II.

Our Supreme Court has been, albeit not consistent, adopting “Originalism” as a
mode of interpreting the provision of the Constitution. Accordingly, those who favor
heavy reliance on originalist sources (text and intentions) are commonly called
“Originalists.”1 Christopher Peters suggests: “Originalism holds that the application of
the Constitution to an issue or dispute should be determined to the extent possible, by
its meaning at the time of the framing or ratification.” 2 For many years, some prominent
scholars (such as Robert Bork) argued that in interpreting the Constitution, one should
look to the original intent of the people who drafted, proposed, adopted, or ratified the
Constitution to determine whose people wanted to convey through the text. 3 In the case
of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary 4 the Supreme Court, through Justice
Fernan, declared that:
“A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the
provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing
a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful
provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the
condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed.
The object is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words
consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose” (emphasis
supplied)
In the same case, the Court further opined “We think it safer to construe the
Constitution from what appears upon its face. The proper interpretation, therefore,
depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting than in the framers’
understanding thereof”. Moreover, the foregoing assertions find support in Chief Justice
Reynato Puno’s Separate Opinion in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Ronaldo
Zamora GR No. 141254, August 15, 2000, where he said: “It must be borne in mind,
however that while a member’s opinion expressed on the floor of the Constitutional
Convention is valuable, it is necessarily expressive of the people’s intent. The
proceedings of the Convention are less conclusive on the proper construction of the
fundamental law than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute,
for in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature the courts seek, while in the former,
courts seek to arrive at the intent of the people through the discussion and deliberations
of their representatives. The conventional wisdom is that the Constitution does not
derive its force from the convention which framed it, but from the people who ratified it,
the intent to be arrived at is that of the people.” 5 (emphasis supplied)

It seems to me that the way our Supreme Court interprets our Constitution leans
toward “Originalism” and not to “Living Constitutionalism”. Contrary to the view of the
latter (that the Constitution, is not dead but living) 6, our Constitution is a written
document and not a living organism. As what the erudite Justice Scalia said, in his
dissent in the case of Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastic Corp 7., “While the
jurisprudence of this Court has sometimes sanctioned “a living Constitution,” it has
never approved a living United States Code. What Congress enacted in 1938 must be

1
Victor T. Tulalian. Constitutional Interpretation. 2020. Central Book Supply, Inc.
2
Christopher J. Peters, What Lies Beneath: Interpretative Methodology, Constitutional Authority, and the Case of
Originalism, 2013 BYU L. Rev. 125, 1259 (2013)
3
Brandon J. Murill, Modes of Constitutional Interpretation. March 15, 2018 (citing Robert H. Bork, Tradition and
Morality in Constitutional Law)
4
GR No. 83896 February 22, 1991
5
Antonio E.B Nachura. Outline Reviewer in Political Law. 2016. Central Book Supply, Inc.
6
Arthur W. Machen, Jr., The Elasticity of the Constitution, 14 ARV.L.REV. 200, 205 (1900)
7
563 U.S 1 (2011)
applied according to its terms, and not according to what modern Congress (or this
Court) would deem desirable.”
The language of our Constitution is too general in the sense that its interpretation
could fit in to different contingencies. The words employed, therefore, are impressed
with flexibility. It is not safe to say, however, that the future trend is aligned with the
past. Both the framers and the ratifiers of our Constitution are not visionaries. That is
why, there is a need for the judicial department to resort to different modes of
constitutional construction or interpretation. Other rules of constitutional construction
would include having to consider the historical background and the underlying rationale
for the inclusion of certain provisions. It has been pointed out, for instance, that since
the Constitution is a framework of a workable government, “its interpretation must take
into account the complexities, realities and politics attendant to the operation of the
political branches of government. It also have to be relevant to the ever-changing
times.”8
Again, the true basis of interpreting the Constitution is the original intent of the
framers and ratifiers from the time they drafted and adopted such written document, and
not on the perceptions of the present interpreters (judges or justices) as to what the
Constitution should look like if confronted with situations of the present time. Anyway,
our Constitution did not cripple the hands of the present and future generations to
address their own problems and issues. To note, we have provisions on Amendment or
Revision under Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. After all, the judiciary’s task is to
INTERPRETE and not to RE-WRITE the fundamental law. The re-writing of the
Constitution through amendment or revision lies within the hands of the sovereign
people, including the generations to come.

8
Rene B. Gorospe. Political Law. 2016 Edition. Central Book Supply, Inc. citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991 and Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994)