33 No. 4, January 2002 610-628
© 2002 Sage Publications

610
 Frederickson / CONFUCIUS AND BUREAUCRACY 611

Confucius and his followers. Section 1 is the contention that there is such a
thing as bureaucratic culture and that it is uniquely associated with Confu-
cianism and particularly evident in the countries of East Asia. Section 2
presents the primary moral positions in Confucian ideology. These moral
positions will be, in almost all cases, compared with Western concepts of
bureaucracy and morality. In Section 2, the reader is asked to suspend
judgment for the moment about the association between Confucian values
and ideology and the present conduct of public agencies and organizations
in the countries of East Asia. For some time in the countries of East Asia, it
has been fashionable to attribute the shortcomings of bureaucracy and
government to Confucianism. In Section 2, as Confucianist values as they
relate to bureaucracy are considered, I purposely beg questions of the fail-
ure of individuals and governments to reach Confucianist standards. That
and related matters are the subject of Section 3, a consideration of the
implications of the legacy of Confucian bureaucratic morality both for
countries with bureaucratic cultures and for the Western conceptions of
bureaucracy and Western bureaucratic practices.

SECTION 1: ARE THERE BUREAUCRATIC CULTURES?

Because of the work of Philip E. Converse and others, it was once gen-
erally believed that the concept of a common culture was weak. Persons in
a given culture, such as Latin American or Catholic countries, may hold
similar views on particular topics but fall short of sharing an entire
worldview. In early analysis, it was demonstrated that mass attitudes on
one subject were only weakly related to attitudes on other subjects, and
therefore, analysts were unable to find in a particular culture a deeply held
and agreed-on worldview (Converse, 1963).
Research findings by contemporary modernization theorists present an
entirely different picture. Using the 1981 and 1990 World Values surveys
(random opinion samples of 70% of the world’s population in 43 coun-
tries), Ronald Inglehart and Marita Carballo (1997) conclusively demon-
strated that “data from scores of societies reveal an astonishingly high
degree of constraint [agreement] between the basic value held by peoples
of different societies. Furthermore, we find huge differences between the
basic values of peoples in different cultural groups” (p. 46; Inglehart,
1988). Modernization theory demonstrates not only that people’s basic
values in particular cultures do cohere and rise to the level of a collective
or agreed-on worldview, they also show that patterns or scenarios of social
612 ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY / January 2002

change go together (societies that place a strong emphasis on religion tend

to favor large families, for example). These coherent cultural patterns
exist and are “linked with economic and technological development” and
constitute the form or structure of modernization (Inglehart & Carballo,
1997, p. 36).
The particular values subjected to analysis in the Inglehart and
Carballo research are (a) respect for traditional authority found in the fam-
ily, in God, in nationalism, and in patriotism; (b) belief in secular-rational
authority found in politics, personal thrift, determination, achievement,
and so forth; (c) a concern for survival with an emphasis on work, money,
technology, and so forth; and (d) well-being and a postmodern or post-
material interest in friends, leisure, the environment, health, and happiness.
Using factor analysis of the World Values surveys data, Inglehart and
Carballo set out these dimensions of modernization values. Their findings
indicate that there are highly distinct cultural patterns and that in these pat-
terns, South Korea, Japan, and China form an interesting cluster.
In the interpretation of their results with respect to the countries with
Confucian cultures, Inglehart and Carballo (1997) stated

China had a relatively secular cultural system for two thousand years, and
bureaucratic authority developed within the Confucian system long before
it reached the West. Thus China and the other Confucian-influenced societ-
ies of East Asia have possessed the bureaucratic component of modern cul-
ture for a very long time.
Until recently, they lacked the emphasis on science and technology and
the esteem for economic achievement that are its other main components;
but their secular, bureaucratic heritage probably helped to facilitate rapid
economic development once these were attained. China’s traditional
emphasis on the state was probably reinforced by four decades of socialism.
Japan, another Confucian-influenced society; and both East and West Ger-
many are also characterized by relatively strong emphasis on rational-legal
authority. (p. 42)

The modernization theorists argue that values and culture change.

Because the World Values surveys were taken in many countries (not the
ex-communist states or China) in 1981 and again in 1990, it is possible to
measure the trends or directions of cultural change. For example, South
Korea has moved somewhat further from survival toward well-being val-
ues and from traditional to secular-rational authority, but Korea is still
well within the Confucian culture grouping. Japan held her position on the
survival–well-being axis but moved further away from traditional toward
secular-rational authority. Both of these countries have managed huge
 Frederickson / CONFUCIUS AND BUREAUCRACY 613

economic growth, which is being followed by rapid growth in China.

Inglehart’s (1988) interpretation of these trends is as follows:

I suspect that the Confucian cultural tradition, its traditional rigidity having
been shattered by the impact of the West, is an important element underly-
ing the current economic dynamism of certain portions of Asia. During the
period from 1965 to 1984, 5 of the 10 fastest-growing nations in the world
were countries shaped by the Confucian and Buddhist traditions: Singa-
pore, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Japan. China ranked thirteenth.
Moreover, three more of the top 20 countries had significant Chinese
minorities that in each case played disproportionately important economic
roles: Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. Finally, immigrants of East
Asian origin have shown disproportionately high rates of economic
achievement throughout Southeast Asia and in the United States, Canada,
and Western Europe. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Confu-
cian cultural tradition is conducive to economic achievement today. It
would be unrealistic to view these traits as indelible, however, my broader
thesis suggests that the intense emphasis on economic achievement not
found among people shaped by the Confucian tradition could emerge only
when the static orientation of traditional society was broken and is likely to
gradually erode when future generations have been raised in high levels of
economic security. For the present, however, it may be a key factor in the
world economy. (p. 1228)

As these findings indicate, there is a quite distinct Confucian culture.

The questions are, (a) To what extent is Confucian culture uniquely
bureaucratic? and (b) Do Confucian values constitute a moral justification
for bureaucracy?

SECTION 2

I begin with a highly simplified but fundamental description of the

objectives and purposes of the Confucian state. The leaders or rulers of the
state have a moral obligation to ensure peace, prosperity, and justice so
that the people will be happy and able to live full lives. The people have a
moral obligation to support their leaders so long as those leaders are meet-
ing their moral obligations to them. The word contract is not used, but the
idea of reciprocity is central to Confucianism and resembles the idea of a
social contract found in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant as well as the leading
neocontractarian John Rowls (Kant, 1783/1950; Locke, 1690/1960;
Rawls, 1971; Rousseau, 1762/1973). All that follows is an elaboration of
the central Confucian concept of leaders’ moral obligations to the people
and the people’s moral obligations to the leaders.
614 ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY / January 2002

Several central features of Confucianism come together to form the

moral justification for bureaucracy and the reasons the countries of East
Asia are referred to as having bureaucratic cultures: (a) the rule of man
versus the rule of law, (b) the characteristics of the good official, (c) the
nature of moral conventions and their importance to governing, (d) the
importance of education and merit, (e) how to serve those in power, (f) the
nature of order in society, and (g) the definitions of virtue and morality.
In the following treatment of these features of Confucian bureaucratic
culture, I compare, where useful and appropriate, Confucian and Western
approaches to bureaucracy and give contemporary examples.

THE RULE OF LAW VERSUS THE RULE OF MAN

There are stark distinctions between Confucian and Western thinking

regarding law. Constitutions and laws are the bedrock of Western demo-
cratic government. It is said that public administration is the law in action.
Most government agencies and organizations rest on enabling legislation
and continue on the basis of annual legislative appropriations. Much of the
work of the judicial branch (actually branches, one for the U.S. federal
government and one for each of the 50 states; even the cities and counties
have courts for local matters) of government, in the case of the United
States, is given over to interpreting the law and applying that law to spe-
cific cases. Much of the work of the executive branch is the development
and application of “regulations” that make more precise the meaning of
legislative-made law. In the United States, in most of the countries of the
Spanish-speaking world, and in many of the countries of the former Soviet
Union, law is assumed to be the appropriate field of academic study and
the correct profession for those preparing for careers in government
leadership.
How could Confucian hostility toward law be understood? In the fol-
lowing ways: Laws make people cunning; laws foster amorality (acting
legally yet immorally); laws tell us what not to do but seldom tell us what
to do; laws foster ruthlessness and the tendency to make the rules (pass
laws) to favor one’s interests over those of others; and laws foster conflict,
contention, and litigation.
In Confucianism, it is argued that a society has lost its basic values,
common traditions, and civilized conventions when it resorts to “a pleth-
ora of new laws, a proliferation of minute regulations, amendments, and
amendments of amendments. . . . For a society, compulsive lawmaking
and constant judicial interventions are a symptom of moral illness” (Leys,
 Frederickson / CONFUCIUS AND BUREAUCRACY 615

1997, p. 176). In the contemporary American setting, the influential book

by P. K. Howard (1995), The Death of Common Sense: How Law Is Suffo-
cating America, describes the debilitating effects of laws and lawyers and
suggests several Confucian-like reforms such as greater consensus build-
ing, more mediation, greater bureaucratic discretion, and other “rule of
man” approaches (Leys, 1997, p. 176).
Confucian practices can be illustrated by this vignette from the Empire
period, in which Confucianism flowered. A local official had adjudicated
a great many lawsuits in his jurisdiction. Would he be commended for his
zeal? No. The excessive contentiousness among the people under his
authority reflected badly on his effectiveness (Howard, 1995).
Several leading American public administration scholars, including
David R. Rosenbloom, John Rohr, and David K. Hart, have been part of a
considerable resurgence of interest in the Constitution and the laws as the
proper basis of American public administration (Leys, 1997). Their claims
for the Constitution and the laws as the moral foundation of bureaucracy
are mixed, with Hart and Rohr making the strongest claims. There is, how-
ever, a considerable countermovement among those who advocate the
civil society approach to governing. Robert Putnam, Benjamin Barber,
Amatai Etzioni, and David Mathews all suggest a reduced emphasis on
lawmaking as a way to deal with social problems and a much greater
emphasis on civil discourse, taking individual and collective responsibil-
ity, developing community norms of civil reciprocity, mediation, and
building consensus—all essentially Confucian approaches to governance
(Hart, 1984; Rohr, 1998; Rosenbloom, 1983).
Consider this saying: “I could adjudicate lawsuits as well as anyone.
But I would prefer to make lawsuits unnecessary” (Leys, 1997, p. 57).
If Confucians reject the rule of law and favor the rule of man, what sort
of man would this be?

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GOOD OFFICIAL

Four hundred years before Christ, in feudal China, a China with a

hereditary aristocracy, Confucius developed an entirely new concept of
rulers and rule. He took an old word, junzi, which meant a hereditary ruler
or gentleman, and gradually transformed it, giving it a new, purely ethical
content. This transformation had huge and radical implications, as it was
eventually to call into question the fundamental structure of the aristo-
cratic-feudal order. For the old concept of a hereditary elite it substituted
the notion of an elite not based on birth or wealth but purely determined by
616 ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY / January 2002

virtue, culture, talent, competence, and merit (Barber, 1986; Etzioni,

1991; Mathews, 1994; Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993). In sum, his
logic changed China from rule by a social elite to rule by a moral elite.
This change, among others, formed the basis of the 2,000-year empire of
Chinese scholar-rulers, the “gentlemen.” The word gentleman, although a
good literal translation of junzi, is a woefully inadequate English word
if one wishes to convey what is actually meant. What is actually meant
by gentleman is an educated, culturally refined, absolutely moral public
official—a good official. In using the phrase good official hereafter to
describe the Confucian ideal, I take liberties with the translation but not
with the meaning.
The good official is above all other things, a moral actor in the context
of moral action. All government or public acts are to be thought of as
moral acts, and all public officials are understood to be moral actors.
The authority for action is not found in law or in delegation from the
ruler; it is found in the individual bureaucrat’s personal morality. Political
authority should be limited to those who can demonstrate moral and intel-
lectual qualifications. A ruler leads by moral power.

If he cannot set a moral example—he forfeits the loyalty of his ministers

and the trust of the people. The ultimate asset of the state is the trust of the
people in their ruler; if that trust is lost, the country is doomed. (Leys, 1997,
p. 105)

This is true both of the ruler and of the ruler’s bureaucrats.

Who is this Confucian official? What are suitable characteristics and
qualifications? What are the good official’s ethics? The public official is
well educated; has a love of learning and knowledge; is loyal to ruling
power; is incorruptible by money, titles, or flattery; is deferential and
respectful; leads by moral example; practices “filial piety” and honors and
obeys parents; practices self-cultivation, daily examining thoughts,
motives, and values; knows the virtues (traits of character, manifest in
habitual action) of honesty, trust, compassion, forgiveness, justice, loy-
alty, and moderation and practices them; is benevolent (disposed to do
good) and has an extensive love of the people; and will be absolutely cou-
rageous in facing a corrupt ruler.
The Confucian moral code is much more sophisticated than any con-
temporary code of ethics with which I am familiar. But, a mere description
of the qualities of a good Confucian official does not provide a set of
coherent principles that can form the moral justification for bureaucracy.
This requires a consideration of education, moral decision making,
 Frederickson / CONFUCIUS AND BUREAUCRACY 617

service to those in power, and the nature of order in society—matters to

which I now turn.

THE NATURE OF MORAL CONVENTIONS AND

THEIR IMPORTANCE IN GOVERNING

If there is to be the rule of man rather than the rule of law, what stan-
dards should guide behavior and provide social cohesion? In Confucian
ethics, order is found in patterned forms of moral convention. The literal
translation is the English words, rites or rituals, but these words fail to
convey either the power of the idea or its practical meaning. Bureaucratic
or official moral conventions should include the proper forms of supervi-
sion of others, so they will be motivated; respect for the supervisor—the
correct way to communicate with subordinates so there will be honesty
and integrity in superior/subordinate relations; the correct forms of rela-
tions with citizens so as to respond to their interests and be fair and just in
administering services to them; and in correct forms of loyalty and
responsiveness to those who rule. Virtually all of these moral conventions
are approximately the same thing as the day-to-day workings of the best of
modern public administration practices.
To be a good official, one must learn and regularly practice the moral
conventions of governance. These conventions appear to be somewhat
more patterned than in the West, a bit like Western notions of protocol in
diplomacy and formal deference in legislative debate or in military organi-
zations and management. Although Confucian moral conventions include
such formal relations, they are also filled with insights regarding nuanced
informal relations.
The important point is this: In Confucian ethics, all bureaucratic rela-
tions are to be guided by moral conventions. Rather than public adminis-
tration being the law in action, public administration is morality in action.
Waldo said that public administration is a form of politics. Confucius
would say that public administration is a form of morality. Issues of right
and wrong penetrate all of bureaucracy, and the effective official will, by
education and experience, learn and practice right or moral behavior.
Confucian notions of moral conventions are remarkably close to the
principles of philosophy, which the Western world inherited from the
Enlightenment. Montesquieu, for example, argued that a government of
moral conventions is to be preferred to a government of laws because an
increase in lawmaking is an indication of a breakdown in social morality
(Leys, 1997).
618 ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY / January 2002

To understand the centrality of morality in Confucianism, one must

consider its approach to education, the subject to which I now turn.

THE IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION AND MERIT

To Western eyes, the single most obvious shared characteristic of the

peoples of the countries of East Asia is the extraordinary importance they
attach to education. In the Confucian states, it is assumed that both gov-
ernmental and family investments in education will reap cultural, social,
and especially economic benefits. This assumption clearly traces to Con-
fucian origins and to the 2,000-year period of respect for Confucius as the
supreme teacher—his birthday is still celebrated in China as Teachers’
Day. “This is a cruel irony. Of course Confucius devoted much attention to
education but he never considered teaching as his first and real calling. His
true vocation was politics. He had a mystical faith in his political mission”
(Leys, 1997, pp. xxv-xxvi).
Part of that political mission was to replace feudal-hereditary rulers
with scholar-rulers, and education was the key. Through education, one
could become a good official, part of the ruling elite. In this way, Confu-
cius built an enduring link between education and political power.
Throughout China, Japan, and Korea, education came to be the great
engine of social mobility, as parents without noble lineage sought educa-
tion for their children as the way for them to achieve social and economic
standing. This Confucian respect for education was true 2,000 years ago
and is just as manifest today.
Confucian education had these characteristics: “It was open to all indif-
ferently—rich and poor, noble and plebeian. Its purpose was primarily
moral: intellectual achievement was only a means towards ethical
self-cultivation” (Leys, 1997, p. xxvii). Education, it is assumed, brings
understanding and knowledge, and with understanding and knowledge
the educated person will be moral and behave properly. Examinations to
measure individual merit are used to select the officials who make up the
civil service. It is little wonder, therefore, that the Confucian states are
sometimes referred to as “bureaucratic cultures.”

In modern times, even after the abrogation of the civil service examination
system and the fall of the Empire, although education ceased to be the key to
political authority—which in this new situation was more likely to come
out of the barrel of a gun—the prestige traditionally attached to culture con-
tinued to survive in the mentality of the Confucian societies: the educated
 Frederickson / CONFUCIUS AND BUREAUCRACY 619

man, however poor and powerless, still commanded more respect than the
wealthy or the powerful. (Leys, 1997, p. xxiii)

Confucian education was humanistic and universalistic with a distinct

emphasis on literature and particularly poetry, music, languages, and
above all, politics. A modern vestige of this approach to education is found
in the liberal arts curricula of Western universities, and another is the
examinations given to recent college graduates who seek to enter the U.S.
Foreign Service. The traditions of selecting top bureaucrats from the best
students in the best universities or from highly selective special colleges
for prospective government leaders continues to be practiced in Great
Britain, France, and Germany.
Confucian education is not technical, nor does it have to do with tech-
niques. The purpose of education is not to accumulate technical informa-
tion or specialized expertise or to be trained with narrow application. The
purpose of education is not about having, it is about being, to develop
one’s humanity (Leys, 1997). This aspect of Confucian education is dis-
tinctly out of step with contemporary education and with the modern
emphasis on technical and scientific development in the West. The Confu-
cian states still tend to favor the liberally educated.

HOW TO SERVE THOSE IN POWER

Then, as now, one of the primary problems faced by the good official
was how to serve those in power, particularly if they were evil or corrupt.
Because the Confucian good official was schooled in issues of morality,
this issue was a key feature of education and of the moral conventions.
Courage, therefore, is an essential moral attribute for the good official: the
courage to tell the prince the truth even if it offends him or the courage to
give one’s life to be righteous. Mencius, the primary disciple of Confu-
cius, developed a nuanced conception of bureaucratic courage in which
dissent was essential but did not obligate the good official to die if doing so
would not likely change events. This perspective has been carefully com-
pared with the Aquinas conception of courage, the comparison finding
that both believed that moral self-cultivation and an understanding of a
commitment to the virtues would enable a good official to achieve a state
of spiritually informed reality that would give greater courage (Leys,
1997). Another follower, Xun Zi, would sum up the matter of courage to
dissent thus: “A good official follows the Way, rather than the ruler” (Leys,
1997, p. xxix).
620 ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY / January 2002

In the 20th-century West, the matter of bureaucratic courage and dis-

sent is usually debated in light of the Holocaust. Arendt and others attrib-
uted the failure of courage on the part of many German bureaucrats, as
well as bureaucrats in conquered countries, to the effects of specialization,
division of labor, and other forms of the compartmentalization of work, to
tendencies toward blind loyalty to those in power, to a pervasive anti-Sem-
itism, and to a banality in which unspeakable evil became ordinary. There
were, of course, conspicuous examples of the courage of good officials
(Arendt, 1963).
The Holocaust has not resulted in the Western development of a bureau-
cratic morality that would mitigate against similar evils in the future.
Indeed, the attempt to patch morality into policy analysis in the form of
“speaking truth to power” has had little lasting effect (Frederickson &
Hart, 1985).

THE NATURE OF ORDER IN SOCIETY

Concepts of social order, harmony, and balance characteristic of Chi-

nese ideology are also central to Confucianism. Among the best known
statements is this: “Let the lord be a lord; the subject a subject; the father a
father; the son a son” (Leys, 1997, p. 57). In the Confucian view, the
sociopolitical order depends on appropriate definitions and descriptions
of each person’s identity, role, duties, privileges, and responsibilities. One
of the primary responsibilities of the good official is to “get the names and
the words right,” meaning to understand the identity and role of each per-
son and to respect and sustain that person in that identity and role. Part of
identity and role is associated with birth and family, but an equally impor-
tant part, as we have seen in the earlier consideration of the good official
and education, has to do with talent and education. A millennium later,
Plato developed a similar philosophy, and more recently, Hobbes’s idea of
a social contract has many of the same features.
Singling out Confucian concepts of social order, without a contextual
consideration of the other key elements of Confucian ideology, could logi-
cally lead one to the view that this philosophy advocates rigid class dis-
tinctions. The equally important emphasis on moral conventions, educa-
tion, and virtue in Confucian logic should serve to indicate that the
importance of clarifying, understanding, and respecting different roles in
society is not the same as consigning persons to fixed social classes.
This aspect of Confucian logic has a modern appeal, particularly in the
West—with its adult children, infantile adults, incestuous fathers, criminal
 Frederickson / CONFUCIUS AND BUREAUCRACY 621

children, and androgynous individuals. All of this reflects an uncertainty

and confusion of roles, obligations, age, gender, and place, if any, in the
family. The moral capacity of political or social leaders to reestablish
those roles and identities is limited. It is no wonder, therefore, that West-
ern thinkers are rediscovering the importance of roles, responsibilities,
identities, and rituals or ceremonies, in echoes of the 2,500-year-old argu-
ments of the Confucians (Tong, 1986; Wildavsky, 1979).

THE DEFINITIONS OF VIRTUE AND MORALITY

As with the early Western philosophers Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle,

the Confucians took as their central question the nature of individual char-
acter and asked, What traits of character make one a good person? It is,
then, on the subject of individual virtue or morality that one finds the
greatest congruence between Western and Confucian philosophy. Indeed,
the thorough comparison of Mencius (the best-known follower of Confu-
cius and his primary interpreter) and Aquinas, by Lee H. Yearley (1990),
indicates that in the treatment of virtue the two are more nearly alike than
they are different. For example, Mencius described “graded love” in
which the first priority of love is for one’s family, followed by benevolence
to all human beings, followed by a general regard for all living creatures
and things. Aquinas suggested an “order of charity” that is rather similar.
The greatest difference is the relative importance placed on the virtue
of propriety in Confucian thought as compared to Western philosophy.
Propriety is the ordering of social interaction that includes the learned and
practiced moral conventions described in the earlier consideration of the
good official. But, propriety also includes proper behavior at rites and ritu-
als, appropriate emotions in particular circumstances, and so forth.
Because there are few Western parallels to East Asian practices of pro-
priety, they are even today confusing and misunderstood by Westerners.
What appears to be quaint courtesy and exaggerated deference in this
propriety is merely the process by which many moral conventions are
played out.
The distinctions in Confucian virtue usually take about this form. The
first is intelligence, an understanding or awareness of right and wrong,
learned through education and experience. Second is righteousness,
which is doing right rather than wrong. One is intelligent if one knows that
murder is wrong. One is righteous if one does not murder. It is especially
important, however, that one does righteous things for the right reasons.
Righteousness always trumps propriety, and the righteous act done with a
622 ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY / January 2002

pure and unselfish heart is greater than mere serviceable goodness. Benev-
olence, the responsibility to help others and relieve suffering, is the next
virtue, and again the attitude or reason for benevolence can be almost as
important as benevolence. The ultimate state of benevolence is to have an
unquestioning love of others and tireless willingness to serve their inter-
ests. Anyone who knows Judeo-Christian religion or the Western philoso-
phers of virtue, or even the modern, popular The Book of Virtues, will rec-
ognize Confucian virtues and not find them strange or unusual (Bennett,
1993).

SECTION 3: THE IMPLICATIONS OF

CONFUCIAN BUREAUCRATIC MORALITY

I return now to the claim made at the beginning of this study that the
most complete and robust moral justification for bureaucracy is found not
in Western thought but in East Asia in Confucian thought. The research of
the contemporary modernization theorists, and particularly of Ronald
Inglehart and Marita Carballo, has determined that there is a distinct Con-
fucian-based bureaucratic culture found today in China, Japan, and Korea.
To attempt to understand that culture, I have set out in simplified form the
seven primary features or characteristics of Confucian thought and
described the association between each of these features of Confucian
thinking and theories and concepts of bureaucracy and bureaucratic
behavior. I turn now to the implications of these contentions and to the
question with which I began.
Table 1, as a way to sum up these arguments, is an array of simplified
“ideal type” comparisons of Western and Confucian approaches to bureau-
cratic morality. Only when the key features of Confucian thought regard-
ing politics and bureaucracy are brought together in this way can one
understand the primacy of morality or virtue. Virtually the entire Confu-
cian logic of education for public service, selection for public service,
effective functioning in government work, effective service to those in
power, and effective service to the people pivots around matters of
morality.
In the Confucian ideal type, good officials, rather than laws, are the pri-
mary instruments of governance. The power derives from moral actions
and from example. They worry more about doing what is right than about
efficiency and productivity. Their roles and relationships are clear, as are
their obligations to one another and to the people. The standards for action
 Frederickson / CONFUCIUS AND BUREAUCRACY 623

TABLE 1
A Simplified Comparison of Approaches to
Bureaucratic Morality in Western and Confucian Thought

Subject Western Thought Confucian or East Asian Thought

Instruments of Constitutions, laws, Man, judgment

governance regulations
Power From authority, from position From morality; from position,
by example
Purpose Efficiency, effectiveness, Understanding, to do good
equity
Rules and roles Ambiguous Clear
Processes Good management, total Moral conventions, intuitive,
quality, scientific, decision judgmental, moral action
making
Values Neutrality, policy advocacy Virtue
Education Knowledge, skills Understanding, virtue
Structure Fluid, loosely coupled, Hierarchy, clear
ambiguous
Qualities Competence, judgment Virtue, judgment
Aspirations To serve, to lead To do good
Standards Constitutions, laws, Moral conventions,
regulations, codes of ethics self-cultivation, virtue

have to do with virtue and morality, a virtue and morality grounded in edu-
cation, experience, and persistent self-cultivation. In the West, the closest
approximation of the Confucian ideal-type good official would be found
in the logic of the reflective practitioner (Schon, 1983) and the perspective
found among public administration ethics scholars who favor the personal
responsibility model (Cooper, 1998; Denhardt, 1988; Hart, 1984; Rohr,
1998; Thompson, 1987).
The great era of the scholar-rulers is long past, but the influence of
Confucian thinking still literally defines a whole culture. Because the
traits found in that culture include some of the elements in the right-hand
column in Table 1, reference to China, Japan, and Korea as Confucian
states with bureaucratic cultures is entirely appropriate. It is, however,
correct to observe that the centuries of totalitarian government and colo-
nialism following the time of the scholar-rulers have significantly modi-
fied government and bureaucracy in East Asia. The power of Confucian
ideas eroded and was used to elevate one class over another, to maintain
power by lineage, and to generally subjugate the people. The splendid and
thorough study of the application of Confucian statecraft in the Korean
624 ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY / January 2002

Choson Dynasty by James B. Palais describes the Confucian remodeling

of the ruling class by education and schools, the gradual discontinuation
of slavery, land reform, the reform of government institutions and the
economy, as well as some significant abuses of authority in the context of
Confucian rule (Palais, 1996). Palais concluded his study with these points:

The moral basis for government never lost force even while the state was
losing ground to human weakness, corruption, and immorality. The ulti-
mate goal of producing a moral order according to Confucian standards was
maintained. . . . These elements may by lugubrious reminders of subjuga-
tion to foreign culture for modern Korean nationalists, but they also are
symbols of the membership and participation of the Korean Confucians in a
world much broader than the confines of the Korean peninsula, governed by
levels of complexity and civilization far higher than most in world history.

Both traditional Western philosophy and Confucian thought predate

the theory and practice of democratic self-government. Much of both
Eastern and Western philosophy was developed in a time of emperors,
kings, mandarians, yougbon, peasants, and slaves. For two millennia in
East Asia, Confucius thought and enlightened bureaucratic practices did
much to ameliorate and make tolerable nondemocratic practices. In time,
Confucian ideas came to be used to subjugate others, and less-than virtu-
ous bureaucrats were much a part of the decline of government by the
scholar-rulers. It is little wonder that by the 19th century, the common
image of the Confucian was mostly negative, assumed to be the source of
many of the ills of totalitarian government in East Asia. The particular
issue was (and is) the evident accommodation to class distinctions in Con-
fucian thought. In short, much of East Asia Confucianism came to be
equated with elite rule. It also came to be equated with despotic and cor-
rupt rule. That there has been corrupt, despotic rule by totalitarian elites at
certain times in the modern history of the countries of East Asia can not be
in doubt. Attributing the negative characteristics of totalitarian govern-
ment to Confucian culture, however, may be more a political slogan than a
fact.
In East Asia today, the big issues are first, democratic self-government;
second, economic development; and third, the elimination of corruption
in government and business. Confucian thought and the best of the tradi-
tions of Confucian culture can contribute favorably to each of these issues.
The core Confucian ideas have already been modified to blend the rule of
law with the rule of man. Constitutionally established democratic govern-
ments are in place in Japan and Korea, each with lawmaking legislative
 Frederickson / CONFUCIUS AND BUREAUCRACY 625

bodies chosen by the people. Both countries also have strong professional
bureaucracies built on Confucian traditions. This has proved to be an
impressive combination, which partially accounts for their economic mir-
acles and for the development of their large and prosperous middle
classes. This is good evidence that Confucian bureaucracy and democratic
self-government are not only compatible with economic growth, but they
may also be a powerful mix of economic, bureaucratic, and democratic
ideas (Fukuyama, 1995).
China is another matter. A totalitarian elite rules and is attempting a
rapid growth capitalist economy in a totalitarian context. At this point,
democratic self-government for China seems a long way off.
All three countries struggle with pervasive corruption. The morality of
many public officials is low, and this includes some democratically
elected leaders as well as some civil servants. Part of this corruption can be
explained as a negative side effect of rapid modernization. Part of it can be
explained by the electoral processes of popular democracy and the cor-
rupting effect of the costs of campaigning for office, which is evident not
only in East Asia but in many Western countries with longer democratic
traditions. But, much of it appears to have to do with a decline in personal
morality on the part of public officials. A rekindling of Confucian ideal-
ism in the modern democratic-capitalist context would do much to reduce
government corruption.
In the West, the moral arguments of the Confucianist can complement a
bureaucratic morality primarily tied to constitutions and laws. There is
widespread evidence of a sharp decline in trust of government officials
and a diminished respect for governmental institutions (Nye, Zalikow, &
King, 1997). The limits of governmental capacity to manage complex
social problems by laws and regulations are now apparent. As a conse-
quence, we see the stirrings of the civil society movement and the yearn-
ing for community. We witness the relentless calls for a higher morality
among our leaders. Western leaders would do well to consider the public
morality of the Confucianist good official practicing moral conventions so
as to earn the trust and respect of all the people.

NOTES

1. The word bureaucracy and the phrase public administration are used interchangeably
and are understood to mean the same thing—the professional administration of public (not
just governmental) organizations; see Frederickson (1997).
626 ADMINISTRATION & SOCIETY / January 2002

2. There have been many Western contenders in the search for the moral basis of bureau-
cracy. Weber’s (1947) sociology still stands as a remarkably accurate description of
large-scale complex organizations. Weber’s account of bureaucracy makes strong empirical
claims but does not attempt a moral justification. Woodrow Wilson argued for constitution-
ally derived democratic proceduralism for lawmaking and an efficiency-oriented profes-
sional bureaucracy for administration, but he did not suggest that public administration
should have an independent moral justification. Several contemporary theorists, including
John Rohr (1986, 1998), Charles Goodsell (1995), Gary Wamsley et al. (1990), David
Rosenbloom (1983), and David K. Hart (1984), made stronger moral claims that tie together
constitutionally based democratic proceduralism, a professional public administration with
extensive discretion, and Judeo-Christian understanding of right and wrong as the basis of a
bureaucratic ethic. Theodore Lowi (1969) discounted these claims, arguing that in the con-
text of democratic government there can be no independent moral justification for bureau-
cracy. For this reason, Lowi argued, law and policy must be precise and specific, leaving
bureaucracy little need for either latitude or ethics. The market theorists—Niskanen (1971),
Downs (1967), Tullock (1965), Arrow (1974), and others—claim that the primary purpose
of public administration should be efficiency and economy or efficiency. The market is
inherently more efficient. Vincent Ostrom (1973) combined market logic with a kind of min-
imalist constitutional interpretation to fashion a unique decentralized commons in which cit-
izens make market-like public choices. Proponents of the new public administration claim
that efficiency and economy are the only reasons for public administration. Using a social
equity argument, they claim that the public sector is often faced with politically unresolved
issues of fairness; therefore, an ethic of social equity rises to the level of bureaucratic moral
imperative.

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H. George Frederickson is the Edwin O. Stene Distinguished Professor of Public

Administration at the University of Kansas. He is a past-president of the American
Society for Public Administration (ASPA), a fellow of the National Academy of Pub-
lic Administration, and the recipient of the Gaus, Waldo, Levine, and ASPA/National
Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration Distinguished Research
awards.