Professional Documents
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Brondial Notes
Brondial Notes
Brondial Notes
ATTY. BRONDIAL NOTES ON REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I 1987 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall
Civil Procedure have the following powers: xxx
What is residual jurisdiction? Jurisdiction of a court in spite losing its a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
jurisdiction because of the perfection of an appeal still retains it for international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
purposes of preserving the rights of the parties. proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(Note: this is the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.)
A is the plaintiff and B is the defendant. Trial court ruled in favor B. A
appeals. Before the records are transferred to the appellate court, the b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll,
trial court retains jurisdiction. or any penalty imposed in relation thereto. (Note: This refers to SC‘s
appellate jurisdiction. So this power to Review, Reverse, Revise,
How can that particular trial court exercise such jurisdiction? Can an Modify and Affirm is within the appellate powers of the jurisdiction of
execution be granted ex parte? No. On what action can the trial court act the
upon? Motion for execution pending appeal. Once appeal is perfected, Supreme Court.)
and the records of the case have been transmitted to the appellate court,
there is no more exercise of residual jurisdiction. But in case of execution c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
as a matter of right, once jurisdiction is lost, it can never be regained.
Nonetheless, under Rule 39, the writ of execution can be granted by the d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua
trial court only. or higher. (Note: The ―or higher‖ clause no longer applies because
the death penalty is suspended)
How can the trial court, if it has already lost its jurisdiction, still exercise
the same? In the exercise of residual jurisdiction. e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
What is residual prerogative? 3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as
public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed
There are 3 principles involved in concurrent jurisdiction: six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
3. Revise – revision, not a simple amendment Lourdes L. Eristingcol vs CA: Petitioner is an owner of a residential lot
in Urdaneta Village, Makati City. On the other hand, [respondent
4. Modify – modification or amendment Randolph] Limjoco, [Lorenzo] Tan and [June] Vilvestre were the former
president and chairman of the board of governors, construction
5. Affirm – accept the decision of the lower body committee chairman and village manager of [Urdaneta Village
Association Inc.] UVAI, respectively. UVAI is an association of
―on appeal or certiorari‖ – to what kind of appeal is it referring to? homeowners at Urdaneta Village.
The word ―appeal‖ is by ordinary appeal. The word ―certiorari‖ is Petitioners action against UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre is founded on
―appeal by certiorari‖ as a mode of appeal under Rule 45 because the allegations that in compliance with the National Building Code and
when you speak of ―review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm‖ it is in the after UVAI‘s approval of her building plans and acceptance of the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction of the SC; it must have come from a construction bond and architect‘s fee, Eristingcol started constructing a
lower court and not an original action under Rule 65 which is a special house on her lot with ―concrete canopy directly above the main door
civil action and not a mode of appeal. and highway‖; that for alleged violation of its Construction Rules and
Regulations (or ―CRR‖) on ―Set Back Line‖ vis-a-vis the canopy
The modes of appeal under Rule 41 section 2 are: easement, UVAI imposed on her a penalty of P400,000 and barred her
workers and contractors from entering the village and working on her
1. Ordinary Appeal; property; that the CRR, particularly on ―Set Back Line,‖ is contrary to
2. Petition for review; and law; and that the penalty is unwarranted and excessive.
3. Appeal by certiorari
The parties reached a temporary settlement whereby UVAI, Limjoco, Tan
But the kind of certiorari mentioned is a mode of appeal because when and Vilvestre executed an undertaking which allowed Eristingcol‘s
you speak of Review, Reverse, Revise, Modify and Affirm, it is the workers, contractors and suppliers to leave and enter the village, subject
exercise of appellate jurisdiction. only to normal security regulations of UVAI.
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The landmark case of Tijam is, in fact, only an exception to the general
UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre filed a motion to dismiss on ground of rule that an objection to the court‘s jurisdiction over a case may be raised
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. They argued that at any stage of the proceedings, as the lack of jurisdiction affects the
it is the Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) which has very authority of the court to take cognizance of a case. In that case, the
jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes involving homeowners Surety filed a Motion to Dismiss before the CA, raising the question of
associations, pursuant to Exec. Order No. 535, Series of 1979, as lack of jurisdiction for the first time—15 years after the action was
amended by Exec. Order No. 90, Series of 1986. commenced in the CFI of Cebu. Indeed, in several stages of the
proceedings in the CFI, as well as in the CA, the Surety invoked the
Petitioner alleged, among others, that UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief, and even submitted
did not comply with the mandatory provisions of Secs. 4 and 6, Rule 15 its case for a final adjudication on the merits. Consequently, it was barred
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and are estopped from questioning by laches from invoking the CFI‘s lack of jurisdiction.
the jurisdiction of the RTC after they voluntarily appeared therein ―and
embraced its authority by agreeing to sign an Undertaking.‖ To further highlight the distinction in this case, the TRO hearing was held
on February 9, 1999, a day after the filing of the complaint. On even
RTC denied the MTD holding that its jurisdiction may not be assailed date, the parties reached a temporary settlement reflected in the
―after they voluntarily entered their appearance, sought reliefs therein, Undertaking. 15 days thereafter, defendants, including Limjoco, filed a
and embraced its authority by agreeing to sign an undertaking to desist MTD. Certainly, this successive and continuous chain of events cannot
from prohibiting (Eristingcol‘s) workers from entering the village.‖ It be characterized as laches as would bar defendants from questioning the
applied the doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. CA dismissed RTC‘s jurisdiction.
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Duero vs CA: According to Duero, private respondent Bernardo Eradel
Issue: occupied Gabriel Duero‘s land in Surigao del Sur. As shown in the tax
Whether it is RTC or Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) declaration, the land had an assessed value of P5,240. Despite repeated
having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint. demands, Eradel refused to leave. Duero filed before the RTC a
complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership against Eradel and
Ruling: Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena. Duero and Ruenas executed a
HLURB. As regards the defendants‘ supposed embrace of the RTC‘s compromise agreement, stating that the Ruenas bound themselves to
jurisdiction by appearing thereat and undertaking to desist from respect the ownership of Duero. Eradel was not a party to the
prohibiting Eristingcol‘s workers from entering the village, suffice it to agreement, and he was declared in default for failure to file his answer to
state that the invocation of the doctrine in Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et the complaint. Duero presented his evidence ex parte. RTC ruled in his
al. is quite a long stretch. favor.
The factual milieu obtaining in Tijam and in this case are worlds apart. As Eradel filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying
found by the CA, defendants‘ appearance before the RTC was pursuant the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr. He explained that he turned
to, and in compliance with, a subpoena issued by that court in connection over the complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as
with petitioner‘s application for a TRO. On defendants‘ supposed landlord, the latter had a better right to the land and was responsible to
agreement to sign the Undertaking allowing petitioner‘s workers, defend any adverse claim on it. However, RTC denied the motion for
contractors, and suppliers to enter and exit the village, this temporary new trial.
settlement cannot be equated with full acceptance of the RTC‘s authority,
as what actually transpired in Tijam. A RED Conflict Case, an administrative case between Duero and
applicant-contestants Romeo, Artemio and Jury Laurente, remained
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pending with the Office of the Regional Director of the DENR in Davao for the first time the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This motion was denied.
City. It was forwarded to the DENR in Agusan del Sur. Duero filed before Eradel raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was
the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the same already on appeal, but when the case, was still before the RTC that ruled
allegation in his Motion for New Trial. He averred that unless there is a him in default, denied his motion for new trial and for relief from
determination on who owned the land, he could not be made to vacate judgment, and denied his 2 MRs. After RTC still refused to reconsider the
the land. Also, the judgment of the RTC was void inasmuch as the heirs denial of Eradel's motion for relief from judgment, it went on to issue the
of Artemio, who are indispensable parties, were not impleaded. The order for entry of judgment and a writ of execution.
grandchildren of Artemio who were claiming ownership of the land, filed a
Motion for Intervention. RTC denied the motion. RTC denied the Petition The lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by
for Relief from Judgment. In an MR, Duero alleged that the RTC had no the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their
jurisdiction over the case, since the value of the land was only P5,240 express consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court
and therefore it was under the jurisdiction of the MTC. RTC denied the over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal.
MR. RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action.
Even if Eradel actively participated in the proceedings before said court,
Duero filed a Motion for Execution, which the RTC granted. Entry of the doctrine of estoppel cannot still be properly invoked against him
Judgment was made of record and a writ of execution was issued by the because the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at anytime and
RTC. Duero filed his petition for certiorari before the CA. CA gave due at any stage of the action. As a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is
course to the petition, maintaining that Eradel is not estopped from not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of
assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC when Eradel filed with said court his conferment as a matter of law. Also, neither waiver nor estoppel shall
MR And/Or Annulment of Judgment. apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly meritorious and
exceptional circumstances.
Issue:
Whether private respondent was estopped from assailing the jurisdiction Estoppel must be applied only in exceptional cases, as its misapplication
of the RTC after he had filed several motions before it. could result in a miscarriage of justice. Duero filed his complaint before a
court without appropriate jurisdiction. Eradel, a farmer whose tenancy
Ruling: status is still pending before the administrative agency, could have
No. It was Duero who filed the complaint before the RTC, believing that moved for dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds. But the farmer
the RTC had jurisdiction. RA 769117 amending BP 129 had already could not be expected to know the nuances of jurisdiction and related
become effective, such that jurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC issues. This farmer ought not to be penalized when he claims that he
but to the MTC. Eradel, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief that made an honest mistake when he initially submitted his motions before
since he was merely a tenant of the Artemio, his landlord, gave the the RTC, before he realized that the controversy was outside the RTC's
summons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the heirs of Artemio, who did not cognizance. To hold him in estoppel as the RTC did would amount to
do anything about the summons. For failure to answer the complaint, foreclosing his avenue to obtain a proper resolution of his case. He
Eradel was declared in default. He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the would be evicted from the land prematurely, while RED Conflict Case
RTC and explained that he defaulted because of his belief that the suit would remain unresolved. Such eviction on a technicality if allowed could
ought to be answered by his landlord. He stated that he had evidence to result in an injustice, if it is later found that he has a legal right to till the
prove that he had a better right than Duero because of his long, land he now occupies as tenant-lessee.
continuous and uninterrupted possession as bona-fide tenantlessee. But
his motion was denied. He tried an alternative recourse. He filed before Gonzaga vs CA: Facts: In 1970, petitioners purchased a parcel of land
the RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment. RTC denied his motion, from private respondent Lucky Homes, Inc. The lot was specifically
hence he moved for reconsideration of the denial. In his MR, he raised denominated as Lot No. 19 and was mortgaged to SSS as security for
On June 22, 1998, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court. It was petitioners themselves who invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC by
Thus, on September 17, 1998, petitioners filed an urgent motion to instituting an action for reformation of contract against private
recall writ of execution, alleging that RTC had no jurisdiction to try the respondents. It appears that, in the proceedings before the trial court,
case as it was vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start to finish. Not even
(HLURB) pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the court‘s jurisdiction during
Buyers Protective Decree). Conformably, petitioners filed a new the entire proceedings which lasted for 2 years. It was only after RTC
complaint against private respondent with the HLURB. Likewise, on rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution against them in
June 30, 1999, petitioner-spouses filed before the CA a petition for 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction ─ and it was only
annulment of judgment, on the ground that RTC had no jurisdiction to because said decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus
try and decide the Civil Case. effectively waived their right to question the courts jurisdiction over the
case they themselves filed.
Res judicata Agan vs PIATCO: The contract for the construction and operation for the
AEDC's Petition is that it is already barred by res judicata. AEDC entered NAIA IPT III was awarded to PIATCO. Petitioners, who are employees of
into a compromise agreement with the Government. service providers at the MIAA and NAIA Terminal I and II, and service
providers themselves, assail:
Because of the compromise agreement among the parties, there was
accordingly a judicial settlement of the controversy, and the Order, dated a. the provisions in the 1997 Concession Agreement and the ARCA
30 April 1999, of the RTC of Pasig City was no less a judgment on the which grant PIATCO the exclusive right to operate a commercial
merits which may be annulled only upon the ground of extrinsic fraud. international passenger terminal within the Island of Luzon, except
Thus, the RTC of Pasig City, in the same Order, correctly granted the those international airports already existing at the time of the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 66213 with prejudice. AEDC, however, execution of the agreement.
invokes the purported pressure exerted upon it by then President Joseph
E. Estrada, the alleged fraud committed by the DOTC, and paragraph 2 b. The contracts further provide that upon the commencement of
in the afore-quoted Joint Motion to Dismiss to justify the non-application operations at the NAIA IPT III, the Government shall cause the
of the doctrine of res judicata to its present Petition. closure of Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminals I
and II as international passenger terminals.
There is res judicata because:
Issue: Whether direct resort to the Supreme Court was a proper Respondent City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8039, Series
remedy; of 2002, providing for the election of representatives of the District
Chapters in the City Chapter of Manila and setting the elections for both
Ruling: chapters 30 days after the barangay elections. Liga sent respondent
YES. The rule on hierarchy of courts will not also prevent this Court Mayor of Manila a letter requesting him that said ordinance be vetoed
from assuming jurisdiction over the cases at bar. The said rule may considering that it encroached upon, or even assumed, the functions of
be relaxed when the redress desired cannot be obtained in the the Liga through legislation, a function which was clearly beyond the
appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling ambit of the powers of the City Council. Mayor signed and approved the
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for city ordinance.
the exercise of this Court’s primary jurisdiction. It is easy to discern
that exceptional circumstances exist in the cases at bar that call for the Issue:
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Whether or not the Liga properly filed the case directly with the Supreme from this Court must be put to a halt for two reasons: (1) it would be an
Court. imposition upon the precious time of this Court; and (2) it would cause an
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication
Ruling: of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the
No. Although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, in lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better
essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a trier of facts.
or illegality of the questioned ordinance and executive order. It, thus,
partakes of the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which this SC will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot
Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. As such, this petition be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling
must necessary fail, as this Court does not have original jurisdiction over circumstances justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of
a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved. certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Petitioner‘s
reliance on Pimentel v. Aguirre is misplaced because the nonobservance
Even granting arguendo that the present petition is ripe for the of the hierarchy-of-courts rule was not an issue therein. Besides, what
extraordinary writ of certiorari, there is here a clear disregard of the was sought to be nullified in the petition for certiorari and prohibition
hierarchy of courts. No special and important reason or exceptional and therein was an act of the President, which would have greatly affected all
compelling circumstance has been adduced by the petitioner or the LGUs. When an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to
intervenor why direct recourse to this Court should be allowed. have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the
duty of this Court. The same is true when what is seriously alleged to be
This Court‘s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of unconstitutional is an act of the President, who in our constitutional
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is scheme is coequal with Congress.
not exclusive, but is concurrent with the RTC and CA in certain cases.
Hannah Serrana vs Sandiganbayan: Petitioner was a student of the
People v. Cuaresma: This concurrence of jurisdiction is not to be taken UP-Cebu (government scholar) appointed by President Joseph Estrada
as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term. Petitioner, with her
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC the Office of the Student
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the projects of the OSRFI was
determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. Estrada gave P15,000,000 to
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The
writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly source of the funds was the Office of the President. The renovation of
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent
level (―inferior‖) courts should be filed with the RTC, and those against filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the
the latter, with the CA. A direct invocation of the SC‘s original jurisdiction Office of the Ombudsman. Ombudsman found probable cause to indict
to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and petitioner and her brother Jade Ian Serana for estafa.
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon SC‘s time Petitioner moved to quash the information: (a) the Sandiganbayan has
and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its no jurisdiction over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court‘s Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not
docket. committed in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally
came from President Estrada, not from the government.
Santiago v. Vasquez: the propensity of litigants and lawyers to disregard
the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly
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Sandiganbayan denied petitioner‘s motion for lack of merit. jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
Accusedmovant‘s claim that being merely a member in representation of defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.
the student body, she was never a public officer since she never
received any compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer. Petitioner claims that she
of no moment, in view of the express provision of Section 4 of RA No. is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular
8249 which provides: tuition fee-paying student. This is bereft of merit. It is not only the salary
grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in
original jurisdiction in all cases involving: P.D. No. 1606. While the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials
with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes
(A) x x x (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade "27" and and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law.
x x x x (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan
governmentowned or controlled corporations, state universities or with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
educational institutions or foundations. government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this
Thus, Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs
involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock
salary grades, because the primordial consideration in the inclusion of corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public
these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions. officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606. Moreover, it is well established
that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it
Issue is merely incidental to the public office. The administration of the UP is a
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan may try a government scholaran** sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP
accused, along with her brother, of swindling government funds. performs a legitimate governmental function by providing advanced
instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving
Ruling: professional and technical training. Moreover, UP is maintained by the
Yes. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by P.D. No. 1606, as Government and it declares no dividends and is not a corporation
amended, not by R.A. No. 3019, as amended. R.A. No. 3019 is a penal created for profit.
statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain
acts of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or The offense charged was committed in relation to public office, according
corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. Pursuant to Section 10 of to the Information. Petitioner argues that even assuming that she is a
R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have jurisdiction over the
filed with the Sandiganbayan. R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an offense because it was not committed in relation to her office. According
enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of
In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals the BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR
not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with prohibition on authorizing her to contract with then Estrada; and that her acts were not
private individuals. P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the ratified by the governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act
was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.
A forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate A court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound by
and different from a plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode
of plunder absorbs the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court
what is sought to be established is the commission of the criminal acts in acquires jurisdiction over a person.
furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. On the other hand, all
that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence, under Summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally on Maj. Gen.
RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondent‘s properties to his legitimate Carlos Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who
income, it being unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties. acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. Substituted
The forfeitable nature of the properties under the provisions of RA 1379 service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner
does not proceed from a determination of a specific overt act committed and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center.
by the respondent public officer leading to the acquisition of the illegal However, such substituted services of summons were invalid for being
wealth. irregular and defective.
Given the foregoing considerations, petitioner‘s thesis on possible double In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, we broke down the requirements to be:
jeopardy entanglements should a judgment of conviction ensue in Crim.
Case 28107 collapses entirely. Double jeopardy, as a criminal law (1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party relying
concept, refers to jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot
suggesting that double jeopardy presupposes two separate criminal be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service within a
prosecutions. Proceedings under RA 1379 are, to repeat, civil in nature. reasonable time. Reasonable time being ―so much time as is
As a necessary corollary, one who is sued under RA 1379 may be necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and
proceeded against for a criminal offense. Thus, the filing of a case under diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that
that law is not barred by the conviction or acquittal of the defendant in should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if
Crim. Case 28107 for plunder. any[,] to the other party.‖ Moreover, the sheriff must show several
attempts for personal service of at least 3 times on at least 2 different
Issue 2: dates.
Whether or not Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the persons of
petitioner and her children. (2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must describe in
the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the
Ruling 2: attempted personal service.
No. Petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her
person and that of her children due to a defective substituted service of (3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and
summons. Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure discretion residing at defendant‘s house or residence; or on a
clearly provides for the requirements of a valid substituted service of competent person in charge of defendant‘s office or regular place of
summons, thus: SEC. 7. Substituted service.—If the defendant cannot business.
be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section
[personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by leaving From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted
copies of the summons at the defendant‘s residence with some person of service of summons was made on petitioner and her children, as the
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply with the first 2
copies at defendant‘s office or regular place of business with some requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service of
competent person in charge thereof. summons. Moreover, the third requirement was also not strictly
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complied with as the substituted service was made not at petitioner‘s sons did not voluntarily appear before the SB constitutive of or equivalent
house or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen. to service of summons.
Garcia is detained, even if the latter is of suitable age and discretion.
Hence, no valid substituted service of summons was made. Platinum Tours and Travel, Inc. vs Panlilio: Platinum filed a complaint
for a sum of money with damages against Pan Asiatic Travel Corporation
The stringent rules on valid service of summons for the court to acquire (PATC) and its president Nelida Galvez. Platinum sought to collect
jurisdiction over the person of the defendants, however, admits of payment for the airline tickets which PATC bought from it. RTC of Makati
exceptions, as when the party voluntarily submits himself to the City, Branch 62, rendered a judgment by default in favor of Platinum and
jurisdiction of the court by asking affirmative relief. In the instant case, ordered PATC and Galvez to solidarily pay Platinum. A writ of execution
the Republic asserts that petitioner is estopped from questioning was issued on motion of Platinum. Pursuant to the writ, Manila Polo Club
improper service of summons since the improvident service of Proprietary Membership Certificate in the name of Galvez was levied
summons in both forfeiture cases had been cured by their (petitioner upon and sold.
and her children) voluntary appearance in the forfeiture cases. The
Republic points to the various pleadings filed by petitioner and her Jose Panlilio filed a motion to intervene in the Civil Case claiming that
children during the subject forfeiture hearings. We cannot subscribe to Galvez had executed in his favor a chattel mortgage over her shares of
the Republic‘s views. stock in the Manila Polo Club to secure her loan and that Galvez had
already delivered to him the stock certificates. RTC denied Panlilio‘s
Special appearance to question a court‘s jurisdiction is not voluntary motion for intervention because (1) a decision had already been
appearance (Sec. 20, Rule 14). The pleadings filed by petitioner in the rendered in this case and that the only matters at issue is the propriety of
subject forfeiture cases do not show that she voluntarily appeared the execution; (2) it will only delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
without qualification. Petitioner filed the following pleadings in Forfeiture rights of the original parties; and, (3) the Intervenor‘s rights may be fully
I: (a) motion to dismiss; (b) motion for reconsideration and/or to admit protected in a separate action.
answer; (c) second motion for reconsideration; (d) motion to consolidate
forfeiture case with plunder case; and (e) motion to dismiss and/or to RTC declared the execution sale null and void due to irregularities in the
quash Forfeiture I. And in Forfeiture II: (a) motion to dismiss and/or to conduct thereof.
quash Forfeiture II; and (b) motion for partial reconsideration.
Panlilio filed against Galvez a collection case with application for a writ of
The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to dismiss, were filed preliminary attachment of the Manila Polo Club shares. The case was
by petitioner solely for special appearance with the purpose of raffled to Branch 146 of the RTC of Makati City. Panlilio again attempted
challenging the jurisdiction of the SB over her person and that of her 3 to intervene in the other Civil Case, this time by incorporating in his
children. Petitioner asserts therein that SB did not acquire jurisdiction complaint a motion to consolidate both Civil Cases.
over her person and of her 3 children for lack of valid service of
summons through improvident substituted service of summons in both Judge Salvador Tensuan of Branch 146 granted the motion for
Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance the petitioner never abandoned consolidation on condition that Judge Roberto Diokno of Branch 62
when she filed her motions for reconsideration, even with a prayer to would not object thereto. Judge Diokno allowed the consolidation of the 2
admit their attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam dated January cases and setting for hearing Panlilio‘s application for a writ of
22, 2005 setting forth affirmative defenses with a claim for damages. And preliminary attachment.
the other subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not abandon her stance
and defense of lack of jurisdiction due to improper substituted services of Platinum moved to reconsider the order of Judge Diokno but its motion
summons in the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the foregoing Sec. 20, was denied.
Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, petitioner and her
Remedial Law Review I – Civil Procedure
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Platinum filed a petition for certiorari at the CA assailing, among others, No. 94-1634, if the former were retained by Branch 62, made Platinum
the order of Judge Diokno allowing the consolidation of Civil Cases. CA act with haste.
annulled the assailed order but left it to Judge Diokno to decide whether
to return the Civil Case to Judge Tensuan, or to keep it in his docket and Manila Bankers vs Ng Kok Wei: Respondent Eddy Ng Kok Wei is a
decide it as a separate case. Platinum filed a motion for partial Singaporean businessman who ventured into investing in the Philippines.
reconsideration of the decision of the CA, praying that the Civil Case be On November 29, 1988, respondent, in a Letter of Intent addressed to
returned to Branch 146 or re-raffled to another RTC Branch of Makati. petitioner, expressed his intention to purchase a condominium unit at
Said motion was denied. Valle Verde Terraces. On December 5, 1988, respondent paid petitioner
a reservation fee of P50,000 for the purchase of a 46-square meter
Issue: condominium unit valued at P860,922.00. On January 16, 1989,
Whether or not RTC-Branch 62‘s basis for acquiring jurisdiction over the respondent paid 90% of the purchase price or P729,830.00.
civil case was extinguished when Judge Diokno‘s July 23, 1996 order
allowing the consolidation of the two cases was annulled and set aside. Petitioner executed a Contract to Sell in favor of the respondent. The
contract expressly states that the condominium unit ―shall substantially
Ruling: be completed and delivered‖ to the respondent ―within 15 months‖ from
No. Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a particular February 8, 1989 or on May 8, 1990, and that ―(S)hould there be no
case, it does not depend upon the regularity of the exercise by the court substantial completion and fail(ure) to deliver the unit on the date
of that power or on the correctness of its decisions. specified, a penalty of 1% of the total amount paid (by respondent) shall
be charged against (petitioner)‖.
Panlilio‘s collection case falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati,
Branch 62. The fact that the CA subsequently annulled Judge Diokno‘s Considering that the stipulated 15-month period was at hand, respondent
order granting the consolidation, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court returned to the Philippines in April, 1990.
which issued the said order.
In a letter dated April 5, 1990, petitioner informed respondent of the
―Jurisdiction‖ should be distinguished from the ―exercise of substantial completion of his condominium unit, however, due to various
jurisdiction.‖ Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the uncontrollable forces (such as coup d‗ etat attempts, typhoon and steel
orders or the decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has and cement shortage), the final turnover is reset to May 31, 1990.
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, as in the instant case,
the decision on all questions arising from the case is but an exercise of Meanwhile, on July 5, 1990, upon receipt of petitioner‘s notice of delivery
such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of dated May 31, 1990, respondent again flew back to Manila. He found the
its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment which does not affect its unit still uninhabitable for lack of water and electric facilities.
authority to decide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction
over the case. Once more, petitioner issued another notice to move-in addressed to its
building administrator advising the latter that respondent is scheduled to
Moreover, the instant petition is premature and speculative. Had move in on August 22, 1990.
Platinum waited until Judge Diokno decided on what to do with Civil
Case No. 96-365, the parties would have been spared the trouble and On October 5, 1990, respondent returned to the Philippines only to find
the expense of seeking recourse from this Court, which in turn would that his condominium unit was still unlivable. Exasperated, he was
have had one petition less in its docket. The unfounded fear that Civil constrained to send petitioner a letter dated November 21, 1990
Case No. 96-365 would unduly delay the final resolution of Civil Case demanding payment for the damages he sustained. Petitioner ignored
Thus, it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction. We have consistently held Reconveyance (RTC): GSIS argues that the action was barred by
that complaints for specific performance with damages by a lot or Statute of Limitations and/or Laches, and that the complaint did not
condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer falls under the state a cause of action. Santiago died during the pendency of the trial
exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB. so his wife replaced him. Court decided in favor of Santiago – 78 lots
(sorry hindi inexplain ng case kung bakit pabawas ng pabawas yung
While it may be true that the RTC is without jurisdiction over the case, lots). CA affirmed. MR denied.
petitioner‘s active participation in the proceedings estopped it from
assailing such lack of it. It is an undesirable practice of a party GSIS argues: (1) that there was no proof of bad faith nor could fraud or
participating in the proceedings and submitting its case for decision and malice be attributed to the petitioner when it erroneously caused the
then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of issuance of certificates of title over the subject lots despite the fact that
jurisdiction, when adverse. these were expressly excluded from the foreclosure sale; (2) an action
for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in
ten years from the time of its creation or upon the alleged fraudulent
Remedial Law Review I – Civil Procedure
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registration of the property, in this case when the ownership was been faithfully paying taxes thereon for twenty years. Respondents
consolidated to GSIS. The action was instituted more than fourteen contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity to sue insofar as
years later; (3) the properties were not returned because no such the island is concerned because an action for reconveyance can
obligation exists under the loan and mortgage agreement. only be brought by the owner and not a mere homestead applicant
and that petitioner is guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure to
SC: At the outset, it bears emphasis that the jurisdiction of this Court in assert his right over the land for an unreasonable and unexplained
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as period of time.
amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law. This Court is not a
trier of facts. Case law has it that the findings of the trial court In the instant case, petitioner seeks to nullify the homestead
especially when affirmed by the CA are binding and conclusive upon patents and original certificates of title issued in favor of the
this Court. Although there are exceptions to the said rule, we find no respondents covering certain portions of the Sombrero Island as
reason to deviate therefrom. By assailing the findings of facts of the trial well as the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor. The
court as affirmed by the CA, that it acted in bad faith, the petitioner petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file an
thereby raised questions of facts in its petition. application for homestead patent over the whole island since it was
he who requested for its conversion from forest land to agricultural
Katon vs Palanca: DOCTRINE: Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction land."
or failure to state a cause of action clearly appear from the complaint
filed with the trial court, the action may be dismissed motu proprio by Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses
the Court of Appeals, even if the case has been elevated for review on and Counterclaim in due time. On June 30, 1999, they also filed a Motion
different grounds. Verily, the dismissal of such cases appropriately ends to Dismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial
useless litigations. court‘s Order to amend his Complaint so he could thus effect a
substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased, Respondent Gapilango.
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the RTC in its Order dated July
assailing the December 8, 2000 Decision and the November 20, 2001 29, 1999.
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 57496.
Petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration of the July 29, 1999 Order was
FACTS: On August 2, 1963, herein Petitioner Katon filed a request with denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated December 17, 1999, for
the District Office of the Bureau of Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, being a third and prohibited motion. In his Petition for Certiorari before
for the re-classification of a piece of real property known as Sombrero the CA, petitioner charged the trial court with grave abuse of discretion
Island. Then Asst. Director of Forestry informed the Director of Lands, on the ground that the denied Motion was his first and only Motion for
Manila, that since the subject land was no longer needed for forest Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order.
purposes, the same is therefore certified and released as agricultural
land for disposition under the Public Land Act. Ruling of the Court of Appeals: Instead of limiting itself to the
allegation of grave abuse of discretion, the CA ruled on the merits. In
Records show that on November 8, 1996, [R]espondent Juan Fresnillo the Assailed Resolution, the CA acknowledged that it had erred when it
filed a homestead patent application for a portion of the island. Records ruled on the merits of the case. Nonetheless, the Complaint was
also reveal that [R]espondent Jesus Gapilango filed a homestead dismissed motu proprio by the challenged Resolution of the CA Special
application. Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was issued Homestead Division of five members – with two justices dissenting – pursuant to its
Patent on March 3, 1977 of Sombrero Island. Respondents aver that "residual prerogative" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of
they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of their respective portions Court.
and have declared said portions for taxation purposes and that they have
Remedial Law Review I – Civil Procedure
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Issues the original records or the records on appeal.In either instance, the trial
1. Is the Court of Appeals correct in resolving the Petition for court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective
Certiorari based on an issue not raised (the merits of the case) in orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order
the Petition? execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
2. Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged ‗residual
prerogative‘ under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint could
Procedure in resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in the not have been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule
Petition?" 41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the
The Court’s Ruling: The Petition has no merit. disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as
residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the
Propriety of Ruling on the Merits: This is not the first time that courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds
petitioner has taken issue with the propriety of the CA‘s ruling on the mentioned in Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under
merits. The CA even corrected itself in its November 20, 2001 authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules.
Resolution. Suffice it to say that the appellate court indeed acted ultra
jurisdictio in ruling on the merits of the case when the only issue that Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined
could have been, and was in fact, raised was the alleged grave abuse of by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
discretion committed by the trial court in denying petitioner‘s Motion for The question is, did the Complaint sufficiently allege an action for
Reconsideration. Settled is the doctrine that the sole office of a writ of declaration of nullity of the free patent and certificate of title or,
certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction. Such writ does not alternatively, for reconveyance? Or did it plead merely for reversion? The
include a review of the evidence, more so when no determination of the Complaint did not sufficiently make a case for any of such actions,
merits has yet been made by the trial court, as in this case. over which the trial court could have exercised jurisdiction.
IMPORTANT! Dismissal for Prescription and Lack of Jurisdiction: In an action for nullification of title or declaration of its nullity, the
Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its "residual complaint must contain the following allegations: 1) that the contested
prerogatives" under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the land was privately owned by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the
"residual jurisdiction" of trial courts over cases appealed to the CA. assailed certificate of title to the defendant; and 2) that the defendant
Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in obtaining a document of
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff. In these cases, the
answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction nullity arises not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the director of
over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow title; hence,
prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on the issued patent or certificate of title was void ab initio.
record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio
dismiss the claim or action. In an alternative action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is also
respected as incontrovertible, but the transfer of the property or title
On the other hand, "residual jurisdiction" is embodied in Section 9 of thereto is sought to be nullified on the ground that it was wrongfully or
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The "residual jurisdiction" of trial courts is erroneously registered in the defendant‘s name. As with an annulment of
available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost title, a complaint must allege two facts that, if admitted, would entitle the
jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land: (1) that the plaintiff was the
This stage is reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or owner of the land, and (2) that the defendant illegally dispossessed the
upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of plaintiff of the property. Therefore, the defendant who acquired the
Section 2. In what courts applicable. — These Rules shall apply in all A. Actions: meaning and commencement
the courts, except as otherwise provided by the Supreme Court. (n)
When is an action commenced? Upon the timely payment of the correct
docket fees.
Section 3. Cases governed. — These Rules shall govern the
procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal and special
Rule 1, Section 5. Commencement of action. — A civil action is
proceedings.
commenced by the filing of the original complaint in court. If an additional
defendant is impleaded in a later pleading, the action is commenced with
(a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the regard to him on the dated of the filing of such later pleading, irrespective
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or of whether the motion for its admission, if necessary, is denied by the
redress of a wrong, (1a, R2) court.
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are 1. Alday vs. FGU Insurance– 350 SCRA
governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to the 2. Mercado vs. CA, 569 SCRA
specific rules prescribed for a special civil action. (n) 3. Proton Pilipinas vs. Banque Nationale de Paris, 460 SCRA
4. Ruby Shelter Builders vs. Formaran, 578 SCRA 283
(b) A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a
5. St. Louis University vs. Cobarrubias, 626 SCRA 649 *
person for an act or omission punishable by law. (n)
6. Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Institute, 726 SCRA, June 18, 2014 *
7. Sy-Vargas vs. Estate of Ogsos, 805 SCRA (2016)
(c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks
to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. (2a, R2) 8. Camaso vs. TSM Shipping Inc., 807 SCRA (2016)
St. Louis University, Inc. vs Cobarrubias: Cobbarubias is an associate Cobarrubias filed her petition for review on December 5, 2007, 15 days
professor of petitioner and a member of the Union. She was placed on from receipt of the VA decision on November 20, 2007, but paid her
forced leave by petitioner pursuant to a provision in the CBA which docket fees in full only after 72 days, when she filed her MR on February
provides that: ―Section 7.7. For teaching employees in college who fail 15, 2008 and attached the postal money orders forP4,230.00.
the yearly evaluation, the following provisions shall apply: (a) Teaching Undeniably, the docket fees were paid late, and without payment of the
employees who are retained for 3 cumulative years in 5 years shall be on full docket fees, Cobarrubias‘ appeal was not perfected within the
forced leave for 1 regular semester during which period all benefits due reglementary period.
them shall be suspended.‖ Cobbarubias resorted to the grievance
machinery, but failed to resolve the dispute. Respondent then filed a Viewed in this light, procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed
case for illegal forced leave or suspension with the NCMB. Parties simply because their non-observance may have prejudiced a party's
eventually submitted the case for VA. VA dismissed the case. substantive rights; like all rules, they are required to be followed.
Respondent received the VA‘s decision on November 20, 2007. However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance,
such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant
On December 5, 2007, Cobarrubias filed with the CA a petition for review from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the
under Rule 43, but failed to pay the required filing fees and to attach to prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by
the petition copies of the material portions of the record. CA dismissed immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default;
the petition on January 14, 2008 due to procedural lapses. Respondent (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of
received the CA resolution on January 31, 2008. On February 15, 2008, the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and attached to her motion the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any
copies of the material portions of the record and the postal money orders showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the
for P4,230.00. She argued that the ground upon which her petition was other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident,
dismissed was technical. CA reinstated her petition finding that mistake or excusable negligence without the appellant's fault; (10)
respondent substantially complied with the rules by paying the appeal fee peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11)
in full and attaching the proper documents in her motion for in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the
reconsideration. SLU insists that the VA decision had already become issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge,
final for failure of respondent to pay the docket fees on time. guided by all ―the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an
effort, on the part of the party invoking liberality, to advance a reasonable
SC: Whether or not jurisdiction was acquired by the appellate court by or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.
virtue of the timely filing and payment of the correct docket fees.
Cobarrubias‘ petition should NOT be reinstated because of her failure to
In Ruby Shelter, the focus was the payment of the correct amount of the SC: When the complaint was filed in 1998, Rule 141 had been amended
docket fees; In Cobarrubias, the emphasis was the timely payment. The by Administrative Circular 11-94.
court acquires jurisdiction over the case upon the filing of the complaint
AND timely payment of the correct docket fees. In Manchester Development Corp. vs. CA, this Court held that the court
acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed
Proton Philippines vs Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP): Proton docket fees. However, that the ruling in Manchester was clarified in Sun
availed of the credit facilities of BNP and executed a corporate guarantee Insurance Office, Ltd vs. Asuncion when this Court held that in the former
of the extent of US$2 million to guarantee its obligation. Under their trust there was an effort to defraud the government in avoiding to pay the
agreement, Proton would receive imported motor vehicles and hold them correct docket fees, whereas in the latter the plaintiff demonstrated his
in trust for BNP, to be applied to its obligations to it in case the vehicles willingness to abide by paying the additional fees as required.
are not sold, Proton would return them to BNP with the documents of
title. Respondent merely relied on the assessment made by the Clerk of
Court which turned out to be incorrect. Respondent prayed for ―accrued
Proton failed to deliver the proceeds and to return the unsold motor interest subsequent to August 15, 1998 until finally fully paid.‖ The
vehicles. Proton‘s guarantors refused to pay its obligation so BNP filed a complaint having been filed on September 7, 1998, respondent‘s claim
complaint ordering them to pay the initial amount of US$2 million with includes the interest from August 16, 1998 until such date of filing.
accrued interest and other related charges. RTC Makati Clerk of Court Respondent did not, however, pay the filing fee corresponding to its
assessed the docket fees at P352,000. The petitioners filed a motion to claim for interest from August 16, 1998 until the filing of the complaint on
dismiss the complaint by BNP for failure to pay the correct docket fees September 7, 1998. As priorly discussed, this is required under Rule 141,
thus preventing the RTC from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. In as amended by Administrative Circular 11-94, which was the rule
addition, the petitioners allege the prematurity of the complaint since applicable at the time. Thus, as the complaint currently stands,
BNP did not priorly send a demand letter. respondent cannot claim the interest from August 16, 1998 until
September 7, 1998, unless respondent is allowed by motion to amend its
RTC denied the motion to dismiss and the subsequent MR. The CA complaint within a reasonable time and specify the precise amount of
denied the appeal by way of certiorari stating that Section 7(a), Rule 141 interest petitioners owe from August 16, 1998 to September 7, 1998 and
of the Rules of Court excludes interest accruing from the principal pay the corresponding docket fee.
amount being claimed in the pleading in the computation of the
prescribed filing fees. CA denied their MR.
SMC filed its answer with counterclaim against Mercado. It contended When Mercado sought to annul the continuing hold-out agreement and
that Mercado delivered only 2 CBC certificates of deposit amounting to deed of assignment, he in effect sought to be freed from them. While he
P4.5 million and asserted that the execution of the continuing hold-out admitted having outstanding obligations, he nevertheless asserted that
agreement and deed of assignment was a recognized business practice. those were not covered by the assailed accessory contracts. For its part,
Furthermore, because Mercado admitted his outstanding liabilities, SMC aside from invoking the validity of the said agreements, SMC therefore
sought payment of the lees products he withdrew (or purchased on sought to collect the payment for the value of goods Mercado purchased
credit) worth P7,468,153.75. SMC filed a third-party complaint against on credit. Thus, Mercado‘s complaint and SMC‘s counterclaim both
EASCO. It sought to collect the proceeds of the surety bonds submitted touched the issues of whether the continuing hold-out agreement and
by Mercado. deed of assignment were valid and whether Mercado had outstanding
liabilities to SMC. The same evidence would essentially support or refute
Mercado filed an urgent manifestation and motion seeking the dismissal Mercado‘s claim and SMC‘s counterclaim.
of the complaint. He claimed that he was no longer interested in
annulling the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment. Based on the foregoing, had these issues been tried separately, the
RTC denied the motion. Instead, it set the case for pre-trial. Thereafter, efforts of the RTC and the parties would have had to be duplicated.
trial ensued. RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered Mercado and SMC‘s counterclaim, being logically related to Mercado‘s claim, was
EASCO (to the extent of P2.6 million or the value of its bonds) to jointly compulsory in nature. Consequently, the payment of docket fees was not
and severally pay SMC P7,468,153.75. necessary for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Remedial Law Review I – Civil Procedure
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(d) Where the claims in all the causes action are principally
for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall
RULE 2 be the test of jurisdiction. (5a)
(b) A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a person for Rule 16, Section 1, (e) That there is another action pending between the
an act or omission punishable by law. same parties for the same cause;
(c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish Rule 2, Section 4. Splitting a single cause of action; effect of. — If
a status, a right, or a particular fact. (Example: settlement of the estate) two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action,
the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as
In civil actions, there are 5 parties: (1) plaintiff, (2) defendant, (3) a ground for the dismissal of the others.
codefendant, (4) third- fourth- fifth- party defendant, and (4) intervenor.
But if judgment has already been rendered, the remedy of B is motion to
In criminal actions, there can only be 2 parties: (1) Republic of the dismiss on the ground of res judicata.
Philippines, and (2) the accused.
Rule 16, Section 1, (f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior
In special proceedings, there is only 1 party: the petitioner. But when one judgment xxx
opposes, he becomes an oppositor akin to a defendant. Exception: In
habeas corpus, writ of amparo, writ of habeas data and writ of kalikasan, Joinder of causes vs Joinder of parties
there must be a respondent.
There are 4 requirements for joinder of causes of action:
B. Rule 2
Rule 2, Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. — A party may in one
One suit for a single cause of action pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action
as he may have against an opposing party, subject to the following
Rule 2, Section 3. One suit for a single cause of action. — A party conditions:
may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of action.
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules
Any party to a case can never file 2 cases based on 1 act or omission by on joinder of parties;
the defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff.
Rule on joinder of parties: Rule 3, Section 6. Permissive joinder of
If A, the plaintiff, leases unto B a parcel of land for a period of 5 years. parties. — All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in
Upon the expiration of the period of 5 years, the obligation of B is to respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions
return the parcel of land to A. B does not return the parcel of land. There is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may,
is only one violation: failure to return the parcel of land to A. How may A except as otherwise provided in these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be
violate the principle of one suit for a single cause of action? If A files (1) joined as defendants in one complaint, where any question of law or fact
common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the
Remedial Law Review I – Civil Procedure
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action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent Assessed value of the property inside Metro Manila > P50,000
any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in Exception: MTC has jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful
connection with any proceedings in which he may have no interest. detainer cases.
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions Personal actions:
governed by special rules; Demand or the value of the property outside Metro Manila > P100,000
Demand or the value of the property inside Metro Manila > P200,000
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but
pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in If A joins the causes of action of sum of money, sum of money and
the Regional Trial Court provided one of the causes of action falls within foreclosure of real estate mortgage, is that a proper joinder of causes of
the jurisdiction of said court and the venue lies therein; and action? No, because Rule 2, Section 5 (b) states that the joinder shall not
include special civil actions.
(d) Where the claims in all the causes action are principally for
recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of The remedy of B is (NOT A MOTION TO DISMISS) to file a motion to
jurisdiction. amend (or omit?) or ex parte to drop. Also the court itself can drop it
(Note: This is called the totality rule) because the court cannot proceed.
B, the defendant, borrowed money from A, the plaintiff, in the amount of Rule 2, Section 6. Misjoinder of causes of action. — Misjoinder of
P150,000 in January. Again, he borrowed P150,000 from A in May. By causes of action is not a ground for dismissal of an action. A misjoined
December, B borrowed P1,000,000 from A secured by real estate cause of action may, on motion of a party or on the initiative of the court,
mortgage (Rule 68). May A join his causes of action against B? Yes. be severed and proceeded with separately.
What action? The 1st and 2nd are for sum of money. The 3rd may be an
action for foreclosure or recovery of the sum of money (P1,000,000). A is a resident of QC and B is a resident of Manila. The real property
which is offered as security in the real estate mortgage is located in
Suppose A decided to file 3 actions for sums of money, what is the Baguio. Where should the case be filed/ what is the venue of the action?
aggregate amount? P1,300,000. Where should it be filed? With the RTC. If 1st action and 2nd action are for sum of money, 3 rd action is for recovery
of real property, can you join them? Yes. The venue is at the option of
Is that mandatory on the part of A to file 3 cases against B? No. the plaintiff. You can join real and personal actions; there is no
prohibition under joinder of causes of action. However, you cannot join
If A chooses to file 3 cases, where would he file them? 1st and 2nd must an ordinary civil action with a special civil action. That has to be dropped.
be filed with the MTC. The 3rd must be filed with the RTC.
B. Parties to Civil Actions
What is the jurisdictional amount under R.A. 7691?
Section 3. Representatives as parties. — Where the action is Section 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. — Parties in
allowed to be prosecuted and defended by a representative or interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action
someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. (7)
included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real
property in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an expert Section 8. Necessary party. — A necessary party is one who is not
trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief
by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete
benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. (8a)
the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to
the principal. (3a) Section 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. —
Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary
Section 4. Spouses as parties. — Husband and wife shall sue or be party is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and
sued jointly, except as provided by law. (4a) shall state why he is omitted. Should the court find the reason for the
omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted
EXN: necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained.
1. Cases against each other The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without
justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim against such
2. Subject matter of the case is part of their individual property party.
Section 5. Minor or incompetent persons. — A minor or a person The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court
alleged to be incompetent, may sue or be sued with the assistance of from proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein
his father, mother, guardian, or if he has none, a guardian ad litem. shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party. (8a,
(5a) 9a)
Section 13. Alternative defendants. — Where the plaintiff is uncertain -must inform the court for the purpose of substation
against who of several persons he is entitled to relief, he may join any
or all of them as defendants in the alternative, although a right to
-in personam does not survive-
relief against one may be inconsistent with a right of relief against the
other. (13a)
-sum of money- action survives
Section 14. Unknown identity or name of defendant. — Whenever
the identity or name of a defendant is unknown, he may be sued as The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
the unknown owner heir devisee, or by such other designation as the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
case may require, when his identity or true name is discovered, the administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the
pleading must be amended accordingly. (14) minor heirs.
Section 15. Entity without juridical personality as defendant. — When The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
two or more persons not organized as an entity with juridical representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty
personality enter into a transaction, they may be sued under the (30) days from notice.
name by which they are generally or commonly known.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased
In the answer of such defendant, the name and addresses of the party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified
persons composing said entity must all be revealed. (15a) period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified
time to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for
Under Rule 3, there are only 2 kinds of parties: indispensable parties and
necessary parties.
Issue: Whether Karen T. Go is the real party in interest, considering that Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza: Finally, there is no law authorizing sole
it was her husband who signed the lease agreement and the lease proprietorships like petitioner to bring suit in court. The law merely
contracts were in Kargo Enterprises‘ name, a trade name without a recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business
juridical personality. organization conducted for profit by a single individual, and requires the
proprietor or owner thereof to secure licenses and permits, register the
SC: Yes. The central factor in appreciating the issues presented in this business name, and pay taxes to the national government. It does not
case is the business name Kargo Enterprises. The name appears in the vest juridical or legal personality upon the sole proprietorship nor
title of the Complaint where the plaintiff was identified as "KAREN T. GO empower it to file or defend an action in court. Thus, the complaint in the
doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES," and this court below should have been filed in the name of the owner of Juasing
identification was repeated in the first paragraph of the Hardware. The allegation in the body of the complaint would show that
Complaint.Paragraph 2 defined the business KARGO ENTERPRISES the suit is brought by such person as proprietor or owner of the business
undertakes. Paragraph 3 continued with the allegation that the defendant conducted under the name and style Juasing Hardware. The descriptive
"leased from plaintiff a certain motor vehicle" that was thereafter words "doing business as Juasing Hardware" may be added to the title of
described. Significantly, the Complaint specifies and attaches as its the case, as is customarily done.
integral part the Lease Agreement that underlies the transaction between
the plaintiff and the defendant. Again, the name KARGO ENTERPRISES This conclusion should be read in relation with Section 2, Rule 3 of the
entered the picture as this Lease Agreement provides: This agreement, Rules.
made and entered into by and between: ―GLENN GO, of legal age,
married, herein referred to as the LESSOR-SELLER; representing SECOND POINT: As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen is
KARGO ENTERPRISES as its Manager,‖ thus, expressly pointing to the party who will directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this
KARGO ENTERPRISES as the principal that Glenn represented. In other case. Contrary to Navarro‘s contention, Karen is the real party-ininterest,
words, by the express terms of this Lease Agreement, Glenn did sign the and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause
agreement only as the manager of Kargo Enterprises and the latter is of action because her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that
clearly the real party to the lease agreements. her husband signed in behalf of Kargo Enterprises.
As Navarro correctly points out, Kargo Enterprises is a sole THIRD POINT: Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo
proprietorship, which is neither a natural person, nor a juridical person, Enterprises and the properties registered under this name; hence, both
as defined by Article 44 of the Civil Code: The following are juridical have an equal right to seek possession of these properties. Applying
persons: (1) The State and its political subdivisions; (2) Other Article 484 of the Civil Code, which states that "in default of contracts, or
corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed by the provisions of
created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been this Title," we find further support in Article 487 of the Civil Code that
constituted according to law; (3) Corporations, partnerships and allows any of the co-owners to bring an action in ejectment with respect
associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a to the co-owned property.
juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder,
partner or member. In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in
interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant
FIRST POINT: pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules, Kargo jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action,
Enterprises cannot be a party to a civil action. Who then is the proper for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the
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38
coowners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable
co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other cause, shall be deemed a waiver of the claim against such party.
coowners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary
parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the suit even without The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from
their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be
benefit of all co-owners. without prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.
Either of the spouses Go may bring an action against Navarro to recover Rule 3, Section 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. — If the consent of any party
possession of the Kargo Enterprises-leased vehicles which they co-own. who should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made a
This conclusion is consistent with Article 124 of the Family Code, defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.
supporting as it does the position that either spouse may act on behalf of
the conjugal partnership, so long as they do not dispose of or encumber Rule 3, Section 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. — Neither
the property in question without the other spouse‘s consent. misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action.
Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any
FOURTH POINT: Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the party or on its own initiative at any stage the action and on such terms as
action to recover possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and
impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4 of proceeded with separately.
the Rules.
Class suit
Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, we
have held in a number of cases that the misjoinder or non-joinder of Rule 3, Section 12. Class suit. — When the subject matter of the
indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground for dismissal of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so
action. The proper remedy when a party is left out is to implead the numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them
indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court, either motu which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to
proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the
indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity to amend his benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to
complaint in order to include indispensable parties. If the plaintiff to protect his individual interest.
whom the order to include the indispensable party is directed refuses to
comply with the order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon Rule 3, Section 3. Representatives as parties. — Where the action is
motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion. Only upon allowed to be prosecuted and defended by a representative or someone
unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title
the action dismissed. of the case and shall be deemed to be the real property in interest. A
representative may be a trustee of an expert trust, a guardian, an
Rule 3, Section 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. — executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An
Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary party agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed
is not joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when
state why he is omitted. Should the court find the reason for the omission the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion of the omitted necessary party if
jurisdiction over his person may be obtained. Examples: guardian, administrator, executor. They are not the parties in
interest. They only filed the case for the parent/the minor children. The
―It is further prayed that henceforth the undersigned counsel for the Issue: Should the petition of the respondents have been dismissed on
heirs of Pedro Joaquin be furnished with copies of notices, orders, the ground of the death of the original petitioner?
resolutions and other pleadings at its address below.‖
SC: No. Respecting the argument that the petitioner‘s death rendered
Evidently, the heirs of Pedro Joaquin voluntarily appeared and the respondents‘ complaint against him dismissible, Bonilla vs. Barcena
participated. CA had ordered his legal representatives to appear and enlightens: ―The question as to whether an action survives or not
substitute for him. The substitution even on appeal had been ordered depends on the nature of the action and the damages sued for. In the
correctly. In all proceedings, the legal representatives must appear to causes of action which survive, the wrong complained of affects primarily
protect the interests of the deceased. After the rendition of judgment, and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person
further proceedings may be held, such as a motion for reconsideration or being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not
a new trial, an appeal, or an execution. survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights
of property affected being incidental.‖
Considering the foregoing circumstances, the Motion for Substitution
may be deemed to have been granted; and the heirs, to have substituted Respondents are pursuing a property right arising from the kasunduan,
for the deceased, Pedro Joaquin. There being no violation of due whereas petitioner is invoking nullity of the kasunduan to protect his
process, the issue of substitution cannot be upheld as a ground to nullify propriety interest. Assuming arguendo, however, that the kasunduan is
the trial court‘s Decision. deemed void, there is a corollary obligation of the petitioner to return the
money paid by respondents, and since the action involves property
Carabeo vs Dingco: The parties entered into a contract of sale of a rights, it survives.
parcel of land for P38,000. The respondents paid P10,000 initial payment
upon signing the contract with the balance to be paid in September 1990. Trial on the merits was already concluded before petitioner died. Since
Respondents handed in parts P9,100 of the balance despite the RTC was not informed of the petitioner‘s death, it may not be faulted for
petitioner asking them not to do so yet because the latter had to settle a proceeding to render judgment without ordering his substitution. Its
―squabble‖ over the land. After the dispute over the land‘s registration judgment is thus valid and binding upon petitioner‘s legal representative
was settled, the respondents offered to pay the balance, but the or successors-in-interest, insofar as his interest in the property subject of
petitioner declined acceptance. The respondents filed a complaint with the action is concerned.
the katarungan pambarangay. No settlement was reached so the
respondents filed for specific performance with the RTC. Petitioner stated In another vein, the death of a client immediately divests the counsel of
in his answer that the sale was void for lack of an object certain since the authority. Thus, in filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner‘s counsel of record
kasunduan did not specify the metes and bounds of the land. The had no personality to act on behalf of the already deceased client who, it
petitioner also alleged that even if the kasunduan were valid, the bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a party after his death. The
respondent‘s failure to comply with their reciprocal obligation to pay the trial court‘s decision had thereby become final and executor, no appeal
balance of the purchase price would render the action premature. having been perfected.
Prior to the decision of the case, the petitioner died. Records do not Contractual Money claims
show that his counsel informed the RTC of his death and that the proper
substitution was effected. RTC ruled in favor of the respondents ordering Rule 3, Section 20. Action and contractual money claims. — When
the petitioner to sell his rights over the property. CA affirmed. The motion the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, express or
for reconsideration was denied so the present petition was filed by the implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court
deceased‘s son. in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be
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dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final court and file a motion for execution because the defendant here already
judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be died.
enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for
prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. He must file it as a claim against the estate. How? You cannot claim
against the heirs of the decedent. It must be claimed against the estate.
When the defendant dies, pendente lite, the case shall not be dismissed The heirs are different from the estate. If the heirs would be representing
but shall move on up to entry of judgment. This is a U-turn from the 1960 the estate, that would be another matter.
Rules of Court where the case must be dismissed. The reason is to
expedite the proceeding. How will the judgment obligee, A, file a claim against the estate of B?
There is a procedure under Rule 86.
A final judgment is different from an entered judgment. Even if there is an
appeal, the appeal continues. Even if there is a petition for review after If there is already a pending settlement of the estate, it would be easier.
the appeal, the petition continues. It must conclude up to entry of If there is no pending settlement of the estate of the decedent, A should
judgment. file a settlement of estate proceeding. Is A authorized to do that? Yes.
Who may file a settlement of the estate? A creditor may do so.
After entry of judgment, what is the next move of the judgment obligee?
Ordinarily, you avail of Rule 39 (Execution of Judgment). Here, do you But if there is already a pending settlement of the estate, A should just
avail of Rule 39? No. there is a cross-reference to Rule 86, which submit a copy of the judgment together with the entry of judgment. Under
provides the 4 matters claimable under the estate: settlement of estate proceedings, you apply for preference of credits.
1. All claims for money against the decent, arising from contract, A is riding his car along Roxas Boulevard and he collided with another
express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or car driven by B, and nobody would like to accept obligation or liability. A
contingent; filed a case for sum of money against B. B, pendente lite, dies. Can you
2. All claims for funeral expenses; apply Section 20? No, Section 20 deals with contractual money claims.
3. Expense for the last sickness of the decedent, and There is no contract in this case.
4. Judgment for money against the decent.
If B is a taxi driver and A is his passenger, this becomes a contractual
Rule 87 is an action for or against executors or administrators. All other money claim (based on the contract of transportation) if A files a suit.
actions except those which are claimable against the estate may be
brought for or against the executor or administrator. D. Venue of actions: real and personal actions
Section 20 must always be correlated with Rule 86 and 87 to see a bird‘s The venue of an action is what the law or rule provides (Example: Give a
eye view of the entire provisions. law providing for the venue of an action: Rule 66 or petition for quo
warranto, where the venue is the residence of the respondent. In a
So if you file it as a claim against the estate, how do you go about it? special proceeding for guardianship, the venue is the residence of the
ward. In adoption, the venue is the residence of the prospective adopter.
A vs B, this is a contractual money claim. B borrowed P1,000,000 from In these cases, you cannot agree otherwise).
A. This is a contract of loan. B did not pay so A filed a case for sum of
money based on contract (contractual money claim). B died. The case In the absence of any rule, the agreement of the parties will govern. See
must continue up to entry of judgment. When there is already an entry of Pacific Consultants Philippines, Inc. (PPI) vs Schonfeld
judgment, what should A do? He cannot avail of Rule 39/ he cannot go to
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43
In the absence of any agreement, you distinguish whether the action is
real or personal. If it is a personal action, the venue is the residence of Schonfeld was a non-resident Canadian citizen. He was employed by
the plaintiff, or any of the plaintiffs, or the residence of the defendant, or Pacific Consultants International of Japan (PCIJ) as Sector Manager of
any of the defendants, at the option of the plaintiff. If it is a real action, PPI in the Philippines. His salary was paid partly by PPI and PCIJ.
the venue is where the property is located. Henrichsen, president of PPI and director of PCIJ, transmitted a letter of
employment to Schonfeld requesting him to accept and affix his
Rule 4, Section 1. Venue of real actions. — Actions affecting title to or conformity. The letter provides: in case of any question of interpretation
possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and of the conditions of employment, as well as any question arising between
tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the the employee and the company which is in consequence of or connected
real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. with his employment, which cannot be settled amicably, should be finally
settled by the Court of Arbitration in London through written submissions.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the
municipal trial court of the municipality or city wherein the real property Schonfeld arrived in the Philippines and was given the status of a
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. resident alien. Later, Henrichsen informed Schonfeld that his
employment had been terminated effective August 4, 1999. He was,
Rule 4, Section 2. Venue of personal actions. — All other actions may however, informed via email to stay put in his job until even after August
be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal 5 until such time that he would be able to report on certain projects and
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal discuss all the opportunities he had developed. He continued his work
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he until October 1, 1999.
may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
Schonfeld filed several money claims with PPI, and also filed a complaint
Rule 4, Section 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents. — If any of for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. PCIJ and PPI filed a Motion to
the defendants does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, and Dismiss on the ground of improper venue: He was a Canadian citizen,
the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff, or any property of employed and dismissed by PCIJ whose principal office is in Japan, and
said defendant located in the Philippines, the action may be commenced the letter of employment was executed in Japan. Under lex loci
and tried in the court of the place where the plaintiff resides, or where the contractus, the complaint should have been filed in Tokyo. Also, the
property or any portion thereof is situated or found. parties agreed that any employment-related dispute should be brought
before the London Court of Arbitration.
Rule 4, Section 4. When Rule not applicable. — This Rule shall not
apply. LA found that the contract of employment was controlling; the case
should be submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of arbitration in
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or London. The NLRC likewise agreed with the LA. The CA ruled in favor of
PPI and PCIJ. Even under the contract of employment, the parties were
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the filing of not precluded from bringing a case related thereto in other venues. While
the action on the exclusive venue thereof. there was an agreement, the venue is not exclusive since there was no
stipulation to that effect.
Pacific Consultants Philippines, Inc. (PPI) vs Schonfeld: Venue
stipulation is just for the convenience of the parties. It is not restrictive SC: The case may be filed and tried in Philippine courts. The settled rule
unless it includes an exclusivity clause. The word ‗shall‘ does not denote on stipulations regarding venue is that while they are valid and
that the stipulation is exclusive. A stronger word than shall must be used. enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede
Words that may be used: ―exclusive‖, ―in no other place‖. the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the ROC in the absence of
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qualifying or restrictive words. Any agreement of venue, without such full settlement of the remaining obligation. The sheriff executed two
restrictive words should be considered merely as an agreement or (2) notices of levy against properties registered under the name of
additional forum, not as a limiting venue to the specified place. They are petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. However, the notices of levy
not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the intention of the parties were to were denied registration because Ma. Teresa had already sold the
restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and two (2) properties to her daughters
categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between
them be litigated only at the place named by them. P’s CONTENTION: There is extrinsic fraud because the bank failed
to verify the authenticity of her signature on the real estate mortgage
BIACO VS. PCRB: In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction and did not inquire into the reason for the absence of her signature
over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer on the promissory notes. She moreover asserted that the trial court
jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons were served on her
over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the through her husband without any explanation as to why personal
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into service could not be made.
actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made
ISSUE: WON the trial court correctly decided that what is required in
effective.
this case is the acquisition of jurisdiction over the res
Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for
HELD: YES
the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for
satisfying the due process requirements. RULE 5
UNIFORM PROCEDURE IN TRIAL COURTS
FACTS: While employed in the Philippine Countryside Rural Bank
(PCRB) as branch manager, Ernesto obtained several loans from the Section 1. Uniform procedure. – The procedure in the Municipal Trial
respondent bank as evidenced by promissory notes. As security for Courts shall be the same as in the Regional Trial Courts, except (a)
the payment of the said loans, Ernesto executed a real estate where a particular provision expressly or impliedly applies only to either
mortgage in favor of the bank covering the parcel of land.The real of said courts, or (b) in civil cases governed by the Rule on Summary
estate mortgages bore the signatures of the spouses Biaco. Procedure. (n)
Despite the demand letter, Ernesto failed to make good of his Section 2. Meaning of terms. – The term “Municipal Trial Courts” as used
liabilities resulting to a complaint filed by the bank for foreclosure of in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
mortgage. Summons was served to the spouses Biaco through Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Ernesto at his office but failed to file the answer causing them to be Courts. (1a)
declared in default. The spouses did not file an appeal. the E. Summary Procedure
respondent bank filed an ex parte motion for execution to direct the
sheriff to sell the mortgaged lot at public auction. The amount of the Rule 5, Section 1. Uniform procedure. — The procedure in the
property sold at public auction being insufficient to cover the full Municipal Trial Courts shall be the same as in the Regional Trial Courts,
amount of the obligation, the respondent bank filed an "ex except (a) where a particular provision expressly or impliedly applies only
parte motion for judgment" praying for the issuance of a writ of to either of said courts, or (b) in civil cases governed by the Rule on
execution against the other properties of the spouses Biaco for the Summary Procedure.
Section 4. In what case not applicable. — These Rules shall not apply C can also file a complaint (a third party complaint). D can file a fourth
to election cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and party complaint.
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except
by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and D can answer the third-party complaint through an answer to a third party
convenient. complaint. When D answers, that is also an answer to the original
complaint because there could be no third-party complaint without the
In Ong Chia vs Republic, Ong Chia was the foreigner who applied to be original complaint.
a naturalized Filipino citizen. It was granted by the trial court. The
government, through the OSG, appealed the case. In the appellate court, The claim of B against A is a separate and distinct pleading called the
the Republic offered certain pieces of documentary evidence which were counterclaim. The counterclaim is not the answer; it is the complaint of
not offered in the trial court. Ong Chia questioned that, claiming the the defendant against the plaintiff. A‘s answer to the counterclaim is not
evidence should not be admitted since they were never offered. SC: In the reply. The reply is the response to the answer but the answer to the
naturalization cases, applying Rule 1, the Rules of Court are not counterclaim is an answer to the counterclaim of the defendant as
applicable but only in suppletory character. against the plaintiff.
Under Rule 5 as well, you have to take note of Summary Procedure. E – intervenor
D – third-party defendant Rule 6, Section 2. Pleadings allowed. — The claims of a party are
asserted in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth,
etc.)party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention.
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say that you have paid the P100,000 that you borrowed from the plaintiff.
Third-party defendant is someone different from the original parties, for In effect, you are admitting that you borrowed money but you put up a
purposes of contribution, indemnification or subrogation. The answer new matter, which is payment, to avoid the claim.
must already include allegations against the original complaint.
Complaint and Answer There are several kinds of affirmative defenses: fraud, statute of
limitations, release, payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, former
Rule 6, Section 3. Complaint. — The complaint is the pleading alleging recovery, discharge in bankruptcy, and any other matter by way of
the plaintiff's cause or causes of action. The names and residences of confession and avoidance. This list is not exclusive.
the plaintiff and defendant must be stated in the complaint.
In the rules of evidence, when you put up an affirmative defense,
Rule 6, Section 4. Answer. — An answer is a pleading in which a whether in civil or criminal cases, you have what you call reverse trial.
defending party sets forth his defenses.
Reverse trial is a process whereby the defendant puts up an affirmative
The complaint constitutes the allegations or the claim of the plaintiff defense and therefore, there is an admission already on his part of the
against the defendant. The defendant‘s answer is the response to the allegations in the pleading. That is why you reverse the trial.
claim of the plaintiff. The answer constitutes defenses.
In criminal cases, there are no pleadings, except the information. The
Defenses: Negative and Affirmative information is read, under Rule 116, before the start of the trial (during
arraignment) and then the accused puts up an affirmative defense (ex.
Rule 6, Section 5. Defenses. — Defenses may either be negative or self-defense in a murder case). It amounts to saying that he admits the
affirmative. allegations. When this happens, there is reverse trial. There is no need to
prove that the accused killed the victim because he already admitted it.
(a) A negative defense is the specific denial of the material fact or There is no need to show evidence-in-chief. The trial starts with the
facts alleged in the pleading of the claimant essential to his cause or accused and he puts up the defense of self-defense. If it is necessary,
causes of action. the prosecution puts up rebuttal evidence.
(b) An affirmative defense is an allegation of a new matter which, Negative pregnant – a term in contradiction. When you invoke negative
while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the pleading of pregnant, in effect, you are admitting what you seek to deny. That‘s why
the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by him. The you can never use negative pregnant if the allegation is a simple
affirmative defenses include fraud, statute of limitations, release, declarative sentence.
payment, illegality, statute of frauds, estoppel, former recovery,
discharge in bankruptcy, and any other matter by way of confession and Example: Defendant borrowed money from the plaintiff in the amount of
avoidance. P100,000. This is a simple declarative sentence so you cannot invoke
here negative pregnant.
2 modes of negative defense:
(1) specific denial – give the reason for your denial But if you qualify that in such manner that it becomes a compound,
(2) lack of knowledge sufficient to form belief as to the truth of the claim complex declaration, then negative pregnant might come out:
Affirmative defense – admission of the allegation but you put up a new Defendant borrowed money from the plaintiff in the amount of P100,000
subject matter so as to avoid the claim. Ex: defendant borrowed when the plaintiff was playing basketball.
P100,000 from the plaintiff. If you invoke an affirmative defense, you‘ll
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I deny that I borrowed money from the plaintiff in the amount of P100,000 Paragraph 22 of the respondents' answer was thus a denial pregnant
when the plaintiff was playing basketball. This is a negative pregnant with admissions of the following substantial facts:
because it proves that he did borrow money, but not at the time the
plaintiff he was playing basketball. Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of
the Swiss bank deposits in the sum of about US$356 million, not having
Republic vs Sandiganbayan: This case involved a negative pregnant. It been specifically denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed
was alleged that Imelda had 15 Swiss accounts. Imelda said no, she only admitted by them pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Revised
had 7 Swiss accounts. So she admitted she had Swiss account. Rules on Civil Procedure
Republic, through the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture before the The matters referred to in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the respondents'
Sandiganbayan against Ferdinand Marcos, represented by his answer pertained to the creation of five groups of accounts as well as
Estate/Heirs and Imelda Marcos. Republic sought the declaration of the their respective ending balances and attached documents alleged in
aggregate amount of US$356 million deposited in escrow in the PNB, as paragraphs 24 to 52 of the Republic's petition for forfeiture. Respondent
ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held in 5 account groups, Imelda R. Marcos never specifically denied the existence of the Swiss
using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks. Petitioner filed funds. Her claim that "the funds involved were lawfully acquired" was an
a complaint and respondent an answer. acknowledgment on her part of the existence of said deposits. This only
reinforced her earlier admission of the allegation in paragraph 23 of the
Petitioner, in the main, asserts that nowhere in the respondents' motions petition for forfeiture regarding the existence of the US$356 million Swiss
for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration were the bank deposits.
authenticity, accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever
challenged. Caneland Sugar Corp. vs Alon: Petitioner does not dispute its loan
obligation with respondent. Petitioner‘s bone of contention before the
SC: This particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on RTC is that the promissory notes are silent as to whether they were
pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the covered by the Mortgage Trust Indenture and Mortgage Participation on
admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are its property. It does not categorically deny that these promissory notes
not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was are covered by the security documents. These vague assertions are, in
directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative fact, negative pregnants, i.e., denials pregnant with the admission of the
expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely
some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an denied.
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is
alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the A negative pregnant is a "form of negative expression which carries with
allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the
that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial
admitted. facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or
modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
The material allegations in paragraph 23 of the said petition were not modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying
specifically denied by respondents in paragraph 22 of their answer. The circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted."
denial contained in paragraph 22 of the answer was focused on the
averment in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture that "Respondents Petitioner‘s allegations do not make out any justifiable basis for the
clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the granting of any injunctive relief. Even when the mortgagors were
same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities." disputing the amount being sought from them, upon the non-payment of
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the loan, which was secured by the mortgage, the mortgaged property is
properly subject to a foreclosure sale. This is in consonance with the This doctrine of Alday was overruled in January 2008 by Korea
doctrine that to authorize a temporary injunction, the plaintiff must show, Technologies Incorporated, where the SC said as of August 13, 2004,
at least prima facie, a right to the final relief. all kinds of counterclaim must be paid irrespective of whether they are
compulsory or permissive. There was a howl of protest. By October of
Counterclaims: Compulsory and Permissive the same year, SC reversed their own doctrine and went back to Alday
vs FGU through Mercado vs CA.
Rule 6, Section 6. Counterclaim. — A counterclaim is any claim which
a defending party may have against an opposing party. Alday vs FGU Insurance: FGU filed a complaint with the RTC alleging
that Alday owed it unliquidated cash advances, unremitted costs of
Rule 6, Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim. — A compulsory premiums and other charges she incurred in the course of her work as
counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of an insurance agent. FGU also prayed for exemplary damages, attorney‘s
justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence fees, and costs of suit.
constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court Alday filed her answer and a counterclaim where she asserted her right
cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the for the payment of direct commissions, profit commissions, contingent
jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, bonuses and accumulated premium reserves. She also prayed for
except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, the attorney‘s fees, litigation expenses, moral damages and exemplary
counter-claim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount. damages for the allegedly unfounded action filed by GFU.
Counterclaim – it is neither an answer nor a reply. It is the complaint of FGU filed a motion to strike out answer with compulsory counterclaim
the defendant against the plaintiff. It is a totally separate pleading. and to declare defendant in default because her answer was allegedly
filed out of time. The RTC denied FGU‘s motion and its MR. FGU then
2 kinds of counterclaim: filed a motion to dismiss Alday‘s counterclaim. It contended that RTC
(1) compulsory – is that which arises from the same transaction or series never acquired jurisdiction over the same because of the non-payment of
of transactions docket fees. Alday asked the RTC to declare her counterclaim as exempt
(2) permissive – does not arise from the same transaction from payment of docket fees since it is compulsory and that respondent
be declared in default for having failed to answer the counterclaim. RTC
Alday vs FGU Insurance: What are the indicia of a compulsory granted FGU‘s motion to dismiss the counterclaim and consequently,
counterclaim? Alday was an insurance agent. She was sued by FGU for denied Alday‘s motion. The RTC found that the counterclaim is
non-remittance of premiums. Alday set-up a counterclaim saying FGU permissive in nature and held that Alday‘s failure to pay docket fees
didn‘t pay her bonuses, commissions. And because of the complaint, she prevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction over it. The RTC likewise
suffered sleepless nights, wounded feelings, etc. FGU said since the denied her MR. CA sustained the RTC‘s order and denied Alday‘s MR.
counterclaim is permissive and Alday did not pay the docket fees, the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the counterclaim. SC: A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the
regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction
SC held that the counterclaim of Alday is of 2 kinds. Some counterclaims or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party‘s
are compulsory, and those do not require docket fees. Some are claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
permissive. Because they did not arise from the complaint, therefore, it is parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
a permissive counterclaim. Alday only had to pay for the permissive
counterclaim.
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Petitioner‘s counterclaim for commissions, bonuses, and accumulated judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
premium reserves is merely permissive. The evidence required to prove authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
petitioner‘s claims differs from that needed to establish respondent‘s additional fee.
demands for the recovery of cash accountabilities from petitioner, such
as cash advances and costs of premiums. The recovery of respondent‘s Although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional
claims is not contingent or dependent upon establishing petitioner‘s requirement, its non-payment does not result in the automatic dismissal
counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials will not result in the of the case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable
substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court and the parties. prescriptive or reglementary period.
One would search the records in vain for a logical connection between
the parties‘ claims. This conclusion is further reinforced by petitioner‘s Was FGU in default for failing to answer petitioner‘s counterclaim? No.
own admissions since she declared in her answer that respondent‘s Insofar as the permissive counterclaim of petitioner is concerned, there
cause of action, unlike her own, was not based upon the Special Agent‘s is obviously no need to file an answer until petitioner has paid the
Contract. However, petitioner‘s claims for damages, allegedly suffered as prescribed docket fees for only then shall the court acquire jurisdiction
a result of the filing by respondent of its complaint, are compulsory. over such claim. Meanwhile, the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner
for damages based on the filing by respondent of an allegedly
There is no need for petitioner to pay docket fees for her compulsory unfounded and malicious suit need not be answered since it is
counterclaim. On the other hand, in order for the RTC to acquire inseparable from the claims of respondent. If respondent were to
jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim, petitioner is bound to pay answer the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner, it would merely result
the prescribed docket fees. The rule on the payment of filing fees has in the former pleading the same facts raised in its complaint.
been laid down by the Court in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Hon. Maximiano Asuncion: Criteria or tests that may be used in determining whether a
counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, summarized as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial 1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim
court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. largely the same?
Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee 2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant‘s claim absent
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable the compulsory counterclaim rule?
prescriptive or reglementary period.
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff‘s claim
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party as well as defendant‘s counterclaim? (Evidence test rule)
claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until
and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may 4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case (Logical relationship rule)
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. (KOGIES) vs Lerma: The rules on the
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the payment of docket fees for counterclaims and cross claims were
filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing amended effective August 16, 2004.
fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the
pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the
court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the
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KOGIES strongly argues that when PGSMC filed the counterclaims, it to Article 2088 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Mercado argued that he had
should have paid docket fees and filed a certificate of non-forum already settled his recent purchases on credit but SMC erroneously
shopping, and that its failure to do so was a fatal defect. applied the said payments to his old accounts not covered by the
continuing hold-out agreement (i.e., purchases made prior to the
We disagree with KOGIES. The counterclaims of PGSMC were extension of the credit line).
incorporated in its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in accordance
with Section 8 of Rule 11, the rule that was effective at the time the SMC filed its answer with counterclaim against Mercado. It contended
Answer with Counterclaim was filed. Sec. 8 on existing counterclaim or that Mercado delivered only 2 CBC certificates of deposit amounting to
cross-claim states, ―A compulsory counterclaim or a cross-claim that a P4.5 million and asserted that the execution of the continuing hold-out
defending party has at the time he files his answer shall be contained agreement and deed of assignment was a recognized business practice.
therein.‖ Furthermore, because Mercado admitted his outstanding liabilities, SMC
sought payment of the lees products he withdrew (or purchased on
At the time PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims credit) worth P7,468,153.75. SMC filed a third-party complaint against
against KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees for said counterclaims EASCO. It sought to collect the proceeds of the surety bonds submitted
being compulsory in nature. However, effective August by Mercado.
16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC,
docket fees are now required to be paid in compulsory counterclaim or Mercado filed an urgent manifestation and motion seeking the dismissal
cross-claims. of the complaint. He claimed that he was no longer interested in
annulling the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment.
Mercado vs CA: Leonides Mercado had been distributing respondent RTC denied the motion. Instead, it set the case for pre-trial. Thereafter,
San Miguel Corporation‘s (SMC‘s) beer products since 1967. In 1991, trial ensued. RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered Mercado and
SMC extended to him a P7.5 million credit line allowing him to withdraw EASCO (to the extent of P2.6 million or the value of its bonds) to jointly
goods on credit. To secure his purchases, Mercado assigned 3 China and severally pay SMC P7,468,153.75.
Banking Corporation (CBC) certificates of deposit amounting to P5
million to SMC and executed a continuing hold-out agreement stating: Mercado and EASCO appealed to the CA, insisting that Mercado did not
―Any demand made by [SMC] on [CBC], claiming default on my/our part default in the payment of his obligations to SMC. CA affirmed the RTC
shall be conclusive on [CBC] and shall serve as absolute authority for decision in toto. Mercado and EASCO both moved for reconsideration
[CBC] to encash the [CBC certificates of deposit] xxx, whether or not I/we but their respective motions were denied. EASCO filed a petition for
have in fact defaulted on any of my/our obligations with [SMC], it being review on certiorari in this Court but eventually agreed to settle its liability
understood that the issue of whether or not there was factual default with SMC. The petition was terminated. Meanwhile, Mercado passed
must be threshed out solely between me/us and [SMC].‖ He also away and was substituted by his heirs, petitioners Racquel, Jimmy,
submitted 3 surety bonds from Eastern Assurance and Surety Henry, Louricar and Virgilio Mercado. Petitioners subsequently filed this
Corporation (EASCO) for P2.6 million. petition asserting that the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision in toto.
The said decision (insofar as it ordered Mercado to pay SMC
SMC notified CBC that Mercado failed to pay for the items he withdrew P7,468,153.75) was void. SMC‘s counterclaim was permissive in nature.
on credit. Citing the continuing hold-out agreement, it asked CBC to Inasmuch as SMC did not pay docket fees, the RTC never acquired
release the proceeds of the assigned certificates of deposit. CBC jurisdiction over the counterclaim.
approved SMB‘s request and informed Mercado. Mercado filed an action
to annul the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment in SC: RTC acquired jurisdiction although SMC did not pay docket fees. A
the RTC. He claimed that the continuing hold-out agreement allowed counterclaim (or a claim which a defending party may have against any
forfeiture without the benefit of foreclosure. It was therefore void pursuant party) may be compulsory or permissive. A counterclaim that (1) arises
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out of (or is necessarily connected with) the transaction or occurrence Rule 6, Section 9. Counter-counterclaims and counter-crossclaims.
that is the subject matter of the opposing party‘s claim; (2) falls within the — A counter-claim may be asserted against an original counterclaimant.
jurisdiction of the court and (3) does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, A cross-claim may also be filed against an original cross-claimant.
is compulsory. Otherwise, a counterclaim is merely permissive.
Reply
When Mercado sought to annul the continuing hold-out agreement and
deed of assignment, he in effect sought to be freed from them. While he Rule 6, Section 10. Reply. — A reply is a pleading, the office or function
admitted having outstanding obligations, he nevertheless asserted that of which is to deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new matters
those were not covered by the assailed accessory contracts. For its part, alleged by way of defense in the answer and thereby join or make issue
aside from invoking the validity of the said agreements, SMC therefore as to such new matters. If a party does not file such reply, all the new
sought to collect the payment for the value of goods Mercado purchased matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted.
on credit. Thus, Mercado‘s complaint and SMC‘s counterclaim both
touched the issues of whether the continuing hold-out agreement and If the plaintiff wishes to interpose any claims arising out of the new
deed of assignment were valid and whether Mercado had outstanding matters so alleged, such claims shall be set forth in an amended or
liabilities to SMC. The same evidence would essentially support or refute supplemental complaint.
Mercado‘s claim and SMC‘s counterclaim.
Reply – response to an answer.
Based on the foregoing, had these issues been tried separately, the
efforts of the RTC and the parties would have had to be duplicated. General rule: The reply is not necessary because if you do not put up a
SMC‘s counterclaim, being logically related to Mercado‘s claim, was reply, it means you controvert the allegations in the answer.
compulsory in nature. Consequently, the payment of docket fees was not
necessary for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter. Exceptions: (1) when the answer sets up a new matter, there is a
necessity of a reply. (2) When the defendant avails of an actionable
Rule 6, Section 8. Cross-claim. — A cross-claim is any claim by one document, you have to file a reply. Otherwise, the authenticity and due
party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that execution of the document are deemed admitted.
is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim
therein. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party against Rule 8, Section 7. Action or defense based on document. —
whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or
of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant. document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set
forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached
Cross-claim – between the defendants. This is the complaint of the to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the
codefendant against his co-defendant for purposes of contribution, pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading.
subrogation or indemnification.
Rule 8, Section 8. How to contest such documents. — When an
B borrowed money from A in the amount of P500,000. A knows the action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or
P500,000 will be used by B and C. B did not pay. A can file a case attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding
impleading alternative defendants. B, in the same case, can file a section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
crossclaim against his co-defendant asking for contribution. deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath specifically
denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts, but the
requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not
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appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order (d) Date. — Every pleading shall be dated.
for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.
Rule 7, Section 3. Signature and address. — Every pleading must be
B. Parts of a Pleading signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in either case his
address which should not be a post office box.
Rule 7, Section 1. Caption. — The caption sets forth the name of the
court, the title of the action, and the docket number if assigned. The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read
the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
The title of the action indicates the names of the parties. They shall all be there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
named in the original complaint or petition; but in subsequent pleadings,
it shall be sufficient if the name of the first party on each side be stated An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may,
with an appropriate indication when there are other parties. in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear
that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay.
Their respective participation in the case shall be indicated. Counsel who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading
in violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein,
Rule 7, Section 2. The body. — The body of the pleading sets fourth its or fails promptly report to the court a change of his address, shall be
designation, the allegations of the party's claims or defenses, the relief subject to appropriate disciplinary action.
prayed for, and the date of the pleading.
The address must not be a post-office box address. Otherwise, the
(a) Paragraphs. — The allegations in the body of a pleading shall be prescriptive period will not lie because it will depend upon when you get
divided into paragraphs so numbered to be readily identified, each of your mails in your post-office box.
which shall contain a statement of a single set of circumstances so
far as that can be done with convenience. A paragraph may be Based on certain circulars of the SC, in every pleading, what is
referred to by its number in all succeeding pleadings. necessary is not only the signature and the address. There are 4 more
items necessary: (1) Roll Number, (2) IBP Number, (3) PTR Number, (4)
(b) Headings. — When two or more causes of action are joined the MCLE Exemption Number.
statement of the first shall be prefaced by the words "first cause of Verification and Certification
action,'' of the second by "second cause of action", and so on for the
others. Rule 7, Section 4. Verification. — Except when otherwise specifically
required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
When one or more paragraphs in the answer are addressed to one of accompanied by affidavit.
several causes of action in the complaint, they shall be prefaced by the
words "answer to the first cause of action" or "answer to the second A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading
cause of action" and so on; and when one or more paragraphs of the and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and
answer are addressed to several causes of action, they shall be prefaced belief.
by words to that effect.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on
(c) Relief. — The pleading shall specify the relief sought, but it may add "information and belief", or upon "knowledge, information and belief", or
a general prayer for such further or other relief as may be deemed lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
just or equitable.
Constante signed the note as owner and as representative of the other Issue: Whether the CA was correct in summarily dismissing the petition
co-owners. Under this note, a contract of agency was clearly constituted for being filed without a certification for non-forum shopping
between Constante and Artigo. Whether Constante appointed Artigo as
agent, in Constante's individual or representative capacity, or both, the SC: No. Non-compliance with the required certification is fatal. To curb
De Castros cannot seek the dismissal of the case for failure to implead the malpractice of forum shopping, Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules
the other co-owners as indispensable parties. The De Castros admit that of Civil Procedure, ordains that a violation thereof would constitute
the other co-owners are solidarily liable under the contract of agency, contempt of court and be cause for the summary dismissal of the
citing Article 1915 of the Civil Code. petition, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the
counsel of the party concerned.
The solidary liability of the 4 co-owners, however, militates against the
De Castros' theory that the other co-owners should be impleaded as The filing of a certificate for non-forum shopping is mandatory in initiatory
indispensable parties. When the law expressly provides for solidarity of pleadings. The subsequent compliance with the requirement does not
the obligation, as in the liability of co-principals in a contract of agency, excuse a party‘s failure to comply therewith in the first instance. In those
each obligor may be compelled to pay the entire obligation. The agent cases where the Court excused non-compliance with the requirement to
may recover the whole compensation from any one of the co-principals, submit a certificate of non-forum shopping, it found special
as in this case. Article 1216 of the Civil Code provides that a creditor may circumstances or compelling reasons which made the strict application of
sue any of the solidary debtors. [Section 5, Rule 7, ROC] clearly unjustified or inequitable. In this case,
however, the petitioners offered no valid justification for their failure to
Mandawer Galleon Trade vs Isidro: Respondents filed a case for illegal comply with the circular.
dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month
pay, and service incentive leave pay against petitioner with the Non-compliance with the requirement on, or submission of defective,
NLRC. They asserted that they were dismissed from employment without verification is not necessarily fatally defective.
just cause and without due process. Petitioners averred that the
respondents were not their employees but were independent contractors. In Altres v. Empleo:
LA found respondents illegally dismissed from employment. 1) A distinction must be made between:
a. non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of
Petitioners filed an appeal before the NLRC but failed to attach a defective verification, and
certification of non-forum shopping to their notice of appeal, as required b. non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of
by Section 4, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. NLRC dismissed defective certification against forum shopping.
the appeal for being fatally defective and affirmed LA‘s decision with
finality. Petitioners filed an MR but it was denied by the NLRC. An entry 2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein
for judgment was issued by the NLRC stating that the resolution had does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may
become final and executory. order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending
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circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be desiring to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby. capacity of any party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, shall
do so by specific denial, which shall include such supporting particulars
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge.
has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in Rule 8, Section 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. — In all
the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct. averments of fraud or mistake the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake must be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, or
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance other condition of the mind of a person may be averred generally.
therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not
curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there Rule 8, Section 6. Judgment. — In pleading a judgment or decision of a
is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal, or of a board
presence of or officer, it is sufficient to aver the judgment or decision without setting
"special circumstances or compelling reasons." forth matter showing jurisdiction to render it.
Rule 8, Section 1. In general. — Every pleading shall contain in a Rule 8, Section 7. Action or defense based on document. —
methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and direct statement of the Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or
ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set
as the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts. forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached
to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the
If a defense relied on is based on law, the pertinent provisions thereof pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading.
and their applicability to him shall be clearly and concisely stated.
Actionable documents – are those which is the basis of one‘s claim or
Rule 8, Section 2. Alternative causes of action or defenses. — A defense.
party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense
alternatively or hypothetically, either in one cause of action or defense or How do you allege an actionable document? Section 7 provides the
in separate causes of action or defenses. When two or more statements answer. To allege an actionable document, you either (1) copy the
are made in the alternative and one of them if made independently would document verbatim in your pleading; or (2) copy the basis of your claim
be sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of and attach a copy of the document.
one or more of the alternative statements.
Use the first mode if your document is short like a promissory note. Use
Rule 8, Section 3. Conditions precedent. — In any pleading a general the second mode if your document is quite lengthy like a contract of
averment of the performance or occurrence of all conditions precedent mortgage consisting of 20 pages.
shall be sufficient. Rule 8, Section 8. How to contest such documents. — When an
action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or
Rule 8, Section 4. Capacity. — Facts showing the capacity of a party to attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding
sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be
representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath specifically
association of person that is made a party, must be averred. A party denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts, but the
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requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not Respondents presented evidence which casts doubt on the veracity of
appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order these documents. Switzerland Insurance presented Export Declaration
for an inspection of the original instrument is refused. No. 1131/85 which petitioner‘s own witness, Rogelio Lumibao, prepared,
in which it was stated that the copper concentrates to be transported to
You contest the actionable document by specifically denying it under Japan had a gross weight of only 2,050 wet metric tons or 1,845 dry
oath. The pleading must contain a jurat (subscribed and sworn to before metric tons, 10 percent more or less. On the other hand, Certified
me). Otherwise, the authenticity and due execution of the document are Adjusters, Inc., to which Switzerland Insurance had referred petitioner‘s
deemed admitted. Only authenticity and due execution, not the contents claim, prepared a report which showed that a total of 2,451.630 wet
of the document. metric tons of copper concentrates were delivered at Poro Point. As the
report stated: It is to be pointed out that there were no actual weighing
Benguet Exploration, Inc. vs CA: Authenticity and due execution made at Benguet Exploration‘s site. The procedure done was that after
constitutes only 4 things: (1) that the document was signed; (2) that the weighing the trucks before and after unloading at
document complied with all the formalities under the laws; (3) that when Poro Point, the weight of the load was determined and entered on
the document was signed, it was in the original form without any ―Philex‖ Trip Ticket which was later on copied and entered by the truck
alteration; and (4) that the document was delivered. driver on Benguet Exploration, Inc.‘s Transfer Slip.
Petitioner contends that the genuineness and due execution of the Considering the discrepancies in the various documents showing the
documents presented, i.e., Bill of Lading, Certificate of Loading, actual amount of copper concentrates transported to Poro Point and
Certificate of Weight, Mate‘s Receipt, were properly established by the loaded in the vessel, there is no evidence of the exact amount of copper
testimony of its witness, Ernesto Cayabyab, and that as a result, there is concentrates shipped. Thus, whatever presumption of regularity in the
a prima facie presumption that their contents are true. transactions might have risen from the genuineness and due execution
of the Bill of Lading, Certificate of Weight, Certificate of Loading, and
This contention has no merit. The admission of the due execution and Mate‘s Receipt was successfully rebutted by the evidence presented by
genuineness of a document simply means that ―the party whose Switzerland Insurance which showed disparities in the actual weight of
signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by another the cargo transported to Poro Point and loaded on the vessel. This fact is
for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words compounded by the admissions made by Lumibao and Cayabyab that
and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; they had no personal knowledge of the actual amount of copper
that the document was delivered; and that any formal requisites required concentrates loaded on the vessel.
by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it
lacks, are waived by him.‖ Genuineness and due execution of the In the face of these admissions, appellant‘s claim of loss or shortage is
instrument means nothing more than that the instrument is not spurious, placed in serious doubt, there being no other way of verifying the
counterfeit, or of different import on its face from the one executed. accuracy of the figures indicated in appellant‘s documentary evidence
that could confirm the alleged loss of 355.736 MT. Notwithstanding the
It is equally true, however, that ¾ execution can only refer to the actual figure stated in Bill of Lading No. PP/0-1 that 2,243.496 WMT of copper
making and delivery, but it cannot involve other matters without enlarging concentrates was loaded by appellant at the port of origin, it should be
its meaning beyond reason. The only object of the rule was to enable a stressed that this is merely prima facie evidence of the receipt by the
plaintiff to make out a prima facie, not a conclusive case, and it cannot carrier of said cargo as described in the bill of lading. Thus, it has been
preclude a defendant from introducing any defense on the merits which held that recitals in the bill of lading as to the goods shipped raise only a
does not contradict the execution of the instrument introduced in rebuttable presumption that such goods were delivered for shipment and
evidence. as between the consignor and a receiving carrier, the fact must outweigh
the recital. Resultingly, the admissions elicited from appellant‘s
Rule 8, Section 12. Striking out of pleading or matter contained (2) litis pendentia (Section 1, Rule 9)
therein. — Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these Rules, upon (3) lack of jurisdiction (Section 1, Rule 9)
motion made by a party within twenty (20) days after the service of the
pleading upon him, or upon the court's own initiative at any time, the (4) statute of limitation (Section 1, Rule 9)
court may order any pleading to be stricken out or that any sham or false,
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter be stricken out (5) failure of any party to appear for the presentation of evidence in
therefrom. chief (Section 3, Rule 17)
D. Rule 9 (6) plaintiff‘s failure to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length
of time (Section 3, Rule 17)
Effect of Failure to Plead
(7) plaintiff‘s failure to comply with these Rules or any order of the court
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(Section 3, Rule 17) (e) Where no defaults allowed. — If the defending party in an action
for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal separation
(8) the rule in summary procedure fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if
Waiver of Defenses and Objections; Default there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that
the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
Rule 9, Section 2. Compulsory counterclaim, or cross-claim, not set
up barred. — A compulsory counterclaim, or a cross-claim, not set up Under the 1997 Rules of Court, when may a party be declared in default?
shall be barred. There is only one ground for declaring a party in default: failure to file
responsive pleading within the required period. Now, there is no more
Rule 9, Section 3. Default; declaration of. — If the defending party fails declaration of a party as in default that used to be in the 1960 Rules of
to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of Court that has been deleted by the 1997 Rules of Court.
the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such
failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall A files a case against B for unlawful detainer and forcible entry and
proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his summons was served upon B on January 5. On February 5, B has not
pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the yet filed an answer. Can B be declared in default for failure to file his
claimant to submit evidence. Such reception of evidence may be answer? No, the case is covered by the Rules of Summary Procedure
delegated to the clerk of court. and an order of default or a motion to declare defendant in default is a
prohibited pleading.
(a) Effect of order of default. — A party in default shall be entitled to
notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial. If there is only one ground, the 2 other grounds in the 1960 Rules of
Court to declare a party as in default have been eliminated: (1) when a
(b) Relief from order of default. — A party declared in default may at party fails to appear at the pre-trial; or (2) the party fails to file a pre-trial
any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a motion under brief.
oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing that his failure
to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence Now, if the plaintiff does not appear at the pre-trial, it will be nonsuited
and that he has a meritorious defense. In such case, the order of default and result to a dismissal. Defendant can present evidence ex parte on
may be set aside on such terms and conditions as the judge may impose his counterclaim. If the defendant fails to appear at the pre-trial or submit
in the interest of justice. a pre-trial brief, the plaintiff can present evidence ex parte. There is no
need to declare them as in default.
(c) Effect of partial default. — When a pleading asserting a claim
states a common cause of action against several defending parties, To declare a party in default because of failure to file responsive pleading
some of whom answer and the others fail to do so, the court shall try the within the required period, the other party must file a motion. There is no
case against all upon the answers thus filed and render judgment upon declaration in default motu proprio. It must always be through a
the evidence presented. litigious/litigated motion.
(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. — A judgment rendered against a There are 2 kinds of motions: (1) litigated motion and (2) non-litigated (or
party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from oral) motion. Since a motion to declare a party in default is a litigated
that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages. motion, it must comply with section 4 (must be in writing, and comply with
3-day notice rule), section 5 (10-day setting rule), and section 6 (copy of
pleading must be served upon the adverse party) of Rule 15.
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When the party is supposed to file a responsive pleading within 15 days
Rule 15, Section 4. Hearing of motion. — Except for motions which the from receipt of the summons (ex. defendant receives the summons with
court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, the copy of the complaint) and he fails to file his answer to the complaint
every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. within 15 days from receipt thereof, the plaintiff can go to the court and
file a motion to declare the defendant in default. It is a litigated motion
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing and it must comply with sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15.
thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the
other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the The plaintiff may also be declared in default in a case where the
court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. defendant files a permissive counterclaim (thus, the plaintiff must file an
answer). What is the effect if a party is declared in default? He loses his
Rule 15, Section 5. Notice of hearing. — The notice of hearing shall be personality before the court. When he loses his personality before the
addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of court, he can no longer participate in the proceedings.
the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of
the motion. How can he regain his personality before the court? There is only one
way according to the SC which was discussed in Banco de Oro vs
Rule 15, Section 6. Proof of service necessary. — No written motion Tansipek: Even if you lose your personality before the court because
set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service you have been declared in default, you are still entitled to notices. You
thereof. are only deprived of participation in the trial but you are still entitled to
processes. In this case, the defaulted party filed a motion for
3-day notice rule – a copy of the pleading must be received 3 days reconsideration. SC held that a motion for reconsideration is not a valid
before the scheduled hearing (not must be sent). If the motion day is a remedy. There is one remedy: a motion to set aside the order of default.
Friday, it must be received not later than Tuesday. Under computation of This motion is also a litigated motion and must conform to Sections 4, 5,
time in Rule 22, you must always exclude the first day and include the 6 of Rule 15. When the motion to set aside the order of default is granted
last day. by the court, then you regain your personality before the court.
Rule 22, Section 1. How to compute time. — In computing any period If you do not regain your personality in court, what follows an order of
of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court, or default? A judgment by default. While there is only one remedy against
by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the an order of default (which is a motion to set aside the order of default),
designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of there are several remedies against a judgment by default. Because it is a
performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, judgment, all the remedies against a judgment may be availed of such as
falls on a Saturday a Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the motion for reconsideration, motion for new trial and appeal.
court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.
General rule: An order of default must always precede a judgment by
10-day setting rule – you have to set the hearing within a period of 10 default.
days from the filing of a motion. If there is a conflict between the 2, what
should prevail over which? The 3-day notice rule must prevail, because Exception: Where a judgment by default may be granted by the court
the 10-day setting rule is addressed to the court while the 3-day notice without being preceded by an order of default: refusal to comply with the
rule is addressed to the adverse party. The adverse party must not be modes of discovery (Rule 29, Section 3(c)).
prejudiced.
Rule 29, Section 3. Other consequences. — If any party or an officer
or managing agent of a party refuses to obey an order made under
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section 1 of this Rule requiring him to answer designated questions, or Rule 9, Section 3(b): Relief from order of default.— A party declared
an order under Rule 27 to produce any document or other thing for in default may at any time after notice thereof and before judgment file a
inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to be done, or to motion under oath to set aside the order of default upon proper showing
permit entry upon land or other property or an order made under Rule 28 that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or
requiring him to submit to a physical or mental examination, the court excusable negligence and that he has a meritorious defense. In such
may make such orders in regard to the refusal as are just, and among case, the order of default may be set aside on such terms and conditions
others the following: xxx as the judge may impose in the interest of justice.
(c) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different from an ordinary motion in
proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or that the Motion should be verified; and must show fraud, accident,
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default mistake or excusable neglect, and meritorious defenses. The allegations
against the disobedient party; xxx of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and (2) of
meritorious defenses must concur.
Banco de Oro vs Tansipek: JOCI, a domestic corporation engaged in
construction, filed a complaint against PCIB (Bank). JOCI contracted with Commission on Appointments (COA) vs Paler: Celso Paler was a
Duty Free Phils. to construct a store in Mandaue. Construction went on, Supervising Legislative Staff Officer II (SG-24) with the Technical
and JOCI authorized Tansipek to collect payments for it. Initial payments Support Service of the COA. He submitted a request for VL for 74
were deposited to JOCI‘s account. However, a check was not deposited working days - from August 1 to November 14, 2003. The Director III of
to its account. Tansipek deposited the check to his personal account in Technical Support Service submitted to the Commission Secretary his
PCIB. PCIB allowed it despite the check being crossed for the payee‘s comments/recommendation on Paler‘s application which principally
account only, and that respondent lacked authority to endorse it. PCIB states that said application for Leave may be acted upon depending on
refused to pay. JOCI demanded payment of the check. PCIB filed a the completion of his work load and submission of the medical certificate.
motion to dismiss but RTC denied it. PCIB filed its answer and a
thirdparty complaint against Tansipek. PCIB alleged in the third-party Since he already had an approved leave from June 9 to July 30, 2003,
complaint that Tansipek presented to it a copy of the board resolution Paler left for the US on June 8, 2003, without verifying whether his
allowing him to deposit the check in his personal account. application for leave (for August 1 – November 14, 2003) was approved
or denied.
Tansipek was given extension of time to file his answer, but he failed so
he was declared in default. He filed a Motion to Reconsider the Default In a letter dated September 16, 2003, the Commission Chairman
Order, but it was denied. He filed a petition for certiorari with the CA informed Paler that he was being dropped from the roll of employees
assailing the default order as well as the denial of the motion for effective said date, due to his continuous 30-day absence without leave
reconsideration. CA dismissed his petition for failure to attach the orders and in accordance with Section 63, Civil Service Commission (CSC)
and denied his motion for being filed out of time. The RTC later Memorandum Circular No. 14, s. 1999. Paler's son received the letter on
promulgated a ruling on the civil case ordering Tansipek and PCIB to pay September 23, 2003.
JOCI. Tansipek appealed it to the CA. CA ruled that RTC erred in
allowing the motion to declare Tansipek in default, and remanded the Paler moved for reconsideration but this was denied on February 20,
case to the RTC. 2004, on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary
period. The denial was received by Paler's son on March 18, 2004.
SC: A motion to reconsider the default order is not the proper remedy.
He should have filed a motion to lift the default order. On appeal, the CSC reversed and set aside the Commission Chairman's
decision. The Commission filed a motion for reconsideration but this was
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61
denied by the CSC. This constrained petitioner to file with the CA a summons together with the complaint was served upon Ester Fraginal,
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Since Paler had secretary of Mrs. Castillo. Respondents filed their ‗Urgent Motion to
in the meantime already reached the compulsory age of retirement on Declare Service of Summons Improper and Legally Defective‘ alleging
July 28, 2005 and was no longer entitled to reinstatement, the CA that the Sheriff's Return has failed to comply with Section (1), Rule 14 of
affirmed with modification CSC resolutions. Petitioner filed a motion for the Rules of Court or substituted service of summons.
reconsideration but this was denied by the CA.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Declare Respondents in Default
Issue: Whether or not the CSC was correct to entertain Paler‘s appeal and to Render Judgment because no answer was filed by the latter.
despite it being filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. Respondents filed the following: a. Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to
Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Compulsory Counter-claim; b.
SC: Yes. Section 72 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, s. 1999, Urgent Motion to Dismiss; and c. Answer with Compulsory CounterClaim.
provides for the period of appeal for non- disciplinary actions, to wit: The judge denied the Motion to Dismiss, admitted their Answer, and set
Section 72. When and Where to File. - A decision or ruling of a the pre-trial. Respondents filed an ‗Urgent Motion to Inhibit Ad
department or agency may be appealed within fifteen (15) days from Cautelam‘ against Judge [Zapatos]. Judge [Zapatos] denied the motion.
receipt thereof by the party adversely affected to the Civil Service [Respondents] filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration.
Regional Office and finally, to the Commission Proper within the same Judge [Zapatos] ruled that [respondents‘] ‗Omnibus Motion Ad
period. xxx Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim‘
was filed outside the period to file answer, hence he (1) denied the
Paler's son received the letter from the Commission Chairman denying Motion to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer; (2) declared
Paler‘s MR on March 18, 2004. Thus, Paler‘s had until April 2, 2004 [respondents] in default; and (3) ordered Oaminal to present evidence
within which to file his appeal with the CSC. It was filed, however, only on ex-parte, [failing] which, the case will be dismissed.
April 5, 2004. Nevertheless, the CSC entertained the appeal in the
interest of substantial justice. Judge [Zapatos] ruled in favor of the petitioner. Respondents filed with
the CA a Petition for certiorari. CA ruled that RTC did not validly acquire
We agree with the CSC. We uphold its decision to relax the procedural jurisdiction over respondents, because the summons had been
rules because Paler's appeal was meritorious. When substantial justice improperly served on them. It based its finding on the Sheriff‘s Return,
dictates it, procedural rules may be relaxed in order to arrive at a just which did not contain any averment that effort had been exerted to
disposition of a case. The purpose behind limiting the period of appeal is personally serve the summons on them before substituted service was
to avoid unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an resorted to.
end to controversies. A one-day delay, as in this case, does not justify
denial of the appeal where there is absolutely no indication of intent to Issue: Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over respondents,
delay justice on the part of Paler and the pleading is meritorious on its although summons was served upon the secretary.
face. It bears stressing that the case before the CSC involves the
security of tenure of a public officer sacrosanctly protected by the SC: Yes. The receipt of the summons by the legal secretary of the
Constitution. Public interest requires a resolution of the merits of the respondents is deemed proper, because they admit the actual receipt
appeal instead of dismissing the same based on a strained and thereof, but merely question the manner of service. Moreover, when
inordinate application of Section 49 (a) of the CSC Revised Rules of they asked for affirmative reliefs in several motions and thereby
Procedure. submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court, whatever
defects the service of summons may have had were cured.
Oaminal vs Castillo: Henry Oaminal filed a complaint for collection
against Respondents Pablito and Guia Castillo with the RTC. The
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In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the and in their Motion to Dismiss -- was their right to invoke the grounds of
defendant either by the service of summons or by the latter‘s voluntary improper venue and litis pendentia.
appearance and submission to the authority of the former. Where the
action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the Verily, respondents did not raise in their MTD the issue of jurisdiction
service of summons may be made through personal or substituted over their persons; they raised only improper venue and litis pendentia.
service in the manner provided for by Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Hence, whatever defect there was in the manner of service should be
Revised Rules of Court. deemed waived.
Personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service. Assuming arguendo that the service of summons was defective, such
Resort to the latter is permitted when the summons cannot be promptly flaw was cured and respondents are deemed to have submitted
served on the defendant in person and after stringent formal and themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court when they filed an
substantive requirements have been complied with. Omnibus Motion to Admit the Motion to Dismiss and Answer with
Counterclaim, an Answer with Counterclaim, a Motion to Inhibit, and a
For substituted service of summons to be valid, it is necessary to Motion for Reconsideration and Plea to Reset Pre-trial. The filing of
establish the following circumstances: (a) personal service of summons Motions seeking affirmative relief -- to admit answer, for additional time to
within a reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of
locate the party; and (c) the summons was served upon a person of default with motion for reconsideration -- are considered voluntary
sufficient age and discretion residing at the party‘s residence or upon a submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Having invoked the trial court‘s
competent person in charge of the party‘s office or regular place of jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief, respondents cannot -- after failing
business. It is likewise required that the pertinent facts proving these to obtain the relief prayed for -- repudiate the very same authority they
circumstances are stated in the proof of service or officer‘s return. have invoked.
The Sheriff‘s Return failed to state that efforts had been made to Asia Const. & Dev. Corp. (ACDC) vs CA: ACDC leased Caterpillar
personally serve the summons on respondents. Neither did the Return generator sets and Amida mobile floodlighting systems from Monark
indicate that it was impossible to do so within a reasonable time. Equipment Corporation (MEC) during the period of March 13 to July 15,
1998 but failed, despite demands, to pay the rentals in the amount of P4,
Nonetheless, nothing in the records shows that respondents denied 313,935.00. From July 14 to August 25, 1998, various equipment from
actual receipt of the summons through their secretary. Their ―Urgent MEC were, likewise, leased by ACDC for the latter‘s power plant in
Motion to Declare Service of Summons Improper and Legally Defective‖ Mauban, Quezon, and that there was still a balance of P456,666.67.
did not deny receipt thereof; it merely assailed the manner of its service. ACDC also purchased and took custody of various equipment parts from
In fact, they admitted in their Motion that the ―summons, together with MEC for P237,336.20 which, despite demands, ACDC failed to pay. With
the complaint, was served by the Sheriff on Ester Fraginal, secretary of all these allegations, MEC filed a complaint for sum of money with
the defendants at No. 7, 21st Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City on 30 May damages (RTC QC) against ACDC.
2000.‖
ACDC filed a motion to file and admit answer with third party complaint
There is likewise no showing that respondents had heretofore pursued against Becthel Overseas Corporation. It admitted its indebtedness to
the issue of lack of jurisdiction; neither did they reserve their right to MEC but imposes the special and affirmative defense that Becthel failed
invoke it in their subsequent pleadings. If at all, what they avoided and refused to pay its overdue obligation in connection with the leased
forfeiting and waiving -- both in their Omnibus Motion ad Cautelam to equipment used by ACDC to comply with its contracted services.
Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim Apparently, Becthel used all the equipment covered by lease for a
construction project and ACDC was not yet paid for its services. ACDC
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63
also reiterated this in the 3rd party complaint praying for dismissal of plaintiff or to the defendant or both for all or part of the plaintiff‘s claim
MEC‘s claim and order for Becthel to pay its obligation. against the original defendant, although the third-party defendant‘s
liability arises out of another transaction. The defendant may implead
MEC opposed this motion on the ground that ACDC already admitted its another as third-party defendant (a) on an allegation of liability of the
obligation to MEC which is independent from the transaction with latter to the defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
Becthel. The third party complaint will only cause undue delays. MEC other relief; (b) on the ground of direct liability of the third-party defendant
filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that there was no to the plaintiff; or (c) the liability of the third-party defendant to both the
genuine issue on ACDC‘s obligation and that the 3rd party complaint plaintiff and the defendant. There must be a causal connection between
must be litigated separately. In MEC‘s reply to the special affirmative the claim of the plaintiff in his complaint and a claim for contribution,
defense, it argued that this was a negative pregnant. indemnity or other relief of the defendant against the thirdparty
defendant.
TC: motion for leave to file 3rd party complaint is denied; motion for
summary judgment granted – trial court considered this as motion for Common liability is the very essence for contribution. Contribution is a
judgment on the pleadings. DECISION IN FAVOR OF MEC. CA: payment made by each, or by any of several having a common liability of
AFFIRMED his share in the damage suffered or in the money necessarily paid by
one of the parties in behalf of the other or others. The rule on common
ACDC argues that although it admitted the obligation to MEC, the 3rd liability is fundamental in the action for contribution. The test to determine
party complaint tendered an issue of whether the MEC‘s claim is whether the claim for indemnity in a third-party complaint is, whether it
connected with the third-party claim. This is a genuine issue that must be arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiff‘s claim is based,
litigated. or the third-party plaintiff‘s claim, although arising out of another or
different contract or transaction, is connected with the plaintiff‘s claim.
Issue: Whether or not the third party complaint was proper.
The claims of the respondent, as plaintiff in the RTC, against the
SC: No. The purpose of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court is to petitioner as defendant therein, arose out of the contracts of lease and
permit a defendant to assert an independent claim against a third-party sale; such transactions are different and separate from those between
which he, otherwise, would assert in another action, thus preventing Becthel and the petitioner as third-party plaintiff for the construction of
multiplicity of suits. All the rights of the parties concerned would then be the latter‘s project in Mauban, Quezon, where the equipment leased from
adjudicated in one proceeding. This is a rule of procedure and does not the respondent was used by the petitioner. The controversy between the
create a substantial right. respondent and the petitioner, on one hand, and that between the
petitioner and Becthel, on the other, are thus entirely distinct from each
Neither does it abridge, enlarge, or nullify the substantial rights of any other. There is no showing in the proposed third-party complaint that the
litigant. This right to file a third-party complaint against a third-party rests respondent knew or approved the use of the leased equipment by the
in the discretion of the trial court. The third-party complaint is actually petitioner for the said project in Quezon. Becthel cannot invoke any
independent of, separate and distinct from the plaintiff‘s complaint, such defense the petitioner had or may have against the claims of the
that were it not for the rule, it would have to be filed separately from the respondent in its complaint, because the petitioner admitted its liabilities
original complaint. to the respondent for the amount of P5,075,335.86. The barefaced fact
that the petitioner used the equipment it leased from the respondent in
A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that some substantive basis connection with its project with Becthel does not provide a substantive
for a third-party claim be found to exist, whether the basis be one of basis for the filing of a third-party complaint against the latter. There is no
indemnity, subrogation, contribution or other substantive right. The causal connection between the claim of the respondent for the rental and
bringing of a third-party defendant is proper if he would be liable to the the balance of the purchase price of the equipment and parts sold and
Section 1. Amendments in general. — Pleadings may be amended by o Thereafter, it is already by leave of court. If you seek amendment,
adding or striking out an allegation or the name of any party, or by you have to precede it with a motion for leave to admit amended
correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistaken or inadequate pleading.
allegation or description in any other respect, so that the actual merits of
the controversy may speedily be determined, without regard to o Whether it is a matter of right or by leave of court, it can be both
technicalities, and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner. formal or substantive.
Section 4. Formal amendments. — A defect in the designation of the Remington Industrial Sales Corp vs CA: Petitioner filed a complaint for
parties and other clearly clerical or typographical errors may be sum of money and damages arising from breach of contract. Among the
summarily corrected by the court at any stage of the action, at its defendants is respondent British Steel. Respondent moved for the
initiative or on motion, provided no prejudice is caused thereby to the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of
adverse party. action against it. RTC denied the motion to dismiss, as well as the MR.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before CA,
claiming that the complaint did not contain a single averment that
As a matter of right vs by leave of court (applies in both civil and
respondent committed any act or is guilty of any omission in violation of
criminal but the time frame differs)
petitioner‘s legal rights. Apart from the allegation in the complaint‘s
Can a complaint still be amended as a matter of right before an answer The remedy espoused by the CA in its assailed judgment will precisely
has been filed, even if there was a pending proceeding for its dismissal result in multiple suits, involving the same set of facts and to which the
before the higher court? defendants would likely raise the same or, at least, related defenses.
Plainly stated, we find no practical advantage in ordering the dismissal of
SC: Yes. Section 2, Rule 10 explicitly states that a pleading may be the complaint against respondent and for petitioner to re-file the same,
amended as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served. when the latter can still clearly amend the complaint as a matter of right.
This only means that prior to the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the The amendment of the complaint would not prejudice respondents or
delay the action, as this would, in fact, simplify the case and expedite its
absolute right to amend the complaint whether a new cause of action or
disposition.
change in theory is introduced. The reason for this rule is implied in the
subsequent Section 3 of Rule 10. Under this provision, substantial
Furthermore, we do not agree with respondent‘s claim that it will be
amendment of the complaint is not allowed without leave of court after an
prejudiced by the admission of the Amended Complaint because it had
answer has been served, because any material change in the allegations
spent time, money and effort to file its petition before the appellate court.
contained in the complaint could prejudice the rights of the defendant
We cannot see how the result could be any different for respondent, if
who has already set up his defense in the answer.
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66
petitioner merely re-filed the complaint instead of being allowed to amend Rule 129, Section 4. Judicial admissions. — An admission, verbal or
it. As adverted to earlier, amendment would even work to respondent‘s written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same
advantage since it will undoubtedly speed up the proceedings before the case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
trial court. Consequently, the amendment should be allowed in the case showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
at bar as a matter of right in accordance with the rules. admission was made.
Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of When you amend the pleading, what happens to the admissions there in
evidence. — When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the the original pleading? They become extra judicial admissions. Therefore,
express or implied consent of the parties they shall be treated in all evidence must be offered. Only admissions in the pleadings, not extra
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of judicial admissions.
the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any Section 7. Filing of amended pleadings. — When any pleading is
party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not amended, a new copy of the entire pleading, incorporating the
effect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at amendments, which shall be indicated by appropriate marks, shall be
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the filed.
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do
so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the Section 8. Effect of amended pleadings. — An amended pleading
ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may supersedes the pleading that it amends. However, admissions in
grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made. superseded pleadings may be received in evidence against the pleader,
and claims or defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended
Amendments vs Supplemental Pleadings pleading shall be deemed waived.
Section 6. Supplemental pleadings. — Upon motion of a party the Rule on Amendments in Criminal Procedure is more taxing. There is only
court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, one pleading in criminal actions, the information; in civil actions, there are
permit him to serve a supplemental pleading setting forth transactions, a lot of pleadings that can be amended. In civil actions, we have
occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the amendatory pleadings and suppletory pleadings. In criminal procedure,
pleading sought to be supplemented. The adverse party may plead there are no suppletory pleadings; instead, they have amendments and
thereto within ten (10) days from notice of the order admitting the substitutions.
supplemental pleading.
B. Time/Period for Filing Responsive Pleadings
Regarding supplemental pleadings, these are availed of after the fact.
Answer
‗after the fact‘ – if something new transpired after the pleadings have
been already in the hands of the court, then you don‘t file an amended Section 1. Answer to the complaint. — The defendant shall file his
pleading but rather a supplemental pleading. answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days after service of
summons, unless a different period is fixed by the court.
Under the Rules of Evidence, Rule 129 (What Need Not Be Proved),
judicial notice and judicial admissions need not be proved. As to the Section 2. Answer of a defendant foreign private juridical entity. —
latter, they are admissions in the pleadings. Where the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity and service of
summons is made on the government official designated by law to
Section 3. Answer to amended complaint. — When the plaintiff files Section 10. Omitted counterclaim or cross-claim. — When a pleader
an amended complaint as a matter of right, the defendant shall answer fails to set up a counterclaim or a cross-claim through oversight,
the same within fifteen (15) days after being served with a copy thereof. inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires, he may, by
leave of court, set up the counterclaim or cross-claim by amendment
Where its filing is not a matter of right, the defendant shall answer the before judgment.
amended complaint within ten (10) days from notice of the order
admitting the same. An answer earlier filed may serve as the answer to Section 11. Extension of time to plead. — Upon motion and on such
the amended complaint if no new answer is filed. terms as may be just, the court may extend the time to plead provided in
these Rules.
This Rule shall apply to the answer to an amended counterclaim,
amended cross-claim, amended third (fourth, etc.)—party complaint, and The court may also, upon like terms, allow an answer or other pleading
amended complaint-in-intervention. to be filed after the time fixed by these Rules.
Section 4. Answer to counterclaim or cross-claim. — A counterclaim 4 periods under Rule 11: 10, 15, 30 and 60 days.
or cross-claim must be answered within ten (10) days from service.
10 (incomplete) 15 (incomplete) 30 60
Section 5. Answer to third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint. — The time Bill of particulars Filing an answer When Extraterritorial
to answer a third (fourth, etc.)—party complaint shall be governed by the Filing an answer Filing an answer defendant is a service of
same rule as the answer to the complaint. to amended to amended foreign summons under
complaint when complaint when juridical entity Section 15,
Section 7. Answer to supplemental complain. — A supplemental amendment is amendment is a and summons Rule 14.
complaint may be answered within ten (10) days from notice of the order NOT a matter of matter of right is served
admitting the same, unless a different period is fixed by the court. The right upon the
answer to the complaint shall serve as the answer to the supplemental Filing an answer Filing an answer government
complaint if no new or supplemental answer is filed. under Rules of to a official
Summary third-, designated by
Reply Procedure fourth- party law (Section
Filing an answer complaint 12, Rule 14)
Section 6. Reply. — A reply may be filed within ten (10) days from to a
service of the pleading responded to. supplemental
complaint
Section 8. Existing counterclaim or cross-claim. — A compulsory Counterclaim or
counterclaim or a cross-claim that a defending party has at the time he cross-claim
files his answer shall be contained therein. Reply
Section 3. Compliance with order. — If the motion is granted, either in If it is denied, the defendant only has the balance of the period, but the
whole or in part, the compliance therewith must be effected within ten period shall not be less than 5 days. Hence, the doctrine laid down in
(10) days from notice of the order, unless a different period is fixed by the Domingo Neypes vs CA or the fresh day period rule does not apply in
court. The bill of particulars or a more definite statement ordered by the Rule 12. The same doctrine does not apply as well in Rule 16 or Motion
court may be filed either in a separate or in an amended pleading, to Dismiss and Rule 64 or Review of the judgment of COA or COMELEC.
serving a copy thereof on the adverse party. These are the only instances when the fresh day period rule does not
apply.
Section 4. Effect of non-compliance. — If the order is not obeyed, or in
case of insufficient compliance therewith, the court may order the striking The defendant received a copy of the summons on March 1. He has until
out of the pleading or the portions thereof to which the order was directed March 16 within which to file the answer. Instead of filing the answer, on
or make such other order as it deems just. March 2, he filed a bill of particulars. It was denied. When should the
defendant file his answer? Within 14 days from his receipt of the notice of
Section 5. Stay of period to file responsive pleading. — After service the denial of the order. If you receive it on April, then start counting 14
of the bill of particulars or of a more definite pleading, or after notice of days in April.
denial of his motion, the moving party may file his responsive pleading
within the period to which he was entitled at the time of filing his motion, Suppose instead of filing it on March 2, you file it on March 15 (1 day
which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event. before the expiration of the period to file the answer) and it was denied.
He has 5 days. If he receives it on April 5, he still has 5 days within which
Section 6. Bill a part of pleading. — A bill of particulars becomes part to file or up to April 10.
of the pleading for which it is intended.
D. Filing and Service of Pleadings, Judgments and other papers
Bill of particular – particularization of the allegation for the purpose that
the adverse party may be able to respond thoroughly or correctly to the Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the filing of all pleadings
allegations in the pleading. and other papers, as well as the service thereof, except those for which a
different mode of service is prescribed.
Example: The complaint states that the defendant borrowed P100,000
from the plaintiff on 3 occasions. Distinction between Filing and Service
Service is the act of providing a party with a copy of the pleading or Section 7. Service by mail. — Service by registered mail shall be made
paper concerned. If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon by depositing the copy in the post office in a sealed envelope, plainly
him shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at
upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one counsel his residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions
appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if
paper served upon him by the opposite side. undelivered. If no registry service is available in the locality of either the
senders or the addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail.
Filing: Manner, completeness, proof
Section 8. Substituted service. — If service of pleadings, motions,
Section 3. Manner of filing. — The filing of pleadings, appearances, notices, resolutions, orders and other papers cannot be made under the
motions, notices, orders, judgments and all other papers shall be made two preceding sections, the office and place of residence of the party or
by presenting the original copies thereof, plainly indicated as such, his counsel being unknown, service may be made by delivering the copy
personally to the clerk of court or by sending them by registered mail. In to the clerk of court, with proof of failure of both personal service and
the first case, the clerk of court shall endorse on the pleading the date service by mail. The service is complete at the time of such delivery.
and hour of filing. In the second case, the date of the mailing of motions,
pleadings, or any other papers or payments or deposits, as shown by Section 9. Service of judgments, final orders, or resolutions. —
the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be Judgments, final orders or resolutions shall be served either personally
considered as the date of their filing, payment, or deposit in court. The or by registered mail. When a party summoned by publication has failed
envelope shall be attached to the record of the case. to appear in the action, judgments, final orders or resolutions against him
shall be served upon him also by publication at the expense of the
Service: Mode, completeness, proof prevailing party.
Section 4. Papers required to be filed and served. — Every Section 10. Completeness of service. — Personal service is complete
judgment, resolution, order, pleading subsequent to the complaint, upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the
written motion, notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment or similar expiration of ten (10) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise
papers shall be filed with the court, and served upon the parties provides. Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by
affected. the addressee, or after five (5) days from the date he received the first
notice of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier.
Section 5. Modes of service. — Service of pleadings motions, notices,
orders, judgments and other papers shall be made either personally or Priorities in Modes of Service
by mail.
When you serve a copy of the pleading to the adverse party, it is
Section 6. Personal service. — Service of the papers may be made by preferred that you do it personally. If you don‘t, you have to state your
delivering personally a copy to the party or his counsel, or by leaving it explanation why you are not availing of personal service. What is the
in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no explanation? Any explanation for that matter. Why is this so? This is new
person is found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has no in the 1997 Rules of Court. There are a lot of lawyers abusing such
office, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the provision. Instead of personally serving, they serve by mail to buy time.
morning and six in the evening, at the party's or counsel's residence, if
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Illustration of this abuse: The counsel of the plaintiff has his law office at complete only upon registered mail, upon
Pacific Land Building on the 44th floor. The defendant‘s counsel is on the the expiration of 5 mail, it expiration of
4th floor of the same building. Yet they do it by mail. days from receipt of is the 10 days
first registry notice complete from mailing**
Section 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. — Whenever only upon the
practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be expiration of
done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, 5 days from
a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation receipt of first
why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule registry
may be cause to consider the paper as not filed. notice
Proof If it is personally If personal service, proof is by
Section 14. Notice of lis pendens. — In an action affecting the title or filed, the proof is the written admission of the party
the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff and the defendant, stamp*** served, or the official return of
when affirmative relief is claimed in his answer, may record in the office the server, or the affidavit of the
of the registry of deeds of the province in which the property is situated party serving
notice of the pendency of the action. Said notice shall contain the names If it is service by If service by If service
of the parties and the object of the action or defense, and a description of registered mail, registered by
the property in that province affected thereby. Only from the time of filing prove: (1) the time of mail, proof is ordinary
such notice for record shall a purchaser, or encumbrancer of the property mailing and (2) time by an mail,
affected thereby, be deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of receipt**** affidavit proof is by an
of the action, and only of its pendency against the parties designated by of the affidavit of the
their real names.
person mailing
person of facts
The notice of lis pendens hereinabove mentioned may be cancelled only mailing of
upon order of the court, after proper showing that the notice is for the facts and the
purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to
registry
protect the rights of the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded.
receipt
There are 2 general issues: filing and service. Under those 2 issues,
* When it comes to filing, only registered mail is accepted. When it
there are 3 sub-issues:
comes to service, it may be either registered or ordinary mail. What is the
rationale? First, the service may be through ordinary mail because it
Filing Service comes from the residence of the party. In some parts of the country there
Modes or Personal filing Personal service are no registry services. Second, with regard to the prescriptive period,
manner By registered mail Service by mail filing can only be done through registered mail because it is difficult to
(registered mail Registered Ordinary* count for the court if it is by ordinary mail. Although the rule regarding
only!) completeness already provides as to when it is complete.
Completenes If filed personally, it If personal, it is complete upon
s is complete upon receipt ** If you mail it on March 1, when is it complete? March 12 (expiration of
receipt by the Clerk 10 days).
of Court
If filed by mail, it is If by If by ordinary
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*** What if there is no stamp (as what happens in actual practice)? A 1. What is summons?
filed. The pleading A filed could no longer be located by the Clerk or
Court. How do you prove it? Through the stamp on your own copy. Alias summons is one which is the second or third or fourth summons
prepared.
**** You are given a registry receipt as proof of mailing, and then you
attach that to a return card as proof of receipt. 2. Who issues, to whom addressed?
Section 12. Proof of filing. — The filing of a pleading or paper shall be After the complaint was filed by the plaintiff, summons was served upon
proved by its existence in the record of the case. If it is not in the record, the defendant. The defendant, in reading the summons, contested it and
but is claimed to have been filed personally, the filing shall be proved by threw it away saying it is not signed by the judge. Is that error on the part
the written or stamped acknowledgment of its filing by the clerk of court of the court? No, the judge never signs nor issues the summons. It is the
on a copy of the same; if filed by registered mail, by the registry receipt clerk of court that signs, issues and serves the summons, not the judge.
and by the affidavit of the person who did the mailing, containing a
full statement of the date and place of depositing the mail in the post Section 1. Clerk to issue summons. — Upon the filing of the complaint
office in a sealed envelope addressed to the court, with postage fully and the payment of the requisite legal fees, the clerk of court shall
prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the forthwith issue the corresponding summons to the defendants.
sender after ten (10) days if not delivered.
Section 2. Contents. — The summons shall be directed to the
The affidavit refers to the affidavit of the sender, not the one who mailed. defendant, signed by the clerk of court under seal and contain (a) the
In proof of filing, it says registry receipt ―and‖ affidavit; in proof service, name of the court and the names of the parties to the action; (b) a
it says ―or.‖ Make a distinction there. direction that the defendant answer within the time fixed by these Rules;
(c) a notice that unless the defendant so answers plaintiff will take
Section 13. Proof of Service. — Proof of personal service shall consist judgment by default and may be granted the relief applied for.
of a written admission of the party served, or the official return of the
server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of A copy of the complaint and order for appointment of guardian ad litem if
the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail, any, shall be attached to the original and each copy of the summons.
proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts
showing compliance with section 7 of this Rule. If service is made by 3. Who serves?
registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and the registry
receipt issued by the mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed Only three people are qualified to serve the summons: the sheriff, deputy
immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu thereof the sheriff, or any other person authorized by the court.
unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice
given by the postmaster to the addressee. Example of a person authorized by the Rules is Section 9. When the
defendant is a prisoner, to whom should it be served? It should be
An SC Circular says that when you file before the SC and the CA, you served to the prisoner by the warden. The warden is authorized by the
have to attach a copy of the affidavit of service (not filing). The SC or the Rule.
CA will not accept any pleading that does not include an affidavit of
service. Can the plaintiff serve the summons to the defendant? Only if he has
been authorized by the court. He has to ask for leave to do that and only
E. Summons for justifiable reasons.
There are 2 ways: delivering it to the defendant himself; and if he refuses In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not
to accept it, by leaving it with him as laid down in Valmonte vs CA. possible and he cannot be personally served, substituted service, as
provided in Rule 14, §§7-82 is essential for the acquisition by the court of
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. — Whenever practicable, jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who does not voluntarily
the summons shall be served by handling a copy thereof to the submit himself to the authority of the court. If defendant cannot be served
defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by with summons because he is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a
tendering it to him. Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave of court, be made
by publication. Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in an action in
Valmonte vs CA: Rosita Dimalanta filed a complaint for partition of real personam, who cannot be personally served with summons, may be
property and accounting of rentals against her sister Lourdes Valmonte summoned either by means of substituted service in accordance with
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Rule 14, §8 or by publication as provided in §§ 17 and 18 of the same reasons why the service of summons on Atty. Alfredo D. Valmonte
Rule. cannot be considered a valid service of summons on petitioner Lourdes
A. Valmonte:
In all of these cases, it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of
the Philippines, otherwise an action in personam cannot be brought 1. Service of summons on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not
because jurisdiction over his person is essential to make a binding made upon the order of the court as required by Rule 14, §17 and
decision. certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court which in fact
refused to consider the service to be valid and on that basis declare
On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer.
the person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court
jurisdiction so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the 2. Service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made
defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country, summons upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, §17. As
may be served exterritorially in accordance with Rule 14, §17. provided in §19, such leave must be applied for by motion in writing,
supported by affidavit of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf and
In such cases, what gives the court jurisdiction in an action in rem or setting forth the grounds for the application.
quasi in rem is that it has jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the personal status
of the plaintiff who is domiciled in the Philippines or the property litigated 3. Because there was no order granting such leave, petitioner
or attached. Lourdes A. Valmonte was not given ample time to file her Answer which,
according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice.
Applying the foregoing rules to the case at bar, private respondent's It must be noted that the period to file an Answer in an action against a
action, which is for partition and accounting under Rule 69, is in the resident defendant differs from the period given in an action filed against
nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for the a nonresident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. In the
purpose of affecting the defendant's interest in a specific property and former, the period is fifteen (15) days from service of summons, while in
not to render a judgment against him. the latter, it is at least sixty (60) days from notice.
Service of summons on her attorney cannot be justified under the third b. substituted service
mode provided for by Section 17, Rule 14.
Substituted service of summons is upon the person residing in the
As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in residence of the defendant who must be of age and discretion. If he
the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance with cannot be found there, at the office of the defendant, to a person in
Rule 14, §17. Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must charge therein of age and discretion.
be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper
of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may Section 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the
order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the
should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the
defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may deem summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age
sufficient. and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at
defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent
This mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside the person in charge thereof.
Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign
country where the defendant resides. Moreover, there are several
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Manotoc vs CA: Agapita Trajano sought the enforcement of a foreign
judgment rendered by the US District Court of Hawaii against Ma. Imelda The substituted service was invalid because the sheriff did not comply
Manotoc (Imee Marcos) for the wrongful death of Archimedes Trajano with the requirements. dela Cruz was not a representative of Manotoc.
committed by military intelligence in the Philippines allegedly working for Therefore, since there was no valid service of summons, there was no
Manotoc. RTC issued summons for Manotoc addressed at Alexandra jurisdiction acquired.
Homes, Pasig. It was served on a Macky dela Cruz described as a
caretaker of her unit. Manotoc failed to file her answer and was declared Jose vs Boyon: Petitioners Patrick and Rafaela Jose lodged a
in default. complaint for specific performance against respondents Helen and
Romeo Boyon to compel them to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a
Manotoc filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction parcel of land subject of a controverted sale. Respondent judge issued
over her person, stating that she is not a resident of the said condo and summons to the [respondents]. As per return of the summons,
that she does not hold office there, and dela Cruz is not her substituted service was resorted to by the process server allegedly
representative or employee. Thus no valid service was made. Further, because efforts to serve the summons personally to the [respondents]
she states that she is a resident of Singapore. failed. [Petitioners] filed before the trial court an Ex-parte Motion for
Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication. The Judge issued an
RTC denied the motion and the subsequent MR. Manotoc filed a petition Order granting the Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect
for certiorari and prohibition with the CA, that was denied. MR was also Summons by Publication. The judge, sans a written motion, issued an
denied. Order declaring [respondents] in default for failure to file their respective
answers. As a consequence of the declaration of default, [petitioners]
Issue: Whether there was valid substituted service. were allowed to submit their evidence ex-parte.
SC: No. In actions strictly ‗in perosnam‘ jurisdiction over the person of Helen , who was then residing in the United States of America, was
the defendant is mandatory and can be complied with valid service of surprised to learn from her sister Elizabeth , of the resolution issued by
summons. If defendant cannot be served, for excusable reason, within a the respondent court. [Respondents] filed an Ad Cautelam motion
reasonable time, substituted service can be resorted to. It is questioning, among others, the validity of the service of summons
extraordinary in character and a derogation of the usual method of effected by the court a quo. The public respondent issued an Order
service thus rules for such must be faithfully complied with. denying the said motion on the basis of the defaulted [respondents‘]
supposed loss of standing in court. The [respondents] once again raised
The requirements of valid substituted service if there is impossibility of the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court via a motion for reconsideration,
prompt personal service which is 15-30 days for the sheriff are: 1) By which was also denied. The [petitioners] moved for the execution of the
leaving copies of summons at defendant‘s residence with a person of controverted judgment which the respondent judge ultimately granted.
suitable age and discretion residing therein or by leaving copies at the
defendant‘s office or regular place of business with some competent Respondents filed before the CA a Petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
person in charge. questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC. CA held that RTC had no
2) The sheriff must narrate in specific details how service in person authority to issue the questioned Resolution and Orders since it never
became impossible. acquired jurisdiction over respondents because of the invalid service of
3) The attempt must be extraordinary and at least 3 times. The summons upon them. First, the sheriff failed to comply with the
person of suitable age and discretion must be at least 18 years old, able requirements of substituted service of summons, because he did not
to read the summons written in English, and must be with confidential specify in the Return of Summons the prior efforts he had made to locate
relation to defendant. A competent person in charge can be the president them and the impossibility of promptly serving the summons upon them
or manager. by personal service. Second, the subsequent summons by publication
Issue: Whether the service of summons on respondents was valid Columbus failed to file its answer or other responsive pleading, hence
petitioners filed a motion to declare Columbus in default. The motion was
SC: No. [P]ersonal service of summons is preferred to substituted granted and petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex-parte. The
service. Only if the former cannot be made promptly can the process case was submitted for decision. RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and
server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service of summons against Columbus. That decision became final on May 12, 1999. The
must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a following day, Columbus filed a motion to lift order of default, which was
reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; opposed by petitioners. RTC ordered the parties to submit their
and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient respective memoranda. However, without waiting for the same, RTC on
age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of May 26, 1999, denied the motion to lift order of default. Columbus filed a
the office or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Undaunted, Columbus
required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in filed a manifestation and motion to lift the writ of execution. It suffered the
the proof of service or in the officer‘s return. The failure to comply same fate as the motion for reconsideration for being dilatory. The
faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of branch sheriff was directed to proceed with the enforcement of the
substituted service renders the service of summons ineffective. decision.
The Return of Summons shows that no effort was actually exerted Columbus appealed to the Court of Appeals, which ruled in its favour.
and no positive step taken by either the process server or Columbus was not properly served with summons, thus it cannot be
petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on faulted if it failed to file an Answer. Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997
respondents. At best, the Return merely states the alleged requires that service of summons upon domestic private juridical entity
whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such information was shall be made through its president, managing partner, general manager,
verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Without specifying corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel. Since service upon
the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted Columbus was made through a certain Ayreen Rejalde, a mere filing
to serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were clerk in Columbus’ office, as evidenced by the latter‘s employment
made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of record, such service cannot be considered valid. Petitioner filed a motion
substituted service of summons. for reconsideration, but to no avail. Hence, this petition for review.
Mason vs CA: Spouses Efren and Digna Mason owned 2 parcels of Issue: Whether there was valid service of summons on private
land. Petitioners and private respondent Columbus Philippines Bus respondent.
Corporation entered into a lease contract, under which Columbus
undertook to construct a building worth P10,000,000 at the end of the 3 rd SC: No. Petitioners contend that while Section 11, Rule 14 clearly
year of the lease. Because Columbus failed to comply with this specifies the persons authorized to receive summons on behalf of a
stipulation, the petitioners, filed a complaint for rescission of contract with private juridical entity, said provision did not abandon or render
damages against Columbus before the RTC. inapplicable the substantial compliance rule. The case law applicable,
contends Columbus, is Villarosa which squarely provides for the proper
Summons was served upon Columbus through a certain Ayreen Rejalde. interpretation of the new rule on the service of summons upon domestic
While the receiving copy of the summons described Rejalde as a corporation, thus: The designation of persons or officers who are
secretary of Columbus, the sheriff‘s return described Rejalde as a authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership
is now limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the
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1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states "general manager" compliance with the rule on service of summons and consequently, it
instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; validly acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any of its
directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule. Service through Petitioner contends that the enumeration of persons to whom summons
Ayreen Rejalde, a mere filing clerk of private respondent and not may be served is ―restricted, limited and exclusive‖ following the rule on
one of those enumerated above, is invalid. statutory construction expressio unios est exclusio alterius.
We find private respondent’s submission on this issue meritorious.
Issue: Whether or not the service of summons upon the branch manager
The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable of petitioner at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the
under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has been general manager at its principal office at Davao City was proper.
settled in Villarosa which applies squarely to the instant case. Notice to
enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere SC: No. Under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the
technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial corporation is no longer authorized. The cases cited by private
proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and indispensable respondent are therefore not in point. The designation of persons or
ingredient of due process. We will deprive Columbus of its right to officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic
present its defense in this multi-million peso suit, if we disregard corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in
compliance with the rules on service of summons. Section 11, Rule 14. The rule now states ―general manager‖ instead of
only ―manager‖; ―corporate secretary‖ instead of ―secretary‖; and
E.B. Villarosa vs Benito: Petitioner and private respondent executed a ―treasurer‖ instead of ―cashier.‖ The phrase ―agent, or any of its
Deed of Sale with Development Agreement wherein the former agreed to directors‖ is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.
develop parcels of land belonging to the latter into a housing subdivision
for the construction of low cost housing units. Private respondent filed a The particular revision was explained by retired SC Justice Florenz
Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against petitioner before Regalado, thus: ―x x x the then Sec. 13 of this Rule allowed service
the RTC allegedly for failure of the latter to comply with its contractual upon a defendant corporation to ‗be made on the president, manager,
obligation in that, other than a few unfinished low cost houses, there secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors.‘ The terms were
were no substantial developments. Summons, with the complaint, were obviously ambiguous and susceptible of broad and sometimes illogical
served upon the petitioner, through its Branch interpretations, especially the word ‗agent‘ of the corporation. The Filoil
Manager Engr. Wendell Sabulbero at the stated address at Kolambog, case, involving the litigation lawyer of the corporation who precisely
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro (CdO) City but the Sheriff‘s Return of Service appeared to challenge the validity of service of summons but whose very
stated that the summons was duly served upon petitioner thru appearance for that purpose was seized upon to validate the defective
SALBULBERO at their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, CdO City. service, is an illustration of the need for this revised section with limited
scope and specific terminology. Thus the absurd result in the Filoil case
Petitioner filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss alleging that necessitated the amendment permitting service only on the in-house
the summons was served upon Sabulbero, who is not one of those counsel of the corporation who is in effect an employee of the
persons upon whom service of summons may be made. Private corporation, as distinguished from an independent practitioner.‖
respondent filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default alleging that
petitioner has failed to file an Answer. Private respondent filed an The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss receive prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that
as well as the Motion to Declare in Default, stating that since the the summons be served on a representative so integrated with the
summons and copy of the complaint were in fact received by the corporation that such person will know what to do with the legal papers
corporation through its branch manager, there was substantial
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served on him. In other words, ‗to bring home to the corporation notice Philippines by personal service as under section 6; or by publication in a
of the filing of the action.‘ x x x. newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the
court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the
The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a court shall be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the
substitute for the plain legal requirements as to the manner in which defendant, or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any
summons should be served on a domestic corporation. x x x.‖ order granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not
be less than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must
Even under the old rule, service upon a general manager of a firm’s answer. (17a)
branch office has been held as improper as summons should have
been served at the firm’s principal office. Section 16. Residents temporarily out of the Philippines. — When
any action is commenced against a defendant who ordinarily resides
The fact that defendant filed a belated motion to dismiss did not operate within the Philippines, but who is temporarily out of it, service may, by
to confer jurisdiction upon its person. There is no question that the leave of court, be also effected out of the Philippines, as under the
defendant‘s voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to service of preceding section.
summons. Before, the rule was that a party may challenge the
jurisdiction of the court over his person by making a special appearance i. personal
through a motion to dismiss and if in the same motion, the movant raised ii. by publication
other grounds or invoked affirmative relief which necessarily involves the iii. any mode
exercise of the jurisdiction of the court, the party is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. This doctrine has been 5. On whom served
abandoned in the case of La Naval Drug Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., which became the basis of the adoption of a new There are specific kinds of defendants.
provision in the former Section 23, which is now Section 20 of Rule 14 of
the 1997 Rules. The emplacement of this rule clearly underscores the a. on corporations: public or private, domestic or foreign
purpose to enforce strict enforcement of the rules on summons.
Accordingly, the filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or not Section 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. — When
belatedly filed by the defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association organized
precisely objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may
of the defendant can by no means be deemed a submission to the be made on the president, managing partner, general manager,
jurisdiction of the court. corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
c. extraterritorial Section 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entities. — When
the defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted
Section 15. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does not business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent
reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no
personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is, such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or
property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded
consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest Section 13. Service upon public corporations. — When the defendant
therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached within the is the Republic of the Philippines, service may be effected on the
Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Solicitor General; in case of a province, city or municipality, or like public
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corporations, service may be effected on its executive head, or on such and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of
other officer or officers as the law or the court may direct. court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation and in such places and for such time as the court may order.
b. on natural persons: prisoners; minors/incompetents; unknown;
entities without juridical personality 6. Proofs of service
Section 8. Service upon entity without juridical personality. — When Section 17. Leave of court. — Any application to the court under this
persons associated in an entity without juridical personality are sued Rule for leave to effect service in any manner for which leave of court is
under the name by which they are generally or commonly known, service necessary shall be made by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of
may be effected upon all the defendants by serving upon any one of the plaintiff or some person on his behalf, setting forth the grounds for
them, or upon the person in charge of the office or place of business the application.
maintained in such name. But such service shall not bind individually any
person whose connection with the entity has, upon due notice, been Section 18. Proof of service. — The proof of service of a summons
severed before the action was brought. shall be made in writing by the server and shall set forth the manner,
place, and date of service; shall specify any papers which have been
Section 9. Service upon prisoners. — When the defendant is a served with the process and the name of the person who received the
prisoner confined in a jail or institution, service shall be effected upon him same; and shall be sworn to when made by a person other than a sheriff
by the officer having the management of such jail or institution who is or his deputy.
deemed deputized as a special sheriff for said purpose.
Section 19. Proof of service by publication. — If the service has been
Section 10. Service upon minors and incompetents. — When the made by publication, service may be proved by the affidavit of the printer,
defendant is a minor, insane or otherwise an incompetent, service shall his foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising
be made upon him personally and on his legal guardian if he has one, or manager, to which affidavit a copy of the publication shall be attached
if none his guardian ad litem whose appointment shall be applied for by and by an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and
the plaintiff. In the case of a minor, service may also be made on his order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the
father or mother. defendant by registered mail to his last known address.
Don‘t apply the word incompetent here to those who are incompetent Biglang-awa vs Phil. Trust Co:
under settlement of estate (ex. drunkards). That‘s a different matter. Asean Pacific Planners vs City of Urdaneta:
De Dios vs CA:
Section 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts Millenium Ind. & Com. Corp. vs Tan:
are unknown. — In any action where the defendant is designated as an Ramos vs Ramos:
unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown Teh vs CA:
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Santos vs PNOC Exp.: (j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been
Dole Phil vs Quilala: complied with. (1a)
Pascual vs Pascual:
Principles involved in motions:
1. 3-day notice rule
Rule 16 2. 10-day setting rule
(d) That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue; Omnibus motion rule (Sec. 8)
Insert here
(e) That there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause; De Guzman v Ochoa
Omnibus motion in relation to motion dismiss
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by
the statute of limitations; Facts of the case
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of What was the principal action? Annulment of contract of
action; mortgage/foreclosure
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's pleading What happened? Why was there an action for foreclosure/annulment of
has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise mortgage? Failure to pay the loan. There are no other grounds for
extinguished; (i) That the claim on which the action is foreclosure. In fact, the judgment for foreclosure does not say judgment
founded is enforceable under the provisions of the statute of to sell. If the court renders a judgment to sell in a foreclosure proceeding,
frauds; and it is an abuse of discretion and a ground for certiorari because a
Rule 25 Rule 28
Interrogatories to parties Physical and mental examination of persons
Is this pending action, before action or pending appeal? This is pending Available in actions where it is relevant
action. You cannot avail of this against non-parties, solely against
parties. Example of relevant cases where this may be applied:
1. Annulment of contract by reason of imbecility of a contracting
Where is the sanction under this rule? Sec. 6. Failure to serve written party;
interrogatories. Who is being sanctioned? The one who failed to prepare 2. Common in paternity cases;
the questions/supposed to prepare the questions. As a result/sanction,
the other party may not be compelled to testify on the matter of the
Sec. 4 = waiver of privilege
interrogatories. How would the court know or determine whether a party
Section 4. Waiver of privilege. — By requesting and obtaining a report of
should be sanctioned for failure to serve written interrogatories? During
the examination so ordered or by taking the deposition of the examiner,
trial, when a witness/other party is asked a question that should have
the party examined waives any privilege he may have in that action or
been asked in written interrogatories.
any other involving the same controversy, regarding the testimony of
every other person who has examined or may thereafter
examine him in respect of the same mental or physical examination. (4)
Rule 26
Request for admission by adverse party
Under privileged communication (Sec. 24, Rule 130) = doctor and
patient; A v. B. A would like to have B examined by Dr. X; Between B
Who should request for admission? Any party may request for and Dr. X, there is privileged communication. Is that waived under this
admission. Aren’t there stipulations and admissions during pre-trial, why rule? Yes. Because it is by order of the court. The results go to A as he
would one request for admission? This applies when the party did not was the one who requested. B is not entitled to his own medical results.
wait for the pre-trial. Does this request for admission contradict Sec. 8,
Rule 8 as regards actionable documents which provides that when you Rule 29
do not specifically deny the claim of one party as against an action
Refusal to comply with the modes of discovery
document, you are deemed to have admitted the authenticity and due
execution of the document, why would one use this? No, there is no
contradiction. Because the documents sought to be admitted under Rule Effects of refusal to comply with modes of discovery:
26 are not actionable documents. They are only relevant and material 1. Compel to answer to the mode of discovery
documents, but they are not actionable. What are examples of these 2. Pay damages; 3. Cite for contempt of court;
non-actionable documents, which must be sought for admission? 4. Arrest.
Voluminous receipts, when such would take time to have each admitted
one by one. Note that a judgment by default can never be issued without being
preceded by an order of default. Exception = Sec. 3, par. c, Rule 29,
Rule 27 when there is a refusal to comply the modes of discovery, the court may
Consolidation = consolidate cases provided there is a common question In a demurrer to evidence, what are you impugning? You are
of fact or law; commonality of parties/parties-of-interest; issue of assailing the or plaintiff‘s (civil) or prosecution‘s (criminal) evidence on
jurisdiction = bars consolidation the ground that upon the facts and the law, the former has shown no
right of relief. The defendant (civil) or accused (criminal) claims that the
Severance = look at joinder of causes of action; evidence is insufficient. In other words, it does not reach the required
The concept of a judgment on the pleadings will not apply when no When you look at these rules, they have only one (1) specific
answer is filed. It will come into operation when an answer is served and characteristic of a judgment which is that it must be personally written
filed but the same fails to tender an issue or admits the material and directly prepared by the judge.
allegations of the adverse party‘s pleading.
For cultural information: In the CA, it needs to be unanimous. If it is
not, there will be no valid judgment so what the presiding justice will do
RULE 35: SUMMARY JUDGMENTS would be to create a special division which consists of five (5) justices
and a majority will render a valid judgment. The same goes for the
When may one file a motion for summary judgment? A summary Sandiganbayan. In the SC, when there are five (5) justices, a majority
judgment, also called accelerated judgment, is proper where, upon a vote will suffice.
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purpose is not to supply an omitted action by the court but to enter into
How do you distinguish several judgment from separate the record an action previously done but which was not reflected in the
judgments? A several judgment is one rendered by a court against record by reason of inadvertence or mistake. This is not really a
one or more defendants, but not against all, leaving the action to proceed judgment but rather, a correction of judgment because it is either there
against the others. It is proper when the liability of each party is clearly was some formal, clerical, or typographical error or that it does not
separable and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that the claims present the facts as it should have been presented.
against each of them could have been the subject of separate suits, and
judgment for or against one of them will not necessarily affect the other. Conditional Judgment: A conditional judgment is one the effectivity of
A separate judgment presupposes that there are several claims for which depends upon the occurrence or the non-occurrence of an event.
relief presented in a single action. Such a judgment is generally void because of the absence of a
disposition.
• Several Judgment: different causes of action
• Separate Judgment: different parties Judgment sin perjuicio: A judgment sin perjuicio is traditionally
understood to be a brief judgment containing only the dispositive portion,
Section 4. Several judgments. — In an action against several without prejudice to the making of a more extensive discussion of the
defendants, the court may, when a several judgment is proper, render findings of fact and law to support it. This is not actually a final decision,
judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action to proceed should be avoided and should not be looked with favor.
against the others.
Judgment upon a confession (cognovit actionem): This is a judgment
Section 5. Separate judgments. — When more than one claim for relief rendered by the court when a party expressly agrees to the other party‘s
is presented in an action, the court, at any stage, upon a determination of claim or acknowledges the validity of the claim against him.
the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising out
of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim, What is the literal meaning of the entry of judgment? It means that
may render a separate judgment disposing of such claim. The judgment the judgment is recorded in the book of entries. But what is important
shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and here it not the actual recording but the date of entry.
the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims. In case a separate
judgment is rendered the court by order may stay its enforcement until What is the date of entry? The date of finality of the judgment or final
the rendition of a subsequent judgment or judgments and may prescribe order shall be deemed to be the date of its entry (Sec. 2, Rule 36). This
such conditions as may be necessary to secure the benefit thereof to the is fundamental. Not understanding this is fatal because entry is used in
party in whose favor the judgment is rendered. many other provisions of the rules. Hence, while entry is the actual
recording of the judgment in the book of entries, what is important is the
What is a judgment on compromise? This is a judgment rendered by date of entry of judgment. You find this also in Sec. 10, Rule 51 which
the court on the basis of a compromise agreement entered into between says that the date when the judgment or final resolution becomes
the parties to the action. It has the effect of res judicata upon the parties. executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry.
But there will be no execution of the compromise agreement except in
compliance with a judicial compromise. The nature of this compromise is Illustration:
that it is immediately executory. • judgment was rendered July 1
• judgment became final and executory on July 16
What is a judgment nunc pro tunc? This literally means ―now for • clerk of court recorded the judgment July 31
then.‖ This is a judgment intended to enter into the record acts which had : date of entry is July 16
already been done, but which do not yet appear in the record. Its
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Why is this so? Because the finality of judgment cannot be made to
depend on the will of the clerk of court who is in charge of recording said 5. the damages awarded are
judgment in the book of entries. Otherwise, if the clerk of court is a friend 1. FAME (fraud, accident, excessive
mistake, excusable
of a party litigant, he may be influenced to adjust the date favorable to his
negligence), which ordinary 6. the evidence is insufficient to
friend and thus affects the reckoning dates prescribed under the rules.
prudence could not have justify the decision or final
guarded against and by reason order
Examples: of which such aggrieved party
• Under Rule 39, when may you execute a judgment as a matter of has probably been impaired in
right? Sec. 1 says five (5) years from entry of judgment. 7. the decision or final order is
his rights -- constitutes 4
• Under Rule 38, when are you supposed to file a petition for relief under contrary to law
grounds
Sec. 3? Within six (6) months from the date of entry.
2. newly discovered evidence,
which he could not, with
reasonable diligence, have
RULE 37: NEW TRIAL OR RECONSIDERATION discovered and produced at the
trial, and which if presented
These are two (2) of the remedies against a final judgment. Motion for would probably alter the result
new trial and reconsideration are NOT MANDATORY. You can
immediately go to appeal.
Note: FAME must be qualified. If you only say FAME, your answer is
The 1997 Rules of Court specifically distinguishes the grounds from new incomplete. You must state the qualifications (...which ordinary
trial and reconsideration. prudence...). But never answer in abbreviation (F.A.M.E.). Spell it out!
If you file a motion for new trial on the ground that the evidence is
NEW TRIAL RECONSIDERATION insufficient, should it be dismissed? No. The court may consider it as
(5 grounds) (3 grounds) a motion for reconsideration.
Reason: What counts is the allegation and not the title. Jurisprudence is
lenient on this matter. Before the 1997 Rules of Court, new trial and
reconsideration are anchored on the same grounds. But even now that
the grounds are distinct, an incorrect assignment does not result in the
dismissal of the case.
Note: Equate newly discovered evidence with unavailability of evidence. • Intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party in a litigation during the trial,
If the evidence is available, it is not newly discovered evidence. You did such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony, which did
not exert enough effort to present that. not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case.
Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua: Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of
the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance, Example: Pre-trial is set for July 5. The adverse counsel calls you up
inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for and told you not to attend the pre-trial anymore because he already filed
new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for re-opening a motion for resetting which you have not received yet because it was
cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new counsel sent via registered mail. Then the next order that you found is that the
could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not case was dismissed because you were declared non-suited by
been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium nonappearance during the trial (you are the plainitff).
on the willful and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view
to securing new trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse decision, Accident: The ground of accident has the same concept as fraud. Any
as in the instant case. kind of an event which is beyond your control can be used as accident.
Note: As a matter of exception, if the errors of lawyers are so gross, then Mistake: This refers to mistake of fact. Exceptionally, it can be a mistake
the court can consider a misadministration of justice. of law depending on the party. If a party is unschooled in the rudiments
of law, he can be excused.
People v. Li Ka Kim: Appellant‘s passport could have easily been
presented and produced during the trial. Such presentation of appellant‘s Excusable Negligence: If it requires extraordinary diligence, that would
passport, would hardly be material to the outcome of the case. Appellant be excusable. Conversely, if it requires ordinary diligence, then it is not
was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as being the excusable. It is already gross negligence. A failure to take the proper
perpetrator of the crime. Most importantly, appellant even identified steps at the proper time, not in consequence of a party‘s own
himself as Li Ka Kim at the trial and not as Huang Xiao Wei, that bolsters carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard of the process of the
the conclusion that appellant deliberately concealed his true identity in unavoidable hindrance or accident, or on reliance on the care and
the nefarious enterprise. vigilance of his counsel or on promises made by the adverse party.
What kind of fraud is referred to in a motion for new trial? It is Analogy: If you are a young lady and you get pregnant out of wedlock,
extrinsic fraud as distinguished from intrinsic fraud. Fraud is that is excusable negligence. But if you were impregnated the second
deceitfulness. Extrinsic fraud is that which is outside the proceedings, time around, that is already gross. :)
outside the course of the trial, of which you do not have control. Intrinsic
fraud is within the proceeding. Suppose the lawyer, in the course of the When do we use an affidavit of merits? An affidavit of merit is required
hearing, presents fraudulent documents. That is intrinsic fraud. If you do in a motion for new trial founded on fraud, accident, mistake, or
not contest it, you have waived your right to oppose it. Hence, it is excusable negligence. Under the Rules, the moving party must show that
admitted. he has a meritorious defense. The facts constituting the movant‘s good
and substantial defense, which he may prove if the petition were granted,
• Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in must be shown in the affidavit which should accompany the motion for a
the litigation which is committed outside the trial of the case, where the new trial.
defeated party has been prevented from presenting fully his side of the
case, by fraud or deception practiced in him by his opponent.
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If it is newly discovered evidence, there is no need for affidavit of merits reconsideration is not allowed, a second motion for new trial is
because the rule provides that said evidence must be attached which authorized by the Rules.
can either be object, testimonial, or documentary. Under Rule 8, if the
allegation is a matter of fraud, you have to allege it with particularity. Section 5. Second motion for new trial. — A motion for new trial shall
You avail of affidavit of merits because the nature of the fraud as it was include all grounds then available and those not so included shall be
committed will be explained therein. deemed waived. A second motion for new trial, based on a ground not
existing nor available when the first motion was made, may be filed
Demonstrative Evidence: If it is object evidence, you can take a picture of within the time herein provided excluding the time during which the first
it. If it is a person, you take his picture which must be not older than six motion had been pending.
(6) months under criminal procedures.
No party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration of a
When is a party exempted from an affidavit of merits judgment or final order.
notwithstanding that the ground for new trial is fraud, etc.? When in
the very motion for new trial, you already stated what constituted fraud. If a motion for new trial is granted, what is the effect? When the
Under Rule 6, you must only allege ultimate facts. motion for new trial is granted, you only try matters which were
questioned so that all the pieces of evidence which have already been
The motion for new trial may be either granted or denied. If it is admitted, they remain to be admitted. Note: Sec. 6, Rule 37 has been
denied, what is your remedy? An order denying a motion for new trial amended.
(or reconsideration) is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal from
the judgment or final order. (Sec. 9, Rule 37) When you appeal from the Under Rule 10, when you amend the amended pleading, it supersedes
judgment, you have to assign as an error the denial of your motion for the original pleading. However, the admitted allegations in the original
new trial. pleading, while they are no longer part of the record, they become
extrajudicial admissions which require offer.
Note: Effective 27 December 2007, an order denying a motion for new
trial is no longer assailable by certiorari because of the amendment to When you speak of trial de novo, you set aside everything as if nothing
Rule 41 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. happened.
Estinozo v. CA: Appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive. Take note that in the amendatory circular of the Supreme Court (A.M.
07-7-12-SC), it deleted paragraph Sec. 2(a) of Rule 41.
Can you file a second motion for reconsideration? No, because all
the grounds were available when you filed the motion: insufficiency of
evidence, excessive award of damages, and decision/final order is RULE 38: RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS, ORDERS, OR OTHER
contrary to law. Filing a second motion for reconsideration will violate the PROCEEDINGS
rule on omnibus motion rule (Sec. 8, Rule 15). Under the ―single
motion‖ rule, a party shall not be allowed to file a second motion for The remedies against an executory judgment are as follows:
reconsideration of a judgment or a final order. 1. Rule 38
2. Rule 47
Can you file a second motion for new trial? Yes, but only when a
ground for new trial was not existing or available when the first motion An executory judgment is necessarily final but a final judgment is not
was made. Consequently, you can only file a second motion for new trial necessarily executory. (big circle: executory judgment/small circle: final
on the ground of newly discovered evidence. While a second motion for judgment)
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guarded against and by reason of which such aggrieved party has
True/False: Rule 38 is a petition so it must be separate and distinct from probably been impaired in his rights.
the original case.
A: False Note: Sections 1 and 2 have the same grounds and with the same
qualifications.
Why? This is merely a continuation of the case.
Illustration: The court denied your notice of appeal because it was filed
Mesina v. Meer: A petition for relief from judgment is not an available out of time. You then file a petition for relief from denial of appeal on the
remedy in the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petition should be filed in the ground of fraud XXX
same case and in the same court under the same number (?). A petition
for relief is an equitable remedy; it is not a matter of right. So, this As to the time frame, a petition for relief must be filed within (a) sixty (60)
remedy is not available when you did not avail of a motion for new trial or days from knowledge of judgment, order, or other proceedings to be set
even appeal when you had the time. aside; and (b) six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order, or other
proceeding. These two periods must concur.
This is why the word ―petition‖ is a misnomer. The better term is
―motion.‖ Section 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. — A
petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must
Why is it called ―petition‖ for relief? Because of the 1997 Rules of be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the
Court. Under the old rules, this was just a motion for relief. judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more
than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or
What are the two (2) kinds of relief? such proceeding was taken, and must be accompanied with affidavits
1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings (Sec. 1) showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied
2. Petition for relief from denial of appeal (Sec. 2) upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial
cause of action or defense, as the case may be.
Section 1. Petition for relief from judgment, order, or other
proceedings. — When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other Note: As to date of entry, refer to Sec. 2, Rule 36.
proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court through fraud, When does a party come to know of the judgment? Ordinarily, it is
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such when he receives a copy of the judgment from the court. But the 60 days
court and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or under this rule does not pertain to such but rather to the time a party
proceeding be set aside. came to know of the judgment from sources other than the receipt of the
copy of the judgment.
Section 2. Petition for relief from denial of appeal. — When a
judgment or final order is rendered by any court in a case, and a party Otherwise stated, you come to know of the judgment upon receipt
thereto, by fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, has been thereof and when you receive a copy of the judgment, your remedy is not
prevented from taking an appeal, he may file a petition in such court and petition for relief but rather, appeal, new trial, or reconsideration because
in the same case praying that the appeal be given due course. that is just a final judgment. This is executory judgment and the 60-day
period is counted from knowledge. It is only when you come to know of it
You can still avail of a petition for relief if your appeal is denied. But you from other sources other than receipt of the notice of the judgment, that
are now limited only to four (4) grounds which are fraud, accident, is where the 60-day period will start to operate.
mistake, excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution
RULE 39: EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the
judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the
A judgment which has no entry yet cannot be executed. judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and
of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
General rule: Only the trial court can execute judgment.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest
Exception: In the case of discretionary, it can be issued by the appellate of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of
court. execution.
Execution pending appeal is, of course, the exception to the general rule. The petitioner and respondent were mayoral candidates in Balingoan,
Normally, execution cannot be obtained until and unless (a) the Misamis Oriental for the May 14, 2001 elections. Respondent was
judgment has become final and executory; declared mayor by the board of canvassers. Petitioner filed an election
(b) the right of appeal has been renounced or waived; protest, and the results were recounted. Petitioner was declared the
(c) the period for appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been filed; mayor by virtue of judgment.
or
(d) having been filed, the appeal has been resolved and the records of Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal. Before the RTC
the case have been returned to the court of origin -- in which case, could act on the motion, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the
execution shall issue as a matter of right. COMELEC, as well as appealed the RTC‘s decision to the COMELEC.
On the other hand, when the period of appeal has not yet expired, the COMELEC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining the RTC
execution of a judgment should not be allowed except if, in the court‘s from acting upon the Motion for execution by the petitioner, pending the
discretion, there are good reasons therefor. These reasons must be case. The COMELEC found the RTC did not err and upheld its ruling.
stated in a special order, because unless these are divulged, it will be Thus it lifted the writ of preliminary injunction, dismissed the petition by
difficult to determine on appeal whether judicial discretion has been the respondent, and directed the RTC to dispatch its judgment.
properly exercised by the lower court. Good reasons consist of
compelling circumstances that justify the immediate execution of a
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RTC granted the Motion for Execution pending appeal, and subsequently
issued a Writ of Execution upon petitioner‘s posting of a bond. While it was indeed held that shortness of the remaining term of office
and posting a bond are not good reasons, we clearly stated in Fermo v.
Petitioner took his oath of office. Respondent filed MR and supplemental COMELEC that: A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution
petition praying the RTC order be nullified, and the grant of the writ of pending appeal requires that it should be based ―upon good reasons to
execution be set aside. be stated in a special order.‖ The following constitute ―good reasons‖
and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant execution
The COMELEC granted the respondent‘s petition and again enjoined pending appeal: (1.) public interest involved or will of the electorate; (2.)
petitioner from exercising duties as mayor. COMELEC issued a the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office;
resolution enjoining petitioner from assuming official functions of mayor and (3.) the length of time that the election contest has been pending.
until final resolution of the election case pending appeal.
The decision of the RTC was rendered on April 2, 2002, or after almost 1
SC: The RTC should have granted the Writ of Execution upon the year of trial and revision of the questioned ballots. It found petitioner as
Motion for Execution pending appeal. It is within the RTC‘s discretion to the candidate with the plurality of votes. Respondent appealed the said
grant the motion for execution pending appeal. Shortness of period of decision to the COMELEC. In the meantime, the three-year term of the
term of office, coupled with public interest and length of time the election Office of the Mayor continued to run. The will of the electorate, as
contest has been pending are the valid reasons for execution of determined by the RTC in the election protest, had to be respected and
judgment pending appeal. Here, the case has been pending for almost 1 given meaning. The Municipality needed the services of a mayor even
year, and the term of office was only for 3 years. To prolong the case while the election protest was pending, and it had to be the candidate
would be to deprive the electorate of services of their mayor. judicially determined to have been chosen by the people.
The petition for certiorari assailed RTC‘s orders for the execution of its Bañes vs Bañes: The wife‘s motion for execution pending appeal was
decision pending appeal. The grant of execution pending appeal was not proper. This is a case of legal separation between husband and wife.
well within the discretionary powers of the RTC. In order to obtain the Judgment was rendered in favor of the wife finding the husband guilty. All
annulment of said orders in a petition for certiorari, it must first be proved the properties belonging to the conjugal property were awarded to the
that the trial court gravely abused its discretion. He should show not wife including the 2 cars and the conjugal home. The wife asked for
merely a reversible error committed by the RTC, but a grave abuse of execution pending appeal. There was no good reason. The husband will
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. We find that no be turned into a pauper. Also, the husband filed an appeal. Although he
grave abuse of discretion was committed by the RTC. In its order might not get a total reversal, perhaps the distribution might be unfair.
granting execution pending appeal, it held:
RTC decided in a Civil Case, decreeing among others the legal
It is of judicial notice that for the public official elected last May 14, 2001 separation between petitioner Aida Bañez and respondent Gabriel Bañez
elections only a short period is left. Relative to this Court‘s jurisdiction on the ground of the latter‘s sexual infidelity; xxx the surrender by
over the instant case, the settled rule that the mere filing of the notice of respondent of the use and possession of a motor vehicle and the smaller
appeal does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and residential house to petitioner and the common children within 15 days
to resolve pending incidents,i.e., motion for execution pending appeal from receipt of the decision.
(Asmala vs. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 745) need not be overemphasized.
Petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion to modify said decision, while
However, the COMELEC set aside the order, saying that shortness of respondent filed a Notice of Appeal.
term alone is not a good reason for execution of a judgment pending
appeal. We disagree. RTC granted petitioner‘s urgent ex-parte motion to modify the decision.
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contended that there was no compelling reason for petitioner to have the
In another motion to modify the decision, petitioner sought moral and judgment executed pending appeal.
exemplary damages, as well as litigation expenses. She filed a motion
for execution pending appeal. Respondent filed a consolidated written SC: The execution of judgment pending appeal was not justified. As held
opposition to the 2 motions, and also prayed for the reconsideration of in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, execution pending appeal is allowed
the previous order. when superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the damages
that may result from the issuance of the writ. Otherwise, instead of being
RTC denied Aida‘s motion for moral and exemplary damages and an instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may well become a tool of
litigation expenses but gave due course to the execution pending appeal. oppression and inequity.
A writ of execution was issued to enforce the decision for (1) respondent
to vacate the premises of the small residential house and for (2) There is no superior or urgent circumstance that outweighs the damage
respondent to surrender the use and possession of said motor vehicle to which respondent would suffer if he were ordered to vacate the house.
petitioner. Petitioner did not refute respondent‘s allegations that she did not intend
to use said house, and that she has 2 other houses in the U.S. where
The petitioner was ordered to post a bond of P1,500,000 to answer for all she is a permanent resident, while he had none at all. Merely putting up
the damages that respondent may suffer arising from the issuance of a bond is not sufficient reason to justify her plea for execution pending
said writ of execution pending appeal and to further answer for all the appeal. To do so would make execution routinary, the rule rather than
advances that petitioner may have received from the Special the exception.
Administrator in this case pending final termination of this present case.
Section 2. Discretionary execution. —
In a petition for certiorari, respondent elevated the case to the CA. CA
set aside the RTC decision. The writ of execution and the Order granting (a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. —
the motion filed by the sheriff to make symbolic delivery of the house and On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in
motor vehicle to the administrator of the are SET ASIDE. CA denied the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession
Aida‘s motion for reconsideration. Hence, the petition in G.R. No. of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be,
132592, filed by herein petitioner. at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion,
order execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of
Petitioner manifested that she no longer questions the CA‘s decision on the period to appeal.
the vehicle because respondent repossessed it. As to the residential
house, she claimed that being conjugal in nature, justice requires that After the trial court has lost jurisdiction the motion for execution pending
she and her children be allowed to occupy and enjoy the house appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
considering that during the entire proceedings before RTC, she did not
have the chance to occupy it. Further, she posted a bond. For these Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated
reasons, she asked for execution pending appeal. in a special order after due hearing.
Respondent denied petitioner‘s allegation that she did not have the (b) Execution of several, separate or partial judgments. — A
chance to occupy the residential house. He averred that she could have, several, separate or partial judgment may be executed under the same
had she chosen to. According to him, as the inventory of the couple‘s terms and conditions as execution of a judgment or final order pending
properties showed, petitioner owned 2 houses and lots and 2 motor appeal.
vehicles in the U.S., where she is a permanent resident. Respondent
i. stay of discretionary execution (Section 3)
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dispositive portion of the judgment in the book of entries, but the date of
Section 3. Stay of discretionary execution. — Discretionary execution entry is not the date of recording but rather..?! Why? Otherwise, the
issued under the preceding section may be stayed upon approval by the prescriptive period will depend on the Clerk of Court. To avoid that
proper court of a sufficient supersedeas bond filed by the party against possible abuse!
whom it is directed, conditioned upon the performance of the judgment or
order allowed to be executed in case it shall be finally sustained in whole Within 5 years, it is a matter of right. Thereafter, it is by independent
or in part. The bond thus given may be proceeded against on motion with action called revival of judgment. Aside from section 6, there is another
notice to the surety. revival of judgment in the Rules of Court: section 34. Distinguish them!
ii. judgments not stayed by appeal (Section 4) Section 34. Recovery of price if sale not effective; revival of judgment. —
If the purchaser of real property sold on execution, or his successor in
The judgments are immediately executory in receivership, accounting, interest, fails to recover the possession thereof, or is evicted therefrom,
compromise, injunction. in consequence of irregularities in the proceedings concerning the sale,
or because the judgment has been reversed or set aside, or because the
Section 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. — Judgments in actions property sold was exempt from execution, or because a third person has
for injunction, receivership, accounting and support, and such other vindicated his claim to the property, he may on motion in the same action
judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared to be immediately or in a separate action recover from the judgment obligee the price paid,
executory, shall be enforceable after their rendition and shall not, be with interest, or so much thereof as has not been delivered to the
stayed by an appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the judgment obligor, or he may, on motion, have the original judgment
trial court. On appeal therefrom, the appellate court in its discretion may revived in his name for the whole price with interest, or so much thereof
make an order suspending, modifying, restoring or granting the as has been delivered to the judgment obligor. The judgment so revived
injunction, receivership, accounting, or award of support. shall have the same force and effect as an original judgment would have
as of the date of the revival and no more.
The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or otherwise
as may be considered proper for the security or protection of the rights of Who revives under Section 34? The purchaser.
the adverse party.
If you buy a property in an auction and you paid but you were not able to
B. Modes of Execution get the property for one reason or another, let‘s say there was a third
party claim and the third party claimant won, you are prejudiced. What
Section 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A final should you do? Go after the judgment obligee because he got the money
and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five that was supposed to go to you. That is the revival of judgment under
(5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and Section 34.
before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by During the period of redemption, who has the property subject of
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by redemption? The obligor. Suppose this properties are being utilized and
action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. they have civil fruits like rentals, to whom should the rentals go? To the
obligor because the purchaser is not yet the owner. Once the title is
When do you execute a judgment by motion? Within 5 years from the consolidated, his rights over the property retroacts to the time of the levy.
date of entry of the final judgment. That‘s how important entry is. What is What is the rationale behind that retroactivity?
the date of entry of judgment? Date of finality of judgment. Contrary to
the literal meaning of entry of judgment, which is the recording of the
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The levy is on January. It was only after the end of January of the the recovery of real or personal property, or the enforcement of a
following year that the title was consolidated. The rights of the purchaser lien thereon;
rights to January of the previous year. Why? Because if there are
claimants or claims against that property, within that one year period, the (c) In case of the death of the judgment obligor, after execution is
purchaser has priority rights. First in time, first in right. actually levied upon any of his property, the same may be sold
for the satisfaction of the judgment obligation, and the officer
making the sale shall account to the corresponding executor or
administrator for any surplus in his hands.
Judgment for P1,000,000. January 5, 1990 is the date of entry of
judgment. Until when can you execute the judgment by motion? January 2. when judgment is for money (Section 9)
4, 1995. From January 5, 1995 until January 4, 2000, you can only
execute the judgment by independent action called revival of judgment. Section 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced. —
Beyond January 4, 2000, how do you execute the original judgment for
P1,000,000? You can no longer execute that judgment because of (a) Immediate payment on demand. — The officer shall enforce an
prescription of judgment. execution of a judgment for money by demanding from the judgment
obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of
Suppose on March 10, 1996, you revived the judgment, you have now a execution and all lawful fees. The judgment obligor shall pay in cash,
revived judgment. This judgment is totally separate and distinct from the certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee, or any other form
original judgment, because it can happen that you have partially of payment acceptable to the latter, the amount of the judgment debt
executed the original judgment of P1,000,000. There is no such thing as under proper receipt directly to the judgment obligee or his authorized
alias writ of execution. This judgment must again be entered. It will not representative if present at the time of payment. The lawful fees shall be
be on March. Say it was entered on April 15, 1996 (date of entry of handed under proper receipt to the executing sheriff who shall turn over
revived judgment), within that period, count 5 years or up to April 14, the said amount within the same day to the clerk of court of the court that
2001 to execute that judgment by action again. And on and on without issued the writ.
limit until you fully satisfy the judgment.
If the judgment obligee or his authorized representative is not present to
1. By motion (Section 6) receive payment, the judgment obligor shall deliver the aforesaid
2. By independent action (Section 6) payment to the executing sheriff. The latter shall turn over all the
amounts coming into his possession within the same day to the clerk of
C. Manner of Execution court of the court that issued the writ, or if the same is not practicable,
deposit said amounts to a fiduciary account in the nearest government
1. when party is dead (Section 7) depository bank of the Regional Trial Court of the locality.
Section 7. Execution in case of death of party. — In case of the death The clerk of said court shall thereafter arrange for the remittance of the
of a party, execution may issue or be enforced in the following manner: deposit to the account of the court that issued the writ whose clerk of
court shall then deliver said payment to the judgment obligee in
(a) In case of the death of the judgment obligee, upon the satisfaction of the judgment. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the
application of his executor or administrator, or successor in interest; on judgment obligor while the lawful fees shall be retained by the clerk of
(b) In case of the death of the judgment obligor, against his executor court for disposition as provided by law. In no case shall the executing
or administrator or successor in interest, if the judgment be for sheriff demand that any payment by check be made payable to him.
The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real The first way to satisfy a judgment for money is by payment.
property of the judgment obligor which has been levied upon.
The sheriff has the writ of execution and goes to the judgment obligor.
When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to Here is a writ of execution for P1 million. Obligor gets P1,000,000 from
satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the his room and pays the sheriff. Is that valid? No.
personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and
lawful fees. In a judgment for money, payment is first. It must be given to the
judgment obligee. PAL vs PALEA: payment was made to the sheriff and
Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal this was not considered satisfaction of judgment. It must be paid to the
property, or any interest in either real or personal property, may be levied judgment oblige.
upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment.
With more reason if it is in check. If it is paid to the order of cash, you will
(c) Garnishment of debts and credits. — The officer may levy on not see the sheriff anymore.
debts due the judgment obligor and other credits, including bank
deposits, financial interests, royalties, commissions and other personal What about if the judgment obligor executes a promissory note? No, the
property not capable of manual delivery in the possession or control of Rule does not allow promissory note but it (or any other form of payment)
third parties. Levy shall be made by serving notice upon the person may be allowed if the judgment obligee accepts.
owing such debts or having in his possession or control such credits to
which the judgment obligor is entitled. The garnishment shall cover only Levy on execution. Distinguish this from levy on attachment (Rule 57)
such amount as will satisfy the judgment and all lawful fees. and levy on foreclosure (Rule 68). Who supervises the levy? The
judgment obligor. Only in the absence of the judgment obligor will the
The garnishee shall make a written report to the court within five (5) days sheriff take over. In actual practice, the obligor is an absentee obligor.
from service of the notice of garnishment stating whether or not the
judgment obligor has sufficient funds or credits to satisfy the amount of Even real properties may be subject to levy. How? Go to the Register of
the judgment. If not, the report shall state how much funds or credits the Deeds and have the title annotated (lien). If the judgment to be executed
garnishee holds for the judgment obligor. The garnished amount in cash, is a Manila Court judgment and you levy on properties in Baguio, do you
or certified bank check issued in the name of the judgment obligee, shall go to Baguio? Yes, you can levy on any property in the Philippines.
be delivered directly to the judgment obligee within ten (10) working days
3. when judgment is for specific act (Section 10) (e) Delivery of personal property. — In judgment for the delivery of
personal property, the officer shall take possession of the same and
Section 10. Execution of judgments for specific act. — forthwith deliver it to the party entitled thereto and satisfy any judgment
for money as therein provided.
(a) Conveyance, delivery of deeds, or other specific acts; vesting
title. — If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or 4. when it is a special judgment (Section 11)
personal property, or to deliver deeds or other documents, or to perform,
any other specific act in connection therewith, and the party fails to There are several kinds of execution: judgment for money, judgment for
comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be done delivery and special judgment. What is a special judgment? One which
at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by only the judgment obligor can accomplish. For other judgments, if the
the court and the act when so done shall have like effect as if done by obligor cannot comply, the court can assign someone else to comply at
the party. If real or personal property is situated within the Philippines, the expense of the judgment obligor. Delivery of property is not a special
the court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof may by an order divest judgment. If the obligor does not want to deliver the property, he can ask
the title of any party and vest it in others, which shall have the force and someone to deliver it at his expense. Example: A famous painter tasked
effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law. to paint. The court can punish him and send him to jail. Is that a harsh
and unconstitutional penalty? No, he had the keys to the jail in his
(b) Sale of real or personal property. — If the judgment be for the pockets. Comply, get out of jail; don‘t comply, remain in jail.
sale of real or personal property, to sell such property, describing it, and
apply the proceeds in conformity with the judgment. Section 11. Execution of special judgments. — When a judgment
requires the performance of any act other than those mentioned in the
(c) Delivery or restitution of real property. — The officer shall two preceding sections, a certified copy of the judgment shall be
demand of the person against whom the judgment for the delivery or attached to the writ of execution and shall be served by the officer upon
restitution of real property is rendered and all persons claiming rights the party against whom the same is rendered, or upon any other person
under him to peaceably vacate the property within three (3) working required thereby, or by law, to obey the same, and such party or person
days, and restore possession thereof to the judgment obligee, otherwise, may be punished for contempt if he disobeys such judgment.
the officer shall oust all such persons therefrom with the assistance, if
necessary, of appropriate peace officers, and employing such means as D. Properties exempt from execution (Section 13)
may be reasonably necessary to retake possession, and place the
judgment obligee in possession of such property. Any costs, damages, 13 items under section 13
rents or profits awarded by the judgment shall be satisfied in the same
manner as a judgment for money. Spouses A and B borrow money in millions from a bank. This is secured
by the home of the spouses. They are not able to pay. Is the family home
exempt from execution? No. Since the security is the conjugal home,
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then it is no longer exempt from execution pursuant to the last paragraph (l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as
of Section 13. such support, or any pension or gratuity from the Government; (m)
Properties specially exempted by law.
Salaries and wages: wages are absolutely exempt from execution.
Salaries are not necessarily exempt (if salary is too big, it is not exempt). But no article or species of property mentioned in this section shall
You don‘t deprive an individual of living or survival. be exempt from execution issued upon a judgment recovered for its
price or upon a judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage thereon.
Section 13. Property exempt from execution. — Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall be D’Armoured Security and Investigation Agency vs Orpia: The sheriff
exempt from execution: tried to levy on guns and ammunitions of the security agency. The
security agency objected because these tools and implements that the
(a)The judgment obligor's family home as provided by law, or the security guards use are exempt from execution because these are used
homestead in which he resides, and land necessarily used in in their livelihood. SC: Tools and implements referred to are the tools and
connection therewith; implements of a working man, not of corporate entities. You don‘t deprive
(b)Ordinary tools and implements personally used by him in his trade, a working man of his living. Corporations don‘t have tools and
employment, or livelihood; implements.
(c)Three horses, or three cows, or three carabaos, or other beasts of
burden, such as the judgment obligor may select necessarily used by Respondents, who were employed as security guards by petitioner, and
him in his ordinary occupation; assigned to Fortune Tobacco, Inc., filed with the Labor Arbiter a
(d)His necessary clothing and articles for ordinary personal use, complaint for illegal dismissal and various monetary claims against
excluding jewelry; petitioner and Fortune Tobacco. LA rendered a Decision stating that all
(e)Household furniture and utensils necessary for housekeeping, and the respondents except Antonio Cabangon Chua are entitled to
used for that purpose by the judgment obligor and his family, such as P1,077,124.29 for underpayment, overtime pay, legal holiday pay,
the judgment obligor may select, of a value not exceeding one service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, illegal deduction and refund
hundred thousand pesos; of firearms bond.
(f) Provisions for individual or family use sufficient for four months;
(g)The professional libraries and equipment of judges, lawyers, From the said Decision, Fortune Tobacco interposed an appeal to the
physicians, pharmacists, dentists, engineers, surveyors, clergymen, NLRC. Petitioner did not appeal. NLRC dismissed the complaint against
teachers, and other professionals, not exceeding three hundred Fortune Tobacco. This Decision became final and executory. Thus, the
thousand pesos in value; award specified in the Decision of the Arbiter became the sole liability of
(h)One fishing boat and accessories not exceeding the total value of one petitioner.
hundred thousand pesos owned by a fisherman and by the lawful use
of which he earns his livelihood; Upon respondents‘ motion, the Arbiter issued a writ of execution. The
(i) So much of the salaries, wages, or earnings of the judgment obligor sheriff served a writ of garnishment upon the Chief Accountant of
for his personal services within the four months preceding the levy as Foremost Farms, Inc., a corporation with whom petitioner has an existing
are necessary for the support of his family; services agreement. Thus, petitioner‘s receivables with Foremost were
(j) Lettered gravestones; garnished.
(k)Monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities accruing or in any manner
growing out of any life insurance; Petitioner filed with the NLRC a ―Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of
Execution and Garnishment‖ which was opposed by respondents. The
Arbiter issued an Order denying the motion and directing the sheriff to
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release the garnished sum of money to respondents pro rata. Petitioner‘s support, and such persons are more in need of the exemption than any
MR was denied, hence, it interposed an appeal to the NLRC. The NLRC other [Gaa vs. Court of Appeals].
dismissed the appeal for petitioner‘s failure to post a bond within the
reglementary period. Its MR was denied. Petitioner filed with the CA a In this context, exemptions under this rule are confined only to natural
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a writ of persons and not to juridical entities such as petitioner. Thus, the rule
preliminary injunction. CA dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for speaks of salaries, wages and earning from the ‗personal services‘
review on certiorari. rendered by the judgment obligor. The rule further requires that such
earnings be intended for the support of the judgment debtor‘s family.
SC: The garnished amount is not exempt from execution.
Necessarily, petitioner which is a corporate entity, does not fall under the
Held: exemption. If at all, the exemption refers to petitioner‘s individual
No. The Rule clearly enumerates what properties are exempt from employees and not to petitioner as a corporation.
execution. It is apparent that the exemption pertains only to natural
persons and not to juridical entities. CA correctly ruled that petitioner, x x x. Parenthetically, in a parallel case where a security agency claimed
being a corporate entity, does not fall within the exemption, thus: that the guns it gives to its guards are tools and implements exempt from
execution, the SC ruled that the exemption pertains only to natural and
Section 13 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear on what not to juridical persons, thus:
properties are exempt from execution. Section 13 (i) of the Rules
pertinently reads: ‗However, it would appear that the exemption contemplated by the
provision involved is personal, available only to a natural person, such as
‗SECTION 13. Property exempt from execution. – Except as otherwise a dentist‘s dental chair and electric fan (Belen v. de Leon). As pointed
expressly provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall be out by the Solicitor General, if properties used in business are exempt
exempt from execution: from execution, there can hardly be an instance when a judgment claim
can be enforced against the business entity‘ [Pentagon Security and
xxx xxx xxx Investigation Agency vs. Jimenez].
(i) So much of the salaries, wages or earnings of the judgment obligor It stands to reason that only natural persons whose salaries, wages and
for his personal services within the four months preceding the levy as are earnings are indispensable for his own and that of his family‘s support
necessary for the support of his family.‘ are exempted under Section 13 (i) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
The exemption under this procedural rule should be read in conjunction E. Third Party Claim (Section 16)
with the Civil Code, the substantive law which proscribes the execution of
employee‘s wages, thus: ‗ART. 1708. The laborer‘s wage shall not be Rule 39, Section 16. Proceedings where property claimed by third
subject to execution or attachment, except for debts incurred for food, person. — If the property levied on is claimed by any person other than
shelter, clothing and medical attendance.‘ the judgment obligor or his agent, and such person makes an affidavit of
his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the grounds of
Obviously, the exemption under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and Article such right or title, and serves the same upon the officer making the levy
1708 of the New Civil Code is meant to favor only laboring men or and copy thereof, stating the grounds of such right or tittle, and a serves
women whose works are manual. Persons belonging to this class the same upon the officer making the levy and a copy thereof upon the
usually look to the reward of a day‘s labor for immediate or present judgment obligee, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property,
unless such judgment obligee, on demand of the officer, files a bond
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approved by the court to indemnity the third-party claimant in a sum not The sheriff shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of
less than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as such property to any such third-party claimant, if such bond shall be filed.
to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person
of execution. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping of the from vindicating his claim to the property, or prevent the attaching party
property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor is from claiming damages against a third-party claimant who filed a
filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of frivolous or plainly spurious claim, in the same or a separate action.
the bond.
When the writ of attachment is issued in favor of the Republic of the
The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond
property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing herein shall not be required, and in case the sheriff is sued for damages as a
contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person from result of the attachment, he shall be represented by the Solicitor General,
vindicating his claim to the property in a separate action, or prevent the and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court
judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or a separate shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of the funds to be
action against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly appropriated for the purpose.
spurious claim.
Rule 60, Section 7. Proceedings where property claimed by third
When the writ of execution is issued in favor of the Republic of the person. — If the property taken is claimed by any person other than the
Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond party against whom the writ of replevin had been issued or his agent, and
shall not be required, and in case the sheriff or levying officer is sued for such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto, or right to the
damages as a result of the levy, he shall be represented by the Solicitor possession thereof, stating the grounds therefor, and serves such
General and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the affidavit upon the sheriff while the latter has possession of the property
court shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of such funds as may and a copy thereof upon the applicant, the sheriff shall not be bound to
be appropriated for the purpose. keep the property under replevin or deliver it to the applicant unless the
applicant or his agent, on demand of said sheriff, shall file a bond
Rule 57, Section 14. Proceedings where property claimed by third approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not
person. — If the property attached is claimed by any person other than less than the value of the property under replevin as provided in section
the party against whom attachment had been issued or his agent, and 2 hereof. In case of disagreement as to such value, the court shall
such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto, or right to the determine the same. No claim for damages for the taking or keeping, of
possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serves the property may be enforced against the bond unless the action therefor
such affidavit upon the sheriff while the latter has possession of the is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of
attached property, and a copy thereof upon the attaching party, the the bond.
sheriff shall not be bound to keep the property under attachment, unless
the attaching party or his agent, on demand of the sheriff, shall file a The sheriff shall not be liable for damages, for the taking or keeping of
bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum such property, to any such third-party claimant if such bond shall be filed.
not less than the value of the property levied upon. In case of Nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any third person
disagreement as to such value, the same shall be decided by the court from vindicating his claim to the property, or prevent the applicant from
issuing the writ of attachment. No claim for damages for the taking or claiming damages against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or
keeping of the property may be enforced against the bond unless the plainly spurious claim, in the same or a separate action.
action therefor is filed within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
date of the filing of the bond. When the writ of replevin is issued in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines, or any officer duly representing it, the filing of such bond
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shall not be required, and in case the sheriff is sued for damages as a What is the remedy of the judgment obligee against a frivolous third party
result of the replevin, he shall be represented by the Solicitor General, claim? File a claim for damages in the same action or in a separate
and if held liable therefor, the actual damages adjudged by the court action.
shall be paid by the National Treasurer out of the funds to be
appropriated for the purpose. When should the sheriff auction the property? Between the hours of 9 in
the morning up to 2 in the afternoon. Where should it be? Where the
Section 16 of Rule 39 (execution), Section 14 of Rule 57 (attachment) properties are located. As to personal properties, the properties where
and Section 7 of Rule 60 (replevin) – same formulation they may be found.
How do you distinguish a third party claim from a third party complaint During auction, who may purchase the property? Anybody; that‘s open to
(under Rule 6; kinds of pleadings)? the public. May the judgment obligee be the purchaser? Yes, that is
usually the case. How much does he have to pay? If he bids less than
Illustrate a third party claim: The property of a judgment obligor has the judgment debt, he does not have to pay. If he bids more than the
already been levied and has been taken in actual custody by the sheriff. judgment debt, he has to pay.
X who is a 3rd party files an affidavit of 3rd party claim gives it to the
sheriff. Sheriff gives it to the judgment obligee who will subsequently file Exception: the purchaser will have to pay even if he bids within the
a bond. judgment debt when there is a third party claim. Why? A case may crop
up between the third party claimant (saying the property to be auctioned
A vs B. Judgment was rendered in favor of A. A could not pay, so sheriff is his) and judgment obligee. If that happens and the third party claimant
levied on the property of B. The properties of B were taken in legal wins, the judgment obligor will have to pay twice. That‘s not fair!
custody by the sheriff. X, not a party to the case, executes an affidavit,
which is his third party claim. X will give the affidavit to the sheriff. The F. Execution Sale (Sections 17-26)
sheriff will give the affidavit of third party claim to A. It is not the third
party claimant that posts the bond. Upon receipt of the third party claim, When the auction begins, there must first be a notice under Section 15.
the judgment obligee, he will post the bond. This holds true in Rule 57 The 2 other requirements are posting and publication.
(attaching creditor) as well as in Rule 60 (applicant).
Section 15. Notice of sale of property on execution. — Before the sale of
The judgment obligee posts a bond equivalent to the value of the property on execution, notice thereof must be given as follows:
property. What is that bond for?
(a) In case of perishable property, by posting written notice of the
What happens if the judgment obligee does not post a bond? The sheriff time and place of the sale in three (3) public places, preferably in
will deliver the property to the third party claimant. conspicuous areas of the municipal or city hall, post office and public
market in the municipality or city where the sale is to take place, for such
It has the same provision in attachment and replevin. More so in replevin time as may be reasonable, considering the character and condition of
where the sale of personal property is quickly processed. the property;
If the judgment obligee posts a bond equivalent to the value of the (b) In case of other personal property, by posting a similar notice in
property, subject of the third party claim, the sheriff keeps the property the three (3) public places above-mentioned for not less than five (5)
for auction sale. days;
The notice shall specify the place, date and exact time of the sale which Section 19. How property sold on execution; who may direct manner
should not be earlier than nine o'clock in the morning and not later than and order of sale. — All sales of property under execution must be made
two o'clock in the afternoon. The place of the sale may be agreed upon at public auction, to the highest bidder, to start at the exact time fixed in
by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the sale of the the notice. After sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the execution,
property or personal property not capable of manual delivery shall be no more shall be sold and any excess property or proceeds of the sale
held in the office of the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court or the shall be promptly delivered to the judgment obligor or his authorized
Municipal Trial Court which issued the writ of or which was designated by representative, unless otherwise directed by the judgment or order of the
the appellate court. In the case of personal property capable of manual court. When the sale is of real property, consisting of several known lots,
delivery, the sale shall be held in the place where the property is located. they must be sold separately; or, when a portion of such real
Under Rule 103 and 108, as to change of name and correction of entries,
the requirement is newspaper of national circulation.
Section 20. Refusal of purchaser to pay. — If a purchaser refuses to pay Section 25. Conveyance of real property; certificate thereof given to
the amount bid by him for property struck off to him at a sale under purchaser and filed with registry of deeds. — Upon a sale of real
execution, the officer may again sell the property to the highest bidder property, the officer must give to the purchaser a certificate of sale
and shall not be responsible for any loss occasioned thereby; but the containing:
court may order the refusing purchaser to pay into the court the amount of
such loss, with costs, and may punish him for contempt if he disobeys the (a) A particular description of the real property sold;
order. The amount of such payment shall be for the benefit of the person (b) The price paid for each distinct lot or parcel;
entitled to the proceeds of the execution, unless the execution has been (c) The whole price paid by him;
fully satisfied, in which event such proceeds shall be for the benefit of the (d) A statement that the right of redemption expires one (1) year from the
judgment obligor. The officer may thereafter reject any subsequent bid of date of the registration of the certificate of sale.
such purchaser who refuses to pay.
Such certificate must be registered in the registry of deeds of the place
Section 21. Judgment obligee as purchaser. — When the purchaser is where the property is situated.
the judgment obligee, and no third-party claim has been filed, he need not
pay the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his Section 26. Certificate of sale where property claimed by third person.
judgment. If it does, he shall pay only the excess. — When a property sold by virtue of a writ of execution has been
claimed by a third person, the certificate of sale to be issued by the
Section 22. Adjournment of sale. — By written consent of the judgment sheriff pursuant to sections 23, 24 and 25 of this Rule shall make
obligor and obligee, or their duly authorized representatives, the officer express mention of the existence of such third-party claim.
may adjourn the sale to any date and time agreed upon by them. Without
such agreement, he may adjourn the sale from day to day if it becomes G. Redemption
necessary to do so for lack of time to complete the sale on the day fixed
in the notice or the day to which it was adjourned. Here, the properties are already sold to the public. When does the
purchaser of the property become the owner of such property
Section 23. Conveyance to purchaser of personal property capable of auctioned? As of the time of the levy. If it was levied in October and the
manual delivery. — When the purchaser of any personal property, sale is on December, he became the owner of the property as of
capable of manual delivery, pays the purchase price, the officer making October. Redemption only applies to real property, not to personal
the sale must deliver the property to the purchaser and, if desired, property.
execute and deliver to him a certificate of sale. The sale conveys to the
purchaser all the rights which the judgment obligor had in such property That does not hold true in case of real properties. If real properties are
as of the date of the levy on execution or preliminary attachment. the subject of an auction, the purchaser only becomes the owner of the
There are 2 kinds of persons who may redeem: (1) judgment obligor; (2) You can only redeem from a redemptioner. If it is the judgment obligor
redemptioner (examples: attaching creditor, mortgagee; must be after the that first redeems the property, no further redemption is allowed. But if it
lien under which the property was sold). is a redemptioner who redeems the property, within a period of 60 days,
it can still be redeemed either by the judgment obligor or another
Look at the time frame: the property was levied on January. It was sold in redemptioner. If it exceeds the 60 day period,
March. From the levy up to the execution sale, there is a gap of 2 months.
What lien are we selling the property here? Under the levy of execution. Mar 10, 1995 (1 year from registration of COS) Mar 9, 1996
The levy took place on January. The sale took place on
March. Within January and March, who may be a possible lien holder? Apr 5 Jun 4 Feb 14
B‘s creditors.
Within the 1 year period (March 10, 1995- March 9, 1996), if it is
Illustration: 1 hectare of land is levied upon. It was sold. Who will redeemed by the judgment obligor, that‘s the end of it and there can no
negotiate or deal with that land within a 2-month period? Under paragraph longer be any redemption.
b, attaching creditor, mortgagee, etc. Who owns this land? The judgment
obligor. When it is levied upon, is there anyone who would deal with said
land? (would anyone attach on the land?) Rule 57. The other creditors of
The one-year period can be extended but only as far as the redemption is H. Other remedies to fully satisfy judgment
concerned. The last redemption will only be the maximum limit. But if the
last re-redemption is only up to March 9. If it was redeemed by a (Referring to section 6 example) In this revived judgment, which you can
redemptioner and it would go beyond the maximum of 1 year, it may still revive again and again so judgment will not expire for execution
be redeemed beyond that. But if the Rule provides that a redemptioner purposes, suppose you were not able to satisfy it fully, what other legal
can redeem it, with more reason that the obligor could redeem it because recourse do you have to fully satisfy it?
it belongs to him.
Judgment for money under section 9: payment, levy, garnishment. If you
1. the right of redemption vs equity of redemption have exhausted all of these but the judgment is still not satisfied, what
are your other remedies? Examination of the judgment obligor under
2. who may redeem (Section 27) section 36, examination of obligor of judgment obligor under section 37,
appointment of a receiver under section 41 and sale of ascertainable
Section 27. Who may redeem real property so sold. — Real property interest under section 42.
sold as provided in the last preceding section, or any part thereof sold
separately, may be redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided, by the 1. Examination of judgment obligor (Section 36)
following persons:
(a) The judgment obligor; or his successor in interest in the whole or Section 36. Examination of judgment obligor when judgment
any part of the property; unsatisfied. — When the return of a writ of execution issued against
(b) A creditor having a lien by virtue of an attachment, judgment or property of a judgment obligor, or any one of several obligors in the
mortgage on the property sold, or on some part thereof, subsequent to same judgment, shows that the judgment remains unsatisfied, in whole
the lien under which the property was sold. Such redeeming creditor is or in part, the judgment obligee, at any time after such return is made,
termed a redemptioner. shall be entitled to an order from the court which rendered the said
judgment, requiring such judgment obligor to appear and be examined
3. effect of redemption (Section 29) concerning his property and income before such court or before a
2. Examination of obligor of judgment obligor (Section 37) I. Judgment: principal vs surety (Section 46)
Section 37. Examination of obligor of judgment obligor. — When the Section 46. When principal bound by judgment against surety. — When
return of a writ of execution against the property of a judgment obligor a judgment is rendered against a party who stands as surety for another,
shows that the judgment remain unsatisfied, in whole or in part, and the latter is also bound from the time that he has notice of the action or
upon proof to the satisfaction of the court which issued the writ, that a proceeding, and an opportunity at the surety's request to join in the
person, corporation, or other juridical entity has property of such defense.
judgment obligor or is indebted to him, the court may, by an order,
require such person, corporation, or other juridical entity, or any officer, When you execute a judgment against a surety, should you implead the
or member thereof, to appear before the court or a commissioner principal?
appointed by it, at a time and place within the province or city where
such debtor resides or is found, and be examined concerning the same. General rule: You cannot run after the surety without the principal.
The service of the order shall bind all credits due the judgment obligor
and all money and property of the judgment obligor in the possession or Exception: In matters of implementing a judgment against a principal
in the control of such person corporation, or juridical entity from the time and a surety, you don‘t have to bring in the principal. The surety is
of service; and the court may also require notice of such proceedings to already an indispensable party. But you may bring in the principal if you
be given to any party to the action in such manner as it may deem want to because the principal is a necessary party.
proper.
J. Effect of judgment (Section 47)
3. Appointment of a receiver (Section 41)
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a
Section 41. Appointment of receiver. — The court may appoint a receiver judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
of the property of the judgment obligor; and it may also forbid a transfer or jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
other disposition of, or any interference with, the property of the judgment
obligor not exempt from execution. (a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in
respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a
4. Sale of ascertainable interest (Section 42) deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal
condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another,
Section 42. Sale of ascertainable interest of judgment obligor in real the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing, the
estate. — If it appears that the judgment obligor has an interest in real will or administration or the condition, status or relationship of the
estate in the place in which proceedings are had, as mortgagor or person, however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of
mortgagee or otherwise, and his interest therein can be ascertained administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the
without controversy the receiver may be ordered to sell and convey such testator or intestate;
real estate or the interest of the obligor therein; and such sale shall be
Sps Serrano filed with the RTC a motion for execution of the RTC‘s SC: No. Generally, the execution upon a final judgment is a matter of
earlier decision. The defendants Geli filed a motion to quash the claim right on the part of the prevailing party. It is the ministerial and mandatory
because he had already redeemed the property, arguing that this duty of the trial court to enforce its own judgment once it becomes final
constituted a supervening event that would make the execution of the and executory. It may happen, however, that new facts and
trial court‘s decision unjust and inequitable. circumstances may develop or occur after a judgment had been rendered
and while an appeal therefrom is pending; or new matters had developed
RTC denied the motion. It noted that the payment of Geli of the after the appeal has been dismissed and the appealed judgment had
redemption price took place before the CA dismissed the appeal, and become final and executory, which the parties were not aware of and
before the decision of the RTC became final, hence, it did not constitute a could not have been aware of prior to or during the trial or during the
supervening event warranting a quashal of the writ of the execution. appeal, as they were not yet in existence at that time. In the first
situation, any attempt to frustrate or put off the enforcement of an
Emilio Geli died intestate and was survived by his children. The heirs filed executory decision must fail. Once a judgment has become final and
with the CA a petition for certiorari and/ or prohibition praying for the executory, the only remedy left for material attention thereof is that
nullification of the RTC orders. Under the terms of the deed of absolute provided for in Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, as amended. There is no
sale with assumption of mortgage which was still subsisting at that time, other prerequisite mode of thwarting the execution of the judgment on
they were ipso facto subrogated to the rights of the Spouses Serrano as equitable grounds predicated on facts occurring before the finality of
mortgagors of the property; hence, they became the owners of the judgment. In the second situation, the execution may be stayed,
property and were entitled to the possession thereof. CA ruled that since notwithstanding the affirmance of the appealed judgment by this Court. It
Geli paid the redemption price while his appeal was pending with the CA, is required, however, that the supervening facts and circumstances must
the redemption was a supervening event which rendered the enforcement either have a direct effect upon the matter already litigated and settled or
of the writ of execution issued by the RTC against them unjust and create a substantial change in the rights or relations of the parties therein
inequitable. which would render execution of a final judgment unjust, impossible or
inequitable or when it becomes imperative in the interest of justice. The
interested party may file a motion to quash a writ of execution issued by
the trial court, or ask the court to modify or alter the judgment to
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harmonize the same with justice and further supervening facts. Evidence bidder at P4.5 million, which appeared to be the account of the spouses
may be adduced by the parties on such supervening facts or at that time. The certificate of sale was executed by the sheriff and was
circumstances. registered with the Register of Deeds.
The payment by Emilio Geli to the GSIS for the account of the In the meantime, the spouses referred the matter to barangay
petitioners was made while the appeal of the private respondents from conciliation but the barangay captain failed to resolve the matter due to
the summary judgment of the RTC was pending. The summary the vehement objections of some of the subdivision homeowners.
judgment of the RTC had not yet become final and executory. It
behooved the said respondents to prosecute their appeal and file their The spouses wrote the bank and asked for 6 months within which to
brief, where they should have invoked the payment of the redemption redeem the property. The bank denied their request. They again wrote to
price as a ground for the reversal of the trial court‘s summary judgment the bank and pleaded for an extension of 3 months to redeem the
in their favor. The respondents failed to do so, and even concealed the property. The bank granted them 1 month. However, the bank
payment of the loan for the account of the petitioners. Worse, the consolidated its title over the property and the Register of Deeds issued
respondents did not pay the requisite docket fees for their appeal, which a TCT in the bank‘s name.
resulted in its dismissal. The respondents even opted not to file any
motion for the reconsideration of the resolution of the CA dismissing First Complaint:
their appeal. In sum, the respondents allowed the decision of the trial
court to become final and executory. Consequently, the enforcement of Instead of repurchasing the property, the spouses filed a complaint
the summary judgment of the trial court can no longer be frustrated by against the bank for the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
the respondents‘ payment, through Emilio Geli, to the GSIS in 1987. real estate mortgage and sale at public auction and/or redemption of the
property, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and a writ of
Irrefragably, the Spouses Geli, as vendees-mortgagors under the deed preliminary injunction to enjoin the bank from consolidating the title over
of absolute sale with partial assumption of mortgage, would have been the property.
subrogated to the rights and obligations of the petitioners under the said
deed, including the right to redeem the property from the GSIS. Allegations:
However, the CA dismissed their appeal for failure to pay the requisite
docket fees, and such dismissal became final and executory. Hence, - They were denied due process because the foreclosure of the real
the summary judgment of the trial court declaring the deed of absolute estate mortgage was extrajudicial.
sale with partial assumption of mortgage rescinded had also become - The sale at public auction was without prior notice to them.
final and executory. - The property was sold for only P4.5 million, the balance of their
account with the bank but about 400% lower than the prevailing
Perez vs CA: The spouses Digos secured a loan of P5.8 million from price of the property.
the International Exchange Bank to finance their project for the - The bank rejected their plea for a 5 month extension to redeem, and
construction of townhouses on their property. However, the project was their offer of P1 million in partial payment of their loan account to
delayed because the homeowners in Pillarville Subdivision which reduce the same to P3.5 million but the bank granted them an
abutted the property refused to allow them to build an access road. extension of only 1 month to redeem the property, designed to
Thus, the equipment to be used for the project could not pass through. divest them of the same and enrich some characters at their
expense.
The spouses Digos failed to pay the amortization on their loan. The
Bank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of their real estate mortgage. The spouses caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the
The property was sold at public auction with the bank as the highest dorsal portion of the TCT. The trial court did not issue a TRO or writ of
- They reiterated the allegations in the first complaint. SC: The second complaint is barred by res judicata. Section 49(b)
- They admitted their failure to pay the amortization on their loans. enunciates the first concept of res judicata, known as bar by prior
- That the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and the judgment or estoppel by judgment, which refers to a theory or matter
sale at public auction were illegal because the bank charged much that has been definitely and finally settled on its merits by a court of
more than the amount due on their loan account. competent jurisdiction without fraud or collusion.
- That although they pleaded for a restructuring of their loan account
and a moratorium on the payment of their account, they were There are 4 essential requisites which must concur for the application of
unaware of the erroneous computation of the balance of their loan this doctrine:
account.
(a) finality of the former judgment;
- That the bank‘s consolidation of its title over the property was
premature because they were given one month to redeem their
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject
property.
matter and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and Relying on these admissions on the part of the private respondents, and
the fact that the bank has already consolidated its title over the property,
(d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of the Court thus dismissed their first complaint. The Order of the Court
parties, subject matter and causes of action. dismissing the first complaint is a judgment of the case on the merits.
Section 49(c) of Rule 39 enumerates the concept of conclusiveness The attempt of the respondents in their second complaint to avoid the
of judgment. This is the second branch, otherwise known as application of the principle of res judicata by claiming the nature of their
collateral estoppel or estoppel by verdict. This applies where, account on the ground therefor and their legal theory cannot prosper.
between the first case wherein judgment is rendered and the second Case law has it that where a right, question or fact is distinctly put in issue
case wherein such judgment is involved, there is no identity of causes of and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a first case,
action. As explained by this Court: between the same parties or their privies, the former adjudication of that
fact, right or question is binding on the parties or their privies in a second
It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be suit irrespective of whether the causes of action are the same. The ruling
conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the of the CA that the action of the private respondents and their legal theory
same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issues be in their second complaint were different from their causes of action and
identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the second legal theory in the first complaint is not correct. A different cause of action
action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that is one that proceeds not only on a sufficiently different legal theory, but
particular point or question, a former judgment between the same also on a different factual footing as not to require the trial of facts
parties will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or material to the former suit; that is, an action that can be maintained even
question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit; but the if all disputed factual issues raised in the plaintiff‘s original complaint are
adjudication of an issue in the first case is not conclusive of an entirely concluded in defendant‘s favor.
different and distinct issue arising in the second. In order that this rule
may be applied, it must clearly and positively appear, either from In this case, the private respondents‘ second complaint cannot be
the record itself or by the aid of competent extrinsic evidence that maintained without trying the facts material to the first case, and the
the precise point or question in issue in the second suit was second case cannot be maintained if all the disputed factual issues raised
involved and decided in the first. And in determining whether a given in the first complaint are considered in favor of the bank.
question was an issue in the prior action, it is proper to look behind
the judgment to ascertain whether the evidence necessary to The principle of res judicata applies when the opportunity to raise
sustain a judgment in the second action would have authorized a an issue in the first complaint exists but the plaintiff failed to do so.
judgment for the same party in the first action. Indeed, if the pleading of a different legal theory would have convinced
the trial court to decide a particular issue in the first action which, with the
If indeed the bank made an erroneous computation of the balance of their use of diligence the plaintiffs could have raised therein but failed to do so,
account as claimed by the private respondents in their second complaint, they are barred by res judicata. Nor do legal theories operate to constitute
this should have been alleged in the first complaint as one of their causes a cause of action. New legal theories do not amount to a new cause of
of action. They failed to do so. The private respondents unequivocably action so as to defeat the application of the principle of res judicata.
admitted in their first complaint that the balance of their account with the
bank was P4,500,000.00 which was the precise amount for which the Hao vs Andres: Kenneth Hao is one of the defendants in a civil case for
bank sought the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and the sale of replevin pending before the RTC. Judge Renato Fuentes issued an
the property at public auction; they even sought judicial recourse to Order of Seizure against 22 motor vehicles allegedly owned by Hao. On
enable them to redeem the property despite the lapse of the one-year
period therefor.
Remedial Law Review I – Civil Procedure
124
the strength of the said order, Abe Andres, Sheriff of RTC, was able to Andres allowed Atty. Macadangdang to get a keymaster to duplicate the
seize 9 motor vehicles on different dates. vehicles' keys in order to take 1 motor vehicle; and (4) Andres admitted
that prior to the implementation of the writ of seizure, he consulted Silver
In his Affidavit-Complaint against Andres before the Office of the Court and Atty. Macadangdang regarding the implementation of the writ and
Administrator (OCA), Hao alleged that Andres gave undue advantage to was accompanied by the latter in the course of the implementation. Judge
Zenaida Silver in the implementation of the order and that Andres seized Fuentes observed that the motor vehicles were speedily seized without
the 9 motor vehicles in an oppressive manner. Hao also averred that strictly observing fairness and regularity in its implementation.
Andres was accompanied by unidentified armed personnel on board a
military vehicle which was excessive since there were no resistance Anent the safekeeping of the seized motor vehicles, Judge Fuentes
from them. Hao also discovered that the compound where the seized pointed out several instances where Andres lacked due diligence to wit:
motor vehicles were placed is actually owned by Silver. (1) the seized motor vehicles were placed in a compound surrounded by
an insufficiently locked see-through fence; (2) 3 motor vehicles were left
In view of the approval of Hao‘s counter-replevin bond, Judge outside the compound; (3) Andres turned over the key of the gate to the
Emmanuel Carpio ordered Andres to immediately cease and desist from policemen guarding the motor vehicles; (4) Andres does not even know
further implementing the order of seizure, and to return the seized motor the full name of the owner of the compound, who was merely known to
vehicles including its accessories to their lawful owners. However, 8 of him as "Gloria"; (5) except for PO3 Despe and SPO4 Nelson Salcedo, the
the 9 seized motor vehicles were reported missing. Andres narrated that identities of the other policemen tapped to guard the compound were
PO3 Rodrigo Despe, one of the policemen guarding the motor vehicles, unknown to Andres; (6) Andres also admitted that he only stayed at least
reported to him that "Nonoy" entered the compound and caused the one hour each day from October 19-21, 2005 during his visits to the
duplication of the vehicles' keys. compound; and (7) even after it was reported to him that a certain
"Nonoy" entered the compound and duplicated the keys of the motor
Subsequently, Hao reported that 3 of the carnapped vehicles were vehicles, he did not exert his best effort to look for that "Nonoy" and to
recovered by the police. He then accused Andres of conspiring and confiscate the duplicated keys.
conniving with Atty. Oswaldo Macadangdang (Silver's counsel) and the
policemen in the carnapping of the motor vehicles. Hao also accused Judge Fuentes also observed that Andres appeared to be more or less
Andres of concealing the depository receipts from them and pointed out accommodating to Silver and her counsel but hostile and uncooperative
that the depository receipts show that Silver and Atty. Macadangdang to the complainant. He pointed out that Andres depended solely on Silver
were the ones who chose the policemen who will guard the motor in the selection of the policemen who would guard the seized motor
vehicles. vehicles. He added that even the depository receipts were not turned over
to the defendants/third-party claimants in the replevin case but were in
After the OCA recommended that the matter be investigated, we fact concealed from them. Andres also gave inconsistent testimonies as
referred the case to Executive Judge Renato Fuentes for investigation, to whether he has in his possession the depository receipts.
report and recommendation. Judge Fuentes found Andres guilty of
serious negligence in the custody of the 9 motor vehicles. He OCA disagreed with the observations of Judge Fuentes. It recommended
recommended that Andres be suspended from office. that Andres be held liable only for simple neglect of duty.
Judge Fuentes found numerous irregularities in the implementation of the SC: We adopt the recommendation of the investigating judge.
writ of replevin/order of seizure, to wit: (1) at the time of the
implementation of the writ, Andres knew that the vehicles to be seized Being an officer of the court, Andres must be aware that there are
were not in the names of any of the parties to the case; (2) one vehicle welldefined steps provided in the Rules of Court regarding the proper
was taken without the knowledge of its owner,Junard Escudero; (3) implementation of a writ of replevin and/or an order of seizure. The
SEC. 4. Duty of the sheriff. Upon receiving such order, the sheriff must It matters not that Silver was in possession of the seized vehicles merely
serve a copy thereof on the adverse party, together with a copy of the for safekeeping as stated in the depository receipts. The rule is clear that
application, affidavit and bond, and must forthwith take the property, if it the property seized should not be immediately delivered to the plaintiff,
be in the possession of the adverse party, or his agent, and retain it in and the sheriff must retain custody of the seized property for at least five
his custody. If the property or any part thereof be concealed in a building days.23 Hence, the act of Andres in delivering the seized vehicles
or enclosure, the sheriff must demand its delivery, and if it be not immediately after seizure to Silver for whatever purpose, without
delivered, he must cause the building or enclosure to be broken open observing the five-day requirement finds no legal justification.
and take the property into his possession. After the sheriff has taken
possession of the property as herein provided, he must keep it in a In Pardo v. Velasco, this Court held that: 'Respondent as an officer of the
secure place and shall be responsible for its delivery to the party entitled Court is charged with certain ministerial duties which must be performed
thereto upon receiving his fees and necessary expenses for taking and faithfully to the letter. Every provision in the Revised Rules of Court has a
keeping the same. specific reason or objective. In this case, the purpose of the five (5) days
is to give a chance to the defendant to object to the sufficiency of the
SEC. 6. Disposition of property by sheriff. - If within five (5) days after bond or the surety or sureties thereon or require the
the taking of the property by the sheriff, the adverse party does not return of the property by filing a counterbond.'
object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon;
or if the adverse party so objects and the court affirms its approval of the In Sebastian v. Valino, this Court reiterated that: Under the Revised Rules
applicant's bond or approves a new bond, or if the adverse party of Court, the property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered
requires the return of the property but his bond is objected to and found immediately to the plaintiff. The sheriff must retain it in his custody for five
insufficient and he does not forthwith file an approved bond, the property days and he shall return it to the defendant, if the latter,
shall be delivered to the applicant. If for any reason the property is not as in the instant case, requires its return and files a counterbond.'
delivered to the applicant, the sheriff must return it to the adverse party.
Likewise, Andres' claim that he had no knowledge that the compound is
First, the rules provide that property seized under a writ of replevin is not owned by Silver fails to convince us. Regardless of who actually owns the
to be delivered immediately to the plaintiff.22 In accordance with the compound, the fact remains that Andres delivered the vehicles to Silver
said rules, Andres should have waited no less than five days in order to prematurely. It violates the rule requiring him to safekeep the vehicles in
give the complainant an opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the his custody. The alleged lack of facility to store the seized vehicles is
bond or of the surety or sureties thereon, or require the return of the unacceptable considering that he should have deposited the same in a
seized motor vehicles by filing a counter-bond. This, he failed to do. bonded warehouse. If this was not feasible, he should have sought prior
authorization from the court issuing the writ before delivering the vehicles
Records show that Andres took possession of two of the subject motor to Silver.
vehicles on October 17, 2005, four on October 18, 2005, and another
three on October 19, 2005. Simultaneously, as evidenced by the Second, it must be stressed that from the moment an order of delivery in
depository receipts, on October 18, 2005, Silver received from Andres six replevin is executed by taking possession of the property specified
of the seized motor vehicles, and three more motor vehicles on October therein, such property is in custodia legis. As legal custodian, it is
19, 2005. Consequently, there is no question that Silver was already in Andres' duty to safekeep the seized motor vehicles. Hence, when he
possession of the nine seized vehicles immediately after seizure, or no
When you read Rule 41, you are left hanging because the process is not As to Section 1 of this rule, there is no need to memorize because the
yet done. The continuation of Rule 41 is Rule 44 (Ordinary Appealed enumeration is not exclusive. Just remember the five (5) tribunals whose
Cases). decisions and final orders must go up only to the Supreme Court. All the
rest is with the CA.
This is a kind of appeal from the RTC to the Court of Appeals when the Note that upon elevation of the records from the RTC to the CA, the CA
former court exercises appellate jurisdiction. will notify also the appellant that the records are already with them. Upon
this notice, the appellant is supposed to submit an appellant‘s brief. Rule
The best example of this rule is an unlawful detainer case because such 44 tells you as to what should constitute an appellant‘s brief which is
case is originally cognizable by the MTC. Hence you appeal to the RTC mandatory.
then you go up on a petition for review, in which case you avail of Rule
42. Section 7. Appellant's brief. — It shall be the duty of the appellant to file
with the court, within forty-five (45) days from receipt of the notice of the
**This is just a reading matter.** clerk that all the evidence, oral and documentary, are attached to the
record, seven (7) copies of his legibly typewritten, mimeographed or
printed brief, with proof of service of two (2) copies thereof upon the
RULE 43: APPEALS FROM QUASI-JUDICIAL AGENCIES TO THE appellee.
COURT OF APPEALS
Section 13. Contents of appellant's brief. — The appellant's brief shall
The CTA is no longer covered by this rule pursuant to RA 9282 which contain, in the order herein indicated, the following:
elevated said court to the level of the Court of Appeals.
1. A subject index of the matter in the brief with a digest of the arguments
From quasi-judicial bodies, you go up to the CA. This is not by notice of and page references, and a table of cases alphabetically arranged,
appeal or by record on appeal but rather, by petition for review. textbooks and statutes cited with references to the pages where they
are cited;
Pleading-wise, this is the same as Rule 42 as to content of the petition for
review. 1. An assignment of errors intended to be urged, which errors shall be
separately, distinctly and concisely stated without repetition and
Section 12. Effect of appeal. — The appeal shall not stay the award, numbered consecutively;
judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the
1) Under the heading "Argument," the appellant's arguments on each Example: You have a copy of the TSN which consists of 105 pages. If
assignment of error with page references to the record. The you look over the records of the case as transmitted to the clerk of court
authorities relied upon shall be cited by the page of the report at of the CA, you will see that your pages 1-50 are not necessarily
which the case begins and the page of the report on which the numbered the in same way as the official records. If you are preparing
citation is found; your appellant‘s brief, you make notations/foot notes. If your foot notes
will follow the paging in your own copy, said notations will not match the
1) Under the heading "Relief," a specification of the order or judgment records of the case such that when the judge reads your brief and finds
which the appellant seeks; and that your references are not correct, he will simply dismiss your case.
1. In cases not brought up by record on appeal, the appellant's brief Trivia: The ordinary market price now for an appellant’s brief is
shall contain, as an appendix, a copy of the judgment or final order P50,000.00.
appealed from.
Under Rule 44, upon receipt of your notice, you have forty-five (45) days
On the basis of Sec. 13, this order must be strictly to prepare an appellant‘s brief (Sec. 7, Rule 44), copy furnished the
followed: subject index statement of the case statement of appellee who has the same period within which to file his appellee‘s brief.
the facts issues argumentations The appellant, if he wants to, within twenty (20) days from receipt of the
prayer appellee‘s brief, may submit a reply brief.
Non-compliance with this order is a ground for dismissal pursuant to Section 8. Appellee's brief. — Within forty-five (45) days from receipt of
Sec.1(f), Rule 50. the appellant's brief, the appellee shall file with the court seven (7) copies
of his legibly typewritten, mimeographed or printed brief, with proof of
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — An appeal may be service of two (2) copies thereof upon the appellant.
dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the
appellee, on the following grounds: Section 9. Appellant's reply brief. — Within twenty (20) days from
receipt of the appellee's brief, the appellant may file a reply brief
xxx xxx xxx answering points in the appellee's brief not covered in his main brief.
For purposes of the bar, there are three (3) exceptions and they are the What is important is to consider the requirement that you can only avail of
remedies against a decision of the following: this when you were not able to avail of the precedent remedies and you
2. Writ of Amparo (2007) are not at fault for not availing of them. Otherwise, you cannot avail of
3. Writ of Habeas Data (2008) annulment of judgments.
4. Writ of Kalikasan (2012)
These prerogative writs are also appealable to the Supreme Court under What are the limitations?
Rule 45 but on both questions of fact and law.
Note that the effect of these two (2) remedies against an executory
judgment are different.
If you are granted petition for relief from judgment (Rule 38), what
happens? The judgment is set aside or vacated then you have trial de
novo. Take note that this trial is not the presentation of the case all over
again. Rather, it is only for those which are relevant to the issues that
have been set aside.