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Using the "F" Word: Federalism in Indonesia's Decentralization Discourse

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Using the "F" Word: Federalism in Indonesia's Decentralization Discourse

Author(s): Gabriele Ferrazzi
Source: Publius, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Spring, 2000), pp. 63-85
Published by: Oxford University Press
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 Usingthe"F" Word:
Federalismin Indonesia's
Decentralization
Discourse
Gabriele Ferrazzi
BrandonUniversity

IndonesiacastoffDutch-imposed federalism infavorofa unitarystate. Soeharto'scentralization

madefederalismtabooin theNewOrder.In thecurrent period,however,
reform theconceptis re-emerging,
butfederalismhas yettobe discussedin an open,inclusive,and balancedmanner.Decentralization
policyisfocusedon thedistrict,
neglectingthepoliticaldemandsofthelargerprovince.Thispolicyis
accompanied bya confused and misleadingofficial thatis consistent
discourse withtheideology ofpower
retentionand maintenance ofpatrimonial governance.As a resultofgreater democratizationofthe
polity,
federalismis slowlyentering
officialdiscourse.Althoughitsprospectsin theshorttermremain
dim,supportmaygrowforfederalprinciples withinIndonesia'sunitarystructure.

The currentreformperiod in Indonesia has unleashed a torrentof

regional discontent. The centralizationof power and resourcesis being
reviled. Politicalupheaval has facilitatedTimor Loro Sae's exit fromthe
republic,plus secessionistmovementsin theprovincesofAceh,WestPapua,
and Riau. All provincesare demanding a betterdeal, makingclear that
widerformsof autonomy,and possiblyfederalism,maybe the price to pay
for national peace. Regional unresthas highlighteddeep divisionsand
divergentinterestsin the nation. Polls indicatethatthe populace is deeply
worriedabout separatism. There is pressureon the national government
to hold Indonesia together,and yetcome to termswiththe root causes of
regional dissatisfaction. Politicians are anxious not to preside over
Indonesia's disintegration, but the new government of President
AbdurrahmanWahid (Gus Dur) appears unable to generatea genuine dia-
logue. The presidenthimselfhas great difficulty even utteringthe word
"federalism"when pressed to discussthe issue.
This essayexaminesbackgroundon federalismin Indonesia to explain
the strongresistanceto the federalmodel. It drawson a reviewof govern-
ment documents,proceedingsof variouspublic fora,participantobserva-
tion,and personalinterviews.Followinga briefintroductionto theanalytical
framework, the historicalroots thatshed lighton center-regionrelations

AUTHOR'S NOTE: I wish to acknowledge Bernhard May, Luc de Meester, and Erita Nurhalim
fiir Technische
(Gesellschaft Zusammenarbeit
team members to the Support for DecentralizationMeasures
projectof the Governmentof Indonesia) forprovidinginformationand viewsthatwere helpfulin updat-
ing the doctoral researchworkthatunderpins thisarticle.

? Publius: TheJournal of Federalism30:2 (Spring 2000)

63

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64 2000
Publius/Spring

are examined in orderto understandthe center'stendenciestowardunifi-

cation and integrationas tools fornation-buildingand domination. The
currentpolicyof emphasizingthe smallersecond-tierregions (more than
300 districtsand cities), ratherthan the largerfirst-tier
regions (26 prov-
inces)' wherefederalistmodels mightbe more applicable,is placed in his-
toricalcontext.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The treatment of discourse about the state should be linked to
and historicalfactorsthatconditionits organizationand
"sociostructural
administration."2For Indonesia, thismeans highlightingthe state'spatri-
monial character and examiningthe debate on federalismin termsof the
materialinterestsof the dominantcentralelite.
PatrimonialismImperiled
Decentralizationhas become a two-edgedswordforthe fractiouspost-
Soehartoelite. The reconstituted eliteincludesmanyofthesame elements
thatmade up the Soeharto elite. This is particularlytrueforthe bureau-
cracy,wherethe patrimonialstyleof governanceof the New Order contin-
ues to prevail. To gain legitimacy, a precious commoditytoday,the elite
mustundertakedecentralization.In doing so, it is undercuttingitspower
base and, thus,the sources of legal and extra-legaltributesthatwere com-
monplace in Soeharto's patrimonialregime.3Herein lies the tensionthat
infusesthe regionalautonomypolicies of the governmentand the official
discourseon alternateformsof decentralization.
Compounding the tensionis the significantdegree of democratization
yieldedbythe centralelite in the earlydaysof the reformmovementthat
toppled the New Order. Exacted fromthe Soeharto elite as the price of
stayingin the game (avoidingrevolution),the new freedomsare making
the old communicationstrategiesof the governmentless effective.As a
result,the legitimacyof governmentpolicies is more difficult to earn, and
thisis evidentin the government'sdecentralizationpolicies. Reduced le-
gitimacythreatensthe elites' tenuous hold on power and the "tribute"
streamsthatflowtowardcentralizedpower.
Discourse
Analysis
The discourse analyticalperspectiveis gaining attention,particularly
due to its abilityto link micro-levelinteraction to macro-contextsre-

'Having recentlylost a province,Indonesia is makingup forit by dividingprovinceselsewhere,in

WestPapua (formerlyIrianJaya)and Maluku; however,these controversialcreationsare in limbo.
2AndresPerez, "Legitimacyand the administrative capacityof the state:public administrationin de-
velopingcountries,"InternationalReviewofAdministrative Sciences57 (December 1991): 646.
3GabrieleFerrazzi,"CriteriaforTransferring Functionsto Sub-nationalGovernments:Selection and
of Guelph, 1998).
Applicationin Indonesian DecentralizationInitiatives,"(Ph.D. diss.,University

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Using the "F" Word 65

search.4 It startswiththe identificationof actors and theirinterestsand

positions. Communication patternscan then be analyzed to note how
the dominant ideology,political power,and governmentalrelations are
sustained. In Indonesia, the lack of open high-levelpolicy discussion is
in part compensated by the ubiquitous seminar and workshop circuit,
in the past largelysponsored or dominated by the government.
The seminar/workshopapproach to communication,persuasion,and
mobilizationhas been takenup withgustoin the post-Soehartoperiod by
civilsocietyand quasi-government organizations.A more aggressivepress
is also generatingmore commentariesand exchanges thatenlarge the po-
liticaldiscourse,adding opportunitiesto note lexicon and rhetoricalstrat-
egies of governmentofficialsand otherplayers.5
Federalism'sMeaningin theIndonesianContext
If gettingthe formof the staterightmatters,it is unfortunateforIndo-
nesia thatmostwritingson the originsof federalismare historicalexplana-
tionsof "causes thatimpel variouspoliticalunitsto come togetherto form
a federalunion."' Littlehas been writtenon whyand how unitarynations
shed theirunitarystatusfora federalform.The literatureon federalismis
especiallysparsewhenitcomes to experiencesof "nationsaving."Belgium
is the notable exception,havingrecentlycompleteda longjourneyfroma
unitaryto a federalstructure, althoughthejuryis stillout on whetheritwill
survivein itsnew form.
Some international researchand reflections
on federalism can be usefulto
theIndonesiancontext.RonaldWattsarguesthatfederalnationsunderstress
should forgea "strategy thatcombinesboth efforts to strengthen a federal
focusof loyalty and an accommodationof the majorconcernsof disaffected
regionalgroups."7 Anotherinsightis givenbyCherylSaundersin herreviewof
European experience. She cautionsthat"federalism is notcreatedbyfederal
institutions and rulesalone,butdependsalso on attitudestowardstheprocess
ofgovernment.Thus,some oftheadvantagesoffederalismmaybe obtained
withouttraditionalfederalstructures.Equally,theymaybe lostin a country
whichotherwise isfederalinform."8Analysismustgo beyondoutwardappear-
ance. AsWilliamRikerobserved,"one does notdecide on themeritsoffeder-

4See, forexample, Teun A. van Dijk, "Discourse and Society:A NewJournalfora New Research Fo-
cus," Discourseand Society
1 (July1990): 5-16.
5Fora descriptionof these elementsof discourse,seeJohn Gastil,"UndemocraticDiscourse: A Review
of Theoryand Research on Political Discourse,"Discourseand Society 3 (October 1992): 469-500.
6Raphael Zariski,"The Establishmentof the Kingdom of Italyas a UnitaryState: A Case Studyin
Regime Formation,"Publius:TheJournalofFederalism 13 (Fall 1983): 1-19.
7RonaldL. Watts,Comparing FederalSystemsin the1990's (Kingston,ON: InstituteofIntergovernmental
Relations,Queen's University, 1996), p. 104.
8Quoted inJoachimJensHesse and VincentWright,"FederalizingEurope: The Path to Adjustment,"
FederalizingEurope?The Cost,Benefits,and PreconditionsofFederalPoliticalSystems,
eds. JoachimJens Hesse
and VincentWright(Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1996), p. 378.

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66 2000
Publius/Spring

alismbyan examinationoffederalism in theabstract, but ratheron itsactual

meaningforparticularsocieties."'
One meaning that may have relevance to Indonesia is "federalismas
covenant." In thesame veinas Saunders,Daniel Elazar explained thatfed-
eralismdoes not entaila quest fora particularsetofinstitutions, butrather
"a particularkindofrelationshipamong theparticipantsin politicallife.""'
Whatis more important,then,are federalprinciples. In Elazar's view,the
federalmodel can accommodateculturalcleavagesbycombiningethnicity
and consentinto both territorial(expressingcleavage) and non-territorial
(crosscutting)polities.
In Indonesia, federalismis debated in language thatexpressescompet-
ing visionsand values." It is a fluidconcept thathas been linked witha
varietyof autonomyarrangements. It has been proposed as a balm for
regional discontentand, at the other extreme,as a regional power grab
thatcould lead to the "disintegration of the state." It is the appropriation
of meaning and its rhetoricaluse thatis of interesthere, ratherthan the
possiblemechanicsofestablishinga federalsystem.The eventualmeaning
and connotationsattachedto the termwilldecide if the federalformwill
be adopted, and withwhatdegree of power-sharing.
FEDERALISM IMPOSED AND REJECTED
There is wide agreementthatthefederalsystembriefly adopted byIndone-
sia in 1949-1950was a Dutch imposition,and it maywell have been a "di-
vide and rule" strategyof the retreatingDutch. Its unpopularityis not in
doubt,as indicatedbyGeorge Kahin:
The greatmajority ofIndonesianswereprofoundly dissatisfied
withthe
federalsystem withwhichtheyhad been saddledbytheHague Agree-
ment. In all fifteen states,thisdiscontent
Dutch-created soon beganto
manifestitselfin spontaneousand widelybasedpopulardemandsfora
scrappingofwhatwasconceivedto be an alien-imposed federalismand
theliquidationofthesestatesand theirmergerwiththeold Republic."2

Accordingto Kahin,thisreturnto theunitaryideal as proclaimedin the

1945 constitutionwas also backed bysupportersof federalismwho wished
to fashiontheirown formof federalismratherthan livewith"an artificial
legacyof theirold colonial master."

'William Riker,Federalism:Origin,Operation,Significance(Boston, MA: Little,Brown and Company,

1964), p. 10.
'ODanielJ.Elazar,Covenant
and CivilSociety-The MatrixofModernDemocracy
Constitutional (New Brunswick,
NJ:TransactionPublishers,1998), p. 302.
"This is truein othercountriesas well. See, forexample,JohnKincaid, "Values and Value Tradeoffs
in Federalism,"Publius:TheJournalofFederalism 25 (Spring 1995): 29-44.
'George McTurninKahin, Nationalismand Revolutionin Indonesia(Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress,
1952), p. 450.

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Usingthe"F" Word 67

Understandably,the impulse of the founding"fathers"was to forgea

unitarystateto meld the diverseregionsthatwere spanned by the Dutch
colonial masters. The domino-styleconsolidationand eventualreintegra-
tion into a unitarystatethatoccurred in 19501' were as much an elite re-
sponse to power dynamicsas theywere the resultof a widespreadpublic
awarenessand favorablesentimentstowardunitarygovernance. The sub-
sequentdifficultiesfacedin framingan alternateconstitutionto thatagreed
in The Hague (when Indonesia livedwitha temporaryconstitution)attests
to the lack of unanimityon the role and formof the state.
The regional autonomyceded in the 1950s did not satisfythe regions.
Some regionsconsidered it theirrightto be self-governed.In theirview,
coming togetherto seek independence did not encompass supportfora
centralizedstate.14Regional unrestdrewconcessionsfroma weak central
government(favorablelawson regionalgovernmentforinstance),but this
turmoilwas in turna factorin Soekarno's decision to impose "Guided De-
mocracy"in 1959, returningIndonesia to the 1945 unitaryconstitution;
ironically,thiswas achieved in an even more constitutionally
questionable
stylethan the Dutch-imposedfederalmodel.'5
The 1945 constitutionguaranteesthe divisionof the countryinto "large
and small" regionswithconsiderationof the "consultativeprinciple"and
the traditionalrightsof special regions. This provided the basis for the
New Order to establishprovincialregions and smaller districtregions'6
withinthemthatwereostensiblyautonomousand non-hierarchical in prin-
ciple (achieved throughLaw 5/1974). Because regional autonomyis not
explained in detailin theconstitution,itsbounds mustbe setin laws. Given
the executive'sextremelystrongpowersunder the 1945 constitution,"the
presidentis thusempoweredto determinethenatureofregionalautonomy.
NEW ORDER DISCOURSE
The New Order period,coveringSoeharto'sreignfrom1965 to 1998,was a
timeofnation-building,characterizedbythe consolidationofpowerat the
center and the eliminationor reduction of resistancefromany quarter.

'SForan account of the states' consolidation,see The Liang Gie, Pertumbuhan Pemerintahan
DaerahDi
NegaraRepublikIndonesiaEdisi Kedua, JilidI (Yogyakarta:Liberty,1993), p. 192.
14TheDutch onlyovercame centralJava in 1825-1830,all ofJava and much of Sumatraby 1850, and
the Islamic SultanateofAceh and South Sulawesibythe firstdecade of the twentiethcentury.Submission
to Dutch rule, and subsequentlyto the Indonesian central government,has never been ingrained in
manypartsof the archipelago.
15Indonesia'sfirstvice-president,Mohammad Hatta,held Soekarno's decree on returningto the 1945
constitutionto be unconstitutional;see Mohammad Hatta "Demokrasi Kita, Pustaka Antara," (Jakarta:
PustakaAntaraPt, 1966), p. 6, 17, 18, as reportedin Muhammad RidhwanIndra, The1945 Constitution-A
Human Creation(Jakarta:CV Haji Masagung, 1990), p. 27.
16After losingEast Timor,and splittingIrianJayaand Maluku (though thesedivisionsmaynot "hold"),
therewere 29 provincesand more than 300 districtsand cities (the latterare all commonlyreferredto as
districts).
"7Fora descriptionof these powers,see Muhammad RidhwanIndra, ThePresident's PositionUnderthe
1945 Constitution (Jakarta:CV Haji Masagung, 1989).

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68 Publius/Spring2000

The regions,particularlythe provinces,were held in check, even as the

rhetoricpromisedregionalautonomy.
as Nation-Building
Centralization
SoehartocontinuedSoekarno'sdriveto stateconsolidationand national
integration.In practice,thismeantcentralization,evidencedin economic
concentration,a suppressed civilsociety,and centralgovernmentpower
overregionaland local governments.Center-region relationsweredescribed
in termsof regional autonomy,but the rhetoricwas not supportedbythe
facts.Over time,about 90 percentof governmentrevenuesaccrued to the
center. This imbalance gave riseto large centraltransfers,withconditions
thatgreatlyrestrictedregionalautonomy.The centerinexorablytightened
itsgripon the regionsand villages.
A resurgencein patrimonialism was also seen in the New Order."8Prox-
imityto the centerbroughtpower and claims over resources. Legal and
extra-legalresourcestreamsbecame the life-bloodof the politico-adminis-
trativesystem;retainingpower was essentialto centralofficialsintenton
exploitingpublic office. Decentralizationhad littlechance of success in
this context. Responding to foreigndonors promotinggreaterregional
autonomy,Indonesian officialsmaintainedthat"autonomyin Indonesia is
not the same as the autonomyknownin Palestine,Moro or Kashmir."19
These referenceswereprimarily usefulfortheirwarningofimpendingstrife,
ifthewrongtypeof autonomywas selected,as fortheirdescriptionofwhat
the Indonesian typemightbe. The typeofautonomyofficialshad in mind
can, however,be gleaned fromthe 1993-1998statepolicies:
To strengthen theunitarystateand smoothen nationaldevelopment, the
implementation ofgovernment in theregionis basedon autonomy that
is real,dynamic,"harmonious," and responsible, with
and in conformity
thecapabilityoftheregioninundertaking decentralized,deconcentrated
and assistancetasks.The implementation ofautonomous governance in
theregionshouldspurpeople'sparticipation in development to encour-
age equitabledevelopment throughout theland to realizetheNational
Ideal and strengthenNationalResilience.20

8BenedictAndersonwas an earlyproponentof thefitbetweentheprecolonialJavanesekingdomand

Weber's patrimonialstate;see Benedict Anderson,"The Idea of Power inJavaneseCulture,"Cultureand
Politicsin Indonesia,eds. C. Holt et al. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 1972). See also Hans I.
Bakker,"The Hindu-JavaneseWorldView inJava:The StructuralRoots of the Pancasila State,"Managing
Changein Southeast Asia: Local Identities, eds. J. Bernardi,G. Forthand S. Niessen, (Ot-
GlobalConnections,
tawa: Canadian Council forSoutheast Asian Studies XXI, 1995), pp. 189-205. For an argumenton the
resurgenceof patrimonialism,see Gabriele Ferrazziand Hans I. Bakker,Of Vestiges, Shadowsand Re-emer-
gence:ThePersistenceofPatrimonial Prebendalism in theIndonesianPolity(Universityof Guelph, unpublished,
1998).
"Soemitro Maskun,"OtonorniDaerah adalah ProgramPemerintah,"Prisma4 (April 1995): 44.
20
Majelis PermusyawaratanRakyat,GarisBesarHaluan Negara1993-1998,(Jalarta:Republik Indone-
sia,1993), p. 26.

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Using the "F" Word 69

By "real,"officialsmeant thatautonomywould onlybe givenin accor-

dance withcapabilitiesto handle autonomy.By"harmonious,"policymakers
meant thatautonomyshould strengthenratherthan dissolveor corrode
bonds between the center and the regions. By being "responsible,"the
regionsrecognizedthatautonomyis more of a dutythan a right: the duty
being to achieve national goals and strengthenthe unityof the nation.
In line withthe above policyprinciples,the regionis viewedas an "inte-
gral part"of the national entity:"Pusatpusatnyadaerah,dan daerahdaerah
pusat" (the centeris the region's center,and the region is the center'sre-
gion). This oft-repeated verityultimately furnishedjustificationforhigher
levelcontroland incursionintotheaffairs oflowerlevelgovernments.Thus,
whilelegislationat timesappeared to assignentirefunctionssectorally, sub-
sequent regulations showed the Indonesian model to entaila more generic
divisionof labor,withpolicy and regulationsset at the center,provinces
given coordinationand supervisionduties (as agentsof the center), and
the districtsheld responsibleforimplementation.As the formerMinister
forStateReformT. B. Silalahi remindedthe regions,whatis transferred is
"onlyimplementation,"withthe policycomponent to be stillheld by the
center.21Districtofficialsoftenlikenthisassignmentoffunctionsto a farm
animal thathas been entrustedto another'scare, withthe ownerinsisting
thathe mustcontinue to hold onto the beast's tail (teruspegangekornya).22
This diminutionof provincialand districtautonomywas internalizedover
timebymanyregionalofficials.23
Discontentwithdecentralizationdid arise froma fewbold lowerlevel
officialsand some non-government actors. Though blunt at times,it was
always within limits. The Minister for State Reform, Sarwono
Kusumaatmadja, was quite direct in his warningabout how decentraliza-
tionin the early1990s was to be interpreted:"This step is purelybased on
developmentefficiencyand effectiveness.So don't politicizeit."24 Such
warningsabout decentralizationissuesmerelyreflectedthe broader politi-
cal discourse,itselftruncated. For example, in the contextof the 1997
economic downturn,the military warnedagainstpoliticizingthe country's
financialwoes lest it lead to "instability."25
More subtle bounds were ex-
in
pressed positive terms. For example, the generalsupportof the military
forautonomywas invariablyfollowedwiththe caution thatautonomymust
supportthe"unityofthenation,""nationalresilience,"and "nationalism."26

21"Pemdaagar Sungguh-sungguhMensukseskanOtonomi Daerah," Kompas,31 January1995, p. 13.

22See Ferrazzi,"CriteriaforTransferring
Functionsto Sub-nationalGovernments."
23See,forexample,thecommentsofthe EastJavagovernorin "Otonomi Perlu,tapi Bertahap,"Kompas,
10 October 1990, p. 1.
24"Penataan Kembali Otonomi DaerahJangan Dipolitisasi,"JawaPos, 4January1991, p. 1.
25"Don'tPoliticiseFinancial Woes,JakartaMilitaryWarns,"StraitTimes,28January1998, p. 11.
26"L.B.Moerdani: Otonomi Harus Tunjang Ketahanan Nasional," Merdeka,13 May 1991, p. 1.

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70 Publius/Spring2000

Only in donor-supportedforacould explorationthatwentbeyond the

officialdiscoursebe found. Even so, donorsrecognizedtheexistingtaboos
and did not encourage anydiscussionof alternatemodels
and sensitivities
of stateformation,but merelywiderformsof autonomy.27
In general,thedecentralizationdiscussionin Indonesia waseitherinter-
nal (and notverytransparent)or in theformof speeches at seminars,with
littleopportunityforinteraction. The officialdecentralizationdialogue,
betweenthe centerand the regions,was low keyand veryfragmented, and
not alwaysintelligible.It was markedbyexplanationsthatplaced the spot-
lighton the perceivedweaknessof the regionsratherthan on the failings
of the centralgovernment.Centralgovernmentcharges thatthe regions
werenot "mampu"(capable) or not "dewasa"(mature)werecommon. Even
governmentofficialswho evidentlychafed under the slow pace of decen-
tralizationnonethelesswereforcedto keep withintheofficially frameddis-
cussion.28The "father-child"and "mature centre-immature region"analogies
werepervasivein the autonomydiscourse,29and reflectedthe broaderdis-
course regarding the political maturityof the people or the regions.
Soeharto's role as "Fatherof Development" (Bapak Pembangunan), a title
bestowedupon
officially him by the People's Consultative
Assembly(MPR),
fed thisanalogy.
Other termsused in relationto regional autonomyare also revealing.
Forinstance,regionswereexpectedto implement(melaksanakan) autonomy,
and theywerejudged as doing thiswell or poorly. Here, autonomyis seen
as a task,givenbythe centerto the regions,thatmustbe handled properly
by the regionsin conformity withcentralexpectations. This formulation
resonateswithLaw 5/1974 statingthatthe irresponsibleapproach to au-
tonomyof thepastwould be supplantedbytheprinciplethat"autonomyis
more of an obligationthana right."
KeepingProvincesin Check
Regional autonomywasgivenlegislativeattentionin theNew Order,but
legal instrumentswere rarelytranslatedinto meaningfulpractice. Prov-
inces and districtswere autonomous largelyin name. The keylegislation
designed to greatlyenhance autonomy (Law 5/1974 and the follow-up
Regulation45/1992) emphasized the second-tierregions. Even so, little
headwaywas achieved, though an effortwas made to push ahead witha

27See,forexample, the workofprojectslike the SupportforDecentralizationMeasures located in the

Ministryof Home Affairsand supportedbythe GermanGTZ, and the Municipal Finance Project,located
in the Ministryof Finance and supportedby USAID.
28See,for example,J.B. Kristiadi,"Mencari KriteriaAlokasi Dana Regional-Prospek Kebijaksanaan
yangIdeal," Prisma8 (April 1991): 44-48.
29See,forexample, the governorof WestSumatra,in his use of the analogyin relationto the second
region governments,"GubernurSumbar Drs. Hasan Basri Durin akui: Masih BanyakAparat Pemerintah
di Daerah Ini Terjebak Pola PikirLama," Haluan, 15 February1995, p. 1.

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Using the "F" Word 71

pilot projectfocused on districtautonomy.30 Notwithstanding the meager

progress,the rationaleforthe emphasis on second-tierregionsillustrates
the politicaldynamicsthatunderpin the stance towardfederalism.
The officialreason fora districtfocuswas,and presumablycontinuesto
be, thatthislevel of governmentis "closestto the people.""' However,this
can be onlya partialexplanationbecause the hamlet (dusun),village,and
traditionalmulti-villageorganizations(e.g., Nagariin West Sumatra) are
even "closer"to thepeople thandistricts.Flowingfromthislogic,anyor all
of these levels should be given autonomous statuswithgreateremphasis
than thatof the provinceor districts.The average district(7,800 sq. km.,
withan averagepopulation of 670,000) is indeed a suitablelevel formany
decisions and services,but itssize nonethelessraisesissuesof externalities
and administrative capacity.On theface ofit,a good numberofsignificant
functionsdo not lend themselvesto managementby the districtor lower
levels (e.g., certainaspectsof secondaryand tertiary education and health
care). Considerations of scale (size and population) providestrongargu-
mentsforthe continued existence,or even the strengthening, of provin-
cial autonomy. In officialpolicy and discussion,however,the option of
enhancing or even maintaininga strongprovincialrole was conspicuous
foritsabsence.
The more likelymotivationof Indonesian policymakers forbypassingor
reducingthe autonomyof the provinceis likelyto be twofold.First,seces-
sionist,centrifugal,disintegrating forcesare more easilygeneratedin the
provinces,requiringthattheybe keptin check. Second, the complexityof
non-hierarchicalautonomous regionsis too great a burden; diminishing
the provincialrole reduces the complexity.The firstrationalewas rarely
acknowledgedor discussed in public fora.32One argumentin the public
arenajustifiedtheabolitionofprovincialautonomybyreferenceto history,
holding that provinceswere created by the Dutch, withno real roots in
Indonesian tradition;the Mataram and Majapahit kingdomsonly recog-
nized district(kabupaten)and village (desa) autonomy.33 JosefRiwuKaho
cites the fearsand preferencesexpressedbyBung Hatta, a founderof the
republic,regardingthe problem of too manyautonomous layers,the ap-
propriatenessof the scale of the districtforconnectingto the people, and
the danger thatwillcome fromregionalmovementsifthe provinciallevel
is retained.

S3Foran account of the 1995 district-autonomy pilot program,see Christoph Beier and Gabriele
Ferrazzi, "The DistrictAutonomyPilot Program:A New Approach to Decentralization in Indonesia."
Nord-Siid XI (April 1997): 94-101.
"3SeeRepublic ofIndonesia, "GovernmentRegulationNumber45/1992 concerningthe implementa-
tion of regional autonomywithemphasis on Level II."
32One exception is JosefRiwu Kaho, "JumlahTingkatan Daerah Otonom: Suatu Analisis," (paper
presented at the Seminar Terbatas Tentang Otonomi Daerah, Badan, Penelitian dan Pengembangan,
Departemen Dalam Negeri,Jakarta,8-9 Oktober 1990).
33Ibid.,19.

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72 Publius/Spring2000

Quite aside fromthe real level of autonomyaffordedin ancient times,

the above argumentforneglectingor eliminatingthe autonomous status
of the provincesdoes not come to termswithcontemporaryregionaliden-
tityand power balance. As well, the argumentneglectsthe factthatthe
perceived danger emanatingfromlower level governmentsalso was the
cause forscrappingthe formalautonomyof a thirdlevel of government.
The experimentwithformalautonomy(throughLaw 1/1957) at the third
regionallevel (tingkat III) was stillbornbecause of fearthat"theformation
of the thirdautonomousregioncould be used to achievecertainintentsby
one certainpolitical force,which could harm national stability."34 Here,
is
Pamudji undoubtedlyreferring to the Communist force,one adept at
massmobilizationat thegrass-roots.Hence, anti-provincial policiesshould
be seen as partof a largerreaction;the targetof anti-autonomy sentiment
and policies emanatingfromthe center is whateverentityhas sufficient
autonomyand/or potentialpoliticalclout to challenge the center.
There is littledoubt thatthe chiefconcern in decentralizationwas the
rebirthofregionalpowerthatcould viewiththatofthecenter.The growth
in the numberof provincesin the turbulent1950s (16 new provinceswere
born between1956 and 1960) had alreadyworriedBung Hatta,who main-
tained thatmakingprovincesstrongerwould incite more groups to seek
provincialstatus.35 Ironically,thisdilutionof powerthroughtheformation
of newprovinceshelped to keep thelid on theboilingregionalpot. None-
theless,the dilutingeffectof provincecreation did not workto appease
existingprovinces,and the centercontinuedto fearthe latentthreatfrom
all provinces.
Appeasementof theregionsturnedto more politicallyrepressivestrate-
gies under the New Order. In thewake of the failed"communistcoup" of
1965, Soeharto feltthathe had the opportunityto consolidate his power
against political forces,includingthe regional elite calling for resources
and powersharing.The tamingof theprovinceswas achievedin a number
of ways. At the rhetoricallevel, promiseswere made to enact laws that
would give"real autonomy"to the regions (ostensiblyto all regions,prov-
inces,and districts or cities). Atthesame timehowever,thecentralgovern-
mentmade clear thelimitsofautonomy,indicatingthatregionalautonomy
would no longer be the "broadestpossible" (seluas-luasnya), as had been
thecase underpriorregionalgovernment laws.Accordingto theNewOrder
government, ". .. based on experienceto date,thistermseeminglycan give

"4S.Pamudji,"TitikBeratOtonomi Pada Daerah TingkatII (Landasan PembinaanSistemPemerintahan

Daerah Di Indonesia)," (paper presented at the Seminar Terbatas Tentang Otonomi Daerah, Badan,
Penelitiandan Pengembangan,Departemen Dalam Negeri,Jakarta,8-9 Oktober 1990), p. 8.
35MohammadHatta, "Demokrasidan Autonomi,"Harian KengPo, 27 April 1957, in The Liang Gie,
Pertumbuhan PemerintahanDaerahDi NegaraRepublikIndonesia,Edisi Kedua, Jilid I (Yogyakarta:Liberty,
1993), p. 301.

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Using the "F" Word 73

rise to thoughttendencies thatcan endanger the integrity of the Unitary

State .. ."36 The trauma of regional unrestweighed heavilyon the New
Order, and centralization,under the guise of a new kind of regional au-
tonomy,was the answer.Hence, the modernizedregionalgovernmentlaw
of 1974 made the provincialgovernordirectlyresponsibleto the central
governmentand maintainedthe principlethatthe autonomyof provinces
and districtsis non-hierarchical(meaning,in essence, thatboth were be-
holden to the center;the provincecould not act as superiorto the districts
unless specificallytaskedto do so). Furthermore,the futureemphasison
regionalautonomywould fallon thesecond-tierprovinces,not on thefirst-
tierprovinces.
The difficultiesin workingwithparallel autonomous regionswere felt
throughout the New Order period. Throughsheerintransigence, theprov-
inces introduceduncertainty in decentralizationinitiatives,
forcingthecen-
terto respond and adjust to different provincialwantsand circumstances.
This mightbe describedas the essence of autonomy,but the centerwas ill
prepared in practice (and psychologically)to make these adjustmentsfor
anylevel ofgovernment.Centralgovernmentofficialswerealso not happy
about provincesbeingable to thumbtheirnose at thecenter,howeverrarely
thisoccurredduringthe New Order period.
The burden of trouble shootingfrequentconflictsbetween the prov-
inces and the second-tierregionsimposed a heavyburden on the center.37
Confusionovertherole of theprovincesin supervisingand controllingthe
lower levels was in part generated by the lack of clarityand operational
consistencyin the non-hierarchicalconcept.38Furthermore, manyofficials
were unclear about the technicalguidance role the provinceoughtto play
in viewofthe existenceofdeconcentratedcentralunitsalongsidethem. In
these conflictingand confusingsituations,the second tierusuallylost,in
large partbecause theprovincefeltlike itwas the seniorof the twolevels,a
feelingno doubt supportedby the dual/hierarchicalrole of the regional
heads. This feelingof hierarchyin practicemayalso derivein partfrom
the 1950s'formulation ofdecentralization
laws,wheretheautonomouslevels
were clearlyhierarchical.39

36RepublikIndonesia, "Penjelasan Atas Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 5 Tahun 1974

Tentang Pokok-PokokPemerintahanDi Daerah," (Jakarta:MenteriNegara SekretarisNegara), p. 2.
37See,forexample, MashuriMaschab, "Mengapa Tidak Satu TingkatDaerah Otonom?" and Ichlasul
Amal, "Otonomi Tingkat Dua," (paper presented at the Seminar Terbatas Tentang Otonomi Daerah,
Badan, Penelitiandan Pengembangan,Departemen Dalam Negeri,Jakarta,8-9 Oktober 1990).
has been acknowledgedbyprovincialofficialsifnot the center;see the commentsof
"3Thisdifficulty
governorof Bali, Ida Bagus Oka, "FungsiPemerintahDaerah TingkatI Dalam Pelaksanaan TitikBerat
Otonomi Pada Daerah Tingkat II," (paper delivered by the governorof Bali at the Seminar Otonomi
Daerah, Jakarta,16 April 1997).
"3SeeIsmail Husin, "Daerah Besar Dan Daerah Kecil Dalam SistemPemerintahanDaerah Di Indone-
sia," (paper presented at the Seminar Terbatas Tentang Otonomi Daerah, Badan, Penelitian dan
Pengembangan,Departemen Dalam Negeri,Jakarta,8-9 Oktober 1990).

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74 2000
Publius/Spring

Bytakingawaythe second tierfromthe provinces'jurisdiction,the cen-

terunwittingly committeditselfto sortingout the meaning of non-hierar-
chical regionalautonomyat the provincialand second-tierlevels. Despite
regional requestsfor clarification,an effectiveworkingmodel was never
developed. It was onlythe continuedcommand chain throughthe Kepala
Wilayah(regional head as agent of the center) that "simplification" was
attainedduringthe New Order,at the expense of any real autonomyfor
the districts.
Concerns about provincialpower and about the complexitiesof multi-
levelnon-hierarchical autonomyeventuallypushed thepolicyofprovincial
subjugation to its logical conclusion; Soeharto and his officials,near the
end of theirreign,concluded thatitwould be best to relegatetheprovince
to the statusof mere administrative territory(wilayah),shornof itslegisla-
tureand regionalhead (Kepala Daerah). The governorwould then purely
be the representativeof the presidentin the province. This notion had
been circulatingin "captured"academic circlesforsome time,40but was
onlyaired forcefully when it receivedthebackingof Rudini,thenminister
ofhome affairs, in 1990.41 Rudiniframeditas theonlyviableoptionthrough
whichtheemphasison autonomycould be realizedon thesecond regional
level. The tuggingbetween the provinceand districtswould be avoided
because the functionswould be divided between the center and the dis-
tricts,withthe provincebeing merelythe extensionof thecenter,fulfilling
a supervisory, guidance, and controlfunctionon behalfof the centralgov-
ernment.
A strongreactionto this"plan" came fromprovincesand some central-
level stakeholders,withthe resultthatthisfasttracktowardenhanced dis-
trictautonomypracticallydisappeared fromofficialdiscourse. However,
the general objectiveremained alive,guidingthe long-termcourse of de-
centralizationand regional autonomy. This can be seen in the district-
autonomypilot program of 1995, where the Ministryfor State Reform
whittledawayat the autonomyof the provinces,and let it be knownthat
thiswould continueuntilitwasapparentto all thatautonomywasno longer
warrantedat thislevel.
Argumentsfora strongersecond-tierrole have some validity, but in the
New Order,theywere the public face of a decision thathad roots in the
politicalcommitmentto denythe provincea strongautonomousrole,par-
the second tier. Removingthe autonomyof the province
ticularlyvis-fi-vis
wouldindeed simplify themultiple-level autonomyconundrum,butitwould

40B.Zainun, "DecentralizationforRural Developmentin Indonesia," Buildingfrom Below-LocalInitia-

tives
forDecentralized
Developmentin Asia and Pacific,ed. A. Bhattet al., (Konrad Adenauer Stiftungand the
Asia and PacificDevelopment Centre, 1988), 3:104-128.
came fromthe Litbangsection of Home Affairs,throughthe letterof its chair
41Theidea "officially"
dated 4June 1990/No. 188.2.294/Litbang.

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Usingthe"F" Word 75

be politicalsuicide and a recipe fordisasterifapplied unilaterallyand in

the contextof risingprovincialexpectations.
HABIBIE'S REFORMS AND POLICY CONTINUITIES
B. J. Habibie came to power in May 1998, when Soeharto stepped aside
under immense studentpressureand general unrest. While some demo-
craticreformswere ceded, Habibie undertookother reformsnot only to
showhis reformistcolorsbut also to maintainthe basic featuresof the pat-
rimonial systemof governance. Regional autonomyreformswere thus
flawed,and the possibilityof federalismwas fiercelyattackedby the "re-
form"government.
Continued toProvincial
Aversion Autonomy
Soeharto's abdication in May 1998 in favorof his proteg6,Habibie, led
to a transitiongovernment,42 national legislature(DPR), and people's as-
sembly (MPR) that were eager to place some distancebetweenthemselves
and theNew Order,butwerenonethelessshorton legitimacy.To make his
markas a reformer, Habibie eagerlygrasped at the decision of the special
session of the MPR to move forwardon decentralization.43
Althoughofficialscharged withdraftinga new decentralizationframe-
workfeltpressureto make some "breakthroughs," therewas littlediscus-
sion of the goals to be emphasized, and little time to embark on a
policy-formulation process and preparationof operationalinstruments to
make the effortboth technicallyand politicallyacceptable. The president
wantedhislawsquickly,and he wantedto displaythesebeforetheMPR and
the nation in his accountabilityspeech scheduled forlate 1999.
The regional governmentand center-regionfinancial relationsbills,
rushed throughparliamentaryapproval in May 1999,44 promisedbroad
autonomy (otonomiyangluas) to the regions (but not the "broadestpos-
sible" autonomy). Despite some progressiveelements,much continuity
can be found withthe New Order. The focus is again to be placed on
districtautonomy,while provincialautonomyis to be restricted(terbatas).
The provinciallegislature(DPRD) muststillconsultthe choice of provin-
cial head (governor)withthe president. This is not the case withthe dis-
wherethe Bupatiand Walikotais freelychosen bythedistrictand
trict/city,
citylegislaturerespectively.Deconcentratedfunctionsgivento the gover-
nor willbe dischargedthroughthe same provincialagencies undertaking
autonomous functions,invitingconfusionand the dominance of vertical

42LastingfromMay 1998 to November 1999.

43RepublikIndonesia, "TAP MPR No. XV/MPR/1998" (regardingthe Implementationof Regional
Autonomy;a JustRegulation,Division and Utilizationof National Resources and the Balancing of Cen-
ter-RegionalFinances withinthe frameworkof the UnitaryRepublic of Indonesia).
44Undang-undang Daerah (regional governmentlaw) and Undang-undang
tentangPemerintahan tentang
PerimbanganKeuanganantaraPemerintah Pusat dan Daerah (center-regionalfinanceslaw).

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76 Publius/Spring2000

prerogativesin provincialdecision-making.As well,the non-hierarchical

principlebetweenprovinceand districtsis made even more explicitthan
in the New Order laws.
SellingAutonomy Federalism
whileDiscrediting
In the run up to theJune 1998 elections,contendingpartiesappeared
reluctantto put forwardalternativesto governmentdecentralizationpoli-
cies. Only nine of the 48 approved partiescanvassedby the dailyKompas
made knowntheirdecentralizationprogram.45On the whole, these nine
favoredbroaderprovincialautonomy.Anothersurvey, elicitingviewsfrom
both contestingand "unqualified"parties,revealedsupportforgivingthe
provincesa largerrole and share of resources. No partyin eithersurvey
explicitlyfavoredenhancing the autonomyof the second regional level-
districtsand cities-aspreferredbythe transitiongovernment.46Mostwere,
however,adamant (at least to be on record) about protectingthe unitary
state. It mayeven be thatthe pro-provincial sentimentsof thesenewpoliti-
cal actorswereheld largelyunawareofpastand intendedgovernmentpoli-
cies favoringthe district.Regardless,the promptallegiance to the unitary
model suggeststhatthe federalismtaboo was stillin place severalmonths
afterSoeharto'sfall.
Public reaction to Habibie's decentralizationframework was generally
for
negative, many reasons. Even before its approval,sixteen NGOs had
gone on recordas "refusing"the draftbill on regionalgovernment(among
themOXFAM,Wahli,MitraTani,and PACT). The generalobjectionraised
was thatthe draftlaw was not prepared democratically, and
transparently,
withparticipationby the public.47 Manyfound the finalversionto be sub-
stantively weak, lacking in clarity,and overlydependent on government
fiat.48However,some governmentofficialswere perturbedby its radical
departurefromincrementaldecentralization,fearingthatitwas federalin
nature and thatit "has the potentialto disintegratethe nation.""49Stake-
holdersremindedthegovernmentof the need fora wide public discourse,
formerEnvironmentMinisterEmil Salim among them.5' This was also the
message conveyedinformally byvariousdonor agencies, thoughthe mes-
sage was not veryinsistent.

45Seespecial summaryedition on the parties,Kompas,6 March 1999.

46GabrieleFerrazzi,Decentralization
Reform: (Jakarta:Almanac of Indone-
Can itkeepIndonesiatogether?
sian PoliticalParties,1999).
""16 LSM Tolak RUU PemerintahanDaerah," Suara Pembaruan,3 March 1999, p. 15.
41See, forexample,ArifAryman,directorof Econit economic researchagencyin Antara,"Autonomy:
Bill on Financial Balance Needs Revising,SaysObserver,"7 April1999; http://www.antara.co.id/rx/eng/
curr/national/1999/04/07/ANT28537.html.
"9CooperativeMinisterAdi Sasono in "Decentralizationof State Finances Needs More Time," Bisnis
Indonesia,5 April 1999 (Netscape version).
5?EmilSalim, "Otonomi Daerah," Kompas,11 Februari 1999, p. 2.

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Using the "F" Word 77

Only twoaspiringleaders broke rankwiththe elite and tooka standfor

federalism. Even so, Amien Rais, of the National Mandate Party(PAN),
soon softenedhis stance,indicatingthathe merelysupporteda dialogue
on the issue and that the federalmodel may not be the best forIndone-
sia.51YuzrilMahendra, head of the CrescentStar Party(PBB), also back-
trackedand indicated supportfor strongprovinces (40 of them) rather
thanthefocuson the districtas enshrinedin the newlaws.52The softening
of positionsundoubtedlywas relatedto the backlashfeltamong the politi-
cal elite,particularlyin thepoliticalpartyGolkar,who had come out strongly
against Rais' position;the politicallyastuteRais and Mahendra apparently
did not want to alienate Golkar-membersupportat later stages of a very
fluidpoliticalprocess.
Federalismhas alwaysbeen a topicofdiscussion,albeitin hushed tones.
This has evenbeen trueamong governmentofficials, thoughthelatterwere
in the main sold on the mythologiesof the New Order. The laydiscussion
wasbecomingmoreintenseduringthemid-1990s.53 In thereformera,when
the elite failed to respond to the emergingfederalismdiscussionamong
thepublic,otherstakeholderstookup thechallenge,no doubtemboldened
bythedrivetowarda more democraticpolity.Academicsand otherobserv-
ers began to writeabout federalism,or autonomyversusfederalism.54 A
well-knownfreedom fighter,the late Romo Mangunwijaya,published a
timelybook dealing at lengthwiththe need fora federalsystem. In the
book and laterwritings, he drewon the symbolof Bung Hatta, indicating
thatthisfounderof the republicfavoreda federalistspiritin regionalau-
tonomy,even ifnot explicitlya federalform.55 Romo suggestedthata fed-
eral model was needed to ward offcivilunrestand violence,but even he
was softin his call, allowingimplementationto extend to theyear2045.
Despite an early1998 pledge that"debate on the federalmodel mustbe
accommodated,"56Ryaas Rasyid,the directorgeneral in Home Affairsre-
sponsible forregional autonomy,went on the offensiveto champion the
decentralizationframework his Home Affairs team had preparedforPresi-
dent Habibie. Senior officialslaunched an informationcampaign to "so-

51See"Debat Golkar-PANSiap Digelar di Teve," Republika, 7 September 1998, p. 1.

52SeeYusrilIzha Mahendra, "PerpolitkanKonsep Federal di Indonesia dan Konsekuensinya,"Federal-
ismuntukIndonesia,eds. Adnan B. Nasution,Harun Alrasid,and Ichlasul Amal (Jakarta:Kompas, 1999),
pp. 154-164.
53Theseare impressionsof the author,gained fromnine years of cooperation withthe Indonesian
governmentat all levels,and throughdiscussionwithnon-governmentstakeholdersduringthistime.
54See,forexample, Soedjati Djiwandono, "Is a Federal SystemSuitable forIndonesia?"JakartaPost,23
July1998, p. 1; Cornelius Lay,"SistemPresidentiilMasih Dibutuhkan 15-20Tahun Lagi," Republika,15
August 1998 (Netscape version); and Amien Syam,"Semua Dati I Harus Diberi Otonomi Luas," Kompas,
24 August 1998, p. 8.
55y.B. (Romo) Mangunwijaya,"MenyalamatkanKetunggalanNegara,"Federalism untukIndonesia,pp.
32-43.
56See"Debat tentangNegara Federal Harus Diakomodasi," Kompas,27 August1998, p. 6.

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78 2000
Publius/Spring

cialize"thecontentsofthetwokeylaws. RyaasRasyidstatedthatthe"broad-
est possibleautonomy"was givenin the new laws,57evokinga concept that
had currencyin the 1950s. Quite aside fromthe factthatthereis no such
formulationin the laws,thisslogan representeda distortionof historybe-
cause the "broadestpossible"autonomyconcept relatedto a period when
theweak centerwas forcedto yieldto keyregionaldemands thatwere pri-
marilyprovincial(e.g., the birthof certainprovincescontiguouswithhis-
toricalbounds or thatapproximatedDutch "residency"borders).58
In a rebuttalof federalism,Rasyidexplained to the public thatfederal-
ism was not possible in Indonesia because federalnations could only be
formed"byindependentnationsdecidingto come togetherto forma fed-
eration."59 To indicate the new laws' generous spirit,Andi Mallarangeng,
also instrumentalin the draftingeffort, statedthatthese laws gave the re-
gions "fullsovereignty."'6
During thisexchange,as carriedout in seminarsand meetingswiththe
press,thepresidentkepta lowprofile,leavinghis regionalautonomydirec-
torgeneral and partyfunctionariesof Golkarto quell incipientdiscussion
on federalism.Golkarattackedsupportersof federalismwithvigor,charg-
ing thatdisintegrating forceslaybehind the desire to establishfederalism.
AkbarTandjung,thepartychairman,invokedthestateideologyofPancasila
as thebase fora unitarystateand pledged to "oppose all effortsto establish
a federalnation."61
Bytheend ofHabibie's government, federalismhad begun to emergein
the broader discourse,but could not be said to have become an acknowl-
edged issue fordeliberationwithingovernment.
THE UNITY GOVERNMENT: USING THE "F" WORD
Once the new governmentof PresidentGus Dur was in place (November
1999), some officialspressed for the immediate implementationof the
Habibie laws.62However,keyfollow-upregulationsdid not exist,a factthat
concerned some regions hopeful for quick action on decentralization.63

untukIndonesia,pp. 17-
Mallarangen and RyaasRasyid,"Otonomi dan Federalism,"Federalism
"57Andi
31.
58See,forexample, Gerald S. Maryanov,Decentralization (Ithaca: Mod-
in Indonesiaas a PoliticalProblem
ern Indonesia Project,Cornell University,1958).
59"Otonomi Lebih Realistisdaripada Federasi,"Kompas,10 September 1998, p. 6.
6?"OtonomiDaerah Tetap Mengandung Risiko,"Kompas,21 September 1999, p. 17.
6""GolkarTolak Negara Federal," Kompas,1 September 1998, p. 6.
62Forinstance,Dewi FortunaAnwar(formerHabibie advisorand memberof the Indonesian Institute
of Science) and Andi Mallarangeng (an architectof the laws and lecturerin the Home AffairsInstitute
forGovernmentalStudies); see "RegionalDiscontentThreatensUnity," Jakarta Post,24 October 1999,p. 1.
and districtofficialsgathered on 30 October 1999 to begin preparationsforautonomy.
63Provincial
They noted the lack of regulationsand warned thatif thiswas not correctedsoon, it would lead to con-
flictsdown the road (reported 30 October 1999 byTelevisionRepublik Indonesia, news program). The
preparationsto be takenwere not made clear,and it is hard to see whatthe regionscan do withoutbeing
givena road map of some type.

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Using the "F" Word 79

To expediteregionalautonomy,the presidentestablisheda new StateMin-

istryfor Regional Autonomy,and placed Ryaas Rasyidas minister. This
signaled the importanceof regional autonomyto the president,and indi-
cated continuitywiththe Habibie government'sregionalgovernmentlaw,
giventhatRasyidhad led itsdraftingas directorgeneral in the Ministry of
Home Affairs.
The new ministerpledged to hasten the implementationof the new re-
gional governmentand financelaws,and reassuredthepublicwiththecom-
mentthat: "Autonomycan be theanswerto all theproblemsofseparatism.
It can serveas an adhesiveforthe unitarystateof Indonesia."''64 Giventhat
no districtsare currentlyseeking nationhood,"65 the minister'sattention
seems misplaced; adhesion is needed largelyat the provinciallevel. The
ministeris undoubtedlyaware of thisreality,but is workingwithinthe per-
sistentlogic thatprovincescan best be kept in check by denyingthem a
prominentrole.
To theratheruninformedpress,thefinalizationofdecentralizationlaws
sounded like good news,even elicitingthe hope that"itwillpostpone ...
forthe timebeing at least ... theheated debate about federalism."66These
sentimentswereexpressedbytheJakartaPostin thesame breathas remind-
ers of provincialclaims on resourcesand referencesto the upcoming de-
centralizationofpower"to theprovinces,"''67suggestingthatsome members
ofthepresswerestillin thedarkabout thecontentsand implicationsofthe
new laws.68
The president'sown pronouncementshave been inconsistentor diffi-
cult to decipher,and perhaps theyare meant to be opaque. He acknowl-
edges thatfederalismmaybe needed,butis reluctanttouse theterm"federal
system,"giventhe unpleasantconnotationsthishas formanyIndonesians,
particularly his vice president,MegawatiSoekarnoputri. Hence, he sees a
need to proceed cautiously,but apparentlynot clearly,holdingthat: "Even
thoughgrantingtotalautonomyis not thatdifferent froma federalsystem,
it is easier to swallow." His quandaryis aptlycaptured in his concluding

64"Government Says AutonomyLaw Ready in 2000,"JakartaPost,23 November 1999 (Netscape ver-

sion).
unrest or calls for independence have been rare but not unheard of in Indonesia's
65District-level
history.The districtof Minahasa, in NorthSulawesi,is probablythe best example. Followingthe war of
independence, the regional elite, led by the Persatuan Minahasa (Minahasan Unity)movementand the
local leader Ratulangie (a nationalist)voiced theirpreferencefor"independence" withina federalIndo-
nesian Republic; see Henley David, "Nationalismand Regionalism in Colonial Indonesia: The Case of
Minahasa," Indonesia55 (April 1993): 91-112.
"See editorial"Delay Not the Autonomy," JakartaPost,23 December 1999 (Netscape version).
67"RIForced into Federal State by2010,"JakartaPost,15 November 1999 (Netscape version).
6This kind of confusioncould also stemfrominappropriateEnglish translationsof the termdaerah
(region) whichcould mean provinceor district,and requiresspecificationin Indonesian (unless ambigu-
is
ity sought). The factthatthe termsremain unspecifiedmaybe an indication of how successfullythe
governmenthas been able to muddle or avoid the issue of provincialautonomy.

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80 Publius/Spring2000

statementto theJapanese press,"I am tryingto do somethingthatcannot

be expressedin words."69
The taboo on federalism,evidentin the election campaign where few
partiesdared mentiontheterm,is crumbling,butveryslowly.The aversion
to using the "f' word stillfeltby the presidentindicatesthathe does not
wish to be perceived as softon the forcesof disintegration;maintaining
territorialintegrityis perhaps uppermostin the president'smind,at least
on par witheconomic recovery.He has givenhisvice presidentthe taskof
managing regional issues,but has kept the "Aceh" portfolioforhimself,
presumablyin lightofAceh's stridentdemands forself-determination and
theirreligiousovertones. Gus Dur at firstappeared to agree withthe call
fora referendum on independence,70butthenhe explainedthatthismeant
only forreligiousmatters.Finally,he allowed his ministerforlegal affairs,
YusrilIhza Mahendra,to statethattherewould be no referendum.In its
place, the governmentwould propose a "special autonomy"package for
Aceh.71
The ad hoc "special"autonomypackagesputforthbythepresidenthave
not arisen fromany policydebate. He has pledged to Aceh province75
percentofnatural-resource revenues."Anotherformof "specialautonomy"
is being promised to West Papua, and recentlythe state ministerfor re-
gional autonomyhas acknowledgedthe meritsof Bali's claim forspecial
autonomy. These accommodationsappear to be unrealisticin termsof
addressingregionalequityand sustainablecenter-region arrangements.73
The pressureforprovincialautonomyor federalismmounted earlyin
Gus Dur's term. Provinciallegislatures,more plural and powerfulin the
new politicalframework, began to rouse. The East Kalimantanlegislature
sent representatives to the national legislatureto lobbyforfederalismin
Indonesia. The East Kalimantanrequeststandsthe fear-mongering of the
New Order on itshead: "Weasked the House to takethe concept of feder-
alismintoconsiderationin an attemptto maintainnationalunity.. ."7 It is
a significantreversalthatthe fearof disintegrationis now fuellingfederal-
ism proposals and discussion. Provinciallegislatorsin South Sulawesiare
also standingbyproposals fora federalsystem,reached as a compromise

6'Broughtto theauthor'sattentionbyBernhardMayas quoted in TheStraitsTimes,22 December1999.

70"Acehto Hold Referendumin Seven Months:President,"Jakarta Post,16 November 1999 (Netscape
version).
71"DPR Diminta PrioritaskanPembahasan Otonomi Khusus Aceh," Kompas,23 December 1999
(Netscape version).
72"IndonesiansFear Domino EffectifProvinceGoes," Globeand Mail, 13 November 1999, p. A15.
73Thismessage,among others,was conveyedto the minsterforregionalautonomybythe donor com-
munity,see AdvisoryWorkingGroup,Decentralization in Indonesia:ManagingtheRisks,MaximizingtheBen-
Prepared byadvisorsfromWorldBank, UNDP, USAID, CIDA, GTZ, November 1999,Jakarta.
efits,
74"EastKalimantan LegislatorsJoin Call for Federalism,"JakartaPost,2 December 1999 (Netscape
version).

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Using the "F" Word 81

followingstudentdemonstrationsin the streetsofMakassarcallingforout-

rightindependence.75
Changes are also takingplace among national politicians. The deputy
chair of Golkar,Marwah Daud, afterher party'spoor showing(except in
South Sulawesi and a fewother regions) statedher intentto learn more
about and push forwardthe cause of federalism."76 AkbarTandjung,the
hard-nosedGolkarchairmanentrustedwithdiscreditingfederalismin the
Habibie period,also experiencedsome kindofconversion.As chairof the
national legislature(DPR), he announced thatthe twopossible optionsto
be offeredto Aceh mightbe the federaloption and the broadestpossible
autonomy(otonomi yangseluas-luasnya) withinthe unitarystate." This has
not been confirmedby the stateministerfor regional autonomy,but the
latterdid go some waytowardacknowledgingthe dissonance betweenthe
new laws and Aceh's demands by puttingforwardseveral autonomyop-
tions for thisprovince,one of whichwould focus on the provincerather
than on the districtsand cities.7"Some senior governmentofficialshave
broken rankswiththe official"unitary-autonomy" line, on one occasion
openlyguessingabout the date when federalismwillcome to Indonesia.79
The regionalrepresentative of thePeople's LegislativeAssembly(MPR),
a much more energeticbody than in the past,organized a forumin early
December 1999 on federalismversusa unitarystate. These "national"poli-
ticianscame out withthefollowingresults:theAceh and WestPapua prov-
ince representatives did not feel thatfederalismwould keep themin the
union; Riau and East Kalimantanpressed for a federal form;and other
representatives waveredor opposed federalism.80
Standingagainstany easing on the federalissue are formidableforces,
namely,theIndonesian DemocraticPartyforStruggle(PDI-P) and themili-
tary.Led byMegawatiSoekarnoputri,PDI-P has strenuouslystateditsop-
position to federalismor any threatto the unitarystate. It has sought to
censure Amien Rais, now speaker of the People's ConsultativeAssembly
(MPR), foradvocatingfederalism.81 In makingthecase fortheunitarystate,
the PDI-P secretary-generalstated: "It was proven thatfederalismwas re-
jected bythe people," alludingto the 1950 returnto the unitarystate. The
enactmentof the newlawswould be "appropriatemeasuresto counterfed-

75"BerceraiKita Runtuh," Gatra,6 November 1998, p. 42.

76"MarwahDaud Siap Mundur,"Kompas,8 November 1999, p. 7.
77"KetuaDPR Tolak Opsi Merdeka," Kompas,4 December 1999 (Netscape version).
78"Ditawarkan Empat Alternatif-Ryaas Rasyidsoal Otonomi untukAceh," Kompas,27 November1999
(Netscape version).
79Seecommentsby Anhar Gonggong, directorof historyand traditionalvalues at the Ministryof
National Education, who stated that preparationsfor a federal state should be complete by 2005, "RI
Forced into Federal State by 2010,"JakartaPost,15 November 1999 (Netscape version).
80PrivatecommunicationswithLuc de Meester,GTZ advisorforthe Home Affairsbased Support for
DecentralizationMeasures project,Jakarta.
"8See "PDI Perjuangan Seeks to Censure Amien,"JakartaPost,30 November 1999 (Netscape version).

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82 2000
Publius/Spring

eralismdemands."s2The yearningfortaboo statusfortheconceptoffeder-

alismseems evidentin these statements.The Java/urbanemphasisof the
PDI-P is also clearlyevident. It is not in touch withthe outlyingregions,
nor is itverysensitiveto the issue of decentralization.
A respectedtraditionalfigure,Yogyakarta GovernorHamengkuBuwono
X, has been somewhatmore thoughtfulin his opposition to federalism.
He warnedthe nationthat: "Manyareas willformstatesbased on ethnicity
or religion ... They will demand independence and Indonesia will col-
lapse."83
Looming in the backgroundis the military.Stilllickingitswoundssuf-
feredin thelastthreeyears,itis nonethelessgrowlingat efforts to "threaten
the unity(persatuan)and unitarynature (kesatuan)and continuityof the
nation (bangsa) and state (negara)."84 A federalstateis clearlynot favored
bythe military,makingit thewildcard in thisintricategame.
THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE DEBATE
The post-electionflurry of demands and protestsoverseparation,federal-
ism,or regionalautonomygavewayto a steadymurmurin theearlymonths
of 2000. The centralgovernmentwas unable to takefulladvantageof the
relativerespite. A "humanitarianpause" was reached withthe Aceh free-
dom movement(GAM), but no agreementon the natureof the autonomy
package ensued, and low-levelviolence continued. On the westernfront,
West Papua convened a provincialforumin earlyJune 2000 that culmi-
nated in a call forrecognitionof its "independentstatus." The autonomy
package thatwas to preemptsuch demands remainsundefined. The fed-
eral option continuesto be raisedin some quarters,but not bythe govern-
ment. GAM representatives have indicated thatthe federaloption might
be an acceptable compromise.85Riau studentscontinueto presstheiroffi-
cials and the centralgovernmentto considervariousalternatives,includ-
ing federalism.86
To relievethe pressure,the governmenthas primarilytriedto inculcate
among officialsthe virtuesof autonomyoverfederalism.On 23 February
2000, theministerofhome affairs, SurjadiSoedirdja,opened hisworkshop
forregional officialswiththe statementthat"Indonesia is an einheidsstaat
[unitarystate],thusIndonesia does not have regionsthatare staats[states].
It cannot possiblyhappen thattherecan be regionsthatare stateswithin

s2"PDI Perjuangan Rules Out Option of Federal State,"JakartaPost,13 December 1999 (Netscape
version).
83"Unitary vs. Federal SystemSized Up," JakartaPost,8 December 1999 (Netscape version).
84"AdaUpaya MerombakBentukNegara Kesatuan,"Kompas,2 December 1999 (Netscape version).
85See"PertemuanBondan-AbdullahTerganggu'Pemusatan' TNI GAM ingin negara federal,"Suara
Kaltim,18 Maret 2000 (Netscape version).
86"Mahasiswa Riau Se-Indonesia TuntutDPR," Riau Pos,9 Maret 2000 (Netscape version).

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Using the "F" Word 83

the unitarystate of the Republic of Indonesia.""' This truismposing for

policyis vintageNew Order rhetoric. The failureto embrace the discus-
sions takingplace outside governmentcan only isolate policymakersand
lead to politicalmiscalculation.These simplisticwarningsof "federationis
disintegration" do a disserviceto the complexityof Indonesia's historyand
are unlikelyto withstandthe kind of scrutinythatcivilsocietyis beginning
to expect and mountof itsown accord.
The unofficialdebate on federalismis being continuedbynon-govern-
mentactors,principallyinJakarta.The national and regionalpressoften
returnsto the theme,seekingviewsfromofficials, intellectuals,and techni-
cal advisorsworkingin relateddonor-supportedprojects. Universitiesand
foundationshold forato discusstheoption,usuallyin tandemwithregional
autonomyoptions. The press also is active in conductingpanel discus-
sions,oftentelevised."88
Foreignadvisorsare no longershyabout voicingtheirviewson the fed-
eral model. Some advisorsopenly speculate that the federal model "in
principlecan be applied to Indonesia,"or thatitis workable"ifthatis what
thepeople want."89Comingfromadvisorstaskedwithsupportingtheelabo-
rationand implementation ofthecurrent"unitary" government's autonomy
policies,these are significantadmissionsifnot endorsements.
Explicitsupportforfederalismis foundamong seniorresearchersin the
respectedIndonesian Instituteof Sciences (LIPI). It recentlycollaborated
withinternationalparties (e.g., Hanns Seidel Foundation) to hold forato
enlarge the discussion,90 withthe expressed intentto influencegovern-
ment policymaking.LIPI examined the question: "Is the unitarystateto
be identifiedwiththe unityof the nation, and is the federal state to be
identifiedwith the nation's disintegration?"Using a scientificforumto
demystify governmentclaims on decentralizationis a marked departure
fromthe New Order patternof co-optedscientificeffort forthe purpose of
statecontroland ideological dominance. The LIPI forumconcluded that
it mightbe possible to introducea compromiseposition,one thatperhaps
the presidenthimselfis strugglingto enunciate,where the unitaryformis

87Translatedfrom Indonesian by the author from the report found in "Pelaksanaan Otonomi
Hendaknya tidakTimbulkanKonflik,"Suara Pembaruan,23 February2000, p. 2.
"88Apublic debate was held in Hotel Meridien,Jakartaon 16 February2000, titled"AntaraBentuk
Negara Kesuatuan dan Federasi" (Between the Unitaryand Federal Form of the State).
89See, for example, the views expressed by the members of the Gesellschaft ffirTechnische
Zusammenarbeit,the executingarm of the German governmentin the latter'scooperation in the Sup-
port for Decentralization Measures project of the Government of Indonesia. These are found in
"Wawancara Dr. Bernhard May-Janggan Menunggu Daerah Berteriak,"Integrasi,2, 24-30Januari 2000,
pp. 12-17, and in "Otonomi Baik, Federal tidak Perlu-Ir.Luc de Meester,Penasehat Pengembangan
PemerintahLokal dan Regional Depdagri," SorotanKhusus,15Juni 1999, p. 69.
"See, forexample, the proposal byLIPI to hold a seminarto compare the meritsof the unitaryversus
the federalmodel forIndonesia; LIPI, "Seminar Internasional-NegaraKesatuan VersusNegara Federal:
Mencari Bentuk Ideal Negara Indonesia Masa Depan," February2000.

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84 2000
Publius/Spring

keptbut the stateover timeabsorbs "some elementsof a federalstatesys-

tem."91Althoughfewstateshave approached federalismwithinthe struc-
tureof a unitarystate,92it is likelythatthisseparationof the "spirit"from
the "form"of federalismcould become the new fieldof debate, echoing
Elazar's focus on the principlesof federalismand Saunders' caution re-
gardingmakingtoo much of structure.
PROSPECTS FOR FEDERALISM IN INDONESIA
Federalismfitswiththe enduringvaluesand currentplightofIndonesians.
The essence of federalism,"the primacyof bargainingand negotiatedco-
ordinationamong severalpowercenters,"93connectswellwiththeIndone-
sian principleof "musyawarah mufakat" (consensus throughdeliberation).
The covenantconcept offederalism,concernedwithethicalcommitments
and equitable materialdistribution betweensocietalgroups,resonateswith
the ideologyof Pancasila. Yet,the pursuitof a federalsystemat thisjunc-
turecould accentuatediversity and grievances,undermininga comprehen-
sive shared sense of identificationand belonging.94Ethnic strifealready
poses a seriouschallenge to nationalunity.The transitionto a federalsys-
temcould exacerbateexistingfractures, possiblyprecipitatingsecessionand
bloody conflict. Elazar's hopeful observationsof the of
ability federalsys-
temsto accommodateculturalcleavagesmightbe too riskyto testin Indo-
nesia. It maywellbe thata strategy of new provincialand districtcreation,
combined withsufficient autonomyforboth, can also serve to recognize
"local identities"and assuage aggrievedgroups. A unitarystatewithan
appropriateformof regional autonomycould be the less convulsiveand
saferroutein the immediatefuture.
The emergingexplorationof "federalismwithintheunitarystate"could
lead to a "made in Indonesia" solution. Some Indonesian scholarswishto
remedythe ineffectualregional representationat the centerthroughthe
creation of a bicameral national legislaturesimilarto the Americansys-
tem.95Anotherelementof thesolutioncould be tailoredspecial autonomy
deals with"separatist"provinces. The proposal forspecial autonomysub-
mittedbyAceh governmentrepresentatives(not necessarilyapproved by

91LIPI,"Resume and Recommendationof InternationalWorkshopon 'UnitaryState versusFederal

State: Searchingforan Ideal Formforthe Futureof the Indonesian State',"Proceedings oftheInternational
Workshop, 28-30 March 2000, p. 2.
92SouthAfricahas skated close to a federalmodel withina unitarystructure.Its new constitutionis
perhaps too young to be used as an example for others. Spain and Italy have had considerable
regionalization,but continuingregional discontentover theirconstitutionalarrangementspersist.
93DanielJ. Elazar, "Federalism,"International oftheSocial Sciences(New York: Macmillan
Encyclopedia
Co. and The Free Press,1968), 5:354.
94James MacPherson, "The Future of Federalism,"Federalismand theNew WorldOrder,ed. StephenJ.
Randall and Roger Gibbins (Calgary:University of CalgaryPress,1994), p. 12.
95Thesescholarsinclude theconstitutionalexpertHarun Alrasidand politicalscientistRamlanSurbakti;
see Idris Kyrwan,KyrwanReport, 15June 2000.

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 Using the "F" Word 85

GAM, the separatistmovement) approaches a loose confederation;only

defense,foreignaffairs,and monetarypolicywould be leftto the center
(along witha modest share of Aceh's revenues). WestPapua separatists
mightfinda similarcompromisepalatable. To the extentthatthe center
cedes such formsof "autonomy,"otherprovincesmightbe emboldened to
strikea betterdeal thanthatpossibleunder thecurrentregionalautonomy
laws thatforesee only "restricted"autonomyfor the provinces. A wider
formof provincialautonomyforall provincesnot involvedin special deals
(i.e., the "separatist"provinces) would likelyensue to stem chaotic and
unstableasymmetrical autonomy.
A national dialogue that examines the opportunitiesand dangers for
autonomyand federaloptionswould be salutary.96It is unlikely,however,
thatthe governmentwillencourage a broad dialogue. Autonomywillhave
to be won bythe regions. While democracyin Indonesia is stilltakingroot,
restricted formsofregionalautonomywillbe preferredbythe government.
Regional autonomyin thiscontextis a flexiblevehicle to variablyappease,
disarm,and undercutthe regions. It allows the basic featuresof the cen-
tralizedpatrimonialstate to remain in place. Even as the presidentand
ministerforregionalautonomyclaim thepoliticalbenefitsof newlawsand
regulationsforregionalautonomy,central-level departmentsare undoubt-
edly readyingthemselvesto diminishtheireffect."97 To the extentthatthe
presidentmaintainsa large and politicallydiversecabinet (to gain support
fromthe manyparties),he willfeed centralismas the ministersor parties
seek to gain controlover policyand access to resources. The immediate
victimsof these central-levelmaneuverswillbe the relativelyweak districts
or cities. The much-touteddecentralizationdriveis likelyto be frustrated
or slowed in the shortterm.
As democracygathersstrength,the unitaryformof the statein thisvast
and populous archipelagiccountrywilllook increasinglyout of step with
the restof the largerdemocracies. It seems inevitablethatmore funda-
mentaland widelylegitimizedreformsthanthose offeredto date willhave
to be fashionedto meet thechallengeofnationalintegrity. The newframe-
workwillneed to betteraccommodate provincialinterestsand, at a mini-
mum,be infusedwithelementsor principlesof a federalsystem.

"6The historicalrecord could be reappraised, and the mythsabout federalismcould be dispelled.

The contention that an established nation cannot restructureitselfas a federationof states could be
counteredwiththe case of the incrementalBelgium conversionto a federalstate. Discussionsbeing held
in the United Kingdom,Sri Lanka, and Italy,all pertainingto the meritsofa federalor quasi-federalstate,
indicate thatthe transformation is not deemed impossibleby these nations.
97Requestsfromcentral departmentsand agencies for amendments or exceptions to government
regulation25/2000 on the distributionof functionsare alreadytricklingin to the ministerforregional
autonomy. Some departmentsare takingstepsto fashiondecentralizationaccording to theirown vision.

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