Bureaucracy: The Problem and Its Setting

Author(s): Reinhard Bendix

Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 12, No. 5 (Oct., 1947), pp. 493-507
Published by: American Sociological Association
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 American
SOCIOLOGICAL
Zevlew
October VolumeI2
I947 Number5
The Official
Journalof the AmericanSociologicalSociety

BUREAUCRACY: THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING*

REINHARD BENDIX
Universityof California

M EN have combined theirefforts in as theydependon a minutedivisionof labor

large-scaleorganizations'through- and on thepreciseenumeration of rightsand
out history,but theyhave done so dutieswithwhicha personis endowedfor
undermanydifferent circumstances and their thedurationof his service.If such a specifi-
moreor less voluntary cooperation has taken cationofrightsand dutiesis consistently car-
many different forms.It may well have re- riedout,it willideallyresultin an exhaustive
quiredas manymento construct the irriga- definitionof the powersof command(their
tionsystemand templesof earlyMesopota- extentand theirlimits)appropriateto every
miancivilization, as are neededtodayforthe positionwithinan administrative hierarchy.
operationoflargeindustrial enterprises.2 The However,we do notordinarily thinkoflarge-
large-scaleorganizations of modemWestern scale organizationsin this sense. We are
Civilizationare, therefore, not noteworthy ratherinclinedto note thattheirdivisionof
fortheirsize, but forthe problemspeculiar laborleads to "red tape" and to monotonous
to ourformsof organizedcooperation. These work for the individualemployee.And we
formsare characteristically modemin so far suspect,evenifwe maynotbe able to prove
it, thatespeciallythe "higher"employeesof
*Manuscript receivedMay ig, I947.
The term"organization"
such organizationswill be able and eagerto
servesas an over-all
designationof the variousformsof deliberately evade theirdutiesand abuse theirauthority.
organized co-operationamongmen.By "large-scale
organization" referenceis made to the growthin I. "THE IRON LAW OF OLIGARCHY"3
size,detaileddivisionof laborand consequent spe- Many studentsof the role of large-scale
cialization,which characterizes moderneconomic organizationsin Westerncivilizationtake
and politicalorganizations.The term"administra>
tion"refersto the formalhierarchy in the division thislatterview.Theyreadilygrantthatthese
of labor,by meansof whichthe workof an or- organizationsare indispensablein modern
ganizationis accomplished.("Administration" is civilization. But they assert that their
relatedto "organization" as the interrelationof its policiesare in effect determined by organized
partsis relatedto theentiremotor.)"Bureaucracy"
refersto the informal relations,
withoutwhichthe 'Cf. the expositionof this theoryin Robert
formaladministrative hierarchy could not get its Michels,PoliticalParties(New York: Hearst'sIn-
workdone; theserelationsare "informal" in the ternationalLibrary,igig) and Gaetano Mosca,
sensethat we are unableto stipulateruleswhich The Ruling Class (New York, I939). Cf. also the
wouldeffectivelygoverntheserelations. restatement of the theoryby PhilipSelznick,"An
2 GordonChilde,Whathappenedin History Approachto the Theoryof Bureaucracy," Ameri-
(New York: Penguin Books, I946), 82-I05. can Sociological Review, VIII (I943), 47-59.

493

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494 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

minorities,forwhomtheunorganized major- and the desirability of achievingit. Rather,

ityis no match.4It is, therefore, meaningless an organizedminority can maintainitspower
to distinguishbetweendifferent organizations and it can make its idea of successprevail,
by the"purposes"theyare said to serve.The as long as disagreement is widespreadboth
"purpose"of any organization is determined withregardto themeaningof "success"and
by the"interests"of its rulingclique. to themethodsby whichit is to be achieved.
But can these"interests" or "purposes"be The "ironlaw of oligarchy"is inadequate
readilyidentified? The "purpose" of busi- in that it speaks of the superiorpower of
ness,forinstance,is ordinarilydescribedas organizedminorities withoutgivingsufficient
profit.Yet, the individualswho conductthe attentionto the causes of dissensusinside
businessmay have a greatdiversityof "in- and outsidethe organizations studied.6The
terests"in mind,ofwhichprofitforthebusi- "law" is also inadequatein so far as it is
ness may be one. The relationbetweenthe based on a narrow,technicalview of ad-
"interests"of individualsand the "purpose" ministration. It assumes,alongwiththeeffi-
of profitis indeterminate in the sense that ciencyexpert,that the administrative pro-
any numberof different administrative ac- cess is bothrationaland neutral.As a result
tionsmightlead to business"success." Ex- it assertsthatan organizedminority can use
cept as individualcases are examinedem- its positionof powerto directan organiza-
pirically,5
it is difficult,
if not impossible, to tion in accordancewithits "interests."To
determinein what mannerthe various"in- thisend the minority can counton the effi-
terests"of individualshave contributed to- cient and disinterested serviceof.the em-
wards the "purpose"of a business.It will ployeesof theorganization. These assertions
be less ambiguous,then,if we speak of the confusethe conceptof technicallyrational
success ratherthan the purposeof an or- administration7with the realityof the ad-
ganization,sincewe can do so withoutjudg- ministrative process.No large-scaleorgani-
ing the intricateinterrelations betweenad- zation is in fact "technicallyrational,"be-
ministration and its results. cause it mustalwaysinvolve
In pursuingtheirown intereststhe mem- a) thesocialandideological background of a
bersof an organizedminority may,however, diversityof persons,whichtheirformal
preventthe successof an organization. This positionswithinan administrative hier-
may be attributedto the fact that the or- archycannotobliterate;
ganizedminority has formedan idea of the b) the institutional
settingin whichthe or-
"success"of theorganization whichconflicts ganizationmustfunction andits effecton
with the ideas which othershave formed. the psychologyof internal
operation;
The criteriaof "success"are themselves c) thehistorical
andpsychological context in
con- whichthepeopleoutsidetheorganization
troversial.Such controversy is likelyto exist viewits activities.
both inside and outsideany large-scaleor-
ganization.It is, therefore, misleadingto as- It is thespecialtaskof thesociologistto ob-
sume that a rulingclique can deliberately servethe effects of thesefactorson the ad-
preventthe "success" of an organization, ministrativeprocess of any large-scaleor-
whileeverybodyelse agreeson the methods ganization.
' This criticismmay be made, for
instance, of
Mosca, op. cit., p. 53. the otherwise excellent study by Oliver Graceau,
For an illustrationof the difficulties
involved The Political Life of the AmericanMedical Associa-
in ascertaininghow decisionsin businessare arrived tions (Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, I940)
at, cf. the study by Robert A. Gordon, Business 7This term refersto Max Weber's ideal type of
Leadership in Large Corporations (Washington: modern administration, accordingto which the ad-
BrookingsInstitution,1945), 46-98. The same point ministratoris an expert, who adheres strictlyto
is illustratedin Leo Tolstoy's characterizationof the ideal of neutrality.As a consequence he will
the relation between General Staff decisions and confine himself exclusivelyto the implementation
actual militaryaction. See War and Peace (New of policies without modifying their explicit or
York: ModernLibrary,n.d.), 1110-46. implicitcontentin any way.

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 BUREAUCRACY: THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING 495

These considerationsindicate that the scale organization have failedso farto make
powerof any organizedminority is circum- thisdependencethecenterof theiranalyses.
scribedby the internaland externalsocial Theyhave ratherbeenconcernedeitherwith
settingof the organization whichit seeks to tracingthe processesby whichmodernad-
control.Such an organization can be used in ministration in businessand government has
theinterest ofa minority themoreeasily,the become technicallymore rational; or with
morethe administrators adhereto the ideal analyzing the "human factor," which is
of impartial,competentservice. But this necessarilyinvolvedin theadministration of
ideal is perhapsneverrealized,sincethe ac- any organization.9 In concentratingon either
tions leading to its realizationcannot by one or the otheraspect these studieshave
definition be motivatedby thespiritof neu- tended to obscure the real issue. Modern
trality.The minority may fosterthis"spirit large-scaleorganizations do notshowa clear
ofneutrality," in orderto maketheorganiza- separation of their technical and psy-
tiona morepliabletool.But if theminority chologicalaspects.Theymaybe morereadily
willuse an organization forits owninterests, understood,I believe,if the interrelations
then it must also frequently resortto the betweenthe technicalrequirements of the
deliberate manipulationof personal and flowof workand the social and psychologi-
ideologicalinfluences, in orderto achieveits cal predispositionsof the individualsen-
ends. In thisway it may underminerather gagedin thisworkare analyzed.Our under-
thanstrengthen the tendencies, whichmight standingof this interrelation may be en-
otherwisefosterthe "technicallyrational" hanced,however,by a briefexaminationof
aspectsof administration. Perhapsthe most thestudies,whichhave treatedtheseaspects
tellingillustrationof this point is the ex- separately.
perienceof the GermanSecretPolice,which
II. STUDIES OF RATIONALIZATION
had encourageddenunciationsin order to
facilitatethe systematicdetectionof all la- It is a familiaridea thatmodernWestern
tent oppositionto the Hitler regime.This Civilizationis increasingly characterized by
policy made it imperativefrom time to bureaucratization. In thepast scientificanal-
timeto "denouncethe denouncers," because yses have characterizedthis development
thefloodofdenunciations forvariouspersonal as one of increasing "rationalization."In the
reasonshad becomeunmanageable.8 fieldof government administrationthisterm
But if thereis no regularconnectionbe- refersto the substitution of learnablerules
tweenrationaladministration and oligarchi- of procedurefor the exerciseof individual
cal abuse,neitheris theresucha connection caprice (of the kingor his representatives)
betweenrationaladministration and demo- and to thesubstitution of a nation-wide gov-
craticinstitutions. Broadlyspeaking,whether ernment for the autonomy of small,decen-
one or the otherwill be the result,depends tralized governmentunits with their ad-
upon the social and psychological settingin herenceto local traditions. Thus,theGerman
whicha technicallyrationaladministration historian Otto Hintze has shownin detail
is attempted.However,the studiesof large- how the modern cabinet system gradually
developedout of the variousofficesin the
8
See E. Kohn-Bramstedt, Dictatorship and King's household.He traces,for instance,
PoliticalPolice(London:KeganPaul,I945), II4-I5. theTreasuryor FinanceDepartment in vari-
If a dictatorialregimeattemptsto avoid this diffi- ous modern governmentsto the King's
culty by discouragingdenunciations,it usually finds servantwho was responsiblefor collecting
itself compelled-in the absence of spontaneous
information-to organize a system of "spies upon 9I leave out of considerationthe voluminous
spies." Such "systematic"effortsat obtainingneeded literatureon the art of management.Interestingly
information entail their own unforseen conse- enough this literaturealso treats the rational tech-
quences.How thissystemmay affectfactoryproduc- niques of management(e.g., testing,job classifica-
tion is illustratedby Victor Kravchenko,I Chose tion, time-and-motionstudies) separately from a
Freedom (New York: Scribner's,I946), 75-8i. psychologicalstudyof personneland publicrelations.

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496 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

and guardingthe moniesowed to the King. whichit was confusedat an earliertime.In-

In addition,Hintze pointsout how modern deed, in analyzingthe overallresultof the
administration has clearly separated state development,which these historianshave
fromhouseholdfinanceand in so doinghas traced,contemporary sociologyhas centered
replaced the traditionalerraticmethodsof its attentionon this disengagement of gov-
the past by regularizedand formallylegal ernmentadministration fromsociety.
administrative procedures.10 This same "ra- Which are the characteristicsthat dis-
tionalization" of governmenthas been tinguishthe administration of the modern
analyzedby ErnestBarkerin his studyof statefromthatof all otherformsof political
the development of pubicservicesin France, organization?Accordingto Max Weber the
England, and Prussia since i 660.11 Pro- key to thisdistinction lies in the conceptof
fessorBarkerhas statedthatpriorto i66o professionalization.13 Specialized training
the state was stillidentified withthe King's and thoroughexaminationsare today in-
family household. Its resourceswere the dispensableprerequisites forthe recruitment
King'sprivateproperty and thenobilityhad of government officials. They are appointed
special privilegesin the government's ad- ratherthan elected.Their workin its pro-
ministrative and militaryorganization, both fessionalcapacityis integratedinto a hier-
in termsof claims on officesand on the archy of command by way of enabling
revenuesobtainedfromthem. statutesand proceduralrules. The special
"Thisconfusion of theidea of theStatewith competenceof each appointeeis utilizedin
notionsof Family,Property andgeneralSociety fulfilling theparticulardutiesascribedto the
was generallycharacteristic of Europe about office whichhe (temporarily) occupies.Thus,
i66o.... So longas it persists, it complicates modem administration is ideally the very
and checksthedevelopment of a pureand spe- antithesisof arbitraryrule.Its everyaction
cificadministration of publicservices.The dis- is predictablesince the principlesof its or-
engaging of theidea of theState,as a service- ganizationare designedto ruleout any pos-
rendering organization for the protection of sible intrusionof personalfactorssuch as
rightsand enforcement of duties,is the prior political convictions,personalbias, or cor-
condition of sucha development. Thereare two
greatlandmarks in the historyof thatdisen- ruption.
gaging. Oneis theinstitutionofabsolutism, as it This construction of "rational" adminis-
wasinaugurated byLouisXIV. The otheris the tration rests on the assumptionthat office
proclamation of nationalsovereignty, as it was holders as a group believe in this"rational-
made in I789. Both of thesemovements, op- ity." "Rationalization"of theadministrative
posedas theyare,agreein postulating a con- process depends on the developmentof a
ceptionof theStateas something separateand professionalethics.The administrator must
sui generis."'2 be thoroughly committed to a execu-
faithful
ProfessorBarkerhas tracedin some detail tion of his duties.He mustbe devotedto a
thehistoryofthisdisengagement in thefields preservation of the impersonalcharacterof
of administration,conscription,taxation, his work.And he mustconfineit withinthe
socialservicesand education.It seemsplaus- limitsof his professionalcompetence.14 In
ible to conclude,both fromBarker's and '3 Cf. for the followingthe chapter on bureauc-
fromHintze's analysis,that administrationracy in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From
in the modernstate is by contrastclearly Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York:
separate fromthe "general society,"with OxfordUniversity Press,I946), i96-244.
'4 This last maxim of his professionalethic is
10Otto Hintze, "Die Entstehungder modernen usually formulatedin terms of the distinctionbe-
Staatsministerien,"HistorischeZeitschrift,
C (i907), tween routine administration and the political
pp. 60-64, 70-72, 9I. process. Cf. Karl Mannheim,Ideology and Utopia
' Sir Ernest Barker,The Development Public (New York: Harcourt,Brace,I936), ioo-i03, and
of
Servicesin Western Europe,i660-I930 (New York: Ramsay Muir, Peers and Bureaucrats (London:
Oxford UniversityPress, I944). Constable, IWIO), 3I, 37. See also in this connection
12 Ibid., 5-6. Alfred Weber's characterizationof national dif-

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 BUREAUCRACY: THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING 497

returnhe will demand a regular salary, culturaland psychologicalwell-being.The

securityof tenure,regularizedadvancement various implicationsof this problemhave
and pensionprovisions.In addition,he or- been one of the major concernsof modern
dinarilyexpectsthathis positionas an agent sociology.Karl Marx observed'7 how the
of the government carriesa reasonablede- machine had become the embodimentof
greeof social prestige,the moreso sincehis man's intellectand had at the same time
educationaltrainingand his standingas a created a workerwhose human faculties
technicalexpertshould bringsuch esteem wereatrophied.Toenniesand Simmel18em-
regardlessof the public officewhichhe oc- phasized that the substitutionof the "ra-
cupies. tional" cash-nexusfor the more personal
The studies of "rationalization"in the relationshipsof an earlier societybrought
large-scale organization of government,in its wake the dissolutionof traditional
whichhave herebeenreviewed, have in com- social bondsand threatened theveryration-
mon that theirmajor emphasisis derived alityof modernsociety.Finally,Mannheim
froma contrastof modernwithearlierforms has shown19that moderntechnological and
of organization.Modern administration is administrative organizations involveda dis-
"rational"in contrastto administration un- junctionbetweensubstantialand functional
der feudalismor in the era of absolute rationality.That is to say, modernoccupa-
monarchieswith its emphasison tradition tions are divided into those competentto
and its identification
ofofficeand incumbent. construct theblueprints of technicalappara-
That is to say, the performance of given tus or administrative organization,and those
taskswithinthesemodernformsoforganiza- competentto "read and apply" theseblue-
tionhas becomemoreuniformand predict- printswithoutbeingable to comprehend the
able. But thisis notto say thatthisperform- principleson whichtheyare based.
ance is in factuniformand predictable.As The morecomplicatedtechnology and ad-
many recent studies15have shown, this ministration become,themoredifficult it also
greaterrationalityof modernorganizations becomesto controlthe uses to whichthese
has failedto eliminatethe "humanfactor." devicesare put. Indeed,the development of
This factorhas not been ignoredby those large-scaleorganizations may lead to an in-
scholarswho have emphasizedthe develop- creasingdesireto escape fromthe necessity
ment of "rationalization."Many of them of deliberationand rational calculation.20
have in factpointedto thevariousunwitting This desirewill in turnincreaseman's dis-
and disorganizing consequenceswhich this abilityto controlthe productsof his scien-
"rationalization" has entailed.'6 tific and organizationalenterprises.Thus,
Men are unable and unwillingto restrain the "humanfactor"is indeedconsideredby
the furtherdevelopmentof technologyand those who emphasize the developmentof
administrativeorganization.At the same "rationalization,"but it is consideredin
time they cannot utilize these productsof
theireffortsfortheirownincreasedmaterial, "Karl Marx, Capital (New York: The Modern
Library,I936), 395-404. See also ThomasCarlyle,
ferences in the professional
ethicsof administratorsPast and Present (New York: Mershon Comp.,
in his essay,"Der Beamte,"Ideen zur Staats-und n.d.), p. 9: "Things, if it be not mere cotton and
Kultursoziologie (Karlsruhe:G. Braun,I927), 88- iron things,are growingdisobedientto man."
' Ferdinand Toennies, Gemeinschaftund Gesell-
See belowunderIII fora discussion of some schaft (Leipzig: Hans Buske, I935), 8-86 and
of thesestudies. Georg Simmel, Philosophie des Geldes (Leipzig:
18 Cf.,amongothers,W. F. Ogburn,SocialChange Duncker and Humblot, i9io), chapterV.
(New York: VikingPress,I922) in the fieldof 'lKarl Mannheim,Man and Society in an Age
technology, E. Rothschild,The Meaningof Un- of Reconstruction (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
intelligibility
in ModernArt (Chicago: University I94'), 39-75.
of ChicagoPress,I934) forart,and RobertRedfield, ' Cf. on this point Erich Fromm,
Escape from
The Folkculture of Yucatan(Chicago: University Freedom (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, I94I),
of ChicagoPress,I94I) in relationto citylife. 24-39, I03-I35.

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 498 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

termsof the effectsof this development. tration,thatit was important to considerthe

However,the "humanfactor"has not been individualparticipant in theproduction proc-
consideredas a contemporary and indispens- ess. For instancehistoriansconcernedwith
able foundation,2' on whichthe rationality the riseof the modernfactoryhave stressed
of large-scaleorganization depends.It is, for the many obstacles of individualworking
example,insufficient to state that the effi- habits,the lack of accuracyand discipline,
ciencyofgovernment administration depends whichstoodin theway of thisdevelopment.
upon the professionalization of administra- In thewordsof theHammonds:
tors. What factorspromoteor retardthis "Scarcelyanyevilassociated withthefactory
professionalization? It is true that admin- system wasentirely a newevilin kind.In many
istrationbecomesmoreuniform and predict- domesticindustries the hourswerelong,the
able if the people who are affectedwill re- paywaspoor,thechildren worked froma tender
spect the administrator for the neutrality age,therewas overcrowding....But thehome
withwhichhe performs his duties.But what worker at theworst. . . was in manyrespects
fostersthisattitudeofrespect?Furthermore,hisownmaster. He worked longhours, butthey
it is truethat "rational"administration de- were his own hours; his wife and children
pends on the ability of administrators to worked, but theyworkedbesidehim,and there
encourageco-operation and initiative in their was no alien powerovertheirlives.. . . The
forcesthatruledhisfatewerein a senseoutside
subordinates.But what are the conditions
his daily life; theydid not overshadow and
whichfavorthe development of such abili- envelop hishome,hisfamily, hismovements and
ties? Obviouslyit is insufficient to charac- habits....
terizeonly the formalprerequisitesof ad- Whattheneworderdidin all theserespects
ministrative rationalization;it is necessary was to turnthediscomforts of thelifeof the
to consideritshumanpreconditions as well.22 poorintoa rigidsystem.. . . To all theevils
fromwhichthe domestic workerhad suffered,
III. STUDIES OF THE "HUMAN FACTOR"D theIndustrial Revolution addeddiscipline,and
To the extentthatstudiesof government thediscipline ofa powerdriven bya competition
administration haveconsidered these"human thatseemedas inhuman as the machinesthat
preconditions" at all, theyhave takentheir thundered in factoryandshed."23
clue fromvariousanalysesof industrialor- Clearlythisprocess
entaileduntoldsuffering.
ganization.Whilemanydifferences existbe- But many of the
historiansfromMarx to
tweenindustryand government, the prob- the
Hammondsviewedthisaspectof thein-
lems of large-scaleorganizationsare still dustrialrevolution
primarilyin a humani-
sufficiently alike,to makethestudiesof one tarianmanner.The
fact tendedto be over-
type of organizationuseful for an under- looked that the
suffering which occurred
standingof the other.It is for this reason duringthe
IndustrialRevolutionwas the
that I turnto a briefconsideration of in- "instrument"by
which the "human ma-
dustrialrelations. terial"was graduallyshapedintoconformity
The studiesof "rationalization" in indus- with the requirements
of machineproduc-
tryhave emphasizedfromthe first,in con- tion.24
trastto theanalysesof government adminis- This humanitarian concernwiththe "hu-
As distinguishedfrom its considerationin an man factor"duringthe period of industri-
analysis of the historyof modern "rationalization." alization was a responseto management's
22 It may be objected that these are considered,
for example, in the various studies of personnel 23J. L. and Barbara Hammond, The Town
management.However, these studies, importantas Laborer, i760-i832 (London: Longmans, Green &
they are, are practical, not analytic; they fail to Co., I925), i8-ig.
probe the conditions which spell the success or ' Contemporaryillustrationsof the importance
failureof their practical application.A provocative of this factor may be found in John Scott, Behind
analysis of this problemis containedin HerbertA. the Urals (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin,I942) and
Simon, "The Proverbs of Administration,"Public Kuo-Heng Shih, China Enters the Machine Age
AdministrationReview, VI (I946), 53-67.. (Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 1944).

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 BUREAUCRACY: THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING 499

attitudetowardsthe worker.Yet this atti- "I haveexpended muchtimeandcapitalupon

tude determined the organization of produc- improvements of the livingmachinery; and it
tion. In writingof this problemas it ap- will soon appear that the time and money so
peared duringthe early i9th century,the expendedin the manufactory of New Lanark,
Hammondshave shownby what reasoning evenwhilesuchimprovements are in progress
only,and buthalfof theirbeneficial effects at-
the absolutesupremacyof the entrepreneurtained,are now producing a returnexceeding
was justified. It maysuffice to quoteonlyone 50%, and will shortlycreate profitsequal to
of the arguments whichwerepopularat the centper centon the originalcapitalexpended
time: in them."27
"Whenthereis toomuchlaborin themarket From Owen's day to the recentdevelop-
andwagesare too low,do notcombine to raise mentof "industrialsociology"it has been a
thewages;do notcombine in thevainhopeof recurrent theme,that properand controlled
compelling theemployer to paymoreforlabor attentionto the worker'ssubjectiverole in
thanthereare fundsfor the maintenance of the productionprocesswould be both hu-
labor;butgo out of themarket. Leave there-
lationsbetweenwages and labor to equalize manitarianand practical.WhileOwenwas a
themselves. You canneverbe permanently kept reformer and stressedthefinancialadvantage
downin wagesby theprofits of capital;forif for propagandistic reasons,later writersre-
theprofits of capitalare toohigh,thecompeti- tainedthisappeal primarily because empiri-
tionofothercapitalimmediately comesin to set cal studiesshowedthe positiveeffectof im-
thematter right."25 provedpersonnelpolicieson individualout-
put. Thus, the principlewhich Owen had
"It is easy to see," say the Hammondsby formulated earlyin the i9th centuryhas re-
wayofcomment, "howthiskindofreasoning mainedthe same eversince.FrederickTay-
producedtheprevalentviewof thecapitalist lor's statementof the same idea may serve
as beneficent whateverthe wageshe paid or as an illustration.
the conditionshe imposed."26Yet, ironically
"Themajority ofmenbelievethatthefunda-
theseverypracticesof exploitationhad the mental interests
ofemployees andemployers are
effectof decreasingratherthan increasing necessarily antagonistic. Scientificmanagement,
industrial production.Indeed, "scientific on thecontrary, has foritsveryfoundation the
management" beganwiththe discoverythat firmconviction thatthe trueinterests of the
exploitationled to lowerproductiveoutput. twoare one and the same; thatprosperity of
"Manyhavelongexperienced in manufactur-theemployer cannotexistthrough a longterm
ing operationsthe advantagesof substantial,of yearsunlessit is accompanied by prosperity
well-contrived, and well-executed machinery.fortheemployee, andviceversa;andthatit is
Experience has also shownthedifference of the possibleto give the workman whathe most
resultsbetween mechanism whichis neat,clean, ' Robert Owen, The Formation of Character
well-arranged, and alwaysin a highstateof re- (i8I3) quoted in L. Urwick and E. F. L. Brech,
pair; and thatwhichis allowedto be dirty, in The Making of ScientificManagement (London:
disorder,. . . andmuchoutof repair. Management Publication Trust, I946), II, 57. The
"If then,duecareas to thestateofinanimate authors of this work ask: "if the principles of
machinescan producesuch beneficial results, effectivemanagement were understood,why was
whatmaynotbe expected if you devoteequal it that hours of work were universallyso long
attention to yourvitalmachines, whichare far and conditionsso poor? Why did Owen encounter
such oppositionin his fightfor minimumstandards
morewonderfully constructed?" laid down by law?" (Ibid., 66). The answer does
not simply lie in a referenceto the forcesof com-
And in answering thequestionwhichhe had petition or the bigotryand ignorance of the em-
posed, Robert Owen indicatedthat it was ployers,though both undoubtedlywere of import-
to considertheroleof the"human
profitable ance. As mentionedabove, considerableimportance
factor"in theproductionprocess. should be attributedto the traditionof compulsion,
which the enforcementof a new work-discipline
5Quotedin Hammond,op. cit.,209. had initiated, because it was indispensable in
26
ibid. machine-production.

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500 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
wants-highwages-andtheemployer whathe variables(e.g. differently spacedrestpauses,
wants-a low labor cost-for his manufac- mid-morning meals,higherpay,variationsin
ture."28 illumination, temperature, etc.) whichwere
tested.3'Andthis"morale"was relatedto the
It should be remembered that Taylor con-
improvedmannerofsupervision, theprestige
finedhimselfto considerations of "human
positionwhichmembersof the test group
efficiency" and that he was concernedwith
occupied,theincreasedattentionwhichtheir
substitutinga rigorouslyplanned working
individualproblems,opinionsand sugges-
performancefor the traditional,rule-of-
tionsreceived,etc. This resultof theexperi-
thumbapproach of each employeeto his
mentswas regardedas a discoveryfortwo
work.Taylorbelievedthathis goals (as de-
reasons. For one, the historyof the labor
finedabove) could be accomplishedby de-
movementand of labor legislationhad fo-
tailedtimeand motionstudies.But his writ-
cussed attentionon the attainment of mini-
ings show that he was aware of the many
mal workingconditions(in termsof hours,
psychologicalproblemswhichstood in the
wages, safety devices,etc). This made it
way of makinghis schemeof "task manage-
appear plausible that these "conditionsof
ment"acceptableto theworker.
work" were the causes of satisfaction.Sec-
Taylor's successorshave becomeincreas- ondly,management'stendencyto thinkof
ingly concernedwith these psychological the workeras the subordinateantagonist
problemsinherentin the rationalization of whoseeverydemandwas a challengeofman-
theproduction process.Theyhave continued agerialauthority, madeany concernwiththe
the experimental testingof various factors causes of dissatisfaction unthinkable.Yet
which were eitherpositivelyor negatively theseexperiments have donelittlemorethan
correlatedwiththe outputof the individual confirman old insight.ApparentlyRobert
worker.Detailedexperimentation in thisfield Owenwas awareofthefactthattheworker's
has indicated,however,thatthe factorscon- satisfaction and fullco-operation in thepro-
stituting theexternalworkingconditionsare ductionprocessdependedupon his recogni-
neithersinglynorin combination responsible tionas a responsible humanbeingand could
for the volumeof outputof the individual not be obtainedas long as he was treatedas
worker,as longas theyare consideredapart a cog in the productionprocess.It seems
fromthe social and psychologicaleffectsof equally clear that Karl Marx discernedthe
his statusin the workgroup.29 "human problem"' of industrialciviliza-
The famousHawthorneexperiments3 con- tionwhenhe pointedout thatthe co-opera-
firmthis point. The controlledobservation tion of laborerswas not the resultof their
of smallworkgroupsovera numberofyears ownefforts, butinsteadtheworkofan "alien
indicatedthat increasedproductionon the power" over them.
whole seemed more closely related to the "Laborers (under capitalism)cannot co-
"morale" of the groupthan to any of the operatewithoutbeingbroughttogether:their
assemblage in oneplaceis a necessary condition
'Frederick W. Taylor, The Principlesof Scien- of theirco-operation....Beingindependent of
tificManagement (New York: Harpers,igig), IO. each other,the laborersare isolatedpersons,
' Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an whoenterintorelations withthecapitalist, but
IndustrialCivilization(Boston: Harvard University, notwithone another. This co-operation begins
GraduateSchoolof BusinessAdministration, I946), onlywiththelaborprocess,buttheyhavethen
I-54.
" In additionto thewritings ceasedto belongto themselves. Onentering that
of EltonMayo cf. processtheybecomeincorporated with capi-
especiallyF. J. Roethlisberger
and W. J. Dickson, tal."32
Managementand the Worker (Cambridge: Harvard
UniversityPress, 1943) and T. N. Whitehead, "1This statementdisregards the relativelyfew
cases in which personalpreoccupation
Leadership in a Free Society (Cambridge: Harvard interfered
UniversityPress, 1936) and the same author's withtheworkers' output.Cf.Mayo,op. cit.,IOI-II2.
The Industrial Worker (Cambridge: Harvard Uni- 82Karl Marx,op. cit., 36I, 365. (My insertand
versity
Press,I938) 2 VOIS. italics.)

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 BUREAUCRACY: THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING 501

And somewhatfurtheron in his analysis productionas long as he was subjectto the

Marx speaks of the humanconsequencesof necessitiesof an organizationwhose opera-
thismediatedco-operation of theworkers. tionandpurposewereplannedand conducted
"Whilesimpleco-operation leavesthe mode withouthis participation. On theotherhand,
of working by theindividual unchanged, manu- the various authors associated withthe In-
facture thoroughly revolutionizes it.... It con- dustrialResearchof the HarvardSchool of
vertsthelaborerintoa crippled monstrosity, by Businesscontendthat Managementis in a
forcing his detaildexterity at theexpenseof a positionto createtheconditions underwhich
worldof productive capabilitiesand instincts. this "morale,"thisspiritof co-operation on
. . .The knowledge, thejudgment andthewill, thepartof theworkerscan flourish.
which,thoughin ever so smalla degree,are
practisedbytheindependent peasantandhandi- "Maintaining internal equilibrium withinthe
craftsman. . . -these facultiesare now re- socialorganization of theplantinvolves keeping
quiredonlyforthe workshop as a whole.In- the channelsof communication freeand clear
telligence
inproduction expands inonedirection, so thatordersare transmitted downward with-
becauseit vanishesin manyothers.What is out distortion and so thatrelevant information
lost by the detaillaborers, is concentrated in regarding situations at theworklevelis trans-
the capitalthatemploysthem.It is a result mitted upwardwithout distortion to thoselevels
of the divisionof laborin manufactures, that at whichit can be bestmadeuse of. This in-
the laboreris broughtface to face withthe volvesgetting the bottomof the organization
intellectualpotencies of thematerial processof to understand the economicobjectivesof the
production as theproperty of another, and as top; it alsomeansgetting thetopoftheorgani-
a rulingpower."33 zationto understand thefeelings andsentiments
of thebottom."35
It is consistentwith this statementto
say that real human satisfactionis not It is of interestto observethat the policy
to be foundin the variousimprovements of whichis advocatedheredoes not seemfeas-
workingconditions,importantthoughthey ible in thelightof theexperimental evidence
are. It does not seemto go beyondthesein- on whichit is based.
sightsof nearlya centuryago if Mr. Mayo The so-calledRelayAssemblyTest Group,
statesthatthe "manyconflicting forcesand to give but one example,(this groupof five
attitudes,"whichare foundin industrialre- girlswas carefullyobservedfora numberof
lations. years) showeda greatdeal of co-operation
withtheexperimenters and amongthemselves
"centerabout... theworkandthemanner of
itsperformance. Somehow or other, no effective with the result that their level of outputin-
relationship betweenthe'workerand his work' creased considerably.But this co-operation
had been established;and sincea communitywas due to theconsidered attention bestowed
of interest at thispointwas lackingthegroup on the group (ratherthan to its external
failedto establish an integrate activity and fell workingconditions).Such attentionwould
into a degreeof discordwhichno one could be incompatiblewith a large-scaleproduc-
understandor control.... If an individualcan- tionprocess.
not workwithsufficent understanding of his "To the investigators, it was essentialthat
worksituation, then,unlikea machine, he can the workersgive theirfulland whole-hearted
onlyworkagainstopposition fromhimself."34co-operation to theexperiment. . . . In orderto
By what factors,then,is the development bringthis about,the investigators did every-
of "morale"and co-operation thing in their power to secure the complete
amongworkers of theirsubjectswiththe result
co-operation
hampered?As is well known,Marx did not thatalmostall the practicescommonto the
believethatit was possibleto incorporate the shop were altered."36
worker'sinitiative,his pride and whole-
heartedco-operationin a commontask of 'F. J. Roethlisberger,Managementand Morale
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, I944),
"3Ibid., 396-97. I92-93.
3 Mayo, op. cit., i i 8-i 9. 9 Ibid., I4. (My italics.)

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502 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Mr. Roethlisberger himselfconcludes,there- thoughtheyattributethisto the ills of our

fore,that underthe workingconditionsof civilization.38 But what appears as insuffi-
large-scaleproductionit is impossibleto cientco-operation fromthemanagerialpoint
providea settingwhichpromotesthe kind of view, may be evidenceof co-operation
of co-operationsuch as the experimental nevertheless. It is found,forexample,that
group showed.soaNevertheless,the experi- workerstend to set social standardsforthe
mentersproceededto develop an interview outputof theirgroupthroughinformalun-
programwhichwas designedto freethepro- derstandings. Does thismeanthattheylack
ductionprocessfromthe variousemotional thespiritof co-operation, or thattheirspirit
difficultiesand personal antagonismsthat differsfromthat desiredby the employer?
werefoundto lowertheoutputofsomeofthe Roethlisberger has statedthatsuchbehavior
workersunderobservation.But such inter- is evidenceforthe "lack of social function"
views could not reproduceunder ordinary in thejob of theworker.39 But can improved
workingconditionswhattheexperiment had personnelpoliciesrestoreto theworkerthat
achieved: to give each personpride in his feelingof personalimportance and integrity
workand in the successfulperformance of whichtheproduction processdenieshim?Is
thegroup.The interviews, whenpracticedat sucha personnelpolicyevencompatible with
large,couldonlysucceedin eliminating from the organizationalrequirements of the pro-
the productionprocessthe variouspersonal duction process? Mayo and others have
factors,which had so far persistently re- statedthatin oursociety"collaboration can-
tardedits further On balance notbe leftto chance.40
rationalization. Theybelievethatthe
it provedto be moreefficient to have thein- suspicion,hostilityand conflictwhichbeset
dividual worker unburden his personal our industrialworld,can be at least greatly
troublesto an interviewer, even if that cut alleviated if managementsees its way
downhis timeon thejob; he was nota good towardsimprovingemployeerelations.But
workerwhilehe worriedabout personalaf- theyfailto ask howmuchthegood"morale"
fairs,and he was likelyto slowup his fellow- of workersis worthin monetaryterms,and
workers.Thus, it is not the co-operation of theyare indifferent to the questionwhether
the workerswhichis increased,but some theprocessof productiongeneratesthevery
human"obstacle"to the further rationaliza- hostilitieswhich interferewith its opera-
tionof the productionprocess,whichis eli- tion.4'
minated.
I have triedto indicatein what manner IV. COMPLIANCE AND INITIATIVE IN
the "human factor"in industrialorganiza- BUREAUCRATIC CONDUCT
tionhas been analyzed.The basic shortcom-
The analysisof large-scaleorganization in
ing of these studiesin industrialsociology
the modern world will be as
deficient, longas
lies in their insufficientawareness of
it makes eitherthe formalorganizational
the technologicaland institutional compul-
structureor the informalhuman relations
sions of large-scaleorganizations.Mayo,
and others,have assumed withinthatstructure thevantagepointofits
Roethlisberger,
observations. The historical approach con-
thattheproduction goalssetby management
ceives modern organization in industryor
furnishthe onlyvalid criteriaforthe inter-
pretationand evaluationof industrialrela- 3 Elton Mayo, The Social Problems of an In-
tions.37As a resultthey have found that dustrial Civilization (Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
workersare insufficiently co-operative,al- sityPress,I945), chapterI.
3 Roethlisberger,Management and Morale, 24-
See also Whitehead,IndustrialWorker,I, 254.
38a
25.
3 Cf. BurleighB. Gardner,Human Relations in 4 Elton Mayo's Foreword to Roethlisberger,
Industry (Chicago: Richard D. Irwin, I945), who Ibid., p. xix.
defines the factory as "a coordinated system of 4' As a result industrial problems are almost
activities directed to the production of goods." exclusivelytreated as problems of defectivecom-
(P. 4). munication.Cf. Gardner,op. cit., passim.

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 BUREAUCRACY: THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING 503

government in termsof a contrastto earlier tiondependin somemeasureon thismixture

forms.Consequently, it stressesthe greater ofcompliancewithauthority and thecreative
rationalityofmodernorganization. The man- exerciseofinitiative. All large-scaleorganiza-
agerialapproach,on theotherhand,focusses tionsfacetheproblemof finding formaland
its attentionon the as yet unmanagedas- informal ways,by whichsucha balancemay
pects of humanrelations,whichhave "as- be facilitated.
serted"themselvesin all organizations. The This balance betweencomplianceand ini-
tacitassumption is madethatthorough study tiativeis likelyto varywithculturaland in-
will show us how these "remaininghuman stitutionaldifferences. The contrastbetween
irrationalities"
maybecomemanageable.But businessand government is perhapsthemost
this assumptionis unwarranted in so faras obviouscase in point.Initiativeis concerned
the divisionof labor and the workrelations with marketchancesin business,but with
requisiteto the productive(or the adminis- politicalchancesin government. Compliance
trative) process necessitatepreciselythose in businessis a matterofmanagerialarrange-
human irrationalities whichmanagementis mentbased on a wage contract.Compliance
now seekingto remove. in government involvesin additionthe spe-
It is apparentthat neitherof these ap- cial legal liabilitiesand disabilitiesof the
proacheshas a sufficient theoreticalbasis. civilservant,whichconcernthe spiritof his
This shortcoming is not overcomeby the work, not only its performance.Business
observationthat the studiesof "rationaliza- is relativelyfreefrombeingboundby prece-
tion" overlookthe human factor,and vice dent,it is notencumbered by theanticipation
versa. Instead, it is necessaryto show in of checksotherthan failureof the venture
whatmannerall large-scaleorganizations re- itself.These obvious differences have their
quire for their success a "proper" irrational basis in the conditionsunderwhichin each
foundation. In thisrespectthebasic problem instancethe formalhierarchyof authority
of all large-scaleorganizations is the same. allows-more or less unwittingly-for an ex-
Suchorganizations dependfortheireffective- erciseofindependent judgment.
ness on a clearlyunderstoodhierarchyof In statingthe problemin thismannerwe
authority.Yet, they would break down if may have a clue to the systematicanalysis
everyofficial wouldfollowall regulationsto and differentiation of large-scaleorganiza-
the letterand consulthis superiorwhenever tions,whichgoes beyondthe obvious con-
theserulesdo notprovidesufficient guidance. trastofgovernment and business.42 Attitudes
Such "typically bureaucratic" behavior toward risk-taking, towards authority,
would interfere withthe functioning of the and towardthe public,as well as the insti-
organization at everypoint.All organizations tutionalconditionsof the"workingclimate"
depend,on theotherhand,on theabilityand differfromindustryto industryand from
the willingness of theiremployeesto act on government to government. These and other
theirown initiative, wheneverthatis called variables affect the relationship of the indi-
for. Yet it would be clearly incompatible vidual employeeto the organizational hier-
withtheireffective operation,ifeveryofficial archy;theymodifythe mannerin whichhe
conductedthe businessassignedto him in functionswithin the organizationand in
accordancewithhis independentjudgment. whichhe sees its over-allpurpose.It maybe
It is consequentlyimperativethat the em- usefulto illustratethesepointsby contrast-
ployeesof all ranksin industryand govern- 'In the study of business organizationsit has
ment strikea balance betweencompliance always been assumedthattheyare essentiallysimilar
and initiative,that they tempertheir ad- in countriesof comparableeconomicstructure.Cer-
herenceto formalrules by a judiciousex- tainly,the similarityof technicaland administrative
erciseofindependent judgmentand thatthey problems in large-scale industriesmakes this view
plausible. Yet there is reason to believe that this
fittheirinitiativeintotheframework of for- assumptionis misleading.Cf. the interestingessay
mal regulation. Both theeffective exerciseof by HermannLevy, Volkscharakter und Wirtschaft
powerortheeffective organizationofproduc- (Leipzig: B. G. Tuebner, I926).

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504 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

ingtheideal typesof democratic and author- authority.It lies in the spiritof "authori-
itarian administration.43 tarian discretion"that a successfulmain-
Authoritarian administration is character- tenance of authorityis in the end more
ized by thefactthatthe official is bothobe- importantthan its possible abuse. In case
dient and arbitrary.His strictcompliance of failuretheofficial is punished, notso much
withthe ordersof his superioris not tem- for an abuse of his authority,but for his
pered (as it is underdemocraticconditions) "demonstrably disloyal" (i.e. unsuccessful)
by responsiveness to public demands.Reli- exerciseofit. Suchmethodsofadministration
ance is placed on the feelingof loyalty, lead in the extremecase to continuoussus-
whichthe officialdemonstrates by his un- piciondownwardsand the attemptto evade
questioning support of the prevailing responsibility on the part of subordinates.
orderofauthority. Suchloyaltyimpliesa dif- Thereis a tellingdescription ofthisinWalter
ferencein statusbetweenofficialdom and the L. Dorn's analysisof Prussianbureaucracy
public and in thismanner"testifies"to the underFredericktheGreat:
reliabilityof the authoritarianofficial.In "FredericktheGreatcherished theinveterate
bringinghis orders nearer executionthis beliefthathis officials werebenton deceiving
loyaltyof the subordinatefindsits counter- him.... This distrust becamean integral part
part in the factthathe mustnow becomea of the bureaucratic system.Unreserved con-
superiorin his ownright.In doingso he acts fidence he reposedin noneof his ministers. He
as a "leader" to whoseguidancethe people keptthemin a perpetual stateof uncertainty
shouldsubmitwithoutquestion.To be sure as to whathe thoughtof theirhonestyand
his authority is limited, but theofficial never- capacity.. . . He frequently struckupon the
thelessconfronts hispublicas therepresenta- expedient of committing the taskof reporting
tive of higherauthorityratherthan as a on any particular piece of businessto two or
threedifferent
officials,
noneofwhomwasaware
"public employee." thatotherswereengagedin thesamemission.
"Theofficial inthemiddleandthelowerranks Whenhe did not whollytrustan official he
of theserviceis in somerespects similarto the chargedan underling withsecretsupervision.
officer.. . . Even without uniform thereis a To controlhis ministers he regularly corre-
strongfeelingof comradeship and a feelingof spondedwiththe presidents of the provincial
solidarity againstcivilians. . . . The subordina- chambers, and to assurehimself of theveracity
tionof lowerto higher ranksin theofficialdomof thelatterhe oftendealtwiththeindividual
is similarto relationsin the armyand it is members of the provincialchambers. By this
tolerableonlywhenit is compensated forby continuouscorrespondence with officials and
a feelingof specialstatusof the officials as their subordinates, by controlling ministers
againstthepublic.. . . Officials in the middle throughtheir subalternsand subordinates
and lowerranksstill represent the superior through theirequals,the kingtappedextraor-
powerandwisdomof thestatetowards a public dinarysourcesof information which,besides
to whomthe largermeaningof publicadmin- the ordinary channelsof information . . ..
istration is indifferentor incomprehensible. In- acquaintedhim witheverything he seriously
deed,the official will tendto regardthe im- desiredto know."45
portance of his administrative sectionthemore
highly thelesshe is ableto comprehend thereal Obviously,this systemof authoritarian su-
over-allsignificance of his own work."44 pervisionhas sincebecomeimpracticalwith
the growingcomplexity of administration in
In thisas in all systemsof administrationa modernstate. Modern dictatorships have
muchis leftto the discretionary exerciseof
4' WalterL. Dorn, "The PrussianBureaucracy
4$Although
this contrastuses onlyillustrationsin the i8th Century,"Political Science Quarterly,
fromGovernment Administrationit appliesequally XLVI (September, I93I), 42I-22. For a modern
well in my opinionto othertypesof large-scale parallelsee Alexander Barmine,One Who Survived
organizations. (New York: G. P. Putnam,I945), i96-233, 237-45.
4 Ottoheinz vonderGablentzand CarlMennicke, A comparablesituationin businessis discussedin
DeutscheBerufskunde, (Leipzig: Bibliographisches"The Stewardshipof Sewell Avery,"Fortune,
Institut,I930), 428-29. (My translation). XXXIII (May, I946), III-I3, I79-86.

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 BUREAUCRACY: THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING 505

institutedinstead elaborate administrativethe methodof application willvarywitheach

organizations forthe systematicsupervision neighborhood and community. There are no
of the politicalloyaltyof the people and set rules, nor even generalguides to policy,in
all government employees.A modernpolice thisregard.Each policeman must,in a sense,
systemcan employthemostadvancedtech- determine the standardwhichis to be set in
the area for whichhe is responsible.. . . Thus
niques in its closelycalculatedcontrolover
he is a policy-forming policeadministrator in
large populations.46Althoughthese tech- miniature, who operatesbeyondthe scope of
niques have freed authoritariansuper- theusualdevicesof popularcontrol. He makes
vision fromthe limitationsof centralizing and unmakesthefortunes of governmental ex-
power in one person, they cannot escape ecutivesand administrators, thoughrarelyfall-
fromthe necessityof foreverduplicating ing underthe directinfluence of the popular
theirsupervisory checks,becausein thissys- will.The onlycontrolto whichhe is subjectis
temno one spy can be trusted. thediscipline ofhissuperiors."47
In democraticadministration officialsare
givencommandsof greaterlatitudethanun- Andyet,hissuperiors are dependentfortheir
der authoritarian conditions,and theirexe- success on the wisdom withwhichthispolice-
cutionof these commandsis subject to a man in his law enforcement practiceswill
ratherdiffusesupervision.The democratic respondto theindirectinfluences oftheacom-
officialis ideallyexpectedto be obedientto munity.
his superior,but he does not therebyex- In exercisingsuch discretionin his direct
press his loyaltyto the people's mandate. contact withthe public the democraticad-
On the other hand, he is to exercise ministrator is ideallyas concernedwithad-
his authorityin the spiritof service,not of ministering a policyas he is withtheexecu-
mastery. The democratic administrator tion of a command. (Indeed, he is always
stands,therefore, in an ambivalentrelation- contributing to a policy,whetherhe knows
shipto his superiorand his subordinate. it or not.) Yet, this policy continuesto be
His
his
compliance, ordersand his initiativeare subject to a multiplicity of influencesto
temperedby a sense of direct,if imponder- whichthe administrator mustremainsensi-
able accountability to thepeople.In thisre- tive. (Shifts in policy under authoritarian
spect, superiorand subordinateare equals conditionsalways take the formof new or-
beforethepublic,althoughtheyare unequal ders from above.) This implies that the
within the administrative democraticofficialdoes his dutyin the con-
hierarchy.This
peculiarcharacteristic of democraticadmin- tinuous anticipation of checkson his author-
istrationis well illustratedby the problems ity, both from his superiorand fromhis
encountered in law enforcement: "public" (which includes legislatures, pres-
suregroups,affected individuals, etc.). He is
"The policeman mayobservea multitude of trainedin considering his officeas a mandate
violations,somerelating to lawsand ordinances of responsibilities, whichare subjectto more
whichwereneverintended by the enactorsto orless continuous modification. Yet,hisman-
be enforced, othersinvolving minorregulationsdate is nevertheless of a generalcharacter,
of publicorder.. . . Theirverynumberand it
is meantto be an integralpartofa schemeof
varietyare such that theirrequirements are
largelyunknown to the peopleto whomthey policiesin processofreformulation. He must,
apply. Hence violationsare extremely com- therefore, seekto redefine his function in this
mon.... scheme on the presupposition that some ra-
"Thepoliceman's art,then,consists inapplying tionalpolicy emergesfromthe "conflictof
andenforcing a multitude oflawsandordinances interests"and in the beliefthat-whatever
in suchdegreeorproportion andinsuchmanner the policy-this "conflict"itselfis a basic
that the greatestdegreeof social protection and worthwhilefeatureof the democratic
willbe secured. The degreeof enforcement and process.
4 Thispointis especially
emphasized
byE. Kohn- 4 Bruce Smith,Police Systemsin the United
Bramstedt,op. cit., pp. 2-6, 95-II7, I37-56. States (New York: Harpers, I940), 20.

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5o6 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

The authoritarian administrator is, on the resentgenuinecompromises of the various

otherhand, moreimmune,his workis less conflicting groups.
directlysubjectto "pressures"fromoutside Both formsof bureaucracymay also de-
the officialhierarchy.Under authoritarian velop the pathologyof large-scaleorganiza-
conditions obedienceand loyaltyare synony- tions.Authoritarian bureaucracy can become
mous,since each administrative superioris a cliqueriddenby suspicion.Its primary con-
ideally the only source of command,the cern with self-preservation results in the
representative of the regimeand the source alienationof the public,a growinginability
of its policy formulation. For each subor- to operateefficiently, and the duplicationof
dinatepolicyemanatesfromthe top and is functions, which a more or less developed
unaffected by the administrator's directcon- internalspy-system necessitates. Democratic
tactwiththepublic.The roleof each official administration may deteriorate, on theother
in the executionof overallpolicyis, conse- hand,becausethefrustrations of administra-
quently,a matterofintra-administrative dis- tive work deter qualified men and because
cussionand adjustment. And because each suspicionof any authority goes so far as to
subordinateadministrator is in thissensere- makeeffective policyformulation and execu-
motefromthepublic,responsibility forpol- tionimpossible.
icy determination is moreclearlyconfined to The temptation is strongto summarize the
the top administrators and is by the same differencebetween democratic and authori-
tokenless affected by publicopinion.It fol- tarianadministration by reference to Mann-
lows fromtheseconsiderations that an ad- heim's distinctionbetween functionaland
ministration willbe themoredemocratic, the substantialrationality, whichwas mentioned
moreits officials are directlyaffected by the earlier. Authoritarianofficialswould be
"antagonismof influences"48 and the more thoughtof as efficient in the use of ad-
theyare, therefore, drawn into participating, ministrative techniques without propercom-
more or less directly,in the processesof prehension of theirrolein the overallpolicy
policyformation. decidedon by the Dictator (functionalra-
The precedingconfrontation of two ideal tionality).Democraticofficialswould com-
typesof bureaucracy may servebothto dis- bine, on the other hand, administrative
pel some misconception and to focusatten- inefficiency with an understanding of the
tionon themajorarea ofinquiryin thisfield. basic policies which they are called upon
Both formsof administration may function to implement (Substantial rationality).49
efficiently. This is the case under authori- This application of Mannheim's distinc-
tarianconditions whentheespritde corpsof tion does not aid us, however,in our
the administrative groupis high,its loyalty analysisof large-scaleorganizations. Mann-
to the regimeintact and in harmony with heim himself would point out that all sub-
public attitude,and its resultantfeelingof ordinateadministrators sufferfromthe spe-
securitya good foundationforthe exercise cial incapacitywhichexclusiveattentionto
of individualinitiativeby the administratorthe techniquesof implementation entails.
withinthis framework. It is the case under Democratic and authoritarian officialsshare
democraticconditions,when the spirit of in theinabilityof comprehending the politi-
public serviceamongadministrators is well cal programwhich"governs"theiractions.
developed,theirresponsiveness to publicde- Besides, Mannheim's distinction suffers
mands kept withinlimitsby the public's from overstatingits case.50 It is impos-
restraintin pressingforindividualprivileges 'This distinctionhas been used to characterize
and by theadministration's successin achiev- Nazi administration.See E. Kohn-Bramstedt,op.
ingconsistent policyformulations whichrep- cit., 2-6 and JohnH. Herz, "GermanAdministration
under the Nazi Regime,"AmericanPolitical Science
Review, XL (August, I946), 684-86.
48John Stuart Mill, "Representative Govern- ' Karl Mannheim, Man and Society, op. cit.,
Libertyand Representative 5V-60. This is not to deny,of course,that Mannheim,
ment,"in Utilitarianism,
Government(London: E. P. Dutton, I9I0), 20I. has pointed to a constant source of friction.The

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 LOGICAL LEVELS IN SOCIAL INQUIRY 507

sible to run any large-scale organiza- because one is representative and inefficient,
tion without some provision for fitting whiletheotheris efficient but arbitrary.The
the specialized technicianinto the larger distinctionbetweenthese two typesof ad-
framework of operation.It is, however,not ministration is an outgrowthof "historical
possibleto directhis everyaction; somere- experience"and presentcircumstances. As
liance must,therefore, be placed on his own suchit affectsthemannerof theadministra-
overallcomprehension ofhis function and on tivetechnician, whocombinesobedienceand
the initiativewhich he developsin imple- efficiency withthe initiativethatis essential
mentingthiscomprehension by co-operative to the successof large-scaleorganization. It
action.Thus, both democraticand authori- is not useful,therefore, to considertheseor-
tarianofficials mustgrapplewiththe prob- ganizationsfromthe pointof view eitherof
lem of overcoming the "trainedincapacity" their"rationalization" or oftheir"humanir-
(Veblen) of theadministrative technicianto rationalities."The problemof bureaucracy
see the largerpolicy framework. Both will lies ratherin the mannerin whichtechnical
tend to use the rationalizations of theirre- and administrative rationality are combined
spectivepoliticalphilosophies,forinstance, withthe exerciseof individualinitiativein
as guidancein all cases in whichtheyneed theaccomplishment of a commontask.Men
but cannotobtaina knowledgeofbasic poli- have combinedtheirefforts in large-scaleor-
cies.51 ganizationsthroughout history. Theirsuccess
Democraticand authoritarian administra- today will depend on whetheror not they
tions differ, therefore,in termsof theirre- can combinetheefficiency ofmodernorgani-
spectiveinstitutions and culturepatterns, not zationwitha flexibility whichallowsthein-
dividual in that organizationto use his
distinctiongoes back to Karl Marx, Capital, op. cit.,
imagination and to apply his convictions,
36i-65, 395-99.
ratherthan do his job in a routineway.It is
' The behavioristicimportanceof political phil- not only a questionof preserving freedom
osophies in a study of administrativeconduct has against the encroachments of bureaucracy.
not so far been sufficiently considered.See in this Rather,we cannotprofitfromthe efficiency
respect John M. Gaus, Leonard D. White, and
Marshall E. Dimock, The Frontiersof Public Ad-
of large-scaleorganizationsunless we suc-
ministration(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, ceedin makingtheinitiative oftheindividual
I936). one ofourprinciples oforganization.

THE DIFFERENTIATION OF LOGICAL LEVELS

IN SOCIAL INQUIRY*
FRANK LORIMER
AmericanUniversity

IN DEALING with populationproblemsand a largepartof ourdailylives.These maybe

relatedsubjectswe necessarilyoperate
on different logical levels. Discussions
are commonly confusedby failureto distin-
guish theselevels,to appreciatethe nature
and limitations of each,and to recognizethe
properrelationof each to others.It is possi-
ble to differentiatefourdistinctlevelsinvolv-
ingscientific inquiry,beyondthemoreprimi-
tivemodesof discoursethatstillrunthrough
* Presidentialaddress,Population Associationof
America,
Princeton,
N.J.,May I7, I947.
definedas follows:
i. Science.Inferencesthatare rigidlycon-
trolledby systemsof implication,such as
mathematics, and by preciseobservations.
2. Technicaljudgments.Scientifically in-
formedbut nevertheless subjective,intuitive
judgmentsin a fieldin whicha scientisthas
special competence.
3. Generaltheories.Theoriesthatare par-
tiallygroundedon scientificinferences but
thatare predominantly intuitive.

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