Petitioners challenged the lower court's order, appointing private respondent Beda

Gonzales as special administrator of the intestate estate of the decedent Agustin

Medina. The Court excludes the said special administrator from interfering in the
possession and enjoyment of the harvests of the property known as "Bitukang Manok"
by petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen to whom the said property had been sold, and
full payment therefor received, by the estate through Gonzales' predecessor with
the approval of the lower court, which overruled Gonzales' opposition thereto as an
assignee of some heirs of the estate, and as one personally interested in the
purchase of the property for himself.

It appears that as noted by respondent CFI of Zambales, approved and confirmed the
deed of sale executed on May 8, 1969 by then special administrator Demetrio
Encarnacion of the intestate estate of the decedent Agustin Medina covering the
sale of its property known as "Bitukang Manok" for P24,000.00 to petitioner Rosalia
M. del Carmen.

The petitioners assailed the appointment of respondent Gonzales as special

administrator giving rise to the anomalous situation "where in an appealed
intestate case to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 49439-R, entitled "Intestate
Estate of the Deceased Agustin R. Medina; Pastor de Castro, Jr. (now Beda Gonzales)
Special Administrator, versus Uldarico Medina and Beda J. Gonzales, Movant's) the
appellate and the appellant are one and the same person," the petition is
manifestly meritorious and must be granted.

The sale to Rosalia of the Bitukang Manok property having been approved and
confirmed by respondent lower court over the personal opposition of said respondent
on March 6, 1970 which approval he appealed to the Court of Appeals, his subsequent
appointment as special administrator of the estate a year later under respondent
lower court's order of February 11, 1971 created a clear conflict of interest that
could cause grave damage and prejudice to the estate and subject it to unnecessary
suits.

With specific reference to the Bitukang Manok property as sold by the estate
through Gonzales' predecessor as special administrator and confirmed by the lower
court, the same has passed to petitioner Rosalia's ownership and possession since
the court's confirmation of the sale on March 6, 1970 and the estate makes no
further claim against the same but on the contrary has defended the sale and
Rosalia's title thereto as the vendee thereof as against Gonzales' adverse
opposition in the appeal brought by Gonzales in his personal capacity.

Yet now, as complained of by Rosalia, Gonzales by virtue of his appointment, as

special administrator a year later seeks in such other capacity to interfere with
her in the harvests of the property purportedly on behalf of the estate when in
fact he is going against the official stand of the estate which upholds the sale.

ISSUE:

WON the appointment of Gonzales' by the lower court as a special administrator is

proper.

Held:

Hence, the established doctrine that an administrator is deemed unsuitable and

should be removed where his personal interests conflict with his official duties,
by virtue of the equally established principle that an administrator is a quasi
trustee, disqualified from acquiring properties of the estate, and who should be
indifferent between the estate and claimants of the property except to preserve it
for due administration, and who should be removed when his interest conflicts with
such right and duly.
As restated by the Court in Lim vs. Dias-Millares, 13 "(I)n this jurisdiction, one
is considered to be unsuitable for appointment as administrator when he has adverse
interest of some kind of hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.".

The Court has resolved to allow the appointment of respondent Gonzales as special
administrator to stand, insofar as taking care of the other properties of the
estate are concerned, to the exclusion of the Bitukang Manok property already sold
by the estate to petitioner Rosalia del Carmen. (The said property shall pertain to
said petitioner's possession and enjoyment as the vendee thereof and in the event
that the appellate courts find cause to set aside the lower court's confirmation of
the sale in her favor in the pending appeal of Gonzales in his personal capacity,
then shall be the time for the estate and/or the heirs to reclaim possession of the
property upon return to her of the purchase price paid by her).

The Court has finally noted that while the estate involved is not large and there
seem to be no complicated questions that have impeded its prompt settlement, and
notwithstanding the lower court's avowed desire to terminate the proceedings once
and for all, the said estate proceedings have been pending now for over thirteen
years without the lower court once having appointed a regular administrator in
accordance with the Rules of Court to take charge of the settlement thereof and the
distribution and partition of the net estate to the heirs entitled thereto.

As time and again stated by the Court, while the provisions of the Rules of Court
may be deemed directory in nature, "the speedy settlement of the estates of
deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to residue by way
of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been
paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law" and "courts of first instance
should exert themselves to close up estate within twelve months from the time they
are presented, and they may refuse to allow any compensation to executors and
administrators who do not actively labor to that end, and they may even adopt
harsher measures."

ACCORDINGLY, the dismissal resolution of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified

and in lieu thereof, judgment is entered allowing the appointment of respondent
Gonzales special administrator to stand, insofar as taking care temporarily of the
other properties of the estate are concerned, but to the exclusion of the Bitukang
Manok property previously sold by the estate to petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen,
who is entitled to the enjoyment of said property as the vendee thereof.