PALE LIST OF CASES:

1. Malecdan V Pekas, 421 SCRA 7

2. Albano V Coloma, 21 SCRA 411
3. Director Of Religious Affairs V Bayot 74 SCRA 579
4. Khan V Simbillo 409 SCRA 299
5. Lorenzana V Fajardo 462 SCRA 1
6. Estrada V Sandiganbayan 416 SCRA 465
7. Erwin M. Jennings V DiGenova
8. Abad V Bleza 145 SCRA 1
9. Bautista V Rebueno 81 SCRA 535
10. Santiago V Rafanan 440 SCRA 91
11. People V Gacott Jr 242 SCRA 514
12. Vitriolo et al V Dasig 400 SCRA 172
13. Far Eastern Shipping Co. V CA 297 SCRA 30
14. Office of the Court Administrator V Morante 428 SCRA 1
15. Pimentel, Jr V Fabros 501 SCRA 346
16. Santiago V Sagucio 486 SCRA 10
17. COMELEC V Noynay 292 SCRA 254
18. Macoco V Diaz 70 Phil 97
19. Collantes V Renomeron 200 SCRA 584
20. PCGG V Sandiganbayan 455 SCRA 526
21. Pimentel V Llorente 339 SCRA 154
22. Burbe V Magulta 383 SCRA 276
23. Sipin-Nabor V Baterina 360 SCRA 6
24. Zaguirre V Castillo 398 SCRA 658
25. Cordova V Cordova AC No 3249
26. Rayos-Ombac V Rayos AC No 2884
27. Leda V Tabang 206 SCRA 473
28. Royong V Oblena 7 SCRA 859
29. Tan V Sabandal 206 SCRA 473
30. Alawi V Alauya 268 SCRA 628
31. Yu V Defensor-Santiago 169 SCRA 364, 379
32. Reyes V Chiong 405 SCRA 212
33. Bugaring V Espanol 349 SCRA 687
34. Lubiano V Gordola 115 SCRA 459
35. Surigao Mineral V Cloribel 31 SCRA 1
 1. Malecdan V Pekas, 421 SCRA 7
421 SCRA 7 MARY D. MALECDAN VS. ATTY. PERCIVAL PEKAS and ATTY. MATTHEW KOLLIN

Facts:

Mary D. Malecdan filed a Complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Baguio and Benguet Chapters,
charging Atty. Percival L. Pekas and Atty. Matthew P. Kollin, for acts committed in violation of the lawyer’s oath. On
November 25, 1999, Mary D. Malecdan (complainant) entered into a deed of sale with the Spouses Washington and
Eliza Fanged over a parcel of land located in Baguio City, where the money received by Eliza Fanged as full and final
payment was deposited in the account of Atty. Artemio Bustamante who was then counsel for the latter. The
complainant later found out, however, that the said lot was the subject of a controversy between the former owners
and the Fanged Spouses. When Atty. Bustamante refused to release the proceeds of the sale to Eliza Fanged, the latter,
through her new counsel respondent Atty.Kollin, filed a complaint for rescission of the contract. Later, the parties
entered into a compromise settlement. In the Manifestation of Compromise Settlement with Motion, it was Atty. Pekas
who signed as counsel for Eliza Fanged.

And as counsel for Eliza Fanged, he also signed the Notice of Dismissal dated December 16, 1999. The money was then
transferred to the respective accounts as prayed for in the compromise settlement. When the complainant’s duly
authorized representative Wilfreda Colorado requested that the money be released to her, Atty. Kolin refused to do so,
on the pretext that there was no written authorization from the latter. Hence, Mary D. Malecdan filed a Complaint to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Baguio and Benguet Chapters, charging Atty. Percival L. Pekas and Atty.
Matthew P. Kollin, for acts committed in violation of the lawyer’s oath. The IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution,
finding respondent Atty. Kollin guilty of dishonesty to the court, while dismissing the complaint as to respondent Atty.
Pekas. Atty. Kollin will be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years, while the complaint against Atty. Pekas
was dismissed for lack of evidence.

Issue:

Whether Atty. Pekas and Atty. Kollin are guilty of acts in violation of the lawyer’s oath and Code of Professional
Responsibility?

Held:

Yes, Atty. Pekas and Atty. Kolin are guilty of acts in violation of the lawyer’s oath and Code of Professional Responsibility.
It is a settled principle that the compensation of a lawyer should be but a mere incident of the practice of law, the
primary purpose of which is to render public service. The practice of law is a profession and not a money-making trade.
As they are an indispensable part of the system of administering justice, attorneys must comply strictly with the oath of
office and the canons of professional ethics – a duty more than imperative during these critical times when strong and
disturbing criticisms are hurled at the practice of law. The process of imbibing ethical standards can begin with the
simple act of openness and candor in dealing with clients, which would progress thereafter towards the ideal that a
lawyer’s vocation is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition but a serious matter of public interest.Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all members of the bar to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law. Rule 1.01 of the Code specifically provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." A lawyer is expected, at all times, to uphold the integrity of the legal profession. In this
case, the amount which the respondents took for themselves as attorney’s fees belonged to a third person, not their
client, as admitted by them in their complaint; the owner was, in fact, an adverse party. It was the possession of the
money, its entitlement, which was in fact put in issue in the complaint for rescission of contract, and, if respondent Atty.
Kollin is to be believed, prompted the filing of the complaint itself. Thus, the respondents could not, without a claiming
party’s knowledge, apply the amount for themselves as attorney’s fees. If there was someone liable for the respondents’
attorney’s fees, it was their client, Eliza Fanged. It cannot be said that there was a real "compromise" as to the manner in
which the amount of P2,600,000 was to be applied, since the complainant was not present when the said agreement
was made. The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring
individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the
misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their lawyer’s oath has
proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar. A lawyer may be disbarred
or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. WHEREFORE,
respondent Atty. Matthew P. Kollin is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years. Atty. Percival
L. Pekas is, likewise, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
 2. Albano V Coloma, 21 SCRA 411
ANGEL ALBANO vs. ATTY. PERPETUA COLOMA

Facts:

This proceeding for disbarment was filed by complainant Angel Albano against respondent Perpetua Coloma, a member
of the Philippine Bar. In a letter dated June 20, 1962 addressed to this Court, complainant alleged that during the
Japanese occupation his mother, Delfina Aquino, and he retained the services of respondent as counsel for them as
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147 of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.

After which came the accusation that after liberation and long after the courts had been reorganized, respondent failed
to expedite the hearing and termination of the case, as a result of which they had themselves represented by another
lawyer.

This notwithstanding, it was claimed that respondent intervened in the case to collect her attorney's fees. It was then
alleged that during the hearing they were surprised when respondent presented in exhibit a document showing that
they as well as their co-plaintiffs in the case promised to pay her a contingent fee of 33-¹/3% of whatever could be
recovered whether in land or damages.

Issue:

May a lawyer be removed for her failure to comply with her obligations as counsel as she served faithfully, efficiently,
continuously and to the best of her knowledge and capacity?

Held:

no, a lawyer be removed without just cause. The Solicitor General could thus rightfully assert that if there was anyone
guilty of bad faith in this case "it is complainant and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147 who, after benefiting from the
valuable services of respondent in said case, tried to renege on their agreement for the payment of the latter's
contingent attorney's fees by dismissing her as their counsel after she had already won for them said case in the trial
court and the Court of Appeals, and later, by attempting to impugn the authenticity and genuineness of their written
agreement for the payment of attorney's fees, . . . ."

Counsel, any counsel, who is worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With his capital
consisting solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the expenditure of
time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to
escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the party
he represents, he himself would not get his due. Such an eventuality this Court is determined to avoid. It views with
disapproval any and every effort of those benefited by counsel's services to deprive him of his hard-earned honorarium.
Such an attitude deserves condemnation.

There is this additional point to consider. As Cardozo aptly observed: "Reputation [in the legal profession] is a plant of
tender growth, and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored."14 This Court, certainly is not averse to having such a risk
minimized. Where, as in this case, the good name of counsel was traduced by an accusation made in reckless disregard
of the truth, an action prompted by base ingratitude, the severest censure is called for.
 3. Director Of Religious Affairs V Bayot 74 SCRA 579
Facts:

The case involves Respondent Estanislao Bayot, an attorney-at-law, who is charged with malpractice for having
published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune, regarding marriage arrangements; to wit:

Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and marriage
arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Respondent asks for “the indulgence and mercy”of the Court, promising not to repeat it and that he published it only
once.

Issue and Ruling:

Whether Respondent’s act is in violation of the legal profession?

Yes. It is undeniable that the advertisement was a flagrant violation by the Respondent of the ethics of his profession, it
being a brazen solicitation of business from public.

That pursuant to section 25 of Rule 127, “the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain constitutes
malpractice”. It is settled that it is highly unethical for lawyers to advertise his talent and skills. LAW PROFESSION IS NOT
A TRADE.

*Respondent was only reprimanded.

_______________________________________________________________________________________

FACTS:

Estanislao Bayot caused the publication of an advertisement of his services in the Sunday Tribune, in direct violation of
the provision of Section 25, Rule 127 which imposes a prohibition on soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain either
personally or through paid agents or brokers.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of malpractice

Held:
Yes. His act of causing the publication of an advertisement constitutes malpractice. Law is a profession and not a trade. A
member of the bar degrades himself or herself in adopting the practices of mercantilism through advertising his or her
services like a merchant advertising wares.
However, considering the fact that Bayot is a young lawyer and that he promises to refrain from repeating the same
misconduct, the Court exercised leniency. He was merely reprimanded for his violation and he was reminded that the
most effective advertisement possible is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity as
well as fidelity to trust.
 4. Khan V Simbillo 409 SCRA 299
Khan v Simbillo

Facts:

Resp Atty. Rizalino Simbillo advertised in the PDI and MB his legal services for annulment cases.

Upon investigation by the Pub Info Office, it was confirmed that Simbillo is offering his services to interested clients.
Ismael Khan, chief of the PIO, filed an administrative charge vs resp for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal
services in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Resp argues that advertising or solicitation is not per se a prohibited act: a. Public interest is not served by the absolute
prohibition b. It’s time for the Court to promulgate a ruling that such advertisement is not contrary to law, public policy
and public order.

The IBP found the resp guilty and suspended him from the practice of law for 1 year, writing it in a resolution

Issues:
W/N resp’s act was a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Ruling:
Yes.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code states that a lawyer is prohibited from performing acts designed to solicit legal business
and that he is not permitted to use self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services.
Practice of Law is not a business. It is a profession with public interest as the primary duty. It’s not a money-making
venture and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The duty is to public service and the
administration of justice. Elements that distinguish it from business: a.
A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence
without making much money;

b. A relation as an “officer of the court” to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and
reliability; c. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary; d.

A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business
methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.

The solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no
injury to the lawyer and to the bar
 5. Lorenzana V Fajardo 462 SCRA 1
FACTS:

COMPLAINANT: Francisco Lorenzana, complainant, charges respondent Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo with violation of the Civil
Service Law and Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and seeks his disbarment from the practice of the
law profession. Complainant alleged that respondent, while employed as Legal Officer V at the Urban Settlement Office
in Manila, until his retirement on May 15, 2002, was a member of the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) of Quezon
City, receiving a monthly honorarium of P4,000.00. He was also a member of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay
Novaliches Proper, also receiving a monthly allowance/ honorarium. Complainant also alleged that respondent was
engaged in the private practice of law, receiving acceptance fees ranging from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00. He lives in a
house and lot owned by complainants family without paying any rental and refuses to leave the place despite the latters
demands.
ISSUE:

whether respondent engaged in the practice of law while employed as Legal Officer V in the Manila Urban
Settlement Office.

HELD:

YES. Private practice of law contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding
ones self to the public as a lawyer. Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or
customary action a succession of acts of the same kind. The practice of law by attorneys employed in the
government, to fall within the prohibition of statutes has been interpreted as customarily habitually holding ones self
out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. In the case at bar, respondents
appearance as counsel is not merely isolated. Evidence presented by complainant shows that he had an extensive
practice of law.

WHEREFORE, for accepting employment as a member of the PLEB of Quezon City while concurrently employed as
Legal Officer V of the Manila Urban Settlement Office, in violation of the Constitution and the statutes, which in turn
contravene his Attorneys Oath and Code of Professional Responsibility; and by engaging in the illegal practice of
law, Atty. Cesar G. Fajardo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective
from notice and is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that any repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more
severely.
 6. Estrada V Sandiganbayan 416 SCRA 465
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,

FACTS:  Petitioner Joseph Estrada was prosecuted under RA 7080 (Plunder Law). He assailed, however, that
the Plunder Law does not constitute an indictable offense because of its failure to provide for the statutory
definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according
to Estrada, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny
him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his
fundamental right to due process. 
ISSUE:  Whether or not RA 7080 (Plunder Law) is unconstitutional for being vague 

RULING:
No   
The Plunder Law is not unconstitutional for being vague. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of
its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the
vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the
whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process
of law. The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free speech cases, but not to penal statutes. 
7. Erwin M. Jennings V DiGenova
 8. Abad V Bleza 145 SCRA 1
FACTS:
In 1981, a shooting incident in a cockpit occurred where Gregorio Abad, a colonel escaped death. In
that incident, Abad had an argument with one Potenciano Ponce and the latter’s bodyguard, Francisco
Sabater Jr. Sabater shot Abad and due to medical intervention, Abad survived. Abad filed two separate
criminal cases against Ponce and Sabater. Ponce was acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence
(because there were conflicting testimonies) while Sabater was found guilty of frustrated homicide but
with mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and lack of intent to kill. Abad, not satisfied with
Bleza’s decisions filed an administrative case against Bleza.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bleza should be disciplined.
RULING:
No (in both cases). In the first case, Bleza erred in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to kill in favor of Sabater – but such error does not hold him administratively liable. In Criminal
Law, in cases of frustrated homicide there is inherently an intention to kill for if otherwise, it would
have been a case of physical injuries. Bleza found Sabater guilty of frustrated homicide hence it is error
for him to appreciate lack of intention to kill as a mitigating circumstance. But as a matter of public
policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are
not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Even on the assumption that
the judicial officer has erred in the appraisal of the evidence, he cannot be held administratively or
civilly liable for his judicial action. A judicial officer cannot be called to account in a civil action for acts
done by him in the exercise of his judicial function, however erroneous. Not every error or mistake of a
judge in the performance of his duties makes him liable therefor. To hold a judge administratively
accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be
nothing short of harassment and would make his position unbearable.
 9. Bautista V Rebueno 81 SCRA 535
Facts:
This mandamus proceeding seeks to compel respondent Judge Alfredo S. Rebueno of the Court of First
Instance of Naga City, Branch IV, to continue trying a civil case assigned to his sala, 1 the issue raised being
that his Order disqualifying himself amounted to a grave abuse of discretion based as it was on a ground other
than that provided for in the Rules of Court.
3 It is by virtue of rule 137 that respondent Judge in the exercise of sound discretion disqualified himself,
granting a motion to that effect of private respondent, a defendant in such case. In such motion reference was
made to certain "attendant circumstances, particularly the fact that he [respondent Judge] is a townmate and
distant relative of plaintiff, [giving rise to the] strong possibility that whatever his actuations are in the instant
case and any of its incidents, [he] might be suspected of being partial to plaintiff; ... . 4 Notwithstanding an
opposition filed by petitioner on the ground that the reason alleged is not one of those provided for by law
respondent Judge issued an Order disqualifying himself and thereafter denied a motion for its reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Rebueno’s reasons in disqualifying himself to try a case assigned to his sala, is
admissible as grounds provided by the rules of court and constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
Respondent Judge clearly acted in accordance with its terms. He exercised a discretion conferred on hint. "The
commitment of this Court to a strict application of the procedural due process mandate of every litigant being
entitled, to follow the language of Gutierrez, to 'nothing less than the cold neutrality of and impartial judge' is
firm and deep-seated." 8 It has found explicit affirmation in the Rule set forth above.
 10. Santiago V Rafanan 440 SCRA 91
Santiago vs. Atty. Rafanan
Facts:
Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology filed for the disbarment of Atty.
Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. The petition stated that respondent, in notarizing several documents on different dates failed
and/or refused to: a) make the proper notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the
affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the
certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the
notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent
executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as evidence in the case wherein he was
actively representing his client.
The IBP Board of Governors modified the disbarment proposal and instead imposed a penalty of P3,000 with
a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty. Contention of the petitioner:
He did not know that the rule is to be applied strictly in notarizing documents because some of his colleagues
are not doing it.
Issue:
Whether the penalty imposed by the IBP is proper
Ruling:
Yes. Atty. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required
to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence
certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of
such certification. They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all
instruments notarized by them; and to “give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before
them a number corresponding to the one in their register and to state therein the page or pages of their
register, on which the same is recorded.” Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of
their commission as notaries public.
Canon 5 is also violated because the canon states the obligation of lawyers to be well-informed of the existing
laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence which the
respondent failed to satisfy by not. With regard to the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his
clients, the Supreme Court held that it was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed out
the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and could not have
possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute
the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents. Hence, the penalty imposed by the IBP is
proper.
 11.People V Gacott Jr 242 SCRA 514

Facts: 
For failure to check citations of the prosecutions, the order of respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio
Gacott Jr dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the Supreme Court. The respondent judge
was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of PHP 10k for gross ignorance of law. The
judgment was made by the Second Division of the Supreme Court.
Issue: 
Whether or not the Second Division of the Supreme Court has the competence to
administratively discipline respondent judge?
Ruling:
To require the entire court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matter or
cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket
and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters,
since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court En
Banc.
 12.Vitriolo et al V Dasig 400 SCRA 172

Facts:
The complainants, all high ranking officials of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), filed an
administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, also an official of the CHED. The charge
involves gross misconduct of respondent in violation of the Attorney’s Oath for having used her public office to
secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED. The complainants allege
that during her tenure as OIC of the Legal Affairs Service of the CHED, she attempted to extort from four
different people sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or
requests before her office.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent should be disbarred for the acts she committed during her tenure
Held:
The respondent was DISBARRED for violation of the Attorney’s Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and 1.03 of Canon
1 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for acts of dishonesty and gross
misconduct as OIC of Legal Services. Respondent’s attempts to extort money from persons with applications or
requests pending before her office are violative of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
prohibits members of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Said
acts also constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from
promoting their private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the
functions of his office.
 13.Far Eastern Shipping Co. V CA
297 SCRA 30

Facts:
M/V Pavlodar owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC) arrived at the port of Manila.
Senen Gavino was assigned by the Manila Pilot's Association (MPA) to conduct docking manuevers for the safe
berthing of the vessel. Gavino stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov,
beside him. When the vessel was already about 2000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped.
Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel. However the anchor did not hold as expected. The
speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. When Gavino inquired
about the commotion, Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it. The bow of the vessel rammed
into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. PPA filed a complaint for a sum of money
against FESC, Gavino and MPA. CA ruled in favor of PPA holding them liable with MPA (employer of Kavankov)
entitled to reimbursement from Gavino.
Issue:
Are the counsels for the parties committed acts which require the exercise of the court's disciplinary powers?
Ruling:
YES. The records show that the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario thru its associate, Atty Tria, is the
counsel of record for FESC in both GR no 130068 and GR no 130150. GR 130068 which is assigned to the
Court's second division, commenced with the filing of a verified motion for extension of time which contained
a certification against forum shopping signed by counsel Tria stating that to the best of his knowledge there is
no action or proceeding pending in the SC, CA or any other tribunal.
Reviewing the records, the court finds that the petition filed by MPA in GR no, 130150 then pending with the
third division was duly filed with a copy thereof furnished by registered mail to counsel for FESC (atty Tria). It
would be fair to conclude that when FESC filed its petition GR no 130068, it would aready have received a copy
of the copy of the petition by MPA. It wa therefore encumbent upon FESC to inform the court of the pending
action. But considering that it was a superfluity at that stage of the proceeding , it being unnecessary to file
such certification of non forum shopping with a mere motion for extension, the court disregarded such error.
On the other hand it took the OSG, representing PPA, an ordinately and unreasonably long period of time to
file its comment, thus unduly delaying the resolution of these cases. In GR no 130068, it took 210 days before
the OSG filed its comment. FESC was not even furnished with a copy. In Gr no 130150 it took 180 days before
comment was filed. This disinclination of the OSG to seasonably file required pleadings constitutes deplorable
disservice to the public and can only be categorized as inefficiency on the part of the govt law office. Counsel
for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario, specifically its asscociate Tria is reprimaded and warned
that a repetition of the same acts shall be dealt with severely. The original members of the legal tean of the
OSG are admonished and warned tha a repetition shall also be dealt with more stringently. Baka lang itanong
kung ano ruling: The decision of the CA is affirmed. Gavino, MPA and FESC are declared solidarily liable with
MPA entitled to reimbursement from Gavino for such amount of the adjudged pecuniary liability in excess of
the amount equivalent to 75% of its prescribed reserved fund.
14.Office of the Court Administrator V Morante 428 SCRA 1
 15.Pimentel, Jr V Fabros 501 SCRA 346

FACTS:
A complaint for disbarment was filed against Attys. Vitaliano C. Fabros and Pacifico S. Paas by Senator Aquilino
Q. Pimentel Jr. for "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct" in relation to the discharge of their
duties as chairman and vice-chairman, respectively, of the provincial board of canvassers, Province of Isabela
(PBC-Isabela) in the 1995 elections.
The complainant alleged that the statement of votes per Municipality prepared and certified to be true and correct by
the respondents was actually fraudulent statement which had been altered and which contain false and untrue entries.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents are guilty of the fraudulent acts and is subject for disbarment.
RULING:
Yes, SC found the respondents guilty of misconduct. As public officers, respondents failed to live up to the
high degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill required of them. As lawyers, they were
found to have engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. They also violated their oath as
officers of the court to foist no falsehood on anyone. Furthermore, by express provision of Canon 6 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the avoidance of such conduct is demanded of them as lawyers in the
government service:
CANON 6 –These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks.
As lawyers in the government service, respondents were under an even greater obligation to observe the basic
tenets of the legal profession because public office is a public trust.
 16. Santiago V Sagucio 486 SCRA 10
Facts:
 Complainant charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

 Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former
Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have
inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. Furthermore, complainant
claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede
and sign an affidavit to support the complaint.

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

 Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law while working as a
government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee
for the months of January and February 1995, another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, and P5,000 for
the month of April 1996.

Issue:
whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with respondent’s role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor 

Whether or not respondent is engaged in the practice of law

Ruling: 
 1. The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (“Code”). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct. Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section
7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 (“RA
6713”).

 Canon 6 provides that the Code “shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official duties.” A
government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition “not [to] represent conflicting interests.” However, this rule is
subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of
interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true
attorney-client relationship exists. Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.

 Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in “unlawful x x x conduct.” Unlawful conduct
includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to “engage in the private practice of [his]
profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with [his] official functions.”

 2. “Private practice of law” contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s
self to the public as a lawyer.

 Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained
counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish
between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually
rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term “practice of law.”
 17.COMELEC V Noynay 292 SCRA 254
Facts:
COMELEC charged some public teachers with violations of Omnibus Election in their engagement in partisan
political activities. COMELEC then filed these criminal cases in RTC. RTC, through Judge Noynay directed
COMELEC to file the cases in MTC as RTC supposedly had no jurisdiction. COMELEC filed an MR arguing that
RTC has jurisdiction following Alberto v. Lavilles where the court supposedly ruled that RTC has jurisdiction
over election cases. Noynay dismissed MR. COMELEC appeals in present court.
Issue:
Did RTC Judge Noynay err in remanding the case to MTC?
Ruling:
Yes he did because the present case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC, not MTC. In this issue, two laws
should be juxtaposed. On the one hand, the Omnibus Election Code states that RTC has jurisdiction for
violations of the code, except on cases of failure to register or vote. One the other, a BP states that MTC has
jurisdiction for cases with penalties of one year to six years. In this case, the RTC implemented the BP.
However, the present court finds his ruling mistaken in that in the same BP providing MTC jurisdiction, it is
stated that MTC has jurisdiction only in cases that does not fall within RTC jurisdiction. Omnibus Election Code
gives jurisdiction to RTC on violates of the code. The violation presented in this case is a violation of the code.
This provided, RTC has jurisdiction, regardless if the penalty is less than six years. Thus, Judge Noynay erred in
ruling that RTC has no jurisdiction.
Doctrine. In relation to Legal Research, this case is relevant in that it zoomed in on the judge’s misreading of
the law and on the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics mandate that judges should be studious in the principles of
law and office administration in due regard of legal system integrity, respectively. As well, Rule 3.01, Canon 3
of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates them to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional
competence. The above actions of Hon. Noynay contradicts these provisions.
Similarly, Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that lawyers should not
misquote or represent court rulings. In its MR, COMELEC through its counsel Atty. Balbuena cited Alberto v.
Judge Lavilles. In this citation, however, the present court finds that errors persist. One, that the plaintiff in the
case is Alberto Naldoza not Alberto Naldeza or Alberto as used by the COMELEC lawyer. Two, that that case is
254 of SCRA not 245. And third, in its ascription of a Court Administrator’s Memo as the Court’s ruling. Atty.
Balbuena is admonished.
 18. Macoco V Diaz 70 Phil 97
Facts:
A complaint for malpractice filed by one Marcelino Macoco against Esteban B. Diaz, attorney-at-law, with
license to practice in Philippine courts.

In order to redeem a property belonging to his wife’s father, which had been levied upon and sold at public
auction, complainant Marcelino Macoco deposited with the provincial sheriff of Ilocos Norte the sum of P380.
As no redemption could be done, the money was returned by the sheriff to one Alberto Saguitan, then counsel
for Marcelino Macoco. Saguitan used the money according to himself and failed to turn it over to Macoco;
whereupon, the latter entrusted its collection to respondent herein, Esteban B. Diaz. It appears that Diaz
succeeded in collecting P300 from Suguitan, but he also misappropriated this amount.

Respondent admitted the misappropriation. He averred, however, that he had an agreement with Macoco for
the payment of the money by him misappropriated: that when this agreement failed, he again entered into a
similar arrangement with Hermenegildo Galapia, Lope Ragragola and Pedro Ragragola, who, as he attempted
to prove, were the persons to whom the sum of P300 was really due, Macoco being merely a trustee thereof;
and that in pursuance of this arrangement whereby he would pay the sum of P300, deducting therefrom 20
per cent for his attorney’s fees, he had already made partial payments to said persons. Macoco, however, and
Lope Ragragola denied this agreement.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Diaz should be disbarred.
Ruling:
Yes. Whatever might have been the agreement and with whomsoever respondent might have entered it into,
the undeniable fact remains that he misappropriated the money in breach of trust. This makes him unfit for
the office of an attorney-at-law. And his being a deputy fiscal and not law practitioner at the time of the
misappropriation, far from mitigating his guilt, aggravates it. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely
condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.

Wherefore, respondent Eteban B. Diaz is hereby disbarred from the practice of law, and is hereby ordered to
surrender his certificate to the clerk of court within five days from notice. This Solicitor General is hereby
ordered to investigate the conduct of Attorney Alberto Suguitan and file later the corresponding report.
 19.Collantes V Renomeron 200 SCRA 584
FACTS:

Complainant, house counsel for V&G, filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Vincent Renomeron, Register of Deeds
of Tacloban City, for the latter’s irregular actuations with regards to the application of V&G for registration of 163 pro
forma. Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be disbarred.

RULING:

Yes. The acts of dishonesty and oppression which respondent committed as a public official have demonstrated his
unfitness to practice the high and noble calling of the law.

__________________________________________________________________________________________________
VERSION 2

Facts:

This complaint for disbarment is relative to the administrative case filed by Atty.  Collantes, house counsel for V& G
Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against Atty. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter’s
irregular actuations with regard to the application of V&G for registration of 163 pro forma Deed of Absolute Sale with
Assignment (in favor of GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.

Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, respondent suspended the registration of the documents with
certain “special conditions” between them, which was that V&G should provide him with weekly round trip ticket from
Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent’s Quezon City
house and lot by V&G or GSIS representatives.

Issues:

(1) WON the respondent, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by the Court for his malfeasance as a public official, and

(2) WON the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service in the discharge of official tasks.

Held:

(1) Yes, a lawyer’s misconduct as a public official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer’s oath
imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer’s oath is a source of obligations
and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.

(2) Yes, the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service in the discharge of their official tasks
(Canon 6). The Code forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of
Professional Responsibility), or delay any man’s cause “for any corrupt motive or interest” (Rule 1.03).
 20.PCGG V Sandiganbayan 455 SCRA 526
FACTS:
PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with
Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened
in the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which
subsequently became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers from accepting “engagement” or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to
prove the existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his
present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the Resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza.
RULING:
The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.”
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is
conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents
et.al. before the Sandiganbayan.
The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not
the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions that
the court gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice
but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the role
of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
 21. Pimentel V Llorente 339 SCRA 154
Facts:
Complainant was then a candidate during the May 8, 1995 elections. He filed this complaint against
respondent Attys. Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon, in their capacity as members of the Pasig City
Board of Canvassers, for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyer’s oath.
Complainant alleges that respondents tampered with the votes received by him, with the result that, as shown
in the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and Certificate of Canvass (CoC), other senatorial candidates were credited
with votes which were above the number of votes they actually received while, on the other hand, petitioner’s
votes were reduced. Respondents denied the allegations, claiming that the errors pointed out by complainant
could be attributed to honest mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents are guilty of misconduct.
Held:
Considering the facts, the Supreme Court held that respondents are guilty of misconduct.
Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, despite the fact that the discrepancies, especially
the double recording of the returns from 22 precincts and the variation in the tabulation of votes as reflected
in the SoVs and CoC were apparent on the face of the documents and that the variation involves substantial
number of votes, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer
shall not engage in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” By express provision of Canon 6, this
is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office
as lawyers to “do no falsehood.”
 22.Burbe V Magulta 383 SCRA 276

Facts: 
Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a claim of money
against a creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters for the petitioner, which were not
successful and so the former intimated that a case should already be filed. As a result,
petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and included also amounts for the filing of the case.

A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback as to the
status of his case. Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyer’s office but to no avail.
The lawyer, to prove that the case has already been filed even invited petitioner to come
with him to the Justice Hall to verify the status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for
hours in the prosecutor’s office while the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to
inquire about the case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk
of Court was absent that day.

Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk of
court to see for himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out that no such case has
been filed.

Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the
delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he
admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the
filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease petitioner’s feelings, he offered to reimburse
him by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of
P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively.

Issue: 
Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.

Ruling: 
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
as follows: “It is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law
Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant’s deposit of the filing
fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was
created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his
client. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees
deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client,
which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest
conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent
reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing
fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds.”
23.Sipin-Nabor V Baterina 360 SCRA 6