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Critical Legal Thinking: Hannah Arendt: The Right To Have Rights
Critical Legal Thinking: Hannah Arendt: The Right To Have Rights
Key Concept
Hannah Arendt. From ‘Vita Activa: The Spirit of Hannah Arendt’. ZEITGEIST FILMS
For Arendt, the problematic nature of the rights of Man is deeply rooted in
the rise of the nation’s sovereignty against the sovereignty of individuals.
As she puts it, the entire project of universal human rights conceives of the
human being as an entity with no higher authority above herself. From a
historical perspective, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and
Citizen (1789) was the first document to incorporate an abstract
understanding of the human being. Such an abstract understanding of a
human suggests that she herself—rather than God or natural hierarchies—
should be the source of human law. The UDHR’s claim concerning the
inalienability of the rights follows the same approach and implies that the
prescribed rights are independent of any higher authority. Theoretically
speaking, although the source of law and governance could be reduced to
the individual sovereignty of human beings, the real source of law and
governance is the people of a particular territory and not the individuals. As
a result, the promised ‘inalienable’ human rights can only find their
guarantee in the collective right to self-governance, which is possessed by
the people of a particular territory: the nation.
Arendt’s critique of human rights and the idea of the right to have rights
have received a vast reception in critical legal and political theory. For
example, Giorgio Agamben, in a radicalized reading of Arendt, has
introduced ‘the figure of the refugee’ as a ‘limit concept’ to rethink the
boundaries of the political community under the paradigm of the nation-
state, and as a potential means of moving beyond the institution of
subjective rights.2 Jacques Rancière has offered a critical reading of Arendt
and fundamentally challenged her distinction between the political life of
the citizen (bios politikos) and the non-political life of the human (zoë). As
Rancière has put it, such a distinction precludes the possibility of claiming
the right to have rights for those who are deprived of a political life and
renders the rights of man either ‘void’ or ‘a justification for humanitarian
interventions’.3 But in an affirmative reading of Arendt, Christoph Menke
has suggested that her conception of ‘human dignity’ could open a
fundamental possibility to overcome the human rights crisis. Such a victory
happens if the entire project of human rights re-establishes itself first on an
anthropology of ‘a politico-linguistic form of life’, and second on an idea of
subjective rights informed by the experiences of what is the ‘right’ thing for
human beings.4
Leila Faghfouri Azar is PhD candidate in Philosophy of Law at the
University of Amsterdam, Paul Scholten Centre for Jurisprudence.
Ahmad M. H. Shboul
14 July 2019 at 11:34 am