On Ethnography: Storytelling or Science?

Author(s): Robert Aunger

Source: Current Anthropology, Vol. 36, No. 1, Special Issue: Ethnographic Authority and
Cultural Explanation (Feb., 1995), pp. 97-130
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of Wenner-Gren Foundation for
Anthropological Research
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CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume36, NumberI, FebruaryI995
? I995 byThe Wenner-Gren
FoundationforAnthropological
Research.All rightsreserved
On Ethnography
or Science?'
Storytelling
by RobertAunger
Thereare two basic analyticalapproachesin social research.The
first,usingformalmethods(e.g.,standardstatisticalanalysis),ag-
gregatesoverthe attributes ofindividualcases to determine the
influenceofabstracteffects on events.This approach,whichre-
sultsin correlations betweenvariables,is unableto provideade-
quate causal explanationsforwhathappensin particularcases.
The interpretive approach,in contrast,
or narrative aggregates
overeventsto tracethe causal development ofa singlecase. This
typeofanalysiscannotbe made reflexive (i.e.,cannotaccountex-
plicitlyfortheintersubjective natureofdata collectionproce-
duresin humanstudies).Thus each method,byitself,is problem-
atic.Therehave been a numberofattemptsto combinethetwo
approachesin a singletheoretical framework. However,because
theconstituent approachesare fundamentally different
in their
ontologicaland epistemological stances,theproposedreconcilia-
tionsremainforced.This paperoutlinesa strategy thatsequen-
tiallyutilizesbothapproaches, preserving theirindependent and
complementary virtues,whileproviding formallinksthatallow
theresultsofone approachto informuse oftheotherdirectly.
It is hopedthatpracticeofthistwo-stepmethodwill dissipate
some oftherecentdoubtsaboutthevalue ofethnographic field-
work.
ROBERT AUNGER iS NationalInstitute ofMentalHealthPostdoc-
toralFellowin Cultureand MentalHealthin the Committeeon
HumanDevelopment,University ofChicago(5730 S. Woodlawn
Ave.,Chicago,Ill. 60637, U.S.A.).Bornin I955, he was educated
at theUniversityofSouthFlorida(B.A.,I976), theUniversity of
SouthernCalifornia(Master'sin UrbanPlanning,i982), and the
UniversityofCaliforniaat Los Angeles(Ph.D., i992). He has
beena lecturerin theUniversity ofChicagoDepartmentofPsy-
chology.His researchinterestsare culturalevolution,social orga-
nizationin preagriculturalsocieties,theanthropology ofreligion,
culturalpsychology, and ethnographic and analyticalmethods.
Amonghis publicationsare "The NutritionalConsequencesof
RejectingFood in theIturiForestofZaire" (HumanEcology2o:
263-9i), "Sources of Variation in EthnographicInterviewData:
FoodAvoidancesin theIturiForest,Zaire" (Ethnology 33:65-99),
"AreFoodAvoidancesMaladaptivein theIturiForestofZaire?"
(JournalofAnthropological Research,in press),and,withRobert
and SexuallyTransmitted
C. Bailey,"Sexuality,Infertility, Dis-
ease amongFarmersand Foragersin CentralAfrica,"in Sexual
Nature/SexualCulture,editedbyPaul R. Abramsonand Steven
D. Pinkerton (Chicago:University ofChicagoPress,in press).
The presentpaperwas submittedin finalformi vi 94.
i. I thankRobertBailey,Gillian Bentley,RobertBoyd,Malcoln
Dow, andRichardShwederforcarefulreadingsofan earlierversioi
ofthe manuscriptand AndrewAbbott,GillianBentley,Malcoln
Dow, and AnneO'Neill forreadingthecurrentone. This researcl
was supported fellowshipfromtheNationalIn
by a postdoctoral
stituteofMentalHealth,a NationalScienceFoundationDoctora
DissertationImprovement Grant,and grantsfromthe Universit,
ofCalifornia,theInstituteforHumaneStudies,and SigmaXi.
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OOII-3204/95/360i-0005$2.50
Historyis the studyof,the explanationof,thepar-
ticular as it reallyhappened in the past. Social sci-
ence is the statementof the universalset ofrules by
which human/social behavioris explained.
This is the famous distinctionbetweenidio-
graphicand nomotheticmodes of analysis, which
are consideredto be antithetical.... Thoughunder-
taken separately,differently and fordissimilar(even
opposing)purposes,it would be fruitful forthe
world of scholarshipto combine the two modes.
IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN,
"World-SystemsAnalysis"
A crisis of confidencehas recentlyarisen in ethnogra-
phy.As newergenerationsofanthropologists have revis-
ited sites studied earlier by other ethnographers,dis-
agreements about the interpretationof particular
cultureshave begun to occur. Previously,the authority
of an ethnographicreportwas assumed to be, and effec-
tivelywas, inviolate because of the lack of alternative
viewpoints on a particular cultural group. However,
Freeman's(I983) widelypublicized attack on the valid-
ityofMead's (i928) interpretation ofSamoan adolescent
sexuality vividly broughtto attentionthe possibility
that differentanthropologistscould come to opposite
conclusions about the same society.
This recognitionhas led ethnographersto examine
theirmethodsmoreclosely,subjecting"anthropological
thoughtitselfto ethnographicdescriptionand ethnolog-
ical understanding"(Scholte I974:437). In particular,a
school critical of traditional ethnographyhas begun
looking at ethnographiesas texts to determinehow
these documentscreatean "objective" representation of
otherlifewaysin the minds ofreaders(forexamples,see
Fabian I983,ManganaroI990, Marcus and FischerI986,
Sanjek I990, van Maanen I988). I will call these critics
"textualists"because most of them draw theirinspira-
tion fromthe hermeneutictraditionoftextualcriticism
in the humanities.The generalupshot of the textualist
critique has been increased attention to the way in
which the ethnographer'sfieldexperienceis translated
into an ethnographicreportand a new degreeof aware-
ness about the way in which ethnographiesare con-
structed.The textualistshave arguedthatclassic ethno-
graphies incorporate linguistic devices that tend to
obscure the uncertain and personal nature of ethno-
graphicstatementsregarding particularfeaturesofsocial
lifeor culturalbeliefin the groupunderstudy(e.g.,Clif-
fordI983, Geertz I988). Because it is difficultto know
whetherethnographicstatementsare based on anything
more than personal impressions,many ethnographies
are convincingonly to the degreethatthe ethnographer
has mastered rhetoric(as shown by the fact that the
most respectedethnographers tend to be the best writ-
ers). The textualistsargue that once readersare aware
of the use of such linguisticdevices, ethnographicau-
thoritycan no longerbe achievedby such methods(Bak-
ker i992:40):
97
98 1 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 36, Number i, February1995
To summarizethe problemof anthropological
knowledge[:]... socioculturalrealitypresentsitself
to the anthropologistin fragmented bits and pieces.
The outcome of fieldworkis verymuch dependent
on the cooperationof the participants,on manyun-
controllablepracticalfactors,and on the personal
whose own sociocul-
qualities of the anthropologist,
turalframeworksubstantiallyscreensthe knowledge
thathe produces.This all implies that the knowl-
edge producedin the fieldis necessarilyincomplete,
distorted,tentative,speculative,and thus essentially
contestable.When put down in writing,this knowl-
edge cannot be separatedfromthe way it is pre-
sentedin the text.In lightof the absence of "hard"
criteria,a lack of independentinformation, and a
body of generallyaccepted anthropologicalknowl-
edge,this raises the question of to what extentplau-
sibilityequals rhetoricaland stylisticpersuasion.
Many textualiststhereforeclaim that the classic in-
terpretation of ethnographicdescriptionsas "objective"
representations of otherways of lifemust be abandoned
altogether(e.g.,Marcus I986). How, then,can new gen-
erationsofethnographers reporton theirstudiesofother
cultures?
At minimum,it is clear that ethnographerscan no
longerobscurewhethera statementis a literal,unedited
transcription of an informant'sspeech,a "freeindirect"
translation(SperberI985) of what an informantsaid, or
the ethnographer'sown opinion. The textualistcritics
have suggested that ethnographicmaterials should
thereforebe presentedin the formin which theywere
elicited.Forexample,Marcus and Fischer(i986) and Ro-
saldo (I989) advocate an "experimentalethnography"
that juxtaposes in the document autobiographicalre-
counting of fieldworkexperiences,multiple narrative
voices,transcriptions ofhistoricaltexts,and so on. Since
the constructionofthe documentreflectsthe inherently
fragmentary nature of the object it is to represent,this
pastiche of primarymaterialsshould jar the readerinto
an unconscious acknowledgmentof the variable condi-
tions under which such materialshave been produced
(e.g.,Marcus I986:I68). The ethnographer, havingpub-
lished all of this materialin relativelyundigestedform,
leaves readersto come to theirown conclusions,prefera-
bly througha sympatheticemotional responseinspired
by the experienceofreadingthe ethnography (e.g.,Tyler
I986). In effect,the textualistscontendthat because of
the intrinsicallyinterpersonalnatureofall human stud-
ies, a scientificapproach to ethnographyis impossible
(Clifford and Marcus I986). Is this direconclusionreally
necessary?
I argue that it is not. To bolsterthis argument,I de-
velop in this paper a rigorousapproachto the analysis
ofprimaryethnographicdata.2Having examineda series
2. Wolcott(I994) arguesthattherearethreestagesin theresearch thelessable to determine independently on whatbasis interpreta-
process:description, Butthereis also tionsare made and henceto whatdegreetheywill concedethose
analysis,and interpretation.
a previousstep of researchdesign,duringwhich the researcher interpretations. As a result,theethnographer's pointofview does
definesa domainofresearch, a goalorresearchquestion,anddeter- notprecludeor preemptthoseofreaders.
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of responses to the textualistcritique of "realist" eth-
nography,I arguethat a particulartwo-stepapproachis
necessaryand sufficientto providea scientificexplana-
tion of processes affectingculturaldomains.
Reflexivity,Formal Methods,
and Methodological Situationalism
The textualist critique has substance; ethnographers
cannot simplyproceed as before.Any responseto this
critiquewhich purportsto resultin a scientificapproach
to ethnographicdescriptionmust thereforemeet both
the textualistchallenge and the requirementsof scien-
tificanalysis.
First,we must acknowledgethebruntofthetextualist
critique:because ofthe interpersonalnatureofdata col-
lection in human studies, ethnographicresearchmust
be reflexive.This somewhatslipperytermrose to promi-
nence in the wake of the Freeman/Meaddebate over
ethnographicpractice,when it was recognizedthat the
reader'sabilityto interpretthe quality of ethnographic
statementsmust be increasedby clues to the originand
natureof ethnographicstatementsprovidedin the eth-
nographicdocumentitself."Reflexiveknowledge,then,
containsnot only messages, but also informationas to
how it came into being, the process by which it was
and Rubyi982:2).
obtained"(Meyerhoff
However, because my goal is to develop a scientific
approachto ethnographicresearch,I use the termsome-
what differently fromthe textualists,who have tended
to believe thatrecognitionof the variablequalityofpri-
marydata requiresan abandonmentof analysis in favor
ofthe "honest" (i.e., unmanipulated)presentationofba-
sic materials. Reflexivityforthem consists in the pre-
sentation of "raw" ethnographicmaterial, which in-
volves the reader more closely in the ethnographic
experience.However, a readerlacking firsthandexperi-
ence with the groupunderstudycannot supplythe eth-
nographer'sinsight.Therefore,the ethnographer cannot
simply leave the reader to contributethe analysis but
has the obligationto interpretethnographicmaterials.3
As a consequence,I emphasizereflexivity as an aspect of
mineswhatconceptsarerelevantto thatdomain(MilesandHuber-
man I994:i6). In ethnography this requiresthatthe set of emic
categories(includinglinguistically
unmarked ones)relevanttothat
domainbe elicited.Ethnoscientific methods(Wellerand Romney
i987) can be used forthispurpose.I am not concerned herewith
theresearchdesignsteporwiththefinalstepin research, interpre-
tation,whichis necessarilyindividualized.
3. Textualistsoftenincludefirsthand narrativesas someportionof
theirethnographic account,placedside by side withothertextual
material,in ordernot to privilegethe ethnographer'sviewpoint.I
argue,on thecontrary, thattheethnographer's interpretations
are
privilegedbecauseoffirsthand acquaintancewiththesubjectmat-
terofthereport.Ifa reflexive approachis used,readersarenever-

analysis ratherthan ofpresentationin the ethnographic
documents.4
In particular,I argue that analysis can be undertaken
in ethnographyas long as analytic methods explicitly
take into account the means by which the data were
collected.Thus, analysismust allow forthe factthatthe
data elicitationprocess itself,as well as circumstantial
aspects of the data collection situation,can influence
what informantssay or do. The fact that social action
is intersubjective requiresa considerationofmanyinter-
personalinfluencesas well as otheraspects ofthe situa-
tionat the time ofobservation.I therefore maintainthat
it is necessaryto specifyfullythe contextof the data
collectioneventin the analysisthroughmethodological
situationalism (Knorr-CetinaI98I). This second crite-
rion foran acceptable ethnographicapproach,a situa-
tionalist perspective,acknowledges that human social
behavioris contextualizedboth in time and space and
withrespectto the simultaneousaction ofotherindivid-
uals. Methodological situationalism can be distin-
guished from methodological individualism, which
holds that no phenomena emerge in the context of a
social interactionthat cannot be reducedto the charac-
teristicsof the individualswho partookin thatinterac-
tion (Rhoads I 99 I: I I 8). It is also distinctfrommethod-
ological collectivism, which argues that referenceto
individualmental constructsor behaviorsis superfluous
because humans are merelythe passive instrumentsof
social-structural
processes (Ritzer I992:79). Where
methodologicalindividualism allows only for human
agencyand methodologicalcollectivismonly forsocial
institutionaldetermination,methodologicalsituation-
alism allows forboth. It "locates knowledgeneitherin
someone's head, as solipsistsdo, nor in an externaland
observer-independent universe.. . as objectivistsor nat-
ural scientists. .. insiston, nor in text,as manyherme-
neuticiansand discourseanalystsargue,but in an essen-
tially circular social practice involving perceiving,
thinking and acting (including languaging) beings"
(Krippendorff
I99I:II5-I6).
My requirementthat an approachbe scientificplaces
additionalconstraintson ethnographic practice.A scien-
tificstudymust meet two methodologicalcriteria:the
researchermust use (and report)an explicitmethodfor
making inferencesfromprimarydata and a means of
assessingthe natureand quality of data priorto the in-
ferencestep.5 Otherwise, inferencesare made froma
flimsy foundation that may affect the conclusions
reached.Unless such steps are takenin thepresentation
of ethnographicmaterials,it becomes extremelydiffi-
4. Anotheraspectofreflexivity-heightened consciousnessabout
personalexperience through self-reflection theeth-
priorto writing
nographic account-is notexcludedeitherbymyinterpretation or
bythatofthetextualists.
5. "Primary data"willbe takenas anyinformation directlyelicited
frominformants, whetherresponsesto questions(whichmayin-
cludereportsofbehaviorat othertimesandplaces)ordirectobser-
vationofinformants' behavior.I meanto excludefromthisdefini-
tionanyfirst-orderinferencethatmightbe containedin fieldnotes,
as well as thenotionthatprimary data are themselves"text."
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AUNGER Ethnography:Storytellingor Science? I 99
cult forreadersto comparealternativeclaims about cul-
tural facts,a problem made obvious by the Freeman/
Mead debate (for overviews see Holmes I987, Caton
I990, Foersteland Gilliami992).
Data qualityis typicallymeasuredin termsofits reli-
ability.I will adoptWhite's (I990: i o) definitionofreli-
abilityhere: "Reliabilityconcernswhat is repeatablein
measurement,such as different measuresofan attribute,
or different repetitionsof the same measure of an attri-
bute. It is a genericconcept,referring to the accuracy
(equivalenceand stability)ofmeasurementwithina par-
ticularcontextofreplication,includingboththepopula-
tion studied and those engaged in doing the study."
From this perspective,reliabilityis a measure of how
likely it is that similar conditionswill give rise to the
same observation.White argues that this is a function
not just of the phenomenonbeing observedbut of the
effectobservationitself has on the nature of what is
observed.This is similarto the textualistcriterionthat
ethnographic representationreflecttheinterpersonal na-
tureof fieldwork.
Since most ethicalobservationsofpeople involvesub-
jects' being aware of probes for information,observa-
tions on such subjects are likely to reflectthe factthat
theythemselveshave at least partialcontroloverwhat
is observed.The methodologicalproblemin the human
sciences thereforeconsists in isolatingthe effectof the
observerfromwhat is observedwithin the situational
contextdefinedabove. For this purpose,an "impartial"
intermediary is required.This is a functionthatformal
analyticalmethodsare designedto handle.A thirdcrite-
rionis therefore thatformalmethodsbe used to analyze
data. Such methodsinclude any procedurewhich looks
forpatternsin data and has an outcome not predeter-
mined by the investigator.Fulfillmentof these criteria
almost always involves some formof reductionof the
originalcomplexityof the data. Mere managementof
data is thus not a formalmethod by this definition.A
dominanttypeofformalmethodis quantitativeanalysis
using standardstatisticalmodels. However,this defini-
tion would also include a varietyof exploratorydata
analysis and some data presentation methods (e.g.,
graphicdisplaysof spatiallyrepresenteddata). All such
methods are analytic in the etymologicalsense: cases
are brokeninto theirconstituentpartsbut onlyin order
to explain the ways in which theyfittogether;interpre-
tationis requiredto understandwhyonlycertainamong
the possible configurationsof parts are realized in the
world.
Formalmethodsbased on an explicittreatmentofthe
situationin which data collection occurs can actually
take advantage of the intersubjectivenature of social
events.As longas the collectionprotocolfeaturesa vari-
etyofrelationshipsbetweenobserversand subjects,sim-
ilar (i.e.,replicated)eventscan be compared.This allows
the analyticalprocedureto distinguishthose aspects of
eventsdue to social interactionsthemselvesfromthose
due to backgroundconditions (i.e., nonsocial causes
such as physical aspects of the world at the time and
the privatemotivationsof the participants).Since the
IOO I CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 36, Number I, February1995
way in which the elicitationprocess itselfbiases obser-
vations is ascertained,the observedphenomenonis ef-
fectivelydivided into its observer-or situation-derived
and subject-basedaspects.6
Through the use of such methods, ethnographers
(much less readers)need not infersignificantpatterns
and processes directlyfrom undigested data. Formal
methodscan assist in the interpretation of data through
theirabilityto discriminatepatternsin complex data-
sets. Such methods forceresearchersto deal with the
output of a determinantprocedureand to bringabout
some conformity betweenwhat theprocedurestell them
and what theirexpectationssuggestedpriorto the analy-
sis, althoughthe typesofpatternsto be soughtare deter-
mined by the researcher,guided by theoreticalexpec-
tations and the ethnographicinsight gained through
personalexperiencein the field.
Thus, at minimumthreecriteriamust be met by any
approach to ethnographicresearch that is consistent
with both textualistconcernsand scientificstandards:
analyticalmethods must be both reflexiveand formal,
and the frameworkforanalysis must be situationalist.
Science: The ReflexiveAnalyticalApproach
What I call the "reflexiveanalytical" approach,because
of its emphasis on reflexivityin an analyticalapproach
to ethnographicdescription,is based on the concept of
a "data collection situation." This concept providesa
situationalistfocus forthe developmentof appropriate
data collection methods and analysis. For example, in
the case of interviewing,the data collection situation
involvesa recognitionthat thereare two active partici-
pants,the interviewerand the informant(each ofwhom
has a number of relevant characteristics),nonrandom
contextual factorssuch as emotional holdovers from
previoussocial encountersbetweenthe interviewerand
informant, and morerandomfactorssuch as theweather
(BriggsI986, Mishler I986). Responses to questions can
thenbe modeledas theresultofa wide varietyoffactors,
rangingfrominformants'privatebeliefsto theirstrate-
gic decisionmakingabout whetherto revealtheir"true"
opinions,miscommunicatedmeanings,and more spuri-
ous influencessuch as distractingeventsin the vicinity
of the interview.
If ethnographicdata analysis is to rely on formal
methods,then data collectionproceduresmust in most
cases themselveschange to reflectthe requirementsof
such methods.Unfortunately, duringthe recentbout of
self-examinationby ethnographers, little attentionhas
been directedto data collection methods.The textual-
ists' solutions involve "not . . . betterways of doing
fieldwork,but different(better?)ways of writingeth-
6. Somewillarguethatthisdivisionis an abstractone,thatevents-
in-the-worldcannot be disaggregated along such lines except
throughsuch artificialmeans as a statisticaltest. This is true
enough,but,as I will arguelater,it is a necessaryfirststepin the 7. Valuesquotedhereare averagedforthetwotypesofdifferences
processofisolatingthe causal processesofrealinterest.
in responsesdistinguished
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aographies" (Wolf I992:I36). Their argumenthas pro-
zeeded on the implicit assumption that ethnographers
3houldcontinue to rely on participantobservationand
the interviewingof key informants.As a result, the
3earchforsolutionsto the problemof ethnographicrep-
resentationhas been unnecessarilylimited. But if, for
=xample,standardstatisticalmodels are to be used, sam-
ple sizes sufficientto allow the statisticalisolation of
the various factorsassumed to cause the phenomenon
:f interestmust be collected. Variabilityin each of the
Eactorsidentifiedby the particularspecificationof the
lata collection situation must also be introducedinto
thedata collectionprotocolin orderto isolate the influ-
:nce ofthosefactors.In the case ofinterview-based data,
thismeans, forexample,the use of multipleinterview-
-rs.Thus, the reflexiveanalyticalapproachcombines(i)
the introductionof variabilityinto each aspect of the
datacollectionprotocol,(2) multivariatestatisticalanal-
ysis (to isolate the many aspects of the data collection
3ituationthat can influenceobservations),and (3) the
[ncorporation ofelicitationeffectsinto the analysis (i.e.,
reflexivity).
An example will make the qualities of the reflexive
analyticalapproach clearer. In a study of food-related
beliefsamonghorticulturalists and foragerslivingin the
[turiForestof northeasternZaire (AungerI994a), inter-
views were repeated on 65 informantsusing different
:ombinationsofinterviewers, in all cases employingthe
3ame structuredinterviewformat.Some of the inter-
viewerswere members of the local population. Infor-
mnants were questionedwith respectto theirfoodavoid-
ances concerning I40 differentanimals. I used the
reflexiveanalytical approach to develop a multivariate
modelthatwas thenestimatedusinglogisticregression.
rhis allowed me to partitionthe likelihood that an in-
Eormantwould make differentresponses to the same
luestion (whichhappenedin about 2o% of cases) to the
Eollowingfactors: I4% to interviewereffects,I3% to
interactions betweeninformantand interviewercharac-
teristics,and 73% to aspects ofinformant cognitivevari-
ition (53% to knowledge-basedcognitive variability,
r9% to reasoningor ability-baseddifferences between
informants, and i % to memoryor recall effects).7 A par-
ticularlyintriguingresult was that, despite language
luency and a year of previous field experience,I per-
Eormedless reliablythan the native interviewers,sug-
gestingthat culturalbackgroundis an importantdeter-
minantof the abilityto elicit replicableresponsesfrom
informants. I also foundthat the reliabilityof different
luestions was the single most importantdeterminant
Dfvariabilityin ethnographicinterviewresponses(36%,
:onsidered to reflectvariabilityin informantknowl-
-dge).Finally,the overall significanceof the statistical
modelsindicated that a considerableproportionof the
variabilityobservedin responseswas not explained.by,
the model. This suggests that unspecifiedsituational
in Aunger(I994a).

factorswere also importantinfluenceson informantre
sponses. In fact,everysituational factorconsideredb'
the reflexiveanalytical approach was clearlyindicates
as being significantin this study.8
Basingthe reflexiveanalyticalapproachon a data col
lection situationmakes it easily generalizableto a vari
etyofdata collectiontechniques.Forexample,responses
to a writtenquestionnairecan be seen as formallyequiv
alent to a social interactionwith a "passive" inter
viewer, since the researchereffectivelyserves as ai
"interviewer-once-removed" when devising the ques
tionnaire.Further,little modificationof the approacl
would be necessary to deal with ethological behavio.
observations
(TinbergenI 9 5 I, LorenzI 9 5O) ortimeallo
cationstudies(GrossI984, JohnsonI975), since sucl
proceduresinvolve directobservationand hence socia
interactionbetween the researcherand the subject al
the time of sampling.The only kind of data collectiot
procedurenot readilyamenable to treatmentusing th(
reflexiveanalyticalapproachis ad hoc methodssuch a,
participantobservationwhich do not involvereplication
of at least some aspects of observations.
Data collectedusing a givenregimemust thenbe ana
lyzedin a fashionthatdiscriminatesbetweenthepurel,
methodologicalvariabilityin observationsand those as
pects that are representativeof the subject. This wil
generallyrequireuse of statisticalmethodsfordata re
duction. Qualitative analytical methods which simpll
representdata-including taxonomictrees,sociograms
and otherdiagrammaticforms-cannot characterizeth(
contextin which the data were collectedas a constrain,
on the outcome ofthe analysis.While thereare rigorous
rules for producingsuch representations,neither th(
identitiesof observersnor otheraspects of the data col
lection situation can be made to appear as representa
tional elements.
As in the example mentionedabove,thereflexiveana
lyticalapproachcan be formalizedusinggeneralizedlin.
ear models (see McCullagh and Nelder I989). These
models extendwell-knownlinearregressiontechnique!
and analysis of variance to logistic regressionand log-
linear models, as well as multivariatedummy-variable
regression(Del Pino I989). The reflexive analytical
approachcan also be easily implementedusing hierar.
chical linear models (Bryk and Raudenbush i992,
GoldsteinI987, Hox and KreftI994) and less familiai
data reductiontechniquesforcategoricalvariablessuch
as loglinear models and optimal scaling (see Agrest:
I990, GifiI990, Wellerand RomneyI990).
In many cases, however,ethnographers have not col.
lectedlargesamples (i.e., over ioo observations)ofrepre.
sentative data that would be amenable to treatmeni
with standard multivariate statistical methods. This
may suggestthat implementationof the reflexiveana.
lytical approach is restrictedin its applicabilityand
to treatthesefactorstogether
8. It is important in orderto deter-
minetheirrelativesignificance in a givencase. Formoresubstan-
tive analysesusingthe reflexiveanalyticalapproach,see Aunger
(I994a, b; n.d.).
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AUNGER Ethnography: or Science?I IO
Storytelling
much more "expensive" than traditionalethnographic
research. It is true that the approach includes some
novel elements(e.g.,use ofmultipleobservers)thatcan-
not be avoided. However,largersamples become neces-
saryonlyas the numberoffactorsto be analyzedsimul-
taneouslyincreases,and randomsamplingis necessary
only if the ethnographer wants to generalizeresultsto
a largerpopulation(represented by the sample) or to use
methodswhich assume an underlyingdistribution(i.e.,
parametricstatistical techniques such as generalized
linearmodels).Ethnographers may simplywish to deter-
mine what can be said about the sample itself,in which
case nonparametricstatisticaltechniques(i.e., testsnot
based on restrictiveassumptions concerningvariable
distributions)can be used. These techniques make the
reflexiveanalyticalapproachmore readilyapplicable to
the kinds of data traditionallycollected by ethnogra-
phers.
Further,the power and varietyof available nonpara-
metrictechniqueshave recentlyincreasedsignificantly
with the developmentof computer-intensive random-
izationprocedures(EdgingtonI987). These methodspro-
vide significancetestsfordata thatwere collectedwith-
out referenceto particularsamplingmethods(although
the resultingtest values are specificto the sample). Be-
cause no referenceis made to specificgeneratingpro-
cesses forthevariableofinterest,the distributionofval-
ues must be foundempirically.Computersare generally
used to permutedata values randomlyin orderto gener-
ate a new dataset of equal size. The relevanttest value
is calculated forthis new dataset. These steps are then
repeateda sufficiently largenumberoftimes to produce
an adequate sample of test values. Finally,the signifi-
cance ofthe testvariablecan be calculatedas thepropor-
tion ofgeneratedvalues thatfallto one or the otherside
of that measuredin the dataset actually observed.
Randomizationproceduresare a fundamentalaspect
of combinatorialassignment methods, an integrative
frameworkfornonparametricdata analysis that consti-
tutes an alternativeto standardstatisticalanalysis (Hu-
bert I987). The simplest formulationin this suite of
techniques,the linearassignmentmodel,can be used to
compare data vectors (i.e., stringsof data values). The
classic vector comparisonproblem is determiningthe
correlationor covariationbetweenvariables(as in analy-
sis ofvarianceor the nonparametricKruskal-Wallistest)
or betweensamples of the same variable(e.g.,the t test
or the Mann-Whitneytest). The linear assignment
model thus coversmuch ofthe same groundas standard
nonparametrictests and generalizedlinear models.
The quadraticassignmentmodel is an excitingdevel-
opment because it provides significancetests for the
structuralsimilaritybetweendifferent two-dimensional
data matrices(fullysatisfactory parametricmethodsfor
comparing matrices have not been developed). This
method providesa measure of the degreeof similarity
between the association patternsseen in two or more
distance matrices. Quadratic assignmentcan thus be
seen as a generalizationof the chi-squaretest, which
looks fornonrandompatternswithina data matrix(i.e.,
I021 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 36, Number i, February1995
an association between categories of two variables).
Methods forfindingsimilaritybetween the structural
patternsin higher-dimensioned matricesare also avail-
able. In general,these combinatorialassignmentmeth-
ods use the resamplingproceduresdescribedabove to
generatemultiple derived datasets on which the rele-
vant statisticaltest is performed.This will produce an
empirical distributionof test values fromwhich the
likelihoodof the observedvalue can be determined.
These computer-intensive approaches-made feasible
by recentincreases in affordablecomputerpower-are
both more general and more realistic formost ethno-
graphicdata than the generalizedlinear model because
they allow the rigorousanalysis of complex problems
that would be difficultor inappropriateto treatunder
standarddistributionalassumptions.Further,an impor-
tant virtue of these "permutation"approachesis that,
unlike nonlineartechniques such as clusteranalysis or
scaling,theyprovidea means to assess the likelihoodof
observedoutcomes.
Any such statistical modeling has several virtues
when applied to ethnographicresearch.First,a natural
interpretation ofreliabilityis builtinto such procedures.
Reliabilitycan be measured as the likelihood that an
observationwill be repeated,which, in turn,is a func-
tion of the probabilitythat the observationwas correct
the firsttime (i.e., not due to measurementerror).Since
specifyingthe criteriaforrepeatabilityof the recorded
event is what permitsassessment of the probabilityof
measurementerror,the estimationofan appropriatesta-
tisticalmodel,when reflexive,accomplishesthe goal of
determiningdata reliability.Second, throughthe use of
reflexivestatisticalmodels, a formof validationof the
researchcan be achieved.Validationis a questionnot of
measurementbut of appropriateness:does the variable
in question measure what theorysuggestsis the factor
of interest?By excludingconfoundingfactors,the con-
text of assessment is constrained,and questions about
the legitimacyof the variable measured are reduced.
Thus, specifyingthe experimentalconditionsforrepli-
cation can providethe basis forvalidation of measure-
ment as well. The investmentrequiredto complete a
reflexiveanalytical ethnographyis not trivial.The re-
flexiveanalytical approach certainlyrequiresmore de-
tailed data than usual in traditionalethnographicprac-
tice, and fieldworkis reformulatedto some extent.
Nevertheless,the resultsof the empiricalstudyon food
avoidances mentionedabove suggestthat the complete
specificationofthe data collectionsituationis necessary
to determinethe quality of primaryethnographicdata.
Because this approachis reflexive,it satisfiesthe ex-
plicit demands of the textualistcritique of traditional
ethnographicpractice and thereforerepresentsan ad-
vance over earlierpractice.9As a result,the abandon-
9. Doubtsmayremainaboutwhetherreflexivity as treatedin this ferent"partialities"are themselvessituated:each voice is posi-
meantin theiruse ofthis tionedrelativeto the othersin an overallspace definedby a set
paperis whatthe textualistsoriginally
term. Denzin and Lincoln (I994:480), following Hammersley ofbiases.This providesthe reflexive
(i992), wouldprobablycharacterize notionhereas overarching
the reflexivity
becauseonly"internally
"postpositivist" in termsoftak- not dependenton theresearcher's
reflexive
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ment of scientificapproachesto the descriptionof cul-
turalgroupscannotbe takenas a necessaryconsequence
ofthe demise of "objective" ethnography.
However,the
widespreadflightofmany culturalanthropologists from
formalmethods suggeststhat a more profoundbut un-
statedcriticismofscientificapproachesexistswhichthe
reflexiveanalyticalapproachmay not address.Are there
othercharacteristicsof standardscientificpracticebe-
ingaccountoftheeffects oftheresearcher andtheresearchstrategy
on the findings thathave been produced."In theirview,theonly
difference betweenpostpositivism and its progenitor, positivism,
is its acknowledgment thatthereality"out there"cannotbe com-
pletelyapprehended or understood, so thatthe researcher should
becomesensitiveto observation effects.Marcus(I994:569) argues
thatthis conceptionof reflexivity as observerbias is inadequate
because it is merelya confessionalist frameforstandardethno-
graphies;althoughexperiential, it is notproperly contextualized.
Althoughreflexivity has been expressedhereas a formofbias,it
is quite different fromthe reflexivity-as-personal-bias associated
withpostpositivism. That sortof bias is consciouslyrecognized
and reported by theresearcher as a kindofcaveatwithrespectto
resultsreachedpriorto or independently ofthereflexive act. The
reflexive analyticalmeasureofbias,in contrast, is foundbya for-
mal modelingtechnique,not by introspection, and is fullyinte-
gratedintotheanalysisratherthanremaining a subjectiveorexpe-
rientialoverlayto the quasi-objectivetreatmentof data. The
reflexive analyticalapproachcan contextualize eventsin a variety
ofways(depending on whatfactorsareidentified in themodel),so
that the researchercan determinehow individualcases deviate
fromexpectedoutcomesbecause of the influenceof each effect
impinging on the observedsituation.For example,the natureof
theinterpersonal "chemistry" whichlies at thefoundation ofin-
tersubjectivity in thehumansciencescan be elucidated.
Marcus(I994:572) himselfprefers a reflexivitythatis "positional
and locational.""Locational"means thatthe ethnographer's ap-
proachis locatedwithrespectto alternative interpretations based
on different sociopoliticalagendas. This contextualizationis
achieved"througha keen sensitivityto the complexoverlayof
related,butdifferent, accountsofalmostanyobjectofethnographic
interest"(MarcusI 994:5 7 I)-in particular, previousethnographic
accountsof a particularculturalgroupor the topic'sdisciplinary
history. In feminist research, positioningis associatedwithstand-
pointepistemologies (e.g.,HartsockI983, SmithI989). Although
inpracticepositioning is oftenreducedto essentialistic confessions
(e.g.,"I am a white,Jewish,middle-class, heterosexualfemale"),
theideal is to describeindividuated personalexperiencewithina
particular materialand social situation(oftenas partofor leading
to a marxistsocial critique).Standpointfeministresearchis lo-
cated,but only"locally,"since it is impossibleto encompassthe
universeofcontext;all knowledgeis necessarilysituatedandpar-
tial (Marcus I994:572). I would argue that the analytical reflexivity
advocatedhereprovidesthepositionaland locationalinformation
associatedwiththe qualitativeapproachesfavoredbymanyfemi-
nists,criticaltheorists,and advocatesofculturalstudies.
Further,Marcus(I994:572) arguesthatHaraway's(i988) intellec-
tualprogram is particularly
boldandlaudablebecauseit aspiresto
more-than-local positioningbydefining "a space ofjuxtapositions
andunexpectedassociationsformedbya nomadic,embeddedana-
lyticvision constantlymonitoring its locationand partialityof
perspectivein relationto others."This seemsan accurateifpoetic
descriptionofthereflexive analyticalapproachas well: embedded,
analytic,located,partial.Not only does the reflexiveanalytical
approachcapturetheexperimentalist ethnographers' multivocality
through theuse ofmanyobserver-observed pairings,butthesedif-
analyticalapproachwithan
framesimilarto Haraway'sjuxtapositioning, although
consciousorganizing abilities.

which undercutits
sides lack of attentionto reflexivity
utility?Indeed thereare.
Contra Science
In the late I98os, a numberofsociologists(AbbottI988,
Abell I987, Ragin i987) developed a profoundcritique
ofstandardstatisticalmodelingwhich identifiedserious
deficienciesunderlyingany approachbased on the use
ofabstractvariables.In particular,the use oftypicalsta-
tistical procedures like the generalized linear model
leads to a viewpointwhich Abbott(i988) calls "general
linearreality,"characterizedby a numberoflargelyun-
recognizedbut unrealistic assumptions (Abbott i992:
433-34):
i. The social world is made up of fixedentities
with varyingattributes(demographicassump-
tion)....
2. What happens to one case [e.g.,individual]
doesn't constrainwhat happens to others,tempo-
rallyor spatially(casewise independenceassump-
tion).
3. Attributeshave one and only one causal mean-
ing withina given study(univocal meaningassump-
tion).
4. Attributesdetermineeach otherprincipallyas
independentscales ratherthan as constellationsof at-
tributes... (main effectsassumption)....
5. Things happen in discretebits [oftime] of uni-
formlengthand are not aggregatedinto overlapping
"events" of varyinglength(continuityor uniform
time-horizonassumption)....
6. The orderin which attributeschange does not
influencewhat changes occur; all cases followthe
same "causal narrative"or model (nonnarrativeas-
sumption).
In essence,generallinearrealityassumes thatindivid-
ual cases can be disaggregatedinto sets of attributes,
each ofwhich can be treatedindependently. These attri-
bute sets are placed in an abstract,artificialalignment
with one another,move in lockstep througha "space"
withouttime or distance,are subjectedto similarpro-
cesses of alteration,and react to these processes in ex-
actlythe same way. Since cases with particularcombi-
nations of attributesdo not exist in this conceptual
space, the units of analysis cannottransform into quali-
tativelydifferent things duringthe analytical process,
norare anyunits added to or subtractedfromthe model.
Outcomes cannotbe sequence-dependent, because there
are no temporalstepsin the analysis: a case's value after
havingjumpedto the nextanalyticaltimeframeis com-
pletelydeterminedby its previousstate.
Abbott(i988:i8i) also arguesthatthe now long-term
use ofstandardstatisticalmethodsin the social sciences
has led to changes in researchers'theoreticalviews.
Many classical social theorieshold thatsocial processes
occur to persons with bundled, uniquely interrelated
sets ofcharacteristics.These personsare subjectto indi-
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AUNGER Ethnography:
Storytelling
or Science?I I03
vidualized historiesof transformation:theycan change
qualitativelyby dying,gettingmarried,or givingbirth;
theycan also have interactionswith othersuch individ-
uals thathappenin time and space. None ofthisis possi-
ble in analyses based on the generallinear model that
dominatesthe social sciences. However,manyformsof
social theoryhave now come into conformity withprac-
tice: the issues considered importantby theoryhave
come to be those which statisticalmethodsare capable
of addressing;those aspects of realitynot amenable to
quantificationare now discountedby social theory(see
also Ragin I987:67; Sayer i984:i60).
As a consequence,forthese sociologists,the ontology
of general-linear-reality-basedscience is depauperate:
thereare no identifiableindividualsactingin a material
world.An importantconsequence is that the notion of
causation derivedfromgenerallinearrealityis also im-
poverished.Abell (i987:IO, citing Harre I970) argues
that,in effect,variables are grantedontological status
as causal forceseven thoughtheymay be indices con-
structedfrom disembodied attributes.General-linear-
reality-stylemodels "attributecausality to the vari-
ables-hypostatized social characteristics-ratherthan
to agents;variablesdo things,not social actors" (Abbott
I992:428). Thus generallinearrealityensuresthatmost
models of social processes allow no interactionsbe-
tween individuals: they are, in effect,asocial and ide-
alized.
Perhapsan even more importantproblemforgeneral
linear realityis its inabilityto deal with multivalent
meaningswithin a single analyticframework(assump-
tion 3 fromAbbott's list quoted above). Ragin (i989:
374-75) arguesthat this violates a numberof aspects of
social reality:(i) "causal conjunctures"(combinations
ofcauses resultin qualitativelydifferent outcomes than
the constituentcauses produce when acting alone), (2)
"causal heterogeneity"("differentcauses combine in
different and sometimes contradictory ways to produce
roughlysimilaroutcomes"), and (3)"outcome complex-
ity" (outcomesthemselvescan be substantivelysimilar
yet have differently related internalaspects that make
them unique). In quantitativeresearch,concepts take
the form of distinct variables ratherthan themes or
motifs as in interpretiveethnography.Because each
variable is a unidimensional construct,relationships
betweenvariablescannotbe complex (e.g..,can be sum-
marizedas simplecorrelations).Advocatesofqualitative
approachesbelieve that in the process of transforming
informantresponsesor behaviorinto variable codes for
statisticalanalysis,somethingintangiblebut important
is lost: "context"and "meaning."This failingformsthe
foundationofmanycritiquesofquantitativemethodsin
general (Abbott I988:I76). Where the general-linear-
realityapproachsees in the social world "causal forces
thatpush on otherforcesin a terrainremovedfromhu-
man activity" (Abbott I992:432), any researchercon-
cerned with historyor narrativesees social processes
as the resultof interactionsamong complexintentional
agentstakingplace in an environmentoftimeand space.
The inabilityof general-linear-reality-styleapproaches
I04 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 36, Number i, February1995

to deal with the multiple possible contextsof a given individualeventhistories),and (3) develop a framework
situation is thus a crucial failingfor process-oriented withinwhich different structurescan be compared(i.e.,
researchers. determinethe generalityor breadthto which particular
This critique of standardquantitativesocial science structuresare applicable). Once the basic types of se-
taintsthe reflexiveanalyticalapproach,which is based quence structuresare identified,the causes linkingpairs
on standardstatisticalmodels. As a result,such an ap- of events in these structurescan be inferredfrominde-
proach cannot providea trulyexplanatory(i.e., causal) pendent informationsources. These comparative ap-
analysis of social phenomena. With our commitment proachesavoid the multivalent-meanings problemmen-
to formalmethods,where can we turn fromstandard tioned above eitherby allowing the object of analysis
quantitativetechniques?Have the textualistswon their itselfto be complex (e.g., the individual-qua-individual
argumentthat we must adopt a strictlyinterpretive ratherthanjust a characteristic)or by allowingtheunits
styleof researchin ethnography(even thoughreflexive of analysis to follow multiple causal pathways under
analysisaccomplishesthe importantgoal ofreflexivity)? specificcircumstances (Abbotti988:I76).
The answeris no. How are formal comparisons between event se-
quences achievedin practice?Severalkindsofapproach,
derivingfromdisciplinesrangingfromsociologyto arti-
StorytellingReborn:The Comparative ficial intelligence,might be distinguished.However,
Event-HistoryApproach this is not the place fora descriptionof the varietyof
techniquesbeingdevelopedbythe different comparative
EvenAbbott(i992), despitebeingtheauthorofthecri- schools. I will thereforedescribeonly the approachesof
tique of standardquantitativemodelingjust described, the two more prominentnarrativepositivists,since, as
advocates the use offormalmethods.WithAbell (i987: historicalsociologists,theirconcerns are most closely
4-5), he envisions "a qualitative methodologywhich relatedto those of ethnography."1
can comparein analyticrigorwiththegeneralizedlinear Abell's (i987) goal is to devise a formalismwhich can
modelusually associatedwiththevariable-centered [i.e., determinethe fundamentalstructureof different narra-
quantitative]methodology." tives. This requiresthat he firstclassifyall human ac-
A varietyof researcherscombine the studyof event tions into a small set; he bases his classificationon a
sequences with the use offormalmethods.Event-based simple theoryof rationalaction (e.g.,if agentA desires
methodsare typicallyinterestedin case histories,caus- goal G and believes that doingX will achieve G, thenA
ally relatedsequences of events.Abbott(i992) calls his will do X). Individual behaviors in social interactions
approach"narrativepositivism"(also exemplifiedbythe can then be classifiedas being intended,unintended,or
workofAbellI987 andHeise I986, i99i), butfollowing preventionsof actions by other individuals. He then
the suggestionofAbell (i987) I will call it "comparative seeks to classifyparticularnarrativesby reducingthem
event-history" because its objective is to compare sys- to a basic structure,representedas a directedgraphor
tematicallysequences of human social interactionsas causal network. This is accomplished by findingthe
constrainedby social structures(AbbottI992:428).10 minimum set of pathways that describes a particular
The basic strategyof the comparativeevent-history sequence of events. Abell argues that,once extraneous
approach is to (i) determinea typologyforevents, (2) links are eliminated,many example sequences can be
determinehow particularsequences of such events are
structured(i.e., finda grammarto describepatternsin
i i. Othercomparative event-historyapproachescan be foundon
variousfrontsin cognitivescience.Each of thesegroupstakes a
io. Important formal"qualitative"approachesto dataanalysisnot somewhatdifferent approachto analyzingevent sequences on
discussedhere(fora generalreview,see Miles andHubermanI994 computers.For example,as Abell (I987:35) notes,the actionse-
or Wernerand SchoepfleI987) includesemanticnetworks(e.g., quencesofnarrative positivismareconceptually similarto Schank
the "culturalmodels" of D'Andrade I990, Holland and Quinn and Abelson's(I977) notionof scripts,whichare descriptions of
I987, and Garroand Mattingly I994; the"activityrecord"ofWer- therecurrent structure in setsofrelatedeventsequences(e.g.,the
nerand SchoepfleI987; and ethnoscientific folktaxonomies[see everyday phenomenon ofordering Another
a meal in a restaurant).
Wellerand RomneyI990]); rule-basedmodels such as decision computer-based comparativeevent-history approachis interested
trees(e.g.,GladwinI989) and computer-based expertsystems(e.g., in simulatingsocial phenomena.This generalclass ofsimulation
Benfer,Brent,andFurbeeI993, ReadandBehrensI990; cf.Cicourel modelshas been variouslycalled "artificiallife" (LangtonI988),
I986); social networkanalysis(Wassermanand Faust I993, Ga- worlds"(Lane I993), "microanalytic
"artificial evolution"(Collins
laskiewicz and WassermanI993, and any issue of Social Net- and Jefferson i992), and "synthetic ethology"(MacLennani992),
works);and Ragin's(i987) verygeneral"qualitativecomparative butthename "simulatedexperimental history"betterclarifiesits
analysis" technique.I do not wish to slightthese approaches relationshipto the othercomparativeapproaches.Individualized
throughexclusion;each has its strengths and weaknesses.How- entitiesareletloose in a simulatedspatialenvironment to interact
ever,in generalthe methodologicalconclusionsreachedlaterin withone another,each pursuinga courseofbehaviordetermined
thispaperwithrespectto thecomparative event-historyapproach by a small set of simple interactionrules.In the courseof the
applyto theseotherones as well. In particular,nonefullysatisfies interactions,information maybe transmitted and coordinated be-
all threecriteriaI haveestablishedforgoodethnographic research: haviorsmayresult.A numberofdifferent populationhis-
artificial
reflexivity,formalmethods,and methodologicalsituationalism. tories(orsequencesofinteractions betweenagents)can be gener-
Given the constraintsof space, my purposehere is to describe ated from multiple simulation runs using different starting
two generalbut verydifferent approachesin social science,thus conditions.These historicalsequencescan thenbe analyzedfor
providing a senseoftherangeofformaltechniquesnow available. comparablefeaturesusinga varietyofformalmethods.

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collapsed into a common narrativeclass called "homo-
morphic"because theyshare a basic structure.He then
compares a wide varietyof such reduced narrativesto
generatethe set of possible narrativeclasses that can
lead to a particular kind of outcome. The result of
Abell's method is an explanationwhich takes the fol-
lowingform:"an individualwith socioeconomic stand-
ing A does X then Y then Z, which leads to his/her
child's exhibitingsocioeconomic standing B." Other
narrativestructures(i.e., involvingactions other than
the sequence X, Y, Z) might be necessary to account
forothercausal pathwaysleading to a person's having
socioeconomic standingB.
Abbott'sapproachis more empiricaland can best be
explained by detailingan example (fora more general ized linearmodels(BehrensI990:324). Mostimportant,
account,see AbbottI992:449-50). Abbottand Hrycak the comparativeevent-historyapproach is not subject
(i990) examined the professionallife historiesof Ger-
man classical musicians duringthe Baroque and Classi-
cal eras.Theirgoal was to discover,froma compendium
of informationabout many such musicians, whether
there were distinguishablecareer patterns.Events in
each individual's careerwere firstcoded as a sequence
of stages characterizedby the type of job held and the
numberof years spent in it (a classificationscheme de-
vised by the researchers).Optimal matchingtechniques
borrowedfrommolecular biology (forDNA sequence
analysis) were then used to compare these sequences.
This involved calculating the distance between event
sequences, taken as the numberof transmutations(i.e.,
insertions, deletions, and substitutions) required to
bringone sequence into equivalence with another.The
different kinds of transmutationwere assigned various
costs reflectingresearchers'views about the nature of
sequence resemblance.For the German musicians, the
degreeofdifference betweenjobs was based on measures
of the social and geographicalmobilityrequiredto go
from one job to another. Given these costs of job
changes,pairs of careersequences were comparedto de-
termineintersequencesimilarities.A dynamicprogram-
mingalgorithmidentifiedthe smallestdistancebetween
each pairingof sequences, given the relativesize of job
changes.Finally,the matrixof intersequencesimilarity
values was analyzedusing clusteranalysisto determine
whether groups of careers resembled each other suf-
ficientlyto be considered a career type. Abbott and
Hrycak(i990) thus distinguished2i different empirical
classes of musical careers.It remains to be determined
why certain career paths were observed while others
werenot and what caused individualsin certaincircum-
stancesto followa particularpath (tasksnot undertaken
by the authorsof this illustrativestudy).For example,
it mightbe that careers heavily dependenton church
patronagebecame available onlyto musicianswho mar-
riedrelativelyearlyin lifeand thus conveyedan appear-
ance of responsibility.
The primaryadvantageof this kind of event-oriented
analysisovergeneralizedlinearmodels is thatthe causal
relationshipsbetween preconditionsand outcomes are
more clearly delineated. For example, analysis using a
generalizedlinear model mightshow an interactionbe-
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AUNGER Ethnography:Storytellingor Science? 1 I05
tween the two variables A and B, but this interaction
might indicate that both factorswere measuringthe
causal influenceof a third,unmeasuredfactoror that
therewas some overlapin the responsibilityofA and B
forthe outcome. In contrast,if those two factorsap-
peared in a particularcombinationin a specific case,
the comparativeevent-history approachwould conclude
thatbothA and B werenecessary(i.e.,independent)con-
tributoryfactors.Thus, the comparativeevent-history
model, unlike the reflexiveanalyticalapproach,allows
a very robust considerationof causation, as well as
allowing for sequence-dependentoutcomes.'2 Further-
more,fewerrestrictiveassumptionsare placed on data
analysis than would be involved in the use of general-
to the above-mentionedcriticismsof generalizedlinear
models such as the reflexiveanalytical approach. But
how does this "new narrativism"avoid the epistemolog-
ical problemsof the old ethnographicnarrativismout-
lined by the textualist critics?Are these comparative
event-history methodsreflexive?
For generalizedlinear models, reflexivityis achieved
byintroducingvariabilityinto all possible aspectsofthe
situated subject-objectrelationshipand then isolating
the variation due to each aspect using a statistical
model. However,the goal of comparativeevent-history
methods is to inferclasses of equivalent causal struc-
tures.Regardlessof whetherthe constituenteventsand
states of a givenstructureare abstractedfromhistorical
accounts,observeddirectlyin the field,or producedby
a computer,they must be classifiedand coded foruse
by a comparativemethod.'3Unfortunately, the classifi-
I2. As Miles and Huberman (I994:238) note, a varietyof quantita-
tivestatisticaltechniqueshavebeendevelopedforcausal analysis
equationmodels),but it is not
(e.g.,LISREL and otherstructural
clear "how you move froma list of 'associated'variablesto an
integrated,causallycoherentpicture"usingsuch approaches.At
best theyprovidesome understanding of "local temporalreality,
withall its complexities."
I3. Jahoda(i980:i26) has criticized methodological situationalism
a classification
as requiring a "the-
ofsituationswithoutproviding
oryof situations"thatwould assist in determiningthe relevant
"naturalkinds"intowhichsituationsmightfall.Indeed,thisis a
majorproblemwiththe comparative approach:the
event-history
firststep of coding events is not formalized. Abbott (I992:449)
assumes that categorization can be made on a purelyempirical
basis,to reflectthe goals ofthe particularanalysis,whileAbell's
(I987) systemis based on a generaltheoryof humanbehavior,
resultingin a fewquitegross,abstractcategories.
Althougha more comprehensive solutionwould be desirable,
Jahoda'stheoryof situationsis probablyimpossible,because any
situationcan be discriminated alongpotentiallyinfinitedimen-
sions. For example,eventscan be consideredactionsby a single
actoror social interactionsbetweenactors-thatis, eventscan be
simple or compound and highly contingent(Abbott I992:437-38).
joint actionas independent
Abell (I987:56-57) characterizes ac-
tionsbyeach actor,buthow "social" is that?Anotherissue is the
leveloforganizationatwhicheventsaretobe represented:whether
in termsof individualsor of some sortof social group(Abbott
I992:45i). Abbott (I992:445) and Abell (i987:2i-22) argue that
althoughAbell requiresthatthe agent
bothlevels are legitimate,
ofactionbe capableofintent.
Inaddition, is notyetincorporated
truesequence-dependence into
IO6 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 36, Number I, February1995

cation of events cannot include explicit recognitionof preciatenothingmore than large numbersof cases but
elicitationeffects.For example, equivalent events can- become statisticallyinvalid as the complexityof causal
not be coded as "event X as observedby A" and "event relationshipsconsidered increases (Ragin i987:68). In
X as observedby B," because this would obscure their this sense, the reflexiveanalyticaland comparativeap-
similarityin otherrespectsand reduce ratherthan ex- proaches are complementary.It seems that they must
pand the scope forgeneralization.Further,such a coding be used together.But how can this combination be
would not necessarilyprovide any informationabout achieved?
how the event as observedby A was different fromthe
eventas observedby B-that is, what bias is introduced
by a particular observation method.'4 Reflexivityre- The Primacyof Ontology
quires that an observationbe analyticallydissected so
thatany methodologicalbiases are eliminated.To make The reflexiveanalytical and comparativeevent-history
an observationreflexiveis to contextualizeit, to make approachescan be seen as representatives of two funda-
it specific,whichis antitheticalto thegoal ofgeneraliza- mentallydifferent ways of conductingresearch,each of
tion. It is thus the need to formalizethe contrasting which has been historicallyimportantin the social sci-
of events and to generalizethe resultswhich precludes ences. Sperber(i985:7) calls these the scientificand in-
reflexivity duringthe comparisonofnetworkstructures. terpretiveapproaches, respectively.The goal of the
In conclusion, like the reflexiveanalyticalapproach, interpretiveapproach is to provide the readerwith an
the comparativeevent-historyapproach is not a suffi- intuitiveunderstandingof a particularculturein its to-
cient solution to the problem of representingethno- tality,while the goal of the scientificapproachis to ex-
graphicrealities.Each of these two generalapproaches plain-that is, to findthe generalprocessesoperatingin
has problemswhen used alone: the reflexiveapproach human society.'5 In order to organize the discussion
is not causal, and the comparativeapproachis not re- about how elementsfromthese two primaryparadigms
flexive.However,each has the quality which the other mightbe combined,table i lists theirdifferences.
lacks. Further,the most importantlimitation of one It is widely arguedthat theoryand methodsin social
methodis the primarystrengthofthe other.Because the studies not only have been historicallylinked but are
comparativecase-based techniques deal with conjunc- logicallyconnected(e.g.,BhaskarI979, Harreand Secord
tions of causal factors,they rapidlybecome unwieldy, I972, Layder I990, Outhwaite I987, Sayer i984). How-
since the numberofpossible factorialcombinationsex- ever,as is apparentfromrecentpracticeand the reflex-
plodes as the number of cases and/ortypes of factors ive analytical and comparative approaches just de-
consideredincreases. Variable-orientedapproaches ap- scribed, it is possible to develop approaches that
combine aspects traditionallyassociated with different
research paradigms. For example, current statistical
techniques make possible the testingof more "struc-
comparative event-history methods.Abbott(personalcommunica-
tion)complainsthateventswhichhave alreadyhappenedcannot
tural"models (i.e., ones with complexwebs ofinterrela-
havethesame ontologicalstatusas thosein theever-moving pres- tionshipsbetweenvariablesin multiple,simultaneously
ent. A similarconsiderationis that comparativeevent-history estimatedequations), thus combiningpositivisticana-
methodscan only attachfinitecosts to havingeventsoccurin lyticalmethodswith somethingcloser to the event ori-
differentorderswhenin factthereis no possibility ofsuchreorder- entationof the interpretivists. Further,the comparative
ings:thoseeventshavealreadyoccurred, andthepastis unchange-
able.Thereis no realcostfunction forthecomparison ofhistorical event-history approachcombines a scientificepistemo-
events;the analysisis hypothetical. logical stance with otherqualities of interpretivisteth-
Thereis also a basic problemof sequencecategorization: What nographywhile the reflexiveanalytical approach does
sets ofevents are isolable as a causal system (AbbottI992:437-40)? just the opposite.
All eventsin theworldareinterrelated. How cansomecausalflows
be separatedout? Wheredoes an identifiable narrative beginand What,then,are the constraintswithinwhich a reflex-
end?Analyzablenarratives are embeddedin narratives ofgreater ive but historical/causalapproach to social scientific
historicalsweep,whichhave eitheradditionalcausal streamsor practicemustbe designed? Sayer(i984:i8o) maintains
greatertemporaldepth.Such sequencesthusrequireassumptions that"the implicitconception[ofparadigmi's statistical
aboutindependenceortheabilityto treatunitsofanalysiswithout models] tends to assume the universalityof closed sys-
theneedoffurther Here,bothAbbott( 1992:449)
contextualization.
and Abell (i987:I9-20) take largely instrumentalist positions. tems [i.e., isolable causal networks that are not re-
Nevertheless, once a codingschemeforeventsis devised,at least strictedto the cases fromwhich theirrelationshipsare
optimalmatching techniquesarefairly robustto differencesin cod- estimated],a regularitytheoryofcausation [i.e.,the sim-
ingstylesbetweenindividuals(Forrest and AbbottI99O). ple notion that B regularlyfollowsA, hence A causes
I4. Abell is aware thatnarrative positivismhas methodological
problems(as well as the conceptualproblemsnotedin n. I3). He B], an atomisticontology(theoryof what exists) and an
admits(i987:56) thatnarratives are data-dependent constructs of
the analyst,thatit is oftennecessaryto piece togethereventse-
quences fromparticipantaccountswhen the relevantbehaviors i5. Sperber'sdistinctionis a starkone, contounding interpretive
werenot directlyobservedby the researcher(thetypicalcase in withhermeneutic, constructivist, culturalstud-
critical,feminist,
historicalsociology).His attitudeis thatthisis an inescapablebut ies, and otherpostmodemschools of social research.However,
notdebilitatingproblemforsocial science.In generalhe argues(p. aremadebya widevarietyofothertheorists
similarsimplifications
I04) thatthereare important social questionsto be addressedand forthe purposeof argument(e.g.,Blaikie I993, Braybrooke I987,
thatwe shouldnot be troubledbymethodological anxieties. SayerI984).

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 AUNGER Ethnography:Storytellingor Science? I I07

TABLE I
Two ParadigmsforSocial Science Research

I 2
Aspect Scientistic/Positivistic Humanist/Interpretive

Logicalform deductive/"theory testing"(theory inductive/"theory building"(data

data) theory)
Epistemologicalstance "objective"(separation betweenobserver "subjective"(interpenetration ofpercep-
and observed) tionand interpretation)
Temporalframework static(i.e.,equilibriumassumed)/abstract processual/historical
Model ofcausality regularity ofcorrelation mechanismsgenerateoutcomes
Social ontology "atomistic"/realist "structural"/constructivist
Philosophicalanthropology mechanist/behaviorist teleological/intentionalist
Unitsofanalysis variables themes/motifs
Data collectionmethods survey,formalinterviews/questionnaires participant observation, interactive
inter-
viewing,introspection
Analyticmethods "quantitative"(i.e.,statisticaltests) "qualitative"(i.e.,narrational)
Population/scale large("macro"-scale) small("micro"-scale, "local")
Sampling representational (e.g.,random) noneor ad hoc
Qualityassessmentcriteria validity,replicability contextualequivalence,authenticity,
stimulusforsocial action
Researchgoals description/generalization/prediction/understanding (Verstehen)/socialcri-
causal explanation(Erklaren) tique/advocacy
Presentationstyle dispassionate/informational evocative/inspiring

SOURCES: Abbott(i988, i992), Guba and Lincoln(I994), Layder(i990, I993), Neuman(i99l), Sayer(i984).

equivalence of explanation and prediction."In effect, approaches to determinewhat aspects from different
onlycertainfeatures-analyticalmethodsand goals,on- paradigmscan be amalgamated. Table 2 indicates on
tology,and the notion of causation-are argued to be which side of the paradigmaticdivide each featureof
connected to a particulartheoreticalparadigm.Simi- the reflexiveanalytical and comparativeevent-history
larly,Abbott(I992:435) arguesthatpresumptions about approachesfalls. This table suggeststhat a researchap-
ontology,causality,time,and social constraintson indi- proach's underlyingepistemologicalstance,philosophi-
vidual action follow fromthe choice of a particularap- cal anthropology,data collection and analytical meth-
proachto research. ods, population or scale of analysis, sampling regime,
Ratherthanmerelycontributeanotheropinionto this researchgoals, and presentationstyle are "mobile" be-
debate,we can examine the reflexiveand comparative tweenparadigms.Thus aspects ofdifferent researchpar-

TABLE 2
Aspects of the ReflexiveAnalytical and ComparativeEvent-
HistoryApproaches

Aspect ReflexiveAnalytical ComparativeEvent-History

Logicalform I 2
Epistemologicalstance 2 I
Temporalframework I 2
Model ofcausality I 2
Social ontology I 2
Philosophicalanthropology 2 2
Unitsofanalysis I 2
Data collectionmethods i or 2 i or 2
Analyticmethods I i and 2
Population/scale i or 2 i or 2
Sampling i or 2 2
Qualityassessmentcriteria I 2
Researchgoals I I
Presentationstyle I I

NOTE: Numbersreferto paradigmslistedin table i.

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io8 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 36, Number i, February1995

adigms can be combined in a single approachin ways firmsthe narrativepositivistposition(see the quotation
not generallyacknowledgedby those debatingresearch fromAbbottabove) that the temporalframeworkof an
methods in social science. In particular,the textualist approachis a functionnot of analyticalmethod but of
critique of ethnographyimplicitlyassumed that if the ontology.There are, afterall, dynamic quantitativeas
objectivistepistemologywas discredited,so were the well as qualitativemethods.'6
methodologicallyindividualistontologyand quantita- But thereis also a rathersurprisingconclusion from
tive methods characteristicof the scientificparadigm. this analysis: commitmentto a particularontologydoes
However, the reflexiveanalytical approach indicates not require the use of specific analytical methods or
that this is not necessarilythe case. Concern with re- units of analysis,each of which can varyindependently
flexivitydoes not necessitate a turn to interpretive fromthe others(which contradictsSayer's expectation,
methodologies;rather,recognitionof the interpersonal quoted above). Thus, paradigm-2-style causal modeling
natureofhuman researchcan be combinedwithformal can be quantitative.Narrative positivistmethods,for
analyticalmethods. example,dependon codingand formalcomparisonsus-
However,many aspects of a researchparadigmare at ing specialized softwareand nonlinearstatisticaltech-
least correlatedwith the chosen ontology,which there- niques. The reversealso holds: paradigm-igoals (gener-
foremightbe called the "core feature"of an approach. alization/description) can be couched in narrativeterms
The featuresthat revolve around ontology(and which (e.g., the argumentthat resultsfoundin the contextof
mightthereforebe called the "satellite features"of an one society hold for another that has had a similar
approach) are its logical form,temporal framework, history).
model of causality,units of analysis,and qualityassess- Anothersurprisingfindingis that epistemologycan
ment criteria(a list similarto those suggestedby Sayer varyindependentlyofontology.When a paradigm-2con-
and Abbott, both quoted above). Thus, once an ap- structivistontologyis joined to a paradigm-2subjectiv-
proach's ontologyis established,a numberof its other ist epistemology,as has historicallybeen the case, the
aspects seem to follownaturally. resultis an approachthatdefinesmultiplerealities,each
For example, causality is connected to ontologybe- existingin the mind of a particularsocial agent. Simi-
cause the typesof relationshipsbetweenthingsdepend larly,a paradigm-iepistemology/ontology combination
on whatis allowed to exist.This connectionhas its basis producesa single-levelrealityindependentofbut know-
in human psychology:"One major point that emerges able throughan agent'sperception.However,the reflex-
from the psychological (particularlydevelopmental) ive analyticalapproachis an example of a realist(para-
studyof causal thinkingis thatintuitiveontologiesand digm-i) approach that is combined with a reflexive
intuitiveexpectationsofcausal powersare two facetsof (paradigm-2) ratherthana positivistepistemology.Thus,
the same distinction.. . . intuitive 'theories' include even thoughthereflexiveanalyticalapproachassertsthe
manyprecise expectationsabout what causal processes existenceofa realityindependentofobservation,it does
different objects can enterinto" (BoyerI994:i52). The not allege thatthisrealityis perfectly knowablethrough
presumptionof the generalized-linear-model or para- eithersense impressionsor theoreticalconstruction.
digm-iapproachis thatthe statisticalestimationofcor- The otherresultsfromtable 2: A researchprogram's
relationsfroma particularset ofdata is applicableto the assumptions about human intentionality(i.e., philo-
specifiedrelationshipsmore generally(Abell i987:9). sophical anthropology)also varies independentlyof on-
But, as Outhwaite (i 987:21) says, "even an inquisitive tology:perhapsthe most significantchangein the scien-
child will feel that there is somethingunsatisfactory tific paradigm representedby the reflexiveanalytical
about explaining'why' somethinghas happenedby say- approachis its emphasis on human agency.Finally,re-
ingthatit always does." Empiricalregularitiesor "prob- searchgoals and presentationstyleseem to be linkedto
abilistic relationshipsare not accepted as demonstra- analyticalmethodsratherthan ontology:the use offor-
tionsofcause" by devoteesofevent-oriented approaches mal methodstends not to be associated with (but does
(Ragin i987:5 I). Rather,"a trulyexplanatorycausal ex- not preclude)social activism and a rhetoricalpresenta-
planationwould want to . . . account forthese regulari- tion style.
ties by referenceto the real underlyingstructuresthat As representativesof the two primaryparadigmsfor
producethese manifestations"(Layderi990:67). ForAb- research,the reflexiveanalyticaland comparativeevent-
bott (I992:435), as a historical sociologist, causation historyapproachesare fundamentallydifferent in their
means neitherHumean correlation(i.e., the regularob- ontology(one is abstract,the othergroundedin events),
servableconjunctionsofevents)northe abstractgenera- epistemology(one is reflexive,the othernot),analytical
tive mechanisms of the generalized linear model but methods (generallinear realityversus sequence analy-
narrative "enchainment": the linking of outcomes sis), and units of analysis (variablesversus events).The
throughsequences ofhuman actions. Thus, foranypro- conclusionofthisanalysisis therefore that,ifthe choice
cessualistthereis a sense thatsome underlyingrelation- of ontologynecessitatesotherchoices such as temporal
ship between events-in-the-world must be identified framework(i.e., historicity)and notion of causality (as
whichan abstractentities-and-attributes approachbyits
verynaturecannot provide. i6. However,the "sequence-dependence" of quantitativetech-
Table 2 shows that the natureof what exists also de- niquessuchas time-seriesanalysisis limitedto stepwiseiterations
termineswhetheran analysis can be dynamic.This af- byits general-linear-reality ontology.

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arguedhere),then the reflexiveanalyticaland compara-
tive event-history approaches cannot simplybe mixed
into a single overarchingformulationwith the virtues
of both and failingsof neither.Instead,if theyare to be
combined,there must be a sequence of use. But how
best to integratethese differentanalyticalsteps?
Storytellingand Science
Abell (i987:5) says that most combinationsof qualita-
tive and quantitativemethods"turnout to be ratherad
hoc and unsatisfactory.... Qualitative studies need to
be placed withina technicalframework whichwill facil-
itatean effectivecombinationofthe two. Until thishap-
pens social scientistswill, it seems, inevitablypolarize
intocamps each philosophicallyseekingto maintainthe
exclusive legitimacyof its own views at the expense of
those of its opponents."Since the gulfbetweenthe two
paradigmsis profound,any bridgingframeworkmust be
strongand high.However,accordingto Abell (I987:87-
9i), general-linear-reality-style
methodscan be used to-
getherwith comparativeevent-history methods.He pre-
sents the following scenario. First, a relationshipis
foundbetween two variables (say A and B) using stan-
dardstatisticalmethods(e.g.,generalizedlinearmodels).
This relationship,once uncovered,may be furthersub-
stantiatedand elaboratedby introducing"intervening"
variables which specifya causal model of the Durk-
heimian sort (i.e., one "social fact" in the formof an
aggregated variableis explainedin termsofother"social
facts").This causal chain fromA and B is then seen as
"in need of explanation in terms of narrativeswhich
link the variables,showinghow human action/interac-
tion establishesthe social facts" (Abell i987:88). Com-
parativeanalysis is then used to uncoverparticularse-
quences of eventsthatlead fromA to B. Abell (i987:89)
notes that the relationshipbetween A and B may be
overdetermined in the sense that many narrativepath-
ways lead fromA to B. The final step is thereforeto
determinethe generalizabilityof each narrative-that
is, to discoverwhethera particularsequence regularly
recursin manycases involvingdifferent individualsand
varyingcircumstances.
Unfortunately, Abell's suggestedsequence ofgeneral-
linear-reality-styleanalysis and comparative event-
historymethodsis an insufficient solution to the prob-
lem of linkingthe two basic kinds of approachin social
science. In particular,it does not resolve the epistemo-
logical problems identifiedby recent critics of ethno-
graphicpractice.The problemlies in the requirementof
a reflexiveanalysis. Without such a requirement,the
comparativestep could proceed quite independentlyof
the generalized-linear-model step,merelytakingits cue
about whereto look fromthe statisticalresultsas in the
imagined example above. (Abell would say that the
eventhistoryis the end resultof an investigation,with
the priorgeneralized-linear-model analysis servingonly
as a preliminary,heuristic step [see Abell i987:341.)
However, with the reflexivityconstraint,it becomes
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AUNGER Ethnography: or Science?I IO9
Storytelling
necessaryto relateexplicitlythe resultsfromthe reflex-
ive analysis to those fromthe event-historyanalysis.
The problemis that the productsof the two steps take
different forms.From the firststep thereis typicallya
set of statisticalresults at some abstractor aggregated
level, fromthe second step a causal networkdiagramat
the event-historicallevel. How are we to bringabout a
comparativeevent-history analysis fullyinformedby a
priorreflexivestatisticalanalysis?Ideally,the compara-
tiveanalysisshould be based on data "cleaned" ofmeth-
odological (particularlydata elicitation)biases.
Furtherdiscussion of the earlier example on food
avoidances in Zaire may help clarifyhow the reflexive
and comparativeapproaches could be used togetherin
ethnographicresearch.In Aunger(I994a), I used the re-
flexiveanalyticalapproachto clean the data and to de-
terminerelationshipsbetween variables. At the same
time,a relatedanalysisusingthe reflexiveanalyticalap-
proachshowed that,ceterisparibus, better-schooled in-
dividuals had greaterknowledgeof the food-avoidance
domain than unschooled individuals (Aunger I994b).
The question thereforearises, is this knowledgediffer-
ence due to cognitive changes broughtabout by the
trainingexperienceof goingto school, or does it repre-
sent the influenceof some difference in lifehistorycor-
relatedwith havinggone to school?
To answerthisquestionwould requirea deeperunder-
standingof the psychologicaland social causes behind
differences in knowledgeofculturallysanctionedbeliefs
in Zairian society. Thus, case-based narrative tech-
niques could be used in a second step to examine the
correlationbetweenschoolingand increasedknowledge.
Because considerablelife-historical information was col-
lected on each individual in the initial fieldwork,the
same datasetused in the reflexiveanalysiscould be used
to assess the typesoflifehistorythatresultin the leam-
ing of particularclasses of avoidances.17 This analysis
(e.g.,usingAbbott'smethod)mightdemonstratethated-
ucated individuals exhibit an increased knowledge of
foodavoidances fromexposureto a widerrangeof such
beliefs when they leave their natal villages to attend
school in more cosmopolitan areas. Further,in yet a
thirdanalyticalstep, individualsmightbe classifiedby
whetheror not they went to school away fromtheir
natal villages.This difference could be includedin a re-
flexive-style statisticalmodel as an additionalvariable.
Anynew relationshipshintedat by this second reflexive
analysis could then be examined by again turningto a
comparativeevent-history analysis,each step thus suc-
cessivelyprobingdeeperand deeperinto the causal uni-
verse in which people live.
Unfortunately,this hypothetical example suggests
thatthereis no clearway to achieve thegoal ofcomplete
I7. In general,researchers
shouldbe able to performbothreflexive
andcomparative event-historical
analysesbasedon a singledataset
becausebothapproachesmake the same ontologicalassumptions
aboutthe phenomenonunderstudy:theycategorizethe research
questionin the same way and are therefore likelyto requirethe
same kindsofinformation.
IIO I CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 36, Number i, FebruaryI995

integrationof the reflexiveanalytical approach with tive nature of this rhetoricalgambit,have arguedthat
comparativeevent history.Events or event sequences ethnographers should createa conscious readingexperi-
can always be coded and treatedas values of a variable ence, interposingthe book-as-objectbetweenthe reader
in cases submittedto a general-linear-reality-style anal- and the realitybeing depicted.Throughan act of will
ysis. Thus, integrationin one direction,fromcompara- and imagination,the readeris supposed to constructan
tive event-history to reflexiveanalysis,is possible, but individualized experience of the ethnographicreality
the comparativeapproach cannot directlyincorporate from the imperfectbuilding blocks of written state-
informationabout the influenceson eventsfroma gen- ments.
eral-linear-realityanalysisintoits considerationofthose Problem2. Experimentalor interpretive ethnography
events because of its goal of generalizingabout types merelyplaces the burdenof analysis and interpretation
of events.Abbott(I992:45 i) has arguedthat one might squarelyon thereader'sshoulders.This is a burdenmost
conceive of events as complex combinations of vari- readersare ill-equippedto assume. In addition,the re-
ables, allowing a translationfromgenerallinear reality cent turnto a more self-conscious,experientialethnog-
to the historicalviewpoint.But this remainsa concep- raphydoes not solve the basic problemofincreasingthe
tual transformation, not an operationalone, especially credibilityof ethnographicreports.One reason is that
in light of Abbott's own descriptionof general-linear- the textualists' use of variable modes of presentation
reality-stylemodels' limited ability to deal with vari- and viewpointsdoes not necessarilyallow the readerto
ables as clusters. determinethe quality of each different kind of material
Thereare,however,two tasksthatpriorgenerallinear in the report.A Rashomon effectmay result fromthe
realitycan performfor the comparativeevent-history concatenationof narratives:as in the Kurosawa movie,
approach.First,it can isolate the relationshipsto be pur- a numberof viewpointson the same event may be re-
sued by comparativeanalysis (i.e., it can establishcorre- countedby different participants,but each voice in the
lations between variables that suggestcausal relation- ethnographywill be slanted in a way that may be un-
ships between events). Second, the methodological knowable to the readerdue to a lack of an overarching
influencesdiscovered by a general-linear-reality-stylecontextualization(see Cronk I993). Readers of experi-
analysis can be avoided or reduced in subsequent data mentalistethnographiesalso do not know whetherall
collection for a comparativeevent-historicalanalysis. the relevantinformationhas been presentedto them,
For example, if particularinterviewersare foundto be because the traditionalreliance on participantobserva-
particularlyunreliable,theycan be eliminatedfromthe tion means that the set of informationacquired during
nextroundofdata collection.However,theseare incom- fieldworkis necessarilyad libitum.In addition,thereis
plete solutions to a problem that must remain un- usuallyno explicitprocedurebywhich the ethnographer
solved-at least forthe present. selectstextualfragments (e.g.,fieldnotes,transcriptions,
or archivalmaterials)forpresentationin the report.
Solution 2. The reflexiveanalyticalapproach.In con-
Summaryand Conclusions trastto bothtraditionaland textualistethnography, this
approachresultsin a scientificreport.Based on formal
The argumentof this paper can be brieflyrestatedas data collection proceduresand statisticalanalysis, the
follows: reportincludes descriptionsof methodsand results,re-
Problem i. Traditionalethnographyis no longervia- flectionson these results,and other,more traditional
ble because it is not reflexive.Traditional "realistic" materials, if applicable. The reflexiveanalytical ap-
ethnographicpractice assumes that readingis like an proach does not draw attentionto the reportitself,as
encounterwithAlice's looking-glass:merelyby opening do the textualists,but also does not attemptto obscure
an ethnographyand passing one's eyes over the pages, the origin and nature of ethnographicstatements,as
one is transportedthroughthe book-as-mirror into the does traditionalethnography.This approach,based on
reality of life in another culture (what van Maanen an explicit considerationof the data collection process
[I988:741 calls the "doctrine of immaculate percep- as a situated human interaction,includes attentionto
tion"). There is no recognitionin the ethnographicme- data elicitationeffects,variationin informantbeliefsor
dium that the social and psychologicalrealityof some behavior,and the effectsof the contextof data collec-
far-off place and time is transformedinto the mental tion. Discussion of an empirical case study (Aunger
representations ofa readerthroughat least one interven- I994a) has shown thatthis approachcan effectively sep-
ing intelligence (the ethnographer's)and several in- arate purely methodological biases in interview re-
stances of physical mutation (e.g., into patternsof ink sponses fromanswersthatmore trulyreflectthe beliefs
on paper). In fact,traditionalethnographersmake use ofinformants in a typicalethnographicsituation.In this
of this magical elision in orderto achieve unwarranted fashion, the reflexiveanalytical approach establishes
credibility,to convince us that "had we been therewe data qualityand achieves a relativelyhigh degreeofva-
should have seen what they saw, felt what they felt, lidity.
concludedwhat theyconcluded" (Geertz i988: i6). Problem3. While the reflexiveanalyticalapproachis
Solution i. Experimentalor interpretive ethnography. sufficientto remedythe epistemologicalconcernsthat
Hermeneuticallyinspiredcritics,recognizingthe decep- arose in the context of the textualistcritique of tradi-

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tional ethnographicpractice, it does not representa
complete approach to ethnographicresearch.Based on
what Abbott (i988) calls general linear reality,which
attributesaction to variables moving throughan ab-
stractspace ratherthan to intentionalagentsacting in
theworld,it is ontologicallyand causallyunrealisticand
impoverished.
Solution 3. The comparativeevent-history approach.
Unlike reflexiveanalysis, this approach deals directly
with events in theirmultifariouscomplexity.A chain
of eventsis identifiedby the researcher,the component
eventsare categorized,the overallstructureofthenarra-
tive sequence is identified(whichmay involve some re-
ductionof irrelevantcomplexity),and then different se-
quences are compared for structural similarities.
Althoughoriginallydesignedforthe analysis of histori-
cal events,thisapproachcan also be used withrespectto
informants'life-history narrativesor even hypothetical
event-stagessuch as the course of an illness. All such
narrativescan be comparedand analyzedforunderlying
causal linkages. This is different fromthe textualists'
solution of simplyprovidingdifferent accounts without
commentary:comparative event historyrepresentsa
formalmethodofcomparisonofaccounts.The presenta-
tion styleof the ethnographicreportin this case is not
a rhetoricalnarrativebut a discussionofthe structureof
causal mechanisms underlyingthe phenomenonbeing
studied.
Problem4. Comparativeeventhistoryis not reflexive.
This is partlybecause of its originin variousdisciplines
which lack traditionsof concernfordata collection is-
sues (historicaldisciplines use secondarydata and so
have no controlover data quality; cognitivescience is
heavilyinvolvedwith computers,where thereis no in-
tersubjectivity problem).But thereare also two reasons
that comparativemethodscannot even be made reflex-
ive. First,comparativeevent-historyanalysis depends
on previouslywrittenaccounts of past events or, alter-
natively,on abstractevents that take place inside com-
puters.Such data are secondhandand cannot be modi-
fied to incorporatereflexiveinformationbecause the
factorsbiasing the originalrecordingprocess are typi-
cally unknown. Comparativetechniques can, however,
be used with respectto events directlyobservedduring
theethnographicfieldseason, in which case thissecond-
hand-accountproblemcan be alleviated.The inevitable
problem,however,is thateven when eventsare directly
observed,thereis no way to incorporatea markerof the
relationshipbetweenthe observerand observedinto the
classificationofevents.To do so would obstructthe goal
of comparison,which is to find general classes of se-
quences of such events,because events would then be
linked to the identities of specific observers.The re-
quirementofformalcomparisonand the goal ofgeneral-
ization togetherpreclude the sensitive analysis of ob-
server-objectrelationshipsnecessaryforreflexivity(as
definedhere).
Solution4. A two-stepanalyticalprocedureconsisting
of reflexiveanalysisfollowedby comparativeeventhis-
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AUNGER Ethnography: or Science?I III
Storytelling
tory.18 Axinn, Fricke,and Thornton (I 99 i) and others
(e.g., Agar I980, Freidenberg,Mulvihill, and Caraballo
I993, Sieber I973) have advocated the simultaneous
combinationofapproachesfromthe two paradigms(e.g.,
long-termparticipant observation with survey-based
quantitativeresearch).Althoughthis offerssome bene-
fits (e.g., the minimizationof measurementerrorsbe-
cause researcherswith ethnographicinsightcan design
moreappropriatesurveyinstruments, increasedvalidity
of those instrumentsdue to backgroundknowledgeand
languageskills developed by the researchersover time,
and more meaningfulinterpretation of data due to eth-
nographicinsight),such protocolsremain loosely inte-
grated and thereforesomewhat ad hoc as an overall
methodology.Further,theyare not reflexive.
My proposalis similarto Abell's (i987) suggestionof
standardstatisticalmodelingfollowed by comparative
eventhistoryexceptforthe emphasison methodological
situationalismand reflexivityin the firststep and the
applicationof this combinationto the ethnographicsit-
uation. The close integrationof the primaryapproaches
to social researchin a two-stepprocedureis made possi-
ble by two crucial features of the component ap-
proaches: (i) Both are foundedin methodologicalsitua-
tionalism,or the idea that "at the centerof our social
ontologytheremust be ... the commonsensepictureof
physicallydistinctpersons capable of independentac-
tion" (Outhwaite I987:IO8). This is capturedin the no-
tion ofthe data collectionsituationin reflexiveanalysis
principleofcompara-
and the events-as-units-of-analysis
tive event history.(2) Both use formalmethods. This
allows output fromone method directlyto informthe
other.The two modes of analysis retaintheirdifferent,
essentialnaturesbut providemoremutual supportthan
Axinn,Fricke,and Thornton's(I99I) simple mixing.
This interdependenceof the steps in the two-stepap-
proachis not, strictlyspeaking,an example of "triangu-
lation" (so-called because it resembles the surveyor's
practiceof findingthe preciselocation of a point by ap-
proachingit fromseveral different directions).In trian-
gulation,resultsfromtwo analysesofthe same phenom-
enon are compared side by side in orderto determine
the overallvalidityof the study.Unfortunately, the dif-
ferencesbetween analytical methods make any such
comparisonnecessarilyimperfect.Campbell and Fiske
(i959) tried to get around this impasse by combining
multiple elicitation methods under a single analytical
umbrella,but the methods they developed exhibit sig-
nificantlimitations in application and interpretation
i8. Two caveatsare in order.First,ethnographic projectshave a
greatvarietyof goals. My proposalis restricted to ethnographic
researchdevotedprimarily to theexplanation ofeth-
ordescription
nographic realities.Ethnographies designedto capturethe experi-
entialnatureoffieldwork or lifein thecultureunderstudywould
have to relyon alternative methodsand presentation styles.Sec-
ond,comparative event-history methodsare butone typeofcase-
based formalprocedures,restricted to the analysisof eventse-
quences; similartechniquesare availableforothertypesof data
(see n. iO).
II21 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 36, Number i, FebruaryI995
(Kennyand Kashy i992). Thus, thereseem to be intrin-
sic constraintson the degree of validity that can be
achieved by any single approachto empiricalresearch.
It thereforeappears unlikelythat a single methodwith
all the featuresdesired by researcherswill ever be de-
veloped.
The two-stepmethodrecognizesboththe necessityof
multiplemethodsand the essential differences between
themand therefore takes anotherapproachto validation
than eithertriangulationor the strainedamalgamation
of disparatemethods into a single procedure.Instead,
two different methodsare utilizedsequentially,withthe
output of one procedurebeing input to the otherin an
iterative cycle of mutual illumination. Thus, formal
methodsare a prerequisiteto the highdegreeofintegra-
tion achievedby the two-stepapproach.The onlycaveat
is thatcomparativeeventhistorydoes not directlymake
use of reflexivelycleaned data; rather,the relationships
it examines are those suggestedby the reflexiveanalyti-
cal results. At least at present,it is not clear how to
improvethis less-than-perfect meldingof methods.
The primaryconclusion ofthis paperis thus thateth-
nographicresearchrequires the use of two fundamen-
tallydistinctapproaches.Reflexivityrequiresthe disag-
gregationofsocial interactionsusinganalyticseparation
techniques,while causal explanationrequiresmultiva-
lent meaning (the abilityof the same event to lead in
two differentdirections,dependingon exogenous cir-
cumstances). Only an approach that can compare the
various abstractaspects of situationscan deal with the
problemof reflexivity(as definedhere),but only an ap-
proach that keeps complex structuresintact can be
causal/explanatory.The formerrequiresbut the latter
is precludedby the use of standardstatisticalmodeling.
For this reason,a researchapproachis eitherreflexive/
statisticalor causal/narrativebut not both. The title of
thispapertherefore perpetuatesa falsedichotomy:both
storytelling and science are necessaryfora completeun-
derstandingofethnographicrealities.This conclusionis
in conformity with a numberofrecentcalls fora plural-
istic approach to social science (e.g., Blaikie I993:2I5;
BraybrookeI987:IIO; Layder I993:I07-28; Outhwaite
I987:II6; Ritzer i992:648; Roth i987).
The primarycontributionofthispaperis to have clari-
fied why there are two fundamentallydistinct ap-
proaches to ethnographicresearch.19Further,although
i9. That the differences betweengeneralizedlinearmodels and
thecomparative event-historical approacharefundamental maybe
moreeasilyseen by examiningwhat can be called theiranalytic
"orientation."Considerhow these approachesdeal with a data
matrix.In thecase ofgeneralizedlinearmodels,rowsofdataiden-
tifyobservations or cases and columnsmeasurevariousaspectsof
thesecases. Althoughthe goal of quantitativeresearchis almost
always(atleastimplicitly) to explaincases (e.g.,howmucha given
changein a particular variableaffects the outcomeofthecase),it
is stillfairtosaythat,analytically,standard multivariate statistical
methodsaggregate overcases.Theymighttherefore be called"col-
umn-oriented," despitetheirlack ofintrinsic interestin particular
variables.Manyofthesetechniquesestimatestatistical parameters
by comparing relationships amongall cases simultaneously, with
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the two approaches have traditionallybeen viewed as
antithetical
(NeumanI 99I:32I), theyhave herebeen
closely integratedinto a single researchprocess. The
two-stepapproach combines an interpretive feel (i.e., a
subjective epistemological stance and a concern with
causal explanation)with scientificaspects (i.e., goals of
comparisonand generalization)in a reflexiveanalysis
throughthe use of formalmethods.Althoughthe vic-
tory has been hard-won, I argue that the two-step
method"saves" scientificethnography fromthe prema-
tureobituarycomposed forit by textualistcritics.
There are still those who object to any sortof scien-
tificapproachto the studyofpeople. For example,a po-
tentiallyfundamentalcriticismof scientificethnogra-
phyis that settingup a specificdata collectionprotocol
introducesan artificialstructurewhich itselfinfluences
informantbehaviorin a way thatnaturalisticparticipa-
tion in social activities by the ethnographerdoes not
(e.g.,Hammersleyi990:9). It is truethat,if everyonein
a groupreactsin the same fashionto beinginterviewed,
then the analysis cannot determinewhat effectbeing
interviewedhas on responsescomparedwith,forexam-
ple, "naturalistic" discourse with the same sample of
informants. However,the mere presenceof the ethnog-
rapherin a social situationalso has an unknowableef-
fecton the behaviorof those around the ethnographer,
so traditionalparticipantobservationis just as subject
to the criticismof introducingsome bias into observed
the influenceof each variablebeingcalculatedindependently of
the effectsof the variablesidentifiedin othercolumns.This is
generallypartof the effort to establishstatisticalcontrolforthe
causal complexityof events,used when experimental controlis
impossible,as it is in mostsocialscienceresearch(RaginI987:58-
59).
Methodsthatfocusattentiondirectlyon the cases themselves
(such as comparativeeventhistory),in contrast,can be seen as
"row-oriented." For example,standardqualitativemethodsoften
directattentionto the explanationof the particularcombination
ofaspectsofsinglecases,notas a possibleoutcomeofmoregeneral
processes(i.e.,interestis not strictly theoretical)(RaginI987:53).
Classical ethnography is such a method,althoughmoreformal
methodscan also be appliedto singlecases (e.g.,contentanalysis
orRagin's"qualitativecomparative analysis").Butthedatamatrix
used by comparativeevent-history methodsis different fromthe
standard datamatrixdescribedabove,in whichonlya singleobser-
vationis made on each case, so thateach columnrepresents an
aspectofan observation (i.e.,an abstractcharacteristic
orvariable).
In the comparativeevent-history approach,each columnof data
represents an observation ofthedifferent case histories,
an identi-
fiableeventthathas been coded to capturethose aspectsof its
naturerelevantto thestudyquestionat hand.Further, in thepro-
cess of data analysis,these methodsviolatethe integrity of the
datamatrixin severalwaysnotseen in generalizedlinearmodels.
Byanalogyto thematrixofvalues in computermemory, the"ad-
dressability"ofparticular datapointsis lostbecausevaluescan be
shuffledbetweencolumns(butnotbetweenrows).In addition,the
numberofcolumnsmaydiffer betweenrows,so thatthedatama-
trixis no longerrectangular. Each row or case is treatedquite
independently, as in traditional qualitativemethods.
Thus,thereflexive analyticalapproachis column-oriented, using
thefirstkindofdata,whilethecomparative event-history approach
is row-oriented and basedon thesecondkindofdata.Thesediffer-
encesin analyticorientation and data typesmakeit verydifficult
to combinethetwo approachesundera singleanalyticumbrella.
 AUNGER Ethnography:Storytellingor Science? I ]

behaviorsand responsesas any otherelicitationproce- and Esseveld I99I:I50). Nevertheless,most liberation-

dure (exceptcovertones). ists (e.g.,Fabian I99I:I95; Wolfi992:6) do not advocate
A complaint specifically against quantitative ap- thatWesternersstop conductingfieldwork.What is the
proachesis thatreplicationin human studiesis impossi- conscientiousethnographer to do?
ble: repeatingan observationwould requirecontrolover In fact,this dilemma cannot be minimized,because
events involvingpeople, which is neitherfeasible nor thepolitical-economiceffectssuggestedby thesecritical
ethical (HammersleyI990:57). However,this argument ethnographers do exist. The case studyusing the reflex-
reflectsa false conceptionof replication.The complete ive analyticalapproachdiscussed above (AungerI994a)
set of circumstancessurroundingany particularevent determinedthatinformants in Zaire bias theirresponses
can neverbe duplicated.Replicationis always a matter in a numberof specificways when the interrogator is a
of degree, regardless of the procedure involved (see powerfulinterloperinto theirsocial circles ratherthan
White I990, quoted above). Within the variable condi- a local individual.However,I would argue that merely
tionsofan ethnographicobservation,thereare elements by providingevidence of the political/epistemological
thatare commonwith otherobservationswhichprovide factorsintrinsicto the ethnographicsituation,the re-
sufficientmaterialforscientificinvestigation. flexiveanalyticalapproachrepresentsa partialsolution
The two-stepapproachalso does not dehumanizethe to the liberationistdilemma. Thus, to findout what ef-
subjects of ethnographicresearchas some criticsargue fect being an expatriaterepresentativeof a colonialist
"reductionistic"scientificmethodsdo (e.g.,Tyleri99i). power has on what informantssay or do in one's pres-
On the contrary, because of theirsituationalism,the re- ence, one can rigorouslycompareit with theirbehavior
flexiveand event-historical approachesview individuals with persons of their own culture in similar circum-
as strategizing agents.They do not gloss overdifferences stances.
in motivation,belief,behavior,or life experiencebut This does not represent a complete solution, of
admitthis variabilitydirectlyinto the analysis,thereby course, because it remains to do somethingabout the
grantinga considerabledegree of personhoodto those imbalance of power in ethnographicresearch.As a first
livingin othercultures.Since moral systemsare some- step,selectionofresearchquestionscan certainlybe tied
times judged by theirtoleranceof the deviant,I argue to issues decided by the native communityratherthan
thatthistreatmentofvariationin the two-stepapproach by Western intellectual fashion. Further,the results
is humane. fromAunger (I994a), suggestthat the best way to get
Finally,the recentround of self-reflection about eth- high-qualityethnographicdata is to turndata collection
nographic practice has had the virtue of increasing overto those who are enculturatedin the culturalgroup
awarenessnot only about the rhetoricalbut also about of interest.Of course,the researchwill probablynot be
theethicalnatureofethnographic research.A numberof done withoutthe directionand monies of the ethnogra-
criticalethnographers(e.g.,Fabian I983, I99i; Rosaldo pher-a point recognized by feministethnographers,
I989; Said I978, i989) are concernedwith the intrinsic who argue that since the researchercontrolsthe terms
differencesin power between ethnographersand their of interactionand the framingof the study,a powerdif-
subjects. Fabian (I99I:I93-94), for example, believes ferentialexists between ethnographerand informant
that "hangingthe walls fullwith reflexivemirrorsmay even if women are writingabout women. As a result,
brightenthe place, but offersno way out [ofthe ethnog- theyarguethatone must adoptin one's researcha politi-
rapher'sdilemma of being]... stuck in the dirtof poli- cal agenda explicitlydirectedat overcomingthe forces
tics or the mire of epistemologicalquandaries." Some of the oppression(Mascia-Lees, Sharp,and Cohen I993:
reactto thisproblemby arguingthatanthropology must 246). Perhapsan intimatecollaborationbetweenethnog-
become "emancipatory"or "participatory"byhumaniz- raphersand local individuals,fromresearchdesignand
ing the conditions of life in the cultural group being executionto the interpretation ofresults,would provide
studied (Burawoyet al. i992, Fals-Bordaand Rahman the best, if still imperfect,solution.20Even so, concern
I99I, Huizer I979, Scholte I974, Stull and Schensul with social power is absolutely necessaryfor a more
I987, Torbert I99I, van Willigen, Rylko-Bauer,and completeunderstanding ofthe situationaland historical
McElroy I989, White I99I, Wulffand Fiske i987). This contextof ethnographicfieldwork.However, the exis-
can involvereturningthe knowledgegained throughre- tence of power differentials even at the interpersonal
search to the communityfromwhich it was derived level does notprecludea scientificanalysisofsocial phe-
(ratherthan merelyenhancingthe Westernacademic's nomena; rather,it precludes exclusive reliance on re-
reputation)or, more radical, making research itself a searchers'personalsentimentsand observations,which
formofaction designedto betterconditionsin the com- must necessarilybe biased by theirpositions in social
munity.Argyris,Putnam,and Smith (I985) and Torbert
(i99i) emphasize the need forthe animator/researcher
to acquirethenecessaryself-reflexive, and 20. Variousformsof such collaborationhave been utilizedby a
interpersonal,
sociopoliticalskills beforeattemptingto lead othersinto varietyofethnographers (e.g.,Abu-LughodI992, BeharI993, Ber-
the developmentof novel social organizationalforms. nardandPedrazaI989, ChapmanI992, CrapanzanoI980, Davison
and Womenof MutiraI989, Dwyeri982). However,theworkof
However, "it is impossible to create a researchprocess eachparticipant/author in theethnographic report,althoughoften
that erases the contradictions(in power and conscious- contextualizedinside framingdevices,remainsfragmentary and
ness) betweenresearcherand researched"(Acker,Barry, thusis notvalidatedby an overarching analyticalframework.

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II4 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 36, Number i, FebruaryI995

I thereforeconclude thatscientificanalysisand evalu with an academic but not a natural history)can lead
ation is not a valueless, morallyodious, or impossible researchprogramsto become moribund:a science that
goal for ethnography.In fact, I maintain that formal does not "carve natureat its joints" will be moredebili-
methodsprovidea rigorousmeans of addressingmany tatedthan one that simplymakes relativelylargeobser-
of the issues consideredimportantby interpretivist an. vation errors.Powerfulexplanationsdeal with "natural
thropologists.In general, as noted by Behrens (i990 kinds,"entitiesthathave causal forcein the world.Un-
325-26), statisticianshave been extremelycreativeir fortunately, thereis no scientificmethodfordiscovering
theirdevelopmentofmethodsto deal withtypesofprob. what categoriesofthingsin theworldconstitutenatural
lems previouslytreatedin a purelyinterpretive manner kinds. Progressiveresearchprograms,it seems, can be
"Take forinstancethe impactofmultidimensionalscal. discernedonly by theirresults.
ing on the measurementand representation of complex In any case, the battle over epistemologyhas been
culturalconstructs.Who in the 40's or 50's mighthave won: it is now widelyagreedthatpositivism-or at least
thoughtit possible to derivea statisticalrepresentatior its objectivistepistemology-is dead (RosenbergI988,
of emotions or kin relations,concepts of illness, or a Bohman I99i, Outhwaite i987). However,debates
culture'sfoodclassification?... [New techniques]havc about ontologycontinueto rage.Forexample,an impor-
allowed us to quantifywhat were once thoughtof as tant currenttheoreticalcontroversyin sociologyis the
strictlyqualitativephenomena." The continuingdevel. so-called agency/structuredebate (see Archer I988;
opmentof formalanalyticalmethodssuggeststhat the Bourdieu I977, I984; Giddens I979, i984). This is the
approachoutlinedherecan serveas a generalframework latest incarnationof the ancient rivalrybetween parti-
forconductingreplicable ethnographicresearchon the sans of intentionalityand those who argue that human
fullrangeof traditionalanthropologicaltopics,fromso- action is significantly constrainedby social institutions.
cial interactionpatternsto marriagerules and religious Perhapsit is time forethnographers to followthe exam-
beliefs. ple of theirsociological cousins. We should turnour at-
Several importantimplications of the analysis herc tentionfromsolipsisticconcernswith textsto substan-
have not been previouslynoted.First,the textualistcon- tive questionsabout what variationin culturalpractices
cern with ethnographicrepresentationwas part of the can tell us about the human condition.
reason thattheircritiqueappearedto lead to an analyti-
cal impasse. The implicit goal of both traditionaland
textualistethnography, to depict cultures,requiresthat
a culturebe a self-consistent, integratedwhole capable Comments
ofbeingpresentedin some unidimensionalform.But as
Barth (I993:4) argues, "we must break loose fromoui
rootmetaphorofsocietyas a systemofarticulatedparts. ANDREW ABBOTT
The image is too simple,and it misleads," because soci- Departmentof Sociology,Universityof Chicago,
etyis not an organicbodywithdefiniteboundariesand a Chicago, 111.60637, U.S.A. I5 vIII 94
particularnature.Rather,it is the resultofmultifarious
agents' performanceof specificroles,each with unique After some years' service in the epistemological
competenciesand different strategies.From these con- trenches,I have begunto sense an uncannyresemblance
siderations,Barth(I993:4) concludes that "the image of between methodologicaldebates and the westernfront
processes serves us betterthan that of a structureor a ofI9I4-I7; soldiersgo overthetopintotheno-man's-
closed system." land between the two cultures while their generals
Further,the debatesregardingreflexivity in the social dream of the ultimate breakthrough.Now comes
sciences have overemphasized epistemological and Aungerand proposes,ifnot the Christmastruce,at the
purelymethodologicalconcerns.Assumptionsabout the least a joiningofforcesagainsta common enemy.What
nature of reality (ontology)made by researchershave is one to make of this?
been shown hereto have moresignificantconsequences Aungerurges us to combine his reflexiveanalytical
foran approach (a claim repeatedlymade by the "new approachand the approachhe kindlyattributesto Peter
structuralists"as well [e.g., Outhwaite I987, Layder Abell and me, that of comparativeevent analysis. By
I990, Giddens I99I, Bhaskar I9791).For example, de- doing this, he argues,we will achieve the best of both
spite an objectivistepistemology,microeconomicshas sides of an old dichotomy and will answer a now-
made considerableprogressin describingindividualde- common extremistcritique.Aungeruses the extremist
cisions regardingresource allocation, indicating that critique-the "writingcultures" traditionand the vari-
havingthe correctepistemologyis less importantin im- ous solipsistand "positional" positionsrelatedto it-as
plementinga theorythan having the rightontological a foil to stimulate reconciliation of event-basedand
categories.In particular,the choice ofontologyhas been variables-basedapproaches.
shown to determinean approach's notion of causality, Of the extremecritiqueI shall say little.By aimingto
units ofanalysis,logical form,temporalframework, and findthe rightway to talk about culturesit denies the
quality assessment criteria.Sperber(i985) and Boyer very premise fromwhich it starts. When the smoke
(I994) have emphasizedthatgrantingontologicalreality clears, this particulargroup of lying Cretans has the
to inappropriatelycharacterizedconcepts (i.e., those same interestsas I, or Aunger,or most othersocial sci-

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 AUNGER Ethnography: or Science?I II5
Storytelling

entists:discoveringhow the social processunfoldsin all the validity of responses. Abell and I, however,think
its flagrantdiversity. thateven these elicitationstudiesproducefallaciousre-
The real question is whetherwe who analyze the so sults, because the analysis of variance presupposes
cial process with "formalist"methods ought now, ir thingsabout people and actions that aren't true: that
thispresentmoment,to followAunger'sprescriptionoi aspects of themare separable,thatthereare such things
rejoiningeventsand variables.I do not thinkwe should as "main effects,"and so on. Undertakinga general-
To be sure,eclecticismis always thebestpracticalstrat linear-reality-basedanalysis of response bias (as it is
egyat a given time.Broadresults,multimethodresults called in the trade)doesn't reallyrespondto the concep-
triangulatedresultsare always best fora givenempirical tual issue involved.
question.We'd ratherknow more than less, we'd rathei Yet this is preciselywhat Aungeradvocates.He deals
have two takes on a subjectthan one, and so on. But we withelicitationeffectsbyassumingthattheyare separa-
purchase eclecticism at a price. We pay firsta price ir ble consequencesofdifferent attributes:thatstatusdoes
methodologicalconsistency.Eclecticism becomes the so-and-so,that kinship does such-and-such,and so on.
last refugeof the intellectuallylazy: "Don't worry,an- That's what "statistical analysis with variables" as-
otherview ofthe problemwill pin thingsdown." By nol sumes. But Abell and I argue that one can't separate
discipliningourselvesto followone methodor approach kinshipand statusin thisway. Because individuals'vari-
to its logical conclusion we easily overlookmattersthai ous qualities are all bound up together,it makes more
proveto be fundamentalto it. NeitherPeterAbell norI sense to tryto groupdifferent typesofindividuals.Then
would have seen theprofoundproblemsin generallineai one can look forelicitationeffects(ifone chooses) with
realityif we hadn't at times been the exact opposite oJ respectto these types.
eclectics, closing our minds against the general-linear- Thus I agreethatstudyingsourcesofvariationin data
realityapproachin a quite bigotedfashion.Many people is crucial. But I don't think that "the classificationof
do verygood and veryinterestingsocial science within eventscannot include explicitrecognitionof elicitation
what we so stronglyrejected. effects."On the contrary,it would be quite interesting
Second,not onlymay our personalviews of a particu- to code data on one eventsequence as perceivedby doz-
lar problembe thus impoverishedbut new views in gen- ens of different actors and then to classifythe different
eral may become more difficultto develop. To turnthe renditionsof the sequence-right down to inclusion of
comparative-eventperspective into a broad approacb different action chains, different subevents,and so on.
equivalentto its predecessorswill requirea whole com- One could begin to characterizesocial groupsin terms
munityof like-mindedpeople. A communityof eclec- of the commonalitiesbetween theirdifferential percep-
ticswon't work.Lazersfeld,Duncan, and theotherswho tionsofwhat happenedat the Rashomon.There is noth-
developed contemporaryquantitative social science ing in the comparative-event approachthatforbidssuch
were, althoughnot a communityof bigots,certainlya an analysis, contraryto Aunger's implication. What
communityof enthusiasts.Had each given the othera mattersis ratherthat such an analysis of elicitationis
full,eclectic critique,theywould neverhave built even true to the project of thinkingof social life in terms
a small bodyofwork,much less the largeone thatthey ofactors,processes,and actions,which a general-linear-
did. They knew the foundational problems in their reality-basedstudyof elicitationeffectsis not.
work;Duncan's quixotic Notes on Social Measurement
(i984) makes that veryclear. But theysubmergedtheir
doubtsin the adventureof development. ARIE DE RUIJTER
My general complaint about eclecticism once ex- Departmentof CulturalAnthropology,Utrecht
pressed,I would like to speak to the issue of reflexivity, University,Utrecht,The Netherlands.8 VIII 94
which is afterall the heart of Aunger's critiqueof the
comparative-eventperspective.For Aunger,reflexivity Aunger's paper is very well-structured.Using a tried-
means dealing with "elicitation effects,"the conse- and-truerhetoricaldevice,Aungerformulatesquestions
quences of the data-gathering situationforour results. forus, points out dilemmas,proposesa series of poten-
This is an unusual definitionforreflexivity, but let it tial solutions,is not afraidof self-criticism.
As a result,
standforthe moment. his conclusion not only appears completelylogical but
First,Aunger's own reflexiveanalytical approach is reassuresus. He leads us by the hand fromthe opposi-
itselfreflexiveonlygivencertainassumptionsabout ob- tion between storytellingand science to the comple-
servers.Aungeremployedmultipleobserversof a single mentarityof storytellingand science. To put it briefly,
phenomenonand then predicteddifferent observations the article is certainlysuccessful on the storytelling
of thatphenomenonon the basis of antecedentcharac- level. If,however,one succeeds in resistingthe tempta-
teristicsof the observers.But he did this with an analy- tion of being taken by the hand, one is led to ask
sis of variance,which presupposespreciselythe general whetherAunger'sclaim thathis particulartwo-stepap-
linearmodel of realityagainstwhich Abell and I argue. proach is "necessary and sufficientto providea scien-
Aungerthus misses an essential part of our critiqueof tific explanation of processes affectingcultural do-
thatmodel. People in the surveybusinesshave been un- mains" is as convincingas it seems. In orderto answer
dertakinganalyses of elicitation effectsfordecades; in this question I will examine his firsttwo assumptions
marketresearch,money-often lots ofmoney-rides on more close1v.

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ii6 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 36, Number I, February1995

First of all, Aunger advocates reflexivitybecause of meaning which forms the basis of metaphoricallan-
the interpersonalnature of data collection in human guage use. (2) From the above it follows that data are
studies.He considersreflexivity to be an aspect ofanaly- constructsanchored in concepts. Since constructsare
sis ratherthanofrepresentation in theethnographic doc- tiedto particularplaces and periodsoftime,translatabil-
ument. This redefinitionof reflexivitydoes, however, ity,comparability, and commensurability are mattersof
take the stingout of the criticismof postmodernistsor interest.Kuhn (i962), amongstothers,has pointed out
(to put it even more generally)constructivistssuch as thatdifferent paradigmsmake us see thingsdifferently.
Latourand Woolgar(i986). It is exactlythe postmodern Researchworkersin different paradigmshave not only
textualistcritiquewhich calls forattentionto the pro- different conceptsbut also different perceptions.Even if
cess of transformation wherebythe ethnographer's field we accept thatresearchers,Aungerincluded,use differ-
experienceis translatedinto an ethnographicreport. ent methods forsettingup researchand evaluatingits
Reflectionson the natureand methodof composition results,the question remainsin what way and to what
of the representation, the role of rhetoricaldevices,the extent the combination of the two can be unambigu-
restrictionsimposedby conventionsand styles,the con- ously and consistentlyunderpinned,and surely this
structedcharacterofethnography's authenticityand au- question is both importantand relevant.Should not at-
thority,and the political and ideological context in tentionbe paid to the problem in judgingthat occurs
which the ethnographicprocesstakes place have caused when "data" and concepts are joined? Althoughjudg-
postmoderniststo argue that data do not exist priorto mentsare the productsof the universalhuman capacity
but take formduringan interpretivedialogue in which to judge, of a "natural rationality"(Barnes I976), con-
researchers,researched,and readersparticipate:"Scien- cretejudgmentsare decisionsbased on information. The
tificactivityis just one social arena where knowledge interestingelement in this is that judgmentsare not
is constructed"(Latourand Woolgar I986:31). formedaccordingto rules,but theyare also not arbitrary
Should one drawthe conclusionthattheethnographic (BrownI988: I 38-39; see also Sperberand Wilson i986).
documentis merelya construct?Since severaldialogues On the basis of the above considerations,I feel a
take place in different contexts,there are also several strongneed forclarificationof Aunger's recommenda-
constructsdiffering fromeach otherin, amongstother tions that the researcheruse and report(i) "an explicit
things,conceptualframework.The question remains- method formaking inferencesfromprimarydata" and
and I forone cannot answerit-whether the confronta- (2) "a means of assessing the natureand qualityof data
tion of constructsleads simplyto the refinementof de- priorto the inferencestep." As concernsi, what exactly
bate or to the developmentof a betterdescriptionor is meantbyprimarydata? First-levelconcepts,verbatim
approximationof reality.For the time being,I am satis- answers, first(hand)impressions, or something else?
fiedwith the thesis that reflexivity allows us more in- With regardto 2, I doubt the fruitfulness or validityof
sightinto the process throughwhich realityis encoun- the advocated differentiation into phases. Is not infer-
teredand construedbut does not in itselflead to a better ence inherentin perception?
productas far as the representationof realityis con-
cerned.On this point I disagreewith Aunger,since he
believes that representationis possible (for instance, MALCOLM M. DOW
"this approach can effectively separatepurelymethod- DepartmentofAnthropology, Northwestern
ological biases in interviewresponsesfromanswersthat University,Evanston,Ill. 60208, U.S.A. 26 IX 94
more trulyreflectbeliefsof informants").
Aunger'ssecond assumptionis thatit is necessaryto Aungercorrectlyidentifiesa mistaken(thoughoftenre-
specifythe contextof the data collection event in the peated) overgeneralizationin the recent spate of self-
analysis. This assumptionignoresthe issue of the im- critical literatureon ethnographicreportwriting:that
possibilityoffullyspecifyingthe contextofthedata col- because each ethnographic interview is essentially
lectionevent.I reasonfromthe followingtwo premises: unique in termsof the individuals involved,theirspe-
(I) Language use is always metaphorical(Hesse ig80). cific interactions,the physical and political contextof
Languageis, afterall, primarilyan orderingmechanism. theinterview,etc.,it is simplyimpossibleto drawscien-
Phenomenaand objects are joined togetheron the basis tific generalizations about human behaviors either
ofcertainconsiderations.Certainaspects ofan objector within or across cultures.To the contrary,Aungerar-
situation are thoughtof as characteristic,while other gues thatratherthan prematurelysurrendering the goal
aspectsare simultaneouslydeclaredinsignificant forthe of scientificgeneralizationin culturalanthropologywe
ordering.There is a whole networkofrelationsbetween should measure and include in the relevantmodel vari-
concepts,which means thata primitiveimplicittheory ables that code for relevant contextual features; his
exists. The imposingof an orderis in essence no more reflexiveanalyticalapproachrequiresthatsuch context-
thanthe selectionand groupingofobjectsand situations sensitive measures be part of the model. His data-
on the basis of observed differencesand similarities. analyticproceduresallow him to partitionvariationin
Which order one imposes depends on the perspective responsesacross distinct(unique, ifyou prefer)settings
that is used. This means that the transferof meaning to determine, using formal inference procedures,
fromone object to another is an essential element of whether any similarities can be established. That is,
ordering.However, it is the mechanism of transferringratherthan assertingthat no scientificgeneralizations

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can be producedfrommultitexturedethnographicdata
Aungerproposesto assess whethergeneralizationsofin
terestto the ethnographer can be foundin thedata usinE
explicit,replicableinferentialmethods.
Aunger'sreflexiveanalytical approach is a new wa)
ofaddressingthe crucial,thoughstill routinelyavoided
problemofaccuracyin ethnographicinterviewdata. As
sessingthe degreeof errorin "key" informants'reports
on behaviors and beliefs should be central to cultural
anthropologicaldiscussion of appropriatedata-captur(
methods. Traditional ethnographicfield practice still
commonly involves collecting reports from a small
numberof "key" informantson behaviorsand beliefso:
interest.However, in studies carriedout in the earl)
I980S by Russ Bernardand his colleagues (see Bernard
et al. i984) the qualityofthe data capturedbysuch tradi-
tionaland stillwidelyused ethnographicinterviewprac-
tices has been called into question. On the basis oftheii
own seven field studies and afterreviewingscores ol
other empirical studies in such areas as child care,
healthcare,communication,and social interaction,Ber-
nardet al. (pp. 503-5, emphasis added) conclude that
these studies lead to one overwhelmingconclusion:
on average,about half of what informantsreportis
probablyincorrectin some way.... thereappearsto
be systematicdistortionin how informantsrecall
just about everything.Furthermore, recall may be af-
fectedby the subject of the study,by whetherinfor-
mants are aided in theirrecall in some way during
the interview(e.g.,givingthem checklistsrather
thanopen-endedquestions),by whethertheykeep di-
aries,by conditionsof the interview,or by a variety
of culturalfactors.Therehas hardly been any re-
search at all on any of these things.
It is astonishingthat a decade later this is still the case
(notableexceptionsbeingFreemanet al. I987 and Rom-
ney et al. i986). Indeed, as Aungerpoints out, the cur-
rent bout of critical self-examinationby "textualists"
has in factled to little change in ethnographicdata col-
lection methods. The currentpreoccupationin ethno-
graphicwritingis with the presentationof various ac-
counts and not at all with theiraccuracy.The obvious
conclusion here, that the great majorityof interview-
based ethnographicstudies are probablymethodologi-
cally problematic,is of major significanceforthe disci-
pline.
Aungerhas, I believe,made a majorcontributionwith
a new proposal forassessing and includingfactorsthat
maylead to informant unreliability.Essentially,his idea
is to include variables that code identifiablefactorsof
theinterviewsituation-physical and social context,in-
terviewer attributes, interviewer-respondent interac-
tion, and so on. Such contextualvariables permithim
to partitionthe likelihood of discrepanciesin responses
on food taboos by his informantsat two time periods
into percentagesdue to interviewereffects,informant-
based effects,and interactions.To my knowledge,this
is a new approach to assessing the magnitudeand the
sources of unreliabilityin ethnographicdata. Applica-
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AUNGER Ethnography:Storytellingor Science? I I]
tion of his reflexiveanalyticalapproachto new data on
foodavoidances ofindividualsin the IturiForestreveals
that the likelihood of "response error"by informants
to the same questions at two points in time could be
attributedmostly to informantcognitivevariationand
almost none to memoryand recall effects.The minute
effectofmemoryand recallis especiallysurprising given
the extensive work in this area by D'Andrade and
Shwederand others.The relativelylargeeffectsofinter-
viewer and interviewer-informant interaction clearly
validateAunger'sclaim thatsuch effectsare measurable
and nontrivialand should be includedas controlfactors
in "reflexive"ethnographicresearch.
Aungergives a broad overviewof some of the more
exciting developments in contemporary statistical
methodology.Here I have two points of disagreement.
First, his critique of general-linear-modelstatistical
methodologyrelies too heavily on Abbott'searlierone.
In particular,the casewise-independenceassumptionis
no longer required in situations in which individuals
are in interactionand clearlyinfluenceone another.A
relativelynew class of networkautocorrelationmodels
specificallyincorporatessample-unitinterdependencies.
Second, it is not the case that "sociograms and other
diagrammaticforms"of data representationcannot be
made reflexive.Sociograms,in particular,are easily re-
stated in matrixnotation,and recentlydeveloped qua-
draticassignmentregressionproceduresallow a depen-
dent matrixof interactionsto be regressedon a set of
independentinteractionmatrices.It is straightforward
to code "reflexive"-type matrices and include them as
regressors,much as dummy variables are commonly
used in standardregressionmodels.
Overall, this is an impressivepiece of work. Aunger
is to be congratulatedforinsistingthatthe goal ofscien-
tificgeneralizationbe made centralto the task of eth-
nographyand for introducingnew methods and data
that demonstratehow such generalizationsmight be
achieved. If the Hegelian dialectic of thesis,antithesis,
and synthesisreallyapplies to the currentanthropologi-
cal discourseon "objectivity"and "scientificgeneraliza-
tion," theremay be some gain in mutingthe "hard-soft"
battle. At least some of the time, the discipline needs
individualswith diverse tastes attemptingto work to-
gethertowardsthe same end. Withoutmore work like
Aunger's the goal of sound generalizationsis unlikely
to be attained.It may be that to bringthis about will
requirea revolutionin the political economyof anthro-
pologydepartments.
GERARD DUVEEN
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University
ofCambridge,Cambridge CB2 3RQ, U.K. I2 VIII 94
Aungerpresentswhat mightbe called a reportfroma
battlefield,or perhaps I should say a despatch froma
combatant,since as authorhe is also participant,and it
is as protagonistthat he is able to send out a signal of
"victory"even if it "has been hard-won."Ethnography,
ii8 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 36, Number I, February1995

it seems, has been saved forscience througha judicious tion which is detached fromsociety,and it is this as-
combination of formal methods and interpretiveap- sumptionwhichI want to question.He writesas though
proaches.And yet I findmyselfunable to join the cele- the social sciences were capable of producingan objec-
bration,since what he claims as victoryseems to my tive account of social phenomena provided that they
eyes closer to what I would recogniseas defeat.Before used an appropriatemethodology.But whose account
explainingmy reactionin more detail I should perhaps would this be? Whose voice could articulateobjective
add that I come to his paper not as an anthropologist knowledgeof society?It seems to me, rather,that the
but as a social psychologist,that is, froma discipline historyof the social sciences is a historyof diversity
which has sufferedmore than most fromthe reification which shows little indication of convergence. The
of formalmethods.Indeed, like many social psycholo- mindsof enoughgood scholarsand researchershave en-
gists I have foundmyselfturningto the use of ethno- gagedthese problemsforus to have recognisedsuch ob-
graphicmethods in researchin orderto recovera per- jective knowledgeif it were accessible to us. In spite of
spective on the meaningfuland intentionalaspects of his disavowals, Aunger's position remains within the
human activitywhichformalmethodsofdata collection cycle of positivist thinking,to the extent that even
and analysis have obscured (e.g., Lloyd and Duveen wherehe appearsto take account ofcriticalperspectives
I992, Duveen and Lloyd I993). It may be thatfromthe these have in fact been assimilated within a positivist
perspectiveof social psychologythe battlefieldappears framework.
to be a differentone fromthe one which Aunger de- Perhapswe expectdifferent thingsfromethnography.
scribes,but the issues which divide us do not seem to I expectit to yieldan explorationofthe meaningswhich
me to be merelydisciplinaryquestions. social actorsengage,and the onlyway ofgraspingmean-
As he is aware, the strategyof incorporating quantifi- ings is by articulatingthem throughother meanings.
cation and statistical analysis into ethnographyis not This is what makes the social sciences an interpretive
one which would commend itself unequivocally endeavour,and because ofthisI also expectto finddiver-
throughoutthe communityof ethnographers. However, sity among scholars. Diversity in the social sciences
my concern is not with these techniques themselves, seems to me to be the corollaryof a constructivistepis-
which have theirplace withinan approachwhich Mos- temology,and it cannot be eradicatedsimply through
covici (i982) has describedas "methodologicalpolythe- the adoptionof formalmethods.
ism." Rather,my centralconcernis one of perspective
which I can best introduceby pointingto some signifi-
cant weaknesses in Aunger'sarguments. LINDA C. GARRO
Sometimesthe weaknesses are embeddedin the way Departmentof CommunityHealth Sciences,
he formulateshis points. For instance,he describeshis Universityof Manitoba, Winnipeg,MB, Canada
second criterionof ethnographicacceptibilityby saying R3E OW3. 8 VIII 94
"it is necessaryto specifyfullythe contextof the data
collectioneventin the analysis." Who amongstus could While Aunger's paper encompasses far more than the
claim the perspicacityto meet such a criterion?As re- reflexiveanalyticalapproach,my commentswill focus
searcherswe are ourselves social and historicalagents, on this topic. By urginganthropologiststo directmore
and one consequence is thatwe operatewithina context systematicattentionto the data collectionsituationand
which we can never "fullyspecify"! by clearlyexplaininga rationaleand means forfurther-
At othertimesit is therigidityofhis argumentwhich ing this objective,Aunger provides an explicit frame-
leads to a lack of what I mightcall interpretive flexibil- workforaddressingreflexivity (whetherone agreeswith
ity. He writes,for example, that his proposals would his definitionor not) and its implicationsforanthropo-
grant"a considerabledegreeof personhoodto those liv- logical practice.He contends that formalmethods can
ing in othercultures."But "personhood"is itselfa cul- contributeto reflexiveanalysisbyascertaining"the way
turallyembeddednotion,and the characteristicshe at- in which the elicitation process itself biases observa-
tributesto it are not objectivebut a reflectionofhis own tions" throughdividingthe observedphenomenoninto
culturalinsertion(and even withinthisculturalsystem, "observer-or situation-derivedand subject-based as-
can therebe degreesofpersonhood?).He makes this ar- pects."
gumentto suggestthat his proposalsoffera "humane" Aungerbrieflydiscusses an example illustratinghow
approachin its treatmentofinformants, but the human- this approachcan be operationalized.Using logisticre-
itywhich is offered has a distinctlyWesternflavour;not gression,the proportionalcontributionof factorsin his
everyculturewould construeindividualsas "strategiz- model to explained variabilitycan be determined.He
ing agents." finds,forinstance,that I4% of the probabilitythat an
If I have identifiedthese points fromhis text it is informantwould give different responses to the same
not to defendthe "textualist"school which he seeks to questionat different times is attributableto interviewer
challengebut ratherbecause theyseem to me symptom- effects.However,this and the otherpercentagesare dif-
atic ofan unacknowledgedassumptionwhichpermeates ficultto interpret,as theirrelevanceis best understood
his text and determineshis rhetoric.Aunger'sposition with referenceto the proportionof the total variability
appearsto me to reston the assumptionthatthe social explained by the model. This informationis not pro-
sciences can articulateknowledgeofsocietyfroma posi- vided by Aunger,who says only that "the overall sig-

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 AUNGER Ethnography:
Storytelling
or Science? I I9

nificanceof the statisticalmodels indicatedthat a con- And althoughI workto distancemyselffrombiomedical

siderable proportion of the variability observed in practitioners,it is ethically importantfor all partici-
responseswas not explainedby the model." The smaller pants to be aware thatthe studyis university-based and
the amount of observed variabilityexplained by the to understandthe ways in which the findingswill be
model, the weaker the explanatorypower of the vari- disseminated.This context,which remainsconstantre-
ables in the model. Additionally,details such as the sig- gardlessofwho conductsthe interview,undoubtedlyin-
nificancelevels associated with the differenttypes of fluenceshow individualsrespond.But is this an effect
factorsand their constituentvariables would help re- which can be measured? Further,Aunger has defined
searchersto evaluate this approachand its implications and limited reflexivityto the data collection situation.
forethnographicinquiry.Further,while Aungerascribes Can concerns about reflexivitybe reduced to method-
the unexplained variabilityto unspecifiedsituational ological mattersand divorcedfromthe formulationof
factors,it is also plausible that,forexample,characteris- the researchproblemand the researchdesign?
tics of the informants,interviewers,or questions that
were not consideredin the model mighthave explana-
toryvalue if theywere included.In correlationalanaly- MARTYN HAMMERSLEY
ses, explanationis necessarilycouched in termsof the School of Education, Open University,Walton Hall,
specificvariables the investigatorchooses to examine Milton Keynes, U.K. 3 VIII 94
and operationalize.If variables are not included, their
contributioncannot be evaluated. Aunger begins fromthe premiss that until I983 "the
Overall,however,Aunger'sattemptto tease apartthe authorityof an ethnographicreportwas assumed to be,
many aspects of the data collection situation that can and effectively was, inviolate because of the lack of al-
influenceobservationsis laudable. It is to be hoped that ternativeviewpoints on a particularcultural group."
researcherswill follow his lead, forit is throughaddi- This is a considerableexaggeration,at best. To mention
tional empirical work that the advantages of such an just one example, Lewis's restudyof Tepoztlan raised
approach relative to its drawbacks can be assessed. It some of the same problemsas Freeman'sre-evaluation
may well provedifficultor infeasibleto implementthe of Mead's work and also led to debates about the objec-
specificrepeated-interview, design tivityand validity of ethnographicaccounts (see Pad-
multiple-interviewer
describedby Aungerin some settings.In addition,the dock Ig6I). I doubt that the ethnographer'sauthority
repetitionof a structuredinterviewwill likely test the has ever been taken as "inviolate." Nevertheless,it is
patience and willingnessof participants.Even so, many probablytrue that the questioningof ethnographicau-
systematicdata collection techniquescan be adaptedto thority,not least by ethnographersthemselves (Ham-
satisfythe criteriahe proposes. Althoughhe excludes mersleyI992), has neverbeen greaterthan it is today.
qualitative analytic methods that representdata (e.g., I agreewith Aungerthat what he calls the textualist
tree diagramsand multidimensionalscaling diagrams), critiquehas substanceand thattheresponseto it should
it would oftenbe possible to collect data in a manner not be to abandon a scientificapproach to ethnogra-
consistentwith the reflexiveanalyticalapproachand to phy-that a rigorousapproachto analysingethnographic
carryout such an analysis priorto the representational data is possible and desirable. However, what he pro-
procedure.One interestingapplicationwould be to add poses seems to me to be defectivein threerespects.
a reflexivedimension(as specifiedbyAunger)to a study First,I thinkhe fails to understandthe radicalnature
like Boster's (i985), in which individualswho gave the ofthe textualistcritique.He writesas ifhe believedthat
more culturallyconsistentanswers,that is, those who he had met the criticisms coming from this source,
agreed more with others,also tended to be the more when in facthe largelyignoresthe textualists'mostfun-
reliable in a test-retestsituation. The contributionof damental (if misconceived) arguments.Thus, some of
variabilityin the two data collection situations to an them claim that cognitiverepresentationis not possi-
understandingof variabilityin responsescould then be ble-that ethnography necessarilyinvolvespoliticalrep-
comparedwith the effectof participantcharacteristics, resentationand in practiceoftenpolitical repression.In
includingagreementwith sharedculturalknowledge.It order to meet this criticism,he needs to address the
should be noted that in domains characterizedby high issues of how cognitiverepresentationis possible, how
culturalagreementone would expect less variabilityin the idea ofethnographicscience can be defended,and in
a test-retestsituation,lesseningthe likelihood of other what senses it is and is not political. He scarcelybegins
significantmeasurable effects.Yet, what remains is to do this.
Aunger'schallenge that researchersaddressissues con- Second, and more important,Aungerunderestimates
cerningthe effectof the observeron what is observed the depthand characterof the differences betweenposi-
duringa data collection situation. tivistand interpretiveapproaches.I agreewith him that
The broaderquestionis whetherthisreflexiveanalyti- these are not simplytwo mutuallyexclusive categories
cal approach representsa necessary and sufficientre- but representa much more complex arrayof assump-
sponse to concerns about reflexivity.Reliabilityof re- tions,arguments,techniques,etc. To take Abell's com-
sponses across time cannot be the only guide. My own parativeevent-history as exemplifyinginterpretiveap-
researchoftenrevolves around illness, and I have used proaches is, however, seriously to misrepresentthe
bothstructuredand moreopen-endedinterviewformats. latterand therebyto avoid most of the issues that are

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I201 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 36, Number i, February1995

in dispute,such as whetherthe goal of ethnographyis phycan only take the formof a juxtapositionof "multi-
explanationor understanding, whetherit is nomothetic ple narrativevoices" which the readeris leftto analyse
or idiographic,etc. These tensions have been present must be challenged,as Aungerinsists.I also agree that
within anthropologyand sociology since the igth cen- the ethnographer's interpretations are privilegedas a re-
tury,and theyare not easily resolved. sult of firsthandexperiencewith the groupunderstudy
Finally, the model of rigorous ethnographywhich and thatthisdoes not preemptorprecludereaders'inter-
Aungerputs forwardis open to question. His concept pretationsas the textualistswould have us believe. The
of reflexivitycaptures only part of what that term is textualistclaim that (social) science is impossible be-
frequently used to denote.And the idea thatthevarious cause it is incompatiblewith the intrinsicallyinterper-
factorsinfluencingthe data collection process can be sonal nature of human studies is also mistaken,and I
measured and statisticaltechniques used to determine thinkthatAungergoes some way towardsrectifying this
theirrelativecontributionto theresultsshows an aston- view.
ishingoverconfidencein the capacityofquantitativere- However, Aunger seems to operate with a fairlyre-
search.Here Aungerignoresthe problemsthat qualita- strictedview of science even thoughhe does not con-
tiveresearchershave longraisedabout themeasurement cede the (scientific)explanatorygroundthatinterpretive
ofvariablesand the determinationoftheircausal contri- (storytelling) modes ofanalysishave arrogatedforthem-
bution.Indeed,some have questionedthe verypossibil- selves.Althoughhe does not sharetheirview ofscience,
ityofthe definitiveconceptson which such an approach he substitutesforit a different but still fairlynarrow
relies.As a result,theyhave set up verydifferentmodels definitionwhich centres on the importanceof formal
of ethnographicrigour,as exemplifiedby ethnoseman- methods of analysis. By so doing he fails to meet (and
tics and ethnomethodology, to mentionjust two exam- thus,answer)an importantpartofthe textualistcritique
ples. In order to establish the superiorityof Aunger's ofobjectivismand scientism,which insiststhatscience
own approach,some comparativeassessment of other does not and cannot take situated meanings into ac-
attemptsto make ethnographyrigorousis surelynec- count.The argumentis thatsocial studyis an inherently
essary. interpretive enterpriseand therefore precludestheuse of
As regardsAunger'sspecificproposals,I am not con- naturalisticscientificmethods.Thus, a textualistmight
vinced that what is required for rigouris an explicit replythat althoughAungerendeavoursto grapplewith
methodformakinginferences.Is not scientificinference some of theircritiqueof scientism(particularlythe ne-
necessarilysubstantiveand situational?If so, it cannot cessityforreflexivity), he has missed a crucial ontologi-
be controlledby method: a crucial elementofjudgment cal pointabout the natureofsocial realityand its refrac-
is involved.And explicitnessis a matterofdegree.What torinessto impersonalanalyticmodes.
is important,surely,is that the analysis be sufficiently This omission is reinforcedin his account of the "re-
explicit to deal with genuine doubt on the part of the flexiveanalytical approach," in which "reflexivity"is
ethnographerand/orthe audience forwhich he or she definedas an aspect of analysis ratherthan of data pre-
is writing.Aungerseems to assume some sortoffounda- sentation-which is what the textualistsmean by it, as
tionalistepistemologyhere. In these respects,thereare Aungerhimselfacknowledges.Leaving behind the tex-
problemswith the very basis on which he builds his tualists' definitionis crucial here, since it means that
proposalforscientificethnography. Aungercannot claim thathis attemptto satisfythe cri-
I believe thatethnographers should explorethe use of terionofreflexivity is successfulin theirterms.Missing
new techniques which mightenable them to improve thefactthatit is the interpretive momentofthepresen-
the rigourof their work and that this should include tationof raw data that is crucial to the textualistargu-
drawingon modes of thinkingand methods developed ment about reflexivity, Aunger cannot really claim to
by quantitativeresearchers.Aunger'sdiscussion of the be marryingstorytellingand science here. Rather,he is
reflexiveanalytical and comparativeevent-historyap- applyingscientifictechniques(via formalanalyticmeth-
proaches is thereforeof value. However, what he pro- ods) to certain kinds of ethnographicprojects which,
poses is not convincingas a scientificbasis formethod- moreover,have alreadybeen definedas beyondthe uni-
ological,philosophical,and politicalethnographic work: verse of discourse to which the textualistcritique ap-
it is questionablein its own termsand hardlybeginsto plies. This is apparentin n. I8, whereAungersays that
take account of the fundamentaldisagreementswhich his two-stepanalyticalprocedure(reflexiveanalysisfol-
currentlyplague anthropologyand the othersocial sci- lowed by comparative event history)applies only to
ences. "ethnographicresearchdevotedprimarilyto the expla-
nationor descriptionofethnographicrealities"and thus
explicitlyexcludes "ethnographiesdesignedto capture
DEREK LAYDER the experientialnatureoffieldworkor lifein the culture
Departmentof Sociology,Universityof Leicester, understudy."
LeicesterLEI 7RH, England. 30 vII 94 To some extent,then,Aunger'scounterto the textu-
alist argumentagainst the possibilityof a scientificap-
I agreewithAunger'sbasic objective,whichis to dispute proach to ethnographymisses its intendedtarget.Fur-
the idea thata scientificapproachto ethnography is im- thermore, I do not thinkthathe providesanythingother
possible.Those "textualists"who believe thatethnogra- than a nominal link between quantitativeand qualita-

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 AUNGER Ethnography:Storytellingor Science? I1I2

tiveformsofanalysis,because his concludingcomments with a useful calling into question of ethnographicau-

stronglysuggest that formalanalytic methods are the thorityand theunreflexivepositivismpresumedto have
basis of"real" science and thatqualitativeanalysisitselfcharacterizedearlierethnographicstudies: "previously,
is somehowunscientificor pseudoscientific.Trulygrap- the authorityof an ethnographicreportwas assumed to
plingwith the textualistcritiquerequiresthat"science" be, and effectively was, inviolate because of the lack of
not be limited to studies reliant on "formal analytic alternativeviewpoints on a particularcultural group."
methods."It has to be shown thatqualitativestudiesin Such statementsare clearlyhyperbolic;disputes of in-
general (not only ethnography)are just as systematic, terpretation in anthropologyhave always been with us.
rigorous,and analytic as those based on quantitative Clifford'sand Freeman'sdepictionsof anthropological/
techniques. ethnographicauthorityor consensuswere rhetoricalde-
Thus, "science" mustbe not just a matteroftheappli- vices intendedto exaggeratethe noveltyof theirrespec-
cation of specificmethodsor techniquesof analysisbut tive views. Even when an ethnographer arguesan inter-
one of the explanatoryformand power of an account. pretationin assertivefashion,one should not inferthat
Further,a science ofthe social mustpresupposean onto- any absolute truthor authorityis claimed. More to the
logical subject matterthat is not limited simplyto the point,one should not assume that professionalreaders
interpretation of the meaningofhuman activitybut ex- have ever accepted any ethnographer's claims solely on
tends to the analysis of social structures,institutions,the basis of some imaginedscientific"authority."
and cultures.That is, it must attendto collectiveas well In otherwords,Aungershares with the textualistsa
as individual or interactionalpropertiesof social life tendencyto neglecttherole ofa scientificcommunity-
and, furthermore, should at some point attemptto un- thedomainofpublic discourseand controversy ofwhich
ravel their mutual influences. Finally, science is not CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY constitutes such a laudable
simplyabout the use ofparticularmethodologicaltech- and concreteexample-in which claims to novelty,ex-
niques and formsof analysis but about the practicalap- planation,and discoveryare ultimatelyevaluated.Even
plicationof certainassumptionsabout the natureof the ifa studyfails(as all ultimatelydo) to satisfyproblemat-
topic under investigation.That is, science is intrinsi- ically conceived criteriaof absolute truthor reliability,
callyabout theoryand makingtheoreticalcommitments this does not in itself disqualifyit fromparticipating
(explicitor implicit,systematicor ad hoc) which influ- in a constructiveway in a wider scientificdiscourse.
ence researchdesign,the choice ofmethodologicaltech- Aunger'sargumentto the effectthatanticipatablebiases
niques and strategies,and the interpretation arisingfromthe natureof informants'vantagesor those
of results.
In summary,although Aunger's overall objectives are of ethnographersshould be taken into account in re-
sound, by ignoringpurelyqualitative analysis his spe- search design is always a good idea. So, too, is the call
cificproposalfora scientificethnography seems too nar- formakingmethodsofdata collectionexplicit.But these
rowlydefinedand prescriptive. values are all but universallyacknowledgedand under-
stood, even if not consistentlypracticed. Practically
speaking,an obsession with method and reflexivity in
P. STEVEN SANGREN research design is very likely,as the current scene dem-
DepartmentofAnthropology,Cornell University, onstrates,to deflectscholarlyattentionfromthe study
265 McGraw Hill, Ithaca, N.Y. 14853 U.S.A. of societies and cultures to studies of method and re-
(pss3@cornell.edu). 27 VII 94 flexivityin the abstract.
One suspects that Aungerwould disqualifyas unsci-
I agree wholeheartedlywith Aungerthat the values of entificthe contributionsofmanyifnot most classic eth-
science oughtnot be abandonedin ethnography (Sangren nographies(e.g.,Boas, Mead, Evans-Pritchard) based on
I988, i989). However,I disagreebothwithhim and with informationsupplied by "key" informants. By now the
the "textualists"he disputes about how science ought shortcomingsof many early ethnographiesare well
to be conceived.It is instructivethat,althoughAunger known, but it is the discipline of the framingpublic
and the textualistsdisagreeprofoundlyon the possibil- discourse on these studies that has improved (made
ity and desirabilityof writingscientificethnography, morescientific)our understandings of the Kwakiutl,Sa-
theyagree ratherremarkablyon what qualifiesas "sci- moans, and the Nuer, not the implementationin single
ence": to be scientific,ethnographicwritingought to case studiesofnarrowlyconceivedresearchmethodsde-
eschew "linguistic devices" and "rhetoric,"eliminate signedto eliminateor minimize bias and distortion.
intendedand unintendedbiases and effectsofpowerine- Aunger'spenchantforbifurcationsof categorieslike
qualities, and emulate the quantitativemethodsof sta- rhetoric and statistics, hermeneutics and science-
tisticallyorientedsociology.Both Aungerand his post- disavowals notwithstanding(it is not only the title of
modern or textualist opponents, by restrictingthe the paperthat"perpetuatesa false dichotomy"between
constructionof scientificauthority(bothrhetoricaland storytelling and science)-also alignswitha similarpen-
real) mainly within the boundariesdefinedby singular chant among those he disputes. I suggestthat Aunger
ethnographiesor researchprocedures,significantly mis- considerthe rhetoricaluses of statisticsand mathemat-
construethe relevantcontextsthatconstitutethe inter- ics. Numerical and mathematicaldevices are not, as he
subjectivesocial world of social science discourse. assumes, devoid of rhetoricalintent;theyare employed
For example, Aunger credits the textualist critique to persuade.And neitherare "linguisticdevices" incapa-

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I22 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 36, Number i, February1995

ble of "scientific"(or at least logical) precision.In this writing,on the one hand, and more coherentlyencom-
regard,Aunger's faith in the objectivityof statistical pass a pluralityof stylesofethnographicrepresentation,
methodsand theirabilityto incorporatea ratheroddly on the other, than can Aunger's laudable attemptto
conceived "reflexivity"into researchdesign is uncon- imaginea single utopian method.
vincing.I, too, believe thatstatisticaldata can be useful
in the constructionof ethnographicdescription.But as
GregoryBateson (I972) so usefullypointed out, statis- DOUGLAS WHITE
tics can "prove" quite "reliably" how such factorsas DepartmentofAnthropology,Universityof California,
"dormativeprinciples"in opium produce sleep! Statis- Irvine,Calif.92717, U.S.A. I IX 94
tics can be employed very productivelyin producing
compellingarguments,but so can argumentativenar- Aunger's analytic reflexivityseeks to combine source-
rative. of-biasconcernsand systematicinterrogation ofpatterns
Clearly,Aungeris favorablyimpressedby the poten- in socioculturalphenomena.It presentsa challengefor
tial ofmethodsdevelopedby statisticalsociologyto en- the continuingevolution of our discipline. While text
hance the scientificstatus of ethnography. Yet data col- critiquecontributesto understanding ofpossiblesources
lection by what amounts to opinion poll has its own of implicitbias in ethnographicsyntheses,understand-
shortcomings.Ethnographers are interestednot only in ing of the relativecontributionsof margin-of-error, dis-
what people say or believe (and any pollstercould tell tortion,and accurate renderingof phenomena requires
you that one cannot take respondents'answers at face systematiccomparisonof alternativeaccounts. Aunger
value; context,the specificnatureof the topic in ques- shows how one can move beyondthe conventionaladdi-
tion, and many other factorsmake interpretationof tive-statistical-influence (generallinear) approach,with
informants'answersproblematic)but also in why they its limitingassumptions,to createan internallycompar-
believe it and how the fact that they "believe" it (or ative science of culture-internal, that is, to the proce-
claim to do so) produces social effects.For example, duresofdata collectionand analysis.His greatestservice
studies of "ideology" under Aunger's researchregime to the discipline,however,is not to rest contentwith
would be diminishedto statisticalportraitsof people's the newermethodologiesforinternalcomparisons(ran-
"beliefs" and their correlations with other "vari- dom assignment and, I might add, discrete-structure
ables"-attempting to controlforvarious biases in data models) but to face the need forprocess descriptionof
collection. The misrecognizing,legitimatingsocial ef- event histories,which bringsactors and theircontexts
ficacyof ideologyas more commonlyconceived could (includingeventand materialflows)into analyticfocus.
not be statisticallystudied in any such straightforwardHis proposed synthesisof the more nomothetic,vari-
way. In short,manynecessaryelementsin good ethnog- able-drivenapproach with comparative event history
raphyare unframablein the termsenjoinedby Aunger's and analysis-"storytelling reborn"-is a good begin-
caveats. ning,and it can be enlargedand strengthened in various
In sum, one can agreewithmanyofAunger'smethod- ways.
ological suggestionsand even grantthat the terms of For one thing,it is possible to combine the newer
his "reflexiveanalytical" approachas partof a two-step methods of internal comparison (e.g., random assign-
researchstrategymightinspireuseful contributionsto mentand discrete-structure models forthe null hypoth-
ethnographicknowledge.However,his claim that "the esis and descriptive-nomotheticcomponents, respec-
approachoutlinedherecan serveas a generalframework tively) with comparative event history and analysis.
forconductingreplicable ethnographicresearchon the Furthermore, it is possible to include flagsforpoint of
full range of traditionalanthropologicaltopics" is at view or possible sources ofbias in the internalcompara-
once too restrictiveand too ambitious.Aunger'sagenda tive event analysis. This will permitdeterminationof
unnecessarilyrestrictsethnographicanalysesto a single whethera potential source of bias makes a systematic
protocol. However, most good ethnographyrequires a difference to the patternsor structuresobserved.(Non-
continual reframingof the premises of one's study as systematicbiases are, by definition,errorsthat do not
researchproceeds. It remains unclear how a mere se- accumulate in one directionor anotherover a series of
quencingofnarrativeand formalframeworks can coher- observations.They behave in a randomfashionto intro-
ently transcendthe epistemologicaldivide Aungerde- duce the marginof errorthatis always presentin obser-
fines by methodologicalmeans. Why not expand our vations but to varyingdegrees. Random biases cancel
horizons beyond individual studies to the imagined one anotherout in averagingover a series and do not
communityof social scientists?Let us aspire to some- detractfromthe validityofdescriptionas do systematic
thingakin to an implementationofcommunicativerea- ones.) There are many more ways to combine process
son (Habermas I982) as a collectiveprocess amongeth- descriptionwith systematicinternalcomparison(story-
nographers(and theirinformants) ratherthan imaginea tellingand science) than the one-two-steplinkagepro-
researchmethodcapable of containingthe powerofthis posed by Aunger.
intersubjectivenotion of science within a single re- Given the need for and possibility of hybrid ap-
search methodology.An understandingof "science" as proachesthat reconceptualizesome of our tools foran-
itselfan intersubjectiveprocess could more effectively thropologicalresearch,processdescriptionsare likelyto
defendthe scientificstatusofethnographic researchand increase in importance. Event-historyapproaches in-

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volvingspecificsets ofactors,contexts,social and inter-
pretiverelations,etc., are intellectuallymore satisfying
than purelyvariable-drivenrepresentationsof the phe-
nomena we study. They necessarilyinvolve us, along
with those we work with, in developingthe phenome-
nologyof human existence.Activitysystems,flow sys-
tems,and relationalsystemsare cominginto wideruse
forrepresentingevent histories.In consequence, flow
dynamics,discretestructures,and networkrepresenta-
tionsare increasinglyused to model continuousand dis-
creteprocesses.These newerevent-flowrepresentations
do need to be subjected,as Aungersuggests,to internal
comparativeanalysis (I would add: at all levels, not jusi
thatof descriptivevalidity).These new directionsin re-
search may help to synthesize the more idiographic
event-historyand the more nomothetic statistical-
influenceapproaches. Some may seek to follow these
directionsto develop more satisfactoryfoundationsfoi
the researchand interpretive problemsthatface anthro-
pology.
Reply
ROBERT AUNGER
Chicago, Ill. 60637, U.S.A. 26 IX 94
As is suggestedby two respondents(Abbott,Duveen)
who begintheircommentarieswith analogiesto martial
combat, taking any stand on ethnographicmethods
these days is like landingin the middle of enemyterri-
tory:one is liable to sufferan onslaughtfromall sides.
I neverthelessthank the commentatorsfor taking up
armsto engagein yetanotherroundofbattle.I will deal
here with the apparentlymore "explosive" positions
taken in the paper.
"Reflexivity."My use of the notion of reflexivity
provedan admirabletargetforcriticism.I eitherused a
peculiarinterpretation of the term(Abbott),was merely
too limited in my definition(Garro,Hammersley),or
"definedaway" the crux of the matteridentifiedby the
textualists(de Ruijter,Layder).However,it seems to me
that the relevant question is not whetherI have ad-
dressedthe textualists'concernsbut whethertheirno-
tion solves thereflexivity problemmoreeffectivelythan
mine. The problemis to provide"informationas to how
it [ethnographicinformation]came into being,the pro-
cess by which it was obtained" (to quote Meyerhoffand
Ruby[i982:2] again).The textualists'gambitof using
representational cues in the textassumes thatthereadei
has the experienceto make the relevantinferences.As
theyrecognize,introspectionis untrustworthy because
of the situatedness and biases of the ethnographer;it
is a feeble sort of reflexivity.The reflexiveanalytical
approachprovidesmore explicit informationabout the
originsand qualities of the data in the formof data col-
lection protocolsand standardizedanalyticprocedures.
Thus, I would argue,reflexiveanalysisis a morepower-
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AUNGER or Science? I I23
Ethnography:Storytelling
fulresponseto thebasic problemofleavingtracksshow-
ing how you reachedyourinterpretivedestination.
In addition,reflexiveanalysis does not preclude the
use of the textualists' reflexivity-as-introspection in
otherstepsofresearch.Garroarguesthatit is important
to be reflexivein the steps which definethe research
problemand design priorto analysis as well as at the
otherend oftheresearchsequence,in theuse ofresearch
results. As I argued in footnotes,I acknowledge that
such steps exist and that self-awarenessin such steps is
necessaryand laudable. Reflexivity in the analyticalstep
representsa new contributionto the researchprocess
which can be used in additionto self-reflection.
Sangrenand Hammersleydecrymyargumentthatthe
textualistcritique representsa new chapterin the ap-
preciation of ethnographies.They argue that ethno-
graphicauthority(a concept developed by the textual-
ists) has always in fact been subject to scepticism. I
thinkthis downplaysthe textualistcontributionto eth-
nographicpractice; the notion of reflexivity has raised
theconsciousnessofethnographers aboutrepresentation
and the truthvalue ofethnographicdescriptions-issues
whichwere implicitpreviously-and, as a result,the de-
greeof sophisticationamong practitionersand consum-
ers of ethnography has increased.I believe that the tex-
tualistsdeservecreditforthis advance.
The reflexiveanalytical approach. The reflexiveana-
lyticalapproachhas also provedquite controversial.San-
gren argues that it is incapable of studyingemergent
phenomena-for example,topics centralto social stud-
ies such as ideology-because it relies on surveystatis-
tics. Informantscan't reporttheirimplicitknowledgeor
can mislead the ethnographerif confusedby false con-
sciousness. But the imaginativeuse of individual-level
data,coupled with ethnographicinsight,can indeedpro-
vide insight into social processes. For example, how
would an inverse correlationbetween the size of a
bride's bound feet and her husband's wealth in igth-
centuryChinese society be properlyinterpretedexcept
as a consequence of rich men's abilityto commandthe
self-defacement of theirwives? A mother'sreportedde-
gree of ambition forher daughtermightalso be found
to be associated with the smallness of that daughter's
feet,suggestingthat women were also socialized to be
the proximalagentsof theirown subjugationin this so-
ciety. Such evidence is indirect,but so are assertions
based on what ethnographerscan themselves observe.
The ethnographer may intuitthatideologicalmanipula-
tion ofbeliefshas occurredin an unfamiliarsociety,but
the use of social statistics can confirmthe ethnogra-
pher'simpression.I would arguethatissues such as ide-
ologyare less persuasivelystudiedin a strictlyinterpre-
tive fashion.
De Ruijter,Duveen, and Garroarguethatno one can
fullyspecifya social situation.Indeed, as Garronotes,
thereare aspects of a situationwhich cannot be explic-
itlyincorporatedinto any model, howeverelaborate,as
is exemplifiedin my own empiricalwork (wheresome
variation remained unexplained by the statistical
model). I was obviouslymisleadingon this point: I did
I24 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 36, Number i, February1995
not mean thateverypossible influenceshould be incor-
poratedinto the reflexiveanalyticalmodel,which is ob-
viouslyimpossible.However,the inabilityofthe reflex-
ive analyticalprocedureto account forall influenceson
the phenomenonofinterestdoes not invalidateit, since
the alternativeis an inabilityto determinethe effectsof
any factorson the situationexceptthroughdirectinfer-
ence fromobservation.Instead,I meant "fully" to im-
ply the inclusion in the analysis of variablesfromeach
ofthefourcategoriesoffactorsidentifiedbythemethod-
ological situationalistposition(i.e., some characteristics
ofthe context,the subject,the observer,and theirinter-
action).These categoriesare admittedlyintroducedonly
later in the paper. Missing "situational" factorsmight
include observercharacteristicsor aspects ofothercate-
goriesbesides context,as Garroasserts.
A relatedpoint: Garro's complaintsabout the inter-
pretationof the reflexiveanalytical case studycited in
the paperare all cogent,but the informationshe desires
(e.g.,about the relativesignificanceofdifferent explana-
toryvariables,the proportionof overall variabilityac-
counted for)is all presentedin the originalpublication
(AungerI994a). Since the purposehere was illustration
ratherthan demonstrationofthe particularsofthe case,
these figureswere not specified.
The comparativeevent-history approach.The second
step of the approachI advocated has been virtuallyig-
nored,exceptby Abbottand White.Certainly,compara-
tive eventhistoriansare few at the moment,and I hope
that by advertisingtheir existence to anthropologists
theirranks will increase. But Abbott makes a tactical
argumentagainst a paper whose purposewas strategic.
He argues that novel approaches to researchmust be
championedby a vigorous and single-mindedcadre of
Young Turks.This may be accuratefroma sociology-of-
science point of view. However, it is irrelevantto my
more theoreticalpoint: what methods are requiredto
treat a research question? If several researchersare
needed to implement the two-step approach because
each is likelyto be specialized in one or the othermajor
approachto research,this is a faultnot of the approach
but of the researchersor their training.Abbott's own
abilitiestestifyagainsthis claim about the impossibility
of "eclecticism": onlysomeone with an expert'sknowl-
edge of general-linear-reality approachescould be so in-
sightfulin criticizingthem.It must therefore be possible
fora single individual to imagine,if not execute, both
kinds of research. Further,since Abbott and his col-
leagues have alreadyuncoveredthe hidden difficulties
with the general-linear-reality approachby concentrat-
ingtheirattentionon the developmentofan alternative,
the constructivework has already been largelydone.
Whatremainsis forpractitionersto applybothmethods
to the same problems,cognizant of the limitationsof
each. As Abbott allows, using multiple methods pro-
vides the best understandingof any given situation.
Abbottand White also assertthat it is appropriateto
performcomparativeevent-history analysison eventse-
quences which describethe same eventsas perceivedby
different actors or observers.While such an analysis is
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not "forbidden,"I still maintain that it is contraryto
thepurposesand virtuesofthe approach.Ifsuch an anal-
ysis were to conclude thateventsat the Rashomonwere
observedmore similarlyby A and B than by A and C,
we would not have come closerto understanding whyA
and B perceiveda particularevent sequence differently.
While the comparativeevent-historicalapproachis able
to sortobserversinto groupsby clusteringtheirdifferent
reportedsequences, it cannot assist the researcherin
identifyingwhat caused their commonalityof percep-
tion. A reflexiveanalysis might,however,suggestthat
this similaritywas associated with A and B's bothbeing
males while C is a female. Of course sex per se is not
the cause ofthe observedgrouping-perhapswomen are
relegatedby social structureto particularroles which
affecttheirperceptionand interpretation ofevents-but
treatingindividuals as if they were unbundled sets of
characteristicscan providesignificantclues aboutwhere
to look forultimate causes. As Abbott himselfrecog-
nizes, doing so has enabled "many people [to] do very
good and veryinterestingsocial science withinwhat we
so stronglyreject" (i.e., the general-linear-reality
meth-
odology). Thus even though, ontologically speaking,
such analysesproduce"fallaciousresults,"theyprovide
powerfulheuristicsthat lead to a deeperunderstanding
oftheprocesseswhich generatedthe differences in what
was observed.
The integrationof idiographic and nomothetic ap-
proaches. I share White's enthusiasm about the pros-
pectsforthe developmentofsocial science methodology
which may lead to greaterinteractionbetween nomo-
thetic and idiographicmethods than is allowed by the
two-stepapproachI have outlinedhere.' I am less san-
guine than White appears to be, however, about the
eventualsynthesisofthese two approachesinto a single
analysis which can deal with both observerbias and
event structuresimultaneously.His proposed solution
is randomized regressionof a structuralmodel (Dow
makes a similar argument).The social-networkand
discrete-structuremodels mentionedby White involve
matrixmanipulationtechniqueswhich look for"struc-
ture" or patternsin matrixvalues. Combinatorialas-
signmentmethodscan be used to investigatethe struc-
ture of differentmatrices,one of which could include
the event sequence codings as elements while another
matrixrepresentedinformationabout the characteris-
tics ofindividualsresponsibleforthe observationsin the
event matrix.
The problemwith this approachfromAbbott'spoint
of view is that the rows in the event matrix are not
treatedas a unit. In the comparativeevent-history ap-
proach events are compared only as elements of se-
quences; White's suggestedapproachwould insteadma-
nipulate each value in the event matrixindependently
wTAithknV1
yor%pn+e
to -rwr-AL ny onlnIv"%no WUhilM thio ; im py_
i. As Dow notes,developments statisticalmethods
in traditional
also lead to new techniqueswhichavoidone or moreofAbbott's
criticalpointsaboutgenerallinearreality.Nevertheless, mostof
Abbott'spointsare trueofmostexistinglinearmodels.
 AUNGER Ethnography:Storytellingor Science? I125

fectlylegitimatestatistically,such a single-stepcombi- methodshave oftenbeen linkedto theoryas a matterof

nationofobserversand eventsbecomes a purelygeneral- academic tradition.For example, Denzin and Lincoln
linear-reality-styleanalysis. I therefore agree with (I994: 2) definequalitativeresearchers as those who
Hammersley that nomothetic and idiographicmodels "study things in their natural settings,attemptingto
representtwo generalclasses of approachwhich are suf- make sense of,or interpret, phenomenain termsof the
ficientlydifferent to inhibittheirmeaningfulsynthesis. meaningspeople bringto them." But theyalso contend
They make different ontologicalassumptions,have dif- (p. 4) that "qualitative researchersstress the socially
ferentanalytical purposes, and are based on different constructednature of reality,the intimaterelationship
units of analysis.In essence, my argumentis thata sup- betweentheresearcherand what is studied,and thesitu-
posedly idiographic analysis may ignore Abbott's ational constraintsthat shape inquiry."I have argued,
qualms about generallinearrealityto such a degreethat however,that such theoreticalpositions are not neces-
the virtuesof a case-orientedapproachare lost. sarilyimplied by reliance on particularmethods.So in
I should note thatthereare examples in the literature factpurelyqualitativeapproachescan be consideredsci-
of approaches which might more closely approximate entific,as Layder and Hammersley assert, as long as
White's ideal. For example, Behrens(i990) developed a theyare as "systematic,rigorous,and analyticas those
procedure which combines random assignment with based on quantitative techniques" (Layder). Ham-
Ragin's (I987) algebraic comparisonmethod forcausal mersley suggests ethnomethodologyand ethnoseman-
analysis. Since this is also a two-stepapproach,it pre- tics as examples of such methods.Certainlya majorre-
servesthe essentialcharactersofthevariables-basedand search programof this school, conversation analysis
case-historical approaches. In particular, cases are (e.g., as practicedby Schegloffand his students),quali-
treatedas wholes. However, Behrens's proceduredoes fiesas a formalmethod.This techniqueis based on tran-
not compare event sequences. Instead, the most parsi- scribednaturalisticdialogues and uses standardizedas-
monious set of necessary and sufficientpreconditions sumptionsabout conversationstructureas well as the
leading to a particularethnographicoutcome is found substanceof what is said to determinehow individuals
using Ragin's methodand then the relativesignificance coordinate these social interactions (Levinson I983:
of these conditionsin producingthe outcome is deter- 294-332). Thus,conversation analysesaretoa consider-
mined using randomization.Althoughevents may os- able extent replicable, and traces of how the analysis
tensiblyserve as preconditions,the algebraiccompari- was conducted (as well as the "raw" transcriptions
son step still retainsa dependent/independent variable themselves)are oftenrepresentedin published reports
"feel," so that the preconditionsas opposed to outcome using this method.Thus I have nothingagainstqualita-
events are considered only as states, not as complex tive techniquesas long as theyare formal(see n. i I).
entities,and thereis no considerationof theirtemporal Althoughformal,conversationanalysisis designedto
(i.e., causal) order.Behrens's approach is thereforenot deal with the intentionalityof the participantsand to
truly event-basedor historical and as a consequence inferthe meaningattachedto speech acts-the very"as-
does not representas complete an integrationof idio- pects of human activitywhich formalmethodsof data
graphicand nomotheticapproachesas the two-steppro- collectionand analysishave obscured,"accordingto Du-
cedureI have outlined.Thus, while I agreewith White veen. Ethnomethodologistshave convincingly con-
thatthereare othermethodswhich can be made analyti- tendedthat meaning is constructedwithin local situa-
cally reflexiveor historical,none has quite the same set tionsthrough socialinteraction (HeritageI987:225-26).
of virtuesas the one I proposed. For this reason, I have emphasized that methodsmust
The nature of "science." The most importantcon- also be situationalist.Thus whetherhuman behavioris
tention,I believe, is that of Layder,Sangren,and Ham- couchedin intentionalorbehavioraltermsis less impor-
mersleythat my notion of science is positivisticand tantthan the kind of analyticalapproachused. Formal-
hence hopelesslyantiquated.Science, theyargue,is not ityof methodshas little do with the natureof what is
about methodologybut about theoreticalcommitments studiedbut everything to do withverificationand credi-
priorto researchdesign.While no researchcan be con- bility.
ducted without theoreticalunderpinnings(if only im- There is furtherevidence thatwhat distinguishessci-
plicit),I disagreewith Layderthatscientificresearchcan ence as a cultural practice is its reliance on methods.
be recognizedby its explanatoryformor power rather The evidence lies in how science producesknowledge.
than by its analytical methods. Science is primarily As the sociology of science has taughtus, conceptual
aboutfalsifiability and thereforeinvolvesa commitment changein science is a functionofsociologicalprocesses.
to publicly disclosed (i.e., replicable) methods. Layder The question is, what processes in which society?Is it
and others would argue that science is not restricted society-at-large, so that scientificknowledgeconsistent
to empirical,testable hypotheses.My response to this with the ideologies of powerfulsocial groupsis legiti-
contentionrequiressome development. mated,as is arguedby the "strongprogramme"in the
First,the nomenclatureof quantitativeand qualita- sociologyof knowledge(e.g., Bloor I976, Barnes I977)?
tive methods obscures the more importantquestion Or is the "scientificcommunity"to which Sangrenre-
whethermethods are formal.Nominally, what distin- ferslargelyself-policing, using its own criteriato estab-
guishes quantitative methods is whether counts (i.e., lish what scientificknowledgeis?
"quantities") are used in analysis. But as I have noted, This question can be answeredby examiningthe data

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i26 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 36, Number I, February1995

on scientificreputation,since who gets an audience de-
termineswhich theoriesand resultsbecome widely ac-
cepted. Reputation can be ascertained from citation
practices-which researchers seek support for their
work by linkingthemselvesto the authorityof others.
Hull (i992) finds that only a small proportionof the
scientistsin any fieldpublishespapersregularly(admit-
tedly, some scientists work outside academia, where
publicationis not expected).Of these papers,onlya few
are evercited; a verysmall proportionofthepaperspub-
lished in any fieldis cited often.There is thus tremen-
dous variationin this measure of scientificreputation,
indicatingthat competitionforreputationis intense.
Since reputation is relative, individual scientists
should seek to elevate theirown reputationsat the ex-
pense ofothers.This can be best achievedby coalescing
into "numerous,relativelyisolated groupsof scientists
who hold significantly different
views fromeach other"
(Hull I992:78), so that within groupsthereis coopera-
tion (i.e., mutual citation,supportin the grantprocess)
while between groups there is competitionfor domi-
nance in the discipline. Kuhnian paradigmshiftscan
then be explained as the ascendancy of cliques which
have theoreticalviews different fromthose ofthe group
whichpreviouslyheld sway.Hull findsevidenceforthis
"demic" organizationof scientistsin National Science
Foundation proposal reviews, where the conceptual
school to which one belongs highlydeterminesthe de-
greeto which one is positive about a proposal.
At the same time, the theftof ideas and falsification
of results are severelypunished-much more so than
in otherprofessions(e.g.,medicine,law, police)-while
honestmistakesarerapidlyforgivenas longas the scien-
tist acknowledges them. The most powerful can be
knocked down instantlyby proofof impropriety. How-
ever,personalfailuresare irrelevantto statusin the sci-
entificcommunity.Honesty is thereforethe most suc-
cessfulscientificattitude,and the scientificwork ethic
should strikea balance betweenthe pursuitofgood the-
oryand little deviationfromnormativepracticesto es-
tablishresults:beinga good scientificcitizenmeans be-
ing moral and creative. Further,this scientificethos
exists independentlyof national culture:in manydisci-
plines,the race forknowledgeis now global,with com-
municationnetworksfacilitatedbyfaxesand e-mail.We
can inferfromthis evidence thatthe scientificcommu-
nityhas a cultureof its own and can be properlyunder-
stood as a self-containedsocietyplayingby a unique set
of rules.
Hull concludes from this investigation(which, be-
cause it relies on formalmethods,he calls the "science
and must continually be backed up by high-quality
work.This analysis indicatesthat the criteriaprimarily
used to establish reputationin science are professional
and internalto the scientificcommunityratherthan
based on power or standingin the largersociety.
More relevantto the presentdiscussion is that what
allows this communityto functionon these standards
is formalmethods. Scientificreputationdependson le-
gitimatedresults,and results,to be legitimated,must
standup to effortsat falsification.As Miles and Huber-
man(I 994: 2) note,the"deep,dark"problem withpurely
interpretiveresearchis that of credibility:"we do not
really see how the researchergot from3,600 pages of
field notes to the final conclusions, as sprinkledwith
vividillustrationsas theymay be." Interpretive research
proceedsdirectlyfromfieldnotesto finalproducton the
basis of analyticalconstructsdevised by the researcher.
Formal methods, in contrast,lead the reader through
the steps precedingthe presentationofresultsand their
interpretation. Such ethnographicreportsare morecred-
ible because the interpretationhas been shown to result
from a replicable protocol, not simply frompersonal
biases.3
Thus, falsificationremainsthe criterionwhich distin-
guishes science as a culturalpracticeand resultsin the
unique ability of scientifictheories to exhibit greater
power over time (as seen in the increasingability of
technologyto manipulatethe environment).In otherar-
eas ofscholarlyendeavor(e.g.,literarycriticism,histori-
cal and humanisticinterpretation), knowledgecan accu-
mulate throughaccretion,but theoreticaldevelopment
does not occur. So science is about replicationand test-
ing, which requires formal,public methods. Certainly
whichmethodsare used is constantlyin fluxas support-
ing technologies and social understandingsof those
methods change. But for the reasons above, I do not
thinkit unreasonableto emphasizemethodsratherthan
interpretive style,as suggestedbyLayder,in distinguish-
ing science fromother types of knowledge-generating
practices.
Of course, scientificreputationcan also depend on
the developmentof novel, widely adopted theoretical
concepts.Theories cannotthemselvesbe falsified(Laka-
tos I970), since theorytends to be underdetermined by
data (hence the need to augmenttheorywith secondary
restrictionsto develop testablepropositions).Therefore
multipletheoriesfora given domain ofphenomenacan
oftenpersist,although nonscientificcriteriamay lead
to preferencesamong them (e.g., elegance, parsimony,
consistencywith theoryin otherdomains-or advocacy
nf t1he thonrv by -nrPetioinh1Q individiual. as is Q11cYYpQtp.d

of science")2that reputationis constantlyunderattack

2. Hull reviewsall the availabledata on citationand reviewprac- politics,competition in the harshenvironment of scientific
pub-
tices in entirescientificcommunities, whereasthe sociology-of- lishingand reputationmakingensuresthatscientificknowledge
science literatureis almost totallyrestricted to individualcase is progressively adaptedto the social worldit helpsto shape.
studies-e.g.,LatourandWoolgar'sI986 classicstudyofa biologi- 3. Because it relies on such formalmethods,I argue,contrade
cal laboratory,citedby de Ruijteras evidenceofthe sociallycon- Ruijter,thatthetwo-stepapproach,like thepostmodemtextualist
structednature of science. However, as Hull (i992:80) notes, this critique,"calls for attentionto the process of transformation
latter evidence remains "impressionisticand programmatic." wherebythe ethnographer's fieldexperienceis translatedintoan
Whiletheworkofindividuallabs maylargelyreflect interpersonal ethnographic report."

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 AUNGER Ethnography:Storytellingor Science? I I27

by the sociologists of science). As I have arguedhere, interpretivegoal of understandingindividual cases, it

ontologyis crucialin determining philosophicalorienta- does not use the means which Hammersleysuggestsis
tion and hence can also influencethe choice of theory. intrinsicto this goal: evocative understanding.Never-
Unfortunately, in most cases ontologicalbeliefsremain theless,each mode of presentationcan produce a valid
highlypersonal,leadingto the kindsof debateswe have typeofknowledge.But while I grantlegitimacyto those
seen recentlyin ethnography. who seek to conveya sense oflifein unfamiliarcultures
Thus, my response on this issue can be summarized by summoningup images and emotions in readers,I
as follows: (i) scientific(i.e., falsifiable)resultsare pro- doubt that the textualists returnthe compliment to
duced using formal, public methods; (2) qualitative those of us who argue on behalfof scientificethnogra-
methodscan be formal;(3) meaning is createdby indi- phy. My objective has been to reassertthat a type of
viduals in social situations,so methodsmust be situa- science recognizable by those in other disciplines re-
tionalist to contend with the aspects of interpretation mains a viable way of knowingin anthropology.
dependenton human intentionality;(4) scientificresults
can "speak to" many theories,hence interpretation is
an artdependingon personalconsiderationsratherthan
proofand remainsopen to dispute.
With respectto the largerphilosophical issues, I am
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 I28 1 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Volume 36, Number I, February1995

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ence: Realism,hermeneutics, and criticaltheory.HongKong: SPERBER, D., AND D. WILSON. i-eievance, communicaulon,
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