Colombia - Search For Peace Diplomacy

Colombia at War: The Search for a Peace Diplomacy
Author(s): Juan Gabriel Tokatlian

Source: International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Winter,
2000), pp. 333-362
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20020080
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International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2000
Colombia at War: The Search for a Peace

Diplomacy
Juan Gabriel Tokatlian*
This essay analyzes Colombian foreign policy over the last three decades with
specific emphasis on Bogota's peace diplomacy from 1978 up to 2000 in the
context of an ongoing and degrading internal war. Initially, it assumes a modi
fied realist perspective that links international relations with domestic struc
tures. Then, the text defines three models of Colombian peaceful diplomacy
according to the purposes, the means, and the rationales employed by the
administrations that covered the above-mentioned period. After empirically
evaluating the governments of Presidents Turbay, Betancur, Barco, Gaviria,
and Samper and the first two years of the presidency of Pastrana, the article
concludes with an assessment of the country's peace diplomacy and its impact
on internal violence and instability. The foreign policies of the six different
mandates show that Colombia never developed an overall, consensual state
strategy towards peace, that the multiple peaceful diplomacies were partially
successful in terms of sustaining the political regime and that, notwithstand
ing the latter, the successive governments failed to achieve a genuine resolu
tion to domestic war. Finally, the article calls for a serious, active, and simulta
neous state foreign policy and citizen's diplomacy in favor of peace.
KEY WORDS: Colombia; foreign policy; diplomacy; international relations theory; peace;
war; drugs; human rights.
La guerra s?lo puede ser evitada si ambos eventuales adversarios la rechazan. No
mediante el hecho de que "por lo menos" uno de ellos sea lo m?s pac?fico posible.
Bertolt Brecht, Escritos pol?ticos
SOME INITIAL REFLECTIONS
For the past two decades Colombian diplomacy has been closely linked
to peace and to war. The "peace diplomacy" currently deployed by Presi
*Universidad de San Andr?s, Buenos Aires, Argentina, e-mail: jgtoka@hotmail.com.
333
? 2000 Human Sciences Press, Inc.
334 Tokatlian
dent Andr?s Pastrana (1998-2002) suggests the intimate linkage between

domestic and foreign policies. This linkage is particularly relevant today
because of the protracted and degraded nature of Colombia's civil strife.
Although "peace diplomacy" has not solely defined Bogota's foreign policy
during the past three decades, it has been an essential component of Colom
bia's interaction with the international community. One can better under
stand the scope of this attempt at relating international politics and domestic
peace by examining it within a theoretical framework and from the perspec
tive of current Colombian foreign policy.1
Invariably, states that experience violent civil conflicts, regardless of
the nature of the regime,2 refer to "peace" to underscore the fact that their
efforts abroad are geared towards resolving their domestic crisis. Never
has any government at any given time thought of referring to its foreign
policy as "war diplomacy". Colombia is no exception.
By "peace diplomacy" this essay means deliberately gearing a country's
international relations towards the specific goal of seeking external support
for eliminating internal conflict.3 This does not necessarily mean that peace
diplomacy addresses a country's civil strife principally through dialogue,
negotiation, and agreement. Such a diplomacy might also seek to legitimate
greater use of force by state agents in order to attain political or military
victory over armed opponents. Peace diplomacy can also be focused on
obtaining passive backing for internal peace efforts, while keeping undesir
able external actors out of a country's civil war.
THEORY AND PRACTICE
Theoretical approaches to international relations all presume a linkage

between domestic and foreign affairs and, with greater or lesser emphasis,
propose a certain level of interaction between domestic structures and
the world system. Nonetheless, there are very few studies detailing the
relationship between national and international politics.4
If diplomacy's typical realm is that of relations and politics among
states, and consolidating domestic peace is one of the state's fundamental
responsibilities, then classical realism5 and structural realism6 can be good
starting points for assessing the Colombian case. Mastanduno, Lake and
Ikenberry combine these perspectives to explain states' internal and exter
nal behavior.7 These authors adopt the classical realism paradigm according
to which the essentially conflictual, international system is dominated by
sovereign states competing for power by means of a rational pursuit of
national self-interest. While classical realism does not thoroughly develop
the logic of domestic politics, it holds that the chances of success of a
Colombia at War: The Search for a Peace Diplomacy 335
country's internal policies is interrelated to its international objectives. On

the other hand, structural realism holds that state activities are to be ex
plained within the framework of an international system which lacks a
higher authority, and where the dominant ordering principle is anarchy.
Thus, structural realism puts the accent on international systemic change
and its impact on state actions.
Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry set forth their model as follows:
The ultimate goal of all states, irrespective of size, location, nature

and capabilities, is survival.
The immediate international goal of all states, central or peripheral,
is the attainment of power and wealth.
The immediate internal goal of all states, strong or weak, is control
ling national resources and securing domestic legitimacy.
To these ends, states can:
At the domestic level, mobilize resources to boost economic growth

and extricate societal resources as a means of maximizing their rela
tive power. Resource mobilization implies generating greater wealth
and a long-term investment in power whereas extracting resources
means acquiring power and consuming wealth in the short-term.
At the international level, attempt to obtain international resources
and endorsement. While the former refers to obtaining material
goods, the latter means looking for political support abroad.8
The authors propose three fundamental hypotheses:
"As the long-term power of the nation-state declines, the state will
increase its internal mobilization;"
"As external threat increase, the state will increase its internal extrac
tion;" and
"As domestic political instability increase, the state will pursue exter
nal extraction and validation."9
Thus, following Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenbery, this study hypothe

sizes that as of the end of the 1970s, the need to counter mounting and
wide-spreading political instability prompted the Colombian state, both
through Liberal and Conservative governments, to seek additional eco
nomic resources (more extraction) and political backing (more validation).
A logical corollary of this hypothesis is that foreign resources and endorse
ment would help the Colombian state to: a) overcome this critical situation;
b) enhance institutional stability; and c) advance in the resolution of its
internal war.
336 Tokatlian
TURBAY AND FORCED PACIFICATION DIPLOMACY
The first of Colombia's peace diplomacies, though not directly referred

to as such by the government, was undertaken during President Julio Cesar
Turbay's administration (1978-1982). This Liberal politician believed that
Colombia's armed conflict had become internationalized inasmuch as exter
nal actors, variables, and phenomena were adversely impinging on the
country's institutional stability.10
At the time, Colombia's domestic context was marked by the prolifera
tion of rural insurgencies and the M-19 guerrilla group's growing expansion
into urban centers; the enforcement of the draconian National Security
Statute (Estatuto de Seguridad Nacional); and the increased military auton
omy vis-a-vis the civilian government. As regards Colombia's neighboring
international environment, the Caribbean Basin was defined by Cuba's
militancy in the advancement of armed revolution,11 by a Sandinista admin
istration in Nicaragua,12 by a Marxist-led government in Grenada, by an
insurgent turbulence in El Salvador, and by the end of moderately demo
cratic Jimmy Carter's term and the beginning of aggressive conservative
Ronald Reagan's administration.
Bogot? and Washington converge around a militant anti-Communism.
In addition, the generalized fear on the part of Colombia's political, eco
nomic and military elite regarding Soviet expansion into the Caribbean,
merged with the Colombian state's feeling of vulnerability as to Nicaragua's
territorial claims and Havana's firm (though not decisive) backing to Colom
bia's armed insurgents (namely, the M-19 in its frustrated 1981 "Invasi?n
del Sur"). The conjunction of all these factors led Colombia to embark
on a proactive hemispheric diplomacy, particularly at a Caribbean level,13
dynamic when compared to Colombia's traditional low-profile standards
in international politics.14 According to Malcom Deas,
"... much of Colombia's former diplomacy was praiseworthy and much of it

realist, however, by 1982 the country felt dangerously alone. Part of the danger
came from Central America, and Nicaragua's territorial claims to the islands and
keys was the least important issue. Colombia could become a target for the insur
gency movement expanding from Central America. Both the guerrilla and the
armed forces watched Central American developments closely. A guerrilla victory
in El Salvador would undoubtedly have a powerful effect on Colombia; in this sense,
Colombia was the biggest 'domino' but the least remarked upon in the region."15
The Turbay administration conducted its foreign affairs through a

Forced Pacification Diplomacy, combining confrontation and submission:
political confrontation against counterparts who might threaten to heighten
Colombia's internal conflict, and ideological submission towards the United
States in order to ensure continued domestic manu militari against the
guerrilla with Washington's blessing; that is, without any serious condemna
tion from the White House16 and the US Congress.
No other moment offers more Forced Pacification Diplomacy initia
tives, acts, gestures and declarations: Colombia's persistent obstruction in
1979 of Cuba's candidacy to the UN Security Council;17 the suspension of
diplomatic relations with that country in 1981; the decision to lend troops
to the Sinai peacekeeping forces at a difficult moment in the Middle-East
peace process, and when only Fiji had sent a contingent;18 the open criticism
of the 1981 French-Mexican Declaration that recognized the FMLN-FDR
as a representative force in the Salvadoran conflict; the 1981 participation
in Operation Ocean Venture (together with troops from the United States,
NATO, Argentina, Venezuela and Uruguay)?an operation then consid
ered a mock invasion of Grenada (finally invaded in 1983)?; the meetings
in 1982 between Colombian and U.S. military establishments in order to
discuss the possibility of setting up a special base on the San Andr?s island;
Colombia's participation that same year (together with the United States,
Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras) in the Central American Demo
cratic Community, which undertook the diplomatic defense of the Salvado
ran government and attack the Nicaraguan revolutionary administration.
These were unequivocal signs of Forced Pacification Diplomacy.19
During his presidency, Julio Cesar Turbay received political,20 military21
and material22 backing from Washington; especially from the Reagan admin
istration. At the time, Colombia was not the object of censure regarding
human rights violations23 neither by the United States nor by Western
Europe.24 The country continued to receive U.S. federal funding, official
development assistance from Europe, loans from private banks and multi
lateral institutions,25 and U.S. and European investment capital.
Officially, external pressures towards a negotiated settlement to Co
lombia's internal conflict were apparently not powerful enough to alter the
course of Colombia's Forced Pacification Diplomacy. Nevertheless, towards
the end of the Turbay administration, international isolation in all likelihood
came, not as the price for the country's worrisome state of social and
political violence, but due to the position assumed by this Liberal president
in the Malvinas/Falkland War.26
In conclusion, at the national level, President Turbay responded to the
country's growing political instability with a series of coercive measures, and,
at an international level, he conducted Colombian affairs through Forced Pac
ification Diplomacy. He sought and obtained sufficient foreign funding and
political support to perpetuate the domestic status quo and to sustain an in
creasingly fragile state. Even though his administration attained further for
eign extraction and validation, it was unable to offset institutional instability
and, much less, to reduce the country's political violence and armed conflict.
338 Tokatlian
BETANCUR AND NEGOTIATED PEACE DIPLOMACY
President Belisario Betancur's administration (1982-1986) was charac

terized, from the beginning of his tenure, by a Negotiated Peace Diplomacy.
His foreign policy was a relevant, and even necessary, if wanting, comple
ment to his domestic search for dialogue and peace with the guerrillas.
However, his foreign policy was not just a substitute for his initiatives
to pacify the country nor was it an instrument meant to legitimate his
personal convictions.
From the outset, Betancur reoriented Colombian foreign policy in an
unforeseen manner. His simultaneous proposals at both the national and
international levels were audacious and unprecedented. Internally, he
sought to enter into peace talks and to grant a general amnesty, while
externally, he embarked on a search for peace in Central America through
the Contadora Group,27 he affiliated Colombia to the Non-Aligned Move
ment (NOAL),28 and became more detached from the United States.29
The linkage between Colombia's domestic conflict and the Central
American crisis was obvious.30 Notwithstanding, unlike for Turbay's inter
national diplomacy, Betancur's31 underlying motives and spirit were the
search for negotiated peace both at home and abroad, as opposed to military
solution in Colombia and diplomatic containment outside.
Betancur's references to the relation between international politics
and the domestic conflict were reiterative. In a message from the island of
San Andr?s on April 9,1983, he declared: ". . . at this junction of Colombia,
it is inevitable to see the intricate union between the internal phase (which
we continue to seek through a generous and encompassing amnesty), and
the international peace we are striving to attain for this tormented region
[Central America]."32 When addressing the Colombian Naval War College
on May 6, 1983, the president asserted:
". . . on occasions we have stayed away from the Caribbean decision-making scene,
which is our just and natural environment ... we believe peace is indivisible, and
we are aware that it is not attainable if acting only within national borders; peace
is generally endangered outside of its domestic scene in a perilously interconnected
world. We seek and will continue to seek peace, solidarity, and a peaceful solution
in any scenario suitable for interrelationships between human beings and nations."33
Moreover, this Conservative statesman actively addressed the Latin

American foreign debt issue which he closely linked to the search for
a balanced economic development, the eradication of poverty, and the
achievement of political and institutional stability. Towards this end, he
put forward the idea of a sort of ''Marshall Plan" for developing nations
which was, broadly speaking, "to be financed from a minimal portion of
arms-race resources, tourism, and world trade".34
Furthermore, Betancur's Negotiated Peace Diplomacy saw beyond

Colombia's foreign policy towards Central America. On different occasions
and in diverse contexts his "peace diplomacy" focused on other countries.
This was the case during the US invasion of Granada in October 1983,
where Colombia intervened on behalf of the Cuban contingent so that it
be allowed to leave the invaded island. This, among other factors, led
Fidel Castro to write two letters to the National Liberation Army (ELN)
guerrillas asking them to free the president's brother, Jaime Betancur
(which they eventually did), and to a mild withdrawal of Cuban support
for the M-1935.
In October 1983, Betancur strove to establish direct dialogue with the
commanders of the M-19 in Madrid and he later tried personally to contact
the representatives of this armed movement in Mexico City in December
1984. Finally, the Colombian Attorney General, Carlos Jim?nez, and the
Colombian Ambassador in London, Bernardo Ramirez, held another un
successful meeting with the M-19 in Mexico in March 1985.36
All the same, the so-called "Cuban ace" and "European ace" did
not help Betancur to achieve peace nor to keep Colombian affairs from
gravitating towards the United States. As political negotiations became
diluted and the narcotic issue became central, Washington's specific influ
ence on the peace and drug questions also increased. When in 1984, U.S.
Ambassador Lewis Tambs, adopted the term "narcoguerrilla"37 to connote
a type of transcendental alliance between narcotics traffickers and guerrilla
groups, the limits to Betancur's internal and external peace-building strate
gies became obvious. In fact, the inescapable question was bound to rise:
if the government negotiated with an armed group, was it doing so with a
political insurgent group, or with a mafia-like organization?
Despite attempts by the government to discriminate between the guer
rilla struggle and drugtrafticking, this became very difficult by 1985. Justice
Minister Rodrigo Lara's assassination in 1984 moved Betancur to bend
towards US pressure and to initiate the extradition of Colombian nationals
to the United States. Colombia's growing economic crisis pushed the Be
tancur administration closer towards the United States inasmuch as Wash
ington was crucial for obtaining the US$ 1 billion dollar "Jumbo" loan in
198538. Lastly, the M-19's 1986 storming of the Palace of Justice led the
president to adopt the "heavy-handed" language so prized by US officials.
Indeed, the then president referred to the M-19 as a "terrorist move
ment", bearer of a "terrorist project", that opted for actions characterized
by "a crescendo of delirium and terrorism which exceed all limits." He
furthermore underscored the fact that the narcotics traffic and terrorism are:
"... the most deleterious phenomena in contemporary society . . . And although

they are two different phenomena in genre, they often overlap and collaborate
340 Tokatlian
insofar as narcotics and weapons often cross paths ... It was not by chance, that
the terrorist [Ivan Marino Ospina of the M-19] issued statements regarding the
[U.S.-Colombian] Bilateral Extradition Treaty and the legitimacy of (violent) at
tacks against American nationals (in Colombia). Nor was it by chance, that both
terrorists and narcotics traffickers concurred in targeting the Supreme Court."39
Towards the end of his term, Betancur's Negotiated Peace Diplomacy

became blurred. Without taking foreign policy to the extreme of adopting
Forced Pacification Diplomacy, this Conservative president retained a tenu
ous "peace diplomacy"; particularly in Central America. Betancur's peace
efforts abroad were received coolly and with discomfort, while his domestic
endeavors were regarded with disdain and mistrust by the United States.
Secretary of State George P. Shultz's comments regarding Betancur are,
without a doubt, revealing. According to Shultz, the Colombian president
had been exceedingly "condescending" with the guerrilla because he was
hoping to "win the Nobel Peace Prize."40
Colombia's renewed repressive momentum against drugs, a visible low
profile foreign policy, and the adoption of a hard-line military policy vis-a
vis the guerrillas during 1985 and 1986 received Washington's full support.
Washington never cast any doubts on the government's legitimacy in spite
of growing signs of institutional crisis. It strongly supported the Colombian
executive's structural adjustment policies, provided additional resources for
the war on drugs, and continued to sideline the human rights issue.41 Europe,
in turn, continued giving Colombia its political backing and economic assis
tance.42 Nonetheless, more and more member countries of the European
Community voiced their uneasiness and objections to the disturbing situation
of human rights violations in Colombia.
Thus, the legacy of Betancur's Negotiated Peace Diplomacy proved to
be ambiguous. The independent stance he adopted at the beginning of his
term bolstered the credibility of his endeavor to hold peace talks and to recon
cile the country. Mounting turbulence in the Caribbean Basin, however,
threatened to "Central-Americanize" the Colombian conflict during the mid
1980s. Furthermore, the implacable "narcotization" of Colombia-US agenda
together with the gradual significance of human rights in Colombian-Euro
pean relations reduced the external negotiating power of the state.
In short, Betancur's government had to face an increasingly unstable
domestic context and a highly critical international scenario. However, in
contrast to his predecessor, the Conservative president sought to deal with
this situation by embarking on a policy of Negotiated Peace Diplomacy.
His strategy was functional to the Colombian state insofar as, regardless
of serious doubts abroad concerning Colombia's drug trafficking and human
rights situation, he managed to obtain foreign funding and political endorse
ment: Bogot? attained external extraction and validation. Nevertheless,
during these four years the country's institutional structure went even
deeper into crisis while the solution to Colombia's political violence and
armed conflict was once again postponed.
BARCO AND NEUTRALIZING DIPLOMACY
President Virgilio Barco's administration (1986-1990) initiated its ac

tivities abroad by developing a Neutralizing Diplomacy. Contadora had
already withdrawn from Central America, and Central Americans them
selves?together with Washington?were promoting solutions to the re
gional crisis. Colombia, now a member of the Rio Group (made up of the
four Contadora members and the four Support Group members), backed
attempts at achieving peace in Central America, and attempted to detach
its own conflict from those of the isthmus.43 Similarly, by creating the
Presidential Office on Human Rights, Barco tried to show the government's
willingness to come to terms with the country's deplorable human rights
situation. Moreover, by coinciding with the United States on the drug issue,
paradoxically, Barco was able to differ on other political dimensions of the
bilateral agenda.44
In order to evaluate Barco's Neutralizing Diplomacy, it is highly rele
vant to understand Cuba's place in Colombian foreign policy. The Barco
administration maintained the contacts formerly established by Betancur
and expanded Colombia's good relations with the island, despite the fact
that formal diplomatic ties had been suspended since 1981. Bogot? and
Havana converged on a series of issues and in different scenarios.45
This was the case at the end of the 1980s with the question of regional
stability in the Caribbean Basin. Accordingly, their respective foreign poli
cies promoted peaceful settlement to the conflicts in Nicaragua and El
Salvador, and they both bitterly criticized the US invasion of Panama in
1989. Within the framework of the UN Commission on Human Rights,
Colombia sought, by abstaining or voting against the United States, to
prevent sanctions against the Cuban regime for the human rights situation
in the island. Within the framework of the UN Security Council, where
Cuba and Colombia coincided in 1990, both countries together with Yemen
and Malaysia, formed the Group of Four which harmonized their postures
regarding the Gulf War after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
Bogot? and Havana's closeness proved to be decisive towards bringing
about two phenomena which were to influence Colombia's domestic and
foreign policies: it facilitated Cuba's role as an important moderator in the
negotiations with a highly weakened M-19 and it contributed to keeping
Colombia from being severely criticized by the international community
in spite of its disastrous human rights record.46
342 Tokatlian
The peace talks and accord with the M-19 from 1989 to 1990 plus the
fact that other parties?apart from the Liberal and Conservative Parties?
were to run in the 1990 elections, in the course of which three presidential
candidates had been gunned down, allowed for minimal institutional stabil
ity in the midst of narcoterrorism and a real "dirty war" against the leftist
movements. Western Europe viewed Colombia's plight sympathetically. It
grasped Colombia's delicate situation in which multiple "violences" over
lapped, giving the country an exceptional nature: even though it was not
an authoritarian regime, there were massive human rights abuses, unaccept
able by any standard; and as the state was not powerful and did not have
great coercive capability, nonpolitical violence was rampant. Western Eu
rope's benevolent outlook, as well as Barco's drastic counternarcotics pol
icy, account for European trade preferences in 1990.47
The United States, in view of Barco's vigorous struggle against drugs,
gave Colombia decisive political, military and economic support. Indeed,
the first presidential counternarcotics summit held in Cartagena in 1990
(and attended by the presidents of the United States, Colombia, Peru
and Bolivia);48 massive US antidrug aid;49 significant increases in military
assistance;50 and Washington's vital support in favor of Bogota's US$ 1
billion dollar Concorde loan in 1987 and 1988, and US$ 1.648 million dollar
Challenger loan in 1989 and 1990;51 as well as the proposal to the US
Congress in 1990 of the Andean Trade Preference Act (finally approved in
1991), were all signs of Washington categorical commitment to Colombia's
fragile and eroded institutional legitimacy.52
As opposed to Turbay's Forced Pacification Diplomacy, and Betanc
ur's Negotiated Peace Diplomacy, Barco's Neutralizing Diplomacy was
relatively operative insofar as an agreement was reached with the M-19
regarding an end to war and a political reinsertion for the insurgents.
However, his administration fell short of achieving a profound and lasting
peace for Colombia.
The three different types of "peace diplomacies" carried out by these
administrations no doubt contributed to sustaining a precarious state, both
politically and economically. They were, however, unable to reinforce it.
The state's continued ability to secure foreign extraction and validation
did not translate into an increased ability to overcome internal institutional
instability or to make progress towards resolving an armed conflict which
was rapidly becoming an irregular war.
GAVIRIA AND NEUTRALIZING DIPLOMACY
President Cesar Gaviria's administration (1990-1994) continued his

predecessor's Neutralizing Diplomacy, although at times there was the
perception that he was shifting from Negotiated Peace Diplomacy to Forced

Pacification Diplomacy. In fact, the beginning of his term labeled "Revol
c?n" (the "Shake Up"), the convening of the National Constituent Assem
bly; and the negotiations with the EPL and the PRT guerrillas and the
Quintin Lame indigenous armed movement, contributed to generate the
impression that, in order to complement his domestic actions, Gaviria would
undertake an active Negotiated Peace Diplomacy. Likewise, at the end of
his four-year term, when talks with the Coordinadora Guerrillera Sim?n
Bol?var (CGBS)?made up of the FARC, the ELN and a splinter EPL
group?,53 when the counterinsurgency military offensive was launched,54
and when the different domestic "violences" reached unforeseen heights,
there was the impression that the government was going to deploy an
assertive Forced Pacification Diplomacy.55 However, this did not occur:
Gaviria persevered in his Neutralizing Diplomacy, which went through
different stages but never varied in content.56
Gaviria's Neutralizing Diplomacy focused on separating the Colom
bian armed struggle conflict from the conflicts in the Caribbean Basin, an
area of concern for Bogota's foreign policy. Thus, Colombia, together with
Mexico, Venezuela and Spain?under the auspices of the UN Secretary
General and with US approval?formed the El Salvador Support Group
which contributed to the signing of a final accord in 1992. Within the context
of the January 1994 broad initial agreement between the government of
Guatemala and the UNRG guerrilla, the parties requested the presence of
Colombia, together with the United States, Norway, Spain, Venezuela and
Mexico, among the "Group of Friendly Nations" participating in the Guate
malan peace process. The Colombian government, furthermore, turned to
the OAS and the UN to restore to power Haiti's elected president, Jean
Bertrand Aristide, who had been overthrown in September 1991. Lastly,
the renewal of diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1994, strengthened recent
political ties between Bogot? and Havana; particularly with regards to
domestic peace and human rights.
This Liberal government's Neutralizing Diplomacy could be also in
ferred by the peace talks with the political insurgency: Caracas, Venezuela
in 1991 and Tlaxcala, Mexico in 1992, were the scenario of the conversations
with the CGSB. All the same, the Gaviria administration did not seek the
active participation of Mexico and Venezuela as moderators or mediators
of what was still considered mainly a Colombian conflict57.
As with its two predecessors, towards the end of its tenure, the Gaviria
administration's foreign agenda became "narcotized" after the infamous
drug lord Pablo Escobar escaped from prison. Likewise, Colombian image
in the international arena became more negative due to the dramatic human
rights situation. While the former was clearly notorious in Colombian
344 Tokatlian
US relations, the latter was manifest in Colombian-European relations.

Meanwhile, both worldwide and at the Latin American level, the Colombian
case began to be viewed with growing concern: countries became extremely
preoccupied with its situation and worried not to reproduce the Colom
bian experience.58
Although the Colombian government received official support from
the United States59 and the European Union, there was an extensive alarm
regarding the rule of law in the country. Notwithstanding governmental
backing from most industrialized countries, condemnations on the country's
human rights abuses were more frequent and more forcefully expressed by
foreign officials. This Liberal president's Neutralizing Diplomacy prevented
open external involvement into Colombia's peace and war affairs but,
by 1994, the Colombian state's external capacity for maneuvering was
dramatically limited.
In short, even if in terms of foreign extraction and validation the
tendency was towards a qualitative and quantitative reduction, the Colom
bian state was still considered fairly legitimate and received recognition
from its own citizens and from the community of nations. Nevertheless,
the state's evident inability to overcome what was already a widespread
conflict, signaled its potential collapse. Neutralizing Diplomacy thus mani
fested its drawbacks: it temporarily halted the internationalization of the
conflict but it was unable to effectively guarantee the nationalization of
peace.
SAMPER AND NEGOTIATED PEACE DIPLOMACY
President Ernesto Samper's government (1994-1998) aspired to con

duct a Negotiated Peace Diplomacy.60 From 1994 to 1995, his "peace diplo
macy" was more closely linked to human rights issues than to negotiations
with the guerrilla. Hoping to make the conflict less inhumane, the executive
submitted the Protocol II (Additional) to the Geneva Conventions to the
Colombian Congress, created an interagency commission to investigate and
clear up the Trujillo massacres of 1988 and 1991, and accepted to open an
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, among other acts.
Nevertheless, the human rights issue, as pointed out by Gustavo Gallon,
soon alternate from cooperation to hesitation.61
Indeed, while Colombia was establishing new and more instances,
agencies and bureaucracies dedicated to protecting human rights at home
and promoting human rights abroad, violations were on the rise and domes
tic sanctions to violators were clearly lacking. The fact that the state was
not promoting the protection of human rights as a matter of public policy
was no longer acceptable abroad, as it had been in the 1980s. It was now
taken as a sign of a crumbling state.
During the second half of his four-year term, Samper's Negotiated
Peace Diplomacy focused on peace talks with the guerrillas. As Samper's
conciliatory gestures towards the FARC multiplied, this insurgency's reluc
tance to hold peace talks became increasingly apparent; and as the president
sought greater external support for his initiatives to establish contacts with
the FARC, the guerrilla's unwillingness to involve the international commu
nity was also evident.62 Additionally, as the domestic conflict intensified,
there was still no clarity as to whether the government aimed at providing
the space required for the rightist paramilitary groups to participate in
future negotiations, or whether the FARC was a narcoguerrilla with which
it was out of the question to negotiate.63 Furthermore, as the government
manifested a growing inclination to politicize the status of paramilitarism
and criminalize the insurgency's behavior, Colombia inadvertently came
to be considered a Gray Area Phenomenon. In other words, it was becoming
a critical threat because large portions of its territory were in the hands
of organizations which were "half-criminal, half-political".64 This placed
Colombia right at the center of a potential low-intensity conflict.
At the same time, during his last year in office, this Liberal president
attempted to enlist the aid of as many countries as possible towards his
peace efforts: Venezuela, Mexico, Cuba, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Spain,
and Germany, among others. At a rhetorical level?or that of formal and
generic declarations?it was easy to accompany Colombia. However, since
there was still no precision as to the guerrilla's willingness to accept the
good offices of these counterparts and no accuracy as to the role that Bogota
intended these friendly nations to play,65 the international component of
an eventual peace process became vague.
The failure of Samper's Negotiated Peace Diplomacy was not so much
due to Colombia's publicly-known, decades-old tragic situation on human
rights, nor was it due to the obvious inconsistencies in Bogota's diplomacy
towards those countries interested in contributing to bring peace to Colom
bia; it was more as of the fact that, for the first time in thirty years of civil
strife, the United States deliberately opted for delegitimizing a Colom
bian government.
The constant reminder of narcotics funding in Samper's presidential
campaign opened the way for Washington's "disciplinary diplomacy" vis
?-vis Bogota.66 Stigmatizing statements by US officials and legislators who
referred to Colombia as a narcodemocracy; the fact that Washington can
celed the entry visas of Ernesto Samper and several other Colombian
civilians and officers; the nasty, disqualifying, and aggressive terms used
by US diplomats to refer to Colombian legislators, judges, businessmen,
346 Tokatlian
prominent persons, police and army personnel; the refusal to fully certify
Colombia for four consecutive years due to an alleged insufficient counter
narcotics cooperation;67 ?among many other signs and facts?showed that
the problem of legitimacy in Colombia, as perceived by the United States,
was not necessarily a personal and circumstantial issue but more likely a
collective and structural phenomenon.
Support in the form of foreign assistance and credit was maintained,
though to a smaller degree when compared to 1980s and to what was
provided to other countries in the region during the 1990s.68 Already weak,
political endorsement from the United States grew fainter while in Europe
those who championed the Colombian cause, both at a state and non
governmental level, became scarcer. The resounding deterioration of hu
man rights in Colombia now alarmed the United States as well as the
European Union. Extended corruption and enormous growth of organized
narcocriminality now not only worried Washington; the European capitals
also became concerned. More and more Colombia's domestic conflict ended
up making North Americans, Europeans and Latin Americans uneasy.69
This Liberal president's Negotiated Peace Diplomacy?full of gestures
and with little substance?barely contributed to preserving dwindling for
eign extraction and validation. Institutional instability became even more
pronounced, and the possibility of putting an end to the country's civil war
became even more remote. What is more, Colombia began to suffer a
genuinely devastating large-scale humanitarian emergency. Abuses of hu
man rights and of international humanitarian law by state agents and parain
stutitional groups constituted the predominant signs of an irregular war,
all of which has ensued in a human tragedy out of all proportion to any
other in the Americas during the 1990s, and barely equaled in the world
at the beginning a new millenium.
PASTRANA AND NEGOTIATED PEACE DIPLOMACY
President Andr?s Pastrana (1998-2002) initiated his administration

by conducting a high-profile Negotiated Peace Diplomacy.70 Neutralizing
Diplomacy was not applicable since, by 1998, it was impossible to avoid
the influence of external factors, actors and variables on Colombia's armed
conflicts. In fact, Colombia could not contain the internationalization of its
domestic conflict; at most, it could attempt an internationalization that
which favored peace instead of what intensifies its internal conflict. More
over, Forced Pacification Diplomacy was not a practicable option since
October 1997 "Peace Mandate" voted during legislative elections, together
with the high voter turnout for the 1998 presidential elections, made peace
ful settlement to the conflict a public must.
Pastrana's Negotiated Peace Diplomacy was formally announced
within his overall peace proposal of June 8, 1998. Points 6, 10 and 15 of
his peace plan hold that:
". . .1 consider the international community's participation in all of the stages of
the process of crucial importance: as facilitators of pre-negotiation conditions, as
proponents of formulae for reaching mutual agreements on the way to formal
negotiations, as witnesses of the accords reached, and as monitors of the compliance
of commitments achieved. However, this cooperation with the international commu
nity, which should be autonomous and sovereign in nature, must be the result of
an accord reached among the disputants, that which presupposes a clear willingness
to come to terms since only the conflicting parties can make peace, not the interna
tional community ... As elected president, I will visit the heads of state of the
industrialized nations who have indicated their willingness to come to our aid,
especially the United States, to establish with them the way in which they are going
to cooperate with us towards initiating the economic and social redemption of those
zones most affected by the conflict . . . Intimately tied to the social problem and
to that of violence is the illicit crops issue . . . Developed countries should help
us to execute a type of 'Marshall Plan' for Colombia, which should allow us to
carry out large investments in the social and agrarian sectors, and in regional
infrastructure . . ."71
In summary, this strategy integrates two fundamental tenets: the utter

most participation of the international community in an eventual peace
process, and the need for the guerrilla's proactive concurrence in the search
for foreign cooperation. It concentrates around a presidential diplomacy
whose main emphasis is on the United States, and which links peace to
drugs. Lastly, it seeks the procurement of massive foreign funds to attack
the social and economic problems which allow for the development of
illicit crops.
Even prior to taking office, this Conservative president was already
conducting "peace diplomacy" on his trips abroad; and, as of taking oath
on August 7, he provided his "peace diplomacy" with new impetus. In a
speech delivered to the UN General Assembly on September 23, 1998,
Pastrana underlined the following:
"On the path to peace, the international community's concurrence will complement
our domestic efforts. We will provide for the defense of fundamental rights . . .
We will take into consideration valuable experiences in conflict resolution else
where . . . Peace in Colombia will require vast investments ... To this end, we will
create a "Peace Fund" . . . We will also seek contributions from the international
community . . . All of these actions will constitute what we have termed peace
diplomacy. It will be a diplomacy with social and economic content . . ,"72
Towards this end, the Foreign Ministry has been entrusted with the
administration's "peace diplomacy"73. Aside from being in charge of secur
ing foreign political support for the peace process, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs should mobilize the international community's financial backing.74
348 Tokatlian
With respect to the United States?principal point of reference for this

Negotiated Peace Diplomacy?this Conservative politician has managed to
mend Colombian-U.S. relations, which had steadily deteriorated during the
Samper administration. The relationship between the two executives has
improved noticeably. However, it is essential to state precisely the type of
structure which prevails in the current relationship between the two coun
tries.
Briefly speaking, two typical models can be mentioned. On the one
hand, there is the "honeymoon" arrangement which supposes a total turn
about in the existing relationship at both state and non governmental levels,
a significantly congenial management of bilateral and multilateral issues, a
noteworthy emphasis on cooperation as a means of resolving the numerous
problems which exist between the two countries, the fostering of greater
commercial and financial opportunities for both parties, and the unrestricted
US military backing for the Colombian armed forces.
On the other hand, there is the "standby" pattern, which can be
qualified by two simultaneous phenomena. First, the United States offers
Colombia a trial period during which it expects to ascertain the true nature
and scope of the new administration's changes in the domestic approach
to drug affairs (applying extradition, increasing eradication through aerial
spraying, further repression of narcotics networks, etc.) Second, Washing
ton backs Bogota's peace initiatives but it holds judgment on their relevance,
effectiveness and reach. After eighteen months into Pastrana's term, every
thing seems to indicate that the latter structure has prevailed.
Rumors and speculations which occasionally arise regarding greater
US intervention in Colombia's internal affairs do not, however, contradict
the above assessment. Routine diplomacy between the two countries came
to an end years ago. In other words, the circumstances whereby Colombian
affairs were traditionally addressed by mid-level officials and a few politi
cians interested in the country, with the US Congress playing a fairly
marginal role, no longer hold true. In this latter stage, strategists have
become increasingly important, namely high-ranking government officials
and senior officers in the executive branch, and the "hawks" in Congress.
Attempts at confining Bogota did not just begin with Pastrana, they date
back a while. Under a "confinement policy", the country is subjected to
close scrutiny while Washington gauges the different scenarios and contin
gency plans for an eventual turbulent political transition in Colombia.
Formally, Bogota is free to act?but under the monitoring of Washing
ton?. In this context, if confronted with an uncontrolled internal implosion,
the United States would not discard a manipulated external intervention.75
Thus, Pastrana is conducting his "peace diplomacy" with mild US
backing. The United States endorsement, although explicit, has been ex
tremely cautious. Scant internal progress in the dialogue and negotiation

process tends to generate further skepticism in Washington, both among
moderates and hard-liners. US support is mostly expressed in military terms
(personnel, training, information and resources) and not by economic aid:
Washington's contribution is the "stick" component in the peace talks
with the guerrilla groups while Colombia's decision to grant the FARC a
demilitarized zone ("zona de despeje") is the "carrot" component. Colom
bia has become the third-largest recipient of US security assistance, after
Israel and Egypt. In 1999, aid for Colombia stood at US$ 289 million
dollars.76
Concurrently, Latin America and Europe have increased their formal
support for peace in Colombia. Nonetheless, the country's current situation
is perceived as a threat to the region.77 Hence, there is no certainty as to
whether Colombia's counterparts are considering the option of participating
dynamically in the peace process or of intervening forcefully in the country's
domestic war.78
In this context, it is highly unlikely?both due to Colombia's domestic
conditions and to diverse international circumstances?that Colombia will
have access to greater economic resources from abroad. Meanwhile, every
thing seems to indicate that the state will continue receiving elemental and
uncertain foreign political support and more U.S. military aid.79 Pastrana's
Negotiated Peace Diplomacy can hope to attain a certain degree of foreign
validation (political) but cannot pretend massive extraction (economic)
from abroad. Furthermore, Colombia cannot continue mobilizing the same
rhetoric at an international level, if nationally a peaceful settlement is not
seen to make genuine headway.
Lastly, if the United States continues to escalate its indirect interven
tion in Colombia, if Latin America persists in its diplomatic silence on
Colombia's civil war and on foreign interference, if foreign governments go
on granting Colombia greater military than economic support, if Colombia's
armed conflict keeps on gaining momentum, and if political negotiations
with the guerrilla groups remain stalled, Pastrana's Negotiated Peace Diplo
macy could be doomed to experience the process undergone by the Be
tancur and Samper pacification diplomacies: although these two presidents
sincerely sought peace, they were unable to resolve the country's profound
structural institutional crisis.
ASSESSMENT AND SUGGESTIONS
In this paper, the theoretical point of departure for discerning Colom

bian "peace diplomacy" was Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry's realist
350 Tokatlian
notion according to which, the ultimate goal of all states, irrespective of

size, location, nature and capabilities, is survival. I also focused my analysis
on their realist hypothesis that holds that "as domestic political instability
increases, the state will pursue external extraction and validation". Further
more I pointed out the logical corollary to this hypothesis, namely that
foreign resources and endorsement would help the Colombian state to: a)
overcome this critical situation; b) enhance institutional stability; and c)
advance in the resolution of its internal war. This seems to be the only
plausible interpretation of Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry's hypothesis
since it would not be realistic to suppose that continued instability can
actually allow for the state's long-term survival.
In this sense, it was noted that the Colombian state was fairly successful
in terms of attaining the foreign resource extraction and political validation
needed to enhance its chances of survival. For two decades both Liberal
and Conservative administrations conducted different types of "peace di
plomacies" whose results, while not thorough, were nevertheless operative
and functional insofar as preserving power at home and recognition abroad.
Even so, the prime situation?national instability?was not resolved at all.
Quite the opposite, public disorder became even more pressing and the
country's civil strife more widespread than ever. The different administra
tions achieve partial successes and/or failures in terms of the linkage be
tween internal and external politics; however the country suffered an over
whelming exacerbation of its multiple "violences." Thus, although on the
international scene the Colombian state managed to preserve some sort of
fragile legitimacy, internally, and in spite of enacting the 1991 Constitution,
it achieved no additional legitimacy.
Essentially, the limits of the "peace diplomacy"?which was unable
to contribute the elements required to definitely settle the internal con
flict?lies in two primary factors. Firstly, the state neglected to comply with
the demand for the substantial changes required to found solid peace efforts
abroad (and at home). Its attempts at peacebuilding have not been accompa
nied by a deep transformation in the existing social and political conditions
nor by a redistribution of economic power. Colombian diplomacy has al
ways projected the ruling class's unwillingness to share power and reformu
late the system's rules of the game. Foreign policy as regards internal
pacification has apparently been focused on showing that, in the case of
Colombia, simple adjustments would suffice to improve the regime. Most
Colombian counterparts, however, think that the Colombian system re
quires a thorough renovation. Thus, the breach between the way the Colom
bian ruling class perceives that which is required for building peace at
home, and the way the international community sees it, is becoming wider
than ever. Likewise, while the political space and the institutional instru
ments required to channel international support towards peace are losing

ground, the influence exerted by external phenomena and forces is becom
ing increasingly notorious. In spite of its "peace diplomacy", the Colombian
state has been relinquishing autonomy in the international arena and in
the governance of the internal variables which have a bearing on the conflict.
Secondly the foreign policies tied to peace were primarily the reflection
of governmental policies and not the result of an international strategy on
the part of the state. What did prevail were shifts and inconsistencies as
well as an isolated, personalistic, and capricious handling of the issues as
opposed to an endeavor to conduct a coherent policy based on a solid
consensus capable of incorporating overall national interests. Even if it is
not reasonable to assume the existence of a monolithic state which expresses
itself with a single voice on all issues and fields, it does appear that the
propagation of multifarious voices on an issue as crucial as peace for Colom
bian national security and well-being is an unsustainable and self-defeating
conduct. These three models of "peace diplomacy" indicate that, rather
than a global policy towards resolving the country's armed conflict, what was
carried out were initiatives for securing the survival of each administration.
However necessary these survival-securing initiatives might seem from a
realist point of view, they nonetheless do not suffice to guarantee the long
term continuity of the state and a true domestic peace.
What should be done towards the future so that the Colombian nation
might benefit from a coherent "peace diplomacy" whose honest specific
goal is the attainment of foreign support in order to terminate the country's
war? I suggest two complementary options: first, to designing a renewed
state diplomacy wholly centered on the search for peace, and second, to
conducting a "citizens' diplomacy" designed with the same purpose?
peace?in mind.
In the first instance, what would be required is a real national consensus
on foreign policy; state and not governmental strategies, on the international
scene; a diplomacy conscientiously guided by the will to promote democ
racy,80 human rights, institutional change; transparency, accountability, and
integrity in all of these processes; as well as a clear-cut precision regarding
the scope of foreign participation in Colombia's domestic strife; and a
conduct abroad consistent with defending the national interests of the
majority of Colombians.
In the second case, I have assumed Cathryn Thorup's conceptual defi
nition of "citizens' diplomacy" according to which:
"... the actions of the citizens of one country regarding a third country?and those
of the non-governmental groups which they conform?imply the appropriation of
those roles considered the sole domain of governmental actors. Comparatively,
while domestic interest groups traditionally operate within a specific national con
text, citizen diplomacy acts at an international or transnational level."81
352 Tokatlian
The principal components of a "citizens' diplomacy" could be focused

on conveying abroad a more detailed and unbiased view of Colombia's
delicate situation; on seeking social and political allies for a peaceful settle
ment to the country's armed struggle; on exploring contacts with those
groups or movements which might exert positive pressure on the guerrilla
groups by demanding them to initiate genuine peace talks; on carrying out
activities which give top priority to defending the human rights of all
Colombians with no distinction; and on mobilizing notable figures from
the arts, politics, culture, science, education and humanities, with the intent
of indicating the fact that the search for peace in Colombia is real and
resolute. These are some among the many endeavors which are urgently re
quired.
Colombia can still avoid the catastrophe of a widespread armed conflict.
Although foreign policy cannot attain that which domestic policy is incapa
ble of achieving, a reformulated "peace diplomacy" may contribute to the
advancement of democracy, human rights and reconciliation.
ENDNOTES
Ph. D. in International Relations from The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced
International Studies. Currently Professor at the Universidad de San Andr?s, Victoria,
Provincia de Buenos Aires, Argentina. Formerly Associate Professor of the Universidad
Nacional de Colombia, in Santaf? de Bogot?, where he was a Research Associate at the
Instituto de Estudios Pol?ticos y Relaciones Internacionales (IEPRI). Translated from
Spanish by Mar?a Mercedes Moreno.
1. An early attempt in this sense can be found in the chapter on foreign affairs and domestic
policy entitled "Relaciones exteriores y pol?tica interna", in Rodrigo Pardo and Juan G.
Tokatlian, Pol?tica exterior colombiana: ?De la subordinaci?n a la autonom?a? Bogot?:
Ediciones Uniandes/Tercer Mundo Editores, 1988.
2. Studies regarding the nature of institutional regime and political violence are scarce.
M?ller and Weede's study of this relationship could be of considerable interest towards
analyzing the Colombian case from a rational actor perspective. See Edward N. M?ller
and Erick Weede, "Cross-National Variations in Political Violence: A Rational Action
Approach", in Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 34, No. 4, 1990, p. 646. References
to Colombia's democracy highlight its defective, unfinished and/or violent nature: formal
democracy, illiberal democracy, restricted democracy, incomplete democracy, exclusion
ary democracy, blocked democracy, limited democracy, genocidal democracy, eunuch
democracy, and narcodemocracy, are, among others, the expressions used by scholars
and observers of Colombia's state of affairs. Do these characterizations convey, implicitly
or explicitly, the semi-repressive nature of the Colombian regime? Does M?ller and
Weede's conclusion apply to the Colombian case?
3. As regards the formal aspects of an international contribution to peace in Colombia,
these vary in ways as well as in means. Broadly speaking, there are four types of interna
tional action which take place in successive stages. Good offices are lent when prominent
persons, influential groups, renown agencies and/or friendly countries approach the parties
and propose alternatives for bridging the gap and generating confidence. Basically, good
offices are there to keep up communication channels between the antagonists, and to
contribute to establishing certain basic rules of the game. Mediation not only focuses on
bringing the conflicting actors together, it also seeks to suggest alternate agreement
options. Fundamentally, mediation implies high foreign participation, it is encompassing
and official. Verification centers on active and detailed monitoring of the agreements
reached. In short, verification leads generally to in situ missions to corroborate that the
accords reached are not broken, and that the guarantees agreed to are duly respected.
Lastly, reconstruction processes include assistance funding, and/or diverse resources and
capabilities provided by different sources for post-conflict environments. Essentially,
reconstruction processes address the economic, social and political sustainability of the ac
cords.
4. See, among others, Kenneth N. Waltz, El hombre, el estado y la guerra, Buenos Aires:
Editorial Nova, 1970; Peter Gourevitch, "La 'segunda imagen invertida': Or?genes interna
cionales de las pol?ticas dom?sticas", in Zona Abierta, No. 74, 1996; Robert D. Putnam,
"Diplomacia y pol?tica nacional: La l?gica de los juegos de doble nivel", in ibid.; Matthew
Evangelista, "Domestic Structure and International Change", in Michael Doyle and G.
John Ikenberry (eds.), New Thinking in International Relations Theory, Boulder: Westview
Press, 1997 and Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In:
Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge: Cam
bridge University Press, 1995.
5. See Hans J. Morgenthau, Pol?tica entre naciones. La lucha por el poder y la paz, Buenos
Aires: GEL, 1986.
6. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Teor?a de la pol?tica internacional, Buenos Aires: GEL, 1988.
7. Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake and G. John Ikenberry, "Towards a Realist Theory
of State Action", in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1989. According to
the authors: "Since states are organizations that participate in both international and
domestic political arenas, it is not surprising that the pursuit of goals in one arena influence
actions in the other. States may both respond to international events through domestic
actions and attempts to solve domestic problems through international actions. This is
an observation few analysis would disagree with but one which has yet to be systematically
incorporated into general theories of international (domestic) politics."
8. ibid., pp. 461-465.
9. ibid., pp. 465-466.
10. In his opening speech at the Thirteenth Conference of the Hemispheric Armies held in
1979 in Bogota, Turbay pointed out that ". . . it is no longer possible to draw a clear
dividing line between the local insurgency, those to whom individuals marginalized by their
adversaries from any power option would turn, and the seditious activities of supranational
mercenaries, who solely abide by foreign ideologies." See, Consigna, November 15,1979.
11. Cuba furthermore chaired the Non-Aligned Movement (NOAL) from 1979 to 1982.
During its administration, Havana tried, unsuccessfully, to reach a consensus within the
NOAL towards considering and accepting the Soviet Union as a "natural ally". Yugosla
via, under Tito's leadership at the time, held the thesis, which finally won, that the
movement should stand at an equal distance from both Moscow and Washington.
12. On February 1980, Managua published a White Paper on the San Andr?s and Providencia
Archipelago, incomprehensibly nullifying the 1928 Esguerra-B?rcenas treaty, which had
settled the Colombian-Nicaraguan boundary. Bogota responded with its own "White
Paper".
13. See Juan G. Tokatlian and Klaus Schubert (eds.), Relaciones internacionales en la cuenca
del Caribe y la pol?tica de Colombia, Bogot?: FESCOL/C?mara de Comercio de Bo
got?, 1982.
14. According to Chernick, ". . .under Turbay, Colombia's pro-American stance became
highly visible, thus constituting the only exception to the country's traditional low-profile
international diplomacy." See Marc W. Chernick, "La pol?tica exterior de Colombia y
su impacto sobre el proceso de paz y reconciliaci?n nacional (1982-1986)", in Documentos
Ocasionales CEI, No. 5, September-October 1988, p. 24.
15. Malcolm Deas, "El proceso de paz colombiano, 1982-1985 y sus implicaciones para
Centroam?rica", in ibid, p. 12.
16. Although towards the beginning of his presidency in 1978 Turbay was criticized by
354 Tokatlian
Washington because people very close to him allegedly (according to the Bourne Memo
randum) had ties to drug trafficking, all bilateral incidents were soon overcome. Washing
ton and Bogota strengthened their ties around the narcotics issue thanks to Colombia's
ratification of a new bilateral Extradition Treaty signed in September 1979; to the Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT), which entered into force in August 1980; to the Bilateral
Counternarcotics Cooperation Agreement signed between July and August 1980; and to
the Joint Military Intelligence Security Agreement ratified in December 1981.
17. As of the suggestion made by Washington from May to June towards blocking Cuba's
entry, which had been proposed a year earlier
18 At the time, Lernoux described the circumstances as follows: "As proof of its pro
American credentials, the Turbay administration agreed to send 800 men to the Sinai
last fall. . . The decision was not implemented without prior subtle "arm twisting" . . .
The State Department informed Colombians that if they did not send troops [to the
Sinai], the administration would make no effort to get the Senate to ratify the [V?zquez
Saccio] treaty?pending since 1972?which ceded sovereignty over the disputed Carib
bean [Quitasue?o, Roncador and Serrana] keys to Colombia. The treaty was saved when
Bogota announced its contribution to a peacekeeping force for the Sinai." Penny Lernoux,
"Colombia's Future Up for Grabs", in The Nation, April 24, 1982. (Retranslated from
a Spanish translation of the original.)
19. See among others, Bruce M. Bagley and Juan G. Tokatlian, "La pol?tica exterior de
Colombia durante la d?cada de los 80: Los l?mites de un poder regional", in M?nica
Hirst (comp.), Continuidad y cambio en las relaciones Am?rica Latina/Estados Unidos,
Buenos Aires: GEL, 1987 and Cario Nasi, "La pol?tica internacional de Colombia hacia
Cuba y Nicaragua durante el gobierno del Presidente Julio C?sar Turbay Ayala", in
Documentos Ocasionales CEI, No. 9, May-June 1989.
20. Indicative of this was U.S. congressional ratification in July 1981 of the 1972 V?zquez
Saccio Treaty, which recognized Colombian rights to the Quitasue?o, Roncador and
Serrana keys.
21. According to Bustamante, up until 1980, "Colombia was the second largest recipient of
U.S. [military] aid for the region [Latin America]." See Fernando Bustamante, "El
desarrollo institucional de las fuerzas armadas de Colombia y Ecuador", in Augusto
Varas (coord.), La autonom?a militar en Am?rica Latina, Caracas: Editorial Nueva Socie
dad, 1988, p. 83.
22. Washington's counternarcotics aid to Colombia at the time was considerably more signifi
cant than that received by any other Latin American country. Funds appropriated for
Colombia from fiscal years 1978 to 1982 amounted to $ 29.013.000 dollars. See, Juan
Gabriel Tokatlian, "La pol?tica exterior de Colombia hacia Estados Unidos, 1978-1990:
El asunto de las drogas y su lugar en las relaciones entre Bogot? y Washington", in Carlos
G. Arrieta, Luis J. Orjuela, Eduardo Sarmiento P. and Juan G. Tokatlian, Narcotr?fico en
Colombia: Dimensiones pol?ticas, econ?mica, jur?dicas e internacionales, Bogot?: Edici
ones Uniandes/Tercer Mundo Editores, 1990, p. 371.
23. One must bear in mind that at the time, Western Europe and the United States took
much more notice of the dictatorships in Central America and in the southern cone of
South America, and that their worries regarding human rights violation in the Americas
spotlighted this area, much more so than the violence in the Andean region. The Chilean
and Salvadoran cases, for example, were much more "visible" than the Colombian case.
24. It should be noted that as of the end of the 1970s non-governmental organizations such
as Amnesty International were reporting increasing human rights violations in Colombia.
25. According to a study carried out by Bruce M. Bagley, Inter-American Development
Bank and World Bank funding disbursements to Colombia as of the 1960s and up to the
1980s were higher, in per capita terms, than those for any other Latin American country.
See, Bruce M. Bagley, "Aid Effectiveness in Colombia" (Mimeo, Washington D.C., The
Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, August 1985).
26. Foreign analysts who study Colombia, such as Deas and Chernick, coincide regarding
this aspect. According to Deas, "towards the end of Turbay's presidential term, Colombia
was dangerously isolated in the international arena." According to Chernick, "Colombia's
pro-American stance culminated in this country's isolation". See Malcolm Deas, op. cit.
and Marc Chernick, op. cit.
27. See, Augusto Ram?rez Ocampo, Contadora: Pedagog?a para la paz y la democracia,
Bogot?: Fondo Rotatorio del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 1986.
28. See, Marco Palacios (comp.) Colombia no alineada, Bogot?: Biblioteca Banco Popu
lar, 1983
29. Just before taking office, in an interview with Newsweek, Betancur stated, "... Colombia
has no want to be the satellite of any superpower. Colombia does not want to be a
satellite of the United States." See Newsweek (International Edition), August 23, 1982,
p. 48. On November 19, 1982 when he sanctioned the Amnesty Law, Betancur pointed
out: ". . . to make some headway towards national assertiveness ... to avoid being the
satellite of any given superpower . . ." On December 1,1982, during a "Peace Banquet",
Betancur declared: "... I am committed to conducting an honorable foreign policy
. . . disengaged from any type of imperialism." See Belisario Betancur, Una sola paz,
Bogot?: Imprenta Nacional de Colombia, 1983, pp. 46-47 and 61.
30 In a conversation held with the correspondents of the British journal Informe Latinoameri
cano, President Betancur closely related the events in Colombia to those of Central
America. As stated by this weekly magazine, "Central America, according to the Colom
bian president, does not pose problems any different from those of his own country:
even though the region has its own features and no Central American country is like
any other, Betancur believes that eliminating the objective causes for the subversion and
negotiating with the rebels in Central America?as in his own country?is the only
possible solution." See Informe Latinoamericano, July 29, 1983, pp. 399-400.
31. According to Cepeda, "... the first effect of Colombia's foreign policy [during the
Betancur administration] was that of blocking the Central-Americanization of the Colom
bian conflict." See Fernando Cepeda Ulloa, "Contadora: El proceso de paz en Colombia y
Centroam?rica", in Fernando Cepeda Ulloa and Rodrigo Pardo Garc?a-Pe?a, Contadora:
desaf?o a la diplomacia tradicional, Bogot?: Centro de Estudios Internacionales, Universi
dad de los Andes/Editorial Oveja Negra, 1985, p. 142.
32. See, Belisario Betancur, Nuestra patria es Am?rica, Bogot?: Imprenta Nacional de Colom
bia, 1984, p. 86.
33. See, Belisario Betancur, Una. . .op. cit., p. 117.
34. See, Belisario Betancur, Nuestra. . .op. cit., p. 77.
35. In all likelihood this is why in an interview with Business Week Betancur affirmed that
". . .in the past there were numerous documents regarding Cuba's influence on the
guerrilla groups. Now, I don't think there is any Cuban influence among guerrilla groups
operating in Colombia." See Business Week, August 27 de 1984, p. 53. (Retranslated
from a Spanish translation of the original.)
36. In many of these events, Gabriel Garc?a M?rquez played the role of an informal diplomat
bringing the parties together and helping to reconcile the divergent stances.
37. It should be noted that prior to Ambassador Tambs, the Colombian Lt. Col. Mario L?pez
Casta?o in a 1982 article published in the Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas analyzed the
ties between the narcotics trafficking and the guerrilla and reached the conclusion which
the US official was to reach later. According to this Colombian officer, these ties were
established at about 1977 with marihuana and were consolidated in the 1980s with cocaine.
L?pez Casta?o remarks on how this profitable emporium has not only adversely affected
the revolutionary behavior of the guerrilla, but that of state security forces as well.
According to L?pez: ". . .paradoxically, one cannot assume that the narcotics problem
would unilaterally affect solely the integrity of the FARC, [state] troops run the same
risk . . . the threat of being the object of bribery and of the well-known effects of this
illicit activity". See Lieutenant Coronel Mario L?pez Casta?o, "V?nculos de las FARC
con el narcotr?fico", in Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas, No. 105, 1982.
38. See, Luis Jorge Garay Salamanca, Colombia y la crisis de la deuda, Santaf? de Bogot?:
CINEP, 1991 y Luis Jorge Garay Salamanca, Alfredo ?ngulo Sanabria y Claudia Cadena
Silva, Cultura de negociaci?n: la experiencia de la deuda externa, Santaf? de Bogot?:
CEREC/FESCOL, 1994.
356 Tokatlian
39. See, Belisario Betancur, El compromiso de la paz, Bogot?: Departamento Editorial del
Banco de la Rep?blica, 1986, pp. 60-62 y 66-70.
40. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1993, p.
133. However, on the basis of reports by high-ranking Colombian military and the Colom
bian National Intelligence Service, and according to Informe Latinoamericano, "... the
M-19 and the FARC have been losing support in Cuba and Nicaragua . . . [since]
President Belisario Betancur's foreign policy has partly undermined international support
for guerrilla organizations." See Informe Latinoamericano, June 3, 1983, pp. 244-245.
41. It would be convenient to remember that the Uni?n Patri?tica (UP) was founded as a
result of the cease-fire agreement and peace talks between the government's National
Peace Commission (CNP) and the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC).
Right from the start, UP members were exterminated one by one, partly by the paramili
tary groups, which were spawned under state auspices and aided and abetted by the
military, politicians and entrepreneurs.
42. Betancur's principal European support came from Socialist leaders holding office in Spain
and France.
43. Colombian policy towards Central America, particularly within the United Nations, is
analyzed by Juan Camilo Rodr?guez G?mez, Liderazgo y autonom?a: Colombia en el
consejo de seguridad de las Naciones Unidas, 1989-1990, Santaf? de Bogot?: Universidad
Externado de Colombia, 1993.
44. An assessment of ten years of U.S. State Department reports regarding voting tendencies
in the UN, reflects the fact that Barco's Government was much less aligned with the
United States on political issues than Betancur's. See the different US Department of
State reports from 1986 to 1990. Report to Congress on Voting Practices in the United
Nations, Washington D. C: US Government Printing Office.
45. As a result of improved relations between Colombia and Cuba, these two countries
signed a Partial-Scope Agreement in Barranquilla on December 12, 1988 by means of
which they sought to augment trade through reciprocal preferential terms. See Julio
Londo?o Paredes, Memoria al Congreso Nacional, 1988-1989, Bogot?: Imprenta Nacional
de Colombia, 1989, p. 320.
46. See Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "La pol?tica exterior del gobierno del presidente Virgilio
Barco: En busca de la autonom?a perdida", in Malcolm Deas and Carlos Ossa (coords.),
El gobierno Barco: Pol?tica, econom?a y desarrollo social, 1986-1990, Santaf? de Bo
got?: 1994.
47. Barco's principal European support came from conservative leaders in office in Great
Britain and Germany.
48. See, Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, La pol?tica exterior de Colombia. . .op. cit.
49. See, Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, Drogas, dilemas y dogmas: Estados Unidos y la narcocrimi
nalidad organizada en Colombia, Santaf? de Bogot?: Centro de Estudios Internacionales,
Universidad de los Andes/Tercer Mundo Editores, 1995.
50. According to Salinas, ". . . as of 1989 Colombia became the largest recipient of U.S.
military assistance in the Americas." See Carlos M. Salinas, "Colombia", in Foreign
Policy In Focus, Vol. 2, No. 49, November 1997.
51. See, Luis Jorge Garay Salamanca, op. cit.
52. President George Bush's words demonstrated Washington's notable support for the Barco
administration towards the end of its term as well as the fact that Colombia was highly
valuable to the United States at this point in time. In fact, on September 5, 1989 when
referring to the narcotics issue, the U.S. president said: "All of us agree that the gravest
domestic threat facing our nation is drugs . . . Tonight, I am announcing a strategy
that reflects the coordinated, cooperative commitment of all Federal agencies . . . I am
proposing more than double Federal assistance to state and local law enforcement . . .
We need more prisons, more jails, more courts, more prosecutors . . . The second element
of our strategy looks beyond our borders . . . You and I agree with the courageous
President of Colombia, Virgilio Barco, who said that if Americans use cocaine, then
Americans are paying for murder . . . We have a responsibility not to leave our brave
friends in Colombia to fight alone . . . Colombia has already arrested suppliers, seized
tons of cocaine and confiscated palatial homes of drug lords. But Colombia faces a long,
uphill battle, so we must be ready to do more ... I spoke with President Barco last
week, and we hope to meet with the leaders of affected countries in an unprecedented
drug summit, all to coordinate an inter-American strategy against the cartels . . . The
third part of our strategy concerns drug treatment. . . Fourth, we must stop illegal drug
use before it starts . . . These are the most important elements in our strategy to fight
drugs . . . This is the toughest domestic challenge we've faced in decades . . . If we fight
this war as a divided nation, then the war is lost. But, if we faced this evil as a nation
united, this will be nothing but a handful of useless chemicals. Victory. Victory over
drugs is our cause, a just cause, and with your help, we are going to win". See The New
York Times, September 6, 1989. As of this moment, no other Colombian president has
ever received such explicit and publicly expressed support.
53. The dialogue between the government and the CRS began in 1993 and ended on April 9,
1994 with a final agreement to demobilize this armed group. On May 1994, the government
signed another two accords with Medellin's Urban Militias, on the one hand, and with
an EPL splinter group, on the other.
54. Although President Gaviria himself did not refer to the military offensive in these terms,
the overall view held by public opinion was that the army was waging a "total war"
against the guerrilla. In his turn, Defense Minister Rafael Pardo stated on March 14,
1993 that ". . .after 18 months, the government will renew negotiations with a guerrilla
organization [the CGSB] which has suffered severe blows by the government's security
forces." See Rafael Pardo Rueda, De primera mano. Colombia 1986-1994: Entre conflictos
y esperanzas, Santaf? de Bogot?: CEREC/Editorial Norma, 1996, p. 382.
55. In 1994, the government achieved the NOAL presidency for Colombia, something which
would have been quite difficult had the country's diplomacy been perceived as having
assumed a belligerent stance in order to solve the domestic conflict through violent means.
56. Gaviria, like his immediate predecessors, recognized the linkages between foreign policy
and domestic peace. Thus, for example, on August 16 1991, within the framework of the
opening of the "II Congress for Peace and Integration", Gaviria affirmed: "... I cannot
abandon this topic without bringing to mind Galan's [popular presidential candidate
assassinated in 1989] statement when he said that a country's foreign policy should be
totally coherent with domestic peace interests. In other words, foreign policy should
support and reflect a search for peaceful solutions, the will to resolve conflicts through
dialogue, respect for pluralism, the protection of basic rights, and a commitment to
democratic values and principles. This is why our foreign policy goes hand in hand with
our domestic policy. Peace is not possible if we betray abroad what we preach at home."
See C?sar Gaviria Trujillo, Pol?tica internacional: Discursos, Santaf? de Bogot?: Imprenta
Nacional de Colombia, 1992, pp. 272-273. On July 20, 1993, during his address to the
Colombian Congress, Gaviria indicated: "... Colombian foreign policy has also been
designed to recoup and promote the most relevant domestic policy objectives, as are the
fight against the narcotics traffic and terrorism. . . the search for peace and strengthening
of participatory democracy. The 'revolc?n' ("shake up") in Colombian foreign policy
seeks to make Colombia into a protagonist and interlocutor in the changes occurring in
the world and the region, and not a mere spectator of the emerging New World Order
. . . The country's foreign policy further seeks to strengthen Colombia's autonomy and
negotiating power as regards the management of its international relations, especially in
highly sensitive issues; and to give the country a higher profile." See C?sar Gaviria
Trujillo, Informe al Congreso, Santaf? de Bogot?: Imprenta Nacional de Colombia, 1993,
pp. 43-44.
57. Regarding negotiations in Caracas and Tlaxcala see Ricardo Garc?a Duran, De la Uribe
a Tlaxcala, Santaf? de Bogot?: CINEP, 1992 and Jes?s Antonio Bejarano, Una agenda
para la paz, Santaf? de Bogot?: Tercer Mundo Editores, 1995.
58. Due to the growing expansion of drug trafficking organizations, which combined extreme
violence and illegality, some specialists began employing "Colombia" or "Colombianiza
tion" to pejoratively refer to criminal phenomena. Thus, for example, one of the best
known experts on drugs and terrorism, Alison Jamieson, described the Colombianization
358 Tokatlian
process of the Italian Mafia, according to which the Camorra, the Cosa Nostra y the
Ndrangheta turn bloodier and more assertive as they become Colombianized at the end
of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. The editor of "Low Intensity Conflict and Law
Enforcement", Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., believes countries like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan and Turkmenistan tend to become new "Colombias" due to
drug production and processing in contexts of violence, political instability and rampant
corruption. See Alison Jamieson, "Mafia and Institutional Power in Italy", in International
Relations, Vol. XII, No. 1, April 1994 and Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., "Narcotics Trafficking
in Central Asia: A New Colombia", in Military Review, Vol. LXXII, No. 12, December
1992. Interestingly, and probably without having read Jamieson or Turbiville, former
president of Bolivia, Gonzalo S?nchez, upon a narcotics traffickers' assault on a prison
in his country in November 1994 stated that "Bolivia is becoming Colombianized and
nothing is more dangerous than the Colombian Mafia". See Semana, November 15,1994.
A similarly "narcotized" perspective of the country is to be gathered from the argument
used by former Russian president Boris Yeltsin to justify the use of military force in the
case of Chechnya: "Such blisters like the Medellin cartel in Colombia . . . and the military
dictatorship in Chechnya do not disappear by themselves ... To preserve its sovereignty
and integrity the state can and must use the force of power". See "Yeltsin Blames Army
for Failures as He Defends War in Chechnya", The New York Times, February 17, 1995,
p. 1. Two U.S. Doctoral theses also depicted a chaotic image of Colombia as of the
consolidation of the drug phenomenon. Starbuck, on the one hand, compares "narcoinsur
gency" power and influence in Colombia with that of Myanmar, a country known for
having a series of "independent opium republics". Robertson, on the other hand, labeled
the Colombian regime of the time as a "narcokleftocracy": the facade was democratic
but the government, however, was controlled by traffickers and thieves. See William C.
Starbuck, "Narcotics Trafficking as Narco-Insurgency in Colombia and Myanmar; A
Comparative Analysis" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Southern California, 1993) and
John M. Robertson, "Nationalism, Revolution and Narcotics Trafficking in Latin America
(Colombia, Peru, Cuba)" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1994).
59. In financial terms, Washington was once again a key figure in procuring the Hercules
US$ 1.775 million dollar loan for fiscal years 1991 to 1994. See Luis Jorge Garay, Alfredo
?ngulo Sanabria y Claudia Cano Silva, op. cit.
60. In his prologue to a text which assesses his foreign policy, President Samper pointed out
that ". . .one of the paths confidently undertaken by the national government is that of
internationalizing the search for peace." See Ernesto Samper Pizano, Escritos. Pol?tica
internacional, 1994-1998, Santaf? de Bogot?: Renacimiento S. A., 1998, p. 18.
61. See, Gustavo Gall?n, "Diplomacia y derechos humanos: Entre la inserci?n y el aislami
ento", in Socorro Ram?rez and Luis Alberto Restrepo (coords.), Colombia: Entre la
inserci?n y el aislamiento. La pol?tica exterior colombiana en los a?os noventa, Santaf? de
Bogot?: Instituto de Estudios Pol?ticos y Relaciones Internacionales (IEPRI), Universidad
Nacional/Siglo del Hombre Editores, 1997, pp. 220-224.
62. The ELN, however, seemed more amenable to the international dimension of contact
and rapprochement, at least in terms of initial good offices, as shown by the meeting
held by members of this armed group with spokesmen for Colombian civil society in
Maguncia, Germany towards the end of Samper's term in office.
63. Samper's stance shifted to such a degree that in 1996 it was held that ". . .with the
dismantlement of the Cali Cartel . . . what's left is a series of former mid-level leaders
who, in several regions, have formalized alliances with some guerrilla groups." This,
according to the executive, opened the way for the configuration of the "narcoguerrilla".
Regarding this topic, see the section entitled "La lucha contra los carteles y las narcoguer
rillas" in Presidency of the Republic, La lucha contra las drogas il?citas. 1996, un a?o de
grandes progresos, Santaf? de Bogot?: Presidencia de la Rep?blica, 1997, pp. 24-25. That
same year, in his UN address, President Samper opened his presentation by declaring:
"In Colombia we have been waging, for quite a few years, a hard battle against the narcotics
traffic . . . Precisely last week, over fifty Colombian soldiers, who were destroying illicit
crops and cocaine-processing labs in the jungle, were killed by guerrilla fighters involved
in defending narcotics traffic interests." Ernesto Samper Pizano, "Hacia una agenda
mundial contra las drogas" (Mimeo, New York, September 23, 1996, pp. 5-6).
64. This definition was put forth by Peter Lupsha and the phenomenon is discussed in
Max G. Manwaring (ed.), Gray Area Phenomena. Confronting the New World Disorder,
Boulder: Westview Press, 1993.
65. Thus, for example, was the Colombian government expressing the hope of bridging the
gap with the guerrilla groups? Was this an isolated and circumstantial executive policy
or a state policy of a strategic nature? Was the idea behind the involvement of foreign
actors that of giving the administration?on which doubts had been cast by the United
States?fresh international breathing space? Or was the idea to exert pressure on the
guerrilla through foreign governments? What end would foreign good offices serve?
Would they be there to keep up communication lines between the belligerent parties,
to make room for potential formulas for future mediation, to weaken the guerrilla's
message there where it conducted its own diplomacy against the Colombian state?
66. What is herein termed "disciplinary diplomacy" is that compound of coercive diplomacy
and blackmail diplomacy used by the United States towards Colombia during President
Samper's Government. On the difference between coercive diplomacy and blackmail
diplomacy see, Alexander L. George, "Coercive Diplomacy: Definition and Characteris
tics", in Alexander L. Geoge and William E. Simons (eds.), The Limits of Coercive
Diplomacy, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.
67. Conditioning in the realm of international relations is an issue which is increasingly
prevalent in the post-Cold War process of globalization. In short, conditioning in contem
porary politics expresses dependency : a set of actors?states, non-governmental, multina
tionals, etc.?, thanks to their great power capabilities, make another set of states and
social actors?with less or scarce resources?satisfy a series of conditions in order to
merit inclusion (or non-exclusion) from a worldwide homogeneous framework both in
political (as refers to the state and democracy) and economic (as refers to markets and
capitalism) terms. The issue of illicit psychoactive drugs has notably been the object of
a conditioned policy. In this sense, the main precondition comes as of U.S. counternarcotics
policy, and it is plainly evidenced by the use of the certification process. Washington
pretends?by imposing its domestic counternarcotics policy at an international level?to
discipline countries which produce/process/transship narcotics. Apart from the wide range
of economic and military options at its disposal, the United States commands a gamut
of norms within the framework of its counternarcotics legislation which allow it to exert
pressure, blackmail and strangle countries which make up the worldwide illicit drugs
phenomenon network. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and the
State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, the State Department could deny or
cancel entry visas to the United States for reasons of crimes related to narcotics. Further
more, the Trade Act of 1974 places the country on a "watch list" whereby the U.S.
President may deny trade benefits if a country fails to fully cooperate with Washington.
Additionally, within the framework of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of
1981?what was known as the Caribbean Basin Initiative of the beginning of the 1980s?
the U.S. President can deny trade preferences to those countries covered by the law but
which do not cooperate in counternarcotics operations. Likewise, the Aviation Drug
Trafficking Control Act of 1984 gives the Department of Transportation the power to
suspend or revoke airline companies' entry certificates to the United States. The annual
certification process thus operates within this coercive framework used to deal with those
nations affected by the illegal traffic of narcotics. When this evaluation instrument was
developed in 1986, the prohibition phenomenon in the United States was at its highest
peak in four decades. Until 1994, Washington measured a country's counternarcotics
efforts on the basis of criteria which was comparatively more empirical. Cooperation was
certified or decertified according to the number of hectares eradicated, the number of
labs destroyed, and the amount of persons put into prison, etc. As of 1995, criteria
regarding narcocorruption levels were included in the assessment of a country's degree
of commitment to counternarcotics efforts. This meant the inclusion of parameters which
were more capricious and subjective than those previously applied. Under the certification
360 Tokatlian
process, an unfavorable judgment by the United States has multiple consequences. The
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended in the 1990's, and the Narcotics Control
Trade Act of 1974, as amended in the 1980s, stipulate the precise scope of the certification
process. By law, the President is to cut off most forms of U.S. assistance to decertified
countries, with the exception of humanitarian aid and counterdrug assistance. U.S. invest
ors, in their turn, lose those guarantees granted them under the Overseas Private Invest
ment Corporation (OPIC), as regards the country decertified. At the same time, the
Export-Import Bank of the U.S. (Eximbank) suspends its loan programs, geared to
facilitate exports of U.S. goods and services, to those countries which have been disquali
fied as of decertification. Furthermore, security assistance, such as defense articles, training
and services, to the penalized nation may be frozen. Additionally, the U.S. representatives
at multilateral development banks (World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank,
and others) must automatically vote against all loans or grants to a decertified country.
This does not imply the immediate refusal of the loan since a negative U.S. vote is not
equivalent to a total veto inasmuch as its decision alone does not weigh heavily enough
in these instances for the funding to be denied. Moreover, according to the Crime Control
Act of 1990, a country which has been decertified does not receive its share of property
or moneys forfeited as of confiscations carried out in the United Sates on the basis of
information provided from abroad. The U.S. President also has the option of exercising
"discretionary" trade sanctions, such as the removal of trade preferences?granted under
the Generalized System of Trade Preferences?for decertified nations; and in the cases
of Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador, cutting off trade preferences provided under
the Andean Trade Preference Act of 1991. Concomitantly, Washington can raise by 50%
the duties levied on certain of the products exported by a decertified country. In its turn,
a decertified nation may have its sugar-sales quota to the United States suspended. Also,
the President can suspend air transportation from the decertified country into the U.S.
Lastly, Washington can withdraw its customs personnel and resources?provided for
under agreements regarding customs clearance for foreign visitors?from decertified
nations. There are three categories in the certification process: "full certification" (ap
proval for clear efforts at cooperating with the U.S.), "decertification" (penalization
for failure to cooperate), and "national interest waiver certification" (a half-and-half
decertification on the assessment that, although the country does not fully cooperate,
for national interest reasons, Washington is unwilling to apply immediate punishment.
Colombia was fully certified between 1986 and 1994. However, under President Samper,
the country was decertified for two consecutive years (1996 and 1997), and received two
national-interest waiver certifications (1995 and 1998).
68. According to those analysts who identify with structural realism, (Mearsheimer, for
example), as a result of the predominance of anarchy in world politics, what counts
in international relations are a state's relative rather than absolute gains. Thus power
preservation and expansion must be measured in comparative terms. In this sense, Colom
bia's situation became more somber. Comparatively, during these four years, countries
like Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico extended their commercial, financial, political
and diplomatic hemispheric influence further than Colombia did. The subject of relative
gains in international relations is developed in John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future:
Instability in Europe After the Cold War", in International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1,
Summer of 1990.
69. The Samper Administration's legacy to Colombian democracy was deplorable. What was
already a tenuous rule of law broke down completely, violation of civil rights and liberties
became more widespread than ever before, and the division of power became more and
more illusory. The sign of the times was an overall lack of accountability in governmental
practices, lack of public ethics, lack of transparency in the management of public goods,
and lack of respect for civil society autonomy. These, and other of the practices for
implementing liberal democracy, became severely eroded during Samper's four-year term.
In short, internal democratic governance was left tottering on the brink of collapse.
70. For a critical evaluation of President Pastrana's first year of peace diplomacy (August
1998-August 1999) see Leonardo Carvajal H., "Paz y pol?tica exterior: Entre la interven
ci?n y la cooperaci?n (A prop?sito de la diplomacia por la paz del gobierno de Andr?s

Pastrana)" (Mimeo, Santaf? de Bogot?, Universidad Externado de Colombia, 1999).
71. See, Andr?s Pastrana, "Una pol?tica de paz para el cambio" (Mimeo, Santaf? de Bogot?,
8 de Junio de 1998, pp. 12-17).
72. Andr?s Pastrana, "Intervenci?n del Presidente de Colombia, Andr?s Pastrana Arango,
en la sesi?n plenaria de la asamblea general de las Naciones Unidas" (Mimeo, New
York, 23 de September, 1998, pp. 6-7).
73. According to Foreign Affairs Minister Fern?ndez de Soto, ". . . the government operates
on the assumption that the best foreign policy is an adequate and effective domestic
policy. A forthwith policy which assumes the challenge of surmounting the country's
great problems, of building a new society, and consolidating a veritable democracy." See
"Conferencia sobre los lincamientos prioritarios de la pol?tica exterior colombiana, dic
tada en el diario El Colombiano de Medell?n por el Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores,
Guillermo Fern?ndez de Soto", in Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, La pol?tica exterior
de Colombia, Santaf? de Bogot?: Imprenta Nacional de Colombia, 1999, p. 87.
74. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Diplomacia por la paz, Santaf? de Bogot?: Imprenta
Nacional de Colombia, 1998, p. 10.
75. Does this policy reflect a high degree of unanimity in the United States towards Colombia?
No, there are still no signs of a definite uniform stance on the part of the state or of
social actors. Despite the high bureaucratic levels reached by the hard-liners in the
intelligence and security agencies, one can see that there are still some moderate sectors
and cool-headed thinkers. On the other hand, Congressional Republicans are influential
but do not determine the course of strategies towards Colombia. Scholars, organizations
tied to the human rights issues, and some of the mass media reject a hostile attitude
towards Bogota. Is this policy geared towards softening Colombian public opinion in
view of a hypothetical use of force by Washington? Yes, the message is the same for
one and all, civilians, the military, the right-wing sectors, and the left: to annul any chance
of reacting and to guarantee gradual acceptance of even greater intervention. Meanwhile,
in Latin America, by means of signals, incentives and pressure there is a growing sensation
that mounting intervention in Colombia could be an irreversible phenomenon. Does this
imply that this U.S. policy would attempt to restore power to the establishment; and is
this a sure sign of an anti-Communist crusade in Colombia? This is not so certain. Firstly,
defending at all costs an elite which has already lost it hegemonic control of the country
could only contribute to deepening Colombia's current armed conflict. Secondly, in the
post-Cold War era, Washington has not always intervened in favor of facilitating the
triumph of traditional and right-wing establishments. Thirdly, the United States, as a
superpower, does not bet on just one horse in a critical situation, and, in general, it
prefers long-term stability. Would this policy lead to a unilateral U.S. intervention in
Colombia? This is unlikely. The United States would not send American soldiers to
combat in Colombia, in which case one can discard direct U.S. intervention, at least in
the short and medium terms. For the time being, indirect intervention will escalate through
diverse forms of military assistance. Should it come to concrete actions, Washington
will probably opt for a multinational mechanism as a means of tampering with the
Colombian war.
76. See, Michael Shifter, "The United States and Colombia; Partners in Ambiguity", in
Current History, Vol. 99, No. 634, February 2000.
77. Currently, Colombia is the most visible country in the hemisphere due to the dimensions
of its internal and external crisis. Colombian elite do not seem to be aware of the changes
effected in continental perceptions of the country. They are still holding on to the idea
that Colombia's position at a regional level is that of the 1960s, 1970s and part of the
1980s, when the country was a solid U.S. ally; when Latin America and wide sectors of
the international community viewed Colombia as a heroic fighter in the war on drugs
and when it was a democratic reference for its near neighbors and for the whole of South
America; when it lent its good offices in the search for negotiated alternatives to the
Central American and Caribbean conflicts; and when its rates of corruption and human
rights abuses were below average for the hemisphere. However, in the eyes of its immedi
362 Tokatlian
ate peers, and other South American neighbors, Colombia is now an exporter of insecurity,
ungovernability and other dangers. The panorama is dramatic: displaced populations;
Colombian paramilitary and guerrilla groups in Panama; insurgents and narcotics traffick
ers crossing the Venezuelan border; and narcotics traffickers, paramilitary squads and
leftist insurgents using Ecuador and Peru as their temporary sanctuaries. Even Brazil,
seems to be increasingly concerned by the Colombian case. In fact, from Canada to
Argentina, the Colombian case is viewed as a serious source of distress and urgency.
78. See, Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, "Acerca de la dimensi?n internacional de la guerra y de
la paz en Colombia: Conjeturas sobre un futuro incierto", in Francisco Leal Buitrago
(ed.), Los laberintos de la guerra: Utop?as e incertidumbres sobre la paz, Santaf? de
Bogot?: Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de los Andes/Tercer Mundo Editores,
1999. The idea, coined by the United States, that Colombia's future affects hemispheric
and regional stability has gained credibility in the Americas although it does, nonetheless,
still lack legitimacy in terms of an indisputable consensus regarding how and when to
confront it as such.
79. On January 11, 2000, the White House asked Congress to approve a US$ 1.574 million
dollar security assistance package for Colombia for fiscal years 2000 and 2001. Finally,
the US Congress approved US $1.319 million in aid to Bogot?.
80. The tenet which guides the establishment of this principle at an international level is
similar to that which moves Palacios to state that "Colombia's main problem is not that
of achieving peace but of building democracy. The country's armed conflict is but one
symptom, among many others, of the lack of institutional democracy." See Marco Palacios,
"Agenda para la democracia y negociaci?n con las guerrillas", in Francisco Leal Buitrago
(ed.), op.cit.
81. See, Cathryn L. Thorup, "Diplomacia ciudadana, redes y coaliciones trasfronterizas en
Am?rica del norte: Nuevos dise?os organizativos", in Foro Internacional, Vol. XXXV,
No. 2, April-June 1995, p. 156.

Colombia - Search For Peace Diplomacy

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Colombia - Search For Peace Diplomacy

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Colombia at War: The Search for a Peace Diplomacy

Author(s): Juan Gabriel Tokatlian

Colombia at War: The Search for a Peace

SOME INITIAL REFLECTIONS

*Universidad de San Andr?s, Buenos Aires, Argentina, e-mail: jgtoka@hotmail.com.

dent Andr?s Pastrana (1998-2002) suggests the intimate linkage between

THEORY AND PRACTICE

Theoretical approaches to international relations all presume a linkage

country's internal policies is interrelated to its international objectives. On

The ultimate goal of all states, irrespective of size, location, nature

To these ends, states can:

At the domestic level, mobilize resources to boost economic growth

The authors propose three fundamental hypotheses:

Thus, following Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenbery, this study hypothe

TURBAY AND FORCED PACIFICATION DIPLOMACY

The first of Colombia's peace diplomacies, though not directly referred

"... much of Colombia's former diplomacy was praiseworthy and much of it

The Turbay administration conducted its foreign affairs through a

BETANCUR AND NEGOTIATED PEACE DIPLOMACY

President Belisario Betancur's administration (1982-1986) was charac

Moreover, this Conservative statesman actively addressed the Latin

Furthermore, Betancur's Negotiated Peace Diplomacy saw beyond

"... the most deleterious phenomena in contemporary society . . . And although

Towards the end of his term, Betancur's Negotiated Peace Diplomacy

BARCO AND NEUTRALIZING DIPLOMACY

President Virgilio Barco's administration (1986-1990) initiated its ac

GAVIRIA AND NEUTRALIZING DIPLOMACY

President Cesar Gaviria's administration (1990-1994) continued his

perception that he was shifting from Negotiated Peace Diplomacy to Forced

US relations, the latter was manifest in Colombian-European relations.

SAMPER AND NEGOTIATED PEACE DIPLOMACY

President Ernesto Samper's government (1994-1998) aspired to con

PASTRANA AND NEGOTIATED PEACE DIPLOMACY

President Andr?s Pastrana (1998-2002) initiated his administration

In summary, this strategy integrates two fundamental tenets: the utter

With respect to the United States?principal point of reference for this

tremely cautious. Scant internal progress in the dialogue and negotiation

ASSESSMENT AND SUGGESTIONS

In this paper, the theoretical point of departure for discerning Colom

notion according to which, the ultimate goal of all states, irrespective of

ments required to channel international support towards peace are losing

The principal components of a "citizens' diplomacy" could be focused

ci?n y la cooperaci?n (A prop?sito de la diplomacia por la paz del gobierno de Andr?s

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