APUSH Howden/Roy

Early Cold War Foreign Policy/Escalation of the Cold War

PART A: Review of Early U.S. Foreign Policy

The Monroe Doctrine (1823)

Things to think about as you read the summary:

In what ways is the Monroe Doctrine an “Isolationist” foreign policy? In what ways does it allow for
“intervention?”

This is a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, and was issued by Pres. James Monroe in his annual message to
Congress. The Monroe Doctrine declared that Europe and Americas were different and must remain distinct
spheres, Monroe made four basic points:

(1) the United States would not interfere in the internal affairs of or the wars between European powers;

(2) the United States recognized and would not interfere with existing colonies and dependencies in the
Western Hemisphere;

(3) the Western Hemisphere was closed to future colonization; and

(4) any attempt by a European power to oppress or control any nation in the Western Hemisphere would
be viewed as a hostile act against the United States.

The Monroe Doctrine was an outgrowth of concern by the United States that European powers would attempt to
restore Spain’s former colonies in Latin America, many of which had become newly independent nations. The
United States was also concerned about Russia’s territorial ambitions in the northwest coast of North America.

Text adapted from: https://www.britannica.com/event/Monroe-Doctrine

The Roosevelt Corollary (1904)

Things to think about as you read the summary:

How was the Roosevelt Corollary a change to the Monroe Doctrine? In what ways is the Roosevelt Corollary
an “Isolationist” foreign policy? In what ways does it allow for “intervention?”

Several times during Roosevelt’s first years in office, European powers threatened to intervene in Latin
America to collect debts owed them by the weak governments there. To combat such threats, Teddy Roosevelt
issued a policy that became known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

The Corollary stated that the United States would not only bar outside intervention in Latin American affairs
but would also police the area and guarantee that countries there met their international obligations. In 1905,
without congressional approval, Roosevelt forced the Dominican Republic to install an American “economic
advisor,” who was in reality the country’s financial director.

Quoting an African proverb, Roosevelt claimed that the right way to conduct foreign policy was to “speak softly
and carry a big stick.”
Text adapted from: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Theodore-Roosevelt/The-Square-Deal#ref673099
PART B: Post WWII U.S. Foreign Policy

Containment Policy (1946)

Things to think about as you read the summary:

What is Containment? What did Kennan believe would happen in the Soviet Union if Containment were
practiced consistently? In what ways is Containment Policy a fundamental change to the traditional U.S.
foreign policy of isolationism? Where, and in what ways does it allow for “intervention?”

Background of George F. Kennan (1904-2005) -- A native of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, graduated from Princeton
University in 1925 and soon thereafter went to work for the U.S. State Department as an expert on Russia. He spent much
of the 1930s attached to the U.S. embassy in Moscow, where he witnessed firsthand the internal workings of the Soviet
Union, including the show trials in which Stalin condemned thousands of suspected political opponents to death. This
experience convinced Kennan that there was little hope for lasting cooperation between the Soviet Union and the West. In
May 1944 he was appointed deputy chief of the U.S. mission in Moscow, where in 1946 he drafted a telegram (“Long
Telegram”) that laid out his views on why the Soviets were behaving as they were. This telegram proved to be highly
influential among many of Truman’s foreign policy advisers, who encouraged him to publish an article clarifying some of
his ideas. What follows is a much shortened version of that article, which appeared in the July 1947 issue of the
prestigious journal Foreign Affairs. Because the author was a prominent official in the State Department, he used a false
name (“X”) rather than his own.
Text adapted from: https://www.britannica.com/biography/George-F-Kennan

“....[I]t is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of long-term,
patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. It is important to note, however, that such a
policy has nothing to do with...threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward "toughness." While the Kremlin is
basically flexible in its reaction to political realities, it is by no means unamenable [unresponsive] to considerations of
prestige. Like almost any other government, it can be placed by tactless and threatening gestures in a position where it
cannot afford to yield even though this might be dictated by its sense of realism. The Russian leaders are keen judges of
human psychology, and as such they are highly conscious that loss of temper and of self-control is never a source of
strength in political affairs. They are quick to exploit such evidences of weakness.… It is clear that the United States
cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the
Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena. It must continue to expect that Soviet policies will reflect no
abstract love of peace and stability, no real faith in the possibility of a permanent happy coexistence of the Socialist and
capitalist worlds, but rather a cautious, persistent pressure toward the disruption and, weakening of all rival influence and
rival power. Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the western world in general, is still by far the
weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will
eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable
confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every
point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world. It would be an exaggeration
to say that American behavior unassisted and alone could exercise a power of life and death over the Communist
movement and bring about the early fall of Soviet power in Russia. But the United States has it in its power to increase
enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of
moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which
must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.”
-- X (George Kennan), “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, July 1947.
PART C: Containment Policy in Action -- The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan

The Truman Doctrine (1947)

The Truman Doctrine arose from a speech delivered by President Truman before a joint session of Congress on March 12,
1947. The immediate cause for the speech was a recent announcement by the British Government that, as of March 31, it
would no longer provide military and economic assistance to the Greek Government in its civil war against the Greek
Communist Party. Truman asked Congress to support the Greek Government against the Communists. He also asked
Congress to provide assistance for Turkey, since that nation, too, had previously been dependent on British aid. At the
time, the U.S. Government believed that the Soviet Union supported the Greek Communist war effort and worried that if
the Communists prevailed in the Greek civil war, the Soviets would ultimately influence Greek policy.
With the Truman Doctrine, President Harry S. Truman established that the United States would provide political, military
and economic assistance to all democratic nations under threat from external or internal authoritarian forces. The Truman
Doctrine effectively reoriented U.S. foreign policy, away from its usual stance of withdrawal from regional conflicts not
directly involving the United States, to one of possible intervention in far away conflicts.
Text adapted from: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine

COLD WAR ESCALATION CHART

APPROPRIATE
HISTORICAL U.S. ACTION, ACTION RESULT OF HOW DOES IT WIN, LOSE,
EVENT ACCORDING TO ACTUALLY ACTUAL ILLUSTRATE OR DRAW?
CONTAINMENT TAKEN BY THE ACTION ESCALATION
POLICY U.S. OF THE COLD
WAR?
Truman Doctrine
They did what they Helped prevented It increased Draw.
Issued in response to Provide $$$/aid
Communist “threat” against Communist planned to do. the spread of tensions between
in Turkey and aggression provide support for communism the US and USSR
Greece (1947)
democratic nations
Communist Coup It increased more Draw.
d’etat in Provide $$$/aid Truman Doctrine Passage of the
Czechoslovakia, against Communist Issued Marshall Plan: tensions between Communism
February 1948 aggression Economic aid to the US and USSR was still
Western Europe
spreading

The Marshall Plan (1948)

On June 5, 1947, at a speech to the graduating class at Harvard University, Secretary of State George C. Marshall issued a
call for a comprehensive program to rebuild Europe. Fanned by the fear of Communist expansion and the rapid
deterioration of European economies in the winter of 1946–1947, Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act in
March 1948 and approved funding that would eventually rise to over $12 billion for the rebuilding of Western Europe.

The Marshall Plan generated a resurgence of European industrialization and brought extensive investment into the region.
It was also a stimulant to the U.S. economy by establishing markets for American goods. Although the participation of the
Soviet Union and East European nations was an initial possibility, Soviet concern over potential U.S. economic
domination of its Eastern European satellites and Stalin’s unwillingness to open up his secret society to westerners
doomed the idea. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the U.S. Congress would have been willing to fund the plan as
generously as it did if aid also went to Soviet Bloc Communist nations. Thus the Marshall Plan was applied solely
to Western Europe, precluding any measure of Soviet Bloc cooperation.
Text adapted from: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/marshall-plan
PART D: Further Escalation of the Cold War
APPROPRIATE
HISTORICAL U.S. ACTION, ACTION RESULT OF HOW DOES IT WIN, LOSE,
EVENT ACCORDING TO ACTUALLY ACTUAL ILLUSTRATE OR DRAW?
CONTAINMENT TAKEN BY THE ACTION ESCALATION
POLICY U.S. OF THE COLD
WAR?
Soviet Blockade of
West Berlin, June Provide $$$/aid US provided West Berlin becomes Very major event WIN - US
1948 against Communist supplies for under control between US and
aggression Berlin by of the Western Allies USSR
airlifts
1st A-bomb test by Very major event
US wanted to turn An arms race has Lose -US
Soviets, August 1949 Provide $$$/aid
over all weapon started between between US and
&China falls to the against Communist
Communists, late aggression to UN, rejected by the US and USSR USSR
1949 could mean atomic
USSR
war

NSC-68 (1950)

Reeling from the recent victory of Communist forces in the Chinese Civil War and the successful detonation of an
atomic weapon by the Soviet Union, Secretary of State Dean Acheson asked the Policy Planning Staff, led by Paul
Nitze, to undertake a comprehensive review of U.S. national security strategy.
What Nitze and his group wrote was a 58-page, top-secret report commonly referred to as NSC-68. This
memorandum is among the most influential documents composed by the U.S. Government during the Cold War.

Its authors argued that one of the most pressing threats confronting the United States was the “hostile design” of the
Soviet Union. They concluded that the Soviet threat would soon be greatly amplified by the addition of nuclear
weapons to the Soviet arsenal. They argued that the best course of action was to respond in kind with a massive
build-up of the U.S. military and its weaponry. The authors of NSC-68 made two key assumptions about the Soviets,
while writing the report.

The first assumption was that it was us versus them.

The global balance of power had been “fundamentally altered” so that the United States and Soviet Union
now dominated the world: “What is new, what makes the continuing crisis, is the polarization of power
which inescapably confronts the slave [Soviets] society with the free [United States].”
The second assumption was that the Soviet Union was attempting World Domination.
“…the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony [domination], is animated by a new fanatic
faith, antithetical [opposite] to our own, and seeks to impose absolute authority,” initially in “the Soviet
Union and second in the area now under [its] control.” Then the crucial sentence: “In the minds of the Soviet
leaders, however, achievement of this design requires the dynamic extension of their authority and the
ultimate elimination of any effective opposition to their authority. …To that end Soviet efforts are now
directed towards the domination of the Eurasian land mass.”
Operating off those two assumptions, NSC-68 made the following recommendations:
(1) against negotiations with the Soviets since conditions were not yet sufficient to force the Kremlin [Soviet
government] to “change its polices drastically;”
(2) the development of hydrogen bombs [H-bombs or thermonuclear bombs] to offset possible Soviet
possession of an atomic arsenal by 1954 (the U.S. tested its first H-Bomb in 1952);
 (3) the rapid building of conventional military forces to preserve American interests without having to wage
atomic war, and limited wars could be fought “to compel the acceptance of terms consistent with our
objectives.” (this is when we build a large standing army. It also helps to explain U.S. involvement in
Korea and Vietnam.);
(4) a large increase in taxes to pay for this new, highly expensive military establishment (These high taxes
will lead to a “tax revolt” in the 1970s and 1980s.);
(5) the mobilization of American society, including a government-created “consensus” on the necessity of
“sacrifice” and “unity” by Americans (Helps explain the 2nd Red Scare, the rise of McCarthyism, and the
conformity the 1950s are known for);
(6) a strong alliance system directed by the United States (The U.S. joins NATO in 1949 and SEATO in
1954);
(7) undermining the “Soviet totalitariat” from within by making “the Russian people our allies in this
enterprise.” (It was vague as to how this was to be done. Although the West did use propaganda, like
Radio Free Europe.)
Initially, a number of U.S. officials strongly opposed NSC-68’s recommendations. Critics such as Secretary of
Defense Louis Johnson, and senior diplomats such as Soviet experts and former ambassadors to the Soviet
Union George Kennan and Charles Bohlen, argued that the United States already had a substantial military
advantage over the Soviet Union. Kennan, in particular, disagreed with Nitze’s assertion that the Soviet Union was
bent on achieving domination through force of arms, and argued that the United States could contain the Soviet
Union through political and economic measures, rather than purely military ones. However, the invasion of South
Korea by Soviet and Chinese-backed North Korean forces in June 1950, and continuing charges by Congressional
critics that the Truman Administration was soft on Communism, quickly settled matters in favor of the report’s
recommendations. NSC 68’s recommendations thereby became policy, and the United States Government began a
massive military build-up.
Text adapted from: https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/NSC68 & LaFeber, Walter. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006. New York: Wiley, 2008.

APPROPRIATE
HISTORICAL U.S. ACTION, ACTION RESULT OF HOW DOES IT WIN, LOSE,
EVENT ACCORDING TO ACTUALLY ACTUAL ILLUSTRATE OR DRAW?
CONTAINMENT TAKEN BY THE ACTION ESCALATION
POLICY U.S. OF THE COLD
WAR?
North Korea’s The Us would stop at
invasion across the Provide $$$/aid Truman pursued The Korean War Draw
nothing to prevent the
38th parallel, against Communist North Korean troops occurred resulting in
June 1950 aggression an armistice spread of
communism. North
Korea was backed up
by the USSR and

CONCLUDING QUESTION: China

FINAL ASSESSMENT due to Schoology on Mon/Tues (3/29-30) BEFORE CLASS STARTS!

Directions:
Write a 1/2 page (single-spaced, 12 font, Times New Roman) response to the following question (be sure to use
specific evidence in your response):

How did the concept of Containment evolve between 1946 and 1950?