TOPIC

Introduction to
Contract

LW201: Contract Law I 2.2

To p i c O u t l i n e
1. Definition of a Contract
2. Definition of the Law of Contract
3. Identify sources of contract law in your country
• Common law
• Statute
• Customary law
4. Classify contracts
• Simple contracts, contracts under seal
• Bilateral, unilateral contracts
• Executed, executory contracts
• Unenforceable, void, voidable, illegal contracts

Learning Outcomes
At the end of this topic you should be able to:
(i) Define a contract; and
(ii) Define that part of the law known as the law of contract.
(iii) Discuss the sources of contract law in your country
(iv) Classify contracts as simple contracts/contracts under seal;
bilateral/unilateral; executed/executory
(v) Prepare a case summary

Prescribed Reading
 Corrin Care J; Contract Law in the South Pacific, Chapter 1.

 Vaioleti v Cross (at end of these notes)

1. Definition of a Contract
A contract is a legally binding agreement made between What is a
two or more people who intend it to have legal effect. contract?

From this it can be seen that there are two necessary

ingredients ‘agreement and intention’. In many cases the
law adopts an objective approach as to whether there has
been agreement and intention; that is the law will look at
what a reasonable person would have concluded by his or
her words or conduct, not what the person might
necessarily have meant or thought to be the case (a subjective approach).
It should also be noted that there are many instances where there is the necessary
agreement and intention but the courts will nevertheless find that there is no
contract or that the contract can be avoided. These circumstances are discussed in
the second semester unit LW202 Contracts 2.

2. Definition of the Law of Contract

The law of contract may be provisionally described as that branch of the law
which determines the circumstances in which a promise shall be legally binding
on the person making it.

th
(Beatson J, Anson's Law of Contract, 27 ed 1998 Oxford University Press, P1)

3. Sources of contract law

Contract law in the South Pacific is still dominated by English common law.
However, there are differences between the South Pacific and United Kingdom
positions. As you saw in first year some statutory reforms in England do not
apply or only apply in some countries in the region. Some statutory innovations
have been introduced by regional Parliaments and not all of these coincide with
English legislative trends.
There are also differences arising from regional case law where courts have
occasionally demonstrated a willingness to develop a law of contract more
suited to local circumstances. In some cases South Pacific courts have looked to
other common law jurisdictions for guidance, for example Australia and New
Zealand. Further divergence within the region results from the application of
customary law, which, in some countries, governs contractual relationships and
contractual disputes at least at the local level.
At the international level there is a United Nations Convention on contracts for
the international sale of goods. This is called the Vienna Convention of 1980.
None of the countries in the region have signed the Convention which seeks to
unify the law governing the international sale of goods. Some of the important
provisions contained in the Convention are noted in Topics 4 and 5 concerning
'offer' and 'acceptance'.

A. Common law and equity

Contract is a common law subject; that is, the law in this area is derived mostly
from judicial decisions as opposed to Acts of Parliament. Equity also plays an
important role in the law of contract. The cases that establish the principles of
contract are mostly English. Although many of these principles are well
established, the common law is continuing to develop through modern cases, not
only in England but also throughout the Commonwealth and in other common law
countries.
As seen in first year, subject to certain conditions, English common law and
equity apply throughout the region, apart from Samoa, where it has been held
that the courts are free to choose from amongst common law principles as
developed throughout the Common Law world. For example in ANZ Banking
Group Ltd v Ale (Ulugia) [1980-83] WSLR 468 (Samoa) – the Western Samoa
Supreme Court dismissed an argument that civil disputes must follow the
tradition of the English common law, and adopted the United States approach of
not having to categorize the actual category of civil action as being in contract or
tort.
In the Marshall Islands, American common law is more relevant. Contract law as
derived from common law and equity may be discarded by the regional courts if
it is inappropriate to the country in question. This renders the distinction between
English common law and Commonwealth common law somewhat academic, as a
regional court which prefers a Commonwealth authority on contract to an English
authority may adopt the Commonwealth line on the grounds that it is more
appropriate to local circumstances.

STUDY TASK 1

As contract law is primarily derived from case law you need to have good skills
in reading and summarising cases.
1. What should go into a good case summary?
2. Why will preparing your own case summaries help you to learn contract
law thoroughly?
3. How can what we covered in topic 1 help you to read cases?
The following resources will help you to answer question 1:
 http://guides.lib.monash.edu/law-research-writing/case-notes
 https://www.survivelaw.com/single-post/348-how-to-write-a-case-note
 https://sydney.edu.au/law/learning_teaching/legal_writing/case_notes.sht
ml
______________________________________________________

B. Statute law
Statute law plays a role in the law of contract, but it is a minor role. In most
countries there is no Contract Code or Contracts Law Act.

STUDY TASK 2

1. There is one exception to statute law playing a role in the Pacific, from
Tokelau. Find the Tokelau Rules 2004 on PacLII and briefly describe what this
law regulates.
 2. What does the Contract Act [Cap 26] of Tonga cover? Does it regulate all
contracts?
_____________________________________________________

The absence of statute law in most countries raises the question as to whether we
should be developing a statutory basis for contractual obligations – codifying the
common law -, or should we continue to rely on the common law? One particular
area where Parliament has intervened is consumer law. Some legislation has
been passed with a view to protecting consumers in their dealing with
commercial bodies - see for example the Fair Trading Degree (Fiji). The most
important English legislation, applying in some countries of the region will be
discussed in this course. Whether or not an English Act relating to contract law
applies will depend on two things. First, whether it is applicable in terms of
suitability to the circumstances of the regional country, and secondly whether it
was passed before or after any cut-off date applying in that country.
As noted above, there are some locally enacted statutes relating to the law of
contract. In addition, many countries within the region have their own
Companies Acts and Limitation Acts which have some relevance so far as
contract law is concerned.
C. Customary law
As discussed in Chapter One of the prescribed text, in most countries of the
region customary law continues to be recognized by those whose customs are
embodied in the law. Accordingly, contractual disputes at village level can be
governed by customary law. However, customary law will not apply where there
is a relevant statute in place in the jurisdiction, especially if that statute was
passed after independence. Thus in Pentecost Pacific Limited v Paulene
Hnaloane (1980-88) 1 Van LR (Vanuatu) the Vanuatu Court of Appeal resolved
a dispute concerning employment by reference to the Vanuatu Employment Act
rather than in accordance with custom.
It is also necessary to consider whether customary law is relevant to contractual
disputes arising outside the customary sphere, for example disputes arising in a
commercial setting or where one or more of the parties do not recognize
customary law. The answer will depend on whether, and to what extent,
customary law has been incorporated into the State system. At independence,
many countries within the region recognized customary law as a source of law
within the State system, to be applied by the courts.
However, the exact place of customary law in the hierarchy of State laws is not
always clear. In particular, there is no uniformity regarding the status of
customary law in relation to common law, and in many cases their relative
positions are uncertain. This causes problems where customary law is relevant to
the contract in situations which would otherwise be governed by introduced law.
In any event, the common law will often be followed without any consideration
of whether there is an applicable customary law. This may be due to a view that
customary law is inapplicable to commercial transactions and/or when expatriate
parties are concerned. For example in the case of Semens v Continental Air
Lines Inc (1985) unreported (Micronesia) the plaintiff claimed damages for an
injury sustained while he was employed to unload cargo from a Continental Air
Lines plane. The Supreme Court of the Federated States of Micronesia held that
the common law of the United States was to be applied in preference to
customary law. This view was based on the fact that a number of the defendants
were not Micronesians and that the claim related to an international business
operation not being of a local or traditional nature.

4. Classification of contracts
Simple contracts and contracts under seal

A simple contract is any binding contact other than a contract under seal. A simple
contract can be oral, written, or partly oral and partly written. It consists of a promise
to do or refrain from doing something in exchange for something given or promised
in return.The parties must intend the agreement to be binding on each other. A simple
contract is binding if it meets all the elements necessary for the formation of a
contract, namely: offer, acceptance, intention and consideration. contract under seal,
sometimes referred to as a deed, is a promise made by written agreement under
seal. The promise will be binding even if it does not satisfy all the elements for the
formation of a contract - for example where the agreement is not supported by
consideration. (Consideration is discussed in Topic 8). A contract under seal is
usually made by signing in front of a witness, attaching an adhesive seal and
then delivering it to the other party. In some jurisdictions the seal itself is no longer
required. Deeds are often used for political reasons when a greater sense of formality
is required or on occasions where the parties want the transfer of a gift to be legally
enforceable.
Additionally, some statutes require a deed, most commonly in relation to land, for
example under the Property Law Act (Cap 130) Fiji.

Bilateral and unilateral contracts

As stated above, all simple contracts are between two or more parties. If the
parties are mutually obliged to do something then the contract is known as a
'bilateral contract'. Thus, a bilateral contract will be formed by an exchange of
promises. Both parties make a promise at the formation of the contract which
they are bound to carry out. Most contracts are bilateral contracts.
When we talk about parties to a contract we often refer to them as the 'offeror'
and the 'offeree'. The 'offeror' is the person who makes the offer and the 'offeree'
is the person (or persons) to whom the offer is made
In Myers v Bavadra and Another (1994) unreported (Fiji Islands) Ashton-Lewis J
distinguished unilateral and bilateral contracts as follows:
If acceptance is by way of counter-promise a bilateral contract comes into
being. If acceptance is by way of performing certain acts which are
stipulated in the offer, then a unilateral contract comes into being. In a
unilateral contract the offeror usually makes a promise stipulating
acceptance on the part of the offeree by the performance by the offereee of
an act or acts.
As noted in the text, the most common type of unilateral contract is one that
consists of a promise in return for an act. In Vaioleti v Cross and the
 Commodities Board of Tonga [1990] Tonga LR 108 the defendant advertised a
prize draw for employees who were not late or absent during a specified period
of work. According to the court the plaintiff fulfilled the requirements laid down
in the offer by her performance and was therefore entitled to be included in the
draw which had been cancelled by the defendant on the grounds that none of its
employees had qualified. This was an example of a unilateral contract which was
formed by one party making a promise and indicating that they agreed to be
bound if and when the other party does a specified act.

E x a m p l e unilateral contract:
Albert offers a reward for the return of his lost dog. Those who hear of the
reward do not have to look for the dog; they do not have to make any promise to
Albert in return. However if, acting on what Albert said, a person finds and
returns the dog then Albert will have to fulfil his promise to pay the reward. In
this example only Albert is subject to a binding obligation and this obligation will
have to be carried out when the other party performs out their non-obligatory act.

Unenforceable, void, voidable & illegal contracts

An unenforceable contract is a contract which although valid, cannot be

sued upon for some legal reason. Pause now to read the relevant part of the text
and identify the example given there of an unenforceable contract. Also consider
why the law should not enforce something that was agreed between the parties.
A void contract is one that has no effect due to some fundamental defect.
Pause now to read the relevant part of the text and identify the example given of
a void contract. A contract that is void is sometimes said to be ‘void ab-initio’,
that is 'void from the beginning' of no legal effect, which means that property
cannot pass.
A voidable contract is an otherwise valid contract, where the law gives one
party an option whether or not to proceed with the agreement. An example
of a voidable contract is a contract induced by a fraudulent misrepresentation.
The innocent party can choose whether to go ahead with the contract and claim
damages in respect of any loss caused by the misrepresentation or seek to set
aside (avoid) the contract.
An illegal contract is one that is contrary to law or contrary to public policy.
An obvious example is a contract to commit a crime. A contract that is contrary
to customary law might be another example in countries where customary law is
part of the general law. No action can be brought on the contract and generally,
property transferred under it cannot be recovered.

STUDY TASK 3

 Using what you learned in study task 1 prepare a case summary of Vaioleti v
Cross.
 VAIOLETI V CROSS AND COMMODITIES BOARD

[1990] TLR 108

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TONGA

VAIOLETI
v

CROSS & THE COMMODITIES BOARD

Supreme Court, Nuku'alofa

Webster J.
Civil case No. 20/1989

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 6, 7 and 15 June 1990

Contract - formation of contract - unilateral contract

Contract - terms - implication of terms
Contract - damages for breach of contract to hold prize draw
Contract - specific performance - refused for prize draw

The Board advertised a prize draw for which only its employees who were not
late or absent during a specified period were qualified. The prize draw was
cancelled by the Board because it considered that none of its employees had
qualified. The plaintiff brought proceedings to compel the Board to hold the
prize draw or pay damages for failure to do so.

HELD:

(1) The advertisement to hold a prize draw constituted an offer which was
accepted by the plaintiff when she began working during the stipulated period;
(2) Terms were to be implied into the contract allowing for absence if a relief
was provided;
(3) The plaintiff qualified in accordance with the express and implied terms of
the contract;
(4) Specific performance of the contract was not appropriate, especially since 18
months had elapsed since the scheduled date of the prize draw;
(5) Damages should be calculated having regard to the fact that three other
employees were also shown to have qualified.
Cases considered:

Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. (1891 - 4) All E. R. Rep. 127.

Hutton v Warren (1835 - 42) All E.R. Rep. 151

Counsel for the plaintiff: Mr S. 'Etika

Counsel for the defendant: Mr M. Paasi

JUDGMENT

Preliminary

In this case the Plaintiff Mrs 'Alisi Vaioleti sues the Defendants Collin Cross,
former Manager of the Desiccated Coconut Factory run by the Tonga
Commodities Board, and the Board itself for breach of contract. She claims that
the Board failed to hold a raffle for employees at the Factory as advertised in the
Tonga Chronicle and therefore claims damages of $6,500 or alternatively an
order for specific performance.

The Defendants deny the claims and contend that employees were informed
through their foremen that no employee had met the conditions for the raffle.

Evidence

The Court heard evidence for the plaintiff from herself and Mele Fau'ulua,
another worker at the Factory; and for the Defendants from Tevita Tapavalu,
Secretary of the Board, Vaiongo Pelesikoti, record keeper at the Factory, and
Folola Ma'u, a leading hand at the Factory. I found the Plaintiff to be a credible
witness, although she was a little deaf.

The Basic Facts

The Board were operating the Desiccated Coconut Factory at Haveluloto but in
1988 had major problems due to low production. In order to improve production
and encourage better attendance by workers they decide to hold a raffle, or more
accurately a prize draw. To make it attractive they arranged good prizes from the
Australian High Commission and companies involved with their products. The
first prize was return air tickets for a family of 4 to Australia or New Zealand and
there were other prizes of television and video sets, a washing machine and
bicycle. They advertised the prize draw on Radio Tonga and in the Tonga
Chronicle several times in May 1988.

The qualifications for entering the raffle given in the advertisement were very
simple. A worker had to be employed at the Desiccated Coconut Factory from
30th May right up to the Christmas break in 1988. He or she must not be absent
or late on any working day during that time.

Mrs Vaioleti determined that she would qualify for the prize draw. Her home was
LW201: Contract Law I 3.10
at Vaini, so each week on a Sunday evening she came in to the Factory, ready to
start peeling coconuts when work started at midnight. The Factory worked
continuously in 3 shifts, from Sunday midnight till Friday or sometimes Saturday.
When Mrs Vaioleti finished her peeling shift, she carried on with another shift as a
daily labourer, then she rested at the Factory ready for the next day. Sometimes she
did overtime as well. She did not go home again until the weekend. She kept this up
for 7 months, more often than not doing double shifts, so great was her
determination to qualify. She said she was never absent or late.

But one day her father's brother died and she had to go to his funeral according
Tongan custom. The Board said she was absent on 21st September. She said she
arranged a relief or swap who did her shift on the day of the funeral: in return he
did that person's shift. She was not certain it was 21st September. She said to be
notified the foreman in accordance with Factory procedure, but the Board said at
while this had been the procedure, it was suspended during the period of the
prize draw. She said she did not call what she did missing work, but the Board
disagreed. Even although Mrs Vaioleti worked 6 shifts that week, the Board still
said she was disqualified. However a worker who was off sick would still qualify
if he or she produced a medical certificate.

When Christmas came the Board cancelled the prize draw as they said nobody
had qualified. Mrs Vaioleti said she and two others, Kuma and Pila, had
qualified. She said the Board did not announce that the draw was cancelled.
Although that is not a matter of importance in this case, the Board said they told
their foremen and leading hands, who were to tell the workers. It is possible that
Mrs Vaioleti was not told. It is also possible that she was informed but didn't hear
or understand because of her deafness. Anyway she raised this action seeking
satisfaction.

The law applied to the basic facts

Applying the law to these basic facts, the advertisement by the Board was an
th
offer which the Plaintiff accepted when she started working at the Factory on 30
May. So a unilateral contract was formed. This case is very similar to the leading,
case of Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co (1892) (1891 - 4) ALL E.R. Rep. 127.
In this case the contract to hold the prize draw for those qualifying was subsidiary
our collateral to the Plaintiff's contract of employment. The express terms of the
contract were those in the advertisement -

"that entries would be restricted to employees who would not be absent or late in
any of the working days as from the 30th May to the beginning of the Christmas
holiday."

but the also became clear in the evidence of the Defendants' witnesses either that
these express terms were interpreted generously and not rigidly or that there was
least one supplementary implied term. Defendants' Counsel Mr Paasi conceded
that the terms of the contract were not all included in the advertisement. A
worker who was off sick would still qualify on production of a medical
certificate, even although he or she was not contributing to the aim of increasing
production. But according to Vaiongo Pelesikoti if workers were excused work
for other reasons that disqualified them from the prize draw, as did reliefs or
LW201: Contract Law I 2.11
20
swapping shifts.

LW201: Contract Law I 2.12

20
The Court can imply other terms into a contract in accordance with custom in
which known usages have been established and prevailed - the principle is that
the parties did not mean the whole of the contract to be expressed in writing, but
to contract, with reference to known usages. (Hutton v Warren (1836)(1835 - 42)
All E.R. Rep. 151; Chitty on Contracts (26th Ed) para. 917). Similarly terms
may be implied from a previous course of dealing (Chitty para. 919).

Here it was admitted that other terms were implied in the contract, such as
absence not counting in the prize draw if a medical certificate was produced, in
accordance with the practice of the Board. It was also agreed by the witnesses
that the Board permitted a practice of swapping shifts or allowing absence if a
relief was provided. Mrs Vaioleti said that procedure was still allowed but Tevita
Tapavalu and Vaiongo Pelesikoti said it had been suspended or stopped. On the
balance of probabilities I accept what Mrs Vaioleti says for three reasons. Firstly,
it would have been unreasonable of the Board to refuse other necessary absences
while still allowing absences for sickness - otherwise workers could just have
gone to the doctor with a headache or a stomach ache when they needed a
medical certificate: it would also have been unreasonable in Tonga to refuse an
absence for the funeral of a very close relative. Secondly, it was in the Board's
own interest to allow reasonable absence with a relief as this interrupted the
production of the Factory far less than either absence without a relief or absence
for sickness. Thirdly, even if the Board did suspend the practice of reliefs or
swaps, Mrs Vaioleti clearly did not know that this had been done - it is most
unlikely, given her single minded determination to qualify for the prize draw, that
she would have disqualified herself in this way if she had known that reliefs or
swops had been stopped.

There was therefore a further implied term in the contract for the prize draw that
absences where a relief was provided would not disqualify a worker. I accept
Mrs Vaioleti's evidence that she obtained a relief when she went to her uncle's
funeral, and so she was not disqualified.

But even if I am wrong in that view, there are other reasons why Mrs Vaioleti
should not be disqualified. In the week in question, the Time Sheets produced
by the Board show that, in all, she did 6 shifts with at least 44 if not 48 hours
work, whereas if she had done the required 5 days work to qualify in the normal
way she need only have done 40 hours work. The Board witnesses Tevita
Tapavalu and Vaiongo Pelesikoti said that what was important to the Board was
that each worker did his or her assigned shift each day, but given the main
purpose of the prize draw of improving production I cannot accept that it was
reasonable for the Board to interpret the terms so as to disqualify Mrs Vaioleti
in these circumstances. Such a strict interpretation of the contract for the prize
draw would be quite unreasonable as Mrs Vaioleti had in fact done very much
more work than was required, rather than less, not only in the week in question
but consistently throughout the period.

It was also not established to the satisfaction of the Court that Mrs Vaioleti was
absent on 21st September. She was not certain of that date. The Defendants
produced to the Court Mrs Vaioleti's Time Sheet for that week, with no entry
for 21st. But they also produced as exhibits sheets with monthly summaries of
Mrs
Vaioleti's attendance, which Vaiongo Pelesikoti had prepared for the Manager.
The original of the September sheet was not available but no objection was raised
to a photocopy. Against that week there were the following written comments -

"O.K.!
4 days
st
(21 /9 - D/L)
but on D/L record"

D/L meant the daily labour shift and Vaiongo said somebody else had written
these comments. With no other explanations being offered, three comments
indicate to the Court that Mrs Vaioleti did work on 21st September and further
that someone at the Factory considered she was therefore duly qualified and so
wrote "OK!". The Court cannot therefore find on the balance of probabilities
that Mrs Vaioleti was absent on 21st September.

There is a further aspect of procedure about this. The only indication of this
ground of defence by the Defendants was the words in Paragraph 5 of the
Statement of Defence that "nobody met the requirements as advertised". There
was no mention of 21st September to give the Plaintiff due notice that it was
Mrs Vaioleti's alleged absence on this day that disqualified her. The first the
Plaintiff knew of this allegation was at the trial. Even in the course of die
discovery of documents Counsel for Plaintiff Mr 'Etika had not seen any of
those actually produced by the Defendant as exhibits: he said that all he was
shown on inspection were large pay streets which not reveal anything and were
not actually exhibited at the trial. While Mr 'Etika did not at the time object to
evidence about 21st September or to the production of those documents
(Exhibits 2, 3 and 4), in his closing submissions he said that the Court should
not consider this ground of defence. In light of the history of this case it clearly
was not fair of the Defendants to conduct the case in this way and it is very
serious indeed that a litigant of the standing of the Board should mislead its
opponent, whether deliberately or simply in error. But die evidence was not
objected to at the time and was heard by the Court and is relevant to the defence
as a whole, so it must be considered by the Court.

Mr Paasi submitted that the Plaintiff had not proved her case, but for all the stated
above the Court is satisfied that Mrs Vaioleti was not disqualified from the prize
draw. On her own evidence she was fully qualified as having met principal
conditions.

However there was some confusion over which draws Mrs Vaioleti qualified
take part in. She believed that, of the 3 workers who qualified, she and she only
as a daily labourer was entitled to take part in the main prize draw. She said the
other two, Kuma and Pila, were huskers or de-shellers and only entitled to take
part in the special draw for their section with a single prize of a coloured
television set and a video. On this aspect of the interpretation of the
advertisement I believe the Plaintiff was confused.
It is very clear from the advertisement that there is to be one major prize draw for
all workers at the Factory, plus an additional special draw with the same
conditions for the coconut huskers, de-shellers and kernel peelers. The main draw
is advertised for the workers without restricting who that means, so it means all
workers. This is consistent with the value and number of the prizes. The prize for
the special draw is obviously offered as an additional incentive for the 3 special
categories of workers, but as it is less valuable than the main prize of air tickets it
clearly would not have been fair to exclude these workers from the main raffle
because of this.

So all three, Mrs Vaioleti, Kuma and Pila, were on Mrs Vaioleti's evidence
qualified to enter the main prize draw and also the special draw, as each was a
husker, desheller or kernel peeler. There was no evidence that any other
workers over and above those three were qualified for the prize draws.

Specific performance

Mr 'Erika requested an order against the Board for specific performance to hold
the prize draws. This is an equitable remedy in the discretion of the Court and I
am not satisfied that it would be appropriate in this case, especially after this
lapse of time.

Damages

The Court therefore has to consider what damages should be awarded to the
Plaintiff for the Defendants' breach of contract. The damages are measured by
what the contract breaker (i.e. the Board) ought to have foreseen when the
contract was made as being not unlikely or liable to result from the breach
(Halsbury's Laws (4th Ed) Vol. 12 para. 1174).

What the Board should leave foreseen is that a worker such as the Plaintiff would
lose her chance of winning the first or any prizes in the prize draws. In the
absence of any other evidence about her probability of winning, but accepting the
Plaintiff's evidence that 3 workers were qualified, I believe that in the main prize
draw the quantification of her chances is the greatest of the following -

(a) a one-in-three chance of winning the first prize of return - air fares to
Australia for 2 adults and 2 children under 12, measured as one-third of the total
cost of return fares; or
(b) a one-in-two chance of winning the second prize of the new colour
television set and video, measured as one-half of their value; or
(c) the certainty of winning the third prize of the new washing machine,
measured as its full value.

So the damages to the awarded to the Plaintiff will depend on the relative values
of the first three prizes. As no evidence about this was led at the trial, further
evidence will require to be given, including evidence from the Defendant with
details of the models intended for the second and third prizes. Perhaps the parties
can agree the figures without the Court hearing evidence.

Similarly in the special prize draw the value of the Plaintiff's chance was one -
third of the value of the new colour television set and video to be awarded as
prize. Regarding the main prize draw, the Court must make it clear that even if
the Plaintiff had been the only worker qualified for the draw, her claim to get all
the prizes could not be upheld. The principle of such a prize draw is that a
participant's name goes into the draw once only and if one prize is gained that
person does not take part further in that draw: So even at the very best the
Plaintiff would have teen entitled to the first prize only.

Summary

The Court therefore grants judgment to the Plaintiff against the Defendants for an
amount to be determined in accordance with this decision.

Costs

The Plaintiff asked for costs and in all the circumstances there is no reason why
costs should not be awarded against the Defendants. The Court will order
accordingly.

Webster J.