 Elements - Article 2176- Quasi-Delicts

Doctrine: Acquittal in a criminal case is not a bar to prosecution in a civil action for damages based on
quasi-delict against the driver and operator.

Tayag v. Alcantara, 98 SCRA 723

Facts:  The petitioners, heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr., filed with the Court of First Instance of Tarlac,
presided over by the respondent Judge, a complaint for damages against the private respondents
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Romeo Villa y Cunanan.

The heirs alleged that in the afternoon of September 2, 1974, while Pedro Tayag Sr. was riding on a
bicycle along MacArthur Highway at Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac on his way home, he was bumped and hit by
a Philippine Rabbit Bus, driven by Romeo Villa, as a result of which he sustained injuries which caused his
instantaneous death.

On October 25, 1977, the respondent Judge rendered a decision, acquitting the accused Romeo Villa of
the crime of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the Civil case on the ground that the
petitioners have no cause of action against them the driver of the bus having been acquitted in the
criminal action. The petitioners opposed the motions since their cause of action is not based on crime but
on quasi-delict. However, the response judge also dismissed the civil case.

Hence, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge,
claiming that the latter acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and for with grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the disputed order, and that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law except thru the present petition.

Issue: WON the acquittal in a criminal case bars the prosecution in a civil action for damages based on
quasi-delict

Ruling: The Court cited Article 31 of the Civil Code which states that when the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or commission complained of as a felony such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

Evidently, the above quoted provision of the Civil Code refers to a civil action based, not on the act or
omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but one based on an obligation arising from other
sources, like quasi delict. 

The Court ruled that all the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely:
1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent;
(2) damage caused by the said act or commission;
(3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or commission; and
4) no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.

The Court also noted that the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a
crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. 
The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi delict  the acquittal of the driver, respondent Villa,
of the crime charged in the Criminal Case is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case for damages based
on quasi-delict

Garcia v. Florido, 52 SCRA 420

Doctrine: The same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or
create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal law,
while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation and
individuality.

Facts: German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with his wife and
bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino
Inesin, and driven by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga
City, for the purpose of attending a conference of chiefs of government hospitals at Zamboanga City.

While the car was negotiating a slight curve on the national highway said car collided with an oncoming
passenger bus owned and operated by the Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro
Tumala.

As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various physical injuries which necessitated
their medical treatment and hospitalization.

Hence, petitioners filed a civil case for damages against the PU car owner and passenger bus.

Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint stating that respondent Pedro Tumala was charged in
Criminal Case in a complaint filed by the Chief of Police for double serious and less serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, and that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil
action could be filed subsequent thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated.

Also, that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art. 33 applied only to the crimes of
physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.

The lower court sustained the arguments of respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala.

Issue: WON the act of filing of criminal case by the Chief of Police bar a separate civil action for
damages subsequently instituted by the petitioners on the same ground under Article 33 of the New Civil
Code?

Held: No. There is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the
Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated
either by conviction or acquittal of said accused.

It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in
effect abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead
to recover them in the present civil case.
As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to
be involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the
prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his
right to institute, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his
interest in the criminal case has disappeared.

As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability
arising from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation
of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own
foundation and individuality.

Quasi-delict v. Delict Article 2177, Civil Code Article 365, Revised Penal Code

People vs. Ligon

Doctrine: By his act and omission with fault and negligence caused damage to the victim and
should answer civilly for the damage done; it does not follow that a person who is not
criminally liable is also free from civil liability; only preponderance of evidence is required in a
civil action for damages

Facts:

The accused, Fernando Gabat, was riding in a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi and driven by the other
accused, Rogelio Ligon. The Kombi was coming from Espana Street going towards the direction
of Quiapo. Fernando Gabat was seated beside the driver, in the front seat by the window on
the right side of the Kombi. At the intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street before
turning left towards the underpass at C.M. Recto Avenue, the Kombi had to stop as the traffic
light was red. While waiting for the traffic light to change, Fernando Gabat called a vendor, Jose
Rosales y Ortiz (Rosales for short) to buy some cigarettes from him. Rosales approached the
Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes. While this transaction was occurring, the
traffic light changed to green, and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved forward.
However, as the Kombi continued to speed towards Quiapo, Rosales clung to the window of the
Kombi but apparently lost his grip and fell down on the pavement. Rosales was rushed by some
bystanders to the Philippine General Hospital, where he was treated for multiple physical
injuries and was confined thereat until his death.

Following close behind the Kombi at the time of the incident was a taxicab driven by Prudencio
Castillo. As the Kombi did not stop after the victim fell down on the pavement near the foot of
the underpass, Castillo pursued it as it sped towards Roxas Boulevard, beeping his horn to
make the driver stop. When they reached the Luneta near the Rizal monument, Castillo saw an
owner-type jeep with two persons in it. He sought their assistance in chasing the Kombi, telling
them "nakaaksidente ng tao." The two men in the jeep joined the chase. Castillo was able to
overtake the Kombi when the traffic light turned red. He immediately blocked the Kombi while
the jeep pulled up right behind it. The two men on board the jeep turned out to be police
officers, Patrolmen Leonardo Pugao and Peter Ignacio. They drew their guns and told the
driver, Rogelio Ligon, and his companion Gabat, to alight from the Kombi. It was found out that
there was a third person inside the Kombi, a certain Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the
rear seat. The three were all brought by the police officers to the Western Police District.

Investigating Fiscal Alfredo Cantos, filed an information in court against Rogelio Ligon charging
him with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. Six months later, however, Assistant Fiscal
Cantos filed another information against Rogelio Ligon and Fernando Gabat for Robbery with
Homicide. He filed the latter information on the basis of a Supplemental Affidavit of Castillo and
a joint affidavit of Espino and Romeo Castil, cigarette vendors, who allegedly witnessed the
incident.

The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's version, stating that there can be no
doubt that Gabat forcibly took or grabbed the cigarette box from Rosales because, otherwise,
there could be no reason for the latter to run after the Kombi and hang on to its window. The
court also believed Castillo's testimony that Gabat forcibly removed or pried off the right hand
of Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi, otherwise, the latter could not have fallen down,
having already been able to balance himself on the stepboard.

However, the Supreme Court noted that while the prosecution witness, Castillo, may be a
disinterested witness with no motive, according to the court a quo, "other than to see that
justice be done," his testimony, even if not tainted with bias, is not entirely free from doubt
because his observation of the event could have been faulty or mistaken. The taxicab which
Castillo was driving was lower in height compared to the Kombi in which Gabat was riding-a
fact admitted by Castillo at the trial. Judicial notice may also be taken of the fact that the rear
windshield of the 1978 Volkswagen Kombi is on the upper portion, occupying approximately
one-third (1/3) of the rear end of the vehicle, thus making it visually difficult for Castillo to
observe clearly what transpired inside the Kombi at the front end where Gabat was seated. As
the taxicab was right behind the Kombi, following it at a distance of about three meters,
Castillo's line of vision was partially obstructed by the back part of the Kombi. His testimony
that he saw Gabat grab the cigarette box from Rosales and forcibly pry loose the latter's hand
from the windowsill of the Kombi is thus subject to a reasonable doubt, specially considering
that this occurrence happened in just a matter of seconds, and both vehicles during that time
were moving fast in the traffic.

Gabat was acquitted since the Supreme Court was not convinced with moral certainty that the
guilt of the accused Fernando Gabat has been established beyond reasonable doubt. In SC’s
view the quantum of proof necessary to sustain Gabat's conviction of so serious a crime as
robbery with homicide has not been met in this case.

Issue: WON a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability

Ruling: The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist
In this case, a preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act and omission with fault and
negligence caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage done. Gabat's wilfull act
of calling Rosales, the cigarette vendor, to the middle of a busy street to buy two sticks of cigarettes set
the chain of events which led to the death of Rosales. Through fault and negligence, Gabat (1) failed to
prevent the driver from moving forward while the purchase was completed; (2) failed to help Rosales
while the latter clung precariously to the moving vehicle, and (3) did not enforce his order to the driver to
stop.

These proven facts taken together are firm bases for finding Gabat civilly liable under the Civil Codefor
the damage done to Rosales.

Articles 1170-1174, Civil Code Article 1174, Civil Code Article 2178, Civil Code

Doctrine: In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have
acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. 

Far East vs. CA

Private respondent Luis A. Luna applied for, and was accorded, a FAREASTCARD issued by petitioner Far
East Bank and Trust Company ("FEBTC") at its Pasig Branch. Upon his request, the bank also issued a
supplemental card to private respondent Clarita S. Luna.

In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was immediately informed. In order to replace the lost
card, Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of this nature, the bank's internal security procedures
and policy would appear to be to meanwhile so record the lost card, along with the principal card, as a
"Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file.

Luis tendered a despedida  lunch for a close friend at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel
Intercontinental Manila. To pay for the lunch, Luis presented his FAREASTCARD to the attending waiter
who promptly had it verified through a telephone call to the bank's Credit Card Department. Since the
card was not honored, Luis was forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588.13. Naturally, Luis felt
embarrassed by this incident.

Consequently, private respondent Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from FEBTC the payment of
damages. Festejo, the vice-president of the bank, expressed the bank's apologies and explained that
when a card is reported to their office as lost, FAREASTCARD undertakes the necessary action to avert its
unauthorized use. The Bank further explained that they failed to inform respondent Luna about its
security and an employee did not consider the possibility that it may have been Luis Luna who was
presenting the card at that time. Festejo also sent a letter to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop
Restaurant to assure that the latter private respondents were "very valued clients" of FEBTC. William
Anthony King, Food and Beverage Manager of the Intercontinental Hotel, wrote back to say that the
credibility of private respondent had never been "in question." A copy of this reply was sent to Luis by
Festejo.

Still evidently feeling aggrieved, private respondents filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of Pasig
against FEBTC.
The RTC rendered a decision ordering FEBTC to pay private respondents (a) P300,000.00 moral
damages; (b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees.

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not private respondents are entitled of moral damages in culpa contractual

Ruling:

In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in
bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract.

Concededly, the bank was negligent for failing to inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. Nothing in
the findings of the trial court and the appellate court can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the
part of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondents. The failure to inform Luis is not considered to be so
gross that it would amount to malice or bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional
design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative
idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or ill-will.

Article 21 of the Code contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. In relation to a breach of contract, its
application can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his contractual obligation is so
deliberate as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse than fraud or bad faith. Most
importantly, Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in human relations that clearly must, in
any case, give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the Civil Code authorizing the grant of
moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to fraud or bad faith.
 
The decision is modified by deleting the award of moral and exemplary damages to private respondents;
in its stead, petitioner is ordered to pay nominal damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code

Syquia vs. CA

Doctrine: A pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of
a culpa aquiliana;

negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place." In the absence of
stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed in the performance of
the obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.

Facts: Juan Syquia, father of the deceased Vicente Syquia, entered in a contract of Deed of
Sale and Interment Order with Manila Memorial Park Cemetery Inc (MMPCI). In the contract,
there contained a provision which stated that the coffin would be placed in a sealed concrete
vault to protect the remains of the deceased from elements. During the preparation for the
transfer of Vicente’s remains in the newly bought lot in Manila Memorial, it was discovered that
there was a hole in the concrete vault which caused total flooding inside, damaged the coffin as
well as the body of the deceased and covered the same with filth.

Syquia filed a complaint for recovery of damages arising from breach of contract and/or quasi-
delict against the MMPCI for failure to deliver a defect-free concrete vault to protect the
remains of the deceased. In its defense, MMPCI claimed that the boring of the hole was
necessary in order to prevent the vault from floating when water fills the grave. The trial court
dismissed the complaint holding that there was no quasi-delict because the defendant is not
guilty of any fault or negligence and because there was a pre-existing contract between the parties.
The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not there was quasi-delict or breach of contract

Ruling:
There is not enough ground, both in fact and in law, to justify a reversal of the decision of the
respondent Court and to uphold the pleas of the petitioners. Although a pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, the SC finds no reason to
disregard the respondent’s Court finding that there was no negligence.

“Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict x x x.”

In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.,
entered into a contract entitled “Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care”. That agreement
governed the relations of the parties and defined their respective rights and obligations. Hence, had there
been actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable
not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but for culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil
Code, to wit: “Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay,
and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.”

However, there was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care and in the Rules
and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. that the vault would be waterproof.  Hence,
that private respondent did not breach the tenor of its obligation to the Syquias.

As to the boring the hole on the vault, it negates the allegation of negligence since private respondent
has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of water inside
the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave filling the same with
earth.