014 ARROYO v. DE VENECIA (COSCOLLUELA) The issue is W/N RA 8420 is unconstitutional. NO.
14 August 1997 | Mendoza, J. | Internal Rules and Discipline
PETITIONER: Joker P. Arroyo, Edcel C. Lagman, John Hnery R.
Osmeña, Wigberto E. Tañada, and Ronaldo B. Zamora
RESPONDENTS: Jose de Venecia, Raul Daza, Rodolfo Albano, the
Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue
SUMMARY: RA 8420 (sin taxes on manufacture and sale of beer and
cigarettes amending certain provisions of the NIRC) originated from the
HoR and was approved on the 3rd reading. It was then transmitted to the
Senate which also approved the same with certain amendments on the 3 rd
reading. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile
disagreeing provisions. On Nov. 21, 1996, the bicam submitted its report
to the HoR at 8am. After recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier delivered his
sponsorship speech and was interpellated by Sarmiento. Petitioner Arroyo
interrupted, moving to adjourn for lack of quorum. Chair Daza called the
roll and declared presence of quorum. Petitioner Arroyo’s appeal was
defeated when put to a vote. Petitioner Arroyo registered to interppellate
and announced his intent to bring up the issue on quorum, but he never
did. Respondent Albano moved to approve and ratify the conference
committee report. Deputy Speaker Daza asked for any objections.
Petitioner Arroyo asked, “What is that, Mr. Speaker?” and simultaneously
Chair Daza declared that there were no objections. Petitioner Arroyo then
said, “No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know
what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.” The
session was suspended for one minute and when resumed, Respondent
Albano moved to adjourn the session the following week. The bill was
signed by the Speaker and President and certified by the secretaries of
both Houses on the same day. The enrolled bill was signed into law by
President Ramos on Nov. 22, 1996. Petitioner Arroyo et al. argue that
there are four different versions of the transcript and that is showed the
violation of the HoR rules thereby making RA 8420 unconstitutional. In
particular, Art. VI. Sec. 13 (3) of the Constitution provides that “each
House may determine the rules of its proceedings” and that violation of
such rules is a violation of the Constitution. The SolGen and Respondent
de Vencia, et al.’s Comments anchor on the principle of separation of
powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that enforcement of rules
cannot be sough in the courts except insofar as they implement
constitutional requirements
Petitioners Arroyo et al. do not claim that there was no quorum but merely
that Petitioner Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum. The constitutional provision being cited by
Petitioner Arroyo et al. serves to support claims of autonomy of the
legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by courts.
Here, they are citing it for the opposite purpose. The rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them. Each House may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights and there
should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitaitons all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say
that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It
is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been
prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is
not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power,
always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations
suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or
tribunal. Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to
its authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House has acted
in a matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion
of the independence of the legislative department for the court to set aside
such action as void because it may think that the House has misconstrued
or departed from its own rules of procedure.
Other grounds why the petition was dismissed:
[Jurisdiction of the SC is subject to the case and controversy
requirement under Art. VIII Sec. 5]
Although the Constitution expanded the scope of judicial inequity, it did
not altogether do away with political questions. There function of SC is to
check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond
the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction. If, then, the established rule is
that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely
of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that
such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the
government has “gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction”
so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII. Sec. 1 power.
[The Chair and Petitioner Arroyo were talking simulataneously]
 Although he objected to the motion, the approval had already been
declared, symbolized by its banging of the gavel. Furthermore, there was
no rule cited which specifically requires that in cases of approving
conference committee reports, the Chair must restate the motion and
conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. In fact, the way H. No. 7189 has
been approved has been the legislative practice.
[The enrolled bill doctrine is conclusive of the law’s due enactment]
The signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President
of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of
Congress that it was passed on Nov. 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due
enactment.  what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.”
DOCTRINE: Each House may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations
all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is
no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better,
more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule
that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of
time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is
exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the
House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the
challenge of any other body or tribunal.
FACTS:
1. RA 8240 amended certain provisions of the NIRC by imposing “sin
taxes” on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes and is
hereby being assailed as unconstitutional via petition for certiorari
and prohibition.
2. Petitioners Arroyo et al., are members of the HoR and are alleging
that Respondents de Venecia et al. violated rules of the HoR which
they claim are constitutionally mandated.
3. RA 8240 originated in the HoR and was approved on the 3 rd reading.
It was transmitted to the Senate which likewise approved it with
certain amendments on the 3rd reading. A bicam conference
committee was formed to reconcile disagreeing provisions.
4. On Nov. 21, 1996 the bicam conference committee submitted its
report to the HoR at 8am. After recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier
delivered his sponsorship speech. He was interpellated by Rep.
Rogelio Sarmiento but was interrupted by Petitioner Arroyo when he
moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. After a roll call, Chair/Deputy
Speaker Raul Daza declared the presence of a quorum. The appeal of
Petitioner Arroyo was defeated when put to a vote.
5. Petitioner Arroyo registered to interpellate and announced his intent
to question the quorum, but he never did. What happened thereafter
was published by Congress in the newspaper. Respondent Albano
moved to approve and ratify the conference committee report.
Deputy Speaker Daza asked for any objections. Petitioner Arroyo
asked, “What is that, Mr. Speaker?” and simultaneously Chair Daza
declared that there were no objections. Petitioner Arroyo then said,
“No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know
The session was suspended for one minute and when resumed,
Respondent Albano moved to adjourn the session the following
week.1
1
MR. ALBANO. MR. Speaker, I move that we now approved and ratify the
conference committee report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know
what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock, Wednesday, next
week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o'clock,
Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
 6. The bill was signed by the Speaker and President and certified by the
secretaries of both Houses on the same day. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Ramos on Nov. 22, 1996.
7. Petitioners Arroyo et al. alleged that there are 4 different versions of
the transcript of Petitioner Arroyo’s interpellation. 2 They argue that
these versions differ in three points:
a. In the audio-sound recording the word “approved” cannot be
heard although it appears in line 13 in the other three other
versions.
b. In the transcript certified on Nov. 21, 1996, the word “no”
on line 17 appears only once, while the other versions it is
reapted 3 times.
c. In the published version, it does not contain the sentence
“You better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the
question of the quorum,” which appears in other versions.
8. Although denying, Respondents de Venecia, et al. admitted without
conceding the correctness of the transcripts. Both parties agreed that
the word “approved” appears in the transcripts.
9. Of particular importance is the proceedings of the HoR on the
conference committee report on H. No. 7198. Petitioners Arroyo et
al. argued that RA 8240 is unconstitutional because it was passed in
violation of HoR rules. In particular, Art. VI. Sec. 13 (3) of the
Constitution provides that “each House may determine the rules of
its proceedings” and that violation of such rules is a violation of the
Constitution. They allege that the rules violated were:
a. Rule VIII Sec. 25 and Rule XVIII Sec. 103. Chair Daza, in
submitting the conference committee report allegedly did not
call for the yeas and nays but simly asked for its approval by
motion in order to prevent Petitioner Arooyo from
2
(1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall
immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which
Petitioner Lagman obtained from the operators of the sound system;
(2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21,
1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21, 1996,
also obtained by Rep. Lagman;
(3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21,
1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996,
also obtained by Rep. Lagman; and
(4) the published version. 
questioning the presence of a quorum.
b. Rule XIX Sec 112. Chair Daza deliberately ignored
Petitioner Arroyo’s question, “What is that Mr. Speaker?”
and did not repeat Respondent Albano’s motion to approve
or ratify.
c. Rule XVI Sec. 97. Chair Daza refused to recognized
Petitioner Arroyo and instead acted on the motion of
Respondent Albano and declared the report approved.
d. Rule XX Secs. 121-122, Rule XXI Sec. 123, Rule XVIII,
Sec. 109. Chair Daza suspended the session without first
ruling on Petitioner Arroyo’s question.
10. The SolGen and Respondent de Vencia, et al.’s comment anchor on
the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine.
They argue that enforcement of rules cannot be sough in the courts
except insofar as they implement constitutional requirements. In
Respondent de Venecia’s comment, he also denies that his
certification of H. No. 7189 is false and spurious and contends that
under the journal entry rule, the judiciary inquiry sought is barred.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether or not RA 8240 is unconstitutional because it was passed
allegedly without conformity with the rules of the House of
Representatives. NO — The rules adopted by deliberative bodies are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
body adopting them.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
[IMPT] Alleged violations are merely of internal rules of procedure of the
House
1. Petitioners Arroyo et al. do not claim that there was no quorum but
merely that Petitioner Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum.
2. The constitutional provision being cited by Petitioner Arroyo et al.
serves to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to
conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here, they are
citing it for the opposite purpose.
3. The rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
 observance, the courts have no concern. Mere failure to conform will
not invalidate the action when the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure.
4. Each House may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or
violate fundamental rights and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these
limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the
House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other
way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no
objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has been
prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules
is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous
power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any
other body or tribunal.
5. The Constitution declares that each house shall determine the rules
of its own proceedings and shall have all powers necessary for a
branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state. Rules of
proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to its
authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House has
acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted
invasion of the independence of the legislative department for the
court to set aside such action as void because it may think that the
House has misconstrued or departed from its own rules of procedure.
6. When it appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be
permitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not
complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure upon the
bill, intermediate its introduction and final passage. The presumption
is conclusive that they have done so. No court has ever declared an
act of the legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of
procedure made by itself , or the respective branches thereof, and
which it or they may change or suspend at will. If there are any such
adjudications, we decline to follow them.
7. In the case of Schweizer v. Territory a gambling statute was assailed
as unconstitutional because the suspension of the rule on three
readings was not approved by the requisite two-thirds vote. The SC
of Oklohama in that case said that there was no constitutional
provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in any
particular manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it
sees fit, either in accordance with its own rules, or in violation
thereof, or without making any rules. The courts cannot declare an
act of the legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules of
procedure made by itself to govern its deliberations.
8. The SC then cites former CJ Fernando: Rules are hardly permanent
in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinary have
no concern with their observance. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken
if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects
person other than members of the legislative body the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open
to question in a case where private rights are involved. 
9. In this case there are no rights of private individuals involved but
only those of a member who chose to transfer the dispute to the SC.
The three departments have their own separate spheres which the
others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on
which the constitutional order rests.
Jurisdiction of the SC is subject to the case and controversy
requirement under Art. VIII Sec. 5
10. Petitioner Arroyo et al. cites Art. VIII Sec. 1 but there must a
justiciable controvery before courts can adjudicate constitutional
questions. Although the Constitution expanded the scope of judicial
inequity, it did not altogether do away with political questions. There
function of SC is to check whether or not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction.
11. If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the
legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of
procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present
a situation in which a branch of the government has “gone beyond
the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction” so as to call for the
exercise of our Art. VIII. Sec. 1 power.
The Chair and Petitioner Arroyo were talking simulataneously
12. While Chair Daza announced the approval of the conference
committee report, Petitioner Arroyo was simultaneously asking,
“What is that… Mr. Speaker?” Thus, although he objected to the
motion, the approval had already been declared, symbolized by its
banging of the gavel.
13. Furthermore, there was no rule cited which specifically requires that
in cases of approving conference committee reports, the Chair must
 restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. In
fact, the way H. No. 7189 has been approved has been the legislative
practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the bills
which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the
conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and
Customs Code were approved.
14. Nor does the COnsitution require that the yeas and the nays of the
Members be taken every time a House has to vote. Except:
a. upon the last and third readings of a bill
b. at the request of one-fifth of the Members present
c. repassing a bill over the veto of the President.
15. Petitioner Arroyo could have also raised his concerns when the
session was resumed. He could have objected if there was anything
he wanted to say. The fact, however is that he did not. Also
noteworthy is that of the 111 members present on Nov. 21, 1996,
only Petitioners Arroyo et al are questioning the manner by which
the conference committee report was approved.
The enrolled bill doctrine is conclusive of the law’s due enactment
16. The signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the
President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed on Nov. 21, 1996 are
conclusive of its due enactment.  factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and substance
17. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of
Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine. To
be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT
cases that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In
one case  the SC “went behind” an enrolled bill and consulted the
Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been
approved by the Senate. But, where as here there is no evidence to
the contrary, the Court will respect the certification of the presiding
officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this
rule, the Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths
vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had
not been obtained, because “a duly authenticated bill or resolution
imports absolute verify and is binding on the courts.”
18. Time and again the Court has refused to even look into allegations
that the enrolled bill sent to the President contained provisions which
had been surreptitiously inserted in the conference committee. It has
also refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon
the last reading of a bill. In other cases the Court has denied claims
that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the
presiding officers of both Houses.
19. Petitioner Arroyo et al. advanced no argument to abandon from the
rule.
20. Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question
is confirmed by the Journal of the House of Nov. 21, 1996 which
shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which
became RA 8740, was approved on that day. 
21. The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are
required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. With respect to
other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals
have also been accorded conclusive effect.
SEPARATE OPINIONS
Vitug, J., concurring opinion
1. Absent a clear case of gadalej, I would respect the judgment of the
Congress under whose province the specific responsibility falls and
the authority to act is vested. o do otherwise would be an
unwarranted intrusion into the internal affairs of a co-equal,
independent and coordinate branch of government. 
Romer, J., separate opinion
1. Reliance on the enrolled bill doctrine is not t be discontinued but its
application must be limited to minor matters relating to form and
of the law itself.
2. Unlike in Tolentino (in that case he did not want to use the enrolled
bill doctrine), the rules of the HoR allegedly violated in the instant
petition are purely internal rules designed for the orderly conduct of
the House’s business. They have no direct or reasonable nexus to the
requireents and proscriptions of the Constitution in the passage of a
bill which would otherwise warrant the Court’s intervention.
Likewise, there are no complaints on substantial alterations
introduced in RA 8240.
Puno, J., concurring and dissenting opinion
1. The issues posed by Petitioner Arroyo et al. are justiciable. In Ballin,
the US SC clearly confimed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon
the validity of congressional rules. Additionally, in the US, the
judiciary has pruned the political thicket. The US SC in the case of
Baker v. Carr assumed jurisdiction ruling that the political question
doctrine will not be so applied as to “promote only disorder” and that
the courts cannot reect as “no law suit” a bona fide controversy as to
wether some action denominated “political” exceeds constitutional
authority.
2. I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration
 to this new constitutional provision (Art. VIII Sec. 1) as the case at
bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to
review violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to
our trust as the last bulwark against government abuses if we refuse
to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure,
it is this exceeding timidity to unsheath the judicial sword that has
increasingly emboldened other branches of government to denigrate,
if not defy, orders of our courts. 
3. As to the enrolled bill doctrine, there are more than a few US SC
rulings as to the reasons for the withering, if not demise of the
enrolled bill theory. It no longer enjoys its once unassailable
respectability in US. It is high time that we reexamine our preference
for the enrolled bill doctrine. Our very own local jurisprudence
would show that we have not blindly accepted the conclusiveness of
the enrolled bill doctrine. Even in Tolentino, Mr. Justice Mendoza
was cautious enough to hold that "no claim is here made that the
enrolled bill is absolute. I respectfully submit that it is now time for
the Court to make a definitive pronouncement that we no longer give
our unqualified support to the enrolled bill doctrine. There are
compelling reasons for this suggested change in stance. For one, the
enrolled bill is appropriate only in England where it originated
because in England there is no written Constitution and the
Parliament is supreme. For another, many of the courts in the United
States have broken away from the rigidity and unrealism of the
enrolled bill in light of contemporary developments in lawmaking.
And more important, our uncritical adherence to the enrolled bill is
inconsistent with our Constitution, laws and rules.