Strategic Analysis

ISSN: 0970-0161 (Print) 1754-0054 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsan20

Globalization of the Jihadist Threat: Case Study of

Trinidad and Tobago

Sanjay Badri-Maharaj

To cite this article: Sanjay Badri-Maharaj (2017) Globalization of the Jihadist Threat: Case Study
of Trinidad and Tobago, Strategic Analysis, 41:2, 173-189, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2017.1278880

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2017.1278880

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Strategic Analysis, 2017
Vol. 41, No. 2, 173–189, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2017.1278880

Globalization of the Jihadist Threat: Case Study of Trinidad and

Tobago
Sanjay Badri-Maharaj

Abstract: Despite a well-integrated Muslim population, and an environment where

there is no tangible discrimination or lack of opportunity, the Jihadist ideology has
succeeded in taking root in Trinidad. Links with organized crime have helped fuel the
movement and strong links have been forged with ISIS and Al-Qaeda with the result
that at least 89 Trinidadians are now in Syria. It is also argued that some Trinidadian
Muslims have succumbed to the messages broadcast by ISIS and that the lure of
fighting for an Islamic Caliphate has found resonance. The conclusion will show that a
lack of political consensus and will has hampered the country’s ability to effectively
neutralize the challenge thus posed.

You now have a golden opportunity to do something that many of us here wish we could do
right now. You have the ability to terrify the disbelievers in their own homes and make their
streets run with their blood.
… terrorise the disbelievers and make them feel fear everywhere, even in their own bed-
rooms. Due to their mere disbelief, their blood by default is lawful to spill.

These words of Abu Sa’d at-Trinidadi—an Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
fighter of Trinidadian extraction—in issue 15 of Dabiq, the glossy online propaganda
magazine of ISIS,1 sent shudders through the population of Trinidad & Tobago. These
words, in a vitriol-laced interview, were aimed at spreading fear among the island
nation’s overwhelmingly non-Muslim population. This was the first time that ISIS
used one of its Trinidadian fighters to exhort his co-religionists in Trinidad to commit
acts of violence against non-Muslims. At-Trinidadi, also known as Asadullah, is
suspected of being one Shane Dominic Crawford. His terrifying message came shortly
after it was revealed that nine Trinidadian nationals had been detained in Turkey for
trying to infiltrate Syria to fight alongside ISIS, thus demonstrating the significant lure
that ISIS has for elements of the Trinidadian Muslim population.2
Earlier, in January 2016, the Trinidad and Tobago Express, citing a Turkish report
reported that four Trinidad and Tobago nationals were being held in Turkey for
fighting for ISIS.3 This was the latest in a steady stream of frightening reports
emanating from a country far removed geographically, culturally and politically
from the turmoil of the Middle East, that underscored the aggressive, proactive and
increasingly successful global Jihadi recruitment effort.
The case of Trinidad and Tobago makes for an interesting study, as on the face of
it, a well-integrated Muslim population, a strong welfare state and the absence of
political persecution on any religious or racial basis should not be a fertile recruiting

Dr Sanjay Badri-Maharaj was a Visiting International Fellow at IDSA from June to September 2016.

© 2017 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

174 Sanjay Badri-Maharaj

ground for Jihadist ideology. However, the converse is most certainly the case, as not
only is there a growing attraction for such extremist causes, but the numbers of
Trinidadian nationals willing to fight for ISIS are also increasing. What is happening
in Trinidad is symptomatic of a broader problem, as Jihadi groups have widened their
reach to the extent that even apparently unconnected groups can now ally with the
ideology, and the resource bases of better known groups without formally being part
of them.
It is submitted that the case of Trinidad and Tobago demonstrates how even at
such a distance, Jihadi propaganda can find recruits and foment disaffection even
where no local cause exists. In addition, it demonstrates the allure of the ISIS concept
of a proto-state. Trinidad’s situation further illustrates how a state with good internal
and external communications, but with porous borders, renders itself peculiarly
vulnerable to the ideological influence of terror groups, alliances with local groups
and the movement of resources and personnel. In addition, given the number of
potential targets for terror strikes in Trinidad, the nexus between terror groups
owing allegiance to a common cause, and inspired by ISIS, is sowing the seeds for
potential problems in the years to come.

Background
Trinidad and Tobago lies at the southernmost point of the Caribbean archipelago, 11 km
off the coast of north-east Venezuela. Trinidad and Tobago is an industrialized society
with a high literacy rate and large petrochemical, petroleum and natural gas sectors.
Literacy exceeds 98 per cent and education up to the tertiary level is free.4 While there is
income disparity and some level of deprivation, Trinidad’s per capita income is no less
than $21,000 in nominal terms, with a very high human development index.5
Demographically, the country has a stable population of just over 1.3 million, with
35.4 per cent of the population being of Indian origin, 34.2 per cent being of African
descent, while 22.8 per cent are of mixed parentage.6 In terms of religion, 57 per cent
of the population identifies itself as Christian, 18 per cent as Hindu, and 13 per cent as
having no religion. Adherents to the Islamic faith comprise only five per cent of the
population.7 It should be noted that there are two distinct groups of Muslims in
Trinidad—those of Indian origin and a more recent group of Afro-Trinidadian con-
verts. While the former have traditionally been well-integrated moderates, the latter,
influenced by the Middle East as opposed to South Asia, are far more radical. All
religious and racial groups are integrated into the wider national community without
compromising their individual identities, with complete freedom of religion being
enshrined in law and effective in practice.
While Trinidad has had a relatively stable political history, there have been two
attempts to overthrow the elected government, one in 1970 and another in 1990. The
first was the result of discontent within the Trinidad and Tobago army, that led to a
mutiny, which assumed wider significance in the light of the then ongoing political
unrest. The latter event, however, is of particular importance as, for the first time, an
Afro-Trinidadian Islamic fundamentalist group—the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen—came
into prominence as the perpetrator of the July 27, 1990 coup that left 24 people
dead, and caused hundreds of millions of dollars in damage. Of significance is the fact
that the said group had received extensive training and support from the Libyan
government, marking perhaps the first time that there was a nexus between interna-
tional terrorist groups and local affiliates. This will be dealt with in a later subsection.
 Strategic Analysis 175

Why is Trinidad important?

At first glance, Trinidad is far off and not in open conflict with radical Islam on behalf
of the West or Western interests. As a relatively stable democracy with a relatively
small radical element, Trinidad does not immediately raise concerns. However, as a
state with a weak security apparatus, its strategic location and its position as an
energy-exporter render the country worthy of study. In addition, the country’s histor-
ical background and its traditionally close relationship with the United States and the
United Kingdom make for a heavily Westernized population, which, despite cultural,
racial and religious diversity, is very much influenced by Western education and
cultural norms and attitudes that may impact upon the discourse for dealing with
radical Islam.
Trinidad is the largest supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to the United
States.8 LNG tankers, lumbering, slow and vulnerable, could become ideal mass
casualty weapons in the hands of terrorists.9 Furthermore, static installations in the
petroleum, natural gas and petrochemical sectors are largely unprotected, with the
attendant risks of attack, and the added attraction that many such installations are
foreign owned which would strike a blow both against the West and against the
Trinidadian economy. Moreover, Trinidad has allied itself, albeit somewhat half-
heartedly, with the West in its fight against Jihadist groups and this may make it a
potentially inviting target.
The country’s air and sea links allow access to countries around the world, making
Trinidad very attractive both as a ground for ISIS recruitment, and as a nodal point for
forces to gather to mount an attack on Western investments in the region. It should be
noted that Trinidadians do not need visas to go to the UK, the Schengen region or
Turkey. There are also large Trinidadian diasporas in the United States, Canada and
the United Kingdom that maintain close ties with their friends and relations in
Trinidad. Demographically, Trinidad’s heterogeneous population makes it easy for
infiltrators to assimilate into the wider population with attendant risks to national
security. In addition, cognizance should be taken of the modest size of the Trinidadian
security forces—some 5,000 in the military, and 6,500 in the police—and the patchy
record of the country’s intelligence services in detecting and preventing nefarious
activities.

July 27, 1990: Trinidad’s brush with violent jihad

Trinidad received a severe jolt in 1990 when on July 27, a radical Afro-Trinidadian
Islamist group, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen led by Imam Yasin Abu Bakr, an Afro-
Trinidadian convert to Islam (previously known as Lennox Philip) and a former
policeman, staged an armed insurrection with 113 of his followers. This led to the
then Prime Minister, Arthur N. R. Robinson, most of his cabinet and several opposi-
tion Members of Parliament, plus the staff of the government owned television and
radio networks, being held hostage for six days.10 The Parliament building and the
television and radio studios were occupied by armed insurgents and severely damaged
during the standoff that ensued. The Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS)
collapsed within the first hour of the insurrection, abandoning the capital city, Port of
Spain, and the military took hours to assemble a viable fighting force. This is,
fortunately, the single most violent incident in the history of Trinidad and Tobago.
176 Sanjay Badri-Maharaj

Formed in the mid-1980s, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen began as a small quasi-

criminal outfit, initially portraying itself as a vigilante group behind the mask of
righteous indignation over the narcotics trade. It grew rapidly in influence and
emerged as a challenge to the state as it obtained funding and training in Libya, as
well as weapons through an elaborate smuggling network, and began to forge
alliances and seek recruits from other radical elements in various mosques. Libyan
funding was routed through Muammar al-Qaddafi’s World Islamic Call Society
(WICS).11
Despite its assertion that the insurrection was spontaneous, it has been revealed
that discussions for assassinating Prime Minister Robinson were held in 1989 and by
October of that year, the physical infrastructure needed for the insurrection was in
place. An example of catastrophic intelligence failure, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen was
ostensibly under surveillance by the police, including the elite Special Branch, and the
military. Despite these precautions, it was able to plan, gather arms and ammunition,
assemble people and coordinate the insurrection without interference from either of
these agencies.12
The insurrection left 24 persons dead and 231 wounded, 133 of them in an orgy of
looting and arson that followed, resulting in damages amounting to hundreds of
millions of dollars.13 Popular support for the insurrection was minimal but a total
breakdown of law enforcement led to chaos, which was exploited by looters for
personal gain. While the insurrection ended with the surrender of Bakr and his
followers, they were acquitted of the charges brought against them by the
Trinidadian courts, which upheld the amnesty granted to them to secure the lives of
the hostages. This emboldened them further and Bakr and his adherents have con-
tinued to occupy an important position of influence and prominence in the local
Islamic and criminal community.
Despite the expensive and controversial commission of enquiry appointed to delve
into the insurrection, the complete failure to detect the preparations for the insurrec-
tion remains baffling. Bakr did have extensive contacts in the military and police,
which may have been a factor.14 Furthermore, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen managed to
infiltrate Trinidad’s Customs and Excise service and were thus able to bring in
quantities of arms and ammunition, exposing the susceptibility of agencies to rela-
tively easy subversion. The outfit also allegedly sought to forge links with political
parties, links that seemed to become more evident in the years after the insurrection.
Politicians have been clamouring for their support, from as far back as the 1991
Parliamentary elections, and these said links continue to come to the fore whenever
elections are near.15 This has led to the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen being an electoral
‘muscle’ much sought after by politicians of all hues.16 Bakr has described himself
as a ‘kingmaker’ in Trinidad’s political scene, but his influence and value have
seemingly waned over the last decade.17
To this day, Bakr and members of the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen are frequently charged
with crimes ranging from extortion to murder, but a dysfunctional criminal justice
system has ensured that Bakr has never been convicted and his henchmen rarely face
sanctions for their actions.18 Despite weapons being seized from their compound in
2005, the 10 Jamaat-al Muslimeen detained for questioning were released without
charge.19 This has given the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen much confidence and credibility
among the denizens of the Trinidadian underworld. Moreover, their seeming impunity
has led to a disenchantment with the security establishment and the criminal justice
system, and as such, actionable human intelligence continues to be problematic.
 Strategic Analysis 177

Confidence in the criminal justice system was further shaken when the Jamaat-al-
Muslimeen were able to reacquire 2 of 10 properties seized for auction at a small
fraction of the market value.20 This has fostered strong suspicions that the Jamaat-al-
Muslimeen have extensive connections within the political establishment across party
lines and continue to subvert the security and intelligence agencies.21 Given the
almost endemic corruption within the police service and the political establishment
(transcending political parties), it is not implausible that such suspicions have merit.22
The 1990 insurrection and its aftermath highlight the muddled, and at times
contradictory, Trinidadian response to terrorism. Underestimating the threat, botching
the response, failing to adequately punish the insurrectionists and the lack of suffi-
ciently severe consequences for their actions, have all emboldened the Jamaat-al-
Muslimeen, and now spawned a series of new groups. Among them are the Jamaat al
Islami al Karibi, the Waajihatul Islaamiyyah (The Islamic Front) and the Jamaat al
Murabiteen, each having drawn their leadership from former members of the Jamaat-
al-Muslimeen.23 The power wielded by these groups helps in creating a fertile ground
for recruitment into potential Jihadist groups. As such, the membership of these
groups keeps expanding, with recruits falling prey to the potent mix of propaganda
and the lure of the perceived empowerment offered by these groups.24 Radicalization
has now acquired a new dimension with the message of ISIS being disseminated
through social media and the Internet, as well as through more direct attempts at
recruitment through proxies and allied groups. In this new dynamic, the Jamaat-al-
Muslimeen and its affiliates, spin-offs and ideological associates and their networks in
Trinidad’s cities, mosques and economically less advantaged urban neighbourhoods,
are ideally placed to act as de facto fronts for ISIS or other Jihadi recruiting efforts in
Trinidad.

Globalization and Jihad: the impact on Trinidad

Trinidad’s Muslim community has not remained immune to the globalization of the
Jihadist movement, and is susceptible to the lure of the radical doctrines espoused
elsewhere. There is no doubt that the Internet is one of the most potent recruiting tools
for the Jihadists and for spreading the message of ISIS. Trinidad is far from being the
only country so affected with ISIS managing to recruit, in just one instance, three
young women from Colorado.25 In addition the Orlando shooter, Omar Mateen, was
also radicalized over the Internet.26 It is difficult to ascertain exactly how many
Trinidadians may have been radicalized through the Internet. However, the Internet
is one of the primary recruiting tools used by ISIS to attract foreign fighters.27 That
some recruits from the Caribbean may have been recruited through the Internet was
hinted at by General John Kelly, head of America’s Southern Command whose sphere
of responsibility includes the Caribbean.28 Social media allows ISIS and its affiliates
to spread its message overtly and covertly, seeking out youth who may be susceptible
to such messages. In Trinidad, such a campaign has the additional support of local
groups such as the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen, and its loose affiliates, the aforementioned
Jamaat al Islami al Karibi, the Waajihatul Islaamiyyah and the Jamaat al Murabiteen.
It has also openly associated itself with Al-Qaeda and has proclaimed its intention of
establishing an Islamic state in Trinidad.29
This plethora of ideologically affiliated groups has enabled ISIS to be surprisingly
effective in recruiting Trinidadian youth for their cause. No fewer than 35
Trinidadians have been identified as fighting for ISIS; adding their family members
178 Sanjay Badri-Maharaj

who support them actively brings the total to 89.30 This figure may well be an
underestimate, as figures discussed in Trinidad’s Parliament have placed the numbers
at anywhere between 102 and 400.31 So successful have ISIS been in recruiting
Trinidadians that several of them, including children, were featured in an ISIS
recruiting video made in late 2015.32 Indeed, in the said video, one identifying
himself as Abu Zayd al-Muhajir had brought his three children to the Ar-Raqqah
province in Syria; while another—Abu Khalid, a Christian convert—used the video to
proclaim that Muslims in Trinidad were ‘restricted’. This was echoed by Zayd al-
Muhajir and yet another Trinidadian, Abu Abdullah, who went so far as to encourage
Muslims in Trinidad to support ISIS in its ambition of creating an Islamic Caliphate.
A recurring theme in the video was that Islam in Trinidad was being ‘restricted’—a
statement without basis in fact, but one which has found unusual resonance among
elements of the Trinidadian population.
Traditionally, the extremist doctrine found most traction with Afro-Trinidadian
converts to Islam, as exemplified by the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen and its affiliates. This
may be a consequence of the strong links between Islam and the 1970s Black Power
movement in the United States, which found considerable resonance in Trinidad.33
Yasin Abu Bakr, for example, openly courted the urban Afro-Trinidadian youth in his
sermons with a mix of Islamic doctrine and Black Power rhetoric. However, another
disturbing trend, wherein more Indo-Trinidadian Muslims, usually moderate and well-
integrated into society, are succumbing to such propaganda, has also been observed.
From the Jihadist viewpoint, the Indo-Trinidadian Muslim, generally better educated
and wealthier than the Afro-Trinidadian converts, offers a potentially more attractive
source of skilled and motivated manpower. Lured by the Salafist doctrine, both
through social media, which includes the use of Jihad videos, and through aggressive
campaigns in many of Trinidad’s 85 mosques, young Muslims have been targeted for
recruitment.34 Indeed, a recruiting video featuring an apparently Trinidadian ISIS
fighter bearing the name Abu Abdurahman al-Trinidad sent shockwaves through a
majority of Muslims who are appalled, angered and concerned about the apparent
attraction that ISIS seems to have, for too many Muslim youth.35
While there have been no local studies on the motivation behind the Trinidadian
Muslims’ eagerness to travel to join ISIS fighters, it is possible that the idea of the
Caliphate has fired the imagination of disaffected youth. The leader of the Waajihatul
Islaamiyyah, Umar Abdullah, who is constantly monitored by an officer of the TTPS
Special Branch, identified some characteristics of the Trinidadians attracted to ISIS.
He noted that those who were recruited by ISIS were arrogant, lacked patience, could
not live among non-Muslims, had marital problems and firmly believed they were
being marginalized as Muslims.36
While there are minimal data and analysis relating to Trinidadian Jihadi recruits,
the available trends seem to bear out Abdullah’s comments. The Trinidad Guardian
newspaper noted that a 50-page police file listed the names, ethnicity and last known
addresses of no fewer than 102 identifiable Trinidadians who had left for Syria
between 2013 and 2015. It appears that they are mainly of Afro-Trinidadian extrac-
tion, from either the lower middle or lower socio-economic groups, often from single-
parent families and were either unemployed or under-employed—the very same
demographic that forms the bulk of organized criminal gangs in Trinidad.37 It should
be noted that Umar Abdullah is himself not above suspicion despite disavowing any
links with ISIS, as the Waajijatul Islaamiyyah still espouses extremist views and is
continuing to call for an Islamic state in Trinidad.
 Strategic Analysis 179

The distribution of ‘Jihad videos’ among young people has also attracted elements
who are attracted to the violence espoused in them. The latter factor should not be
underestimated as the level of brutality in ISIS recruiting videos surpasses that of the
earlier Jihad videos from the 1990s. Given the rising levels of violent crime in
Trinidad, it is possible that there are recruits who find the lure of the gun, and the
power over life and death, attractive and revel in the sense of invincibility it gives
them. In addition, there is little doubt that the rhetoric of the ‘War on Terror’ has been
couched in terms that are too often Islamophobic. This and the notoriety of the
incarcerations in Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib, widely publicized in the media,
would also have had an impact upon the psyche of Trinidadian Muslims.38
It should be noted that these extremist outfits have fanned the flames further by
perpetuating the myth that Muslims are not allowed to freely practise their faith in
Trinidad and are being persecuted. This is being used as a rallying call by Trinidadian
ISIS fighters and their sympathizers, to attract more recruits.39 That it is having so
much success points to the lack of a cogent counter-narrative. It is also a very telling
example of a blatant untruth being repeated often enough to be accepted as the truth
by some. It is also interesting that, to date, while condemning ISIS and radicalization,
not even one Trinidadian moderate Islamic group has publicly stated that Islam is not
being discriminated against, and that the faith enjoys adequate freedom of practice in
the country.

Nexus between terror groups and organized crime

Trinidad illustrates two interesting aspects about the nexus between terror groups and
organized crime. Trinidad’s radical Islamic groups initially came to the attention of the
authorities not for their links with terror groups but for their involvement in organized
crime. This is certainly not a phenomenon unique to Trinidad as transnational
organized crime as a source of funding for international terror groups is increasing
globally and, as suggested, has the potential to morph into a terror threat in its own
right. From mere coexistence, the relationship between organized crime and terror has
moved to the stage of cooperation (based on the belief that their mutual interests
would be served by temporarily working together), which in Trinidad’s case amounts
to convergence (as several criminal groups and potential terror groups are virtually
one and the same).
It is undoubtedly beneficial for terror groups to link themselves with organized
crime as the networks, expertise and reach of such criminal organizations enable the
terrorist groups to establish a self-sustaining structure, and not one that is dependent
on captured supplies or territory. As ISIS’s affiliates are loosely aligned rather than
centrally controlled, the ability of local groups sympathetic to ISIS to be financially
self-sustaining reduces the burden on ISIS as an organization. Money laundering
facilities available to organized crime groups also facilitate the concealment of
terrorist funding, while counterfeiting and fraud have the potential to damage an
economy. The human trafficking element of organized crime opens avenues for
terrorists to infiltrate countries hitherto deemed inaccessible. These decentralized
criminal links also create an inherent resilience in their allied groups which, in
loose or close alliance, would allow for a degree of longevity—the names of groups
could change but their personnel and ideology could morph into a different form and
emerge, on the surface, as a criminal gang.
180 Sanjay Badri-Maharaj

The Latin American region is no stranger to links between terror and organized
crime as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have a long history of
involvement with the narcotics traffickers of the region.40 Less well known is the fact
that cocaine smuggled from the Latin American mainland was shipped to Mali in
order to fund Islamist groups in the Sahel region.41 In one high-profile incident, a
Boeing 727 coming from Venezuela crashed in Gao on November 5, 2009 after
transporting and unloading a shipment of cocaine at a makeshift landing strip.42
There are also reports of Hezbollah establishing links with Colombian drug cartels
and Mexican narco-traffickers and they have thus established a presence in Latin
America.43 In this regard, Argentine prosecutors have sounded warnings regarding the
size and scale of Islamist terror networks operating in the region.44 ISIS, on the other
hand, has established some measure of control over the Afghan heroin trade, allegedly
supplying as much as half the heroin consumed in Europe.45 In addition, as ISIS
gained the loyalty of the Islamist groups fighting in North Africa, it also gained
effective control over their links with the Latin American cocaine trade.46 It is known
that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad
in West Africa (MUJWA) have ‘taxed’ the narcotics trade to obtain funding for their
movements.47 The prospect of ISIS controlling the supply of heroin and cocaine to the
European market is frightening.
In the case of Trinidad, the link between organized crime and extremist groups is
so close as to amount to virtual convergence. The Jamaat-al-Muslimeen in particular
were widely accused of having links with the narcotics trade, the smuggling of
weapons and trafficking in people. Indeed, the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen control no
fewer than 21 affiliated criminal gangs who continue to hold parts of the capital
city—Port-of-Spain—in their thrall, unleashing waves of violent crime almost at
will.48 In a very real sense, the criminal–terror group nexus has led to the creation
of a virtual parallel state in some parts of Trinidad. Port of Spain, as noted earlier,
would on careful analysis appear to be run by criminal gangs rather than by its elected
officials and bureaucracy.
It is an unfortunate fact that nearly all the major political parties have flirted with
criminal gangs, seeking election muscle at different times. The gangs, in turn, have
been rewarded with grants of lucrative government contracts. These contracts, for
building infrastructure and alleviating unemployment, have been used by these groups
to enrich themselves and recruit additional personnel. Their ability to dispense patron-
age has made them powerful within their communities, and the wealth, skimmed off
the said contracts, has provided them with lavish lifestyles and an influence that stems
from a combination of muscle and money.49
Many of these gangs, but, it is to be noted, not all, who are affiliated with Islamic
extremist groups have secured control over whole swathes of Port of Spain and have
begun to expand their zones of influence and control. With private armies, nearly the
size of infantry battalions, they have begun to exert their power farther afield,
targeting the populous urban and semi-urban communities in what is locally known
as the ‘East–West’ corridor—a prosperous largely middle-class zone of territory,
running laterally from Port of Spain eastwards. Their writ runs over whole commu-
nities and government control exists only peripherally. While government services
and law enforcement agencies operate on the surface, actual control largely rests with
the gangs.50 Other loosely allied extremist groups, affiliated with the Jamaat-al-
Muslimeen, operate with virtual impunity in some parts of South and Central
Trinidad, openly carrying assault rifles and other weapons. It is suspected that
 Strategic Analysis 181

organized crime provided the money for the 1990 insurrection attempt and continues
to fund the activities of radical groups in Trinidad.
The gangs, by their presence and the image they cultivate, have been able to serve
as a potential source of personnel for ISIS in Trinidad, since the extremist leaders of
these criminal gangs are able to attract aspiring, impressionable and motivated recruits
towards extremist ideology. Embedded in the urban neighbourhoods of the country
and targeting vulnerable youth, the gangs are able to exert maximum influence over
their communities and, as has been noted already, they have no problem in recruiting
large numbers of ‘soldiers’ to carry out their wishes. It would appear that the billions
of dollars spent on social programmes and welfare systems have failed to stem
disaffection and the youth are ready to be swayed by the rhetoric and ideology of
these extremist/criminal gangs. Combating disaffection in this vulnerable demo-
graphic will thus be the key factor in reducing the supply of recruits to both the
gangs and ISIS.

Ease of movement of ideas, cadres and resources

Trinidad’s local extremist groups have forged links with other groups within the
region. In 2007 a Trindadian—Kareem Ibrahim—was among a group of four, includ-
ing three Guyanese, who were plotting to attack JFK International Airport.51
Guyanese nationals, Russell Defrietas and Abdul Kadir, reportedly approached the
Jamaat-al-Muslimeen for assistance and financial backing for the plot.52 Another
Guyanese national, Abdel Nur, was among the three—Ibrahim and Kadir being the
others—extradited from Trinidad to the United States.53 Ibrahim, Kadir and Defrietas
were found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment while Nur pleaded guilty and
received a reduced sentence of 15 years.54 Of interest is the fact that Ibrahim and
Kadir were Shiite Muslims, yet they were willing to seek assistance from Sunni
groups such as the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen.
Trinidad’s proximity to the South American mainland and the flow of illegal
migration between the countries of the region lend themselves to easy coordination
between terrorists and criminal groups. Despite the monitoring of extremist groups by
Trinidad’s Strategic Services Agency (SSA) and the Police Special Branch, there are
rumours of the stockpiling of weapons and ammunition by extremist groups. The fact
that Trinidad’s maritime borders are porous, and its coast guard is hard pressed to
effectively patrol the country’s border with Venezuela, makes the flow of arms and
ammunition into the country relatively easy. The virtual collapse of Venezuela’s
economy has made weapons even more easily available with a brisk trade in arms
for basic commodities being undertaken between Trinidad’s coastal areas and
Venezuelan smugglers.55 It is, however, an unfortunate fact that Trinidad has yet to
undertake a comprehensive analysis of its vulnerability, the Jihadi threat or the extent
of the radicalization in the country. A single study was commissioned in 2014 but was
wholly inadequate.56
External intelligence agencies have also continued to keep Trinidad on a watch
list, noting particularly the regional links between Islamist extremist outfits and their
growing membership and support.57 It is also an unfortunate fact that the Trinidadian
criminal justice system has a very poor arrest and conviction record. Moreover, it is
plagued by severe systemic defects that result in prolonged trials, weak enforcement
of bail conditions and an ineffective witness protection programme—leading among
other things to criminal gangs being able to operate with impunity. While there are
182 Sanjay Badri-Maharaj

many international agreements for cooperation to sever the nexus between organized
crime and terror groups, such cooperation has been less than effective to date. The
scale of the threat requires a fresh look at such cooperation, with a view to expand-
ing it.
One of the reasons that ISIS has become such a globally terrifying entity is its
ability to transmit ideas, infiltrate cadres and coordinate resources with relative ease.
As we have seen, ISIS is able to spread its propaganda and attract recruits through the
Internet. It is also noted that porous land borders make the movement of ISIS fighters
and potential recruits relatively easy. It is estimated that ISIS recruited some 30,000
foreign fighters in 2014–2015, of whom 4,500 were Westerners—including 250
Americans, 750 Britons and of course 89 or more Trinidadians.58 It is observed that
the majority of those joining ISIS reach Syria through Turkey through existing travel
routes and by taking advantage of the European Union’s relaxed internal borders.59
Needless to say, established smuggling routes have ensured that the free flow of
weapons to ISIS fighters continues unchecked. However, this freedom of movement
works both ways—facilitating the flow of recruits to ISIS’s armies in Iraq and Syria,
but also facilitating the travel of ISIS trained personnel to other countries.
This ease of movement between countries has contributed directly to the growth of
local Trinidadian terrorist groups, and their access to arms, propaganda and technical
know-how. In 2014, a group of eight Muslim men was detained by the Venezuelan
intelligence agency, SEBIN, on suspicion of terrorist activities and for what was
described as undergoing ‘pre-jihad’ training.60 Five were only recently released
after pleading guilty to lesser charges as SEBIN has photographic and video evidence
of their military-style training but political considerations enabled a compromise to be
reached.61 Given that these men were seeking visas to go to the Middle East, through
Saudi Arabia, it is a matter of interest, whether or not these men were intent on joining
ISIS. In September 2015, the nephew of a former government minister was arrested in
Saudi Arabia on suspicion of being a terrorist.62 Trinidad’s easily accessible air
transport system allows for easy transit through the United States and the United
Kingdom, which is a cause for concern unless strong border controls and screening
are implemented.
Of greater concern to Trinidad is the open lobbying to allow the free and
unhindered return of foreign trained fighters to the country. Domestic political con-
siderations (the Trinidadian equivalent of vote-bank politics) and intense lobbying
efforts by the leader of Waajihatul Islaamiyyah, Umar Abdullah, have meant that the
country is in limbo regarding the fate of Trinidad’s ISIS fighters.63 It would be
inconceivable, for example, for Trinidad to follow Singapore’s example and move
towards the compulsory registration of Islamic teachers.64 Given the weak security
apparatus of the country, the return of trained ISIS fighters could be potentially
disastrous. It should be noted that the then Trinidad and Tobago government’s co-
sponsoring of the September 2014 UN resolution 2178 (2014), which commits
Trinidad and Tobago to act against and share intelligence on foreign trained
fighters,65 was opposed by the then opposition, now the ruling party, revealing the
competing political compulsions in the country.66 Indeed, there is surprisingly little
political consensus between the government and opposition on the issue, despite the
threat being made so apparent.
The ease of movement, combined with the Internet and aggressive proselytizing
by Middle-Eastern trained preachers (a departure from the traditional local training
that has been espoused by the moderate majority of the Muslim community), means
 Strategic Analysis 183

that the Jihadist message is spreading unchecked. Of equal concern, however, is the
uncontrolled influx of illegal firearms into the country. With a coastline that is largely
unprotected, despite recent efforts to bolster a depleted coast guard, military standard
firearms come into Trinidad with a frequency that is disconcerting. With as many as
15,000 illegal firearms circulating in a population of 1.3 million, their inflow aided
and abetted by corruption in the coast guard, police and customs and excise, the seeds
of potentially explosive violence have been sown.67 Indeed, one might say that the
combination of ideology, motivated and trained personnel from ISIS and an easy
supply of weapons puts Trinidad in an unenviable situation. It is equally of concern,
given Trinidad’s continuing politicization of the intelligence services (consecutive
governments have removed directors of the intelligence agencies for apparently
political, and possibly racial, considerations), the police high command and, increas-
ingly, the military.68 All these militate against an effective and proactive response to
what is emerging as a clear and present danger.
Trinidad’s experience makes for an interesting comparison with countries such as
South Africa, where the increasing radicalization of that country’s Muslim population
has been cause for concern for several years. South Africa’s government played host
to a Hamas delegation in October 2015, raising eyebrows in Israel, which had been a
strong partner of the old apartheid-era regime.69 This in and of itself is not reflective
of any South African support for terrorism, but given that Hamas is designated as a
terrorist organization by several countries—Israel, the United Kingdom and the
United States among them—playing host to the organization could be indicative of
South Africa’s desire to break with the Western narrative on terror. This is not the case
in Trinidad where the Western narrative holds sway. However, South Africa, like
Trinidad, has been accused of having a muddled response to revelations of terrorist
links.70
South Africa seemingly disbelieved rumours that 140 of its nationals were fighting
with ISIS, until 11 of them returned.71 There were fears that the 11 had been released
to act as agents for ISIS within South Africa which, despite having a well-developed
internal security apparatus, lacks adequate monitoring mechanisms for ISIS returnees.
As an ominous portent of the risks that radicalization poses for Trinidad, two South
African youths—the twins Brandon-Lee and Tony-Lee Thulsie (apparently converts
to Islam)—were arrested and charged with being part of ISIS plots to bomb the US
Embassy in Pretoria and Jewish institutions in South Africa.72 It is possible that the
threats appearing in the August 2016 issue of Dabiq—as mentioned at the beginning
of this article—could be the first salvo in a series of attacks in Trinidad. It should be
made clear that countries like Trinidad and South Africa, with well-integrated Muslim
populations, cannot be realistically expected to engage in aggressive anti-Jihadi
campaigns of a violent nature. Rather, these countries would need to systematically
study, monitor and assess the impact of radicalization on their Muslim populations,
and engage with the community to counteract the malignant influence of radical
ideology on the susceptible elements of the population.

ISIS or Al-Qaeda—switching of allegiance to ISIS by local terror groups

In Afghanistan and Pakistan, there have been a series of ‘defections’ from the Taliban
as several groups—the Jundallah, the Tehreek-e-Khilafat and the Jamaat-al-Ahrar and
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan among them—are now voicing support for ISIS
instead.73 Within the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), there have been internal
184 Sanjay Badri-Maharaj

squabbles over support for ISIS with its spokesman Shahidullah Shahid being sacked
for pledging allegiance to ISIS, as well as defections, including those of local TTP
leaders in Orakzai, Kurram and Khyber tribal regions and Peshawar and Hangu
districts.74 Given the traditionally close links between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda,
this switch of loyalty could be taken to demonstrate the weakening influence of Al-
Qaeda and the strengthening of ISIS. Further evidence of this apparent weakening of
Al-Qaeda in the eyes of its affiliates may be seen in the 2014 pledge of allegiance to
ISIS by the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in the Philippines, as that group had been a
strong supporter of Al-Qaeda.75 One is left wondering how much of the switch from
Al-Qaeda to ISIS is merely an effort to associate with the organization that seems to
be in the ascendancy.
It is difficult to determine the extent of the allegiance Trinidad’s extremist groups
have to ISIS. Groups which openly displayed their allegiance to Al-Qaeda (such as
Umar Abdullah’s Islamic Front) have been less vocal in their support for ISIS and
some have gone out of their way to deny any links with ISIS. However, given the fact
that the Islamic community in Trinidad is small and that there are relatively few
radical groups within that community, and by their own admission, some of the local
groups know some of the Trinidadians who are currently fighting in Syria, one must
question the honesty of such denials.
Trinidadian criminologist Darius Figueria unequivocally believes that ISIS has
established a ground presence in Trinidad and Tobago. His views are supported by
elements in the Trinidad security apparatus, all pointing to the fact that it is not an
easy task for a Trinidadian to simply tell someone he wishes to join ISIS, and get to
Syria or Iraq.76 The process of indoctrination, travel and training has to be organized
by a well-developed yet covert infrastructure, and one which has proven to be
effective.
Of greater concern should be the ability of ISIS to generate ideologically allied
affiliates with only the loosest of connections with the ISIS leadership. It must be
noted that ISIS has been able to inspire deadly lone-wolf attacks, such as Omar
Mateen’s massacre in Orlando and the October 22, 2014 Parliament Hill shootings in
Ottawa, Canada.77 Even the incident involving a hatchet-wielding assailant in
New York, a day later, seems to be an ISIS-inspired incident with the perpetrator
influenced by ISIS propaganda.78
One advantage that Al-Qaeda had over ISIS was that its rhetoric was couched in
anti-Western/anti-US terms, which had a broader appeal in Trinidad. However, the
ISIS model and its aim to create its own proto-state along Islamic lines have fired the
imagination of some Trinidadian radicals. It is perhaps here that we may find an
explanation for why the ISIS ideology has found such fertile ground among elements
of Trinidad’s Muslim community. It is the prospect of a state devoid of Western
influences and purportedly governed by Islamic ideals that has made so many
Trinidadians willing to leave the relatively comfortable surroundings of the
Caribbean to fight for a cause in a far-off foreign land. Given what we know about
Trinidad’s extremist groups, it is suggested that while they will not publicly acknowl-
edge any links, the ideology, local-level flexibility and momentum of ISIS would
invariably mean the apparent nexus between ISIS and local Trinidadian groups
becoming more evident in the years to come.
 Strategic Analysis 185

Conclusion—clear direction needed

Given the relatively small size—actual and relative—of the Muslim population in
Trinidad, there is little chance that the country would be turned into an Islamic
state. However, this does not mean that the country cannot be used as a base of
operations for radical groups to target Western countries and interests. As has been
pointed out, the relative ease of movement enjoyed by Trinidadians and its
geographical location make it very attractive for that purpose. In addition, the
ability of ISIS to inspire lone-wolf attacks could lead to similar incidents taking
place in Trinidad. A greater concern is that as the boundary between criminal gang
and extremist group is blurred in Trinidad, the growing influence of such groups
erodes the state, allowing extremist ideology to flourish unchecked. It is suggested
that given the aforementioned commonality of socio-economic factors between
Trinidad’s ISIS recruits and its urban criminal gangs, efforts to combat the latter
will have an impact on the former. In this regard the failure of the TTPS and SSA
to deal effectively with criminal gangs has a direct impact on its ability to contain
the ISIS threat.
Trinidad is handicapped by the lack of a coherent policy on how to combat this
increasing radicalization, or to treat with those who have already been radicalized.
The repatriation and rehabilitation of captured Trinidadian ISIS fighters is currently in
political limbo. The pressures from radical elements to bring these people home are
clashing with the societal fear of them and a complete lack of confidence in the state
to either keep these elements under surveillance or de-radicalize them. Moderate
Muslims have not been afraid to speak out against extremism, but their voices have
as yet not proved effective as a counterweight to the extremist message. There is no
coordination of effort or state-level involvement and this has severely hampered any
efforts to create an effective counter-narrative. Part of this is due to the sensitivities of
the Trinidadian government with respect to interfering in any aspect of religion; the
other part is that this is a problem unlike any faced by Trinidad’s Islamic community
to date. Easy answers do not present themselves and it is unclear whether solutions are
being actively worked on. Nonetheless, Trinidad cannot afford to fail in its efforts to
halt the increasing radicalization of a section of its Muslim population. Having had
one violent experience in 1990, a clear direction and commitment is needed to prevent
a possible repetition, and halt the growing influence of extremist groups and the
erosion of the state that will inevitably follow.

Acknowledgements
A shorter version of this article formed the basis of a presentation at a seminar on ‘Sub-
Conventional Conflicts: Emerging Threats and Challenges’ hosted by the Centre for Land Warfare
Studies on February 25–26, 2016.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes
1. Dabiq, ‘Interview: Abu Sa’d at-Trinidadi’, Issue 15, at http://www.clarionproject.org/factsheets-
files/islamic-state-magazine-dabiq-fifteen-breaking-the-cross.pdf (Accessed October 4, 2016).
186 Sanjay Badri-Maharaj

2. Antigua Observer, ‘Nine Trinidad Nationals to be Deported from Turkey after Trying to Join
ISIS’, August 5, 2016, at http://antiguaobserver.com/nine-trinidad-nationals-to-be-deported-
from-turkey-after-trying-to-join-isis/ (Accessed October 4, 2016).
3. Trinidad Express, ‘Four Trinis Fighting for ISIS Captured by Turkish Forces’, January 18,
2016, at http://www.trinidadexpress.com/20160118/news/four-trinis-fighting-for-isis-captured-
by-turkish-forces (Accessed October 4, 2016).
4. ‘Trinidad and Tobago Literacy’, at http://www.indexmundi.com/trinidad_and_tobago/literacy.
html (Accessed October 4, 2016).
5. IMF World Economic Outlook Data, International Monetary Fund, at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2014&ey=2019&scsm=1&ssd=
1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&pr1.x=73&pr1.y=10&c=369&s=NGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%
2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC&grp=0&a (Accessed October 4, 2016).
6. Trinidad and Tobago Demographic Report 2011, Central Statistical Office, p. 15, at http://cso.
planning.gov.tt/sites/default/files/content/images/census/TRINIDAD%20AND%20TOBAGO
%202011%20Demographic%20Report.pdfhttp://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/Census__
Mixed_population_on_the_rise-191944721.html (Accessed October 4, 2016).
7. Ibid., pp. 17–18.
8. ‘U.S. Natural Gas Imports by Country’, Energy Information Administration, at http://www.eia.
gov/dnav/ng/ng_move_impc_s1_m.htm (Accessed October 4, 2016).
9. C. Kelshall, ‘Radical Islam and LNG in Trinidad and Tobago’, Institute for the Analysis of
Global Security, August 15, 2004, at http://www.iags.org/n1115045.htm (Accessed October 4,
2016).
10. It should be noted that the insurrectionists were not provisioned to sustain a siege of this
duration.
11. S. Ryan, The Muslimeen Grab for Power: Race, Religion, and Revolution in Trinidad and
Tobago, Imprint Caribbean Ltd., Port of Spain, 1991, pp. 252–266.
12. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the 1990 attempted coup, Trinidad and Tobago
Parliament, pp. 56–57, at http://ttparliament.org/documents/rptcoe1990.pdf (Accessed
October 4, 2016).
13. Ibid., p. 7.
14. Ibid., p. 34.
15. D. Gold, ‘The Islamic Leader Who Tried to Overthrow Trinidad Has Mellowed… a Little’,
vice.com, May 30, 2014, at https://news.vice.com/article/the-islamic-leader-who-tried-to-
overthrow-trinidad-has-mellowed-a-little (Accessed June 25, 2016).
16. Ibid.
17. C. Zambelis, ‘Jamaat al-Muslimeen on Trial in Trinidad and Tobago’, The Jamestown
Foundation, March 9, 2006, at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%
5D=699&no_cache=1#.V2-eNbh97ic (Accessed October 4, 2016).
18. Trinidad Guardian, ‘Abu Bakr Sedition Trial Ends with Hung Jury’, August 16, 2012,
at http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2012-08-16/abu-bakr-sedition-trial-ends-hung-jury
(Accessed June 25, 2016).
19. U. Cambridge, ‘Police Swarm Abu Bakr’s Base, Find Weapons and Ammunition’,
Jamaica Observer, November 11, 2005, at http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/92269_
Police-swarm-Abu-Bakr-s-base–find-weapons-and-ammunition (Accessed June 25, 2016).
20. Trinidad Express, ‘Bakr Auction Flops’, August 18, 2010, at http://www.trinidadexpress.com/
news/BAKR_AUCTION_FLOPS.html (Accessed June 25, 2016).
21. C. Zambelis, ‘Jamaat al-Muslimeen: The Growth and Decline of Islamist Militancy in Trinidad
and Tobago’, Jamestown Foundation, July 30, 2009, at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_
ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35344#.V25Qgbh97ic (Accessed June 25, 2016).
22. Caribbean News, ‘US Pursuing Warner’s Claim of Political Corruption in Trinidad’, October
19, 2015, at http://www.caribbeannewsnow.com/topstory-US-pursuing-Warner’s-claim-of-
political-corruption-in-Trinidad-27958.html (Accessed June 25, 2016).
23. American Jewish Congress, ‘The Caribbean: A New Frontier for Radical Islam?’, at http://
www.ajc.org/atf/cf/%7B42d75369-d582-4380-8395-25925b85eaf%7D/caribbean_briefing_
08152007.pdf (Accessed October 4, 2016).
24. Op. cit., no.21.
 Strategic Analysis 187

25. M. Vultaggio, ‘ISIS Online Recruitment: 3 Colorado Teenage Girls A Textbook Case’, IB
Times, November 11, 2014, at http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-online-recruitment-3-colorado-
teenage-girls-textbook-case-1722155 (Accessed October 4, 2016).
26. E. Pilkington, D. Roberts, ‘FBI and Obama Confirm Omar Mateen was Radicalized on the
Internet’, The Guardian, June 13, 2016, at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/13/
pulse-nightclub-attack-shooter-radicalized-internet-orlando (Accessed October 4, 2016).
27. R. Marrouch, ‘How ISIS is Growing, and the Fight to Stop it’, September 15, 2014,
CBS News, at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/isis-focus-on-recruiting-foreigners-and-the-
online-drive-to-stop-it/ (Accessed October 4, 2016).
28. CBS News, ‘U.S. General: Caribbean Recruits Joining Extremists in Syria’, March 12, 2015,
at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/islamic-extremists-recruiting-militants-from-caribbean-to-
fight-in-syria/ (Accessed October 4, 2016).
29. Op. cit., no. 23.
30. Trinidad Guardian, ‘89 Trinis Join Isis Fighters’, November 16, 2015, at http://www.guardian.
co.tt/news/2015-11-16/89-trinis-join-isis-fighters (Accessed October 4, 2016).
31. G. Alexander, ‘Serious Threat to T&T’, Trinidad Guardian, April 4, 2016, at http://www.
guardian.co.tt/news/2016-04-15/serious-threat-tt (Accessed October 4, 2016).
32. C. Kissoon, ‘Trini Children in ISIS Recruitment Video’, Trinidad Express, November 6, 2015,
at http://www.trinidadexpress.com/20151106/news/trini-children-in-isis-recruitment-video
(Accessed October 4, 2016).
33. Op. cit., no. 21.
34. ‘Fear and Islam In Trinidad’, Dialogo Americas.com, April 1, 2012, at http://dialogo-americas.
com/en_GB/articles/rmisa/features/regional_panorama/2012/04/01/feature-pr-12 (Accessed
October 4, 2016).
35. Trinidad Guardian, ‘Local Muslims Disturbed by Trini Links to Terrorists Say: Isis Not a Way
to Paradise’, October 7, 2014, at http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2014-10-07/local-muslims-
disturbed-trini-links-terrorists-say-isis-not-way-paradise (Accessed October 4, 2016).
36. Trinidad Guardian, ‘Islamic Front Leader on T&T Fighters in Syria… “I Nearly Joined Isis”’,
November 22, 2015, at http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2015-11-22/%E2%80%98i-nearly-
joined-isis%E2%80%99 (Accessed October 4, 2016).
37. Kissoon, no. 32. Also, discussions by the author with senior police officers and a former
Director and three Deputy Directors of the Strategic Services Agency (SSA) conducted
between March 2013 and December 2014.
38. The author can attest to the impact of the images of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, as while
conducting a training seminar for Trinidadian intelligence analysts, one Muslim trainee made
mention of the apparent intent of the United States to ‘oppress Muslims’.
39. T. Batchelor, ‘ISIS in the Caribbean: Islamic State in Alarming Call to Arms to Jihadis on
Paradise Isle’, Express, November 10, 2015, at http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/618059/
Islamic-State-ISIS-militants-expand-terror-network-Trinidad-Tobago (Accessed October 4,
2016).
40. M. Cardenas, P. Viillar, ‘Colombia: Defeating FARC’s Narcoterrorism’, The Brookings
Institution, September 27, 2010, at http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2010/09/
27-colombia-narcoterrorism-cardenas (Accessed October 4, 2016).
41. E. Alda, J. Sala, ‘Links Between Terrorism, Organized Crime and Crime: The Case of the
Sahel Region’, Stability Journal, September 10, 2014, at http://www.stabilityjournal.org/arti
cles/10.5334/sta.ea/ (Accessed October 4, 2016).
42. The Daily Telegraph, ‘Boeing Transporting Cocaine from South America to Africa Crashes’,
November 16, 2009, at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mali/
6585439/Boeing-transporting-cocaine-from-South-America-to-Africa-crashes.html (Accessed
October 4, 2016).
43. S. D’Alfonso, ‘Why Organized Crime and Terror Groups Are Converging’, Security
Intelligence, September 4, 2014, at https://securityintelligence.com/why-organized-crime-and-
terror-groups-are-converging/ (Accessed October 4, 2016).
44. A. Brice, ‘Iran, Hezbollah Mine Latin America for Revenue, Recruits, Analysts Say’, CNN,
June 3, 2013, at http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/03/world/americas/iran-latin-america/
(Accessed October 4, 2016).
188 Sanjay Badri-Maharaj

45. Russia Today, ‘High Finance: ISIS Generates up to $1bn Annually from Trafficking Afghan
Heroin’, March 7, 2015, at https://www.rt.com/news/238369-isis-drug-money-trafficking/
(Accessed October 4, 2016).
46. T. Porter, ‘Cocaine Funding Isis: Drug Smuggling Profits Islamic State-Linked Jihadists
in North Africa’, IB Times, November 20, 2014, at http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/cocaine-
funding-isis-drug-smuggling-profits-islamic-state-linked-jihadists-north-africa-1475824
(Accessed October 4, 2016).
47. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Traffickers and Terrorists: Drugs and Violent Jihad in
Mali and the Wider Sahel’, Gov.uk, at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/256619/Oct_2013_Traffickers_and_Terrorists.pdf (Accessed
June 22, 2016).
48. C. Parkinson, ‘Trinidad Gangs in Violent Dispute over Govt Contracts’, Insight Crime, August
21, 2013, at http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/trinidad-gang-leader-has-600-men-under
-his-command (Accessed October 4, 2016).
49. E. Johnson, ‘Gangs Are the New Law in Urban Trinidad & Tobago’, Center of Hemispheric
Affairs, October 11, 2013, at http://www.coha.org/gangs-are-the-new-law-in-urban-trinidad-
and-tobago/ (Accessed October 4, 2016).
50. Y. Baboolal, ‘600 Soldiers under Boss’, Trinidad Guardian, August 21, 2013, at http://www.
guardian.co.tt/news/2013-08-21/600-soldiers-under-boss (Accessed October 4, 2016).
51. BBC, ‘Two Convicted in JFK Airport Bomb Plot’, August 2, 2010, at http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-us-canada-10846189 (Accessed October 4, 2016).
52. Op.cit., no.21.
53. The Toronto Star, ‘Trinidad Judge Orders 3 Extradited to U.S.’, August 6, 2007, at https://
www.thestar.com/news/2007/08/06/trinidad_judge_orders_3_extradited_to_us.html (Accessed
October 4, 2016).
54. Federal Bureau of Investigation, ‘Kareem Ibrahim Sentenced to Life in Prison for Conspiring
to Commit Terrorist Attack at JFK Airport’, January 13, 2012,
at https://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2012/kareem-ibrahim-sentenced-to-life-in-
prison-for-conspiring-to-commit-terrorist-attack-at-jfk-airport (Accessed October 4, 2016).
55. C. Kong Soo, ‘Experts Warn of Guns for Food Trade with Venezuela’, Trinidad Guardian,
May 29, 2016, at http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2016-05-29/experts-warn-guns-food-trade-
venezuela (Accessed October 4, 2016).
56. The author has had sight of the report, which was not classified, and it was vague, general
and offered neither information nor insight. The inadequacies reflected in the poor quality
of the report are symptomatic of the shortcomings that plague Trinidad’s security
establishment.
57. G. Alexander, ‘Islamic Links Keep T&T under Watch’, Trinidad Guardian, September 11,
2014, at http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2014-09-11/islamic-links-keep-tt-under-watch
(Accessed October 4, 2016).
58. C. Danner, ‘Report: ISIS Has Recruited as Many as 30,000 Foreigners in the Past Year’,
New York Daily Intelligencer, September 27, 2015, at http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/
2015/09/isis-has-recruited-as-many-as-30000-foreigners.html# (Accessed October 4, 2016).
59. A. Massi, H. Sender, ‘How Foreign Fighters Joining ISIS Travel to the Islamic State Group’s
“Caliphate”’, IB Times, March 3, 2015, at http://www.ibtimes.com/how-foreign-fighters-
joining-isis-travel-islamic-state-groups-caliphate-1833812 (Accessed October 4, 2016).
60. Caribbean News Now, ‘Trinidad Muslims Travel to Venezuela for Jihadist Training’, May 13,
2014, at http://caribbeannewsnow.com/headline-Trinidad-Muslims-travel-to-Venezuela-for-
jihadist-training-21089.html (Accessed October 4, 2016).
61. Antigua Observer, ‘Fate of Five Trinidadian Muslims Still up in the Air’, February 28, 2015,
at http://antiguaobserver.com/fate-of-five-trinidadian-muslims-still-up-in-the-air/ (Accessed
October 4, 2016).
Note: the five held in custody were released on October 15, 2016. Details of their plea remain
unclear but it is known that they were found guilty but released having served over two years
in prison.
62. D. Achong, ‘Student Detained on Terrorism Suspicion: Trini Held in Saudi Prison’, Trinidad
Guardian, September 3, 2015, at http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2015-09-03/student-detained
-terrorism-suspicion-trini-held-saudi-prison (Accessed October 4, 2016).
 Strategic Analysis 189

63. G. Alexander, ‘Griffith: Ban Returning Nationals… No Second Chance for ISIS Terrorists’,
Trinidad Guardian, November 24, 2015, at http://www.guardian.co.tt/news/2015-11-24/no-
second-chance-isis-terrorists (Accessed October 4, 2016).
64. Asian Correspondent, ‘To Curb Radicalization, Singapore Wants All Islamic Teachers
Registered’, August 22, 2016, at https://asiancorrespondent.com/2016/08/singapore-
registration-compulsory-islamic-religious-teachers-curb-radicalization/ (Accessed October 4,
2016).
65. United Nations Security Council, ‘Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution
Condemning Violent Extremism, Underscoring Need to Prevent Travel, Support for Foreign
Terrorist Fighters’, September 24, 2014, at http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11580.doc.htm
(Accessed October 4, 2016).
66. Trinidad Newsday, ‘Rowley Blasts TT Support of UN Security Resolution’, September 28,
2014, at http://www.newsday.co.tt/news/0,200944.html (Accessed October 4, 2016).
67. C. Kong Soo, ‘Merchants of Death’, Trinidad Guardian, January 11, 2015, at http://www.
guardian.co.tt/news/2015-01-11/merchants-death (Accessed October 4, 2016).
68. J. Loutoo, ‘Wrong, Mischievous’, Trinidad Newsday, April 17, 2016, at http://www.newsday.
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