Federal Aviation

Safety Management Administration

System (SMS)
Fundamentals

The Core
Processes, Elements and
Components of a Robust
SMS
Presented By: Flight Standards
Version Date: Apr 1, 2012

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Subjects Covered:
• Why SMS?
• Case for SMS & Safety Fundamentals
• SMS Fundamentals – Overview
• SMS Details:
• Policy Component
• Safety Risk Management Component
• Safety Assurance Component
• Safety Promotion Component
• SMS Guidance, Tools and Implementation
Overview
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What SMS is not and what it is…
What it isn’t: What it is:
A substitute for Compliance is integral
compliance to safety management

A substitute for An effective interface for

oversight safety management
A replacement for SMS completes the
system safety systems approach

A requirement for a A set of decision making

new department processes for senior and
line management

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SMS, ATOS/NPG, SAS and QMS
SMS
• Management System Does SMS = QMS?
• Only service provider can • Same principles but
manage
different objectives
ATOS/NPG • QMS Objective
• Oversight System – Management driven
• Used to meet regulator – Customer satisfaction
responsibilities
• SMS Objective
SAS – Management driven
• Safety Assurance System – Aviation safety focused
• FAA Future State System Safety
Oversight across 14 CFR parts
(121, 135, 145)

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 Federal Aviation
Administration

Why SMS?

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Safety in aviation GA ACCIDENT RATE PER 100KHR
1927 - 1999

250

200

What we understand: 150

100

50

30

34

38

43

47

51

55

59

63

67

71

75

79

83

87

91

95

99
19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19

19
– Our record is a good one.
– Why Change?

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Attributed to Dr. Malcolm Sparrow
Things that are Things that cause
illegal harm

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What is safety?
• Freedom from harm (Dictionary)
• Safety is not equivalent to risk free (U.S.
Supreme Court, 1980)
• “Risk management” is a more practical term
than “safety.” (Jerome Lederer ,1928)
• “Carelessness and overconfidence are more
dangerous than deliberately accepted risk”.
(Wilbur Wright, 1901)
• Practical safety is risk management
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Definition of Safety

“Safety is the state in which the risk of harm

to persons or property is reduced to, and
maintained at or below, an acceptable level
through a continuing process of hazard
identification and risk management”

ICAO Doc 9859

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Safety Management Systems

“A systematic approach to managing

safety, including the necessary
organizational
structures, accountabilities, policies and
procedures”.
ICAO Doc 9859

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SMS Purpose and Methods

Provides:
– A systematic way to identify and control risk.
– Assurance that risk controls remain effective.
– A formal means of meeting Statutory
requirements (Title 14)
– The FAA a means of evaluating an
organization’s safety management capability

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System Safety
• "The application of special technical and
managerial skills in a systematic, forward
looking manner to identify and control hazards
throughout the life cycle of a
project, program, or activity" (Roland & Moriarty, 1990)

• Traditional approach concentrates on technical

• SMS adds emphasis on management elements

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ICAO Annex 6, Part I, International
Commercial Air Transport
• “From 1 January, 2009, States
shall require, as part of their
safety programme, that an
operator implement a safety
management system
acceptable to the State of the
Operator…”
• FAA filed a difference with ICAO
• Currently no FAA procedures to
approve or accept an SMS

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ICAO Annex 6, Part 1 (Amendment 33)
Amendment 33 “… which will become
applicable 18 November 2010”

Note - The framework for a Safety

Management System is contained in
Appendix 7.

• 1. Safety policy and objectives

• 2. Safety risk management
• 3. Safety assurance
• 4. Safety promotion

Applies to International Commercial Air

Transport only

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 ICAO Annex 6, Part II, International
General Aviation Section 3
Large Reciprocating and Turbo Prop
airplanes, and all aircraft with one or more
turbo jet engines (Over 5700kg [12566#] or Jet)

• 3.3.2.1 “An operator shall establish and

maintain a safety management system that is
appropriate to the size and complexity of the
operation.”

• 3.3.2.2 “Recommendation – …SMS Minimum:”

– ID Hazards, assess risk
– Develop & imp remedial action [to]
acceptable level of safety
– Monitor & assess SM activities

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 ICAO • Annex 6
State Safety
Programme (SSP) • ICAO Doc 9859, SMM

AVS • Order 8000.369; FAA SMS Guidance

FAA Aviation Safety Office
Safety Program = AVS SMS
• Order VS8000.367; AVS SMS Requirements

AVS LOB’s AFS • Order 8000.368 FS Service Oversight

Flight Standards • AC 120-92A; SMS for Avn. Svc. Providers
• AFS Developmental Guidance

Service Providers SMS • Safety Management System

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Clarifying the “3 R’s”

FAA’s Safety
Roles, Responsibilities
Management
(Oversight)
and Relationships:
(SAS)
• FAA
• Service Providers

Operator’s Safety
Management Operators Services
System Operational Provided
(External SMS) Processes

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 Federal Aviation
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Case for SMS

&
Safety Fundamentals

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What is your company’s #1 objective?

Achieve its production objectives!

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Protection and Production
• Safety Requirements
– Title 49 USC 44702 “…the duty of an air carrier
to provide service at the highest level of
safety in the public interest”
• Economic Authority
– [Proposed operation must be] “…consistent
with public convenience and necessity”
– [Company must be] “…fit, willing and able to
provide the service proposed”

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Safety Management System
• Infuses safety into all parts of the system
– People
– Tools Management levels
– Procedures
– Materials
– Equipment
– Software
Protection Production

• To maintain the balance of production and

protection
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 U.S. and Canadian Operators Accident Rate by Year
Fatal Accidents-Commercial Jet Fleet – 1959 Through 2007
50

…
Annual
40

Technical Factors

fatal 30
accident Human Factors1949 British Comet
rate
(accidents
per million
20
departures) Organizational Factors

10
1954 Boeing

0
59 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 07
Adapted from Boeing (2008) Year

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 Organizational Culture
Values
National Culture Professional Norms

Psychological
Decision-making
•Laws/Regulations
•Industry Standards

System/
Behavioral Performance
Environment

•Industry Norms Practices

•Business Relations
•Markets

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 Informed Decision Making
Management and employees understanding hazards & risks

Reporting: All personnel freely share critical safety

information.
Just: Employees must know what is acceptable
& unacceptable behavior.

Learning: The company learns from mistakes. Staff are

updated on safety issues by management.

Flexible: Organizational willingness to change.

AC 120-92

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To Support a Sound Safety Culture:
1. Senior management commitment
2. Senior management visibility
3. Safety accountability framework
4. Safety
policy, goals, objectives, standards, and
performance
5. Resource commitment
6. Effective employee safety reporting system
7. Safety information system
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 Safety Management Strategies
Reactive Proactive Predictive
(Past) (Present) (Future)

Responds to Analyzes
Actively identifies
events that have system
hazards
already processes and
through the analysis
happened, such as environment to
of the organization’s
incidents and identify potential
processes
accidents future problems

SMS
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