1.Reyes vs Mosqueda , G.R. No.

L-45262 July 23, 1990

FACTS:

1. Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and without issue.

2. He was survived by his sister, Ursula Pascual and the children of his late
sisters.

3. During his lifetime, Dr. Pascual executed deed of donations covering the
property located at 1109-1111 R. Papa St., Tondo, allegedly to the following:

a. Donation mortis causa in favor of Ursula Pascual dated November 2, 1966.

b. Deed of donation of real property inter vivos in favor of Ofelia Parungao dated
May 15, 1969.

3. The heirs filed a Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M in the CFI, Pampanga. Atty.
Marcela Macapagal was appointed special administratrix but was later on replaced by
Reynaldo San Juan.

4. Thereafter, Ursula Pascual filed a motion to exclude some properties from the
inventory of Pascual's estate and to deliver the titles to her by virtue of the
"Donation Mortis Causa".

5. RTC: It exluded from the inventory of the estate the properties donated to
Ursula.

6. However, a temporary restraining order enjoining the trial court from enforcing
the decision was issued. (subject of G.R. Nos. 45262 and 45394)

7. When Parungao reached the age of majority or on December 20, 1976, she tried to
have the donation registered. The petition was granted. TCT No. 17854 was
cancelled and TCT No. 129092 was issued in the name of Ofelia Parungao.

8. Benjamin Reyes, private respondent in G.R. Nos. 73241-4 filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of TCT No. 129092 against Ofelia Parungao and Rosario
Duncil. (Civil Case No. 115164) While Ofelia Parungao filed a complaint for
recovery of possession over the Tondo property against Benjamin Reyes. (Civil Case
No. 119359)

9. RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 115164: It declared null and void the TCT No.
129092 in the name of Ofelia Parungao.

10. RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 119359: Dismissed the complaint for want of
merit.

11. Parungao appealed the decision to the Appellate Court, hower, the it affirmed
the lower court's decision.

12. The appellate court ruled that the deed of donation was actually a donation
inter vivos

ISSUE:

1. In G.R. No. L-45394, petitioner Pedro Dalusong questions the jurisdiction of the
probate court to exclude the properties donated to Ursula Pascual in its Order
dated August 1, 1976, and
2. In G.R. No. L-45262 and G.R. Nos. 73241-42, petitioners questioned the appellate
court's finding that the "Donation Mortis Causa" executed by Emilio Pascual in
favor of his sister Ursula Pascual was actually a Donation Inter Vivos.

HELD:

1. It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings

whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to
outside parties.

All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether
they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator.

If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a
final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so.

2. Settled is the rule that the title given to a deed of donation is not the
determinative factor which makes the donation "inter vivos" or "mortis causa.

This Court ruled that the dispositions in a deed of donation-whether "inter vivos"
or "mortis causa" do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation
but on the provisions stated in such deed.

It is the body of the document of donation and the statements contained therein,
and not the title that should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the
donor.

Whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends upon the nature of the
disposition made.

There is no doubt that the so-called DONATION MORTIS CAUSA is really a donation
inter vivos.

The donation was executed by Dr. Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual out
of love and affection as well as a recognition of the personal services rendered by
the donee to the donor. The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to
the donee was immediate and independent of the death of the donor.

The provision as regards the reservation of properties for the donor's subsistence
in relation to the other provisions of the deed of donation confirms the intention
of the donor to give naked ownership of the properties to the donee immediately
after the execution of the deed of donation.

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows:

1) In G.R. Nos. 45262 and 45394 the petitions are DENIED. The Temporary Restraining
Order issued on January 5, 1977 is hereby LIFTED; and

2) In G.R. Nos. 73241-42, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. This DENIAL is
FINAL.