LAW NOTE PREPARED BY PRESENTED ON

DARA FINLEY, 3L MARCH 2021

ANTONIN SCALIA LAW SCHOOL - GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY

THE ABRAHAM
ACCORDS AND
WESTERN SAHARA

THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE DEAL

Global Rule of Law & Liberty Legal Defense Fund

GLA
© 2021 All Rights Reserved
 The Abraham Accords and Western Sahara: The Legal Status of the Deal
Prepared by the Global Liberty Alliance Rule of Law & Legal Defense Fund

Ms. Dara Finley, 3L **

Antonin Scalia Law School – George Mason University

Spring 2021

I. Introduction

On December 10th, 2020, President Trump tweeted that he signed a proclamation

recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara. 1 This announcement came as part

of President Trump’s “Abraham Accords,” deals brokered by the United States with various

Arab nations to normalize their relations with Israel. 2 For example, Bahrain, the United Arab

Emirates, and Sudan all normalized relations with Israel in return for various benefits from the

United States.3 Sudan was removed from the US state sponsored terrorism list, and the United

** Dara Finley is a third year law student at George Mason Antonin Scalia Law School graduating in May 2021.
She currently works as a law clerk with the Global Liberty Alliance. She has a passion for international human
rights law and hopes to pursue a career in the field.
1
Safaa Kasraoui, Trump Recognizes Morocco’s Sovereignty Over Western Sahara, MOROCCO WORLD NEWS (Dec.
10, 2020), https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2020/12/328413/trump-recognizes-moroccos-sovereignty-over-
western-sahara/.

2
U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, THE ABRAHAM ACCORDS DECLARATION, available at https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-
accords/.

3
U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, ABRAHAM ACCORDS: DECLARATION OF PEACE, COOPERATION, AND CONSTRUCTIVE
DIPLOMATIC AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS (2020), available at https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/09/Bahrain_Israel-Agreement-signed-FINAL-15-Sept-2020-508.pdf; U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE,
ABRAHAM ACCORDS PEACE AGREEMENT: TREATY OF PEACE, DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND FULL NORMALIZATION
BETWEEN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AND THE STATE OF ISRAEL (2020), available at https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/09/UAE_Israel-treaty-signed-FINAL-15-Sept-2020-508.pdf; U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, THE
ABRAHAM ACCORDS DECLARATION (2020), available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Sudan-
AA.pdf.

1
Arab Emirates received an arms deal containing 50 F-35 stealth weapons and 18 reaper drones

amounting to millions of dollars.4

The Kingdom of Morocco also received an Abraham Accords deal, and in exchange for

normalization of relations with Israel, the United States recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over

Western Sahara.5 Western Sahara is not a state, it is a “non-self-governing” entity according to

the United Nations; its people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government.6

Morocco and Western Sahara have been embroiled in a state of conflict since 1975 when

Spain left the region as a colonial power. 7 Morocco and Western Sahara fought until 1991 when

the United Nations brokered a ceasefire and established MINURSO (the United Nations Mission

for Referendum in Western Sahara). MINURSO’s mission is to monitor the ceasefire and

organize and conduct a referendum where the Sahrawi people (the indigenous people of Western

Sahara) could vote on whether to integrate with Morocco or remain independent. 8

Most nations have avoided recognition of Western Sahara as either an independent state

or a territory of Morocco; however, Western Sahara is a full-fledged (or an independent state)

member of the African Union and the United States has been a supporter of the MINURSO

mission while still maintaining close trade and security relations with Morocco. 9 The U.S.-

4
See Alex Ward, The battle over Trump’s huge UAE arms deal, explained, VOX (Dec. 1,2020),
https://www.vox.com/2020/12/1/21755390/trump-uae-f35-israel-weapons-sale.

5
U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, JOINT DECLARATION (2020), available at https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/01/Joint-Declaration-US-Morrocco-Israel.pdf.

6
United Nations, Non-Self-Governing Territories, UNITED NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/nsgt.

7
See BBC, Western Sahara profile, BBC (May 14, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
14115273.
8
Background, MINURSO, https://minurso.unmissions.org/background.

9
See Aggrey Mutambo, AU sides with Western Sahara on autonomy despite US decision, THE EAST AFRICAN (Dec.
12, 2020), https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/rest-of-africa/au-sides-with-western-sahara-on-autonomy-despite-us-

2
Morrocco arrangement was met with opposition from actors both inside the United States and

from external international actors and entities. 10

As Biden Administration officials are attempting to implement and achieve its own

foreign policy goals and objectives, this law note discusses how this arrangement was made and

what legal obligations it has imposed under international and customary international law. This

note argues that based on customary international law norms and the doctrine of unilateral

declarations, the deal has imposed no legal obligations on the parties, leaving the United States

free to revoke its recognition of Moroccan sovereignty if it chooses.

II. Background

The conflict over Western Sahara began in 1975 when Spain exited the region as a

colonial power.11 Morocco immediately invaded and annexed Western Sahara, claiming

sovereignty based on cultural and political ties to the region. 12 The Polisario Front, a political

and military organization initially organized to fight against Spanish colonial rule, opposed this

claim.13 In 1976 they proclaimed the Western Sahara as the “Sahrawi Arab Democratic

Republic,” establishing their fight for independence and self-determination.14 From 1975 to

decision-3226802 (the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic was admitted as a member to the AU in 1982); see also
Paul D. Shinkman, GOP Ally Blasts Trump’s Decision to ‘Trade Away’ Western Sahara to Morocco, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2020-12-10/republican-ally-blasts-
trumps-decision-to-trade-away-western-sahara-to-morocco.

10
See id.

11
See BBC, supra note 7.

12
See id.

13
See id.
14
See id.

3
1991, Morocco and the Polisario Front fought, forcing many indigenous Sahrawi people to flee

to Algeria, a Polisario ally. 15

A. MINURSO and Attempted Referendum

By the late 1980’s Morocco had gained control over 80% of Western Sahara, controlling

the most densely populated areas, the resources, and the coast. 16 In 1991 the UN brokered a

ceasefire and established MINURSO, but no referendum has been held. 17 The Sahrawi people

who live under Moroccan control inside Western Sahara face oppression and human rights

violations; they may not demonstrate or exercise their rights to self-determination and many are

political prisoners.18 Sahrawis in Morocco face torture, arbitrary detention, forced dissapearance,

and denial of legal process.19 Despite not achieving international recognition, the African Union

recognizes Western Sahara as an independent member state. 20

Although MINURSO actively enforces its mission, there has been no referendum to

date.21 Dispute between Morocco and Western Sahara over who should vote in the referendum,

how to identify those people, and whether refugees living in Algeria or elsewhere are included

15
See id.
16
See Flora Pidoux, Morocco and Western Sahara: a decades-long war of attrition, THE CONVERSATION (Sept. 19,
2019, 9:26 AM), https://theconversation.com/morocco-and-western-sahara-a-decades-long-war-of-attrition-122084.

17
Id.

18
Morocco and Western Sahara 2019, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-
east-and-north-africa/morocco-and-western-sahara/morocco-and-western-sahara/.

19
Id.

20
See Arpan Banerjee, Morocco Entry to the African Union and the Revival of the Western Sahara Dispute, 59
HARV. INT’L. L. J. (2017), https://harvardilj.org/2017/12/moroccan-entry-to-the-african-union-and-the-revival-of-
the-western-sahara-dispute.
21
MINURSO, Mandate, UNITED NATIONS, https://minurso.unmissions.org/mandate.

4
has delayed the process. 22 Various plans and agreements attempt to resume the process and get a

result.

James Baker, a former US Secretary of State, was asked by UN Secretary General Kofi

Annan to become his personal envoy to the region and achieve a deal. 23 Unfortunately, neither

Morocco or Western Sahara wanted to proceed with the proposed plan, and instead Baker helped

them negotiate the completion of the identification process.24 By 2000, Morocco saw it was

unlikely to win through the referendum, and so offered to discuss a political solution aiming at

autonomous Moroccan sovereignty. 25

The Polisario Front knew it would likely win the referendum and therefore only wanted

to discuss the settlement plan with Morocco. 26 Morocco has rejected numerous plans, and refuses

to recognize a referendum where Western Saharan independence was an option. 27 The UN

Security Council has been unwilling to ask the parties to make the difficult decisions to resolve

the conflict, and therefore the status of Western Sahara has not changed. 28

B. Resumption of Hostilities

22
See Jacques Roussellier, How Autonomous is Autonomy? The Western Sahara Dispute in a Bind, MEI@75
(2018), https://www.mei.edu/publications/how-autonomous-autonomy-western-sahara-dispute-bind.
23
James Baker, Annan’s personal envoy for Western Sahara, resigns, UN NEWS (June 11, 2004),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2004/06/106612-james-baker-annans-personal-envoy-western-sahara-resigns.

24
Anna Theofilopoulou, The United Nations and Western Sahara: A Never-ending Affair, UNITED STATES
INSTITUTE OF PEACE (July 1, 2006), https://www.usip.org/publications/2006/07/united-nations-and-western-sahara-
never-ending-affair.

25
Id.

26
Id.

27
Id.
28
Id.

5
 As of November 13th, 2020 hostilities have resumed; Morocco moved forces into the

buffer zone in Guerguerat after weeks of demonstrations by the Polisario Front, who has been

blocking goods and people from coming along the road (which the Polisario considers illegal)

that connects Morocco and Mauritania. 29 The Polisario Front claims that Moroccan security

forces shot civilians peacefully demonstrating in the zone, and Polisario confirms that they then

targeted military bases along the berm and other posts in about 10 regions of Western Sahara. 30

On December 14th the Sahrawi Ministry of Defense stated that its units had launched around 189

attacks by artillery, mortars, and missiles on the bases.31 The US recognition of Moroccan

sovereignty over Western Sahara could inflame this already hostile environment.

C. The Role of Twitter

The announcement of this deal comes at a time where “Twitter Diplomacy” is on the

rise.32 Many presidents, prime ministers, and state actors use Twitter to announce policy changes

and agreements.33 The status of these communications under domestic US law is that the

President, when tweeting, is acting in his official capacity and therefore the tweets are “official

29
See Morocco: Security forces launch operation in Western Sahara November 13, GARDAWORLD (Nov. 13, 2020,
1:52 PM), https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news-alerts/399371/morocco-security-forces-launch-operation-in-
western-sahara-november-13.
30
Morocco troops launch operation in Western Sahara border zone, ALJAZEERA (Nov. 13, 2020),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/13/morocco-launches-operation-in-western-sahara-border-zone.

31
Interview by Tony Iltis with Hamdi Toubali, After Trump’s Colonial Carve-Up, Western Sahara Has Risen Up,
JACOBIN (Jan. 30, 2021), https://jacobinmag.com/2021/01/western-sahara-polisario-trump-israel-deal.

32
See Krishnadev Calamur, The International Incidents Sparked by Trump’s Twitter Feed in 2017, THE ATLANTIC
(Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/12/trump-tweets-foreign-policy/547892/;
see also Alexi Drew, The Rise of Twitter Diplomacy is Making the World More Dangerous, WORLD POLITICS
REVIEW (Aug 10, 2020), https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28976/the-rise-of-twitter-diplomacy-is-
making-the-world-more-dangerous.

33
See Twitter is the Prime Social Media Network for World Leaders, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (May 31, 2017),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/twitter-is-the-prime-social-media-network-for-world-leaders-
300466300.html.

6
statements.”34 Under international law, state practice had traditionally been expressed through

official acts and statements, not private acts of state actors. 35

Although a tweet is a private action, when used by a President to threaten armed force or

announce an important change in policy it is transformed into a state act. 36 Clearly the President,

under his Article II foreign affairs powers and the Curtiss Wright doctrine, had authority to act

and his tweets were “official statements”.37 However, just because the declaration of Moroccan

sovereignty is an official statement does not mean it was legally binding under international law,

and does not mean that the United States, Morocco, Israel, or Western Sahara have any

obligation to conform their behavior to this announcement.

Not only is the recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in contravention with 40 years of

US foreign policy of non-recognition and support for the MINURSO mission, 38 this recognition

is contrary to international law for two reasons: it violates the international legal concept of uti

possidetis and the decision of the International Court of Justice, and it does not meet the

standards of binding unilateral declarations.

34
See Loerelei Laird, DOJ says Trump’s tweets are official presidential statements, ABA JOURNAL )Nov. 14, 2017,
2:49 PM),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/government_says_trumps_tweets_are_official_presidential_statements.

35
See Chris Davis, The True Power of Trump’s Tweets, THE NATIONAL INTEREST (July 16, 2018),
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/true-power-trumps-tweets-25931.

36
See Francis Grimal, Twitter and the jus ad bellum: threats of force and other implications, 6:2 J. ON THE USE OF
FORCE AND INT’L. L. 183, 187-90 (2019), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/20531702.2019.1690269;
see also Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 235-36 (2d Cir. 2019) (finding
that President Trump acts in an official capacity when he tweets and when he blocks those who disagree with him on
Twitter).

37
See id.; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (holding that the
President is the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations and may be exercised
without Congressional approval).

38
U.S. supports Moroccan autonomy plan for Western Sahara, REUTERS (Mar. 19, 2016, 12:01 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-morocco-westernsahara-usa/u-s-supports-moroccan-autonomy-plan-for-western-
sahara-idUSKCN0WL0OX.

7
III. Analysis

This recognition defies the international legal concept of uti possidetis, which requires

that newly independent states inherit the pre-independence administrative boundaries set by the

former colonial power.39 It is a presumption that the frontiers of the new states will conform to

the boundaries of prior administrative decisions, and that title to colonial territory devolves to the

local authorities, who prevail over any competing claim based on occupation. 40 In its 1975

advisory opinion, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that Western Sahara was not terra

nullius (a territory belonging to no one) at the time of its colonization by Spain. 41 Nomadic tribes

in the territory had legal ties to the land. 42

Morocco was attempting to exert sovereignty over Western Sahara by claiming that it

was a territory belonging to no one before Spanish rule, and also claiming that even if the

territory was not terra nullius there were still legal ties between the territory and the Kingdom of

Morocco that allowed for the claim of territorial sovereignty.43 The ICJ held there were legal ties

of allegiance between Morocco and some tribes that lived within Western Sahara, but that the

information presented established no tie of territorial sovereignty between Morocco and the

Western Sahara territory.44

39
See Concerning The Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), Summary of Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 171,
at 172 (Dec. 22); see also Brian Taylor Sumner, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, 53 DUKE
L. J. 1779, 1790 (2004)

40
See Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali, 1986 I.C.J. at 172

41
See Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 100 (Oct. 16).

42
Id. at 101.

43
Id.
44
Id. at 100.

8
 When the ICJ is tasked with determining border and territory disputes, they first look to

treaty justifications, but when no treaty exists, the ICJ will use the doctrine of uti possidetis to

settle the dispute.45 Based on this decision and applying the concept of uti possidetis, the

Moroccan claim to sovereignty is null because before Spanish colonization local tribes in

Western Sahara exerted control over the territory, and these tribes should have been granted the

title to the area following decolonization. The US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty is

contrary to the ICJ opinion and uti possidetis.

Also, the US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty was a unilateral declaration that

created no legal obligations. The legal status of unilateral declarations was first legally defined

by the Ihlen Doctrine.46 The Ihlen Doctrine comes from a 1931 Permanent Court of International

Justice case between Norway and Denmark over the legal status of Eastern Greenland. 47

A. Unilateral Declarations and the ICJ

In determining the legal status of the disputed territory the Court focused on statements

made by Norwegian foreign minister Ihlen to the Danish foreign minister. 48 In July of 1919

Minister Ihlen stated to the Danish minister that “the plans of the royal Danish government

respecting sovereignty over the whole of Greenland would meet with no difficulties by

Norway.”49

45
Sumner, supra note 39 at 1804.

46
See Legal Effects of Unilateral Declarations, INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW AND JUSTICE,
https://iilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Excerpts-from-Eastern-Greenland-Case-PCIJ-1933.pdf.

47
See id.

48
See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Norway v. Denmark), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53 (Apr. 5).
49
Id. at 36.

9
 The Court found this statement created a binding bilateral engagement between Norway

and Denmark, and that a country is bound by a reply on behalf of its minister of foreign affairs. 50

The response by the diplomatic representative of a foreign power is binding upon the country the

minister represents.51 The affirmative, unilateral reply of the minister of Norway could create an

agreement.52 This doctrine still exists in international law, however it has been expanded and

constricted by new case law and guidelines. The ICJ, in the Nuclear Test Cases involving

France’s announcement it had completed its nuclear tests in the South Pacific and would not be

doing anymore, held that declarations made by way of unilateral acts may create a legal

obligation.53 The sole question that is at issue with unilateral declarations is whether there is a

clear intent to be bound.54 An undertaking , given publicly intending to be bound, even though it

is not made within the context of an international obligation, is still binding. 55

There need not be a quid pro quo and it does not matter if the declaration is written or

oral.56 The status of President Trump’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty of Western Sahara

is unclear, the decision was veiled in opaqueness and was not made within the context of

international obligations like treaties. This deal is more akin to a unilateral declaration and can be

compared to the case involving Greenland; much like in the Norway v. Denmark case, an official

50
See id. at 71.

51
See Legal Effects of Unilateral Declarations, supra note 46.

52
See Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States caoable of creating legal obligations, with
commentaries thereto, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS (2006),
https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_9_2006.pdf.

53
See Legal Effects of Unilateral Declarations, supra note 46.

54
Id.

55
Id.
56
Id.

10
made a statement to another country’s official recognizing control over a disputed area (and in

both cases, neither indigenous group had a voice in determining its governance).57 Under the

Ihlen Doctrine it seems as though President Trump’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty in

Western Sahara would have created a binding agreement, however the United Nations has

provided subsequent guidelines on the doctrine of unilateral declarations. 58 Unlike the Nuclear

Test Case or the Norway v. Denmark case, this declaration did not create a legally binding

obligation on the parties.

The UN has provided guidelines on the capability of unilateral declarations to create legal

obligations. A relevant guiding principle is that to determine the legal effects of these

declarations the content and the factual circumstances must be considered.59 And the UN states

that a unilateral declaration in conflict with a peremptory norm of general international law is

void, and finally, that no obligation may result for other states from the unilateral declaration of a

state unless they clearly accept such a declaration. 60 The United States’ recognition of Moroccan

sovereignty does not meet several of these guidelines and is not legally binding.

B. Lack of Intent to be Bound

First, the context and factual circumstances surrounding this deal do not demonstrate a

legal intent to be bound. Morocco’s “normalization” of diplomatic relations with Israel is not

something novel, the two countries have a long history of cooperation in security operations,

57
Id.; see also International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, Greenland,
https://www.iwgia.org/en/greenland.html.

58
See Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States caoable of creating legal obligations, with
commentaries thereto, supra note 52.

59
See id.
60
See id.

11
business and trade, and cultural ties that show that their nations have never been hostile to one

another.61 Additionally, Morocco has not committed to its end of this so-called deal, Moroccan

officials have stated that they are only opening “liason” offices in Israel, not a full embassy, and

deny that the agreement entails full diplomatic recognition. 62 Clearly, this shows that Morocco

does not feel it is legally bound to this declaration, and has demonstrated no intent to be bound

by this declaration.

C. Violation of Peremptory Norms

Also, this declaration violates peremptory norms of international law, which makes it

void.63 Recognizing Moroccan sovereignty goes against the prohibition on annexation in the UN

Charter.64 The UN Charter prohibits annexation and territorial conquests, and there is an

international norm against annexation following the trends seen in World War II. 65

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force and asks all members to

respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of other states. 66

Annexations inherently violate this Article of the UN Charter; unless the state being annexed

consents, their sovereignty and territorial integrity is not being respected. Annexations are

usually committed through force, and with Western Sahara, Morocco’s invasion and subsequent

61
See Ahmed bin Taher, Morocco, Israel: 6 decades of secret ties, cooperation, ANADOLU AGENCY (Dec. 20, 2020),
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/morocco-israel-6-decades-of-secret-ties-cooperation/2083157#.

62
Yasmina Abouzzohour, Morocco’s partial normalization with israel comes with risks and gains, BROOKINGS
(Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/12/14/moroccos-partial-normalization-
with-israel-comes-with-risks-and-gains/.

63
See Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States caoable of creating legal obligations, with
commentaries thereto, supra note 52.

64
See id.

65
See id.
66
U.N. Charter art. 2(4).

12
use of force throughout the conflict resulted in their control of 80% of the territory of Western

Sahara.67

By recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over the territory it has unlawfully and forcefully

annexed, the US is supporting this annexation and circumventing international legal norms. The

prohibition on annexations has been adopted into US foreign policy through the Stimson

Doctrine.68 In 1932, in response to Japanese aggression in Manchuria, Secretary of State Stimson

and the US government drafted a set of principles explicitly stating that the US would not

recognize territorial changes produced by force. 69 Recognizing Moroccan sovereignty over

Western Sahara violates the domestic and international prohibition on annexations.

D. Lack of Consent

Finally, the UN holds that no obligation may result for other states unless they clearly

accept the declaration. 70 International law has established that obligations cannot be imposed by

a state upon another state without its consent. 71 Western Sahara has not accepted this declaration,

and therefore does not have to act as though Morocco is its sovereign. Although Morocco

accepted this declaration, they are not acting so it shows they feel a legal obligation to uphold

their end of the deal.72 The unilateral declaration by the United States recognizing Moroccan

67
Pidoux, supra note 16.

68
Stimson Doctrine, TOTALLY HISTORY, https://totallyhistory.com/stimson-doctrine/.

69
Id.

70
See Guiding Principles applicable to unilateral declarations of States caoable of creating legal obligations, with
commentaries thereto, supra note 52.

71
Id.
72
Abouzzouhour, supra note 62.

13
sovereignty over Western Sahara was not legally binding under the principles of unilateral

declarations.

IV. Conclusion

The United States’ recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty is not legally binding under

various principles of international and customary international law. It imposed obligations

without consent, violated peremptory norms, and did not demonstrate an intent to be bound.

Additionally, it violated concepts used to resolve territorial disputes and decisions of the ICJ.

The recognition also contradicts years of US policy regarding Western Sahara and US foreign

policy regarding annexations.

The recognition is not legally binding and can be revoked without incident. Although

President Trump had domestic constitutional authority to make this deal, President Biden has the

same authority to change it, especially since there are no international obligations. By revoking

this recognition, the US will avoid weakening relations with African and European allies who

support Western Sahara. 73 Additionally, the US will most likely not alienate Morocco or Israel,

because relations between the two were cordial and cooperative before and Morocco has made

no official move “normalizing” the already normal relations. The US will also uphold its

longstanding support for the right to self-determination of all peoples and protect human rights.

73
Jacopo Barigazzi, EU stresses UN peace process after US U-turn on Western Sahara, POLITICO (Dec. 10, 2020),
https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-stresses-un-peace-process-after-us-u-turn-on-western-sahara/.

14