Popular Radicalism

in java, 1912-1926
\
Takashi Shiraishi
ISBN D-AOm-ElAfi-A
An Age in Motion
Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912-192 Takashi Shiraishi
"An important book, not only for South�east Asia specialists but for the
comparative study of ideological change. Dealing with a liminal period in the
transition between tradi�
tional and modern thought, and with a conjunction between religion, nationalism,
and
social radicalism, it should attract the attention of historians of intellectual
change and
people interested in contemporary movements elsewhere in the world. In this book,
Shiraishi shows vividly how the ideology of the independence movement was born in
the
experience and thought of ordinary people."-Ruth McVey, School of Oriental and
African Studies, University of London"This superb political and intellectual study
of early twentieth-century Indonesian nationalism in Java sets a new standard for
writing history as subtly and richly as it hap�pened."-Daniel S. Lev, Department of
Political Science, University of Washington Takashi Shiraishi examines the
emergence during the first quarter of this century of an Indonesian popular
movement (called pergerakan). Expressed in such forms as news� papers, rallies,
trade unions, revolts, novels, and songs, this popular movement marked a time when
Indonesians began to view their world in a new way, to articulate this new
conciousness in modern forms, and to believe that these expressions could have a
political effect-in sum, it was a time that Indonesians felt to be in motion.
Modern Indonesian politics was born in the pergerakan, and Indonesian nationalism,
Islamism, and communism,as political movements, trace their origins to this period.
(continued on back flap)

An Age in Motion
Asia East by South
A series published under the auspices of
the Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University
An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in java, 1911-1916,
by Takashi Shiraishi
An Age in Motion
Popular Radicalism in Java,
1912-1926
Takashi Shiraishi
Cornell University Press
Ithaca and London
THIS BOOK HAS BEEN PUBLISHED WITH THE AID OF A GRANT FROM
THE HULL MEMORIAL PUBLICATION FUND OF CORNELL UNIVERSITY.
Copyright c 1990 by Cornell University
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts
thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing
from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, 124
Roberts Place, Ithaca, New York 14850.
First published 1990 by Cornell University Press.
International Standard Book Number 0-8014-2188-8
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 89-37476
Printed in the United States of America
Librarians: Library of Congress cataloging information
appears on the last page of the book.
c The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the
American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library
Materials Z39.48-1984.

Digitized by the Internet Archive

in 2018 with funding from
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Contents
Maps and Tables
Preface
Abbreviations
Glossary
1 The Arena
The Age of Capital, i 8
Reorganization 18
The Age of Capital, 2 23
The Modern Age 27
2 The Birth of the Pergerakan
The Surakarta Sarekat Islam 41
Dunia Pergerakan (The World of the Movement) 48
The Rise of Tjokroaminoto 70
Marco in Doenia Bergerak (The World in Motion) 79
3 The Age in Motion
The Rise of Semaoen 98
Tjokroaminoto's Radicalization 103
The Age of Strikes and the Rise of "the Strike King" 109
4 The Insulinde and Peasant Strikes in Surakarta
Tjipto, a Ksatrya 117
Misbach, a Muballigh 127
The Rise of the Insulinde, 1 137
The Rise of the Insulinde, 2 146
Misbach and the Peasant Strikes 157
Tjipto, Douwes Dekker, and the Polanharjo Affair 165
ix
xi
xvii
xix
1
4i
9i
117
Vll
Vlll Contents
5 Solo in the Pergerakan
Tjipto in Motion 175
The Resurgence of the Sarekat Hindia 184
"The Age of the World Upside-Down" 188
The Sarekat Abangan 197
The Government Strikes Back 203
The Collapse of the Sarekat Hindia 207
6 The Age of Reaction, the Age of Parties
Deepening Schism 218
The PFB General Strike Fiasco 220
The CSI Split 225
The Age of Reaction 231
The Age of Parties 243
7 Islamism and Communism
Misbach's Return 250
Solo in the Age of Reaction 266
Journey to Manokwari 278
Islamism and Communism 285
8 Final Years
Marco's Return 299
The Government versus the Party 309
The Surakarta PKI and SR in Motion 316
The Final Year 326
Epilogue
Selected Bibliography
Index
175
216
249
299
339
343
355
Maps and Tables
MAPS
1. Java xxiv
2. Residency of Surakarta, 1920s 4
3. Center of Insulinde/NIP-SH actions 155
TABLES
1. Railway transportation through East-West and SemarangVorstenlanden Lines 9
2. The area leased to European plantations in Surakarta and
Yogyakarta, 1862-1920 11
3. Sugar and tobacco production in the Vorstenlanden,
1880-1910 12
4. Sugar and tobacco production in the regencies of
Surakarta, Boyolali, Klaten, Sragen, and Wonogiri in 1890,
1900, and 1910 12
5. The number of second-class native schools and pupils 28
6. Native elementary schools in Java and Madura 28
7. Native students attending Dutch-language schools 29
8. The CSI Central Committee, 1914-17 75
IX

Preface
The rise of a popular movement, expressed in such forms as news�
papers and journals, rallies and meetings, trade unions and strikes,
associations and parties, novels, songs, theaters, and revolts, is the
phenomenon that most vividly struck the Dutch as the "native" awak�
ening in the Indies in the first quarter of the twentieth century. It was
and still is called the pergerakan (movement), in which "natives"
moved (bergerak) in their search for forms to express their new politi�
cal consciousness, put in motion (menggerakkan) their thoughts and
ideas, and confronted the realities of the Indies in the world and in an
age they felt to be in motion.
In the orthodox historiography shared by both Indonesians and Indonesianists, the
pergerakan is often seen as the movement in which
the yet-nameless nation was in search of its own name, Indonesia, and
its national ideal, Indonesia Merdeka (Free Indonesia). In this view, the
pergerakan begins with the letters of R. A. Kartini and the establish�
ment of the Boedi Oetomo (BO, Lofty Intent), the first individual and
organizational expressions of national awakening, and ends with the
establishment of the Perhimpoenan Indonesia (Indonesian Association)
and Soekarno's Partai Nasional Indonesia (National Party of Indo�
nesia) and with sumpah pemuda, the oath by which Indonesian youth
committed themselves to Indonesia as one country, one nation, and
one language. In this view, the pergerakan in the first quarter of the
twentieth century was essentially transitional, in the sense that it was
national but not yet really nationalist. Its historical significance can be
appreciated only in terms of what it eventually attained, the discovery
of the national ideal of Free Indonesia and the creation of traditions
that had taken shape in the course of the pergerakan, above all the
ideological and organizational classificatory system of nationalism, Isxi
Xll Preface
lam, and communism. In this perspective, all the individuals and or�
ganizations that "moved" are understood as precursors of what even�
tually succeeded them. Kartini is thus seen as the mother of Indonesian
national awakening; the BO and the Indische Partij (IP, Indies Party) as
nationalist; the Sarekat Islam (SI, Association of Islam) and the
Moehammadijah as Islamic; and the Indische Sociaal-Democratische
Vereeniging (ISDV, Indies Social Democratic Association) and the PKI
(Perserikatan Kommunist di India, League of Communists in the In�
dies, and later Partai Komunis Indonesia, Communist Party of Indo�
nesia) as Communist.
What is the historical basis of this historiography? It seems that this
view is a child born from the marriage between Dutch Indies state files
and the post-independence Indonesia-centric perspectives. Its founda�
tion was laid by J. Th. Petrus Blumberger in his trilogy De Communistische
Bewegirtg in Nederlandsch-Indie (The Communist move�
ment in the Netherlands Indies), De Nationalistische Beweging in
Nederlandscb-Indie (The nationalist movement in the Netherlands In�
dies), and De Indo-Europeescbe Beweging in Nederlandscb-Indie (The
Indo-European movement in the Netherlands Indies).1 Petrus Blum�
berger, a former administrative official of the Indies state, came to
occupy the celebrated position of its founding father because of the
rare access he enjoyed to Dutch colonial archives, through whose files
and dossiers he could view the pergerakan in the Indies as if looking at
fish in an aquarium. In writing his trilogy, however, he not only ob�
tained data from Dutch colonial files but also, and more important,
inherited the two classificatory systems the Indies state employed in
organizing its memory. One of the systems was racial, reflecting the
fundamental principle by which the Indies state classified and thus
segregated the Indies population into the "Europeans," the "Eura�
sians" (Indos), the "foreign Orientals," and the "natives." The other
was organizational, because the state worried more about organiza�
tions than about individuals and because organized political parties
had become normal by the time Petrus Blumberger embarked on his
research on the pergerakan. The BO, the SI, and the Communists (the
ISDV and the PKI) were thus juxtaposed with trade unions, religious
movements (the Moehammadijah and the Ahmadijah), and ethnic
movements in De Nationalistische Beweging, while the IP and its suc�
cessors, the Insulinde and the Nationaal Indische Partij-Sarekat Hindia
(NIP-SH, National Indies Party-Association of the Indies), were jux�
taposed with the Indo-Europeesch Verbond (Indo-European Union) in
1J. Th. Petrus Blumbergber, De Communistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie
(Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1928); De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie
(Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1931); De Indo-Europeesche Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie
(Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink, 1939).
Preface xiii
De Indo-Europeescbe Beweging simply because the IP was the brain�
child of an Indo, E.F.E. Douwes Dekker.
In the post-independence era, two types of changes took place. The
first one was nominal, as names were changed to express Indonesia�
centric perspectives. The Netherlands Indies became Indonesia, the
"native" awakening became the Indonesian national awakening, and
Inlanders (natives) became Indonesians. Second and more significant,
the original two classificatory systems were consolidated into one ideo�
logical and organizational classificatory system of nationalism, Islam,
and communism. This change was brought about because the racial
categories were outright colonial and because the classificatory system
of nationalism, Islam, and communism had become commonsensical
since the middle of the 1920s in the discourse of Indonesian politics.
Partial rehabilitation of the IP as a nationalist precursor resulted from
this revision. With these revisions a hybrid historiography came into
being.
Once born, this hybrid orthodox historiography has been challenged
in no fundamental way and has continued to orient further research on
the pergerakan, research done primarily to fill in "gaps" left by Petrus
Blumberger. The only exception was Ruth T. McVey's classic, The Rise
of Indonesian Communism. Investigating the changing party lines of
the PKI and its relations with the Comintern, she demonstrated that the
Communist movement in the Indies defied racial segregations.2 Yet
even her work remains a partial revision of the orthodox historiogra�
phy because, concentrating her attention on the development of Indo�
nesian communism (the ISDV and the PKI), she did not really question
the validity of the classificatory system of nationalism, Islam, and com�
munism.
Yet the orthodox historiography has two fundamental weaknesses.
First, the fact that the Indies state organized files on the pergerakan in
terms of organizations does not necessarily mean that organizations
are of paramount importance for the understanding of the pergerakan.
Indeed, how can the orthodox view be justified, if those who "moved"
in those years thought, said, and acted in the first person and if only in
the 1920s did parties start to suppress first-person voices in the name
of organization and discipline? Second, seeing the pergerakan in the
1910s and the first half of the 1920s as transitional, the orthodox
historiography fails to ask one set of important questions: how people
were confronted with what realities, what thoughts and ideas guided
them, and above all what forms and languages they employed to ex�
press their new consciousness.
2Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 1965).
XIV Preface
The age of pergerakan in Indonesia is comparable in its importance
to the rise of a popular movement in China in the 1910s and 1920s, in
the Philippines in the 1880s and 1890s, and in Malaya in the immedi�
ate postwar years. It was in those years that people-at first a few from
particular social groups and backgrounds and later wider segments of
the population-began to see the world in a new way (which was,
however, intimately related to older ways), to feel that they could
change their world, and to express this new consciousness in modern
forms and languages now familiar to us, such as newspapers, rallies,
strikes, unions, parties, and ideologies. It is this new consciousness and
the richness of forms and languages in which it was cast which gives
the pergerakan its major significance.
How, then, can we understand the pergerakan in its own fertility and
richness? Who "moved" in what realities and against whom? What
were their thoughts and ideas? In what forms and languages were they
expressed and how were those forms and languages read? In short,
what was the pergerakan like? Certainly there are a number of ways to
approach these questions. We may focus our attention on individual
pergerakan leaders' thoughts and try to understand how their minds
struggled with the realities of the Indies in the 1910s and the 1920s.3
We may place ourselves in a certain locality and try to appreciate the
richness of the pergerakan there. Or we may view the pergerakan from
the center of the Indies state in Buitenzorg and try to understand how
the pergerakan was encased in the "Glass House" and was monitored,
shaped, and eventually crushed by the Dutch Indies state.4
The approach employed in this book is eclectic in this respect: we
will set our stage in Surakarta, Central Java, and read pergerakan
leaders' and followers' words and deeds in their social, cultural, politi�
cal, and economic contexts, while keeping fully in mind what went on
outside Surakarta-in Java, the Indies, and beyond-as read and dis�
cussed in newspapers and at rallies and meetings. This approach is
justifiable for two reasons. If we try to see the pergerakan from the
center, we will easily end up viewing it in the Glass House, taking pale
and senseless images of the pergerakan gleaned from files and dossiers
as real; and if we concentrate our attention solely on a certain locality
or on a certain personality, that hybrid historiography will remain
intact. In this sense, this book is not just a study of the pergerakan in
3See for instance Benedict Anderson, "A Time of Darkness and a Time of Light:
Transposi�
tion in Early Indonesian Nationalist Thought," Anthony Reid and David Marr eds.,
Percep�
tions of the Past in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980),
pp.
219-248; Kenji Tsuchiya, Indonesia Minzoku-shugi Kenkyu: Taman Siswa no Seiritsu to
Tenkai (Tokyo: Sobunsha, 198Z).
4Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Rumah Kaca (Jakarta: Hasta Mitra, 1988).
Preface xv
Surakarta. But Surakarta as an arena is strategic for our purposes
because Surakarta was the only center of the pergerakan in which all
social forces-Javanese princes and aristocrats, native officials, native
bourgeoisie, Western-educated native intellectuals, pesantren (Islamic
boarding school)-educated Muslims, artisans, workers, peasants, Indos, Chinese,
Dutch administrative officials, and Dutch plantation
managers-joined the pergerakan or became its enemies; and because
three figures who defy the classification of nationalism, Islam, and
communism-Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, Marco Kartodikromo, and -
Hadji Mohammad Misbach-illuminated the pergerakan in Surakarta
in their own different ways.
The chapters that follow are divided chronologically into four parts.
After delineating Surakarta as our arena, I discuss the pergerakan in its
formative years (1912-17) in Chapter 2 and its transformation in the
age of strikes (1918-20) in Chapters 3-5. I then move on to the
pergerakan in the age of parties in Chapters 6 and 7, and discuss in the
last chapter the final years of the pergerakan leading to the ill-fated
Communist revolts in late 1926 and early 1927.
In dealing with the problem of variations in the spelling of Indone�
sian names and words, I have found no satisfactory solution. The
system I follow is this: personal and organizational names as well as
Indonesian words in quotations are spelled in the original (hence, for
instance, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, not Tjipto Mangunkusumo or
Cipto Mangunkusumo, and Boedi Oetomo [BO], not Budi Utomo
[BU]); place-names and Indonesian words not in quotations are spelled
in the modern system (hence Yogyakarta, not Djogjakarta or Jogjakar�
ta, and muballigh, not moeballigh).
This book traces its conception to my encounter with Hadji Moham�
mad Misbach's serialized article in Medan Moeslimin, "Islamisme dan
Kommunisme [Islamism and communism]," at the National Museum
Library in Jakarta in December 1977. Unable to make sense of it, I
looked for and tried to reconstruct a meaningful historical context in
which to locate and read the article. This eventually led me to question
the orthodox historiography of the pergerakan. In the very slow proc�
ess of maturation of my research over ten years, I accumulated an
enormous amount of debt to many people and institutions. Here 1
above all wish to acknowledge my great intellectual and personal debt
to Benedict Anderson, Shinkichi Eto, and David K. Wyatt, who have
all given me support and encouragement and in very different ways
have shaped my thinking about Indonesia and Asia. I am also deeply
grateful to Sherman Cochran, Audrey Kahin, Ruth McVey, James
Siegel, Kenji Tsuchiya, and Pramoedya Ananta Toer, who not only
XVI Preface
read the manuscript and offered many helpful and insightful sugges�
tions and criticisms but also made available their own materials for my
benefit.
Acknowledgment is also due the Japan Society for the Promotion of
Science, the Southeast Asia Program of Cornell University, the Depart�
ment of International Relations of the University of Tokyo, the Minis�
try of Education of Japan, and the Nitobe Fellowship, whose support
permitted me to study at Cornell University and to do research in the
Netherlands and Indonesia. I am also grateful for the help I received
from the archives of the Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken (Ministry
of Internal Affairs) in The Hague, which granted me permission to
consult papers in the Archives of the Netherlands Indies, and from the
LIPI of Indonesia.
The list of friends at Cornell University and in Indonesia, the Nether�
lands, and Japan whose thoughts, writings, and experiences have helped
me in so many ways is too long to append here. Special thanks are,
however, due Sumio Fukami, Hiroyoshi Kano, Yudhistira, Adhie and
Antho Massardi, the late Akira Nagazumi, William and Jeanne O'Mal�
ley, Onghokham, Saifullah Mahyuddin, and the late Haji Roesli. My
editor at Cornell University Press, Holly Bailey, was helpful in many
ways, Fois Krieger copyedited the manuscript with care, and Jana
Mrazkova made index with great thoroughness.
Finally, my wife, Saya, an Indonesianist in her own right, helped and
inspired me in so many ways, and to her I dedicate this book with love.
Takashi Shiraishi
Ithaca, New York
Abbreviations
BB
BO
CSI
ELS
GG
HBS
HIS
IJB
IP
IPO
ISDP
ISDV
M
NIP-SH
NIS
OSVIA
PEB
PFB
PGHB
PID
PKBO
Binneniandsch Bestuur (Interior Administration, the European
Civil Service)
Boedi Oetomo
Centraal Sarekat Islam
Europeesche Lagere Scholen (European Elementary Schools)
Gouverneur Generaal (Governor General)
Hollandsche Burger Scholen (Dutch Middle-Class Schools)
Hollandsche Inlandsche Scholen (Dutch Native Schools)
Inlandsche Journalisten Bond (League of Native Journalists)
Indische Partij (Indies Party)
Indonesische Padvinders Organizatie or Organisatie Pemoeda
Indonesia (Indonesian Youth Organization)
Indische Persoverzicht (weekly survey of Javanese, Malay, and
Chinese-Malay newspapers)
Indische Sociaal-Democratische Partij (Indies Social Democratic
Party)
Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging (Indies Social
Democratic Association)
mas (Javanese title of nobility below raden)
Nationaal Indische Partij-Sarekat Hindia (National Indies
Party-Association of the Indies)
Nederlandsch Indische Spoorweg (Netherlands Indies Railway)
Opleiding School voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren (Training
School for Native Officials)
Politiek Economische Bond (Political Economic Union)
Personeel Fabriek Bond (Sugar Factory Workers' Union)
Perserikatan Goeroe Hindia Belanda (Netherlands Indies
Teachers' Union)
Politieke Inlichtingendienst (Political Intelligence Service)
Perserikatan Kaoem Boeroeh Oemoem (General Workers' Union)
xvn
XV111 Abbreviations
PKBT
PKI
PKT
PPKB
PPPB
PSI
R
SATV
SBB
SBG
SDI
SH
SI
SPKI
SR
ST
STOVIA
THHK
TKNM
VIPBOW
VOC
VSTP
Perkoempoelan Kaoem Boeroeh dan Tani (Peasants' and Work�
ers' Union)
Perserikatan Kommumst di India (League of Communists in the
Indies), or Partai Komunis Indonesia (Communist Party of
Indonesia)
Perserikatan Kaoem Tani (Peasants' Union)
fesaioean Perserikatan Kaoem Boeroeh (Concentration of
Trade Unions)
Perserikatan Pegawai Pegadaian Boemipoetra (Native Pawn�
shop Workers' Union)
Partij Sarekat Islam (Party of the Association of Islam)
raden (title of nobility)
Sidik Amanat Tableg Vatonah (To Confirm, Convey, and Propagate Goodness) v
Sarekat Boeroeh Batik (Batik Workers' Union)
Sarekat Boeroeh Goela (Sugar Workers' Union)
Sarekat Dagang Islam or Sarekat Dagang Islamijah (Commercial Association of Islam)
Sarekat Hindia. See NIP-SH
Sarekat Islam (Association of Islam)
Sarekat Penolong Kesengsaraan Indonesia (Association of Help�
ers of Indonesian Misery)
Sarekat Ra'jat (Association of the People)
Sarekat Tani (Peasants' Union)
School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen (Native Doctors'
Training School)
Tjong Hoa Hwee Koan (Chinese Association)
Tentera Kandjeng Nabi Mohammad (Lord Prophet Moham�
mad's Army)
Vereemging Inlandsch Personeel Burgerlijke Openbare Werken
(Union of Native Public Works Employees)
Vereemgte Oost-Indische Compagme (Dutch East India Com�
pany)
Vereemging voor Spoor- en Tramwegpersoneel (Railway and
Tramway Workers' Union)
Glossary
abangan nominal(ly) Muslim, strongly influenced by Hindu-Buddhist
and animist religious ideas
adat customary law, tradition or custom
Algemeene General Investigation Service
Recherchedienst
Arbeidsleger Labor Army
babad
bau
bekel
Binnenlandsch
Bestuur
dunia
fitnah
glidig
chronicle
0.7 hectare
one who holds a lease on land of an appanage holder
Interior Administration, the European civil service (BB) in
Dutch Java
world
slander
wages the peasant receives from the plantation for his agri�
cultural labor
haram
hormat
forbidden by Islamic law
respect, especially used for deference forms, prescribed clothing.
ijtihad
language behavior
the process of arriving at new judgments by drawing conclu�
sions from basic sources of Islam (the Koran and hadith), as
opposed to acceptance of tradition
Islam lamisan
Islam sedjati
jongkok
kampung
kasepan
pseudo-Islam
true Islam
humble, crouching walk
quarter or area, administrative or otherwise, of a city
money paid by a plantation to a peasant in compensation for an
extra two to six months' use of his field
katentreman
kaum abangan
kaum muda
tranquillity
See abangan.
"young" group, that is, progressives
xix
XX Glossary
kaum putihan
Kepatihan
ketoprak
korban
kretek
kring
kromo
ksatrya
kuli
kuli kenceng
Kweekschool
kyai
lungguh
mandur
mantri polisi
merdeka/mardika
mualim (pi.
mualimin)
muballigh (pi.
muballighin)
mukmin/
moekmin
munafik/
moenafik
Narpowandojo
negara
negaragung
nggogol
(group of) devout Muslims
patih's office
Javanese popular opera
sacrifice, victim
cigarette with ground cloves added to the tobacco
literally, circle; subbranch
commoner without rank and status; high-Javanese
See satria.
peasant under bekel's control who cultivates land, pays taxes
and performs corvee labor
peasant entitled to have the usufruct of half a bau of arable land
and a housing plot
Teacher Training School
respected elder man, especially of Islamic learning
appanage
foreman, overseer
native police officer
free
religious teacher, guide
preacher, Islamic propagandist
the believers, the faithful
hypocrite
ngoko
Opiumregie
orang particular
pandita
panggugah
Pangreh Pradja
partijtucht
patih
patuh
pengajian
pengulu
perang sabil
pesantren
pikul
prapat
Association of Kasunanan princes
state, capital
the inner realms, the core region
traditional form of peasant protest, mass petition to a high
official
low Javanese
government opium monopoly
white-collar workers employed by private business, as opposed
to those in government service
sa8e> priest in wayang tradition
awakener
indigenous administrative corps
party discipline
grand vizier
appanage holder
recital of Koranic verses
head of the religious officials
holy war
traditional rural Islamic school
61.76 kilograms or 136,161 pounds
literally, quarter; institution that arbitrates conflicts between
peasants and plantation owners
Glossary xxi
priyayi
Procureur
Generaal
racun
radja (raja)
ra'jat/rajat
recherche
regent polisi
Rekso Roemekso
ronda
rust en orde
sama rata sama
rasa
santri
satria
satria maling
satria palsoe
(palsu)
satria sedjati
Sekaten
sembah
Siang-hwee
singkeh
sinyo
slametan
tabligh
tandak
tata tentram
tentram
Volkslectuur
Volksraad
vorst
Vorstenlanden
wargo pangarso
wargo roemekso
wayang
wayang orang
wedana
wedana polisi
wong cilik
member of the Javanese official class
Prosecutor General
poison
king
people
detective force, investigation department
native police chief in the same rank with regent
the Guard, association established by H. Samanhoedi for mutu�
al help and assistance
night watch
tranquillity and order
equality and solidarity
student of a pesantren
warrior-aristocrat of Javanese legend and tradition
thief satria
fake satria
true satria
court festivity celebrating the Prophet Muhammad's birthday
gesture of obeisance with hands held before face
Chinese Chamber of Commerce
a Chinese who has recently arrived from China
European or Eurasian boy
ritual communal feast
religious meeting, Islamic public sermon
Javanese female dancer
order and tranquillity
tranquil, calm
People's Reading, government agency that published books and
ran libraries for the population and surveyed native and
Chinese-Malay newspapers
People's Council
prince, ruler
principalities
literally, members willing to go first; "group presidents of SI
who were appointed for each kampung
literally, guard members; cadres
theater of flat leather shadow puppets
Javanese stage show
district chief
native police chief in the same rank with wedana
literally, little man; ordinary people
zaman age

An Age in Motion

I The Arena
In the colonial era of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the
regions of Surakarta and Yogyakarta in Central Java formed four"selfgoverning"
principalities under the suzerainty of the Dutch Indies
state. The city of Surakarta was the seat of the Kasunanan and the
Mangkunegaran royal houses, while Yogyakarta was the seat of the
Kasultanan and the Pakualaman houses. These four royal houses legit�
imately claimed to be heirs of the once powerful Javanese dynasty of
Mataram, but were Dutch colonial creations as well. The Dutch placed
their domains under two administrative residencies of Surakarta and
Yogyakarta and called the entire region the Vorstenlanden (prin�
cipalities), distinguishing it from the rest of Java directly ruled by the
Dutch Indies government.
From the time of the East India Company (VOC), the Dutch re�
peatedly exploited internal dissension, wars, and disturbances in the
Mataram kingdom to extract ever greater economic, territorial, and
political power. In 1743, after the Mataram king or susuhunan (sunan)
had been ousted by his rivals in a rebellion and then restored to the
throne by the Dutch, he moved the palace to Solo (Surakarta), while
ceding the northern coastal regions to the VOC. This was the founding
of the Kasunanan house in Surakarta, and also the beginning of Dutch
colonial penetration into the core regions of the former Mataram king�
dom, for the patih (grand vizier) in charge of the administration of that
domain was now brought into the service of the VOC and the sunan. A
rival royal house, the Kasultanan, was then established in Yogyakarta
by the Treaty of Gianti in 1755, with Sultan Hamengkubuwana I given
control of half the core and outlying regions of Mataram. Two years
later another rival, the Mangkunegaran royal house, was founded in
Surakarta by the Treaty of Salatiga, with Mas Said as its founding
2 An Age in Motion
prince. He swore allegiance to the sunan, the VOC, and the sultan,
received the title of Pangeran Adipati Mangkunegara, and controlled
his appanage as a self-governing principality. Further division and ero�
sion of the Vorstenlanden came in the early nineteenth century. During
the wars that attended the British interlude in Java (1811-16), a tiny
new principality, the Pakualaman, was carved out of the domain of the
Kasultanan. And with the quelling of the Java War (1825-30) and the
Dutch takeover of the outlying regions there emerged the final shape of
the Vorstenlanden, confined to the core region of Mataram and Pajang
in inland south Central Java, divided administratively into four prin�
cipalities, and politically and militarily impotent.
The residency of Surakarta was composed of the Kasunanan and the
Mangkunegaran domains. The region's border was formed partly by
Mount Lawu in the east and Mounts Merapi and Merbabu in the west.
In the center of the residency lay the fertile Solo plain, bounded by the
foothills of Mounts Merapi and Merbabu in the west and the foothills
of Mount Lawu in the east. To the south lies a dry limestone plateau,
Gunung Sewu, and in the north the Solo plain meets a range of moun�
tains. The Solo River runs through the Solo plain, generally from south
to north, passing near the capital of Surakarta on its journey to East
Java and the Java Sea and bringing fertile volcanic deposits to the soil
of the Solo plain.
The capital of Surakarta, where the sunan's and the Mangkunegara's
palaces as well as the Dutch resident's office were located, was in the
middle of the Solo plain. The city lay on the left bank of the Solo River,
and the Pepe River ran through its center. The largest part of the city
belonged to the Kasunanan. About one-fifth of the area of the city
belonged to the Mangkunegaran. Outside the capital, the area was
divided between the Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran. If we follow
the administrative divisions that had emerged toward the end of the
nineteenth century, the regencies of Klaten and Boyolali as well as a
large part of Sragen belonged to the Kasunanan, while Karanganyar
and Karangpanden belonged to the Mangkunegaran. The regency of
Wonogiri was largely in Mangkunegaran domain, except for the dis�
tricts of Sukoharjo and Tawangsari, which belonged to the Kasunanan.
According to the first reliable census in 1920, the sunan's domain cov�
ered an area of 3,360 square kilometers with a population of 1,383,000,
while the Mangkunegaran covered an area of 2,780 square kilometers
with a population of 706,000. The population of the city of Surakarta
was 134,000, including substantial European, Indo-European (Indo),
Chinese, and Arab populations. In 1920 the population of Europeans
and Indos was 5,000, half of whom lived in the city. The Chinese
numbered 14,000, of whom 8,000 lived in the capital, and the Arab
The Arena 3
population was 800, all in the city.1 The plural nature of the popula�
tion was much more pronounced in the city of Surakarta, where Euro�
peans, Indos, Chinese, Arabs, and other "foreign Orientals" composed
some 10 percent of the whole population.2
True to traditional conceptions, the center of the realm was the
capital (negara), and the center of the capital was the sunan's palace.3
The sunan lived with his wives and female dignitaries in the inner core
of the palace. Outside the inner court and enclosed by the walls of the
larger complex extended the living quarters of officials, functionaries,
courtiers, and various craftsmen and workers. On the north and south
sides of the sunan's palace lay two squares. To the west side of the
northern square lay the Great Mosque, and the area surrounding the
mosque was Kampung Kauman, the living quarters of the sunan's
religious officials, the abdi dalem putihan, headed by the pengulu.
Outside the capital, sunan's negaragung (the core region) extended to
the south, the west, the north, and the northeast.
The replication of traditional conceptions of the realm, however,
ended there. To the southwest, beyond the sunan's negaragung, was
the Kasultanan, equal in status with the Kasunanan. Within the resi�
dency itself, Karanganyar and Wonogiri to the east and to the south�
east of the capital were under the control of the Mangkunegaran. And
in the capital, the Mangkunegara's palace lay northwest of the sunan's
palace, on the west bank of Pepe, with the living quarters of the Mang�
kunegaran officials and legionnaires. Northwest of the sunan's palace,
across the Pepe River, was the Kepatihan (the patih's office). It was a
traditional institution inherited from Mataram, but now the sunan
only nominated the patih, while the Dutch confirmed his appointment.
With the backing of the Dutch, to whom the patih owed allegiance as
well as to the sunan, the Kepatihan grew more independent of the
sunan, and actual administrative authority and responsibility were in
his hands.
In between the sunan's palace and the Kepatihan, just north of the
square, lay the European section, with the residency house, offices, a
church, theater, clubs, schools, and Fort Vastenburg. The Dutch resi1Volkstelling
1920 (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij), pp. ioo-ioi.
2In the residency of Yogyakarta the Kasultanan covered an area of 2,900 square
kilometers
with a population of 1,148,000 and the Pakualaman an area of 145 square kilometers
with a
population of 96,000, which was composed of the Pakualaman territory in the city of
Yogyakarta and the regency of Adikarta. In terms of area and population, the
Kasunanan
clearly came first, closely followed by the Kasultanan and the Mangkunegaran, with
the
Pakualaman as a tiny appendage.
3For traditional conceptions of the realm, see Selosoemardjan, Social Changes in
Jogjakar�
ta (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, i960), pp. 23-27; H.K.J. van Deinse, De
Foestand
in de Vorstenlanden (Leiden: P. Somerwill, 1887), pp. 32-33.
INDIAN OCEAN
Map 2. Residency of Surakarta, 1920s
The Arena 5
dent performed a dual function. First, he had legal jurisdiction over
Europeans and all other inhabitants in the residency who were not
subjects of either the sunan or the Mangkunegara. Second and more
important, he was the official representative to both princes and politi�
cal agent of the governor general of the Dutch Indies. To the sunan he
was officially a "father" and to the Mangkunegara a "friend." His
relations with the sunan were largely determined by a political contract
the ruler had signed at his accession, while his relations with the Mang�
kunegara were determined by a certificate of relations.
The main Chinese quarter was Pasar Gede (Great Market) in the
center of the city and on the north bank of the Pepe River. It was
administered by the Dutch-appointed Chinese officers. The Chinese
officers in turn were intimately connected by kinship and business with
the Chinese opium farm. In the nineteenth century, when pass and
quarter regulations were applied to the Chinese, Chinese officers were
responsible for Chinese traveling in their regions, and the farmers and
their employees were exempted from residence rules and accorded a
liberal application of pass regulations. Under such conditions, the reve�
nue farms, the most important of which was the opium farm, were the
major vehicle by which Chinese merchants tapped rural markets, and
the vast commercial networks centering around the revenue farms were
dominated by the Javanized Chinese elite. The Chinese officers were
those most prominent among this elite. The Chinese officers and the
farm Chinese thus controlled these networks, along the human links of
which material goods, money, and credit entered the countryside in
exchange for Javanese rice and other agricultural produce. In the resi�
dency of Surakarta, Pasar Gede formed, true to its name, the center of
non-European commercial activities.4
The deviations of the Kasunanan from the traditional conceptions of
the realm, as represented in its topology, reflected the fundamental
anomaly felt and experienced by the Javanese ruling elite in the post1830, post-
Java War years. Locked in southern Central Java, divided
into four, and painfully aware of their military and political impotence
in the face of the Dutch, it was clear that the rulers could no longer be
whatJavanese rulers should be. This reality threatened the very basis of
traditional legitimacy, even if the internal workings of the royal admin�
istrations were largely left to the patihs.
In this new era of Dutch colonial rust en orde (tranquillity and
order), Surakarta and Yogyakarta were placed in different situations.5
4For a superb description and analysis of the opium farms and the Chinese officers
in the
nineteenth century, see James R. Rush, "Opium Farms in Nineteenth-Century Java:
Institu�
tional Continuity and Change in a Colonial Society, i860-1910" (diss., Yale
University,
*977).
5The following discussion of the colonization of Javanese cultural tradition is,
unless
6 An Age in Motion
The year 1830 not only marked the beginning of a new era in the
Vorstenlanden but it was also the year that the new governor general,
J. van den Bosch, introduced the Cultuurstelsel, the Forced Cultivation
System, in the Indies government territories. This new colonial policy,
which required that Dutch officials work more closely with native
officials, needed more Dutch Javanese experts who could speak Jav�
anese and were knowledgeable about things Javanese. To this end, the
Institute of the Javanese Language (Instituut voor het Javaansche Taal)
was established in Surakarta, where future Dutch Javanese experts
learned Surakartan Javanese and made excursions to such places as
Dieng, Borobudur, and Prambanan to see the remains of Old Javanese
tradition. In the 1840s the institute was replaced by the newly estab�
lished Royal Academy in Delft, which was later moved to Leiden and
linked with Leiden University. The leading figure in building up the
institutional basis of Javanese studies in the Netherlands was Taco
Roorda, who became the founding father of Dutch Javanology at
Leiden University. Throughout these years, it was Surakartan Javanese
and culture that was studied and learned by future Dutch Javanese
experts and Javanologists. Javanese-Dutch dictionaries and texts on
Javanese grammar were compiled based on Surakartan Javanese, and
the type of Javanese script produced was based on that of the sunan's
court. Surakartan Javanese became the standard Javanese, and Sur�
akarta, especially the sunan's palace, was accorded the status of the
epitome of Javanese culture by Dutch power and Dutch Javanology.
Furthermore, Dutch Javanologists studied Old Javanese literature, Old
Javanese language, and Old Javanese history, which had long been lost
to the Javanese. Dutch Javanology restored the Old Javanese tradition
and then linked it with Surakarta. The Surakartan principalities, above
all the Kasunanan, were thus accorded by the Dutch their historical
claim to Javanese tradition and hence their claim to cultural legitimacy.
This process of cultural legitimation of Surakarta by the Dutch,
however, had another side. First, Dutch Javanology, with its innate
interest in things Old Javanese and equipped with funds, methods, and
institutional continuity, soon exposed the fundamental superficiality of
the Javanese literad's understanding of the Old Javanese tradition and
became its sole conqueror. It was Dutch Javanology that "discovered,"
"restored," and gave shape and meaning to the Javanese past. If the
Javanese wanted to go back to their own past, they too had to read the
works of Dutch Javanologists written in Dutch and, if possible, go
through Javanology training in the Netherlands.6 Second, along with
otherwise noted, based on Kenji Tsuchiya, "19-Seiki Jawa Bunka-ron Josetsu: Jawa-
gaku to
R�ngg�warsito no Jidai," in Kenji Tsuchiya and Takashi Shiraishi, eds., Tonan Aija
no Seiji
to Bunka (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1984), pp. 71-127.
^Thus in the early twentieth century a number of Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran
princes
were sent to the Netherlands for higher education and studied Javanology; they
included
The Arena 7
the development of professional Dutch Javanology, there arose in Sur�
akarta an Indo-Javanese-Chinese community that, being essentially ama�
teur, loved and patronized "modern, decadent" Javanese literature and
all the other cultural activities ignored and disregarded by the Dutch
Javanologists. This community was formed with the first Javaneselanguage newspaper,
Bromartani, as its center. It was published in
18 5 5 by C. F. Winter, an Indo who was born in Yogyakarta and lived
and died in Surakarta. And it was read, contributed to, and subscribed
to by the small, most Westernized segment of the Javanese elite as well
as by Indos and Chinese and became the new forum of Javanese liter�
ary activity.* * * 7
Nothing more clearly illustrates this cultural transformation of
nineteenth-century Surakarta than the place R. Ng. Ranggawarsita
occupied in this age. The legitimizer of the realm through his language,
he was the court poet of the Kasunanan and yet of no use to the palace
because by then cultural legitimacy was conferred by the Dutch. His
patron was thus no longer the sunan's palace but Dutch Javanologists
and the growing Indo-Javanese-Chinese community that patronized
modern Javanese literature. He worked as an informant for Dutch
Javanologists, but he increasingly became a dubious informant on Jav�
anese literary and cultural tradition. By i860 Cohen Stuart ridiculed
his ignorance of Old Javanese, and by the end of the nineteenth century
the fraudulence of his claim to authority on ancient Javanese traditions
was proved beyond doubt in the minds of Dutch Javanologists. Yet his
poetry was legendary in his lifetime and set the standard for artistic
accomplishments of the day. His writings were spread by printing, not
hand-copied manuscripts, and they were enjoyed by members of the
Indo-Javanese-Chinese literary community but not in the court circle.
Ranggawarsita's position as the court poet being such, his poetic world
was pervaded with mutability and eeriness, in which the palace, the
script, the past, and the age were caught as hollow and empty as lifeless
inscriptions and abandoned but enduring monuments of the past.8 The
world he created in his writings showed that the rulers and the realm
were impotent and that the very source of traditional wisdom had been
conquered by the Dutch. Ranggawarsita thus said the impossible-
that the rulers could no longer be what they should be and were now
just empty signs-and left the world in 1873. But the intense sense of
contradiction, obscurity, and mystery was there in his writings, and
once a new sense of direction and new kinds of social visions were
R. M. Soerjosoeparto (future Mangkunegara VII), R. M. Woerjaningrat, Pangeran
Ngabehi
(future Pakubuwana XI), and Pangeran Hadiwidjaja, all of whom were to play
important
roles in the Boedi Oetomo in the 1910s and 1920s while appealing to Javanese
nationalism.
7Anthony Day, "Meanings of Change in the Poetry of Nineteenth-Century Java" (diss.,
Cornell University, 1981), pp. 257-263.
8Ibid., pp. 187-189, 257, 267-284.
8 An Age in Motion
obtained, his writings would become a fertile cultural arsenal for those
who would use them out of the context in which Ranggawarsita him�
self had lived and suffered.
The Age of Capital, i
In Ranggawarsita's final years, the engine of new changes had al�
ready been set in motion in the Vorstenlanden as well as in Java in
general. The engine was capital. And the age of capital, the age of new
liberal colonial policy and private capitalism, was formally ushered in
with the passing of the Agrarian Law in 1870. In that same year the
first railway in the Indies came to the Vorstenlanden from Semarang,
run by the private Nederlandsch Indische Spoorweg (NIS) to transport
sugar produced by private sugar plantations operating in the Vorsten�
landen. A few years after the coming of the railway, the transportation
of goods by water on the Solo River virtually died out, and commercial
centers of the city moved from Sangkrah and Beton to the central
parts.9 Railway transportation between Semarang and the
Vorstenlanden steadily expanded. By 1875 the railway carried 899,000
passengers and 124,000 tons of merchandise a year and earned 2 mil�
lion guilders, while in 1880 it carried 950,000 passengers and 334,000
tons of goods and earned 2.6 million guilders. In five years the goods
transported by the railway increased by 270 percent. Then in 1884 the
East line run by the State Railway (SS) reached Surakarta and linked
the Vorstenlanden with Surabaya. In 1894 the West line came to
Yogyakarta and completed the through line linking Batavia, Bandung,
Yogyakarta, Surakarta, and Surabaya. In 1895 the East and West line
run by the SS and the Semarang-Vorstenlanden line run by the NIS
together carried 5,759,000 passengers and earned 3,054,000 guilders
from passenger fares and 6,588,000 guilders from merchandise trans�
portation. Furthermore, in the last few years of the nineteenth century
and in the first decade of this century, tramways were built in the
Vorstenlanden: the Yogyakarta-Brosot Tramway, the YogyakartaMagelang-Parakan
Tramway, and the Surakarta-Boyolali Tramway,
all run by the NIS.10 This development of the railway and tramway
networks connected in a much more efficient way the countryside of
the Vorstenlanden with the capitals, and the Vorstenlanden as a whole
with major commercial centers to the west, north, and east, and moved
9R.M.P. Soerachman, Het Batikbedrijfin de Vorstenlanden (Weltevreden:
Landsdrukkerij,
192.7), p. Z3.
10For the development of railways, see "Spoor- en Tramwegen" in Encyclopaedic van
Nederlandsch Indie, zd ed. Statistical data are calculated from those included in
Koloniaal
Verslag, 1876, 1881, 1896.
The Arena 9
Table i. Railway transportation through East-West and Semarang-Vorstenlanden lines
Earnings from
Passengers Goods
Kilometrage Passengers (in thousand guilders)
1895 U3i9
5,759,000 3.054 6.588
1900 1,609 9,738,000 4.022 9-743
1905 1,704 13,361,000 4-979 10.216
1910 2., 174 28,420,000 8.825 15.738
1915 2,448 42,579,000 13.685 22.194
Source: Calculated from the data in Koloniaal Verslag, 1896, 1901, 1906, 1911, and
1916.
people and goods in increasing quantities (Table 1). The changes al�
ready under way were greatly accelerated, and in the countryside it was
most salient in the penetration of Dutch plantations and the concomi�
tant transformation of the appanage system.
In the Vorstenlanden the Cultuurstelsel was not implemented in the
years from 1830 to 1870 and Dutch private plantations could operate
most freely in these princely territories. In the Vorstenlanden, even
before 1830, some Chinese and Europeans leased land from the rulers
and appanage holders. But in the pre-1830 years the land leased was
not only small but also was located only in the vicinity of the capitals,
cultivated for rice, vegetables, and fruits solely for local consumption.
In the years from 1830 to 1850, this situation did not change much,
and the land leased to Chinese and Europeans remained small. In
Yogyakarta the land leased never amounted to more than 15,000 bau
(1 bau equals 0.7 hectare) and in Surakarta not more than 50,000. But
in the 1850s and 1860s Dutch private capital, while pressing the Indies
government to open up Java for their activities, started to flow into the
Vorstenlanden. The Indies government prohibited Chinese from leas�
ing land in the Vorstenlanden but let Dutch private capital flow into
the area. Thus the land leased to European planters increased enor�
mously in the 1850s and 1860s. In Surakarta' European planters leased
an area of 30,000 bau in 1855. It increased to 160,000 in i860 and
reached 200,000 bau in 1864. In Yogyakarta, the land leased to Euro�
pean planters increased more modestly, but even there it went from
15,000 bau in 1853 to 46,000 in 1862.*1 The difference between
Surakarta and Yogyakarta lay not only in the amount of land leased
but also in the crops cultivated. In 1870, for instance, 137 plantations
nJ. M. Roosenschoon, "De Westerse Cultures op Java voor 1870" (diss., Utrecht,
1945),
pp. 444-448, 450-451.
IO An Age in Motion
were in operation in Surakarta, among which 73 plantations cultivated
coffee solely or in combination with other crops, 31 plantations culti�
vated sugarcane, 30 indigo, and 19 tobacco. In the same year 58 plan�
tations operated in Yogyakarta, among which 46 cultivated indigo, 8
cultivated sugarcane, and 6 tobacco.12 The extensive cultivation of
coffee in Surakarta and the absence of coffee plantations in Yogyakarta
show that only plains were leased to European planters in Yogyakarta,
while both plains and hilly areas were leased in Surakarta. The railway
came to the Vorstenlanden in the service of plantations that had al�
ready been operating in increasing numbers and size, and provided
them with the means of transporting their product. Thus, in the 1870s
the plantations in the Vorstenlanden greatly expanded, the area leased
to European planters reaching 301,000 bau in Surakarta and 88,000
bau in Yogyakarta in 1880 (see Table 2).
In the development of European plantations in the Vorstenlanden,
the economic depression in the middle of the 1880s marked a water�
shed. In the predepression years, plantations were owned and managed
by private individual European planters responsible only to themselves.
They leased land and ran their plantations with the capital they bor�
rowed from financial institutions. The Culture Bank most active in the
Vorstenlanden was Dorrepaal Co., which in 1884 financed twenty-two
sugar, thirty-eight coffee, and fifty-three other plantations largely oper�
ating in the Vorstenlanden.13 Because individual planters were short of
money and the interest rates were high, they were vulnerable to falls in
the prices of plantation crops, and could not afford to build capitalintensive
sugar factories. Though several sugar mills existed there in
predepression years, they were old-fashioned and were operated either
by water power or by water buffalo.14 Nor could they afford to spend
money for the improvement of techniques and seeds and for the exten�
sive use of fertilizer. Productivity remained low. The expansion of plan�
tations was essentially a static one. As more and more planters came,
the area leased to plantations increased, and less capital-intensive in�
digo and tobacco were cultivated in preference to the more capitalintensive sugar.
The mid-1880s depression virtually wiped out these
private individual planters. Dorrepaal Co. failed in 1884, was convert�
ed into the Dorrepaalsche Bank, and was again reconstructed in 1887
as the Cultuur Maatschappij der Vorstenlanden controlling many plan�
tations there. Now corporate capital took over plantations. The enter�
prises were reconstituted as limited liability companies, and private
individual planters gave way to salaried managers responsible to the
directors of the companies. Culture Banks continued to finance these
X2Koloniaal Verslag, 1871.
13J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy (Cambridge:
Cambridge
University Press, 1944), pp. 197-198.
14Roosenschoon, "De Westerse Cultures," p. 454.
The Arena ii
Table 2. The area leased to European plantations in
Surakarta and Yogyakarta, 1862-1920 (in bau)
Surakarta Yogyakarta
1862 _
46,000
1864 200,000 -
1875 248,000 78,000
1880 301,000 88,000
1890 259,000 93,000
18 95 273,000 93,000
1900 246,000 89,000
1905 245,000 85,000
1910 235,000 95,000
1915 214,000 97,000
1920 183,000 102,000
Sources: Figures of 1862 and 1864 are taken from
Roosenschoon, "De Westerse Cultures op Java," p. 450.
Figures of 1875 onward are taken from Koloniaal Verslag, 1876, 1881, 1886, 1891,
1896, 1901, 1906, 1911,
1916, and 1921.
enterprises, but they now insisted on control. Employing advisers from
among the most competent plantation managers, they were able to
insist on improvements in techniques and seeds and economy of pro�
duction and intervened in the conduct of cultivation and business.15
Culture Banks in turn were linked to normal banking institutions head�
quartered in the Netherlands. The corporate capital that controlled
plantations thus had immense political power in the metropolis. In the
postdepression years, then, corporate capital successfully put pressure
on the Indies government to extend the land-lease period to thirty
years, built highly capital-intensive sugar factories run by steam power,
invested money for the improvement of techniques and seeds, and
raised the productivity of plantation crops. Not only did the amount of
land leased stop increasing but less fertile land also was returned to
the rulers and appanage holders. Yet production rose spectacularly.
Because of the development of railway networks, transportation no
longer posed problems. The price stagnation of coffee and indigo in the
world market made their cultivation less profitable, while sugar
cultivation became much more profitable, especially after the Brussels
Convention of 1902, which opened up the world market for cane
sugar.16 The area leased to coffee plantations was returned, and indigo
plantations were converted into tobacco and especially sugar planta�
tions.
15Furnivall, Netherlands India, pp. 197-199.
16William J. O'Malley, "Indonesia in the Great Depression: A Study of Fast Sumatra
and
Jogjakarta in the 1930s" (diss., Cornell University, 1977), p. 46.
12 An Age in Motion
Table 3. Sugar and tobacco production in the Vorstenlanden, 1880-1910
Sugar (in thousands of pikuls) Tobacco (in tons)
Surakarta Yogyakarta Surakarta Yogyakarta
1880 198 277 805 49
1890 332 475 1,053 17
1900 725
865 5,7i7
1,520
1910 1,215 1,687 6,421 1,855
Source: Figures calculated from the data in Koloniaal Verslag, 1881, 1891, 1901,
and 1911.
In the last decade of the nineteenth century and in the first two
decades of this century, the most important plantation crop cultivated
in the Vorstenlanden was sugarcane and the second most important
was tobacco. In Surakarta, sugar production rose from 332,000 pikuls
(one pikul equals 61.76 kilograms or 136.161 pounds) in 1890 to
725,000 in 1900 and 1,215,000 in 1910, while tobacco production
increased from 1,053 tons m 1890 to 5,716 in 1900 and to 6,421 tons
in 1910. In Yogyakarta, tobacco production never became as impor�
tant as in Surakarta, but sugar production was even higher than in
Surakarta and increased from 475,000 pikuls in 1890 to 865,000 in
1900 and 1,687,000 in 1910 (see Table 3). In Surakarta, Dutch sugar
and tobacco plantations occupied the fertile rice area in Klaten and, to
a lesser extent, in the regencies of Surakarta, Boyolali, and Sragen, all
belonging to the Kasunanan. Dutch plantations did not operate much
in the Mangkunegaran. Instead, Mangkunegara IV, the "modernizer,"
established the royal sugar factories of Tasikmadu and Calamadu in
the early 1870s and ran royal sugar plantations, while abolishing the
Table 4. Sugar and tobacco production in the regencies of Surakarta, Boyolali,
Klaten,
Sragen, and Wonogiri in 1890, 1900, and 1910
Surakarta Boyolali Klaten Sragen Wonogiri Mangkunegara
Sugar (in thousands of pikuls)
1890 - 103 203 26 48
1900 66 4i
520 98 - 102
1910 91 112 829 183 -
195
Tobacco (in tons)
1890 11 35 950 54 3
1900 614 295 4,454 306 49
1910 839 200 5,2-55 121 6
Source: Koloniaal Verslag, 1891, 1901, 1911.
The Arena i3
appanage system in 1871 (see Table 4). In Yogyakarta, plantations
operated in Sleman, Kalasan, and Bantul of the Kasultanan. The Pakualaman was too
small even to give appanages to its princes and digni�
taries, and in 1877 the Pakualam V abolished the appanage system
altogether. European plantations thus penetrated into the Kasunanan
and Kasultanan countryside, the very area where the appanage system,
the traditional institutional device of the Mataram state to control and
exploit the peasantry, was maintained and in turn transformed it to
their own advantage.
Traditionally the Mataram state controlled not the land but the
people and the produce they raised by tilling the land.17 The king's
realm as well as the appanages were thus measured by jung, which was
equivalent to four karya, the land that could support one caca or a
household and that necessarily varied in size depending on the fertility
of the soil and the availability of water. The Kasunanan as well as the
other principalities inherited this traditional system of domination. The
Kasunanan controlled some 10,520 jung in 1910-the number of jung
the Kasunanan controlled changed over time because the population
increased and the fertility of the land also changed due to irrigation-
which were divided into the area in the service of the sunan and the
area given as appanages to his princes (sentana dalem) and officials
(abdi dalem).18 The appanages given to the princes and officials were
called lungguh and the appanage holders patuh or lurah patuh. Ap�
panage holders enjoyed the right to tax and to procure labor from the
people living on their appanages-for three generations in the case of
princes and for the tenure of office in the case of officials.
Living in the capital, the appanage holder did not tax and procure
labor from the people by himself, but appointed bekel for the manage�
ment of his appanage. The land and the people living on the land under
the bekel's control was called bekelship (kabekelan). The relationship
between the appanage holder and the bekel was personal and dyadic in
the sense that it had to be established anew every time either one of
them changed. At his appointment, all the obligations of the bekel to
his appanage holder were specified in detail and he paid bekti money as
a token of respect for his patuh. The bekel in turn received one-fifth of
the bekelship land as his lungguh (appanage), for the cultivation of
17The following discussion of the appanage system and its transformation is based,
unless
otherwise noted, on R. Soepomo, De Reorganisatie van bet Agrarische Stelsel in bet
Gewest
Soerakarta (The Hague: L. Gerretsen, 1927); G. P. Rouffeur, "Vorstenlanden,"
Adatrechtbundels 34 (1931); P. W. Jonquiere, "Grepen uit de Vorstenlandsche
Hisrorie van de laatste
jaren," Koloniaal Tijdschrift, no. 7 (1918), pp. 1399-1425.
,8Of 10,520 jung the Kasunanan controlled in 1910, 1,880 jung were given as
appanages
to the princes, 5,700 jung to the officials, and 240 jung to perdikan desa (free
village), while
the sunan retained 2,700 jung in his own service. H. van Kol, Reisbrieven van H.
van Kol: De
Reorganisatie der Vorstenlanden (Yogyakarta: "Midden-Java," 1911), pp. 11-14.
14 An Age in Motion
which he was entitled to procure labor from the people under his
control.
The peasant under the bekel's control, who was called a kuli (coolie),
cultivated the remaining four-fifths of bekelship land and was obliged
to pay taxes and to perform corvee labor. In the case of a rice harvest,
he paid one-half of the produce to the appanage holder, and in the case
of a second crop harvest, one-third of the produce. The payment could
be made either in kind or in cash. In either system it was the bekel who
actually collected the tax and brought it to his appanage holder, in
general twice a year on Garebeg Mulud (the feast day to commemorate
the Prophet Muhammad's birthday) and Garebeg Puwasa (the first day
of jawal, celebrating the end of the fast). He was also obliged to pro�
cure peasant labor for the appanage holder at the time of Garebeg
Mulud, Garebeg Puwasa, and Garebeg Besar (the Islamic holiday of
Hadj), and in the service of the state to maintain public roads, bridges,
and irrigation ditches.
The appanage system was thus built to mobilize peasant produce
and labor, in which the bekel constituted the crucial linkage between
the state-the ruler and his princes and officials-and the peasantry. It
was the bekel who siphoned off the peasant produce and labor that the
ruler and his princes and officials "ate" and who maintained order and
tranquillity (tata tentrem) in the countryside. In the course of the nine�
teenth century, however, as more and more princes and officials had to
be fed by the appanages under the reigning colonial rust en orde, and as
the money economy increasingly penetrated the Vorstenlanden, the
position of bekel came to be manipulated by the appanage holders. The
appanages were more and more divided to support increasing numbers
of princes and officials, and the appanage holders in turn divided their
appanages into ever smaller bekelship and appointed ever more bekel
so as to get more bekti money from these newly created bekel. The very
fact that the bekel were decreed to be hereditary and could not be
newly created suggests that the contrary situation was prevalent. In this
process the bekel lost most of their police and administrative functions
and became simple tax collectors, each controlling only five to ten
peasant households under his command. Van Kol describes the situa�
tion in a somewhat exaggerated way as follows:
In these regions there is no real administration to speak of. No one is
responsible and everyone steals and cheats to his heart's content. The
officials in charge of tax collection are real leeches for the population; the
only people with authority, the bekel, are hostile to the police and enrich
themselves as quickly as possible, calculating as they do that their posi�
tion is very fragile. The reason is that many have been dismissed, if for
nothing else than for the sake of "bekti"-a sort of monetary "homage"
that has to be paid to the local lord with every new appointment. New
bekelship are sometimes put up for auction and given to the highest
The Arena i5
bidder. The more bekel appointed, the more profit goes to the appanage
holder. No wonder, then, that their numbers have increased alarmingly,
even though the increase is in conflict with the old Javanese laws, which
prescribe only one bekel per jung.19
If one bekel per jung was indeed the norm, the erosion of bekelship
must have been far more serious in the Kasunanan than in the Kasultanan, for in the
Kasunanan there existed 20,250 bekel for 10,520
jung, while in the Kasultanan there were 5,750 bekel for 7,200 jung in
1910.20 It is against this erosion of the bekelship, upon which the
appanage system was based, that the Dutch introduced administrative
and agrarian reforms in the 1910s and early 1920s.
While the degeneration of the appanage system resulted in the ero�
sion of bekelship in the area Dutch plantations did not penetrate, in the
fertile rice areas Dutch plantations further transformed the appanage
system. In legal terms the plantation insinuated itself in the appanage
system by becoming the bektl in its relation with the appanage holder,
and the appanage holder in its relationship with the bekel and their
kuli. In reality, however, this entailed the perversion of the appanage
system in one important respect: the transformation of the maron
system into the glehagan system in the indigo, sugar, and tobacco
plantations.
In the maron system, the peasant (kuli) under the bekel's supervision
cultivated four-fifths of bekelship land and paid one-half of the pro�
duce in kind to the appanage holder. For the plantation, however, the
produce the peasant raised, such as rice and second crops, was of no
use. What the plantation needed was land and labor with which plan�
tation crops could be cultivated for the world market. Thus in contrast
with the maron system, in which the produce was divided equally
between the peasant and the appanage holder, under the glebagan
system the productive factors, land and labor, were divided between
the peasant and the plantation. First, after one-fifth of the land was set
aside for the bekel as his lungguh (salary land), the remaining fourfifths of
bekelship land were divided into two: two-fifths of the land for
peasant cultivation of rice and other food crops, and the other twofifths for the
cultivation of plantation crops. In order to prevent planta�
tion crops from depleting the soil of vital nutrients, the fields for the
plantation crops and for peasant agriculture were exchanged annually,
ideally alternating between rice and export crops every twelve months.
Hence the name of glebagan, which means "to keep turning." Second,
the peasant was obliged to provide for the plantation the same amount
of labor as he put into cultivating rice and other food crops on his own
field. This unpaid corvee labor for the plantation guaranteed the plan
19Van Kol, Reisbrieven, pp. 13-14.
20Ibid., p. 11.
16 An Age in Motion
tation a sufficient labor supply for the cultivation of plantation crops
It the plantation required the peasant to supply more labor than it was
entitled to it had to pay him wages, glidig, for the extra labor, but the
labor itself was obligatory. If he could not perform his corvee labor for
the plantation, he had to compensate for it in cash, which was also
called glidig.
The transformation of the maron system into the glebagan system
created entirely new conditions for agrarian conflict in the plantation
area. The points of conflict between the peasantry and the plantation
were essentially twofold. First, though the fields for peasant agriculture
and for the cultivation of export crops were to rotate every twelve
months such was not actually the case. This was especially serious in
sugar plantations, where the cultivation of sugarcane needed fourteen
to eighteen months from the preparation of the field to the harvesting.
he plantation paid money, kasepan (rent), to the peasant for the
compensation of the extra two- to six-month use of the field. But the
amount of rent was always much smaller than the income the peasant
could have gamed if he had grown rice or other food crops in the same
period. The second point of conflict concerned the corvee labor the
peasant was obliged to perform for the plantation. Though it is not
theoretically impossible to talk about the labor on the tobacco and
sugarcane fields as equal in amount to the labor he put into the cultivanon of nee
and other food crops, in fact the types of agricultural labor
needed for the cultivation of export crops and peasant crops were so
i erent that there was no way to measure how many man-days of
corvee labor were equivalent to the labor he put into the cultivation of
rice. Thus the issue was not only the amount of wages paid for extra
corvee labor but also what types of agricultural labor in the cultivation
of export crops should be counted as unpaid and paid corvee labor. In
addition, there were always grievances on the part of the peasantry
over water distribution and the restrictions imposed by the plantation
on the crops peasants cultivated.
In these conflicts the bekel was powerless, both economically and
culturally. If serious peasant grievances arose in the nonplantation
areas, he might well soften his squeeze on the peasants under his con�
trol for in most cases the appanage holder had no way to oversee the
conduct of his bekel on a day-to-day basis. Even if their grievances
were not redressed as the peasants demanded, what went wrong was
clear. Maybe it was the appanage holder who was no longer as he used
to be and too insistent and greedy; or maybe it was the greedy bekel
who no longer knew the limit. But the relationship between the ap�
panage holder and the bekel and that between the appanage holder and
the peasants remained personal and concrete. However manipulated
and degenerated, it retained and entailed the persistent sense of hier-
The Arena 17
archical Javanese social order. Once the plantation came to the scene,
however, the radical departure was made. The Dutch plantation man�
ager and overseers were only interested in the smooth and profitable
operation of the plantation. They took every measure to make sure the
cultivation of export crops went efficiently and without trouble. They
employed local toughs to intimidate peasants and to suppress their
grievances. They gave bonuses to the bekel when cultivation and har�
vesting went as scheduled. But their relationship with the bekel and the
peasants was thin and purely economic in content. In Dutch eyes the
peasants were cheap labor and the bekel the head of an agrarian labor
gang, not substantially different from the mandur (foreman). If a bekel
did not or could not measure up to the expectations of the Dutch
manager, he was simply dismissed.
Under these circumstances, peasants resorted to two types of protest
action. The first was individual actions to protect their own interests
and to take revenge on the Dutch and the plantation. In the 1860s and
1870s, when Dutch plantations penetrated rapidly into the Vorstenlanden, bandits
were very active. They beat up and occasionally killed
European plantation administrators. Cane burning was also prevalent.
During the final months just before the harvest, sugarcane is extremely
dry and flammable. Peasants, eager to take back their land as quickly
as possible so as to start cultivating rice, sometimes resorted to burning
down the cane field and to doing damage to the plantation. But this
type of social protest invited the strengthening of the police apparatus
and became costly in the twentieth century, though cane burning oc�
curred every year.
The second type of peasant protest was collective and took two
forms. One was nggogol, which was recognized as a legitimate form of
peasant protest by the state, in which peasants went en masse to the
office of the regent, complained about such grievances as heavy corvee
duties, arbitrary conduct of Javanese foremen and Dutch overseers,
and wages, and refused to obey the order of the regent to go home until
their grievances were heard and the regent promised redress. If the
regent did not respond to the nggogol as peasants hoped, they some�
times went to the capital and did nggogol to the patih. Since it was seen
as legitimate, the Dutch assistant resident or the controller also at�
tended the scene of nggogol with the regent, listened to the peasant
grievances, proposed to set up the prapat, and tried to arbitrate be�
tween the protesting peasants and the plantation. The prapat consisted
of two representatives each of the peasants and the plantation (hence
the term prapat, meaning "quarter") and worked under official super�
vision.
The other form of peasant protest was the strike (mogok), in which
peasants collectively refused to perform corvee labor either for the state
i8 An Age in Motion
or for the plantation. It was usually small-scale, involving one or at
most several bekelship, but occurred almost every year. It was illegal in
the sense that the peasants on strike transgressed the regulations stipuated in the
pranatan (regulations issued by the patih in the name of the
sunan/sultan). Therefore, in legal terms, the strike was different from
the legal nggogol; but this difference was superficial, for the strike as a
form of peasant protest functioned in the same way as the nggogol. In
the nggogol, peasants went to the regency office, and the regent ac�
companied by the assistant resident or the controller, heard their griev�
ances. In the strike, the regent and the Dutch assistant resident came to
the peasants on strike, heard their grievances, and proposed to set up
t e prapat to arbitrate the conflict between the peasants and the plan�
tation Once the officials proposed establishing a prapat, the peasants
agreed and returned to work. Usually no one was arrested or punished,
n either case, the bekel played no role. It was the state to which
peasants looked to counter the powerful plantation. And it was the
state authority, as we will see, which was enacted in peasant collective
actions, irrespective of whether peasant grievances were redressed.
Reorganization
With the era of liberal colonial policy coming to an end and the
Ethical era beginning, the appanage system and the agrarian and ad�
ministrative conditions in the Vorstenlanden came increasingly under
attack, and in the 1910s and early 1920s reorganization or administra�
tive and agrarian reform of the Vorstenlanden was introduced by the
Indies government.21 Two factors contributed to its introduction The
first was ideological. In the Ethical era, the idea that the people should
be free from the bond of the land, and that there should be a separation
between the usufruct of the land and the command over the labor
of people who live on the land, became indisputable; and in the light
of this idea the agrarian situation in the Vorstenlanden increasingly
came to be seen as a "medieval" system, a carry-over of the nineteenthcentury
Cultuurstelsel.22 The second factor was the drive of the Indies
state in the Ethical era toward standardization, centralization, rational2 ^he
following account of reorganization is based, unless otherwise noted, on "Aleemeene
Hervorming van de Maatschappelijke en Agransche Toestanden in de Vorstenr,' *n
Mededeehngen der Regeering omtrent enkele Onderwerpen van Algemeen
Belang (Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1921); Resident van Surakarta, "Vervolg
verslae
omtrent den stand der hervormingen in de Zelfbestuursgebieden Soerakarta en Mangkoe
Negaran in het Gewest Soerakarta over het jaar 1919," 20 Aug. 1920, Gouverneur
Generaal
(hereafter abbreviated as GG) aan Minister van Kolomen, 4 Oct. 1920, Exh. 22 Nov.
1920
22V45 t0eiP�Dm0; �e ReorSanisatie van het Agrarische Stelsel in het Gewest
Soerakarta
Van Kol, Retsbneven, p. 53.
The Arena 19
ization, and expansion. In the Vorstenlanden, though some measures
had been taken in the middle of the nineteenth century to standardize
variegated administrative machinery, and though Dutch assistant resi�
dents were appointed and stationed in each regency in the early 1870s,
the control and supervision of the internal workings of the administra�
tive machinery were largely left to the patih, and the Dutch resident
was content with the control of the top command post. In the 1900s,
however, successive Dutch residents started to intervene in the internal
workings of administrative machinery. In 1914 the outgoing resident
of Surakarta, van Wijk, noted with some satisfaction that during his
tenure the flow of government documents changed and that the regents
had begun to submit their reports to the resident and the assistant
residents rather than to the patih. Yet the Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran
administrative bureaucracies were still huge patron-client
networks at that time, and as he observed it was reorganization that
could streamline the administrative machinery by enabling the Dutch
resident to intervene directly in their internal workings in such matters
as recruitment, personnel management, salaries, and finance in gener�
al.23 In this sense, reorganization was an attempt to put the administra�
tive machinery under the direct command of the Dutch resident and to
extend the authority of the Indies state to the area that had hitherto
been left to the already-eroded appanage system and Dutch planta�
tions.
Reorganization was introduced by Dutch initiative in 1912 and was
brought to completion in 1924. The reforms consisted of four basic
measures: (1) the abolition of the appanage system, (2) the formation
of the village as an administrative unit, (3) bestowing clearly defined
usufruct rights in the land to the peasant, and (4) the revision of landlease
regulations. Let us look at these measures one by one.
First is the abolition of the appanage system. Measures to this effect
were taken in 1917 in the Kasultanan and in 1918 in the Kasunanan.
(In the Mangkunegaran the largest part of the appanages had already
been abolished in the early 1870s.) Former appanage holders were
instead given salaries and allowances in cash, and peasants and planta�
tions were to pay the land tax and rent to the treasuries of the prin�
cipalities. With the appanage system went the bekelship. Bekel were
dismissed and given pension land. In the Kasunanan, the bekel was
given a quarter bau of pension land, the usufruct he enjoyed for his
lifetime. After his death, his pension land was to be returned to the
newly constituted administrative village and to be incorporated in the
village treasury land.
Second is the formation ofthe village as an administrative unit, replac23Van Wijk,
"Memorie van Overgave."
20 An Age in Motion
mg the former bekelship as "a village community." In constituting the
village, the following principles were followed, (i) The boundaries of a
village should follow natural boundaries as far as possible. (2) A village
should be constituted from 80 to 150 kuli kenceng (peasant entitled to
have the usufruct in half a bau of arable land and a housing plot), so
that the newly appointed village officials could exercise satisfactory
supervision of the villagers. (3) The lungguh (salary land) for the village
officials and pension land for former bekel should be located in the
village where they live. (4) All the kuli kenceng should be given the
usufruct in equal amounts of arable land, irrespective of the fertility of
the soil. The land given to kuli kenceng should be divided into two in
the plantation area, one for the peasant agriculture and the other for
the cultivation of plantation crops.
Following these principles, 1,226 villages were organized in the Ka�
sunanan and 738 villages in the Mangkunegaran upon the completion
of the reorganization. All the land now belonged to the village The
land was classified and used as salary land for village officials, pension
land for former bekel, village treasury land for financing village admin�
istration, and village communal land, the usufruct rights of which were
distributed to the kuli kenceng. Village officials were appointed from
among former bekel by the regent. In Kasunanan, village officials were
composed of the lurah (village headman), the carik (secretary), the
kamitua (deputy village head), the modin (village religious official), the
u "lin C^arge of water distribution and management), and
the kebayan (village messenger). Each of the village officials was given
salary land; 4.5 bau for the village headman, 2.25 bau for the secretarF> anc!1,0
hau each for the deputy village head, the religious official,
the official in charge of water distribution and management, and the
messenger. The salary land, as well as pension land for the former
bekel, was exempted from the land tax and from lease by the planta�
tion. The village officials were also exempted from labor service for the
Kasunanan and for the village. Though all the village officials were
appointed from among former bekel, only about one out of three
former bekel could become a village official. Whether or not he could
become a village official made a great difference to a former bekel.
Former bekel who were appointed village officials controlled large
amounts of tax-free salary land and enjoyed other privileges, while
former bekel who were not appointed village officials were given only a
quarter bau of pension land. Thus, as the Dutch rightly anticipated,
reorganization produced strong disaffection among those former bekel
who failed to become village officials. As we shall see, this reservoir of
discontent formed an important background to peasant protest actions
in 1919 and 1920 in the Kasunanan.
Third, with the formation of the village, usufruct rights in village
The Arena 21
communal land were distributed to the villagers, while dominion over
the land belonged to the ruler and ownership rights to the village.
Village communal land was parceled out in plots, each of which was
approximately half a bau, and the usufruct right was given to a vil�
lager. The villager who was given the usufruct right in half a bau of
arable land and was also given a housing plot was called kuli kenceng.
In plantation areas, half a bau of rice land given to each kuli kenceng
was further divided into two fields, blok A and B, to be rotated for the
cultivation of rice and plantation crops. As long as village communal
land was available, all the male household heads capable of performing
obligations to the village and the state were accorded the hereditary
status of kuli kenceng, which as a rule was inherited by the eldest son.
The kuli kenceng was not allowed to have the usufruct of more than
half a bau of village communal land. If that happened, say, by inheri�
tance, all in excess of half a bau of rice land was returned to the village.
If a kuli kenceng died without anyone to inherit his status, his usufruct
in village communal land was returned to the village. When new land
became available, the village gave usufruct rights to those who did not
have any and created new kuli kenceng.
The status of kuli kenceng naturally entailed obligations to the state
and the village. First, the kuli kenceng was obliged to perform labor for
the village, maintaining village roads, ditches, bridges, and graveyards,
and in ronda (night watch). Second, he had to perform corvee labor for
the state in the maintenance of public roads, irrigation canals, and
dams. And third, he had to pay the land tax for his half a bau of rice
land and his housing plot. In plantation areas, he had to pay the land
tax for his quarter bau of rice land and his housing plot and also make
available to the plantation his other quarter bau of rice land. The kuli
kenceng who did not fulfill these obligations was fined, imprisoned,
and/or deprived of his kuli kenceng status (and thus of his usufruct
right of half a bau of village communal land).
Fourth, under the new land-lease regulations put into effect in 1918,
the plantation was to lease land not from the appanage holder but from
the principality. Plantations that voluntarily cancelled old lease con�
tracts with appanage holders and made new lease contracts with the
principality under the new regulations were given fifty-year land leases
and allowed to procure paid corvee labor from the kuli kenceng for an
initial five years under conditions stipulated by the state. Thus the
interests of the plantations were duly taken into account and the only
changes brought about were the abolition of corvee labor and the
change in the flow of rent from the appanage holders to the principality
treasury. Neither the village nor the kuli kenceng had anything to do
with rent, because the plantation directly paid rent to the state.
In the high time of the Ethical era, the reorganization of the Vorsten-
22 An Age in Motion
landen was regarded by Dutch officials as the major enterprise of the
Indies state in this area, and as such, successive Dutch residents main�
tained that it would be a panacea to improve agrarian conditions and
to guarantee rust en orde in the Vorstenlanden. But it was certainly not
a panacea and did not substantially improve the conditions generated
by the extensive operation of Dutch plantations. The implementation
of the new land-lease regulation notwithstanding, the structure of con�
flicts between the peasantry and the plantation remained unchanged.
As we have seen, conflicts between the peasantry and the plantation
before reorganization centered around three issues: the amount of rent;
the mitigation of unpaid corvee labor and its conversion to paid corvee
labor; and the amount of wages to be paid for corvee labor. The new
land-lease regulation indeed abolished corvee labor and replaced it
with free labor, but conflicts over the amount of rent and wages could
not be resolved by institutional reform, for these concerned the ques�
tion of how much. As long as the economic interests accruing to the
peasants in the form of rent and wages remained smaller than the
income they could have gamed by cultivating rice without the planta�
tion, conflicts could arise at any time between the peasantry and the
plantation, and could be aggravated by the arbitrary and arrogant
conduct of Dutch overseers toward the peasantry.
In contrast to this structural persistence of conflict between the peas�
antry and the plantation, the relationship between the peasants and the
principality underwent fundamental changes upon the introduction of
reorganization. The abolition of the appanage system and the bekelship signified
the final institutional liquidation of the traditional per�
sonal and dyadic relationship between the appanage holder and his
bekel and between the bekel and his kuli. The formation of the admin�
istrative village was based on the wholly different idea of the corporate
village. While the bekelship was formed by the bundle of dyadic rela�
tions between the bekel and the kuli, the administrative village was a
territorial corporation in which every kuli kenceng had an equal usufructry share
in village communal land and which was managed by a
board of directors, the village administration. But this board of direc�
tors was not primarily responsible to the shareholders: it was the state
that appointed them and gave them salary land. The administrative
village was a modern institutional device for the state to rule the coun�
tryside by the map, and village officials were the state's agents, forming
as such the lowest echelon of the administrative machineries now ra�
tionalized and placed under the direct command and supervision of the
Dutch resident. They could not act against the plantation because the
management of the village naturally entailed the job of making land
and labor available to the plantation and letting the operation of the
plantation run as scheduled and without trouble. Reorganization
The Arena 2-3
brought about changes, but they were changes that placed the peasan�
try in a position in which their obligations to the state and the planta�
tion could be more effectively and closely administered by the village
officials and the state.
The Age of Capital, 2
While the age of capital dawned in the countryside in the form of the
ever deeper penetration of Dutch plantations and the concomitant per�
version of the appanage system, it came to the city of Surakarta and to
a lesser extent to Yogyakarta with the development of the batik indus�
try.24 In Central Java, batiking had been practiced since the invention
of canting (a small brass pot used in batiking), and had become the
major all-female industry in the Vorstenlanden, first developed in ur�
ban court centers and then diffused to surrounding rural areas. In
Surakarta the art of batiking was so highly regarded that the ability to
do batik work was considered a basic part of a woman's education at
court.25 From the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the open�
ing of new markets, coupled with technical innovations in batiking, led
to the transformation of the batik industry in two successive stages.
The first stage of transformation took place in the 1850s. In the
middle of the 1840s, a new batiking method was introduced from
Semarang by a batik manufacturer of Kauman. This new cap (stamp)
method involved stamps made of strips of copper welded to a base with
a handle attached, the application of which made possible the produc�
tion of cheaper batik in much more quantity with much less labor. In
the course of the 1850s, increasing numbers of batik manufacturers
came to employ the stamp method and established commercial batik
workshops for market production. The 1850s and 1860s were the
years when Dutch private capital started to flow into the Vorsten�
landen. The Dutch plantations brought readily available cash to the
peasants in the form of wages and rent, while exploiting their labor and
depriving them of time. Peasants turned to local markets to buy neces�
sary goods, one of the most important of which was cheap batik cloth.
Given readily accessible local markets, batik production rose rapidly,
probably doubling in the 1850s, judging from the import statistics of
cotton goods, which more than doubled from 1850 to i860, the most
24The following account of the batik industry in the city of Surakarta is based,
unless
otherwise noted, on "Batik," in Encyclopaedic van Nederlandsch-lndie; Soerachman,
Het
Batikbedrijfin de Vorstenlanden; Batikrapport, vol. 2 (Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij,
1931).
I also thank James Siegel for allowing me to consult his voluminous and highly
useful notes
on batik.
25S. Ann Dunham, "Women's Work in Village Industries on Java" (unpublished paper,
1982), pp. 69-70.
24 An Age in Motion
significant part of which was for batik production.26 During this stage,
the center of the batik industry in Surakarta was in the central parts of
the city, such as Kauman, Keprabon, and Pasar Kliwon, and the com�
mercial workshops set up were of small scale. Though the stamp meth�
od greatly rationalized batik production, the stamps used in the bank�
ing were small, usually 1X2 square centimeters, and the stamp
process complemented, rather than replaced, the canting process.
The second stage of development took place in the 1870s. Not only
did local markets expand with the increasing penetration of Dutch
plantations into the countryside but railways directly linked the Vorstenlanden to
the major urban commercial centers-Semarang in
1870, Surabaya in 1884, and Batavia and Bandung in 1894-and thus
continually opened up new markets for the Solonese batik industry.
The technical evolution of the stamp continued. In the early 1870s the
size of stamps became 10 X 15 square centimeters, and the stamp
process came to occupy the central place in batik production in com�
mercial workshops. New batik workshops of larger scale were estab�
lished, no longer in the central parts of the city but in the suburbs.
Batik entrepreneurs moved into the area of Tegalsari and especially
Lawean, where the river nearby supplied much-needed water for largescale batik
workshops. Now these large-scale batik workshops pro�
duced cheaper stamp batik for mass consumption, not only for local
markets but also for the "national" market. Batik production ex�
panded again, probably more than doubling from 1870 to 1875, and it
stayed largely at that level till the end of the nineteenth century except
for the mid-i88os depression years.27
Throughout these years the city of Surakarta was the major center of
the batik industry, and Surakarta batik dominated "national" as well
as local markets till the end of the 1910s, when Pekalongan batik
began to offer increasingly tough competition, especially in West
Java.28 In these years, batiking was done all over the city. Reflecting
-6The import 0f cotton goods for the Indies increased from 9.837 million guilders
in 1850
to 20.943 million guilders in i860 to 16.024 million in 1870. Furnivall,
Netherlands India d
171.
2 The import of cotton goods for the Indies in 1870 was 16.024 million guilders,
while the
import of cotton goods for only Java and Madura amounted to 29.105 million guilders
in
1875. For more on the import statistics of cotton goods for Java and Madura for
1875 to
1920 see Furnivall, Netherlands India, p. 207, and p. 339 for the years 1875 to
1900; S.
Koperberg, De Javaansche Batikindustrie," Djawa 2, no. 2, p. 148 for the years 1905
to
-8See Batik," in Encyclopaedic van Nederlandsche-Indie. According to this source,
in
I9*V ere ex,sted 225 batik workshops (defined as employing more than five workers)
with
3,608 workers in Surakarta, while the second-largest batik production center,
Pekalongan
had H4 workshops with 1,266 workers. In the 1920s the lucrative West Java market
was
ost to the Pekalongan batik. See Batikrapport, vol. 2, p. 321. Yet the batik
industry remained
the major industry in Surakarta, even after it was hit by the great depression.
According to
the 1930 census, 6,900 out of 40,800 male workers and 14,100 out of 33,700 female
The Arena z5
the pattern of historical development of the batik industry, there was
clear regional specialization of batik production within the city. The
eastern part of the city, as well as the central part, such as Kauman,
Keprabon, and Pasar Kliwon, largely continued to make fine batik,
while the more western part, especially Tegalsari and Lawean, spe�
cialized in the production of stamp batik for mass consumption. In this
specialization, Kauman and Lawean occupied the central position. Ka�
uman, an older center of batik production, was also a center of batik
trade. It also was the area where the sunan's religious officials lived.
Though the wholesale trade in batik for the "national market" was
controlled largely by Chinese and Arabs, batik trade for local markets
was in the hands of Javanese traders. Many small batik traders came,
dealt in batik cloth, and went to local markets by train. It was largely
women who managed workshops, made batik, and engaged in the
batik trade. Women thus earned money and supported their families,
while men got or tried to get positions as officials and, in Kauman,
became religious teachers as well. Therefore, in central parts of the city
such as Kauman there emerged no independent class of native bour�
geoisie, even though there were numerous batik workshops and many
batik entrepreneurs amassed wealth. In Marco Kartodikromo's words,
batik entrepreneurs in this area were "still in the family" with sunan's
officials.29
In contrast with batik entrepreneurs in the central parts of the city,
batik entrepreneurs in Lawean, who came to settle there from outside
in order to set up large-scale batik workshops from the early 1870s,
were economically stronger and socially, if not culturally, more auton�
omous. As we have seen, large-scale batik workshops came to be con�
centrated in Lawean, largely because the river nearby made water
readily available. But the continual existence and prosperity of Lawean
batik workshops were made possible by their production of cheap
stamp batik, not only for local markets but also for the "national"
market. They maintained their own commercial networks in East and
West Java, largely independent of Chinese and Arab wholesalers. For
instance, Hadji Samanhoedi, a leading batik entrepreneur in Lawean in
the 1900s and 1910s, maintained branch offices in Surabaya, Banyuwangi, Bandung,
and some other places, among which at least one, the
Bandung branch, was managed by his own brother.30 This access to
workers were engaged in batik manufacture and trade in Surakarta. Volkstelling 1940
(Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1936).
29Marco Kartodikromo, Student Hidjo (Semarang: N. V. Boekhandel en Drukkerij Masman
&c Stroink, 1919), p. 6.
30Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942 (Singapore:
Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 106.
z6 An Age in Motion
the "national" market in turn made Lawean batik workshops less
dependent on local markets, where batik cloth was in demand only
when peasants had readily available cash after harvesting rice and
second crops and after the harvesting and milling of sugarcane, and
could manage to operate even in the slack seasons from November to
April.31 In the workshops in Lawean, it was again the wife of a
workshop-owning family who played the dominant entrepreneurial
role in choosing batik designs, purchasing materials, managing and
supervising the production process, and marketing goods. The sup�
pliers of materials such as cotton goods and dyes looked at her clothes
and jewelry, especially her earrings, to judge the credit standing of the
workshop. But in Lawean men were also batik entrepreneurs and
rarely officials. Though a son of a Lawean batik entrepreneur might
well become a government official, he then never returned to Lawean;
and if a son followed the path of a batik entrepreneur he often married
the daughter of a Lawean batik entrepreneur. Though individual fam�
ilies who owned workshops in Lawean may have changed over genera�
tional time, Lawean was at any given moment predominantly the area
of batik entrepreneurs who controlled the "national" market, and as
such remained socially closed to the world outside, as eventually was
symbolized by the high whitewashed walls surrounding the area.32
The batik industry in Surakarta thus entered the twentieth century
with two centers of batik manufacturing and trade. Lawean batik en�
trepreneurs produced stamp batik for "national" as well as local mar�
kets, while batik entrepreneurs in the central parts of the city produced
and traded batik for local markets. Batik production continued to
expand and batik manufacturers and traders prospered, until hit by the
steep price rise of materials caused by World War I. In the meantime,
their own weakness lay in the supply of materials such as cotton goods,
wax, and dyes, for which they were dependent on the Chinese and
Arab wholesalers who distributed materials imported by European
firms abroad. And it was exactly this weak spot that the Chinese tried
31Once the West Java market was lost to Pekalongan batik in the 1920s, Lawean batik
workshops could no longer be free from seasonal fluctuations of demand in local
markets.
See Batikrapport, vol. 2, pp. 98-101.
32The existence of large-scale batik workshops in Lawean naturally created and con�
centrated substantial numbers of batik workers. The division of labor arose not
only along
functional lines but also by sex. Stamping and dyeing was done by men. Canting
work, wax
scraping, and hand-hemming was done by women. And other tasks such as soaking,
pound�
ing, boiling, and drying were done variously either by men or women. In this
division of
labor, printers occupied a special position. Since the handling of stamps required
a lot of skill
and the stamping process formed the central part of the batik production process,
printers
were paid three to four times higher than other workers and their positions were
more stable
as long as the industry was booming. Thus the labor relations remained largely
harmonious
throughout the years before World War I and it was only in the mid-i920S that
printers
emerged as an independent social force (see Chapter 8).
The Arena 2*7
to exploit when they began to invest money in the Solonese batik
industry toward the end of the 1900s.
The Modern Age
With the opening of the twentieth century, the age of a new colonial
policy, the Ethical era, began. The watchword of the new era was
"progress." The words signifying progress-such as vooruitgang (ad�
vance), opheffing (uplifting), ontwikkeling (development), and opvoeding
(upbringing)-embellished the language of the day together
with bevordering van welvaart (promotion of welfare). A daughter of
the regent ofJepara, Raden Adjeng Kartini, started the first letter to her
Dutch pen pal with the sentence "I have so desired to make an acquain�
tance with a modern girl,"33 and soon became an idol of Dutch ethici.
It was in this sense that progress was understood: progress to moderni�
ty, progress as evolution under Dutch tutelage and modernity ex�
emplified by the Dutch in the Indies and understood as Western civili�
zation. This notion of progress gave a new sense of direction to the
people of the Indies, a sense of direction that had been absent in Ranggawarsita's
final days. The world and the age were now on the move,
and as if symbolizing it the electric tram came into operation in Batavia
with the opening of this new era.
The new era was, as Furnivall aptly named it, the age of "expansion,
efficiency, and welfare."34 The archipelago "from Sabang to Merauke"
was now under Dutch control, and within this territory the colonial rust
en orde was realized. Dutch business activities expanded rapidly: ex�
ports doubled in the first decade of this century and more than octupled
by 1920. The Indies state was increasingly rationalized and centralized,
and state activities were expanded. Volkscredietwezen (People's Credit
Service); Government Pawnshops; Agricultural Information and Exten�
sion Service; Opiumregie (State Opium Monopoly); Peoples' Health
and Medical Extension; Post, Telegraph, and Telephone Service; State
Railways; Government Schools; Forestry Service-all formed part of
state activities. Those employed in these state activities joined the native
administrative officials from Pangreh Pradja (indigenous administrative
corps) and swelled the ranks of government priyayi (member of the
Javanese official class). Besides, in urban centers, orang particulier,
white-collar workers employed by private business (as opposed to those
in government service), emerged and with government priyayi formed
the middle class. A government priyayi, quitting his job and moving to a
33Quoted in Kenji Tsuchiya, "Kartini no Shinsho Fukei," Tonan Ajia Kenkyu 22, no. i
(June 1984), p. 63, italics mine.
34Furnivall, Netherlands India, p. 227.
28 An Age in Motion
Table 5. The number of second-class native schools and pupils
Year
Number of schools Number of pupils
State Private Total State Private Total
1900 55i
836 1,387 62,742. 3C43i 98,173
1905 674 1,268 I?942 95,075 66,741 161,816
1910 1,021 2,106 3,I27 i33,425
99,2.04 232,629
1915 1,202 2,198 3,400
O
rv
00
VC
H
134,644 32.0,974
1920 1,845 2,368 4,2i3 2.41,4J4
116,556 357,970
Source: S. L. van der Wal, ed., Het Onderwijsbeleid in Nederlands-Indie, 1900-
1940 (Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1963), p. 7.
city, could get a job in Dutch private business and become an orang
particulier. An orang particulier in turn could become a state function�
ary. They were the salaried middle class, mobile but essentially urban,
and had one thing in common: Western-style education.
The expansion of Western-style education was the hallmark of the
ethical policy. Not only was Western-style education imperative to
produce the kind of work force needed for the state and Dutch private
business activities but it was also seen as a major means to "uplift" the
natives and to guide them to modernity and to "association between
East and West." Thus toward the end of the nineteenth century and
especially in the first two decades of this century Western-style educa�
tion was greatly expanded. In 1893 two types of elementary schools for
natives were introduced, the Eerste Klasse Inlandsche Scholen (FirstClass Native
Schools) for the priyayi and the well-to-do, and the
Tweede Klasse Inlandsche Scholen (Second-Class Native Schools) for
the children of the population. The increase in the number of secondclass native
schools and pupils can be seen in Tables 5 and 6. The firstand second-class native
schools, however, offered instruction in the
vernacular and Malay, and their pupils could proceed only to com�
mercial, technical, and vocational schools upon graduation. Given the
Table 6. Native elementary schools in Java and Madura
Year Java/Madura Surakarta Yogyakarta
1895 391 15 13
1905 722 19 40
1910 1,088 4i
hi
1915 i,237
61 109
Source: Koloniaal Verslag, 1896, 1906, 1911, 1916.
The Arena 29
Table 7. Native students attending Dutch-language schools
Year Elementary
Secondary
HBS and MULOa
Vocational (STOVIA,
OSVIA, etc.)
1900 896 13 376
1905 D353 118 -
1910 1,681 50 1,470
1915 25,808 406 -
1920 38,024 1,168 3,9i7
Source: Van der Wal, Het Onderwijsbeleid, pp. ii-iz.
aMULO stands for Meer Uitgebreide Lagere Onderwijs, Extended Primary
Education or junior high school.
language stratification in the Indies, these native schools were there�
fore second-rate, and it was only in 1914 that the HIS (Hollandschinlandsche
scholen, Dutch native schools) were created out of the FirstClass Native Schools,
where instruction was given in Dutch, and were
linked to the Dutch secondary school system. Before that, parents who
saw the merits of Western-style education and could afford to do so
sent their children to ELS (Europeesche lagere scholen, European ele�
mentary schools), and pupils upon completion proceeded to Dutch
secondary education at the HBS (Hoogere burgerscholen, Dutch
middle-class schools), the STOVIA (School tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Artsen,
Native Doctors Training School), or the OSVIA
(Opleiding School voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren, Training School for
Native Officials). The number of native students who attended schools
where instruction was given in Dutch is shown in Table 7.
As we can see from Tables 5-7, although Western-style education
expanded substantially, the number of students was never great com�
pared with the huge native population in the Indies, and the literate
formed only a tiny proportion of the population. According to the
1920 census, the literacy rate of the natives in Java was still only 2.74
percent in the vernacular and 0.13 percent in Dutch. And yet the
number of literate people was substantial: 943,000 in native languages
and 87,000 in Dutch.35 For an understanding of what happened to this
substantial number of literates, the radical difference between traditional
and Western-style education is of crucial importance, for Western-style
education was not only secular but also geared to the politically cen�
tralized and racially and linguistically stratified colonial order, while
traditional education was essentially religious. In Western-style educa�
tion, the higher one went up the educational ladder and the nearer
35Volkstelling 1920, pp. 141-142, 148-149.
30 An Age in Motion
one came to the urban centers of the colonial world, the greater the
chance that one could get a "respectable" job, the more deeply satu�
rated in the world of Dutch language, and the more modern and re�
mote from the kind of life one's parents' generation had led. In this
process of metamorphosis there were two essential ingredients.36
First, as is always pointed out, Western-style education provided the
key to upward mobility, but it was upward mobility in the racially
stratified social order created and maintained by the Indies state, where
natives were natives, however well educated. Being a Javanese, a Sundanese, or a
Minangkabau, did not make any difference, because all
were natives. Thus the category of natives, which could make sense
only in terms of Dutch colonial domination, formed the basis of new
solidarity for those who went through the Western-style educational
system created by the Dutch.
Second, the experience they had in the schools and in their life after
graduation was radically different from that of their parents' genera�
tion. The very fact that they had a modern education and got jobs as a
newly created urban salaried middle class became the basis of their
generational solidarity. They called themselves kaum muda (the
young), more modern and advanced than their parents and those who
did not have Western-style education. Among kaum muda themselves,
those who attended European elementary schools and secondary
schools were more modern and advanced than those who went to
native schools. The key was their knowledge of Dutch and their access
to the Dutch world in the Indies, for the Dutch exemplified modernity
and the Dutch language was the key to open the modern world and
age. The emblems of kaum muda were the Dutch words sprinkled in
their daily conversations in the vernacular, their wearing of Westernstyle clothes
and shoes, their habit of going to restaurants and drinking
lemonade, seeing movies, enjoying music and not gamelan-in short,
doing the modern things that the Dutch did. In his novel Student
Hidjo-here "student" is an emblem of modernity-Mas Marco Kartodikromo explains kaum
muda as those who understand Dutch, and
he depicts two members of kaum muda, Raden Hidjo who is a gradu�
ate of HBS and has passed the final examinations, and his fiancee,
Raden Adjeng Biroe, against the background of Solo.
"Let's go!" said Raden Adjeng, who stood beside him [Hidjo] and
looked as if she could not stand waiting for him. "Goed [good]! Wait for
a while!"
Hidjo continued to read the book.
36The following discussion is based on Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities
(Lon�
don: Verso, 1983).
The Arena 3i
"Kom [come] now!" said Raden Adjeng strongly and took away the
book Hidjo had just started to read.
"Kom" said Hidjo while half laughing, stood up from his chair, and
looked at Biroe's very, very cute face.
[It was the night of Puasa (fasting month) 25 and two of them went to
Sri Wedari, which was, Marco says, "the zoo owned by Hingkang Sinoehoen of Solo"
and where electric lamps illuminated like the sunlight.]
In Sri Wedari Raden Adjeng and Hidjo went around and looked
around the situation there.
"Let's go! Djo. Do you see a movie or wayang orang?" asked Raden
Adjeng and held Hidjo's hand with hers. "Nee, Lieve [No, love]," said
Hidjo and his voice, which was not loud, was brought closer to Raden
Adjeng's ears as if he wanted to kiss her. "We just look for a place in the
restaurant which is a little dark and talk there."37
Here the conversations and the scene are full of things modern-their
usage of Dutch, Hidjo's reading a printed book bought at a bookstore,
sitting on a chair, illuminating electric lamps, a movie, a restaurant
where they would drink lemonade-and these modern things are jux�
taposed with things traditional. Note his fantastic phrase about Sri
Wedari: "the zoo owned by Hinghang Sinoehoen of Solo." The zoo is
plainly modern. What is bizarre is Hingkang Sinoehoen (the sunan) of
Solo, which indicates Marco's essentially Batavian colonial/national
conception of the Indies. In his conception, Solo constitutes only a local
part of the Indies, his country, and this is the reason he writes as if there
were many Hingkang Sinoehoens, not only of Solo but also of
Yogyakarta, Blora, and other places.38
This was kaum muda and the milieu in which they lived. This does
not mean that they were totally Westernized and cut off from tradition�
al ideas, perceptions, habits, and ethics. They were not. What is impor�
tant is that things traditional lost coherent meaning and were jux�
taposed with things modern so that they became accessible to the
modern style and their meaning changed. What was unique about the
times was this juxtaposition.
Kaum muda thus formed their "national" consciousness of being
natives of the Indies, and as such moving with other "nations" in linear
open-ended time toward modernity, the vanishing point in the future
from which their present existence gained meaning. They did not know
one another personally, but they knew for certain of the others' exis�
tence in Batavia, Bandung, Semarang, Solo, Yogyakarta, Surabaya,
37Marco Kartodikromo, Student Hidjo, pp. 12-13.
38I owe this point to Benedict Anderson.
32 An Age in Motion
and all over the Indies, and they shared many experiences, ideas, and
assumptions about the world, the Indies, and their time. For a while
this "nation in embryo" did not have its own name and they were
simply natives (bumiputera) and kaum muda. In fact, the pergerakan
nasional (national movement) understood in the orthodox historiogra�
phy of post-independence Indonesia was the journey of this "nation in
embryo" in search of its own name-Indonesia. But well before the
"discovery" of Indonesia this growing "nation in embryo" certainly
existed in kaum muda's minds and styles and soon acquired its own
institutional means to express its "national" consciousness. The means
was native newspapers.
In the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first of this
century, especially after 1906, when the new press law substituted
post- for precensorship, the number and circulation of Malay and
other vernacular periodicals greatly expanded from eight in 1890 to
eighteen in 1905 to thirty-six in 1910. Though no statistical data are
available about their circulation, its increase can be guessed from the
fact that printed matter sent by the postal service increased by 370
percent from 1890 to 1910.39 The first to become active in journalism
were Indos, and the leading journalists of the day were such Indos as
H.C.O. Clockener Brousson of Bintang Hindia, E. F. Wiggers of Bintang Barat, and G.
Francis of Pemberita Betawi. Then, from the middle
of the 1900s , the Chinese started to establish printing houses and to
publish periodicals in increasing numbers. In 1905 the Chinese pub�
lished one newspaper in Java, but five in 1907, nine in 1909, and
fifteen in 1911. It was largely Chinese publishing activities that con�
tributed to the spectacular increase in the number of periodicals in the
second half of the 1900s. In this development of journalism, natives
also took part, first apprenticing themselves to Indo and Chinese jour�
nalists, then as editors of Indo- and Chinese-published newspapers,
and finally as publishers of their own newspapers as well. The first
native journalists emerged in the mid-i90os. In Batavia, R. M.
Tirtoadiwinoto, F. D. J. Pangemanan, and R. M. Toemenggoeng
Koesoemo Oetojo became editors-in-chief of Ilmoe Tani, Kabar Perniagaan, and
Pewarta Prijaji. In Surakarta, R. Dirdjoatmodjo edited
Djawi Kanda published by Albert Rusche & Co., and in Yogyakarta
Dr. Wahidin Soedirohoesodo became the editor of the Javanese journal
Retnodboemilah published by Firma H. Buning. They were soon fol�
lowed by increasing numbers of native journalists: R. Tirtodanoedjo
and R. Mohammad Joesoef, both editors of Sinar Djawa published by
Hong Thaij Co.; Djojosoediro, the editor of Tjabaja Timoer pub�
lished in Malang by Kwee Khaij Khee; and Abdoel Moeis, the editor of
39Koloniaal Verslag, 1891 and 1911.
The Arena 33
Pewarta Hindia in Bandung published by G. Kolff & Co. These
emergent native journalists, by their very act of writing articles, com�
menting on letters sent by readers, and editing newspapers for un�
known numbers of unknown people, were in fact presiding over "the
nation in embryo" and expressing their solidarity with their readers as
natives and as kaum muda. This quality of solidarity was clear from
the start. Pewarta Prijaji, edited by R.M.T. Koesoemo Oetojo, the
regent of Ngawi, for instance, appealed for the unity of prijaji and
allotted most of its space to translations and detailed explanations of
government statutes, supplements, and legal judgments-in short, in�
formation useful to the government prijaji; and there existed an asso�
ciation of its supporters, sympathizers, and subscribers, with fifteen
branches in Java, Madura, and Sumatra.40
But in the first several years those native journalists were employed
by Indo and Chinese publishers and were not entirely independent in
presiding over "the nation in embryo." In 1903 R. M. Tirtoadhisoerjo,
then already a star reporter at the age of about twenty-one, started his
own newspaper, Soenda Berita, with the financial help of the regent of
Cianjur, R.A.A. Prawiradiredja. It was the first newspaper financed,
managed, edited, and published by natives. Then in 1907 he started a
new weekly, Medan Prijaji (Forum of priyayi), and the next year, in
1908, together with Hadji Mohammad Arsad and Pangeran Oesman,
established the first native limited-liability company, N.V. Javaansche
Boekhandel en Drukkerij en Handel in Schrijfbehoeften "Medan Prija�
ji" and bought one of the first native printing houses. Tirtoadhisoerjo,
born to a Bojonegoro regent family in 1880 but refusing to enter
the Pangreh Pradja, went for some time to the STOVIA in Batavia
(1893/94-1900) and joined Pemberita Betawi as an editor. In 1906 he
founded Sarekat Prijaji (Association of Priyayi), to promote, through
establishment of a fellowship, the education of the sons of priyayi and
native aristocrats. Medan Prijaji was initially conceived as its organ
and published as a weekly (1907-9) and then as a daily (1909-12).
Tirtoadhisoerjo created his own journalistic style in Medan Prijaji,
militant and sarcastic in tone and mixing many Javanese and Dutch
words in his Batavian Malay, and it became the leading native news�
paper of the day with its subscribers reaching two thousand in early
1911.41 Though the title of the newspaper was Medan Prijaji, it was no
longer the forum for only the priyayi, as Koesoemo Oetojo's Pewarta
4<)Akira Nagazumi, "The Origin and the Earlier Years of the Budi Utomo, 1908-1918"
(diss., Cornell University, 1967), pp. 23, 38.
41See, for instance, Tirtoadhisoerjo's "Persdelict: Umpatan-A. Simon Konrra R. M.
Tirto
Adi Soerjo," reprinted in Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Sang Pemula (Jakarta: Hasta Mirta,
1985), pp. 208-216, and originally published in Medan Prijaji, no. 19 (1909), and
Soeloeh
Keadialan 4 (1909). The title alone (Tirto versus Simon) demonstrates his militant
dueling
style.
34 An Age in Motion
Prijaji was, but as its motto says, "the voice for all the [native] rulers,
aristocrats, and intellectuals, priyayi, native merchants, and officers as
well as merchants of other subordinated peoples made equal [in status]
with the Sons of the Country [Anaknegri] all over the Dutch Indies."42
The "nation" was now imagined as an entity with clear demarcation-
in Tirtoadhisoerjo's own words as "the Sons of the Country," the
Dutch Indies.43
Tirtoadhisoerjo's success as the first editor-publisher was partly due
to the access he had to Governor General van Heutsz, which provided
him with protection from bureaucratic harassment and with respec�
tability among his educated countrymen, foreign orientals, Indos, and
ethical-minded Dutch. In 1909, however, van Heutsz left office and the
new governor general, A.W.F. Idenburg, came to the Indies. Tirtoadhisoerjo lost his
most powerful patron and within a few months he
found himself serving a two-month exile because of an old charge
against him of press offense (persdelict, transgression of the press law).
This was a clear sign that he was not in Idenburg's favor. Contributors
were scared away. European companies were no longer willing to place
their advertisements in Medan Prijaji. And Dutch and native officials
who had once been attacked by Tirtoadhisoerjo in his newspapers
finally saw the moment for their revenge.
Toward the end of 1900s N.V. "Medan Prijaji" ran into serious finan�
cial trouble. The subscribers were encouraged to buy shares of N.V.
"Medan Prijaji" and reduced subscription rates, legal aid, and discounts
for stays at Hotel Medan Prijaji in Batavia were offered to shareholders.
Tirtoadhisoerjo also established the Sarekat Dagang Islamijah (Com�
mercial Association of Islam) of Muslim traders in Bogor in 1909 as an
association of Kaoem Mardika (Free People), his translation into Malay
of the Dutch Vrije Burgers (Free Citizens), and modeled after the Sianghwee
(Chinese Chamber of Commerce). This was a last-ditch effort to
buttress his major enterprise, the publication of Medan Prijaji. We will
see more about his role in the formation of the Sarekat Islam in Surakar�
ta, but for now it will suffice to note that he was the archetype of
pergerakan leaders in the early 1910s and that he was the first native
who moved the "nation" through his language, the language with which
he wrote in Medan Prijaji.
In the meantime, the Boedi Oetomo (BO) also came into existence in
May 1908. The idea that led to the formation of the BO was the same
as that of Tirtoadhisoerjo's Sarikat Prijaji: promotion of native prog42Pramoedya,
Sang Pemula, p. 49.
43For more on Tirtoadhisoerjo, see Pramoedya, Sang Pemula; Soebagijo I. N., Jagat
Wartawan Indonesia (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1981), pp. 348-351; Adjunct Adviseur
voor
Inlandsche Zaken (D. A. Rinkes) aan GG (Idenburg), 19 Feb. 1912., Vb. 9 July 1913,
No. on.
The Arena 35
ress couched in the language of social Darwinism as the survival of the
fittest through the struggle of the "nations." Yet thanks to Governor
General Idenburg's blessing and to Douwes Dekker's enthusiastic
Dutch-language reporting in Bataviaasch Nieuwshlad, the BO attained
its celebrated status as the first organizational expression of the native
awakening. Its spiritual founding father was Dr. Wahidin Soedirohoesodo, a doktor
jawa (native doctor) in Yogyakarta and one of the
earliest native journalists in the Indies. The actual founders were medi�
cal students of the STOVIA in Batavia, and in its earliest stage branches
were established in native institutions of secondary education. The BO
was thus based on the kind of solidarity generated by Western-style
education, and its messages were sent through circulars and printed
media as well as by personal contact. But the leadership of the BO soon
passed from the students into the hands of Western-educated, progres�
sive, but politically cautious, established priyayi, and its headquarters
was moved to Yogyakarta under the patronage of the Pakualam house.
The organs were published, but these were in Dutch and Javanese.
Congresses were held, but in buildings hardly accessible to wong cilik
(little men, that is, ordinary people)-the first congress was in the
building of the Kweekschool (Teacher Training School) of Yogyakarta,
and the second in the clubhouse "Mataram" in Yogyakarta. The BO
thus remained predominantly Javanese and priyayi.44
In the Ethical era, the air of progress to modernity was also inhaled
by Chinese and Arabs. Arabs set up the Djami' at al-Chair in Batavia in
1905, which furnished money for the establishment of primary schools
with a modern curriculum.45 Arabs also joined Tirtoadhisoerjo in es�
tablishing the Sarikat Dagang Islamijah to protect and promote the
commercial interests of Arab and native Muslim merchants. But it was
Chinese, both Javanized peranakan Chinese and newly arrived singkeh, who were most
active in the first decade of this century. Toward
the end of the nineteenth century the revenue farms such as the opium
farm and pawnshops, which had been the financial mainstay of the
Indies state and the institutional basis of peranakan Chinese economic
activities, were gradually dismantled and replaced by state institutions.
The loss of farms deprived the Chinese of their access to Java's rural
market, and their freedom of economic activities was further curtailed
by more rigid application of the pass (1897) and residential (1900)
regulations. Their freedom of commercial activities restricted, Chinese
traders not only sold fewer goods but, more important, could not
44For more on the Boedi Oetomo, see Aikra Nagazumi, The Dawn of Indonesian Na�
tionalism: The Early Years of the Budi Utomo (Tokyo: Institute of Developing
Economies,
1972.)-
45The Siauw Giap, "Group Conflict in a Plural Society," Revue du Sud-Est Asiatique
1
(1966), p. 199.
3^
An Age in Motion
collect the debts of villagers, paid customarily in rice or other produce,
and fell into serious trouble.46 Besides, the Dutch recognized the Ja�
panese as equal with Europeans in their legal status in 1899 and ac�
corded them the same freedoms Europeans enjoyed. In the eyes of the
Chinese, the reason for this difference was quite clear. The strong,
modernized Japanese state could protect and improve the position of
the Japanese in the Indies, while the weak, not yet modernized Chinese
state could not. The key to improve the position of the Chinese was
progress and state protection. In 1900 the Tjong Hoa Hwe Koan
(THHK, Chinese Association) was established in Batavia by Westerneducated Chinese,
and in 1901 it established the first Western-style
THHK school. In a few years THHK schools were in operation all over
the Indies. The advice, assistance, and protection of the Chinese state
were eagerly sought, and the Ch'ing dynasty, seeing the chance to tap
the wealth of the Indies Chinese, responded positively. From 1906 on,
Ch'ing dignitaries visited the Indies every year. With their advice,
Siang-hwee (Chinese Chambers of Commerce) were established in
commercial centers and the officials of Siang-hwee were given Ch'ing
official ranks. To raise funds for the support of their operation of
schools, the THHK taxed such business transactions as Chinese com�
mercial shipments and cotton and tobacco sales. Siang-hwee organized
boycotts of European firms to protect Chinese commercial interests.
And in 1907 and 1909 two Chinese warships visited Indies ports.
Indies Chinese jubilantly welcomed the warships and demonstrated
their solidarity.47 The power of the Indies Chinese was now felt by the
Indies state. The Dutch, being a weak imperial power, responded to
growing Chinese power by acceding to Chinese demands. The HCS
(Hollandsch-Chineesche scholen, Dutch Chinese schools) were estab�
lished in 1907. The pass system was relaxed in 1904 by the grant of
passes valid for a year instead of for a single journey, and in 1910 the
right of free passage along the main highways without a permit was
granted.48 The Chinese, this time not just the farm Chinese but all the
Chinese, gained their freedom of commercial activity and they now
sought to place their money in sugar plantations and local industries
such as kretek cigarettes and batik as well as in small shops and com�
merce. Besides, along with the expansion of THHK schools, Chinese
revolutionaries supporting Sun Yat-sen's cause also came to the Indies
as THHK schoolteachers and from 1909 started to establish Soe Po
46James Rush, "Opium Farms in Nineteenth-Century Java," pp. 262-265.
47See Liem Thian Joe's description of the mood among Semarang Chinese waiting for
the
coming of two Chinese warships in Riwajat Semarang, quoted in Lea E. Williams,
Overseas
Chinese Nationalism (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, i960), p. 162.
48Furnivall, Netherlands India, pp. 240-241.
The Arena 37
Sia, Chinese reading clubs where lectures were held and books and
periodicals were made available to the Chinese public.
Chinese nationalism was now in ferment. Then in October 1911 the
Chinese revolution took place. The Ch'ing dynasty collapsed and the
republic was born. Indies Chinese saw this event as a sign of the emer�
gence of a strong, modernized Chinese state, and the sense of Chinese
power was all the more heightened. Wild rumors circulated and
Chinese now dared to say to natives that the new republic would soon
drive away the Dutch and that the Chinese would become their rulers
and masters. The Chinese attitude toward natives accordingly became
"arrogant," and they demanded that natives address them as toean
(master) and show them due respect as they did to the priyayi and the
Dutch.49 In Surabaya, during the Chinese New Year celebration in
February 1912, a Dutch ban on hoisting the Chinese republican flag
led to disturbances between Chinese and the police. In protest against
severe police measures, the whole Chinese community in Surabaya
closed down their shops for several days. The inconvenience caused by
this market strike was felt by natives, who could not buy the rice they
needed. In indignation natives, especially Madurese, attacked Chinese
shops and beat up Chinese. Similar but smaller-scale incidents took
place in various places, and in Surabaya, Bangil, and Cirebon hostility
between Chinese on the one hand and natives and Arabs on the other
flared into rioting.50
In the Vorstenlanden, especially in the capitals of Surakarta and
Yogyakarta, all these developments were felt directly. In the Ethical
era, the two capitals were no longer isolated inland Central Javanese
towns but were directly connected with the administrative and com�
mercial centers of colonial Java, Batavia and Bandung to the west,
Semarang to the north, and Surabaya to the east, by the enormous
expansion of communication and transportation networks. People,
goods, and information all moved in increasing numbers between the
two capitals of the Vorstenlanden and the major urban centers in the
west, the north, and the east. Not only was the administrative appara�
tus rationalized and brought under the direct control of Dutch resi�
dents, but state activities such as government pawnshops, Opiumregie,
and government schools were also extended to the Vorstenlanden.
"Professional" priyayi and orang particulier emerged as a social group
to occupy a peripheral place in the priyayi order, at the apex of which
stood the four royal houses. The kaum muda as described by Marco
emerged. Journalism started to develop. In 1900 there were two peri49Resident van
Surakarta (G. F. van Wijk) aan GG, 1 1 Nov. 191 z, Vb. z8 May 1913,
No. 9.
5()Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism, p. 190.
3� An Age in Motion
odicals in Surakarta and one in Yogyakarta, all edited and published
by Indos. In the early 1900s two native journalists, R. Dirdjoatmodjo
in Surakarta and Dr. Wahidin in Yogyakarta, became the editors of
Djawi Kanda and Retnodboemilah respectively. In 1909 four more
periodicals appeared in Surakarta, among which one, Djawi Hiswara,
was the outgrowth of the Malay section of Djawi Kanda, but the other
three were published by Chinese: Ik Po published by Tjoa Tjow Kwan,
Taman Pewarta by Sie Dhian Ho, and Darma Kanda. The editor of
Djawi Kanda and Djawi Hiswara, Raden Martodharsono, was a for�
mer editor of Tirtoadhisoerjo's Medan Prijaji and the two newspapers
were like its "satellites."51 The BO central leadership was in Yogyakar�
ta. Though the Surakarta priyayi were not very enthusiastic about the
BO in the first few years, a branch was established in 1909 and started
to publish an organ in 1911.
In two respects, however, Surakarta and Yogyakarta remained dis�
tinct from other urban centers. First, the two cities were the seats of
Javanese royal houses and as such were regarded as places where "the
heart of the Javanese tradition beats." The imposing authority of tradi�
tional though in fact quite mestizo Javanese culture embodied by the
royal houses was much more strongly felt by government priyayi and
orang particulier there. Among the four royal houses, however, there
were clear differences in their response to the coming of the modern
age. The Pakualaman of Yogyakarta and the Kasunanan and the
Mangkunegaran of Surakarta responded positively and sent their prin�
ces to the Netherlands for higher education, while the Kasultanan
remained conservative. Pakualaman princes were most "advanced"
because, being a tiny appendage, Western-style education was the only
way for their survival. The Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran were
no less "advanced" because they could safely feel that after all Surakar�
ta was more authentic as the epitome of traditional Javanese culture
than was Yogyakarta, and thus could more freely follow the spirit of
progress. Though the BO remained weak in Surakarta for its first several
years, it was largely because the BO was seen as a client of Pakualam�
an aristocrats and priyayi. As we will see, in the 1910s the Surakarta
branch of the BO would become the strongest and wealthiest, and the
BO central leadership would fall into the hands of Western-educated
"progressive" Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran princes. Besides, in
1906 the patih of the Kasunanan, R. Adipati Sosrodiningrat, estab�
lished one of the earliest modern-style religious schools, Madrasah
Mamba'oel Oeloem, attached to the Great Mosque, and took the ini51S. L. van der
Wal, ed., De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging in NederlandsIndie
(Groningen: J. B. Wolters, 1967), p. 78.
The Arena 39
dative to modernize the Kasunanan religious bureaucracy, an initiative
that in the Kasultanan didn't come from either the sultan or the patih
but rather from Kasultanan religious officials.52
Second, the capitals of Surakarta and Yogyakarta were distinct from
other urban centers because of the existence of a strong native bour�
geoisie, batik manufacturers and traders. When the Chinese started to
revive their commercial activities after the relaxation and final aboli�
tion of the pass system, the batik industry in Surakarta, which con�
trolled the "national" market, became one of the major fields in which
Chinese vigorously invested money. Chinese competition increasingly
was felt by native batik manufacturers and traders, all the more so
because cotton goods and other materials imported by European firms
from abroad were brought by Chinese as well as Arab traders. Thus,
when the Surakarta branch of the BO was established and invited
Hadji Samanhoedi, a leading batik entrepreneur in Lawean, and Hadji
Bakri in Kauman, to join the BO, while proposing the establishment of
native cooperatives, they joined with their friends, relatives, and fol�
lowers, as a result of which the membership of the BO in Surakarta
reached some eight hundred. Seeing Samanhoedi joining the BO and
fearing that the BO might indeed set up small cooperative shops in
competition with them, the Chinese invited him to join their mutual aid
association, the Kong Sing. Upon receiving this invitation, Samanhoedi
left the BO, joined the Kong Sing, and became its commissioner. The
Kong Sing was formally a mutual aid association for funerals, but in
fact it was a remnant of the once powerful opium farm network built
on the model of Chinese secret societies, and mutual aid was furnished
not only for funerals and feasts but also for trade and for fighting and
retaliation. The Chinese members of the Kong Sing were reportedly
smaller and poorer traders, probably newly arrived immigrants from
Macao, and certainly of a different breed from the respectable Javanized peranakan
Chinese who had been in the batik trade and formed
a part of the Indo-Chinese-Javanese community of the nineteenthcentury
Vorstenlanden. After Samanhoedi and his followers joined the
Kong Sing, Javanese members swelled its ranks, until there were twice
as many Javanese as Chinese members. But the Chinese members re�
mained in control, and when the news of the Chinese revolution
reached the Indies, they became "arrogant" and started to treat the
Javanese members badly. Resentful, Samanhoedi had his friends estabS2Kenang-
kenangan zzo Tahun Usia Masjid Agung Surakarta {17^7-1976) (Surakarta:
Pengurus Masjid Agung 1974/76, 1976), and Karel A. Steenbrink, Pesantren, Madrasah,
Sekolah: Recente Ontwikkelingen in Indonesisch lslamonderricht (Meppel
(Netherlands]:
Krips Repro, 1974), P- 33-
40 An Age in Motion
lish a similar association for mutual help. The association was called
the Rekso Roemekso. When Samanhoedi was convinced that the new
association would succeed, he left the Kong Sing on the pretext that he
had to move to Surabaya. On his return from Surabaya, he became the
president of the Rekso Roemekso. Soon street fighting started to take
place between Chinese members of the Kong Sing and Javanese of the
Rekso Roemekso, which Chinese called the Kong Sing Djawa (Jav�
anese Kong Sing). The police came to investigate whether the Rekso
Roemekso had applied for incorporation status. Raden Ngabehi Djojomargoso, a member
of the Rekso Roemekso and a remote relative of
the patih, asked for the help of R. Martodharsono, who in turn asked
for Tirtoadhisoerjo's help.53 The Sarekat (Dagang) Islam was about to
be born. Its breeding ground was the batik manufacturers and traders
in Lawean, but to be born it needed the help of a midwife, which
appeared in the form of two native journalists. And once born, the
Sarekat (Dagang) Islam no longer remained a petty street-fighting or�
ganization, but with the advice and assistance of journalists it was to
become a powerful weapon of the native bourgeoisie to boycott the
Chinese and to develop into the first mass movement in the Indies.
53Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken aan GG, Z3 May 1913* Vb. 9 Aug. 1913, No. B13. See
also Resident van Rembang (G. L. Gonggrijp) aan GG, 18 Apr. 1913? Vb. 9 Aug. i9I3?
No.
B13, and van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 170-171.
2 The Birth of the Pergerakan
The Surakarta Sarekat Islam
The Sarekat Islam (SI) was born out of the Rekso Roemekso in early
1912. The Rekso Roemekso, formed by Hadji Samanhoedi and his
relatives, friends, and followers, was an association for mutual help
against "bandits," who made the area of Lawean insecure, presumably
because of their stealing of batik cloth that was put out for drying in
the gardens of batik workshops.1 It was therefore what the name sig�
nified, "the guard," that is, an organization for ronda (night watch),
keeping a vigilant eye out for the security of the neighborhood. But as
animosity developed between the Rekso Roemekso and its sister organ�
ization, the Kong Sing, petty street fighting took place in the last
months of 1911 and the first months of 1912 between Javanese of the
Rekso Roemekso and Chinese of the Kong Sing. A series of street fights
invited police inquiry as to the legal status of the Rekso Roemekso, an
inquiry that in turn transformed the Rekso Roemekso from a simple
ronda organization into the SI.
In those years any association without the legal status of incorpora�
tion could be dissolved at any time by order of the resident under the
Constitutional Regulation of 1854 (Article III). The question of its
legal status was therefore of crucial importance for the continued exis�
tence of the Rekso Roemekso. But its leadership was composed of
batik entrepreneurs and some lower-ranking Kasunanan officials, and
it was beyond their understanding and capability to draw up statutes
and follow due legal process to ask the Kepatihan and the resident for
'A.J.N. Engelenberg, "Voorloopig Opmerking over de Sarekat Islam Beweging," Vb. 13
Aug. 1913, No. B13.
41
42. An Age in Motion
recognition of their statutes and the granting of the legal status of
incorporation. This was the major reason Djojomargoso, an official
of the Kepatihan and close associate of Samanhoedi, asked the help of
Martodharsono, who, as a former editor of Medan Prijaji, personally
knew Tirtoadhisoerjo and of his activities in organizing a commercial
cooperative, Sarekat Dagang Islamijah (SDI), and could understand the
legal problems now confronting the Rekso Roemekso.
Upon police inquiry, Martodharsono tried to avoid troublesome le�
gal problems by stating that the Rekso Roemekso was a branch of the
SDI of Bogor. When the police ordered the Rekso Roemekso leadership
to submit its statutes, Martodharsono asked for Tirtoadhisoerjo's help.
Tirtoadhisoerjo came to Surakarta in late January or early February
1912 to draw up the statutes, submitted them to the head of the sub�
district of Lawean, and announced the establishment of the Surakarta
branch of the Bogor SDI in his newspaper.2 The Rekso Roemekso, a
ronda organization, was thus clothed in modern language and given a
new name, Sarekat (Dagang) Islam.
The statutes formulated and signed by Tirtoadhisoerjo and back�
dated to November 9, 1911,3 stated in their foreword the establish�
ment of the SI: "It will be known well to everyone that the present time
is considered as the age of progress. Our watchword thus must be that
striving for progress should not remain idle sound. On us Muslims also
rests the obligation to contribute to it. Therefore we have decided to
establish the Sarekat Islam Association." Article 1 of the statutes then
stated that the association would be established wherever there existed
fifty members and that the purpose of the association should be "to
make the members associate with one another as brothers, to foster
solidarity and mutual help among all Muslims, and to try to uplift
the people, so as to attain prosperity, welfare, and the greatness of the
realm by all available means that are not in conflict with the laws of the
country and the Government."4
The association was named Sarekat Islam from the beginning,
though Solonese also called it Sarekat Dagang Islam. It was natural in
light of the organizational reality of the Rekso Roemekso, which was a
ronda organization and not a commercial cooperative, as the Bogor
2Adjunct Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken (D. A. Rinkes) aan GG, 23 May 1913, Vb. 9
Aug. 1913, No. B13. "De Sarekat Dagang Islam in de Residentie Soerakarta," Mr.
2301/12,
Vb. 28 May 1913, No. 9. Also see van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische
Beweging, pp. 86-92.
3November 9, 1911, is too early for the conversion of the Rekso Roemekso to the SI.
Both
the resident of Surakarta (van Wijk) and Tjokroaminoto state that Tirtoadhisoerjo
came to
Surakarta in early 1912, most likely in February, after the Chinese market strike
in Surabaya,
when the first boycott was organized by the SI in Surakarta. See "De Sarekat Dagang
Islam in
de Residentie Soerakarta," Mr. 2301/12, Vb. 28 May 1913, No. 9; Proces Verbaal
(Tjokroaminoto), Mr. 184X/21, Vb. 2 May 1923, No. D6.
4"Sarekat Islam," in Encyclopaedia van Nederlandsche-Indie.
The Birth of the Pergerakan 43
SDI was.5 But in the statutes embellished by modern words of the
Ethical era, it was defined as an association of Muslims working for
"progress," in which Islam was the signifier of nativeness, as Christian�
ity of the Dutch and Confucianism of the Chinese. In the first six or
seven months of its existence, the phase now commonly known as that
of the SDI, the organizational structure, nature, and activities of the SI
were molded by the subtle and complex interplay of the persistent
ronda character and the modern clothing given it by Tirtoadhisoerjo.
Organizationally, the SI was structured as stipulated by the statutes.
The central committee was constituted of president, secretary, treasurer,
and commissioners. Samanhoedi became the president. Djojomargoso
was appointed first secretary. Hardjosoemarto of Purwosari, a former
apprentice at the subdistrict office of Lawean, was chosen as second
secretary. And Kartowihardjo, a batik trader, was appointed treasurer.
Tirtoadhisoerjo became adviser and Martodharsono, together with
Djojomargoso, ran the SI office established in Purwosari in the sub�
district of Lawean.6 Except for Tirtoadhisoerjo, who lived either in
Bandung or in Bogor, all the members of the central committee lived in
Lawean. At first the membership was largely confined to Lawean, but
soon the membership started to increase and the SI expanded outside
Lawean.7 Lrom among the members, then, were appointed wargo pangarso (literally,
members willing to go first, which the Dutch called
"group presidents") for each kampung (city quarter). Wargo pangarso
supervised the activities of the members and functioned as the linkage
in communicating instructions from the central committee to the mem�
bers.8 Lrom among the members were also appointed wargo roemekso
(literally, "guard members") who were in charge of maintaining se�
curity in the kampung and obliged to be in the vanguard of the mem�
bers in case fighting broke out. The wargo roemekso were led by the
wargo pangarso and together they formed the core of the SI, whose
essential function was, as in the days of the Rekso Roemekso, ronda.
Part of the money collected from the members in the form of entrance
fees was given to them. On joining the SI, new members were required
to pay thirty cents as entrance fees but were not required to pay
monthly or annual contributions. If money was needed on special occa5The confusion
arose because the association called itself a branch of the SDI of Bogor for
legal expediency. Thus when envoys were sent by the SI central committee to
Surabaya in
May 1912, they explained that the Surakarta SI was a branch of the Bogor SI (and
not the
SDI). Sartono Kartodirdjo, ed., Sarekat Islam Lokal, p. 336. Conversely, when the
first SI
branch was established in Kudus in September 1912, it was called the Sarekat Dagang
Islam.
Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, p. 93.
6Sartono, Sarekat Islam Lokal, pp. 332-334.
7Engelenberg, "Voorloopig Opmerking over de Sarekat Islam Beweging," Vb. 1 3 Aug.
1913, No. B13.
8Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, p. 98.
44 An Age in Motion
sions, contributions were collected.9 At their initiation, new members
took an oath of faith in and obedience to the SI and the leaders. They
were then initiated into the secret signs of the SI, so that they could
recognize their "brothers" and maintain communication with their
wargo pangarso. Since the majority of the members were illiterate,
signs and the spoken language were essential to run the organization. A
piece of black paper put up at an easily visible place, such as on trees or
buildings, signified that someone had been robbed and needed help.
Under the command of the wargo pangarso, the members collected
information and sometimes caught thieves by themselves and handed
them over to the police. A piece of yellow paper meant that someone
was in difficulty. A piece of red paper signified that two members had
quarreled and that someone was needed to mediate between them. And
a piece of brown paper meant that someone had to be boycotted. If
they saw these signs, the members had to go to their wargo pangarso to
get further information and to attend meetings. The signs functioned to
convene meetings, and attending meetings became the primary form of
organizational activity for all members.10
In the nature and activities of the SI, the interplay of the ronda
character and the modern clothing was no less subtle and complex.
Certainly the statutes, the written official language of the SI, commit�
ted the SI to things modern and opened up new fields of activities. The
central committee announced plans to establish schools for Muslims,
to promote commerce, and to publish a Javanese newspaper as its
organ.11 The SI leadership also announced a plan to establish a mosque
and asked members to contribute for this project.12 But nothing came
of the projects to establish schools and a mosque. Though proposals
were put forward to the central committee to establish SI shops and
requests were made for financial help, nothing materialized for the
time being. These modern plans remained idle sounds. The only excep�
tion was the publication of its Javanese organ, Sarotomo (in wayang
Sarotomo is the name of Arjuna's magic bow). Tirtoadhisoerjo became
its editor-in-chief, but since he was far away from Surakarta and could
not maintain daily contact with the central committee, Martodharsono
was appointed coeditor. Because the SI did not own its own printing
9For more on wargo pangarso and wargo roemekso, see Proces Verbaal (Tjokroaminoto),
Mr. 184X/21. Five percent of entrance fees was given to wargo pangarso and 65
percent was
used for "local purposes," while 30 percent was handed over to the central
committee. Van
der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 211-212.
10"De Sarekat dagang Islam in de residentie Soerakarta," Mr. 2301/12, Vb. 28 May
1913,
No. 9. For more on the initiation ritual and secret signs, see van der Wal, De
Opkomst van de
Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 204-207.
nVan der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, p. 88.
12Adjunct Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken aan GG, 23 May 1913, Vb. 9 Aug. 1913,
No. B13.
The Birth of the Pergerakan 45
house and all the printing houses in Surakarta published their own
newspapers and did not want to print Sarotomo, it was printed at the
firm of H. Buning of Yogyakarta and Mas Wignjoardjo was employed
as proofreader.13 But Sarotomo never assumed importance during the
first phase of the SI. Though some efforts were made to expand the SI
outside Surakarta in such places as Yogyakarta, Madiun, Kediri, and
Surabaya, no branches were established before September, and the
envoys sent out by the SI leadership were successful in recruiting mem�
bers only in Surabaya.14 Since the Si's sphere of influence was confined
to the residency of Surakarta, especially the capital, the signs and the
spoken language made Sarotomo superfluous. Sarotomo remained
only an emblem of modernity, and the central committee made no
effort to establish a printing house. Besides, it was started at a time
when Tirtoadhisoerjo's limited-liability company Medan Prijaji went
into liquidation and he ran into serious financial trouble trying to keep
Medan Prijaji alive. After three issues of Sarotomo appeared, Tirtoadhisoerjo
reportedly appropriated money to be paid to the printing
house H. Buning for the publication of Medan Prijaji. Sarotomo tem�
porarily ceased publication and the central committee severed all rela�
tions with Tirtoadhisoerjo.15
This does not mean that the SI remained a simple but huge ronda
organization like the Rekso Roemekso. Though ronda remained
central to the SI, a new form of movement, the boycott, was also
introduced to the SI by Tirtoadhisoerjo and Martodharsono. While
individual members were obliged to follow the precepts of Islam-to
be correct in behavior, to obey the laws of the country and the govern�
ment, and not to drink alcoholic beverages or smoke opium-all the
collective actions of the SI were directed against theft, fire, adultery,
and the difficulties in which members found themselves not due to their
own fault. In other words, mutual help among members was directed
against absolute loss, on the fear of which ronda was and is prac�
ticed.16 In early 1912, however, this fear of absolute loss was easily
13Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, p. 88.
14Ibid., p. 96. See also Proces Verbaal (Tjokroaminoto), Mr. 184.X/21; Sartono,
Sarekat
Islam Lokal, pp. 335-337.
15Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 88-92. Shortly
there�
after, Medan Prijaji ceased publication. Tirtoadhisoerjo was taken into custody
over a debt
and sentenced to six months' exile on the charge of press offense. He was detained
in custody
until early 1913 and then went into exile in Ambon. He returned to Java in early
1915, by
which time he was, Rinkes says, already finished "as an agitator, also [as] a
behind-the-scenes
figure." He died in 191 8 in Hotel Samirana, the former Hotel Medan Prijaji, in
custody of his
former protege R. Goenawan. For the last years of Tirtoadhisoerjo, see Pramoedya,
Sang
Pemula, pp. 1 51 - 174.
16For an excellent analysis of ronda, see James Siegel, Solo in the New Order,
chap. 2. For
the SI members' obligations, see van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische
Beweg�
ing, pp. 93-94-
46
An Age in Motion
linked to the fear of and hostility against the Chinese. The Chinese
recently had been exempted by the Indies government from the obliga�
tion to pay respect to the Dutch and Javanese officials. Young Chinese
also started to change their appearance soon after the news of the
Chinese revolution reached the Indies, cutting their Ch'ing-style pigtail,
changing their traditional Chinese-style clothing for Western-style
clothing, and appearing in public like sinyo (European or Eurasian
boy). All these things were seen by the Javanese as a sign not just of
Chinese power but also that the Chinese were outside and above the
hierarchical Javanese social order. In addition, Chinese commercial
activities had become increasingly vigorous and the Chinese market
strike in Surabaya in February 1912 demonstrated their power to the
natives. The technique of the boycott was introduced against this back�
ground. The first boycott was organized against a Chinese firm, Sie
Dhian Ho, a firm that came into operation in 1902 and dealt in station�
ery, published the Malay Chinese newspaper Taman Fewarta, and was
engaged in the batik trade.17 Shortly after the Chinese market strike in
Surabaya, Sie Dhian Ho, with other Chinese firms, tried to beat down
the price of batik cloth they wanted to buy from native batik manufac�
turers in Lawean. In response, native batik manufacturers boycotted
Sie Dhian Ho under Martodharsono's leadership. Thereafter a number
of boycotts were organized against Chinese firms. Numerous requests
were made to the central committee to organize boycotts against those
who committed unfair commercial practices and behaved arrogantly-
such as a pawnshop owner who gave counterfeit money and acted
rudely to customers. The SI was the first organization to launch a
boycott using strong-arm methods. Along with boycotts, incidents of
street fighting between members of the SI and Chinese increased. Not
only small-scale fighting ensued, but also some ninety soldiers of the
Mangkunegaran Legion broke into Pasar Gede and beat up Chinese.
Javanese children grouped under the name of Soetarsa Moelja (liter�
ally, children of goodwill) fought with Chinese children.18 The atmo�
sphere became so tense that the SI leadership had to organize special
ronda in areas neighboring the Chinese quarters at the time of a
Chinese festival in June in order to make sure that no large-scale distur�
bances took place.19 In all these activities Martodharsono was en�
trusted by the SI central committee with playing the central role. Not
only did he run the SI office and revive Sarotomo but he also led
boycotts and acted as the SI representative to the police if fighting took
place. For all these jobs, he was the right person. As a journalist, he
17Pramoedya Ananta Toer, "Sepatah Kata Perkenalan," in Tempo Doeloe, ed. Pramoedya
Ananta Toer (Jakarta: Hasta Mitra, 198Z), p. 8.
18Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 86-87, 95~97-
19Sartono, Sarekat Islam Lokal, pp. 334-335-
The Birth of the Pergerakan 47
knew about the modern world, but he was also an influential guru who
taught people how to be invulnerable against physical attack, often
with magical formulas. He had hundreds of disciples and maintained
extensive personal connections both with the underworld of Surakarta
and with Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran princes and officials.20
In the tense atmosphere created by boycotts and beatings, the SI
started to expand rapidly in June and July. On one June Saturday
alone, some two thousand new members were initiated by the group of
twenty to thirty.21 The membership rose so rapidly that the central
committee could not keep the membership list up-to-date. The assis�
tant resident of Surakarta estimated that membership reached thirtyfive thousand in
early August.22 Given the fact that the male popula�
tion of the city of Surakarta at that time was sixty thousand at most,
including Europeans, Indos, Chinese, and even baby boys, it is not an
exaggeration to say that almost all the native and Muslim males in the
city joined the SI, except for high-ranking officials and princes of the
Kasunanan and the Mangkunegaran, irrespective of their age and so�
cial standing. In SI meetings, physical sanctions were issued against
members who committed adultery. Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran
officials, once they joined the SI, no longer wanted to pass information
on the SI to the Dutch and high-ranking Javanese officials.23 The resi�
dent of Surakarta became increasingly nervous about the SI. Moreover,
the SI started to expand to the countryside in July and the sense of
power and solidarity felt by SI members generated "improper" atti�
tudes and behavior among them toward officials. On the Ceper sugar
plantation and on some other plantations, peasants went on strike and
refused to perform corvee labor for the plantations. In Krapyak, where
reorganization had just started, some seventy SI members of village
Tempel showed "highly offensive" attitudes toward the assistant resi�
dent and the regent and did not want to answer their questions.24 All
these incidents were seen by the resident as the Si's threatening the rust
20For more on Martodharsono, see Resident van Surakarta (Harloff) aan GG (van Lim�
burg Stirum), 21 Apr. 1918, Mr. 142X/18. According to this report, Martodharsono
was
formerly an official of the Kasunanan, but was banished to Lombok in 1894 on the
charge of
forgery. It seems he was already an influential guru at that time, for he escaped
Lombok and
secretly returned to Surakarta with the help of his disciples. In Surakarta he was
again
arrested and banished, this time, to Sumatra. After serving his term and being
allowed to
return to Java, he stayed in Bandung and became an editor of Medan Prijaji and then
back in
Surakarta became the editor-in-chief of Djawi Kanda and Djawi Hiswara. For
Martodharsono's activities in 1912 and 1913, see Resident van Surakarta (van Wijk)
aan GG (Idenburg), 24 May 1913, Vb. 9 Aug. 1913, No. B13.
21 "De Sarekat Dagang Islam in de residentie Soerakarta," Mr. 2301/12, Vb. 28 May
1913.
No. 9.
22Sartono, Sarekat Islam Lokal, p. 333.
23Van der Wal, De Opkomst nan de Nationalistische Beweging, p. 85.
24Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 11 Aug. 1912, Vb. 4 Jan. 1913, No. 29. "De Sarekat
Dagang Islam in de residentie Soerakarta," Mr. 2301/12, Vb. 28 May 1913, No. 9.
48 An Age in Motion
en orde. On August io, 1912, the resident ordered the suspension of all
SI activities and prohibited the SI from holding meetings and accepting
new members. The police, under the command of the assistant resident
of Surakarta, raided the SI office and the houses of the central commit�
tee members. Four days later the fasting month started, and the SI
central committee used this as an excuse to suspend all activities.25
Dunia Pergerakan (The World of the Movement)
The resident's August 10 order suspending all SI activities marked
the second turning point in the transformation of the SI. It drove the SI
to expand outside the residency of Surakarta. In less than a year the SI
expanded all over Java and Madura like a "flood" and SI branches mush�
roomed everywhere. The key to this expansion was no longer ronda
and boycott, but newspapers and rallies that expressed native soli�
darity, presided over by journalists-turned-professional SI leaders. This
expansion of the SI took place while the government policy as to the
legal status of the SI was undecided and the Indische Partij (IP) came
and disappeared like lightning as the first political party in the Indies
that appealed to "the Indies for the Indiers." It was under these circum�
stances that dunia pergerakan (the world of the movement) was born.
The resident's order and the police raids drove the Surakarta SI
leadership into something of a panic and put them at a loss as to what
to do. To look for a way out, the central committee invited two Sur�
abaya members to Surakarta: R. M. Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto, an
engineer of the Rogojampi sugar factory, and R. Tjokrosoedarmo, a
clerk at a Dutch notary office, both of whom had joined the SI in May
1912. In Surakarta, they discussed with central committee members
how they might circumvent the resident's order. In legal terms, the
resident's order applied only to the SI constituted on the basis of the
statutes drawn up by Tirtoadhisoerjo and within the boundaries of
the residency of Surakarta. A way was sought to exploit these points.
The central committee appointed Tjokroaminoto a commissioner and
entrusted him to draw up new statutes, while starting vigorous efforts
to expand the SI outside the residency of Surakarta.26
On September 14, 1912, Tjokroaminoto, with the help of Tjokroso�
edarmo and a Dutch notary, Mr. Dommermg, drew up new statutes,
submitted them to the resident of Surabaya, and asked for legal recog25Van der Wal,
De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 95, 172.
26Proces Verbaal (Tjokroaminoto), Mr. 184X/21.
The Birth of the Fergerakan 49
nition of the SI, an association newly constituted in legal terms and
independent of the old Surakarta SI.27 Three days later the resident of
Surakarta lifted the order of suspension upon the petition of the SI
central committee on condition that it draw up new statutes that spe�
cifically confine the geographical sphere of SI activities to the residency
of Surakarta and that it control its financial matters more properly.28
The Surakarta SI resumed its activities in the residency of Surakarta.
But the central committee never drew up new statutes as the resident
ordered. Instead, the SI leadership made all-out efforts to expand the SI
all over Java.
At first, SI propaganda was made through personal contacts by en�
voys sent by the central committee. In September the first SI branch
was established in Kudus. In October the Darma Loemekso was set up
in Bandung by Samanhoedi's brother, Hadji Amir.29 The Surabaya SI
was also established with its own central committee under the chair�
manship of Tjokroaminoto.30 In November SI branches were estab�
lished by Djojomargoso in Madiun, Ngawi, and Ponorogo. By the end
of 1912 the Bandung and Semarang SI branches also came into
being.31 Then, in early 1913, newspapers started to propagate the SI.
Aside from Sarotomo, newspapers such as Oetoesan Hindia of Sur�
abaya, Sinar Djawa of Semarang, Kaoem Moeda of Bandung, and
Fantjaran Warta of Batavia became de facto SI organs. Open-air prop�
aganda rallies started to be organized. The first huge SI rally was held
in Surabaya in January 1913 and was attended by some ten thousand.
It was organized by Tjokroaminoto, who learned the power of a rally
from the IP rally organized by Douwes Dekker in Bandung on Decem�
ber 25, probably the first political rally ever held in the Indies. The first
SI rally was so successful that the rally soon became the most charac�
teristic feature of the SI movement. Newspapers and rallies greatly
accelerated SI expansion. When the first SI general meeting was held in
Surabaya on January 26, there already existed fifteen SI branches, of
which thirteen sent delegates representing eighty thousand members.32
Two months later, the first SI congress was held in Surakarta on March
27Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 172-173. For the
new
statutes, see p. 161.
28"De Sarekat Dagang Islam in de residentie Soerakarta," Mr. 2301/1 2, Vb. 28 May
1913,
No. 9.
29Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 173-175, 177.
3()Proces Verbaal (Tjokroaminoto), Mr. 184X/21. See also van der Wal, De Opkomst
van
de Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 173-175.
31Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 176-178, 195.
32For the first SI general meeting, see Assistent Resident voor de Politie
(Schippers) aan
Resident van Surabaya (van Aalst), 21 Feb. 1913, Mr. 490/13; De Indische Gids,
1913, pp.
5I7-5I8-
50 An Age in Motion
25. The number of SI branches reached forty-eight, of which forty-two
with a total membership of two hundred thousand sent delegates.33
The enormous expansion of the SI strongly affected both the govern�
ment position toward the SI and the nature and structure of the SI
central leadership. First, the SI became too large for a resident to
handle. Its very expansion made the SI a serious policy problem for
the Indies government, all the more so because the SI expansion was
accompanied by all sorts of "confusions" and "irregularities"-wild
rumors, street fighting, "improper attitudes" of SI members toward
administrative officials, refusal to perform corvee-and thus touched
the nerves of administrative officials, who were extremely sensitive to
any sign of the undermining of their authority and rust en orde, and
upset the European community, especially the powerful Sugar Syndi�
cate. Shortly after the SI congress in Surakarta, on March 29, Governor
General Idenburg gave the SI representatives an audience, in which he
showed sympathy to the SI but remained uncommitted to any future
government position as to its legal status.34 Instead the whole govern�
ment apparatus was geared to supervising and gathering information
on the SI. The fate of the SI was ultimately dependent on the govern�
ment decision on the legal status of the SI. The SI central leadership
was well aware of this. But the government headed by Idenburg also
saw the rise of the SI as a sign of native awakening and did not want to
declare it illegal. The government had to look for a way to tame the SI.
Government policy toward the SI, formulated in the form of the deci�
sion as to its legal status, did not take clear shape until the end ofJune.
In the meantime, the SI central leadership was placed in a state of
suspense and in that state pushed ever more for the expansion of the SI.
Second, the expansion of the SI generated new SI centers in major
urban areas and made changes necessary both in its organization and
in the central leadership. It had already been decided at the first SI
general meeting that a new Committee for the Department of East Java
be established in Surabaya under the command of the central commit�
tee.35 This change in the organization of the SI progressed further at
the first SI congress in March. Now the central committee of the SI was
seated in Surakarta, under whose command came three committees for
the departments of East, Central, and West Java. All the SI branches
formally came under the command of one of the three committees. The
33For the SI congress, see Soerjosoeparta, "Verslag van het Congres van de Sarekat-
Islam
op Zondag 23 Maart 1913, gehouden in den Stadstuin (Snwedari) te Soerakarta," 25
Mar.
1913, Vb. 9 Aug 13, No. B13; Sartono, Sarekat Islam Lokal, pp. 304-307; Resident
van
Madiun (Hofland) aan GG, 29 Mar. 1913, Mr. 1096/13, Vb. 25 June 13, No. 62.
34Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 161-164. See also
D.M.G. Koch, Batig Slot: Figuren uit het Oude Indie (Amsterdam: De Brug-Djambatan,
i960), p. 14.
35Assistent Resident voor de Politie aan Resident van Surabaya, 21 Feb. 1913, Mr.
490/13.
The Birth of the Pergerakan 5i
following members of the central and department committees were
also elected at the congress (in parentheses are the place of residence
and other information).36
Central Committee (seated in Surakarta)
Adviser: Pangeran Ngabehi (Surakarta; eldest son of the sunan)
Chairman: M. H. Samanhoedi (Surakarta; batik entrepreneur in Lawean)
Vice-Chairman: R.M.O.S. Tjokroaminoto (Surabaya; editor-in-chief of
Oetoesan Hindia)
Secretary: R. Mohammad Joesoef (Semarang; editor-in-chief of Sinar Djawa)
Treasurer: M. H. Ngabdoelpatah (Surakarta; batik entrepreneur in Coyudan)
Commissioners: H. Hisamzaijnie (Surakarta; Koranic teacher and batik trader
in Kauman)
R. Tjokrosoedarmo (Surabaya; clerk of a Dutch notary office)
R, Goenawan (Batavia; editor-in-chief of Pantjaran Warta)
Chatib Amin K. H. Dahlan (Yogyakarta; president of the Moehammadijah)
Committee for the Department of East Java (seated in Surabaya)
Chairman/Secretary: R. Adiwidjojo (general secretary of the Setia Oesaha)
Vice-Chairman: R. Tjokrosoedarmo
Committee for the Department of Central Java (seated in Surakarta)
Chairman: R.M.A. Poespodiningrat (Bupati Nayaka of the Kasunanan)
Vice-Chairman: R. Dipomartono (batik entrepreneur of Lawean)
Secretary: R. Ng. Djojomargoso (Kepatihan official)
Committee for the Department of West Java (seated in Batavia)
Chairman: R. Goenawan
Secretary: R. Boerhan Kartadiredja (journalist)
Treasurer: M. Andong
The central committee and three department committees loosely formed
the SI central leadership. Two cautionary remarks, however, are needed
here. First, though the Surakarta SI leadership managed to dominate the
central committee, their role was more apparent than real. With the
establishment of the department committees, the central committee w as
relieved of the task of leading the SI branches. The money handed over
by the branches to the central leadership also changed in its flow. It was
now up to the department committees whether the money go into the
coffers of the central committee from the branches or simply remain at
the department committee. The only task left to the central committee
was to decide policies affecting the whole SI movement, but its chance
?6Soerjosoeparto, "Verslag van het Congres van de Sarekat-Islam," zs Mar. 1913, Vb.
9
Aug. 13, No. B13.
52. An Age in Motion
did not come until after the government decision on the legal status of
the SI was made. In the meantime, the central committee was more a
symbol of SI unity, under whose facade increasing decentralization
proceeded.
Second, though Java was divided into three spheres of influence and
the branches in Central, East, and West Java came formally under the
command of the Surakarta, Surabaya, and Batavia SI leadership, nei�
ther the division of spheres nor the control of the branches was reality,
especially in Central and West Java. In Central Java, Tjokroaminoto,
as the vice-chairman of the central committee, made propaganda for
the SI and undermined the leadership position of the Surakarta SI. In
West Java, Goenawan controlled only branches of the Batavia region.
The Bandung SI leadership under Soewardi Soerjaningrat not only
disregarded the Committee for the Department of West Java but also
represented the center of opposition to the SI central leadership. In
order to understand the SI at the center more clearly, we need to look
at the newly emergent SI centers as well as the old center of Surakarta.
In East Java, the Surabaya SI branch emerged as the most important
center of the SI movement. Surabaya was probably the only place
where the envoys sent by the SI central committee prior to the suspen�
sion of SI activities in August 1912 had some success in recruiting new
members. The central figures of the Surabaya SI, such as Tjokroaminoto,
Tjokrosoedarmo, and Hadji Hasan Ali Soerati, all joined the SI in
May.37 In Surabaya, after the Chinese market strike in February, street
fighting between Chinese on the one hand and natives and Arabs on
the other repeatedly took place, and Arab and native Muslim mer�
chants no longer wanted to place commercial advertisements in Chi�
nese newspapers. Instead they planned to publish their own newspaper
and to set up a clinic for Muslims. To this end, Arab traders established
a limited-liability company, the Setia Oesaha, under the leadership of
Hasan Ali Soerati. Its initial capital was fifty thousand guilders, half of
which was financed by Hasan Ali Soerati and other Arabs in Surabaya
and the other half by Arab and native Muslim traders in Semarang,
Pekalongan, Batavia, and Bandung. Hasan Ali Soerati became the di�
rector. After its establishment, the Setia Oesaha founded its own print�
ing house and started to publish a newspaper, Oetoesan Hindia, in
December 1912. It was from the beginning intended as an organ of the
SI, because, as Hasan All Soerati remarked at the SI general meeting,
"any association should have its organ as the IP has De Expres"38
Initially Hasan Ali Soerati planned to offer the job of editor-in-chief to
Dr. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, who was then leading the Kartini de37Sartono, Sarekat
Islam Lokal, pp. 335-337; Proces Verbaal (Tjokroaminoto), Mr.
184X/21.
38Assistent Resident voor de Politie aan Resident van Surabaya, 21 Feb. 1913? Mr-
490/13.
The Birth of the Pergerakan 53
bating club in Malang; but Tjipto soon moved to Bandung and joined
Douwes Dekker's De Expres as an editor. Tjokroaminoto got the job
instead. Since he was new to the trade, R. Tirtodanoedjo, a former
editor-in-chief of Sinar Djawa and a former official of Volkslectuur,
became coeditor. Oetoesan Hindia thus became the de facto SI organ
and Setia Oesaha the office for the Surabaya SI.39
In the beginning the Surabaya SI expanded as a ronda and boycott
organization like its counterpart in Surakarta. To defend communities
from street fighting between Chinese and Arabs and to lead fighting
with the Chinese, talang pati (one who risks one's life for a cause) were
appointed from among the members and organized under the com�
mand of kampung leaders (pengurus) in the same way that wargo
roemekso were organized under the command of wargo pangarso in
Surakarta. But Tjokroaminoto soon placed talang pati under his direct
command to prevent petty street fighting from developing into largescale
disturbances, and gradually let the ronda organization wither
away.40 The Surabaya SI thus never attained the size of the Surakarta
SI, and its membership remained far smaller than that of the Surakarta
SI.41 Instead, the activities of Tjokroaminoto and other Surabaya SI
leaders were geared to the establishment of SI branches in East and
Central Java.
In these activities, Tjokroaminoto clearly occupied the central posi�
tion, not only because he was the editor-in-chief of Oetoesan Hindia
but also because he was an unrivaled orator at SI rallies, gifted with his
"deep penetrating baritone voice," which could be heard without a
microphone by thousands of people.42 Born to a high priyayi family in
Ponorogo in 1882, Tjokroaminoto followed the path to bureaucratic
priyayi status by his mid-twenties, as most sons of high priyayi birth
did in those years. But he graduated from the OSVIA at Magelang and
entered the Pangreh Pradja in the 1900s, when jongkok (humble,
crouching walk) and sembah (gesture of obedience with hands held
before face) were seen by the emerging kaum muda not only as disgust�
ing but also against the modern age, and when white-collar jobs were
becoming increasingly available to the Western-educated in major ur�
ban centers. Tjokroaminoto quit the Pangreh Pradja in 1907 and
moved to Surabaya, where he became an engineer at the Rogojampi
sugar factory after completing an engineering course at night school.
After the establishment of the SI, he again quit his job and became the
39Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 173-175.
40Proces Verbaal (Tjokroaminoto), Mr. 184X/21.
41At the first SI general meeting the membership of the Surabaya SI was announced
as six
thousand, while that of the Surakarta SI was said to be sixty-four thousand.
Assistent Resi�
dent voor de Politie aan Resident van Surabaya, 21 Feb. 1913, Mr. 490/13.
42The quotation is from Missive van den Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken (Rinkes) van
30
Nov. 1915, Mr. 1263/16, Vb. 1 Sept. 1917, No. 33.
54 An Age in Motion
first successful pergerakan leader who made his livelihood by leading
the pergerakan-that is, getting his income by leading the SI and run�
ning the Setia Oesaha and establishing his career as a professional
politician.43
To consolidate his position in the SI and to run the SI and the Setia
Oesaha, Tjokroaminoto gathered his friends and proteges around him,
distributed positions and sources of income, and led them to expand the
SI under the Surabaya SI leadership. Tjokrosoedarmo and Tirtodanoedjo were his
close associates. They were soon joined by R. Adiwidjojo, R.
Achmad, R. P. Sosrokardono, and Brotosoehardjo. Adiwidjojo, a clerk
in a Dutch commercial firm and a friend of Tjokroaminoto, became the
general secretary of the Setia Oesaha, the secretary of the Surabaya SI,
and after the SI congress, the chairman/secretary of the Committee for
the Department of East Java. Achmad, a classmate of Tjokroaminoto's
at the OSVIA, became the chairman of the Surabaya SI in the middle of
1913. Brotosoehardjo became an editor of Oetoesan Hindia.44 Sosrokar�
dono went to Pekalongan and Sukaraja to take care of the SI branches
there on Tjokroaminoto's behalf. All except Adiwidjojo lived with
Tjokroaminoto and his family.45 Those who threatened Tjokroami�
noto's leadership were driven away from Surabaya. When Tjokroaminto
became vice-chairman of the SI central committee in March 1913, M.
Tondokoesoemo and R. Sosrokoernio became the chairman and secre�
tary of the Surabaya SI, but could not maintain good terms with Tjokro�
aminoto. They were attacked at rallies on charges of embezzling SI
money and were ousted from their positions. Both of them moved to
Surakarta.46 By August 1913 Tjokroaminoto's control of the Surabaya
SI was complete. Hasan Ali Soerati, founder of the Setia Oesaha and
most instrumental in establishing SI shops in the Surabaya region, was
forced to resign as director of the Setia Oesaha and was replaced by
Tjokraominoto. The money needed to buy out shares of the Setia
Oesaha to become director was financed by Arab merchants who were
anti-Hasan Ali Soerati.47 The Surabaya SI and the future Centraal
Sarekat Islam (CSI) in Surabaya never had its own office. Instead the
office of the Setia Oesaha and Tjokroaminoto's house became de facto
SI offices.
43For more on Tjokroaminoto, see Amelz, H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto: Hidup dan
Perdjuangannja (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1952).
44Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 195-196; Proces
Verbaal (Tjokroaminoto), Mr. 184X/21.
45For Sosrokardono's relationship with Tjokroaminoto, see Raden Pandji Sosro
Kardono
aan GG, Weltevreden, 18 Nov. 1920, Mr. 1353X/20, Vb. 28 Mar. 1922, No. E3bis.
46Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, p. 379.
47Mr. 184X/21. Though Tjokroaminoto did not disclose where his financial backing
came
from, it was most likely Hadji Hasan bin Semit, who later became a CSI commissioner
in
1917 as Tjokroaminoto's loyal ally.
The Birth of the Pergerakan 55
In Central Java, the old SI center of Surakarta remained the most
important. Samanhoedi and other batik entrepreneurs from the Rekso
Roemekso days continued to control the SI funds and occupied the
central place. Frightened by the resident's order of August 1912, how�
ever, they were now eager to show their respectability to the Dutch and
high-ranking Javanese officials. The days of boycotting and beating
Chinese were over. The SI membership continued to grow, especially in
the countryside, but they were now serious about setting up SI shops
and encouraging religious education. In Surakarta, Klaten, and Sragen,
a number of SI shops were established with the financial support of
the SI, and associations were created for children to study Koranic re�
citation.48 Martodharsono, who had played such an important role in
the first half of 1912 and had become suspect in the eyes of the au�
thorities, became of dubious use. Dissatisfied, he gradually became less
active, leaving the editing and management of Sarotomo to M. Marco
Kartodikromo and the daily administration of the SI office to Sosrokoernio. To
improve the respectability of the SI, Samanhoedi and other
batik entrepreneurs called in Kasunanan princes and high-ranking
Kepatihan officials to occupy central positions of the Surakarta SI
leadership. It was a good opportunity as well for Kasunanan princes
and high-ranking Kepatihan officials to bestow patronage on the now
huge SI. Prior to the first SI congress, the Surakarta SI leadership asked
R. M. Woerjaningrat, a son of the patih, to become adviser to the SI,
but he declined because the legal status of the SI was still pending. The
SI leadership then asked Pangeran Ngabehi, the sunan's eldest son, to
assume the position. He accepted the offer. This was a clear sign that
other princes and high-ranking officials might join the SI. Soon another
son of the patih, R.M.A. Poespodiningrat, assumed the position of
chairman of the Committee for the Department of Central Java, and
R.M.A. Soerjodiningrat became the chairman of the Surakarta SI
branch. The Surakarta SI leadership was thus placed under a coalition
of batik entrepreneurs and Kasunanan princes and high-ranking offi�
cials.49
This coalition, however, proved short-lived. Shortly after the SI con�
gress, Pangeran Ngabehi resigned as adviser on the sunan's order.50 This
was a sign of the sunan's displeasure with the SI. Other Kasunanan
princes and high-ranking Kepatihan officials also quit the SI or simply
stopped being active. The Committee for the Department of Central
48For SI activities in the residency of Surakarta in early 1913, see Resident van
Surakarta
aan GG, 24 May 1913, Vb. 9 Aug. 1913, No. B13.
49Ibid. This development alarmed Mangkunegaran princes, who established and
financed
the rival association, Darmo Hatmoko. See "Spionnenbericht uit Soerakarta," 18 Aug.
1913,
Mr. 1996/13; Proces Verbaal (Tjokroaminoto), Mr. 184X/21.
50Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 24 May 1913, Vb. 9 Aug. 1913, No. Bi ?.
5^ An Age in Motion
Java virtually collapsed, because Poespodiningrat and Djojomargoso,
chairman and secretary, resigned. Left alone, Samanhoedi and other
batik entrepreneurs fell back on journalists, this time on Marco, former
editor of Medan Prijaji, and Sosrokoernio, former secretary of the
Surabaya SI. Sosrokoernio was appointed secretary of the Surakarta SI
branch and Marco a commissioner. They carried out all the daily
activities-editing and publishing Sarotomo, running the SI office, and
organizing rallies-and became professional pergerakan leaders. Unlike
the journalists in the new SI centers, however, they could not control SI
funds. They remained Samanhoedi's "employees."51
R. Mohammad Joesoef of the Semarang SI and Chatib Amin K. H.
Ahmad Dahlan of the Yogyakarta SI also joined the SI central com�
mittee. But this did not mean that the Semarang and Yogyakarta SI
branches also emerged as SI centers in early days. In Semarang, the SI
branch was established by Mohammad Joesoef and an envoy sent by
the central committee by the end of 1912. Soon, however, an incident
occurred in which SI members killed several Chinese. The patih of
Semarang intervened, and under his pressure a general meeting re�
elected a new branch leadership. Members of the Mangoenhardjo, an
association of native officials, occupied the majority of the new branch
leadership with R. Soedjono, an official at the regency office of Sema�
rang, as chairman. Mohammad Joesoef was retained as vice-chairman
to edit and publish Sinar Djawa, which the Semarang SI had bought
from the Chinese firm, but in the branch he had no real power. The
Semarang SI was well tamed by the local authorities.52
In Yogyakarta, the situation was even worse, though in a different
way. Here the branch was established in January 1913 and Pakualaman administrative
and religious officials occupied the majority of the
positions in the branch leadership. Initially K. H. Dahlan, a sultan s
religious official and a noted progressive ulama in Kauman, was far
from enthusiastic about the SI. He had just established the Moehammadijah to
promote Muslims' understanding of Islam. Seeing the enor�
mous expansion of the SI elsewhere, however, he soon took over the
Yogyakarta SI leadership. Dahlan became chairman and Mas Pengoeloe Hadji Abdoellah
Sirat, Moehammadijah secretary, became sec�
retary. The Yogyakarta SI was allowed to exist only as long as it did
not threaten the interests of the Moehammadijah. The membership of
the SI remained small and was largely confined to the city of Yogyakar�
ta and Kota Gede.53
51The word "employees" (orang upahan) was used in the pejorative sense by Rinkes in
his
letter to Samanhoedi. See "Marco: Pro of Contra Dr. Rinkes, Doenia Bergerak i, no.
i
(I9I4).
52Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, p. 176. Sartono,
Sarekat
Islam Lokal, pp. 136-138.
53See Resident van Yogyakarta (Liefrinck) aan GG, 20 Apr. 1913, Vb. 13 Aug. 1913.
NoB13; Resident van Yogyakarta aan GG, 16 May 1913* Vb. 13 Aug. 1913* bio. B13.
The Birth of the Pergerakan 57
In West Java, two SI centers emerged in early 1913 in Batavia and
Bandung. The Batavia SI branch was established in March just before
the SI congress. The leading figure was R. Goenawan, the editor-inchief of
Pantjaran Warta. Goenawan was the Tjokroaminoto of West
Java. Born the son of an assistant wedana (district chief) in Ngawi in
1880, he graduated from the OSVIA at Probolinggo, entered the Pangreh Pradja as a
minor clerk in Ngawi, quit the service in 1907, worked
as a coolie contractor for some time, and then joined Tirtoadhisoerjo's
Medan Prijaji as an editor. After Medan Prijaji went bankrupt,
Goenawan took over Hotel Medan Prijaji in Batavia and became the
editor-in-chief of Pantjaran Warta.54 Like Tjokroaminoto, Goenawan
also became a successful pergerakan leader. After the establishment of
the Batavia SI, it bought a printing house and Goenawan became the
editor-publisher of Pantjaran Warta. He propagated the SI in his news�
paper and organized open-air rallies in the Batavia region almost every
week. In the two weeks after the SI congress alone, he established SI
branches at Purwakarta, Tanggerang, and Bogor and recruited thou�
sands of new SI members, especially in the private estates area.55 He
was popular not only among government priyayi and orang particular
but also among Arab and native Muslim traders who stayed at his
hotel. At the rallies, he appealed mainly to "advancing Islam" and
heightened the religious sense of Muslims. Attendance at communal
Friday prayers sometimes increased more than ten times and people
flocked to the SI. The membership of the Batavia SI soon reached more
than twelve thousand, surpassing the Surabaya SI and becoming the
second largest after the Surakarta SI.56
In Bandung, two Sis came into existence by the end of 1912. The
first was the Darma Loemekso, established in October by Samanhoedi's brother, Hadji
Amir. The membership of the Darma Loemekso
was largely confined to native, presumably Javanese, Muslim traders
engaged in the batik trade. The second Bandung SI branch was estab�
lished on December 25, 1912, just after the IP inaugural rally, by
Tjokroaminoto and Hasan All Soerati. Its leadership was in the hands
of journalists: R. M. Soewardi Soerjaningrat, an editor of De Expres,
as chairman; A. Wignjadisastra, the editor-publisher of Kaoem Moeda,
as secretary; and Abdoel Moeis, a proofreader of AID Preanger Bode,
as vice-chairman.57 Of these two Sis, the more important was the
54Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, p. 191; Noer, The Mod�
ernist Muslim Movement, p. 107.
55For his activities and the situation of the Purwakarta, Tanggerang, and Bogor
Sis, see
Sartono, Sarekat Islam Lokal, pp. 18-25, and relevant documents in Vb. 9 Aug. 19U,
No. B13.
56Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 178, 19*; Sartono,
Sarekat Islam Lokal, pp. 15-18; Resident van Batavia aan GG, 10 May 1913, Vb. 9
Aug.
1913, No. Bi3.
57Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 177-178. Soewardi,
58 An Age in Motion
Bandung SI branch led by Soewardi, a rising leader of the Indische
Partij (IP) who was to form the tripartite IP leadership together with
Tjipto and Douwes Dekker. Its importance lay in its connection with
the IP.
The IP was the first political party in the Indies that appealed to "the
Indies for the Indiers," the independence of the Indies from the Nether�
lands. The driving force in its establishment was E.F.E. Douwes Dek�
ker, an Indo journalist who presided over De Expres in 1912. The IP
general committee was established in early September 1912, and then
on December 25 the IP was formally inaugurated at a rally held in
Bandung. The IP central committee was headed by Douwes Dekker,
chairman, and Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, vice-chairman. Since IP
propaganda was carried out largely among Indos, the majority of the
IP membership also was Indo. Of the total membership of more than
seven thousand in March 1913, natives constituted only fifteen hun�
dred.58 The predominantly Indo character of the IP did not mean that
it had little impact on the natives. Tjipto had long established himself
as an outspoken leader of the natives in his own right. The idea of "the
Indies for the Indiers" was something novel for the native kaum muda.
The huge rallies the IP organized were also a novelty in the Indies. And
the tone of IP language was shocking for those who had only known
the Ethical language of progress. At the Bandung rally, Douwes Dekker
proclaimed that the establishment of the IP was "a declaration of war"
of "the shining light against darkness, of good against evil, civilization
against tyranny, the colonial tax-paying slave against the Dutch tax�
scraping state."59 This was a total reversal of the Ethical language, in
which "progress" was conceived as the light of Western civilization
illuminating the darkness of native society, as shown by the title ethicus
Abendanon gave to a collection of Kartim's letters, Through Darkness
born in 1889, was the second son of Pangeran Soerjaningrat of the Pakualam house
and
studied for some time at the STOVIA in Batavia. In the late 1900s he started to
contribute his
writings to newspapers while working at a sugar factory in Probolinggo and then at
a
dispensary in Yogyakarta. In 1912 he moved to Bandung and became an editor of De
Expres
at Douwes Dekker's invitation. Wignjadisastra, a Bantenese, started his career as a
journalist
by joining Medan Prijaji and in early 1912 established Kaoem Moeda with the
financial help
of Arab and native, presumably Palembang Malay, Muslim traders. Abdoel Moeis, born
in
Bukittinggi in 1878, was a protege of a well-known ethicus, J. H. Abendanon, and
worked at
the Department of Education and Religion and then at the Volkscredietwezen
(People's
Credit Service) in the 1900s. He then became an editor of Bintang Hindia in
Batavia, the
editor-in-chief of Pewarta Hindia in Bandung, and when the Bandung SI was
established he
was a proofreader of Preanger Bode.
58For more on the IP, see Van der Veur, "Introduction to a Socio-Political Study of
the
Eurasians of Indonesia" (diss., Cornell University, 1955), pp. 151 - 169; van der
Wal, De
Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 99-160. For Douwes Dekker's
propaganda
tour and the IP Bandung rally, see De Indische Gids, 1912, pp. 1644-1646.
39Quoted in Van der Veur, "Introduction to a Socio-Political Study of the Eurasians
of
Indonesia," p. 163.
The Birth of the Pergerakan 59
to Light. What made this reversal possible was the question of colonial
domination and subordination. It was their concern with this question
that made the Bandung SI leadership unique, for Bandung was the
center of the IP and the Bandung SI leaders, especially Soewardi as an
editor of De Expres, were in daily contact with Douwes Dekker and
Tjipto.
The IP as a party, however, soon disappeared from the scene. In
early March the request of the IP for legal recognition as a corporate
body was twice turned down by the Indies government. Then, at an
audience given to IP representatives on March 13, the governor general
made it clear that the government had no intention of recognizing the
IP, a political party that challenged the colonial order. At the Indiers
congress held just prior to the SI congress, the IP decided to dissolve
and urged its members to join the Insulinde, a nonpolitical, Indodominated
association founded in 1907.60 This all happened just be
fore the SI congress. At the congress, Soewardi challenged the central
leadership and proposed dropping the Muslim qualification from SI
membership requirements.61 As the title of the Bandung SI journal,
Hindia Sarekat (The Indies united), indicated, in his view what was
needed was the solidarity not of Muslims but of all the Indiers, and his
proposal to drop the Muslim qualification from SI membership re�
quirements was meant to transform the SI into the Sarekat Hindia
(Association of the Indies) along this line of thinking. But in a cheerful
mood of loyalty to the Netherlands and the Indies government, his
proposal sounded too "radical" and the congress simply ignored it.
The Bandung SI leadership emerged as the center of opposition to the
SI central leadership and was soon to raise a voice quite different from
that raised by Tjokroaminoto and other central SI leaders.
At the SI centers, whether at the central leadership or at the opposi�
tion Bandung SI leadership, those who came to the fore were journal�
ists. It was natural, because the SI was now geared to expansion for
expansion's sake. The key to this expansion was newspapers and
rallies, and only journalists knew how to write in newspapers and talk
at rallies to unknown numbers of unknown people. But the journalists
who led the SI were no longer as they used to be. Now they not only
wrote articles, commented on letters sent by readers, and edited and
published newspapers but also organized and talked at rallies and
meetings, heard the complaints SI members brought to them, and nego�
tiated with the authorities to settle conflicts arising between SI and
non-SI members and between the SI and the local authorities. They
were professional pergerakan leaders, equipped with the necessary ex6<)Ibid., pp.
169-172.
6,Soerjosoeparta, "Verslag van het Congres van de Sarekat-Islam," 25 Mar. 1913, Vb.
9
Aug. 13, No. B13.
6o An Age in Motion
pertise, devoting twenty-four hours a day to the SI, and making their
livelihood by running it. Never before had anyone been able to live his
life in this way. Tirtoadhisoerjo was the archetype of the newly
emergent pergerakan leader. He moved the "nation" through the lan�
guage he wrote in Medan Prijaji. He was still, however, financially too
dependent on Arab and native Muslim traders, and the language
through which he moved the "nation" was the written language. But
now the pergerakan leaders led the SI through their language, both
written and spoken, and succeeded in mobilizing far larger followings
of literate as well as illiterate natives. The SI thus generated money in
the forms of increased subscriptions to SI newspapers, entrance fees,
and occasional contributions, and these funds supported the profes�
sional pergerakan leaders. With the rise of the SI, dunia pergerakan
(the world of the movement) was born and the journalists-turnedpergerakan leaders
were permanent residents of that world.
In leading the SI by their language, professional pergerakan leaders
expressed their own ideas about what the pergerakan was all about
and what a pergerakan leader should be like. In the early days of the SI,
however, there was no language available to express their modern
experiences except the Ethical language of progress and the IP language
of colonial domination and subordination. The pergerakan leaders em�
ployed either one of these languages to express their ideas without
really identifying themselves with either the ethici or the IP. The idea
that came to dominate the SI in the early years was most eloquently
expressed by Tjokroaminoto's voice. Sinar Djawa reports his speech at
a rally held in Semarang:
First of all, I would like to explain what the name "Sarekat Islam" means.
In short, Sarekat Islam means "association of people whose religion is
Islam." This is no ordinary association, but an extraordinary one, bound
by the rope of the religion of Islam. The Natives have already established
a number of associations with lofty purposes, but not one of them could
become permanent and large. But once the Sarekat Islam emerged, thou�
sands of people became members, bound by the rope of the religion of
Islam. That is why the Sarekat Islam has become an extraordinary asso�
ciation.
It is on the basis of religion that we will find the strength to hold high
our worth as Natives by legitimate means. ... As the book says (Editors:
we forget the citation and the name of the book) people must obey the
commands of their King. Who is it now that commands us Natives?
Indeed it is the kingdom of Ollanda [the Dutch]. Thus according to the
religious law of Islam we have to obey the laws of the kingdom of
Ollanda. Therefore, we must also obey the commands of the kingdom of
Ollanda. We must fully and loyally comply with the laws and regulations
The Birth of the Pergerakan 61
of the Dutch, which have been for the people [rajat] of the kingdom of
Ollanda. . . .
As I said, the Sarekat Islam has become an extraordinary association,
so it is no wonder that the movement [pergerakan] of the Sarekat Islam
has encountered many obstacles from various groups with mistaken
views. The anti-SI people are, as it were, trying to destroy the Sarekat
Islam. But we will not cease our efforts to seek a way to advance our
nation in everything that is useful for their livelihood. . . .
Among our people there are many who only care for their personal
interests and oppress the ignorant-the satriahood of such people has
vanished, and [in fact] has been reversed to [turn them into] ass-lickers.
Even though the anti-SI group is getting bigger and bigger, and seems
to be obstructing our movement, we will not give up making mighty
efforts, under the protection of the Government, to advance and elevate
the lot of the Natives; and we will continue to hold tight to our satria�
hood in order to reach what we are aiming for.
Brothers! How great was the satriahood of olden times! Just look at
the wayang stories, for example the battle between Soegriwo and Soebali
for possession of the tjoepoe manik asto gino. How did the hero answer
when bidden by his King to obtain the tjoepoe manik asto gina? He said:
"To win the tjoepoe manik asto gino your humble servant is ready to
suffer not only wounds or suffering, but even death." Such are some
examples of the character of a self-respecting satria. Therefore we will
not give up our efforts before achieving our lofty purpose.62
Here Tjokroaminoto was talking in Malay not only to the native au�
dience at the rally but also to the native readers of Sinar Djawa and to
the Indies government, and was trying to impress the loftiness and
respectability of the SI on all of these audiences. In this speech woven
by languages of Islam, progress, and wayang, we may note two impor�
tant points. First, Islam was no more and no less than the signifier of
the yet nameless nation of the natives. The editor's note in parentheses,
"we forget the citation and the name of the book," shows how little
significance was attached to the content of the citation. Important was
the fact that Tjokroaminoto cited a religious book and that he could do
so because the SI was an association of natives, the natives were Mus�
lims, and Tjokroaminoto was a leader of the SI. Second, therefore,
Islam could not be used to discriminate between SI natives and anti-SI
natives. Instead, the story of Soegriwo and Soebali from the wayang
world of the Ramayana cycle served this purpose. In the wayang,
Soegriwo and Soebali are satria.63 The criterion that distinguished
62Sinar Djawa, 18 Mar. 1914.
63For Soegriwa and Soebali, see Ryo Matsumoto, Wayang Ningyo Zukan (Tokyo:
Mekong, 1982), pp. 54-55.
6z An Age in Motion
"good" SI people from "bad" anti-SI people was their satriahood, that
is, how loyally devoted they were to accomplishing the king's com�
mands. As the king commanded Soegriwo and Soebali to obtain
tjoepoe manik asto gino in the wayang, the king of the Dutch now
commanded the natives to "progress." Like tjoepoe manik asto gino,
progress was lofty in itself. The SI would loyally seek to achieve it as
the satria "under the protection of the Government."
In Tjokroaminoto's language, therefore, there was absolutely no
contradiction between native progress and loyalty to the government.
Progress was what the Indies government was working for, and sincere
devotion to native progress would prove the loyalty of the SI to the
government. In this spirit, Tjokroaminoto and other central SI leaders
appealed to native progress and attacked whatever was against prog�
ress, which was the true will of the government. They thus attacked
sembah and jongkok as adat Modjopaitan or adat kodokan (the cus�
toms of the Modjopahit era or the customs of frogs) because now was
the modern age and the government was denouncing excessive hormat
(respect) practices.64 They criticized administrative officials, not only
because of their frequent harassment of the SI but also because they
neglected the king's command by so doing. Therefore those attacked
most were lower-ranking native officials and never the governor gener�
al and his retinue in Buitenzorg. Various complaints were voiced about
taxes, rents, corvee labor, wages, encroachments on native rights, and
private estates, but the question of colonial domination and subordina�
tion was never raised.65 Native solidarity was expressed in the name of
Islam, but then one phrase was added: "The religion of Islam teaches
its believers to obey the law of the state."66 What Tjokroaminoto and
other central SI leaders voiced was essentially the kaum muda con�
sciousness at large. They read and heard what they had already been
aware of. The only difference lay in the tone. Now the SI central
leadership voiced what they had already known in a militant tone, and
precisely because of its militancy the voice sounded pleasant, coura�
geous, spirited, and yet essentially safe.
How innocent and respectable Tjokroaminoto's and other central SI
leaders' voices sounded to kaum muda and the ethici can be under�
stood if we compare Tjokroaminoto's voice with Soewardi's. The occa�
sion Soewardi took to express his radical idea was the centennial cele�
bration of Dutch liberation from French rule, a celebration organized
64See, for instance, Sambong Tjinde, "Manakah jang haroes dipoedji P. of J?"
Sarotomo,
1915, p. 206; Sinar Djawa, 17 Aug. 1915.
65See, for instance, Achmad's "militant" speech at a rally held in Semarang. Sinar
Djawa,
18 Mar. 1914.
66See, for instance, the speech of Adjunct Pengulu of Klaten reported in Resident
van
Surakarta aan GG, 24 May 1913, Vb. 9 Aug. 1913, No. B13.
The Birth of the Pergerakan 63
by the Indies government on a grand scale and joined by natives.6
Soewardi, together with Tjipto, established Comite Boemipoetra (Na�
tive Committee) or Native Committee for the Celebration of the
Netherelands Centenary of Freedom, which was composed of Tjipto as
chairman, Soejatiman [Soetatmo] Soeriokoesoemo as vice-chairman,
Soewardi as secretary, and Wignjadisastra as treasurer. On July 19, the
Comite Boemipoetra published Soewardi's article, "Als ik eens
Nederlander was [If I Were a Dutchman]," the most radical writing by
a native until then. In this article Soewardi's radicalism came from
three sources. First, the content was radical. Writing as if he were a
Dutchman, he sharply criticized the contradiction of the Dutch Indies
government celebrating the Dutch liberation from French rule in the
Indies colonized by the Dutch. The question of colonial domination
and subordination was thus clearly raised in the article. Second and
more important, the article, written in Dutch, was translated into Mal�
ay. In fact, the content of the article alone, though radical, was not very
different from that of articles carried in De Expres. But De Expres was
a Dutch-language newspaper and could be read only by those literate
in Dutch, whereas Soewardi's article, once translated into Malay,
could be read by a far larger number of those literate in Malay. The
Dutch officials saw this as most dangerous, because Soewardi now
clearly showed that he was a good "intermediary" who could carry
Douwes Dekker's subversive idea to the natives, especially the SI. This
was the major reason the Indies government quickly took action to
banish Soewardi as well as Tjipto and Douwes Dekker from the Indies.
Third and most important, Soewardi's radicalism revealed itself in his
article's title: "If I Were a Dutchman." In the Indies this was a doubly
impossible thing to say. It was not only unthinkable and indeed impos�
sible for the natives to become Dutch but also this idea was to remain
unspoken even if it occurred to them. By saying what should remain
unsaid, Soewardi actually transformed Dutch, and by translation Mal�
ay, into his low Javanese (ngoko) and put the colonial order into flux.
For if one could say openly, "If I were a Dutchman," one could also say
openly, "If I were the minister of colonies," "If I were a resident," "If 1
were a regent," if not, though logically possible as well, "If I were a
coolie." Whereas Tjokroaminoto said that the natives should work for
progress "under the protection of the Government" and thus did not
challenge the colonial order, Soewardi said that the natives were hu�
man beings equal to the Dutch and he challenged the Dutch colonial
domination in a frontal way. In the eyes of natives, Soewardi showed
67The following analysis of Soewardi's "Als ik eens Nederlander was'' is based
largely on
Tsuchiya's discussion in Indonesia Minzokushugi Kenkyu, pp. 96-114. An English
transla�
tion of Soewardi's article is available in Savitri Prastiti Scherer, "Harmony and
Dissonance:
Early Nationalist Thought in Java" (master's thesis, Cornell University, 1975), PP-
2.98-304.
64 An Age in Motion
himself to be a true satria, a satria like Bima in the wayang world who
talks in low Javanese to any person and any god except to his inner
being, Dewa Ruci. Soewardi's exile to the Netherlands only strength�
ened his credentials as a true satria, because it was seen as the sacrifice
he made for his nation. But his idea did not dominate the SI. The idea,
the satria without the protection of the government, sounded too sub�
versive to kaum muda and was too far ahead of their consciousness.
The government action to banish Soewardi, Tjipto, and Douwes Dekker clearly showed
them the danger. Tjokroaminoto's voice remained
dominant. But Soewardi's voice was certainly heard, and soon his
example was to be followed by what Dr. Rinkes called "bad elements"
or "IP'ers."
While Tjokroaminoto and Goenawan played the dominant role in SI
propaganda at the center, local Tjokros and Goenawans dominated the
scene at the branch level. They were readers of SI newspapers. They,
together with their friends and relatives, set up preparatory commit�
tees, organized rallies, and invited SI leaders from the center. At rallies,
SI leaders from the center, especially Tjokroaminoto in Central and
East Java and Goenawan in West Java, explained what the SI was all
about and heightened the sense of native solidarity. Branches were
established and branch leaderships elected. Those who composed
branch leaderships were largely government priyayi, orang particulier,
native Muslim traders, and to a much lesser extent religious teachers.
In the branches dominated by government priyayi and orang par�
ticulier, advancement in native education and promotion of the native
commercial activities were stressed. In the branches led by native Mus�
lim traders and religious teachers, promotion of native commercial
activities and advancement of Islam were appealed to. Local Samanhoedis established
SI shops. Local Tjokros and local Goenawans
organized and talked at rallies and meetings. Some of them also started
to send letters to SI newspapers regularly and were appointed their
correspondents. Some of them eventually joined SI newspapers as edi�
tors and started to follow the path that would lead them to become
professional pergerakan leaders, that is, they apprenticed themselves to
central SI leaders.
If SI branch leaders were themselves native kaum muda and saw in
the SI the expression of their kaum muda consciousness, those who
swelled the ranks of the SI were kromo (illiterate people without rank,
status, or wealth) and they responded to the SI call expressed not in SI
newspapers but at SI rallies. They came to the SI rallies without any
clear idea of what the SI was all about, experienced the SI there, and
joined the organization by paying entrance fees and receiving member�
ship cards on the spot. To kromo, therefore, the voice that expressed
kaum muda consciousness sounded quite different and their under-
The Birth of the Pergerakan 65
standing of the SI was closely intertwined with their experience of the
SI at the rallies. What, then, was an SI rally like? Marco describes the
atmosphere in the city and the mood of the rally on the eve of an SI
congress:
Five-thirty in the evening in the Balapan [Surakarta] NIS station. Peo�
ple were jostling, passengers who had just arrived and those who came to
receive them. Tens of andong [carriages for rent] all displayed the flag
with the letters SI. This was the sign the carriage was already hired by the
association of SI to pick up people who came to attend the SI congress.
Naturally those who were not SI members and for whom vehicles were
not sent were forced to walk, because at that time there was not even an
andong for rent that did not display the SI flag. There all the people of
Islam showed solidarity with one another. On the streets SI members who
came across a carriage with the SI flag all certainly showed their pleasure.
All the SI carriages went in the direction of kampung Kabangan, the place
where the rally was to be held by the SI Bestuur. . . .68
When Wardojo and Prajogo came to kampung Kabangan, the place of
the SI rally, hundreds of people were already there, who all wanted to
attend the rally and who all were delegates of Sarekat Islam branches all
over the land of Java. Music that sounded at the place of the rally made
merrier and merrier the hearts of the people of Islam who were there.
Aristocrats from the Kraton of Solo, merchants, Government priyayi, and
orang particulier, all showed their love to one another. Because of the
influence of the Sarekat Islam, there was no discrimination among the
people, all recognized one another as brothers, not only the people who
had high status but also those who had low status.69
Here the merry, festive mood of the rally and the sense of power and
solidarity felt by SI members are recreated by the visual image of tens
of andong with the SI flag, the sound of music-probably "Het
Wilhelmus" (the Dutch national anthem)-and by Marco's frequent
use of the word "all." This was the rally, the occasion of merry, pleas�
ant festivity. And here every speech was greeted with great applause.
But this was not an ordinary festivity to which the Javanese were
accustomed. For one thing, the rally was distinctly modern. Music and
not gamelan sounded. Photographs were taken. People came to the
place dressed as they liked-Javanese, European, and "Turkish" (Ara�
bic).70 And for another, the rally was extraordinary in that it did not
make sense in terms of the Dutch Javanese colonial order. At a rally
held at the congress, for instance, SI leaders-government priyayi,
orang particulier, and batik entrepreneurs-sat on chairs with princes
68Marco, Student Hidjo, pp. 95-96.
69Ibid., pp. 99-100.
70See Sinar Djawa, 16 Mar. 1914.
66 An Age in Motion
and high-ranking Kepatihan officials, crossing their legs, smoking
cigarettes, chatting with one another, without making jongkok and
sembah.71 In other rallies at other places organized by SI branches,
branch leaders together with representatives of the SI central leadership
and other SI branches sat on one stage, while guests such as the assis�
tant resident, the controller, the chief commissioner of the police, the
regent, and the patih, together with journalists of both Dutch and
native newspapers, took their seats on another stage. Subbranch
(,kring, literally "circle") leaders, group leaders, and other SI leaders
also sat on chairs reserved for them.72 People stood, watched, and
listened. Formal words of welcome and gratitude were pronounced by
branch leaders to the local authorities. Beyond that no deference was
shown to the officals. The stage was dominated by satria "under the
protection of the government." The tone of their speech was militant.
Various complaints were openly voiced to the local authorities. Dutch
and native administrative officials were sometimes attacked. Native
solidarity was appealed to in the name of Islam. And people were told
that all the SI members were brothers irrespective of age, rank, and
status.73
For kromo, the experiences they had at a rally were entirely novel,
extraordinary, exciting, and odd. We may visualize their experiences
by imagining, say, a peasant in a village, hearing something unusual
about the SI by rumors, coming on foot together with his friends and
relatives all the way to the rally site, and finding himself watching and
listening to what he had never known or expected before. It was a new
world where the hierarchical Dutch Javanese order was temporarily
suspended and where SI leaders acted on equal terms with Dutch and
native officials while telling the audience that all the natives were
brothers and that they were as human as the Dutch. On the spot they
paid entrance fees, joined the SI, and received membership cards. With
their membership cards in hand, they returned home. Back home, they
naturally talked among themselves of their extraordinary and unusual
experiences. But they did not have a modern vocabulary with which to
express it. The Dutch words that were so central to kaum muda con�
sciousness simply did not make sense. The rally was called vergadering
and the speech voordracht. Thus they expressed their novel, extraordi�
nary, odd, unusual experiences of the rally in the languages they knew,
including the language of Ratu Adil (Just King). In studies of the SI,
the explanation has often been put forward that the people flocked to
71Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, p. Z09.
72See, Sinar Djawa, 16 Mar. 1914.
73See, for instance, the summary of Tjokroaminoto s speech at the first SI general
meeting
in January 1913 in De Indische Gids, 1913, PP- 517 51 ^-
The Birth of the Pergerakan 67
the SI out of their "millenarian" and "messianic" expectations and
hopes.74 But the logical sequence of the explanation seems the other
way around. It was rather the unusual and strange experiences people
had at the rallies that generated the language of Ratu Adil. With the
expansion of the SI, all sorts of wild rumors circulated. The coming of
Ratu Adil, imminent war, and the establishment of the new realm were
among them. In the private estates area of Batavia, rumors said that in
the near future all the land under the control of foreign Orientals
(private estates owned by Chinese landlords) would be returned to the
natives and that in the coming war all the Chinese would be killed and
the Europeans driven from Java.75 In Banyumas, rumors circulated
that Javanese who were not SI members would get no help when they
got into difficulties during the war between the Javanese and the Dutch
kings, and that once sufficient numbers of people became SI members,
the SI would make its own law and SI members would no longer be
obliged to obey the law of the country.76 In some places, people, upon
joining the SI, refused to perform corvee labor for the state and showed
"improper" attitudes toward Dutch and native officials. In other
places, the religious sense of Islam was also suddenly heightened and
attendance at the communal Friday prayers at the mosque increased
greatly. SI members no longer wanted to exchange labor with non-SI
members and to invite them to slametan (ritual meal). Village religious
officials who joined the SI refused to offer funeral services for those
who died without joining the SI.77 Street fighting took place in many
places between SI members and Chinese and between SI and non-SI
members. Beatings and in some cases killings of Chinese took place in
Surabaya, Bangil, Rembang, Semarang, Cirebon, Batavia, and else�
where.78 In many places SI members "undermined state authorities" by
arresting thieves themselves and handing them over to the policed9
They threatened those who abused SI members and "intervened in
74See, for instance, Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements in RuralJava (Kuala
Lumpur:
Oxford University Press, 1973); and Robert Van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern
Indo�
nesian Elite (The Hague and Bandung: Van Hoeve, i960).
75Assistent Resident van Meester Cornelis (Feith) aan Resident van Batavia, 2.8
July 1914,
Mr. 2030/15.
76Resident van Banyumas (Doeve) aan GG, 29 May 1913, Vb. 9 Aug. 13, No. B13.
77See Assistent Resident van Meester Cornelis (Cohen) aan Resident van Batavia, 10
May
1913, Vb. 9 Aug. 1913, No. Bi3; Resident van Semarang (de Vogel) aan GG, 12 May
1913.
Vb. 9 Aug. 1913, No. B13; Bupati van Tuban (Pringgowinoto) aan Resident van Rembang
(Gonggrijp), 25 July 1913, Mr. 2065/13; Resident van Pasuruan (van Soelen) aan GG,
1 }
May 1913, Vb. 9 Aug. 13, No. B13.
78For anti-Chinese incidents, see Assistent Resident van Krawang (Bedding) aan
Resident
van Batavia, 21 Apr. 1913, Vb. 9 Aug. 13, No. B13; Resident van Kedu aan GG, 31 May
1913, Vb. 9 Aug. 13, No. B1 3; Sartono, Sarekat Islam Lokal, pp. 65-71, 133-136,
249-
255.
79Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 204-205.
68 An Age in Motion
administrative affairs." On a plantation in Klaten, a kuli, an SI mem�
ber, who was abused by a foreman, complained to the local SI leader�
ship, which sent a band of seventeen SI members "armed" with sticks
and sickles to the foreman and made him retract the words he had
uttered to the kuli and promise not to abuse SI members anymore. The
local authorities arrested all seventeen SI members. The Surakarta SI
asked the resident to release those arrested and further angered him
because of the Si's meddling in "administrative affairs."80
In many places anti-SI organizations were established with overt and
covert encouragement of administrative officials. In Meester Cornelis,
the Kong Dji Hing was organized by Chinese landlords of private
estates, lower-ranking native officials, and local toughs under the
protection of a district chief.81 In Surakarta, Mangkunegaran princes
organized and financed the Darma Hatmoko, whose members
aggressively engaged in fights against SI members and Chinese.82
The Chinese became nervous. The European community was greatly
alarmed. And administrative officials harassed the SI, intervening in
the election of the local SI leadership and the management of SI funds,
putting pressure on government priyayi to quit the SI, and arresting SI
members on minor charges.83 All the "confusion" and "irregularities"
thus came out of the "Pandora's box" of native society, opened by the
language generated quite unintentionally by SI central leaders at the
rallies.
Since early 1913, the Indies government had watched the expansion
of the SI with great concern. Governor General Idenburg put all the
government apparatus into gear to supervise and to collect information
on the SI while keeping government policy toward the SI undecided.
Toward the end of June 1913, however, this position became increas�
ingly difficult to maintain. The SI continued to grow with dazzling
speed, and the "confusion" and "irregularities" taking place on the
periphery of the SI movement were clearly getting out of the control of
both the central and branch leadership of the SI. The European com�
munity was increasingly restless and the powerful Sugar Syndicate de�
manded that the governor general ban the SI. Dutch and native admin�
istrative officials got angry at the SI "undermining" their authority and
disturbing their much-prized rust en orde, and on their own discretion
intervened in SI branches.
80Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 24 May 1913, Vb. 9 Aug. 1913, No. B13.
81Assistent Resident van Meester Cornelis aan Resident van Batavia, 28 June 1914,
Vb. 9
Aug. 1913, No. B13.
82Spionnenbericht uit Soerakarta, 18 Aug. 1913, Mr. 1996/13; Proces Verbaal
(Tjokroaminoto), Mr. 184X/21.
83For the most telling case of Dutch and native administrative officials'
intervention in the
SI and native and Chinese anti-SI activities, see the case of the Meester Cornelis
in Mr.
2030/15.
The Birth of the Pergerakan 69
The time was coming to decide what to do with the SI. To the Indies
government there were basically four policy options available: first, to
keep the policy undecided; second, to ban the SI once and for all; third,
to recognize the SI statutes as submitted by Tjokroaminoto and to
grant the legal status of incorporation to the one unified SI; and fourth,
to give legal recognition to the locally constituted Sis while denying
legal recognition to the one unified SI.84 The first option was out of the
question for reasons mentioned above. The second option the governor
general and many other high-ranking Ethical-minded officials did not
want to choose, because they saw the rise of the SI as a sure sign of the
"native awakening" and because they reasoned that even if the govern�
ment decided to ban the SI, this massive native awakening would reemerge sooner or
later, in a form possibly more radical and revolution�
ary, under the influence of the IP. The third option would give the
government no leverage to tame the SI. The fourth policy option, in
contrast, would give the government a double advantage in taming the
SI. On the one hand, locally constituted Sis could easily be tamed by
local authorities, which was happening to many SI branches. On the
other hand, the SI central leadership, legally cut off from the SI
branches, would become more dependent on the government and thus
would be easily tamed by the government. The government could
choose several SI leaders as intermediaries and let them guide the SI,
this "exciting and growing expression of developmental pressure
[among the natives] . . . onto the path we hope or at least not objec�
tionable to our authority."85
On June 30 the Indies government finally decided its policy on the
legal status of the SI. It turned down the request of the SI for legal
recognition of its statutes and the granting of the legal status of incor�
poration. Instead, the government made it clear to the SI central leader�
ship that it was ready to grant legal recognition to locally constituted
Sis that confined their geographical sphere of operation to a certain
locality, and that it had no objection to the establishment of a central
body for the cooperation and coordination of the local Sis. To foster
the transformation of SI branches into local Sis, the deputy first
government secretary instructed residents to give permission to SI
branches to hold rallies and not to ban SI activities.86 Dr. Rinkes, now
appointed adviser for native affairs, replacing Dr. Hazeu, was put in
charge of guiding the SI central leadership along the path the gov�
ernment favored. The SI reached yet another turning point in its trans�
formation.
84Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, pp. zz^-zzS, Z46-Z76.
85Missive van den Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken, 30 Nov. 1915, Mr. iz6*/i6, Vb. 1
Sept. 1917, No. 33.
86Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, pp. Z77- Z83.
70 An Age in Motion
The Rise of Tjokroaminoto
The government decision of June 30 was formally conveyed by the
resident of Surakarta to the representatives of the SI central committee
on July 10. On the same day, the SI central committee convened a
general meeting of SI branches and decided to accept the government
decision and to transform SI branches into local Sis.87 The task of
drawing up new statutes for the local SI was entrusted to Tjokroami�
noto. Rinkes attended the meeting and offered his help in drawing up
the statutes. But his offer was rejected because of Soewardi's strong
opposition. Instead, those at the meeting decided to ask for the assis�
tance of Mr. Bijl, a solicitor in Semarang, to formulate the statutes. In
drawing up the statutes, J.J.N. Engelenberg, a former resident of Bang�
ka who came to know Tjokroaminoto well in early 1913 in the process
of compiling his extensive report on the SI for the governor general,
also personally helped Tjokroaminoto. The draft statutes were drawn
up and informally submitted to the government secretary in late Octo�
ber. Rallies started to be organized toward the end of 1913 to convert
SI branches into local Sis.88
Formally responsible for the conversion were the SI committees for
the departments of East, Central, and West Java. Yet reality was far
more complex and entangled. In West Java, Goenawan controlled the
SI branches in the Batavia region and played a central role in their
conversion. In Banten, however, the branches were under Hasan Djajadiningrat's
influence, while the Bandung SI leadership remained hos�
tile to Goenawan, even after Soewardi was exiled from the Indies in
early September. Besides, in Priangan, SI branches such as Sukabumi,
Majalaya, and Taskimalaya Sis increasingly showed separatist ten�
dencies because of intervention by local authorities. In Central Java the
department committee had long since collapsed and Marco and
Sosrokoernio's activities were largely confined to the vicinity of Sur�
akarta. Instead, Tjokroaminoto, as the vice-chairman of the central
committee, made propaganda extensively and increased his influence
at the expense of the Surakarta SI leadership. The branches in Kudus,
Demak, Tegal, and Pekalongan came under his control and handed
over money not to the treasurer of the central committee but to
Tjokroaminoto. A number of SI branches were divided between proTjokroaminoto and
pro-Samanhoedi factions and Surabaya SI leaders
actively intervened in the elections of branch leadership on Tjokroaminoto's
behalf.89
87Resident van Surakarta aan GG, Mr. 1473/13, Vb. 26 Aug. 1913, No. 38.
88Missive van den Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken, 30 Nov. 1915, Mr. 1263/16, Vb. 1
Sept. 1917, No. 33; Proces Verbaal (Tjokroaminoto), Mr. 184X/21.
89Proces Verbaal (Tjokroaminoto), Mr. 184X/21; Raden Pandji Sosro Kardono aan GG,
18 Nov. 1920, Mr. 1353X/20, Vb. 28 Mar. 1922, No. E3bis.
The Birth of the Pergerakan 71
In converting SI branches into local Sis, the most crucial problem for
the central SI leaders was how to deal with the local authorities. After
the government decision of June 30, local authorities continued to
intervene in the SI, manipulating the elections of branch leadership,
demanding that the branch submit its membership list, insisting on the
proper management of SI funds, and directing the activities of SI
branches away from holding rallies and meetings to more "sober"
activities such as establishing SI shops. Some SI branches were so firmly
controlled by local authorities that they converted themselves into local
independent Sis without ever consulting with the SI central leadership.
In places where branches resisted the intervention of local authorities,
assistant residents flatly banned all SI activities and prohibited the SI
from holding rallies. To keep SI branches under its influence and to
carry out their conversion into local Sis, the SI central leadership had
first to deal with the local authorities. And in negotiating with the local
authorities, Rinkes's help was very valuable because, as adviser for
native affairs, he had direct access to the governor general and was
capable of dealing with residents on behalf of the SI. The question that
remained was with whom he would work to guide the SI and for whom
he would take the trouble to reduce harassment of the SI by local
authorities.
If the central SI leaders needed Rinkes's help in the conversion of
branches into local Sis, the Indies government also needed an interme�
diary to guide the SI onto the desirable path. But candidates available
to the government for the job were few. In Rinkes's view, Goenawan
was influential but could not be trusted in financial matters. Moehammad Joesoef
was "a reasonable person and a good speaker," but as a
clerk of the Semarang Juana Tramway Company he could not devote
all his time and energy to the SI. Bandung SI leaders were suspect
because of their complicity in the Comite Boemipoetra. Though the
founder and chairman of the SI, Samanhoedi was totally unqualified to
be an intermediary. In Rinkes's words, he "lacked virtually all the
qualities necessary for a good leader, [since he was] practically unedu�
cated in both the Mohammedan as well as modern sense, narrow�
minded on anything outside his everyday Lawean environment, totally
lacking in oratorical talent or urbane manners, and in addition obsti�
nate and self-willed." Thus it was only Tjokroaminoto who was quali�
fied for the job, for he could lead the SI in his own right and yet was
reasonable enough to work with Rinkes. Rinkes enthusiastically de�
scribes how ideal Tjokroaminoto is as an intermediary: "By contrast
[with Samanhoedi] Tjokro is of good priyayi origin, and as such has
from birth a natural command of good manners; and though not free
of pervasive Javanese superstitiousness, still he has a more open-minded
nature, and certainly does not feel himself constrained by religious
considerations; by comparison with others fairly honest, or-what
72. An Age in Motion
amounts to virtually the same thing here [in Java]-more prudent and
cautious in doing the usual embezzlements; with a thoroughly decent
education; [he] has a good knowledge of men, is an outstanding orator
with a penetrating, sonorous baritone, such that many people can
simultaneously follow what he says. Furthermore he is gifted with a
fine political instinct that can be useful in every sense."90
In late October Rinkes sent a letter to Tjokroaminoto in which he
offered his help in converting branches into local Sis, while reminding
him of the fate of the IP once it came into the hands of "bad ele�
ments."91 This was what Tjokroaminoto was waiting for. He under�
stood well that once Rinkes committed himself to him, he would help
him control the whole SI movement. Tjokroaminoto accepted Rinkes's
offer. In December they met in Surabaya and decided to start the
conversion of branches to local Sis first in East Java, and then in
Central and West Java. Rinkes asked the residents of Madura, Kediri,
and Besuki to permit SI branches to hold rallies for that purpose.92
From late December 1913, the conversion of SI branches into local
Sis proceeded smoothly under the leadership of Tjokroaminoto and
Rinkes, and by the second SI congress, held in Yogyakarta in April
1914, sixty SI branches had been converted into local Sis.93 The pro�
cess of conversion was similar everywhere. First, Tjokroaminoto sent
to the branch leadership draft statutes and all the documents necessary
for application for the legal status of incorporation. If local authorities
were known to be hostile to the SI and troubles were expected in
organizing a rally, Rinkes personally wrote a letter to the resident and
asked for his cooperation in converting SI branches. Then the rally was
held, at which Tjokroaminoto explained the new statutes and the new
local SI leadership was elected. In most cases, Rinkes accompanied
Tjokroaminoto and made a speech at the rally. After that, the new
executive committee of the local SI submitted the draft statutes to the
government for legal recognition, which was given in a routine fashion
within a few months.94 In the conversion, Goenawan also played an
important role in West Java, especially in the Batavia region. But in
other regions, it was always Tjokroaminoto who, assisted by Rinkes,
cleared the way and presided over rallies for conversion. In the eyes of
local SI leaders it was clear that Tjokroaminoto enjoyed the blessing of
and direct access to the governor general, through Rinkes. Tjokroami90Missive van
den Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken, 30 Nov. 1915, Mr. 1263/16, Vb. 1
Sept. 1917, No. 33.
91Van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 346-353.
92Missive van den Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken, 30 Nov. 1915, Mr. 1263/16, Vb. 1
Sept. 1917, No. 33.
93Calculated from the table of local Sis in Fukami Sumio, "Sarekat Islam no
ChihoShidosha," Nampo-Bunka 5 (Nov. 1978), pp. 73-94*
94Proces Verbaal (Tjokroaminoto), Mr. 184X/21.
The Birth of the Pergerakan 73
noto was well on his way to becoming the supreme leader of the SI, a
position he formally attained at the second SI congress in Yogyakarta.
The second SI congress was attended by 147 delegates, representing
81 local Sis and SI branches with a total membership of 440,000. After
deciding to locate the seat of the provisional Centraal Sarekat Islam
(CSI) in Surakarta, changes were introduced in the organizational
structure of the SI. Now the three committees for the departments of
East, Central, and West Java were abolished and all the local Sis came
under the direct guidance of the CSI. Since the local Sis were legally
independent and in fact quite autonomous in their activities, this
change did not really affect the position of the local Sis. But the change
had direct bearing on the flow of money from the local Sis to the
central leadership. Before the congress, the department committees
collected 30 percent of the income the branches raised and kept it
largely for their own use without handing it over to the SI central
committee. But now it was decided that the CSI would collect 10 per�
cent of the income the local Sis raised for the initial six months after their
establishment. This temporarily strengthened the financial position of
the CSI, especially of Tjokroaminoto, while leaving the long-term fi�
nancial position of the CSI uncertain. The new central committee of the
CSI was also elected. It consisted of fourteen members headed by Tjok�
roaminoto, chairman; Goenawan, vice-chairman; Achmad, secretary/
treasurer; and K. H. Dahlan, adviser. At the opening of the congress,
Samanhoedi announced his willingness to remain as chairman, but on
Hasan Djajadiningrat's proposal he was made CSI honorary chairman,
a position without power. Together with Samanhoedi, all the Surakar�
ta SI leaders from the Rekso Roemekso days were effectively elimi�
nated from the central leadership except R. H. Abdoelfatah, former
treasurer of the central committee. The posts of commissioners vacated
by the elimination of Surakarta SI leaders were given to the representa�
tives of the local Sis of Madura, Malang, Serang, Bondowoso, and
Wonosobo. But this did not mean that Tjokroaminoto's influence was
checked by rising new SI leaders. Quite the contrary; all the new com�
missioners were picked by Tjokroaminoto and were his proteges.95
In the war years from 1914 to early 1917, Tjokroaminoto remained
the supreme leader of the SI. After the second SI congress in Yogyakar�
ta, SI congresses were held in Surabaya in June 1915 and in Bandung in
July 1916. In the meantime the CSI submitted its own statutes to the
government in September 1915 and was given legal recognition as his
last act of blessing in the final days of Idenburg's tenure as governor
general. The Bandung SI congress was the first CSI congress after its
95For the second SI congress in Yogyakarta, see Assistent Resident van Mataram
(Coert)
aan Resident van Yogyakarta (van Bijleveld), Yogyakarta, zz May 1914, Vb. zs Feb.
1916,
No. 49; Sinar Djawa, zz and Z3 Apr. 1914.
74 An Age in Motion
attainment of legal recognition, and as such it was called the first
National Congress.96 It was so named after the Indian National Con�
gress, but it also reflected Tjokroaminoto's pretension of the Sis em�
bodying the nation.
At every SI congress, the central committee of the CSI was reelected.
Table 8 shows the CSI central committee (hoofdbestuur) formed at the
congresses of 1914, 1915, and 1916. Formally the supreme decision�
making body was the CSI central committee meeting (bestuursvergadering), which was
to be convened by the chairman whenever a
problem affecting all the Sis arose. In addition, to run routine CSI
administration and to guide local Sis on a daily basis the standing
committee (dagelijksbestuur) consisted of the chairman, the secretary,
and the treasurer. In 1914 to early 1917, however, neither the central
committee meeting nor the standing committee functioned as stipu�
lated on paper. The central committee meeting was convened only once
in August 1916; when pressed by the BO campaign for the defense of
the Indies and the formation of native militia, the CSI had to decide its
position on this issue.97 The standing committee was in fact cotermi�
nous with Tjokroaminoto. It consisted of Tjokroaminoto and Achmad
in 1914; Tjokroaminoto, Achmad, and Ardiwinata in 1915; and Tjok�
roaminoto, Sosrokardono, and Ardiwinata in 1916. Since its office was
in Surabaya, either in the office of the Setia Oesaha or in Tjokroami�
noto's house, Ardiwinata, who lived in Batavia, was effectively ex�
cluded from the standing committee.98 Achmad and Sosrokardono
were Tjokroaminoto's proteges and did whatever he instructed them to
do. As Sosrokardono later put it, the CSI hoofdbestuur (central com�
mittee) was in fact Tjokroaminoto's eenboofdbestuur (one-man central
committee) Among the CSI leaders only Goenawan retained suffi�
ciently strong local SI support to challenge Tjokroaminoto.
Throughout these years Tjokroaminoto remained a satria under the
protection of the government and continued to voice the kaum muda
consciousness at large. When World War I started and the Indies gov�
ernment got ready to make a concession on the issue of popular repre�
sentation in exchange for the introduction of the native militia for the
defense of the Indies, he supported the native militia and started to
campaign for popular representation and eventual self-government.
But what Tjokroaminoto envisioned was self-government and not in�
dependence. In answering the question of why not independence but
96For the Surabaya SI congress and the Bandung CSI congress, see Sinar Djawa, 28
June
1915, 2 and 3 July 1915; van der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Bewegtng,
pp.
492-496.
97See "De S.I. en Indie Weerbaar," De Indische Gids 37 (1917). P- 9*2..
98Proces Verbaal (Tjokroaminoto), Mr. 184X/21.
"R. P. Sosro Kardono aan GG, 18 Nov. 1920, Mr. 1353X/20, Vb. 28 Mar. 1922, No.
E3bis.
The Birth of the Pergerakan 75
Table 8. The CSI Central Committee, 1914-17
Apr. 1914- June 1915- July 1916-
June 1915 July 1915 Oct. 1917
Chairman Tjokroaminoto
(Surabaya)3
Tjokroaminoto Tjokroaminoto
Vice-chairman Goenawan
(Batavia)
Goenawan (Goenawan)
Deputy vice-chairman Abdoel Moeis
(Bandung)
Secretary Achmad
(Surabaya)
Achmad
Deputy secretary Sosrokardono
(Surabaya)
Treasurer Achmad Ardiwinata
(Batavia)
Ardiwinata
Commissioners Moh. Joesoef Moh. Joesoef Moh. Joesoef
(Semarang)
H. Abdoelfatah H. Hisamzaijnie
(Surakarta) (Surakarta)
H. Ahmad Sjazili H. Ahmad Sjazili
(Madura)
Djojosoediro Djojosoediro Djojosoediro
(Malang) (Batavia)
Djajadiningrat Djajadiningrat Djajadiningrat
(Serang)
Soerjodipoetro Soerjodipoetro Soerjodipoetro
(Bondowoso)
Soerjopranoto Soerjopranoto Soerjopranoto
(Wonosobo)
Tjokrosoedarmo Tjokrosoedarmo Tjokrosoedarmo
(Surabaya)
Ardiwinata Abdoel Moeis Abdoel Moeis
(Batavia) (Bandung)
Hasan b. Semit Hasan b. Semit
(Surabaya)
Sosrokardono
(Surabaya)
Moh. Samin Moh. Samin
(Medan)
H. Moh. Arip
(Banjermasin)
H. Moh. Arip
Advisers: K. H. Dahlan K. H. Dahlan K. H. Dahlan
(Yogyakarta)
H. Hisamzaijnie
(Surakarta)
H. Ahm. Sjadzili
(Madura)
aIn parentheses is the place of residence and the local SI represented.
7^ An Age in Motion
self-government, he argued against Darnakoesoema, a representative
of the Insulinde: "What is the significance of an Indies that rules itself
and yet is in no state to defend itself or to fight against a possible
enemy? More rights should necessarily go together with more obliga�
tions. Equal obligations, equal rights. This is a reasonable demand. We
must have freedoms, but we must also obey decent laws. Order and
freedom are identical."100 What he meant was clear. He said what the
Indies government wanted to hear, while heightening people's expecta�
tions for popular representation and eventual self-government. In the
same spirit, at the congresses he raised many complaints to the govern�
ment about taxation, encroachments on native rights, private estates,
and various government regulations. But the basic idea remained un�
changed. If he raised his voice, the government would listen. It was up
to the government whether or not those complaints would be redressed.
The last thing he would undertake was direct protest action. And if
local Sis launched protest actions, he tried to squelch them, while
saying to the authorities that they were aberrations. For instance, when
the new land-rent regulation was introduced in the residency of Rembang, Said
Aboebakar, the Lasem SI chairman, organized rallies, cam�
paigned against the regulation, and led passive resistance to the land
rent assessment. When he was arrested by the local authorities, Tjokroaminoto sent
Sosrokardono to Lasem, not to protest his arrest but to
ask the resident not to ban the Lasem SI.101
Under Tjokroaminoto's leadership, however, the SI could not re�
main as it used to be. As we have seen, the enormous expansion of the
SI in the first half of 1913 was based essentially on the sense of native
solidarity expressed by newspapers and rallies and heightened by SI
leaders' militant, courageous, spirited, pleasant-sounding voice. Once
people got used to that voice, newspapers and rallies could no longer
generate a heightened sense of native solidarity. Kaum muda kept read�
ing newspapers and were perhaps interested in the pergerakan. But
Tjokroaminoto's writings no longer sounded brilliant and extraordi�
nary. A more militant, courageous, spirited voice was raised by Marco,
and a more respectable voice was raised by BO leaders. Kromo no
longer attended rallies. In the beginning, rallies were indeed unusual,
extraordinary, novel, and odd experiences for them. But once they
learned what a rally was like, it became what it had been, and they no
longer talked about it. Certainly they remembered their past excite�
ment and the money they paid to the SI. They kept their membership
cards and if they got into trouble they went to the local SI to ask for
100R. C. Kwantes, ed., De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging in
NederlandschIndie: 1917-medio 1913 (Groningen: H. O. Tjeenk Willink, 1975), p. 44.
nnproces Verbaal (Tjokroaminoto), Mr. 184X/21. For passive resistance against the
intro�
duction of the new land-rent regulation in Rembang, see Sartono, Sarekat Islam
Lokal, pp.
246-255.
The Birth of the Pergerakan 77
help.102 But for most of them the SI became a thing of the past. To
borrow the phrase a Semarang SI chairman had once used to describe
the fate of the BO, people left the SI like "people finished watching
wayang."103
This created serious financial problems for the CSI. It was financed
by two sources: io percent of the income raised by the local Sis for the
initial six months after their establishment, and occasional contribu�
tions, especially those collected at the congresses and rallies. Yet
kromo, no longer interested in the SI, did not respond to the call for
contributions. The amount of occasional contributions decreased. The
only way to keep the CSI going was to establish new local Sis and
collect money from them. Tjokroaminoto constantly traveled through�
out Java, organizing rallies in new places and establishing new local
Sis. Goenawan also did the same thing in West Java and Sumatra.
Local Sis continued to crop up in Java and Sumatra. In Java alone,
ninety-two local Sis were established by the end of 1916. But this was a
hollow expansion, because while new local Sis were established, old
local Sis stagnated, sometimes sinking into total inactivity.104 Yet this
hollow expansion brought with it its own problems to the CSI. As we
have seen, the conversion of SI branches into local Sis proceeded
smoothly under the guidance of Tjokroaminoto and Rinkes in the first
half of 1914. Sixty-three local Sis were established by the end of June
1914. After that the tempo of the establishment of local Sis in Java
considerably slackened. From July 1914 to June 1915 only eighteen
local Sis were established, and from July 1915 to the end of 1916 only
eleven. Instead, from the middle of 1914 local Sis started to be orga�
nized in Sumatra and thus money started to flow into the CSI from
Sumatran Sis. This created two problems. First, the Sumatran local Sis
demanded commissioner posts in the CSI central committee, so far
monopolized by Java. At the 1915 SI congress, however, only the
representative of the Medan SI was given the post of commissioner.
This offended representatives of other Sumatran local Sis.105 Second,
Sumatran local Sis were largely established under Goenawan's guid�
ance. Therefore, the money collected from Sumatran local Sis came
into Goenawan's and not Tjokroaminoto's hand. If the money had
continued to come into Tjokroaminoto's hand from local Sis of Java,
this would not have been such a serious problem. But now many local
Sis in Java were sleeping, if not dying, and Tjokroaminoto was in
serious financial trouble. Thus the money from Sumatran local Sis
,02Proces Verbaal (Tjokroaminoto), Mr. i84x/h.
*03Sinar Djawa, 16 Apr. 1914.
104Missive van den Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken, 30 Nov. 1915, Mr. 1263/16, Vb. 1
Sept. 1917, No. 33.
10SSinar Djawa, 2 July 1915.
7� An Age in Motion
became the central issue in the power struggle between Goenawan and
Tjokroaminoto for control of the CSI.
The first move was made by Goenawan to consolidate his position in
West Java and Sumatra. At the Surabaya SI congress of 1915,
Goenawan formed an alliance with Samanhoedi and invited to Sur�
akarta those Sumatran local SI representatives who were not given
posts as commissioners. Then, in December 1915, Goenawan pub�
lished the draft statutes of "the CSI for West Java and Sumatra" in
Pantjaran Warta and convened the inaugural rally in January 1916. At
the rally, "the CSI for West Java and Sumatra" was established with
the strong support of the Benkulen and Kota Bumi SI representatives,
and the central committee was constituted with Samanhoedi as chair�
man and Goenawan as secretary/treasurer. At the rally, Samanhoedi
proposed the return of the SI to the organizational structure of three
department committees and gave his blessing, "as Father of the SI," to
Goenawan's attempt.106 In countering Goenawan's move, Tjokroami�
noto made two efforts. First, he appointed Ardiwinata of Batavia trea�
surer of the CSI to make it easier to siphon off money from Sumatran
Sis. But Ardiwinata was no rival of Goenawan. Second, Tjokroami�
noto himself made a propaganda tour to Palembang and prevented the
wealthy Palembang SI from joining Goenawan's CSI.107 Moreover,
support came to Tjokroaminoto from two different sources. In late
1915 Tjipto exposed Goenawan's embezzlement of sixty thousand
guilders from the SI and attacked him as a satria mating (thief satria).108 This
was disastrous for Goenawan, a pergerakan leader who
was seen as a satria by the people, all the more so because the attack
was made by Tjipto, who had proved himself a true satria through the
sacrifices he had made for the nation in the Comite Boemipoetra affair.
The government's legal recognition of the CSI in March 1916 also
helped Tjokroaminoto. Goenawan's attempt proved abortive. Though
the local Sis in Batavia, Benkulen, and Lampung joined Goenawan's
CSI, they soon deserted it one after another. To give the final blow to
Goenawan, Tjokroaminoto convened the first CSI national congress of
1916 in Bandung, the rival SI center in West Java, and appointed
Abdoel Moeis, a Sumatran, deputy vice-chairman. By the end of 1916
Goenawan himself abandoned his attempt and soon thereafter he was
ousted from the chairmanship of the Batavia SI.
Goenawan's challenge to Tjokroaminoto and his defeat clearly illus106Aan de
Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken toegevoegde ambtenaar aan GG, 21 Feb. 1916,
Vb. 1 Sept. 1917, No. 32.
107Proces Verbaal (Tjokroaminoto), Mr. 184X/21.
108For Tjipto's attack on Goenawan, see Tj. Mk. [Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo], "He
Pemaling, Djahanam! manakah moeka kamoe? Manakah mintasraja kamoe?" Sarotomo, 1915,
pp. 261-264.
The Birth of the Pergerakan 79
trates the hollowness of the SI movement under Tjokroaminoto's lead�
ership. As his abortive effort to establish "the CSI for West Java and
Sumatra" shows, Goenawan's challenge was entirely based on the chang�
ing geographical power balance within the SI, created by the stagnation
of the SI in Java and the expansion of the SI in Sumatra. The issue was
money and the relative power positions of Goenawan and Tjokroaminoto. No questions
were raised as to what the pergerakan was all
about, how a leader should act, and how and where the pergerakan
should be led. Both Goenawan and Tjokroaminoto were banal. They
said and did what they had been saying and doing-manipulating
positions, money, and personal rivalries, and invoking past memory.
Had Tjipto not attacked Goenawan as a satria maling and the Indies
government not timely recognized Tjokroaminoto's CSI, Goenawan's
CSI might not have met such a disastrous fate; rather, a compromise
might have been struck. And to prove the hollowness of the whole
squabble, Tjokroaminoto's victory also turned out to be hollow. By the
end of 1916 the establishment of local Sis in Sumatra also came to a
halt and the money stopped coming into the CSI.109
The SI under Tjokroaminoto was thus colossal but empty. Though
the membership was substantially dwindling, its sheer size dwarfed the
BO and the Insulinde. But no new idea and no new style came from
Tjokroaminoto. He remained a satria under the protection of the gov�
ernment. But the world and the age were in motion, changing fast in an
accelerated tempo toward the end of World War I. The kaum muda
consciousness was also changing accordingly. From outside the SI, the
BO, capitalizing on the issue of the defense of the Indies, successfully
campaigned for popular representation and was transforming itself
into a political party of government priyayi.110 And from inside the SI,
it was Marco who voiced and acted out what a pergerakan leader
should be in the new world and the new age to come.
Marco in Doenia Bergerak (The World in Motion)
In the years of Tjokroaminoto's dominance, Surakarta remained in
popular memory as the birthplace of the SI, and Hadji Samanhoedi
remained its founding father. But the Surakarta SI itself fell apart and
lost almost all the mass following it once had. In its heyday it was an
all-encompassing Javanese association under the leadership of batik
entrepreneurs and Kasunanan aristocrats. But those exciting days were
long gone. Kromo lost their interest and returned to their everyday life.
109On the seriousness of the CSI's financial position, see Proces Verbaal
(Tjokroaminoto),
Mr. 184X/2.1.
n�Nagazumi, The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism, pp. 93-117.
8o An Age in Motion
SI shops established in late 1912 and 1913 all went into bankruptcy.
The move of the CSI central committee to Surabaya meant that money
stopped flowing from local Sis into the hands of the Surakarta SI
leadership. The batik entrepreneurs in Lawean could not and did not
want to finance the SI. In the war years the prices of goods for batik
production rose steeply. Entrepreneurs had to worry more about their
business than about the SI. Some of the batik traders and Koranic
teachers in the central parts of the city, especially Kauman and Keprabon, remained
active, but their activities were largely directed to the
advancement of Islam. In 1915 leading figures among them, Hadji
Mohammad Misbach and Hadji Hisamzaijnie, started to publish a
journal, Medan Moeslimin, in response to the publication of Mardi
Rahardjo by Christian missionaries. The title Medan Moeslimin was
reminiscent of Tirtoadhisoerjo's Medan Prijaji, and it was in fact the
first journal ever published by pesantren-educated Islamic intellectuals
in Java. It was a belated effort of Islamic kaum muda to follow the age
of progress and as such remained peripheral to the pergerakan politics
by the end of 1917.
Kasunanan princes and high-ranking Kepatihan officials had long
ago deserted the SI. They instead joined the BO from the middle of
1914, because the BO was respectable, all the more so after the BO
central committee started to campaign for a native militia for the de�
fense of the Indies. The leading figures of the BO in Surakarta were Dr.
Radjiman Wediodipoero, the sunan's court physician; R.M.A. Soerjosoeparto, a highly
educated Mangkunegaran prince who in March
1916 became the head of the Mangkunegara house as Pangeran
Adipati Ario Prabu Prang Wedana; R.M.A. Woerjaningrat, a son of
the patih R. Adipati Sosrodiningrat and the general secretary of the
Kepatihan; and Pangeran Hadiwidjojo, reportedly the best-educated
Kasunanan prince and the leader of the Narpowandojo, the associa�
tion of Kasunanan princes. They controlled both the BO central com�
mittee and the Surakarta branch. Dr. Radjiman (August 1914-15),
Soerjosoeparto (1915-March 1916), and Woerjaningrat (March
1916-22) successively headed the BO central leadership, while
Hadiwidjojo was the chairman of the Surakarta branch throughout
these years. They were a new breed of Solonese aristocracy in the
modern age. They all knew that now was the age of progress and
pergerakan. Woerjaningrat was the one whom the SI leadership had
once asked to be their adviser. As an official of the residency office,
Soerjosoeparto had written the report on the first SI congress of 1913.
They saw themselves as most qualified to guide the native awakening,
not only because they were legitimate heirs to the Javanese tradition
but also because they were educated in the Netherlands and thus by
definition were most advanced. Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran offi-
The Birth of the Pergerakan 81
dais and government priyayi joined the BO in increasing numbers. BO
branches were set up not only in the capital of Surakarta but also in
Klaten, Sragen, Boyolali, and Wonogiri. The total membership of the
BO in Surakarta reached almost six hundred, making it the largest
among the nonmilitary BO branches and the wealthiest.111
Thus left in the Surakarta SI were journalists-turned-pergerakan
leaders. But Sarotomo ceased publication in the middle of 1914 for
lack of funds. Martodharsono returned to his old job as editor-in-chief
of Djawi Kanda and Djawi Hiswara. Only Marco and Sosrokoernio
were left alone at the once brisk SI office in Purwosari, without
a newspaper to edit and without an organization to run. Yet they
remained in Surakarta, working as editors for Martodharsono's news�
papers, raising money by organizing wayang orang, and trying to
revive the once powerful SI, while watching successful journaliststurned-pergerakan
leaders playing satria on the stage of SI rallies. It
was under these circumstances that Marco tried to show that not those
on the stage but he himself was a true satria, by his writing and acting.
Mas Marco Kartodikromo, born about 1890 in Cepu, was the son of
a lower priyayi family. He graduated from the second-class native
school at Bojonegoro and the private Dutch native school at Purworejo. He then
entered the Forestry Service as a minor clerk about 1905.
But he soon moved to Semarang and became a clerk of the NIS, while
learning Dutch from a Dutch private tutor.112 He was a member of the
emerging kaum muda, created by Western-style education and main�
tained by the expanding state and Dutch private business activities. But
in a curious way he was a minor member of the kaum muda. In terms
of education, he was inferior to early pergerakan leaders such as Tirtoadhisoerjo,
Tjokroaminoto, and Soewardi. They all received the best
education then available in the Indies-the ELS and then the HBS, the
OSVIA, or the STOVIA-and not only read but wrote and spoke
Dutch fluently. Marco also read Dutch, but his writing and conversa�
tional ability in the Dutch language was never great. He never mingled
freely with the Dutch and all his writings were either in Malay or in
Javanese. Things Dutch and European being the emblems of moderni�
ty, he was by definition less advanced than such pergerakan leaders as
Tjokroaminoto and Soewardi. Perhaps it was his uneasiness about this
that made him become infatuated with symbols of modernity and
drove him to appear in public in European style like a sinyo, while
Tjokroaminoto and Soewardi usually appeared in public in Javanese
dress.1 13 In 1911 Marco left Semarang for Bandung, joined Medan
111 Ibid., 132-135.
1,2Proces Verbaal (Marco Kartodikromo), Mr. 550X/27.
113See his picture in Sarotomo, 1915, p. 281. For an excellent analysis of Marco,
see
Pramoedya, Rumah Kaca, pp. 182-183, 189-190.
82 An Age in Motion
Prijaji as an apprentice and started his career as a journalist. After
Medan Prijaji went bankrupt, he joined Sarotomo in late 1912 as an
editor and administrator at Martodharsono's invitation. At the age of
twenty-two, he thus entered the pergerakan world. But soon the Sur�
akarta SI collapsed and Sarotomo ceased publication. In his Bandung
years his mentor was Tirtoadhisoerjo and one of his close friends was
Soewardi. In Surakarta he again followed the examples set by these
two journalists: to publish his own newspaper and to say what he
wanted to say without leaving anything unsaid. Unlike Soewardi, how�
ever, he intended to do this in Malay. To this end he established the
Inlandsche journalistenbond (IJB, League of Native Journalists) in Sur�
akarta in the middle of 1914. Here "Journalisten" clearly implied per�
gerakan leaders without any organizational base. But Marco now tried
to turn the marginality of a "journalist" to his advantage. As the IJB
organ, he published Doenia Bergerak (World in motion), which sig�
nified that it was in fact the organ for the world of the movement-
dunia pergerakan. Marco became chairman and Sosrokoernio secre�
tary. Part of its financial support probably came from Kauman batik
traders, judging from the fact that M. Hadji Bakrie, a wealthy batik
trader in Kauman, was appointed treasurer.114 The IJB was also joined
by former IP leaders-Tjipto, who was allowed to return to the Indies
from his exile because of illness in July 1914, and M. Darnakoesoema,
a member of the Insulinde central committee-both of whom came to
settle down in Surakarta at about that time. Doenia Bergerak was
printed by the printing firm Insulinde in Bandung. In Dutch eyes, there�
fore, Doenia Bergerak under Marco's editorship emerged as the van�
guard of IP'ers.
From the start, Marco intended to wage "a war of voice" through
Doenia Bergerak.115 The voice he raised was tense and harsh. In its
first issue, Marco attacked D. A. Rinkes, the adviser for native affairs.
Marco had once criticized the Welfare Commission in Sarotomo. An�
gered at this article, Rinkes sent a personal letter to Samanhoedi, repri�
manding him for his negligence in supervising his "employees," while
branding Marco's article as a pure lie. Marco printed Rinkes's letter in
its entirety in Doenia Bergerak and in juxtaposition with it published
his own article, "Marco: Pro of Contra Dr. Rinkes [Marco: Pro or
contra Dr. Rinkes]." It reads in part:
At the heading of this text, I have written pro or contra. Pro means
agree; contra means oppose (not agree).
Do I not agree with the explanation of Padoeka Dr. Rinkes above?
114Departemen Penerangan Republik Indonesia, Surat Kabar Indonesia pada Tiga Zaman
(Jakarta, 1979), pp. 40-41.
115Sosrokoernio, "Zaman Soerat Kabar," Sarotomo, 1915, p. 154-
The Birth of the Pergerakan 83
This is still a question. Do I have to believe his explanation? This too is
not yet certain.
A person such as Padoeka Dr. Rinkes, the adviser for native affairs,
who has been entrusted by the Administration with matters concerning
the situation of the Natives certainly:
1. understands better than anyone else the good or bad lot of us Natives;
2. more than anyone else loves us Natives;
3. has more adequate knowledge about anything whatsoever than us
Natives.
But how about Marco? What sort of person is he? Marco is a person
from the little-man-class; he has never stepped through a school door; his
views are not broad; etc., etc. Nonetheless, by the ordaining of the one
God, Marco has been given two ears, two hands, one head, one mouth,
etc.-just like most people.
Marco's two eyes are no different from the two eyes of a graduate from
a Universiteit (college). Thus if Marco sees something white, certainly
that something also appears white to the eyes of the educated. And so on.
As I have said above at no. 1, Pjadoeka]. T[oean]. Dr. Rinkes knows
more about the lot of the Natives than I do. [But] have P. T. Dr. Rinkes or
the members of the Welfare Commission witnessed for themselves wheth�
er the little people live in happiness?
What kind of life is it that they call happy, safe, lacking nothing what�
soever?
I often ask village people how their living conditions are.
They answer my question: "Most of the little people live like this: they
eat once a day . . . they never even think of eating fish; just as long as
there is salt and hot peppers, it is enough." . . .
If human beings live like this, can one say [they are] happy and lack
nothing!? This too is not easy to know.
Now [let us] discuss no. 2 above, i.e.: P. T. Dr. Rinkes and all the
members of the Welfare Commission love us Natives dearly.
Which is more dearly loved: one's own body or the bodies of other
people!
I am very confident that the W.C. members love the little people, yet
still love themselves far more.
Marco also loves himself very much, so he always keeps on shout�
ing, because if his shouts are fulfilled, he too will share in the [general]
happiness.
If I think long [about it], the W.C. members are like Doktor (doekoen
[magician-healers]). But we Natives are people who are already very
seriously ill. Which one more insistently asks for healing from an
illness-the Doktor (doekoen) or the patient?
In my opinion it is certainly the sick patient who insists most strongly
on escape from the danger. As for the Doktor (doekoen) he merely prac�
tices his [skill]-whether the sick person recovers or not, that is up to
Almighty God-as long as the Doktor (doekoen)'s monthly salary
doesn't decrease, that's fine. It's quite another matter if what is sick is the
Doktor's own body, and he is also the one who must treat it.
84 An Age in Motion
In no. 3 above, I said that P. T. Dr. Rinkes has more knowledge than
others [the Natives]. I do not need to explain this further, for you readers
have already certainly got the point. But I dare say that P. T. Dr. Rinkes
and the W.C. members, who have the rank of Regent, all have certainly
scarcely ever-or perhaps never-mingled with villagers (the majority of
the population).
Perhaps the W.C. members have only questioned the priyayi, from the
Wedana on down to the Lurah [village headmen].116
Here Marco shows himself in clear form. Rinkes was the person who
helped Tjokroaminoto dominate the SI and thus tamed the SI for the
Indies government. The Welfare Commission was an important sym�
bol of the Ethical policy. By criticizing Rinkes and the members of the
Welfare Commission, Marco in fact was waging his "war of voice"
against the Indies government and Tjokroaminoto, who had fallen into
their hands. But how did he wage his war? There are three related
points. First, his language is violent. The venerable Welfare Commis�
sion is turned into the W.C., and Doktor, which relates to Padoeka
Toean Dr. Rinkes, is equalized with doekoen (dukun, magicianhealers), certainly not
a respectable status in the modern age of prog�
ress. Second and more important, every time he writes Doktor he
persistently adds doekoen in parentheses, a sign that Marco is saying
what he should keep unsaid in his mind. The phrase "but I dare say"
shows the same spirit. He needed to "dare" because he was speaking
low Javanese, just as Soewardi did in his "If I Were a Dutchman." And
the title of the article, "Marco: Pro of Contra Dr. Rinkes," indeed
shows Marco to be on equal footing with Rinkes as a human being.
Third, however, while Soewardi said "If I were a Dutchman," Marco
no longer says that. Instead, Marco says "If I were a little man," which,
though logically possible as well, Soewardi had probably never intend�
ed to say. Thus Marco stretched Soewardi's rhetorical device to its end
and said all were human beings and equal, Padoeka Toean Dr. Rinkes
as well as kromo with "the little-man status" and no education.
Characteristic of Marco, he made all these points clear in a straight�
forward way. He did not wait, as Tjokroaminoto did when he was
given an audience by Governor General Idenburg, for the Dutch to
invite him and his fellow natives to sit on a par with them, while saying
"We all are human beings."11^ Unlike Tjokroaminoto, who as a satria
"under the protection of the government" only needed to raise his
voice, he had to "shout" and to attack the government as a true satria.
Yet in a curious way he had one thing in common with Tjokroaminoto
and the kaum muda at large, because what mattered in "shouting" was
116"Marco: Pro of Contra Dr. Rinkes," Doenia Bergerak, no. i (1914). PP- 3~8;
reprinted
in Bintang Timur, 24 Aug. 1962. Italics in the original.
117D.M.G. Koch, Batig Slot, p. 14.
The Birth of the Pergerakan 85
also voice, and not action. It was still the time of voice; the time of
action had yet to come.
Doenia Bergerak continued to be published from the middle of 1914
to the middle of 1915. Throughout the period Marco wrote articles
and carried readers' letters in Doenia Bergerak in this spirit-shouting
"we all are human beings." Given the strict press laws in the Indies at
the time, one could easily expect that Marco would soon be prosecuted
on charges of press offenses, and in fact Marco was waiting for that
day, when he would show his true satriahood.118 In early 1915 the day
arrived. He was accused of press offenses after his publication of four
readers' letters in Doenia Bergerak. These letters were not very differ�
ent from others published in Doenia Bergerak and other newspapers.
Different was Marco's behavior. He took complete responsibility for
the writings in Doenia Bergerak and sternly refused to disclose to the
authorities the identities of the writers.119 At the native court (landraad), he
was sentenced to seven months' imprisonment. He appealed
to the court of justice. The CSI leadership was happy about the pros�
ecution of Marco. In fact, Oetoesan Hindia wrote "Thank God" for
his prosecution. Instead, help came from the Insulinde and from the
ISDV (Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging, Indies Social Dem�
ocratic Association), established by Henk Sneevliet in May 1915. At
that time the ISDV was still a tiny debating club of Dutch socialists.
Eager to find a way to influence the natives, Sneevliet took the initiative
to protest the prosecution of Marco and the Indies press laws. To this
end a rally was organized in Semarang in July and a committee was
formed by Sneevliet and D.J.E. Westerveld of the ISDV and G. L.
Topee, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, and Kessing of the Insulinde. At the
July rally Marco proclaimed, "I dare say, as long as you, people of the
Indies, do not have courage, you will always certainly be trampled on
and said to be quarter human beings."120 His prosecution was, as
Marco himself put it, a touchstone to prove his courage. Marco was
now emerging as a central figure among IP'ers. And it was at this
moment that Soewardi sent his open letter to Marco and put the mean�
ing of Marco's action in relief. Soewardi's open letter to Marco and
Marco's comments on the letter read, in their entirety:
Den Haag, 15 August 15 To M. Marco in Solo
Dearest Brother
With dismay I in Holland have read in the newspaper Goentoer Bergerak
that you have been interrogated by the Law and that one of its officers
n8This point is well made by Pramoedya Atlanta Toer in Rumah Kaca, p. 191.
119Marco, "Boekan Persdelict Tetapi Klachtdelict," Sarotomo, 1915, pp. 31-32. See
also
I. N. Soebagijo, Jagat Wartawan Indonesia (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1918), pp. 1-6.
120Sinar Djawa, 9 and 22 July 1915.
86 An Age in Motion
has demanded a two-year prison sentence. Inalilahi waina ilaihi radjioen
[In truth we come from Allah and to Him we return]. Such is the wish of
the government! Good!(i)
We do not yet know what the decision of the Law will be, it may be
heavier, but it may also be lighter.(2) By the time this letter comes into
your hands, certainly this will already have been decided. I hope with the
greatest hope that such a heavy sentence will be rescinded.(3) Amin! If it
is your destiny to be sentenced, please do appeal. You yourself certainly
understand the right way to do this.(4)
Indeed it is not easy, and also not pleasant, for a person to defend the
nation, but for us it is a duty. Never, never may we abandon our hopes.
However great this sacrifice, all of us are obliged to sacrifice our very
selves if necessary. Such is the duty of excellence.^)
Now your excellence in loyalty is manifest.(6) Remember, excellent are
not they who have titles and ranks. For me, the highest excellence lies in
the heart, in the bones and marrow that have excellence. With this press
offense you have sacrificed yourself, and all these punishments will surely
be for you a medal of honor, a true Ridderkruis [Knight's Cross, a high
Dutch medal of honor]. In my eyes now your rank is very high, because it
is clear that you have excelled as a defender of the nation.
Do not think that there will be none who will want to take your place.
I feel [sure that] ten, twenty, thirty people will want to take your place.
With this press offense, many people will surely enter the field of our
pergerakan. Courageous because in the right. All obstacles will be sur�
mounted. Amin.
respectful greetings
Surijaningrat
with R. A.
(1) Yes, good! Once again, "Good!"
(2) Nine months, brother, not bad.
(3) The SI branch in Solo will have it rescinded.
(4) Indeed.
(5) Don't be discouraged, there are still tens of candidate-satria who will
dare to fight the green giant, alias the half-witted giant.
(6) Don't spoil with praise before [a man] is dead.
Not only do I personally know R. M. Soewardi Soerjamngrat, but I
also know well the whole of his family. As I have long known, brother
R.M.S.S. is indeed a person of our nation whose humanity is very deep.
When brother R.M.S.S. heard the news that we: Darna [Koesoema] and
Marco got attacked for press offense, immediately he sent us a letter,
which went like this: "Good, Marco and Darna, come to Holland, and I
will go back to the land of Java, so that the money I eat up each month
can be used for your livelihood in Holland; even if I must get punished,
that doesn't matter." These are the words of a satrija sedjati [true satria],
The Birth of the Pergerakan 87
not of a satria looking for a good time, alias a satrija palsoe [fake satria].
Who is [the fake one]? Look for him yourself!
Marco121
This article-Soewardi's open letter to Marco and Marco's com�
ments-was probably a new style in pergerakan writings. It is com�
posed in such a way that the reader can watch and hear Marco reading
Soewardi's letter aloud while saying whatever comes to his mind, and
then Marco turns to the readers and addresses them. To put it in a
somewhat different way, this article turned pages into an imagined
stage on which the scene was set by Soewardi, and Marco played the
role of a satria and then addressed the audience. What is the scene? It is
the world of inner excellence standing against the world of outward
excellence, excellence in the heart and in the bones and marrow against
titles, ranks, and Ridderkruis, "we" as the "nation" with its own imag�
ined moral hierarchy against the government as the hierarchy of titles,
ranks, and medals of honor earned for immoral oppression. The sense
of this "we" standing against the government is clearly shown by
Soewardi's words, "Such is the wish of the government! Good!" and
Marco's comment, "Yes, good! Once again `Good!'" The satria takes
clearer shape against this background. He is a "defender of the na�
tion," and his credentials lie in the sacrifice he makes for the nation. He
can no longer be a satria "under the protection of the government,"
because the government is the green giant, alias the half-witted giant. If
there are still those who style themselves as satria under the protection
of the government, they cannot be genuine. They are satria looking for
a good time, alias fake satria, or if we use Tjipto's words, thief satria,
alias pickpocket satria. Important now was not only the words but also
the action exemplifying his will to sacrifice himself, the exemplary
action as an extension of language. And with this transformation of the
notion of satria, the meaning of prison also changed. Prison was now
seen as a place for an ascetic retreat, from which a satria would emerge
with his moral power strengthened.
Now the only thing left for Marco to do was to go to jail. Soon after
the article was published in Sarotomo, Marco went to jail in Semarang.
Before he went to jail, Sosrokoernio conducted a fund-raising cam�
paign to support Marco's family-his wife and child-and to send
Marco to the Netherlands in order to raise the question of the Indies
press laws to the Tweede Kamer (the Second Chamber). But only five
hundred guilders was raised, which was barely enough to support Mar�
co's family.122 Then an ironic thing happened. Attacked as a thief
121"Soerat Terboeka," Sarotomo, 1915, pp. 125-126. Italics in the original.
122Sr. K. [Sosrokoernio], "Itoelah soedah mendjadi nasibnja toean MARCO," Sarotomo,
1915, pp. 280-283.
88 An Age in Motion
satria by Tjipto and eager to exploit Marco's credentials as a true
satria, Goenawan came to his help. He financially supported Marco's
family and, once Marco got out of jail in the middle of 1916, sent him
to the Netherlands as a special correspondent of Pantjaran Warta. He
stayed in Holland for five months, returned to Java in early February
1917, and joined Pantjaran Warta on February 13. Immediately he
published a series of articles under the title "Sama Rata dan Sama Rasa
[Equality and solidarity]" and campaigned against the native militia
for the defense of the Indies, while demanding equality of the natives
with the Europeans. In less than a week he was taken into preventive
custody again and later sentenced to one year's imprisonment.123 From
late 1915 to the middle of 1918, Marco thus spent his time in jail and
in the Netherlands. In these years the political climate in the Indies
changed more than Marco had perhaps expected. World War I entered
its final stage. The Russian Revolution took place and a new world
emerged. When prices rose steeply and wages were suspended, the
people in the Indies got increasingly restless. Eighteen-year-old Semaoen took over
the leadership of the Semarang SI in 1917, suc�
cessfully led a series of strikes, and in a year expanded the Semarang SI,
making it the strongest and most radical SI in the Indies. Trade unions
cropped up. The time was becoming the time of action, not only of
exemplary actions like Marco's but also of collective action-strikes
(pemogokan). The time was with Marco or perhaps even ahead of him.
In 1917, while he was still in jail in Weltevreden, he composed a poem
(syair) titled "Sama Rasa dan Sama Rata [Solidarity and equality]."
This poem is from jail,
When I was just sentenced.
To stay in Weltevreden,
For the period of twelve months.
# # #
The name of this poem is: "Solidarity"
And "Equality," it is clear;
But it is no poem for those
Who drag us off to jail.
To be in jail is not pleasant,
Separated from wife and child,
Associating with many thieves and robbers,
Like a nation [? bangsa] of bandits.
But such are of the selfsame type
As those who have in their control
123"Mas Marco," De Indische Gids 37 (1917), pp. 1079-1082.
The Birth of the Pergerakan 89
Power and the wealth of men,
Yet acting in a hidden way.
There are robbers refined and crude,
There are robbers small and big,
Masked with culture and educated,
There are those who rob in error,
All of them are robbers
Demanding things by force
Uncaring of their nationhood
The human nation of the world.
Fear not that we'll lose hope
Feeling this world's dirt and filth,
Like a child still very small
And unawakened from his sleep.
We have now the crossroads reached,
And we have walked so very fast;
Our friends who walked along so slowly
Are left behind us very far.
We mean to go on straight ahead
But we feel a mounting thirst.
Indeed true hope is never lost,
If need be even unto death.
The path I aim for's very hot
With many thorns and raging winds;
We have to sever all the bonds
We also have to smash the bars,
So that the way'll be sama rata
Those walking it sama meRASA,
Joyful, happy all together,
That is: "Sama rasa, sama rata."
Don't fight the way the giant does,
Loudly bellowing and shouting,
Fond of money, cowardly,
That's not the custom of the satria.
In ages past the true satria
Was not afraid to enter fire
Or plunge into the ocean's depths
To seek the purpose in his heart.
90 An Age in Motion
Believe me, brothers, only go
In the direction of the East;
There is the place where is the light
Which can illuminate the world.
# # #
Broeders! Laat mij even blijven rusten
[Brothers! Let me take my rest];
Laat den anderen zijn rol vervullen
[And let the others do their part].
Ik zal wel met genoegen gaan spelen
[I'll willingly take up my own].
Zoodra het derde bedrijf moet komen
[Once the third act has begun].124
The true satria in this poem is Bima in search of Dewa Ruci. The
poem thus proclaimed Marco's determination to return to the stage of
the pergerakan (the third act) as Bima, but it also foretold the new
mood of the pergerakan in the days to come: the hatred of colonial
exploitation and the militant sense of solidarity and equality. Indeed
sama rasa sama rata would soon become a most popular watchword
used to express the spirit of the pergerakan. The pergerakan that had
been born with the enormous expansion of the SI was now entering a
new stage. The days of satria "under the protection of the government"
were coming to an end and the days of "true satria" were beginning.
The pergerakan working for native progress was giving way to the
pergerakan for sama rasa sama rata. Upon his release from jail, Marco
joined the rising Semarang SI as a commissioner and didn't return to
Surakarta until late 1924. But in the days to come the pergerakan was
also to revive in Surakarta, this time not under the banner of the SI but
under the Insulinde led by Hadji Mohammad Misbach and Dr. Tjipto
Mangoenkoesoemo.
124Marco, "Sama Rasa dan Sama Rata," in Sair Rempah-rempah (Semarang: Druk. N.V.
Sinar Djawa, 1918), pp. 1 - 5.
3 The Age in Motion
While Marco was in jail in Weltevreden in 1917, the pergerakan
started to show signs of regeneration. Between 1917 and 1920 the
world changed quickly and the age was felt to be in motion. World
War I entered its final stage, came to its conclusion, and the postwar
world started to emerge. In these years, the pergerakan underwent
profound transformations. If the age of the early SI was that of rallies,
it was now the age of strikes, when new leaders and new centers of the
pergerakan emerged. Within the SI, young ISDV'er Semaoen rose as
the leader of the Semarang SI and the VSTP (Vereeniging voor Spooren
Tramwegpersoneel, Railway and Tramway Workers' Union) and
the "strike king," Soerjopranoto, emerged as the leader of the Yogyakarta SI and
the PFB (Personeel Fabriek Bond, Sugar Factory Workers'
Union), while threatening and increasingly undermining Tjokroaminoto's dominance
over the CSI. And without the SI, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Hadji Mohammad Misbach
led the Insulinde/NIP-SH
(Nationaal Indische Partij-Sarekat Hindia, National Indies PartyAssociation of the
Indies), the successor of the ill-fated IP, in Surakarta
as a "revolutionary" pergerakan force and exemplified what a "revolu�
tionary" pergerakan would be like. To understand this profound trans�
formation of the pergerakan in the age in motion, let us first focus our
discussion on the SI and examine the development of the pergerakan in
general in this chapter, leaving the examination of the rise of Tjipto
and Misbach and the pergerakan in Surakarta for Chapters 4 and 5.
Not only for the history of the pergerakan but also for the history of
the Indies, World War I marked a watershed. Neither the Netherlands
nor the Indies was directly involved in the war. But the war seriously
affected the Indies and its relationship with the metropolis. As soon as
war broke out, the Dutch and the Indies governments realized that the
9i
9* An Age in Motion
Indies might not be able to remain a peaceful Dutch colony insulated
from the outside world and the war. Japanese aggression in China and
in the German colonies in the Pacific made the Dutch and the Indies
governments nervous about the defense of the Indies. Governor Gener�
al Idenburg's five-year tenure was to expire in December 1914, but
in view of the uncertainties created by the war, the Netherlands gov�
ernment asked him to stay in office. In the course of 1915, it became
increasingly clear that the worst fear of the Indies, that of being
dragged into the war, could be avoided. In March 1916, the new
governor general, J. P. graaf van Limburg Stirum, came to the Indies
and replaced Idenburg. Yet the war made physical communication
between the Indies and the metropolis increasingly difficult and forced
the Indies government to run the state and the economy more autono�
mously. Coming to the Indies in this situation, van Limburg Stirum
tried to steer the Indies onto a more autonomous path, urging the
Netherlands government to ratify the establishment of the Volksraad
(People's Council) quickly, while establishing the Political Intelligence
Service (Politieke Inlichtingendienst, PID) to watch out for possible
foreign aggression and subversive activities in the Indies.1
While the impact of the war was immediately felt by the Dutch and
the Indies governments, it was felt with no immediacy by native kaum
muda. Battles were reported every day in Malay-language newspapers,
but they were taking place far away in Europe. The BO central leader�
ship cheerfully campaigned for the native militia and the defense of the
Indies, but more to show their loyalty to the government than in re�
sponse to the possibility of foreign aggression.2 And perhaps the one
thing that most fascinated native kaum muda was German submarines
that hit ships destined for enemy countries from deep beneath the sea.3
But as the war proceeded with no sign of end in sight, not only the
native kaum muda but also the whole Indies population was hit by the
war, like ships hit by submarines. Deterioration in shipping transporta�
tion and chaotic conditions of world markets increasingly hurt the
Indies colonial economy. With prices of imported goods in 1914 set at
The PID was established as a temporary measure in May 1916 to keep suspect
foreigners
and revolutionary activities under surveillance and was directed by W. Muurling, a
former
captain of the general staff of the KNIL (Konmklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger, Royal
Nether�
lands Indies Army). After the war, the PID was abolished (in April 1919) and the
police
( algemeene politie) under the command of the hoofdparket (the office of the
prosecutor
general) took over the job of keeping revolutionary activities under surveillance.
This intelli�
gence service (recherchedienst op het hoofdparket) was headed by a police
commissioner first
class, A. E. van der Lely, who worked in the hoofdparket from July 1918 while
officially
remaining a police officer in Batavia. Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de
Nationalistische
Beweging: i^iy-medio 1923, pp. 134-135.
2For the defense of the Indies and the BO campaign for the native militia, see
Nagazumi,
The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism, pp. 93-117.
3See, for instance, the conversation on submarines in Marco, Student Hidjo, p. 5.
The Age in Motion 93
ioo, the price index rose to 167 from 1914 to 1916, to 226 in 1917,
and to 262 in 1918. The retail-price index rose to 138 from 1914 to
1916, to 168 in 1917, and to 189 in 1918.4 Yet wages remained the
same throughout these years. The absolute standard of living declined
and the people got increasingly restless. In Europe, revolution took
place in Russia in March 1917, followed by the Bolshevik Revolution
in November. The tsar and his family were slain and soldiers', work�
ers', and peasants' soviets came to power. Inspired by the Bolshevik
Revolution, European ISDV members, above all J. A. Brandsteder, the
secretary of the Bond van Mindere Marinepersoneel (Association of
Noncommissioned Naval Personnel), started the Red Guardist action,
organizing sailors' and soldiers' soviets especially in Surabaya, the ma�
jor naval center in the Indies.5 Soviet Russia, even if hazily, came to
represent a new world. Getting out of prison, Marco soon wrote a
poem, "Tabeat Apakah? [What character?]," in which he juxtaposed
Tolstoy and Ronggowarsita.6 Tjipto went to Blora to study Saminism
and, relying on Jean Finot's Parmi les saints et les possedes (Between
saints and devils), drew a parallel between a religious sect in tsarist
Russia that denied God, the devil, paradise and hell, the power of the
tsar, property, and the law, and Agama Adam (Religion of Adam)
taught by Soerontiko Samin.7 Then in early November 1918 revolu�
tion took place in Germany. The German empire collapsed. The kaiser
fled the country and a republic was established by the socialists. On
November 11, Germany surrendered and the war came to an end. The
next day, there was a political crisis in the Netherlands. Following the
German example, M. J. Troelstra, the leader of the SDAP (Sociaal
Democratische Arbeiders Partij, Social Democratic Workers' Party),
demanded the transfer of power to the socialists. The Troelstra "revo�
lution" itself fizzled away in a few days. But it was a clear sign that
neither the metropolis nor the Indies could be immune in the age in
motion and that socialism and democracy were a real force in the
emerging postwar world.
In this age in motion, the political climate in the Indies also changed
quickly and the pergerakan underwent profound transformation. Ini�
tiatives to change the political climate and the pergerakan came from
two different sources: from without, from the Indies government, em4Departement van
Landbouw, Nijverheid en Handel, Prijzen, lndexcijfers en \\ isselkoersen op Java
1913-1926 (Batavia: Drukkerijen Ruygrok, 1917)-
sFor the Red Guardist action, see Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism,
pp. 29-30. See also Wd. Hoofd van PID (Muurling), Geheim Verslag No. 41 van 1918:
Nota
omtrent de revolutionnaire socialistische actie hier te lande, 29 May 19 * Mr.
is8\/ 18, \ b.
6 Jan. 1919, No. 16.
6Marco Kartodikromo, "Tabeat Apakah?" in Sair Rempah-rempah, vol. 2, pp. 15-19-
7Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, Het Saminisme: Rapport Uitgebracht aan de Vereentging
Insulinde (Semarang: Benjamins, 1918).
94 An Age in Motion
bodied in the person of Governor General van Limburg Stirum; and
from within, from the Semarang SI, led by young Semaoen, Sneevliet's
most gifted protege.
Governor General van Limburg Stirum, who took the initiative in
molding a political climate in the Indies, was not an old colonial hand
but a liberal-minded career diplomat conscious of his aristocratic back�
ground. Coming to the Indies in the war years, he saw that "the Indies
cannot always remain a branch of the Netherlands" and that more
autonomy of the Indies would serve the interests of the metropolis.8 In
this respect, he had a strong ally in the Netherlands: the minister for
the colonies, Th. B. Pleijte. In Idenburg's years, Pleijte as the minister
for the colonies had got the right of political assembly approved by the
Dutch Parliament in 1915, though it was not implemented until 1919.9
He also proposed the establishment of the Colonial Council, which
was still under discussion in Parliament when van Limburg Stirum
came to office. Besides, in the Indies, the BO and the CSI were cam�
paigning for popular representation and the defense of the Indies. Van
Limburg Stirum encouraged all these moves and steered the Indies to
more autonomy. In his picture of the more autonomous Indies, the
Volksraad, the name given to the Colonial Council by the Dutch Par�
liament shortly after van Limburg Stirum came to the Indies, occupied
a central place, because it provided the institutional framework not
only for the Dutch residents to participate in the administration of the
Indies but also to co-opt and guide the native political awakening onto
an evolutionary and parliamentary path.10
The establishment of the Volksraad was approved by the Dutch
Parliament in December 1916. It was to be an advisory body without
any power of legislation, interpellation, or parliamentary inquiry. It
had thirty-eight members, one-half to be elected by municipal and
residency councils, and the other half nominated by the governor gen�
eral. Native Volksraad members were limited to fifteen, ten elected and
five appointed by the governor general. Younger, more radical-minded
8D.M.G. Koch, Batig Slot, pp. 18-26.
For the right of political assembly, see Wijziging van Artikel iii van het
Regeeringsreglement," Mededelingen omtrent enkele onderwerpen van algemeene belang,
1920, pp. 16-
24. Article iii ol the Constitutional Regulation of 1854 denied the right of
political associa�
tion and assembly. It was amended with the decentralization law of 1903, which
prescribed
that meetings in connection with the election of Europeans to the local councils
would not be
regarded as political gatherings such as were prohibited under the Constitutional
Regulation.
In 1915 the right of association and assembly was recognized in principle with a
provision
that the cancellation of Article 111 of the Constitutional Regulation of 1854
should not take
place until notified. The right of association and assembly was finally put into
effect on
November 1, 1919, with the royal decree of December 17, 1918.
luFor the establishment of the Volksraad and the central role played by Pleijte,
see Akira
Nagazumi, "Volksraad no Setsuritsu to Indonesia Minzoku Shoseito," Tonan Ajia:
Rekishi
to Bunka 1 (1971), 2 (1972).
The Age in Motion 95
pergerakan leaders mocked the Volksraad as a "puppet show" and a
"comedy."11 Yet it was attractive to the men who controlled the cen�
tral leadership of the BO, the CSI, and the Insulinde because whatever
its shortcomings, it was clearly a step toward self-government and
because it would provide them with an excellent stage on which they
could raise their voices with parliamentary immunity and where the
ears of high-ranking government officials would always be accessible
and press coverage of both Dutch- and native-language newspapers
guaranteed. In the course of 1917, thus, the BO, the CSI, and the
Insulinde all drew up party programs and formally transformed them�
selves into political parties.12
In the campaign for the Volksraad election, the most enthusiastic
was the BO central leadership. By March 1917 the BO central commit�
tee had sponsored a meeting to discuss the coming Volksraad election,
and in late 1917 it entered into cooperation with the NIVB (Nederlandsch-Indische
Vrijzinnigenbond, Netherlands Indies Liberal Leag�
ue), the party of Dutch ethici, to draw up a list of candidates for the
Volksraad election.13 But van Limburg Stirum did not intend to bestow
patronage on the BO alone. If Idenburg had patronized Tjokroaminoto
and the CSI, van Limburg Stirum's pet project was the Volksraad itself.
His worst fear was that only hupatis (regents) and wedanas (district
chiefs) would be elected to the Volksraad, and he was determined to
use his appointive power to make the Volksraad as representative as
possible.14 In January 1918 the Volksraad election was held and ten
native members were elected: Abdoel Moeis (CSI), Dr. Radjiman (BO),
M. Aboekasan Atmodirono (BO), R. Kamil (BO), R. Sastrowidjono
(BO), R.M.T.A. Koesoemo Joedo (Regentenbond), R.A.A. Djajadiningrat (Regentenbond),
R.M.T.A. Koesoemo Oetojo (Regentenbond),
Abdoel Rivai (Sumatra's West Coast), and Waworoentoe (Menado).
Not only did BO members and regents form a majority but also eight
members were government officials. Then, in February, the governor
general appointed five native members: Prince Mangkunegara Prang
Wedana, Tjokroaminoto (CSI), M. Ng. Dwidjosewojo (BO), Tjipto
Mangoenkoesoemo (Insulinde), and M. Tajeb (Aceh). All eventually
accepted the nomination, though Tjokroaminoto met stiff opposition
when he sought the CSI central committee's approval of his acceptance
of the nomination. The Volksraad opened in May 1918 and the first
session was successfully over in July. Both the Europeans and the nanSee, for
instance, De Indische Gids 40 (1918), pp. 215 - 218, 865 - 866.
12For the party programs drawn up and adopted at the congresses of the BO, the
C.S1, and
the Insulinde, see Koloniale Studien 1 - 3 (1917).
13For the BO activities in the Volksraad election, see Nagazumi, l he Dawn of
Indonesian
Nationalism, pp. 118-130.
14Nagazumi, "Volksraad," Tonan Aija 1 (1971).
96 An Age in Motion
tive members acted and spoke in the Volksraad building in a solemn
and authoritative manner reminiscent of the manners in the Tweede
Kamer.15 As far as pergerakan politics are concerned, however, three
points should be noted as regards the native members and their ac�
tivities in the Volksraad. First, Tjipto's appointment as a Volksraad
member, intended by the governor general to refute the attack on the
Volksraad as a "comedy," opened up a new opportunity for him to
move in pergerakan politics. Second, though the CSI was represented
by Tjokroaminoto (chairman) and Abdoel Moeis (vice-chairman),
Tjokroaminoto, if not Moeis, did not and could not throw his full
weight into Volksraad activities. The reason was quite simple. On the
one hand participation of the CSI in the Volksraad was strongly op�
posed not only by Semaoen and other Semarang SI leaders but also by
Sosrokardono, Tjokroaminoto's adjutant and CSI secretary. On the
other hand, Abdoel Moeis, Hasan Djajadiningrat, and other loyalist
CSI leaders, mainly from West Java, unconditionally supported CSI
participation in the Volksraad. With the CSI central leadership as well
as local SI leaders thus evenly divided by the issue of Volksraad par�
ticipation, Tjokroaminoto could not afford to alienate anti-Volksraad
leaders by devoting himself wholly to parliamentary activities.16 And
third, the most active and most heavily represented in the Volksraad
was the BO, with five members and its patron and former president,
Prang Wedana. In and outside the Volksraad, the BO now acted as the
party of loyal government priyayi and appealed to Javanese national�
ism. This was strongly criticized by the Insulinde leadership, especially
Tjipto. In the disputes that took place between Tjipto and Soetatmo
Soeriokoesoemo, a leader of the Committee for Javanese Nationalism
(Comite voor het Javaansche Nationalisme), which was under the pat�
ronage of the BO central leadership and Prang Wedono, the ideological
cleavage between the Indies nationalist Insulinde and the Javanese na�
tionalist BO became increasingly clear.17
In the early days of the Volksraad, therefore, the Volksraad provided
a new arena for the pergerakan and generated many expectations and
hopes among kaum muda despite its institutional weakness and the
attacks made by Semaoen, Sosrokardono, and others. This was espe�
cially so in late 1918 and early 1919 when the governor general, seizing
a chance in the wake of the political crisis in the metropolis, took the
initiative to introduce a major reform of the Volksraad and to push the
15Nagazumi, "Volksraad," Tonary Aija 2 (1972).
16Tjokroaminoto's acceptance of the nomination was barely approved by the CSI
central
committee, with six for, five against, and five abstentions. De Indische Gids 40
(1918), pp.
994-995.
17Takashi Shiraishi, "The Disputes between Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Soetatamo
Soeriokoesoemo: Satria vs. Pandita," Indonesia 32 (Oct. 1981), pp. 93-108.
The Age in Motion 97
Indies to more autonomy and eventual self-government. As a matter of
fact, van Limburg Stirum was not very satisfied with the Volksraad as
it came into being, and he was waiting for a chance to initiate a major
reform of it. This chance came with the Troelstra revolution. When the
news reached the Indies, rumors circulated in Batavia that the Nether�
lands government had been overthrown by socialists, that Queen
Wilhelmina had stepped down from the throne, and that the governor
general would be replaced.18 In this uncertainty, Ch. G. Cramer, a
Volksraad member of the ISDP (Indische Sociaal-Democratische Partij,
Indies Social Democratic Party), formed a parliamentary coalition, the
Radical Concentration, with the BO, the CSI, and the Insulinde on
November 16 to prepare for any drastic political change in the Nether�
lands. By that time the political crisis in the metropolis was almost
over. On the fifteenth, the minister for the colonies, Idenburg, had sent
a cable to the governor general and informed him that "nervousness
considerably allayed, Troelstra declared no intention [to] use vio�
lence."19 Van Limburg Stirum received this cable on the seventeenth,
but he "did not sit still but went quickly forward" to push the Indies to
more autonomy "by a couple of years" in a few weeks.20 On the
eighteenth, the governor general let D. Talma, the government repre�
sentative to the Volksraad, make a declaration (the November declara�
tion) in the Volksraad, announcing the government's intention to
quicken the tempo in guiding the Indies to autonomy and urging closer
cooperation between the Volksraad and the government.21 With this
fait accompli, the governor general committed the government to an
accelerated path to autonomy and informally discussed setting up a
committee to investigate constitutional reforms with J. H. Carpentier
Alting, president of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands Indies.
Toward the end of November, the Radical Concentration finally de�
manded that the government establish a Parliament within three years.
As if responding to this demand, but in fact following the course al�
ready set beforehand, the governor general formally inaugurated the
Carpentier Alting commission for constitutional reforms of the Indies
18S. L. van der Wal, ed., De Volksraad en de Staatkundige Ontwikkeling van
NederlandsIndie (Groningen: J. B. olters, 1964), p. 256.
19Ibid., p. 254.
20Ibid., pp. 259-261. In van der Wal, ed., De Volksraad en de Staatkundige
Ontwikkeling
van Nederlands-Indie, are collected two private letters van Limburg Stirum wrote-
one to
Idenburg, the minister for colonies and of different political creed from his, and
the other to
Pleijte, the former minister for colonies, of the same political creed, and a close
friend of his-
regarding the circumstances and motives leading to the November declaration. Though
these
two letters are often contradictory in content, it seems, his letter to Pleijte is
more reliable on
his motives for the November declaration, judging from the tone of the two letters.
The letter
to Idenburg starts with "Excellentie" and the tone is remote and formal, whereas
the letter to
Pleijte starts with "Amice" and the tone is personal and intimate (pp. 256-261).
21For the government's November declaration, see ibid., pp. 604-605.
98 An Age in Motion
state. At the same time, the governor general banished Sneevliet from
the Indies in early December and soon crushed the Red Guardist action
led by European ISDV members, in order to make sure that this evolu�
tionary plan would not be damaged by revolutionary socialists.22 Now
the prospect for the establishment of a Parliament and an evolutionary
path to self-government was felt to be very real not only by BO mem�
bers but also by the majority of SI and Insulinde members.
The Rise of Semaoen
While Governor General van Limburg Stirum steered the Indies to
more autonomy and guided the pergerakan onto an evolutionary and
parliamentary path, the initiative to move the pergerakan to direct
action and a revolutionary path came from the ISDV, especially from
Sneevliet and Semaoen. Sneevliet, who had been the chairman of the
SDAP-controlled Railway and Tram Workers' Union in the Nether�
lands, came to the Indies in February 1913 at the age of thirty. In the
Indies he first joined the editorial staff of Soerabajaasch Handelsblad
and then moved to Semarang in May to succeed D.M.G. Koch as the
secretary of the Semarang Handelsvereniging (Semarang Chamber of
Commerce). As a dedicated socialist and professional trade union pro�
pagandist, Sneevliet soon took the initiative to establish the ISDV in
May 1914 while becoming an editor of De Volbarding, the organ of
the Semarang-based VSTP.23 In 1914-16, however, the ISDV re�
mained a debating club of Dutch socialists, deeply divided as to the
guiding principles of the party and without any real influence on the
pergerakan. The only major political activity the ISDV central leader�
ship carried out was to support Marco when he was prosecuted on the
charge of press offenses by organizing protest rallies with the Insulinde
and setting up a committee for the freedom of the press in the middle
of 1915.
While the ISDV remained small, politically insignificant, and largely
Dutch, the VSTP underwent a profound transformation in these years
under Sneevliet's influence. The VSTP was one of the oldest trade
unions in the Indies, established in 1908 as the union of European
workers of the NIS and the SS and headquartered in Semarang. When
Sneevliet first got into contact with the VSTP central leadership in the
middle of 1913, the VSTP was still largely European (that is, Dutch
22McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, pp. 34-35.
23For more on Sneevliet, especially on his activities in the Indies in 1913-17, see
McVey,
The Rise of Indonesian Communism, especially chap. 2; and Fritjof Tichelman, Henk
Sneevliet: Een politieke biografie (Amsterdam: Kritiese Biblioteek van Gennep,
1974), pp.
17-30.
The Age in Motion 99
and Indo) and the central leadership was solely in the hands of Euro�
pean trade union propagandists. But in the early 1910s, skilled, literate
native workers such as engine drivers, stationmasters, and administra�
tive personnel steadily increased, and under Sneevliet's influence the
VSTP central leadership decided in late 1913 to accept native members
as equal with European members. Then in early 1914 the VSTP con�
gress decided that at least three out of seven members of the VSTP
central leadership should be natives. These measures proved to be a
turning point for the VSTP. In the war years, the number of skilled
literate native railway workers continuously increased. As they joined
the VSTP, it was rapidly transformed from a European-dominated
trade union to a largely native trade union within a few years.24
Semaoen emerged as one of the first native trade union propagand�
ists against this background.25 Born in 1899 in Mojokerto the son of a
railway worker, Semaoen was not of priyayi birth and yet, growing up
in the Ethical era, enjoyed an elementary Western-style education. He
graduated from a first-class native school and joined the SS as a clerk in
1912 at the age of thirteen. The next year he joined the Surabaya SI
branch and rose to become secretary of the Surabaya SI in 1914. In
early 1915 he met Sneevliet in Surabaya and, impressed by his "sincere
and human attitude" free from the Dutch "colonial mentality," joined
the ISDV and the VSTP. After he met Sneevliet, he learned not only to
read but also to write and speak Dutch, and soon became secretary of
the predominantly European ISDV Surabaya branch as well as a mem�
ber of the VSTP Surabaya branch leadership. According to the recollec�
tion of Marco, who first met Semaoen in the middle of 1915, Semaoen
was very close to Sneevliet and H. W. Dekker, a co-founder of the
ISDV and vice-chairman of the VSTP central committee, and was al�
ready active in organizing and talking at VSTP rallies.26 Then in July
1916 he quit the SS, became a full-time salaried VSTP propagandist,
and moved to Semarang as an editor of Si Tetap, the VSTP Malaylanguage organ.
Shortly thereafter Semaoen became a propagandist
and commissioner of the Semarang SI, and in May 1917 at the age of
eighteen he was elected its chairman, replacing Mohammad Joesoef.
As this brief description of his career suggests, Semaoen was a new
24For the early history of the VSTP, see John Ingleson, "Bound Hand and Foot:
Railway
Workers and the 192.3 Strike in Java," Indonesia 31 (Apr. 1972), pp. 53-62. At the
end of
1913 the VSTP membership was 1,242, of which 673 were European and 569 were
natives.
In January 1915 the membership reached 2,292, of which 1,439 were natives. The
Malaylanguage organ, Si Tetap, started to be published in 1915 with Mohammad
Joesoef, clerk of
the N1S and CSI commissioner, as editor-in-chief.
25The following account of Semaoen is based, unless otherwise noted, on McVey, rhe
Rise
of Indonesian Communism, and Moehkardi, "Umur 14 tahun aim. Dr. Semaun sudah
anggota Sarekat Indonesia [sic]," Intisari, 1972.
2feMarco Kartodikromo, "Korban Pergerakan Rajat: Semaoen," Hidoep, 1924, p. 17.
IOO An Age in Motion
breed of pergerakan leader. First, he was not a journalist-turnedpergerakan leader,
as most of the early SI leaders were, but started his
career as a trade union propagandist who learned Marxism as well as
how to organize unions and to lead strikes from his mentor, Sneevliet,
a professional party activist and trade union propagandist. Second, he
was not only not of priyayi birth but he was also extremely young-
seventeen years younger than Tjokroaminoto and nine years younger
than Marco. In the fast-changing Indies of the 1910s, this meant that
Semaoen came to his adolescence in the midst of the pergerakan, that
the pergerakan was a fact of life to him, and that he had not really
experienced the kind of anger, fear, and anxiety felt by those who had
lived through their teens and early twenties before the rise of the per�
gerakan. Perhaps one most telling example of this is Semaoen's attitude
toward jongkok and sembah. As we have seen, CSI leaders such as
Tjokroaminoto and Goenawan and IP'ers such as Marco hated and
attacked jongkok and sembah as a custom of the Modjopahit era and a
custom of frogs. But when they faced high-ranking Dutch and native
officials, their instinct worked against their will and they had to brace
themselves not to perform jongkok and sembah. But Semaoen seemed
to have felt no such fear. He could simply make fun of it, as we can see
in his novel Hikajat Kadiroen 27 And third, because he was so young,
brilliant, and good-natured, neither Dutch officials nor older per�
gerakan leaders saw him as a real threat. Rather, they saw Sneevliet
behind him and blamed him for whatever they considered disagreeable
about Semaoen. When Rinkes reviewed pergerakan journals in 1917,
he noted a significant improvement in the quality of Sinar Djawa after
Semaoen replaced Mohammad Joesoef as editor-in-chief and deplored
that he was under Sneevliet's "sinister" influence.28 Tjokroaminoto
also regarded Sneevliet as disturbing, but saw Semaoen as a representa�
tive of the younger postwar generation of kaum muda like his protege,
Sosrokardono, and saw his radicalism stemming from his youth and
not from his ideological conviction.
Though his association with Sneevliet was of crucial importance in
his rise as a trade union propagandist and young socialist, Semaoen
was a new type of pergerakan leader in his own right. He expressed a
new idea of what the pergerakan was all about, different from the ideas
that guided the CSI leaders and the IP'ers. We can see this in his debate
with Mohammad Joesoef, chairman of the Semarang SI and leading
figure of the SI movement since its very beginning. The debate took
place at the Semarang SI general meeting convened in March 1917 at
Semoen's request. It was convened to discuss how to support Marco,
27See Semaoen, Hikajat Kadiroen (Semarang: Kantoor PKI, 1920), pp. 1-2.
28Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging: 191J-medio 1923, p.
15.
The Age in Motion IOI
who had been prosecuted for the second time on the charge of press
offenses in February and whether the Semarang SI should join the
committee for freedom of the press established by Sneevliet in 1915. In
this debate, Mohammad Joesoef opposed the Semarang SI joining the
committee. Sinar Djawa, the Semarang SI organ, reports his argument:
Frankly speaking, if the Natives have any objection, they need not shout
with a loud voice; it is enough to send a representative to the Governor
General, for instance. In that way we can indicate our objections without
them being known by thousands of people. But if we shout, thousands of
people will know our objections and this can generate the seeds of
hatred. . . .
Besides, the majority of the SI members don't understand this thing
[freedom of the press], except for those who can read and write. Most of
the SI members do not understand discussions of politics at this level, and
so the Si's pergerakan for press freedom will lose its usefulness.
Semaoen then argued againstJoesoef and in favor of SI participation in
the committee. Sinar Djawa again reports Semaoen's argument:
[Semaoen explained that] wherever there is a pergerakan, tranquillity will
disappear, for the pergerakan exists [precisely] because tranquillity disap�
pears. Move and calm are two things in direct conflict. If the government
isn't accustomed to take any [criticism from] the pergerakan, that shows
its weakness; thus articles 66a and b are applied, and the pergerakan is
oppressed, because "tranquillity" or "standstill of movement" is seen as
good, [whereas] we who want to advance will certainly move and cannot
be calm. If we are compelled to be calm, [it means] we are certainly
obstructed in our advancement. In our pergerakan [we] move, [we] shout
and raise our voices, but [we] need not spill blood. But in our advancing
we must persuade and inform the majority of the people, so that our
advancing can be strong. Therefore the propagandist [that is, Semaoen]
does not agree that we should tell our objections only to the Governor
General, for by so doing we cannot get strength, and wherever strength is
weak, there no fruits can be obtained.
Whether or not [we] sow the seeds of hatred by means of newspapers
depends wholly on one's point of view. The Natives who read Marco's
articles don't feel that they are being sown with the seeds of hatred, so
why does the government suspect that they are so being sown? . . .
The viewpoint [that counts] in these matters is that of those with
power, and since we Natives are not strong our views will certainly not be
taken seriously. So we must seek power by means of the pergerakan
(achti [actie?] en beweging [movement]). . . . To make sure that the nega�
tive view does not damage or obstruct the advancement of the Natives, let
article 66a and b disappear and give freedom to those Natives who want
to raise their voices and to write.
As regards sowing the seeds of hatred, this cannot happen if there is no
102 An Age in Motion
soil on which to plant them or which can make them bud and grow. If the
Natives talk about tax regulations, about the [different] punishments for
Natives and the Dutch, and so on, and conclude that the government is
not just, is such talk to be judged as sowing the seeds of hatred? Who is it
who creates discrimination and arouses hatred? Surely not those who
merely inform people about them and who write [about them].
If the SI moves, this is then described as hating the government. But
such is only the view of the other side. We demand no more and no less
than not to be obstructed in our advancement, and if the government
gives us the freedom to raise our voices and to write, there will certainly
be no S.I. members who hate the government.
That SI members won't easily understand [the issue] is no reason to
oppose our demand for the abolition of articles 66a and b, for those who
do not understand will do so if we move and make the demand. On the
other hand, if we keep silent, SI members will never understand at all. We
need not wait for everyone to understand-we will make them under�
stand by our deeds.29
Here we can clearly see the basic difference between Semaoen's idea
of the pergerakan and that of Mohammad Joesoef, an old guard SI
leader, though Joesoef was also a member of the ISDV. As was
Tjokroaminoto's, Joesoef's basic idea was begging, not with loud voice
but with soft voice, so that the government should not be offended and
the people not get excited. It was therefore of no use for the SI to move,
because, as he saw it, the government was ready to listen to native
grievances if only the SI followed due manners in putting them for�
ward. In contrast, Semaoen's idea was straightforward, strong, and
revolutionary. There are basically three ingredients in the thrust of his
argument. First, his discussion of the native and the government's
views clearly shows that he built his idea on the basis laid by IP'ers, the
idea of "we" against the government, the world of inner excellence
against the world of outward excellence, as articulated in Soewardi's
open letter and Marco's comments. "Such is only the view of the other
side" is a clear statement of this. Second and more important, Semaoen
was perhaps more revolutionary than IP'ers. Though Marco said "the
natives are as human as the Dutch" and thus attacked the Dutch Jav�
anese colonial order, he never really attacked the ideal principle of
Javanese social order, tata tentrem (order and tranquillity). Rather, in
Marco's and Soewardi's idea, tata tentrem was differentiated from the
actual colonial rust en orde (tranquillity and order) and was made the
hierarchical principle of the world of inner excellence, excellence in the
heart and in the bones and marrow. But now Semaoen set the per�
gerakan against katentreman (tranquillity), which signified both Dutch
rust (tranquillity) and Javanese tentrem (tranquillity), and said in effect
-9Sinar Djawa, 16 Mar. 1917, reprinted in Marco, "Korban Pergerakan Rajat:
Semaoen,"
Hidoep, 19Z4, pp. 17-20.
The Age in Motion 103
that the pergerakan leads to native progress and katentreman to stag�
nation. Third, therefore, what mattered to Semaoen was not exemplary
action as Marco did, but strength. While Tjokroaminoto said "order
and freedom are identical," Semaoen said strength/power and per�
gerakan were identical. It was this idea of power formation that guided
Semaoen in leading the pergerakan.
In his debate with Mohammad Joesoef, Semaoen's position was sup�
ported both by the majority of the Semarang SI executive members and
by ordinary members. The general meeting approved the Semarang Si's
participation in the committee for freedom of the press and appointed
Semaoen as its representative. Two months later the Semarang SI again
convened the general meeting, at which Semaoen was elected its chair�
man.30
Semaoen campaigned against the native militia and the defense of
the Indies and also against SI participation in the Volksraad. Under his
leadership, the Semarang SI expanded spectacularly, from seventeen
hundred in 1916 to twenty thousand in 1917.31 In a time of rapid
inflation, workers were restless because their wages declined in abso�
lute value. In late 1917 and early 1918 Semaoen successfully led a
series of strikes in the city of Semarang. The first strike was launched
by workers in a furniture factory, where about three hundred workers
were employed. The success of this strike furnished an example of how
to organize unions and strikes. Soon two more work stoppages were
called among printers and led by the Semarang SI Labor Group
(Vakgroep SI). Both of the strikes also ended successfully. Then strikes
were launched by the Singer Sewing Machine Company workers, auto�
repair workshop workers, and workers of steamship and perahu
(prow) transportation. Strikes in Batavia, Surabaya, Bandung, and
elseswhere followed, and workers who struck looked to the Semarang
SI for guidance.32 Now trade union movement and strikes came to
be seen as an important form of the pergerakan. The age of strikes
dawned in the Indies and the Semarang SI under Semaoen emerged as a
center of the pergerakan.
Tjokroaminoto's Radicalization
In 1917-18 the rise of Semaoen and the Semarang SI increasingly
annoyed Tjokroaminoto. By 1917 Semaoen's campaign against the
defense of the Indies and SI participation in the Volksraad, as well as
30Marco, "Korban Pergerakan Rajat: Semaoen," Hidoep, 192.4, PP- 2.0-11.
31McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, p. Z3.
32Semaoen, "An Early Account of the Indonesian Movement," translated and commented
on by Ruth T. McVey, Indonesia 1 (Apr. 1966), p. 61. See also Kwantes, De
Ontwikkeling
van de Nationalistische Bewegtng: 1917-medio 192.3, p. 118.
104 An Age in Motion
his biting criticism of the CSI leadership, had angered Tjokroaminoto.
But Semaoen was not Marco and he had his own organizational base.
Besides, his campaign against the native militia and his mocking of the
Volksraad as a "comedy" was popular among kaum muda, not only
because his voice was militant but also because they knew that once the
native militia was introduced they would be the first affected.
Tjokroaminoto therefore changed the tone of his speech, though not
the content. While he proclaimed at the 1916 Bandung CSI congress
that "the CSI will work for uplifting the native people under and with
the Netherlands Indies government,"33 at the 1917 Batavia CSI con�
gress he spoke in a more militant tone:
What we want is: sama rasa [solidarity], irrespective of religious differ�
ences. The CSI wants uplifting, equality of all races in the Indies so as to
reach [the stage of] self-government. The CSI is opposed to capitalism.
The CSI will not tolerate the domination of one people over another. The
CSI will cooperate with anyone who is willing to work in this direction.
The CSI wants education, so that people will have a voice and can con�
tribute to the welfare of the Indies. The self-government that must one
day come to the Indies must involve the same [level of] participation as
[in] the self-governing countries of Europe. There must be no comedies.
The orientation of the States-General in the Netherlands is wholly in
accord with the spirit of the SI. Let us no longer form a possession of the
Netherlands, but a Netherlands people [Applause] ... If this is not pos�
sible this year or next, then let it be in ten or twenty years. But it must
come, we must demand it. [Applause] But at the same time, it is true that
if we were to obtain it right now, we would be too ignorant to receive it
[properly]. Therefore it must come gradually, but not too gradually and
not too slowly.34
In the content of this speech, Tjokroaminoto remained a satria under
the protection of the government; but the mild content was tortured by
the militant tone. Sama rasa (solidarity), to oppose capitalism, not to
tolerate the domination of one people over another, no comedies-all
such militant-sounding words he borrowed from IP'er Marco and
ISDV'er Semaoen. His militant tone was greeted by the audience with
applause and upset Dr. Hazeu, adviser for native affairs.35 Yet when
Semaoen went on stage at the rally, his speech was greeted by the
audience with more lasting applause.36
33Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging: 1917-medio 1923, p.
35.
34"Het S.I. Congres," De Indische Gids 40 (1918), pp. 215-218.
3iKwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging: 1917-medio 1923, pp.
35-38. Hazeu replaced Rinkes as adviser for native affairs in 1916.
36"Het S.I. Congres," De Indische Gids 40 (1918), p. 218. For more on the 1917 CSI
congress, see Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging: 1917-medio
I923> PP- 34-39- Though the 1917 SI congress is sometimes seen as a turning point
in the
radicalization of the SI movement, what changed was the tone: the CSI declaration
of
The Age in Motion 105
After the Batavia CSI congress, Semaoen further threatened Tjokroaminoto's
supremacy by successfully leading a series of strikes, and
soon he was joined by Marco in February 1918, who after his release
from prison in Weltevreden became an editor of Sinar Djawa (which
was soon renamed Sinar Hindia) and commissioner of the Semarang
SI.37 Now younger, more radical-minded pergerakan activists looked
to Semarang and subscribed to Sinar Djawa/Sinar Hindia. In many
places local Semaoens and local Marcos became active and in several
places took over local SI leaderships. In Demak, Soehario expanded the
PKBT (Perkoempoelan Kaoem Boeroeh dan Tani, Peasants' and Work�
ers' Union) by attacking head tax, village schools, ronda obligations,
and the like, and eventually took over the Demak SI leadership.38 In
Kudus, the PKBT branch formed the center of opposition to the proTjokroaminoto
local SI dominated by kyai (Islamic scholars) and pious
Muslim traders.39 And in Kendal, Mohammad Kasan, a Semarang SI
leader, took over the local SI leadership.40
Now it became increasingly clear that militant tone alone could no
longer guarantee Tjokroaminoto's dominance over the CSI. He then
tried to ride a new spirit of democracy and socialism while mobilizing
dormant social forces. The first action he took was to encourage the
Djawa Dipa movement. It was started by two Surabaya SI leaders,
Tirtodanoedjo and Tjokrosoedarmo, with the aim of abolishing high
Javanese (kromo), making low Javanese (ngoko) standard Javanese,
and replacing priyayi titles with Djawa Dipa titles-"Wiro" for men,
"Woro" for married women, and "Roro" for unmarried girls.41 The
principles was adopted not in response to the rise of the Semarang SI but in
response to the
establishment of the Volksraad, and the composition of the CSI central committee
remained
largely the same as in 1916. The CSI central leadership elected at the 1917
congress was
composed of: chairman, Tjokroaminoto; vice-chairman, Abdoel Moeis; secretary,
Sosrokardono; treasurer, Ardiwinata; commissioners, Mohammad Joesoef, Djojosoediro,
Hasan Djajadiningrat, Soerjodipoetro, Soerjopranoto, Tjokrosoedarmo, Said Hasan bin
Semit, Wignjadisastra, Soekirno, Mohammad Samin, and Hadji Mohammad Arip; advisers,
K. H.
Dahlan, H. Hisamzaijnie, Hadji Ahmad Sjadzili. The major changes were the rise of
Sosrokardono to secretary, appointment of Wignjadisastra of the Bandung SI as a
commis�
sioner, and the replacement of Goenawan by Soekirno as the Batavia SI chairman.
37Bureau van den Hoofdambtenaar voor de Volkslectuur, "Persoverzicht: Januari-medio
Maart 1918," 30 Mar. 1918, Mr. 264X/18.
38Sartono, Sarekat Islam Lokal, pp. 169-170. The PKBT was established at the 1SDV
initiative in 1917 in Surabaya as the Porojitno, an association of peasants and
unskilled
laborers. The Porojitno under Soekirno carried out propaganda activities in private
estate
areas in Surabaya and led peasants to demand increases in rents for land leased by
sugar
plantations. Koloniaal Verslag, 1918, p. 4. It was reorganized into the PKBT in
January 1918
by Soehario. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, p. 42..
<9For the PKBT in Kudus, see Resident van Semarang (Kern) aan GG, 28 Dec. 1918, Mr.
25x/r9, Vb. 3 June 1919, No. 3; Sartono, Sarekat Islam Lokal, pp. 155-166, 178-189.
4(,De Hulpofficier der administrative Politie te Kendal aan Procureur Generaal, 20
Oct.
1919, Mr. 875X/19, Vb. 30 Dec. 1921, No. Z14.
41For the Djawa Dipa movement, see Anderson, "Sembah-Sumpah: The Politics of Lan�
guage and Javanese Culture," pp. 23-27; P. J. Zurcher, Jr., "Djawa Dipo," De
Indische Gids
io6 An Age in Motion
Djawa Dipa proponents did not necessarily deny the use of high Jav�
anese to express sincerely felt respect, but denounced its use to officials.
In this sense, it was a peculiarly Javanese expression of democracy and
as such gradually gained popularity among young government priyayi
and orang particulier.42 At first Tjokroaminoto was not very enthusi�
astic about Djawa Dipa and preferred to use Malay. But as the move�
ment gradually spread in 1918 and came to be seen as a militant
expression of democratic spirit, he started to champion the cause, stat�
ing that it was a primary means to remedy the "slavish spirit" of the
Javanese and to prepare them for self-government and progress.43
Second, as in the early days of the SI, he once again tried to mobilize
support by appealing to Islam, though this time not as a symbol of
native solidarity but to mobilize kaum putihan (straitlaced and ortho�
dox Muslims), especially Arab and pious native Muslim traders. A
good opportunity for this came in early January 1918 when Martodharsono published
an article by Djojodikoro titled "Pertjakapan
antara Marto dan Djojo [Conversation between Martodharsono and
Djojodikoro]" in Djawi Hiswara. In it Djojodikoro wrote: "Highness
the Prophet [Goesti Kandjeng Nabi Rasoel] drank A.V.H. gin, drank
opium, sometimes also liked to smoke opium."44 The article gave
Tjokroaminoto an excellent chance to do three things: demonstrate
that the government did not care about Islam; champion the cause of
Islam, mobilize Arab and pious Muslim traders, raise money, and re�
vive dormant Sis under his leadership in the name of the defense of
Islam; and attack his old Surakartan enemies, Martodharsono as well
as Samanhoedi and Sosrokoernio behind him.45 In late January
Tjokroaminoto and Hasan bin Semit, a leader of Surabaya A1 Irsjad
and a CSI commissioner, convened a huge SI rally in Surabaya to
discuss the "Djawi Hiswara affair," while in Oetoesan Hindia Abikoesno
Tjokrosoejoso, a younger brother of Tjokroaminoto and secre�
tary of the Surabaya SI, called for the defense of Islam and demanded
that the sunan and the Indies government punish Martodharsono and
42 (1920), pp. 691-695; Pawitrohadinoto, "De Djowodipo-Beweging," De Indische Gids
41 (1919), pp. 220-223.
42Mededeling der Regeering omtrent enkele Onderwerpen van Algemeen Belang (1919),
p. 7.
43Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging: 1917-medio 1923, pp.
113-114, 216-217.
44Djojodikoro, "Pertjakapan antara Marto dan Djojo," Djawi Hiswara 11 (Jan. 1918).
The sentence was based on Suluk Gatoloco and was meant to elucidate Martodharsono's
teaching of ngelmu kasampurnan (science of perfection). For the Suluk Gatoloco, see
Bene�
dict Anderson, trans. and intro., "The Suluk Gatoloco," Indonesia 32 (Oct. 1981),
pp. 109-
150; 33 (Apr. 1982), pp. 31-88.
45De Regeenngscommissaris voor Inlandsche en Arabische Zaken (B.J.O. Schrieke) aan
G.
G., 16 Feb. 1918, Mr. 70X/18. See also Proces-Verbaal (Tjokroaminoto), Mr. 184X/21.
The Age in Motion 107
Djojodikoro. Then in early February, the TKNM committee (Tentera
Kandjeng Nabi Mohammad, Lord Prophet Mohammad's Army) was
established in Surabaya "to defend the honor of Islam, the Prophet,
and Muslims." Tjokroaminoto became chairman, Sosrokardono secre�
tary, while Sech Roebaja bin Ambarak bin Thalib, a Surabaya A1 Irsjad
leader, became treasurer.46 The point of the TKNM lay in two words:
tentara (army), which signified militancy, and Mohammad, the symbol
of devout Muslims' unity. But now this army of kaum putihan was
directed for the first time in pergerakan politics against kaum abangan
(nominal Javanized Muslims). The TKNM's militant call for the de�
fense of Islam proved highly successful. Its inaugural rally in Surabaya
on February 6 alone raised more than three thousand guilders. Protest
rallies convened simultaneously on February 24 in forty-two places all
over Java and in some parts of Sumatra were attended by more than
150,000 and raised more than ten thousand guilders. Subcommittees
of the TKNM were established all over Java except Semarang and
Yogyakarta, and long-dormant local Sis were revived under the leader�
ship of TKNM subcommittees.47
Third, while riding the spirit of democracy by championing the cause
of the Djawa Dipa and mobilizing the support of Arab and native
Muslim traders by the TKNM, Tjokroaminoto also tried to ride the
tide of the trade union movement and to take over its leadership from
the Semarang SI. Before the 1918 Surabaya CSI congress, Sosrokar�
dono and Alimin, Tjokroaminoto's protege and vice-chairman of the
Batavia SI, had taken over the central leadership of the PPPB (Perserikatan Pegawai
Pegadaian Boemipoetra, Native Pawnshop Work�
ers' Union). At the congress, then, assisted by Hadji Agoes Salim, who
had learned trade unionism from Dutch SDAP members, Tjokroami�
noto formally adopted the trade union movement as a major field of
CSI activities. Now he called for the "economic struggle" and the
organization of peasants and workers, attacked capitalism as well as its
protector, the government, and pledged support for workers' strikes to
improve the native lot.48
The CSI congress held in late September-early October 1918 thus
marked a major shift in CSI activities. This did not mean that the CSI
46De Regeeringcommissaris voor Inlandsche en Arabische Zaken aan GG, 14 Feb. 1918,
Mr. 70X/18. Tjokroaminoto later explained to the procureur generaal that he
launched the
anti-Djawi Hiswara campaign in the name of the TKNM, because the SI could no longer
arouse much interest among the people, expecially among Arabs. Mr. 184X/21.
47De Regeeringcommissaris voor Inlandsche en Arabische Zaken aan GG, 14 Feb. 1918,
Mr. 70X/18. De Regeeringscommissaris voor Inlandsche en Arabische Zaken (Hazeu) aan
GG, 5 Mar. 1918, Mr. 90X/18.
48For more on the 1918 Surabaya CSI congress, see Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de
Nationalistische Bewegirtg: 1917-medio 1923, pp. 104-12.0. See also Proces Verbaal
(Tjokroaminoto), Mr. 184X/21.
108 An Age in Motion
moved onto the revolutionary path. The "economic struggle" did not
necessarily mean class struggle and an expectation for self-government
on the evolutionary and parliamentary path was still very strongly
voiced by Tjokroaminoto. But now at the congress, the major theme of
speeches became "power formation." As Hazeu noted in his letter to
the governor general, "Now the period has gone when men exclusively
concerned themselves with formulating wishes and grievances, which
were then submitted to the Government or the local authorities in
due and respectable manners. Growing opposition made itself felt
against this-begging and beseeching-especially where men under�
stood that they could come out to demand their rights and could form
power by the strength of good organization against the `capitalist so�
ciety.' "49
At the congress, Semaoen and Darsono were appointed, respectively,
commissioner and propagandist of the CSI. This was seen as a major
victory by the ISDV. In Tjokroaminoto's view, however, the rise of the
ISDV'ers in the CSI was more generational in its significance than
ideological. In his view, proteges such as Sosrokardono and Alimin
were no less ISDV'ers than Semaoen and Darsono, because Sosrokar�
dono was deeply interested in learning socialism and Alimin was in fact
a member of the ISDV. And socialism was in any case in vogue. More
important was the fact that they were much younger than Tjokroami�
noto-Sosrokardono was born in 1893, Alimin in 1889, Semaoen in
1899, and Darsono in 1897, while Tjokroaminoto was born in 1882-
and as such they represented the younger generation of kaum muda,
who lived through their teens and early twenties in the age of the
pergerakan. In light of the general decline of native living standards, it
was natural for these younger leaders to become radical. What was
important was to steer them under his leadership. Though Semaoen's
rise and biting criticism of the CSI leadership was disturbing because of
his organizational base, Tjokroaminoto was confident of keeping him
in his hands. And in fact when Semaoen and Darsono joined the CSI
central leadership, they promised him that they would not attack the
CSI leadership openly before a matter was discussed first among the
central committee members.50
49Ibid., pp. hi-112.
50Ibid., p. 118. Th central leadership of the CSI elected at the 1918 congress was
composed
of Tjokroaminoto, chairman; Abdoel Moeis, vice-chairman; Sosrokardono, secretary;
Brotosoehardjo, deputy secretary; Tjokroaminoto, deputy treasurer; Mohammad
Joesoef, Djojosoediro, Hasan Djajadiningrat, Soerjopranoto, Tjokrosoedarmo,
Semaoen, Wignjadisastro, Mohammad Samin, Soekirno, Hadji Mohammad Arip, and Prawoto
Soedibio,
commissioners; K. H. Dahlan and H. Ahmad Sjadzili, advisers. For the 1918 CSI
congress,
see also "Derde Nationaal Congres der Centraal Sarekat Islam," De Indische Gids
41(1919),
pp. 223-225. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, pp. 37-38.
The Age in Motion 109
The Age of Strikes and the Rise of uthe Strike King"
In late 1918 and 1919 the "economic struggle"-the organization of
workers into trade unions and the launching of strikes-proved suc�
cessful. In those days, native workers were becoming increasingly rest�
less because inflation persisted and Dutch business made huge profits
while the worker's wages remained fixed. The government position
toward the trade union movement and workers' strikes also was favor�
able. With the November declaration the government had just commit�
ted itself to an accelerated path to self-government. In this context, the
government saw "nothing to be denounced in the economic struggle-
which is in any case inevitable in the long run-for the improvement of
social prosperity and [increased] people's influence on the municipal,
rural, and state administration." On the contrary, "if a people is blind
to their lack of political rights, acquiesces in their economic backward�
ness, and lacks the energy to uplift themselves from backwardness,
they will never develop themselves either quickly or regularly, and will
become prey to their inner discord. [Therefore] economic struggle will,
if carried out well, stimulate political development." The government
position was therefore basically that of "benevolent neutrality," con�
fining its role to maintaining order and providing arbitration only if
requested by both parties in labor conflicts.51
Against this favorable background, many strikes were launched suc�
cessfully and trade unions emerged. Unions that had existed for some
time, such as the VSTP, the PGHB (Perserikatan Goeroe Hindia Belanda, Netherlands
Indies Teachers' Union), and the PPPB, became active.
Many new unions were established under the leadership of pergerakan
leaders: the VIPBOW (Vereeniging Inlandsch Personeel Burgerlijke
Openbare Werken, Union of Native Public Works Employees), the PFB
(Personeel Fabriek Bond, Sugar Factory Workers' Union), the HAB
(Havenarbeidersbond, Dock Workers' Union), the Typografenbond
(Printers' Union, which was also called Perserikatan Boeroeh Tjitak,
the PBT), the SPPH (Sarekat Pegawai Pelikan Hindia, Indies Miners'
and Oil Workers' Union), the Chauffeursbond (Chauffers' Union), the
Koetsiersbond (Coachmen's Union), the Sarekat Postel (Postal and
Telegraph Workers' Union), the PPDH (Perserikatan Pegawai Dinas
Hutan, Forestry Service Officials' Union).52 Many of these unions
came under the control of Semarang SI leaders-most notably the
VSTP, the Typografenbond, the PPDH, the SPPH, and the HAB. SurslMededeeling der
Regeering omtrent enkele Onderwerpen van Algemeen Belang, 1919,
p. 3.
52Semaoen, "An Early Account of the Independence Movement," pp. 71-72. See also
Blumberger, De Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 130-132.
no An Age in Motion
abaya SI leaders controlled the PPPB and the Sarekat Postel. Others
were largely led by independent trade union propagandists. Yet of all
the trade unions the most important and largest to emerge in this
period was undoubtedly Soerjopranoto's PFB, which boosted the Yogyakarta SI as a
center of the pergerakan in 1919.
The establishment of the PFB was formally announced shortly after
the 1918 CSI congress by Soerjopranoto, CSI commissioner and chair�
man of the Yogyakarta SI, in the name of "the commandant of the
Arbeidsleger-Adhi Dharma."53 R. M. Soerjopranoto, born in 1871,
son of Pangeran Soerjaningrat of the Pakualam house, was the elder
brother of Soewardi Soerjaningrat. He graduated from the OSVIA of
Magelang and the Agricultural School of Buitenzorg and joined the
Agricultural Information and Extension Service in Wonosobo in 1914.
He led the Wonosobe SI and was appointed a CSI commissioner in
1914. In 1916, however, he quit the service and returned to Yogyakar�
ta, where he first established a peasant cooperative, Mardi Kiswa, and
tried to organize peasants and bekel.54 This attempt, however, proved
unsuccessful. He then became active in the Yogyakarta BO. This was
not surprising, because the Yogyakarta BO was dominated by Pakualaman aristocrats
and priyayi such as R. M. Pandji Gondoatmodjo, vicechairman of the BO central
committee, and Dwidjosewojo, a commis�
sioner and because he himself was a Javanese nationalist like his cousin
Soetatmo Soeriokoesoemo. In Yogyakarta, Western-educated Pakualaman aristocrats
were associated with the Adhi Dharma, an association
of Pakualaman princes. Being a Pakualaman aristocrat himself, Soer�
jopranoto became its leading figure and successfully transformed it
from a club of Pakualaman aristocrats into a patronage network of
Pakualaman aristocrats and priyayi, extending not only to the Pakuala�
man but also to the Kasultanan and beyond. The purpose of the Adhi
Dharma, as stated in the statutes Soerjopranoto drew up and submitted
to the government, sounded lofty but vague: "to promote harmonious,
spiritual, moral, and intellectual progress" and "to work for a higher
spiritual life." But its programs and organizational principle unam�
biguously revealed its nature. As the statutes said, it was organized on
the "hierarchical" principle, with Soerjopranoto not as chairman or
president but as commandant. And its programs covered financial help
to invalids, credit giving to the needy, promotion of commerce, and
above all the establishment of Adhi Dharma native schools. In August
1918, in view of the labor unrest that took place in the Padokan sugar
53Wd. Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken (R. A. Kern) aan GG, 29 Sept. 1920, Mr.
1248X/20.
54For Soerjopranoto's early career, see Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de
Nationalistische
Beweging: 1917-medio 1923, pp. 227-228; Tamar Djaja, Pusaka Indonesia: Riwajat
Hidup Orang Orang Besar Tanah Air (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1966), pp. 680-686.
The Age in Motion hi
factory in Yogyakarta, Soerjopranoto established the Arbeidsleger (La�
bor Army), which was also called Prawira Pandojo ing Joedo, as a
branch of the Adhi Dharma in order to help laid-off workers look for
new jobs and to help them financially in the meantime.55
The PFB grew out of the Arbeidsleger. Its whole point lay, like the
TKNM, in its militant name, in which Arbeid signified "labor" and
leger "army." This was already the age of strikes, and sugar factory
workers were restless because of their declining wages in real-value
terms. Soerjopranoto and his Labor Army rode their discontent. Soer�
jopranoto announced the establishment of the PFB in November 1918.
In the first circular he wrote:
Now is the age of democracy, the age of popular government. No [longer
may] the king rule the people as he pleases, but the people themselves
must have a say, must share in making the laws, and must no longer
merely be ruled. But we the people are ready to abide by laws which we
recognize as valid. All workers must possess freedom and equality [before
the law], and they must have the right to have a say in all measures that
the capitalists take in their regard. After all, we know very well that
capitalism would collapse if there were no workers. We also know very
well that capital is nothing but the accumulated sighs and moans of the
workers.
If all this is so, why do these capitalist gentlemen act according to their
own sweet will and do not consult their workers? At the slightest excuse,
they curse them out; at the drop of a hat, they beat them and dismiss
them. But can capital exist without us? Do they not know that workers
too are human beings, who too must eat, and that mankind must advance
together? Even a machine cannot work well if it is insufficiently lubri�
cated.56
Then in February 1919 the first central committee was formally
constituted with Soerjopranoto as chairman, Soemodihardjo as secre�
tary, and Soemoharjono as treasurer. Consuls were appointed to lead
the PFB branches and to make propaganda for the PFB. The PFB
consuls concentrated their propaganda efforts in organizing skilled
workers, surveyors, engineers, clerks, and bookkeepers employed on a
regular basis, rather than a mass of agricultural laborers employed on a
daily basis. In the first several months the PFB expanded slowly. In
March 1919 PFB membership was 750 and largely confined to the
Yogyakarta region. But in the sugarcane harvesting and milling season
of 1919, the PFB expanded rapidly all over the sugar plantation areas
ofJava. Demanding wage increases, equality between European and na55For the Adhi
Dharma, see Wd. Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken aan GG, 29 Sep. 1920,
Mr. 1248X/20.
56Mr. 1248X/20.
112 An Age in Motion
tive workers, improvement in working conditions, the eight-hour work�
day, one paid day off a week, and extra pay for extra work, workers
struck in many sugar factories at their own initiative. Once workers of
a sugar factory decided to launch a strike, they made contact with the
PFB central leadership and asked it to send a propagandist to lead the
strike. The PFB central committee then sent a consul who acted as a
representative of striking workers and set up a PFB branch. Thanks to
the government's benevolent neutrality, many strikes ended success�
fully. Encouraged, PFB branches sometimes demanded more of facto�
ries and again successfully organized strikes. In this growing and
largely successful wave of strikes, the PFB expanded rapidly. In June
the membership surpassed a thousand and the central committee start�
ed to publish its organ, Boeroeh Bergerak (Workers in motion), under
the editorship of Soerjopranoto, Soemodihardjo, and Fladisoebroto.
By the end of 1919 the PFB became the largest and most militant trade
union in the Indies with ninety branches and ten thousand members
and candidate members all over Java.57
The enormous expansion of the PFB boosted Soerjopranoto as a
leading trade union propagandist and the Yogyakarta SI as a new cen�
ter of the pergerakan. As we have seen, the SI was never strong in
Yogyakarta in its early years and was only allowed to maintain its
existence under the control of the Moehammadijah leadership. Soer�
jopranoto took over the leadership of this stagnant Yogyakarta SI in
1918 with the Adhi Dharma as his power base. This, however, did not
mean that the Yogyakarta SI broke with the Moehammadijah. In fact,
among the Moehammadijah leaders, younger, more militant muballighin (Muslim
propagandists) emerged with Hadji Fachrodin, secre�
tary of the Moehammadijah central committee and leading figure of
the Moehammadijah tabligh (Islamic propaganda) branch, as their
leader. As one of K. H. Dahlan's first disciples and himself the son of a
sultan's religious official, Fachrodin enjoyed Dahlan's complete trust
and was indeed absolutely loyal to him. Bom in 1889 and living
through his early twenties in the age of the pergerakan, however, he
was much more concerned with social and political questions than
Dahlan and learned journalism from Marco as a member of the IJB and
a regular contributor to Doenia Bergerak.58 When Soerjopranoto took
over the leadership of the Yogyakarta SI, Fachrodin joined him and the
Yogyakarta SI was placed under Soerjopranoto as chairman, with his
organizational base in the Arbeidsleger-Adhi Dharma and the PFB, and
Fachrodin, vice-chairman, with his base in the Moehammadijah, espe�
cially its tabligh branch.
57Ibid.
58For more on Fachrodin, see Alfian, "Islamic Modernism in Indonesia," pp. 325-329.
For Fachrodin's relations with Marco, see Tamar Djaja, Pusaka Indonesia, pp. 318-
319.
The Age in Motion 113
From late 1918 on, the SI movement revived with the trade union
movement as its vanguard. The "economic struggle" adopted at the
1918 CSI congress almost guaranteed Tjokroaminoto's supreme posi�
tion in the CSI. Though many unions were under Semarang SI leaders'
control, the only major one was the VSTP. Soerjopranoto was emerg�
ing as "strike king" with his PFB. But he did not openly challenge
Tjokroaminoto. Tjokroaminoto's proteges, Sosrokardono and Alimin,
controlled yet another large union, the PPPB, and at the PPPB congress
held in Bandung in May 1919 they took the initiative in establishing
the PPKB (Persatoean Perserikatan Kaoem Boeroeh, Concentration of
Trade Unions, or Vakcentrale).59
In the middle of 1919, however, two disastrous incidents occurred
that eventually led to the demise of Tjokroaminoto's organizational
base and to the collapse of the SI movement. The first was the Toli-Toli
incident in Central Sulawesi, which took place in June. In May Abdoel
Moeis made a propaganda tour for the CSI in this area. His visit unex�
pectedly sparked enthusiasm for the pergerakan and in some places
people began to refuse to perform corvee. A month after his propa�
ganda, the Dutch controller was killed when he visited the center of un�
rest to enforce corvee obligations. Proceedings were instituted against
Moeis for having instigated the assassination by his visit. Moeis now
temporarily stopped all his activities and his credentials as a moderate,
reasonable CSI leader were disgraced in the eyes of Dutch ethici.60
In July a more disastrous incident took place in West Java. In Garut,
Hadji Hasan and his family who resisted forced rice delivery, were shot
and killed by armed police led by the assistant resident. Investigating
the shooting, the local authorities "unearthed" the existence of a secret
SI organization, SI Bagian Kedoea (Second Branch) or Afdeeling B (B
Branch), with "subversive" purposes. In a symbolic way, the Afdeeling
B affair exposed the internal contradiction of Ethical thinking. Its basic
idea was that the natives could be guided onto the path of progress
under Dutch tutelage. It was this idea that allowed scholar-bureaucrats
like Hazeu and Rinkes to play such an important role as advisers for
native affairs and that opened up room for those Western-educated like
Tjokroaminoto to "move" as their intermediaries. But the Afdeeling B
affair showed that not only the Western-educated but also the unedu�
cated mass of natives had started to "move" in directions they them�
selves chose. Dutch ethici now realized that they had opened up a
Pandora's box of native society. The Afdeeling B affair thus horrified
the Ethical-minded government officials. Dismayed, Hazeu, a leading
S9For the PPPB congress held in Bandung, see "De Stand der Inlandsche Beweging," De
Indische Gids 41 (1919), pp. 102.3-102.8.
60McVey, The Rise ofIndonesian Communism, p. 40. See also Mededeelingen der Regeer�
ing omtrent enkele Onderwerpen van Algemeene Belang, 1920, pp. 28-31.
An Age in Motion ii4
ethicus, resigned as adviser for native affairs and returned to Holland
to teach at Leiden University. The whole government apparatus was
geared to investigate the existence of the SI Afdeeling B all over Java.
The governor general announced that "where the movement exceeds
the bounds it will bite iron."61 The armed police (gewapende politie)
was reorganized into the more mobile armed field police (veldpolitie).
The Garut SI decided to dissolve itself and was placed under the direct
command of the CSI. Yet massive arrests followed and many local Sis
in West Java collapsed. Sosrokardono was arrested in September 1919
and Tjokroaminoto himself expected his arrest and the banning of the
CSI. Though Tjokroaminoto was not arrested immediately, he had lost
the trust and favor of Dutch ethici. They now saw him as "dishonest,
insincere, untrustworthy, weak, and indecisive." Worse still, frightened
by the government suppression of local Sis and massive arrests, Arab
and pious native Muslim traders as well as loyalist SI leaders deserted
the SI en masse.62
At the 1919 Surabaya CSI congress, which was held in late October
and early November, the success and excitement of the "economic
struggle," the rise of the Semarang and the Yogyakarta SI as new
centers, the Toli-Toli incident, the Afdeeling B affair, the collapse of
Tjokroaminoto's power base, the echoes of the government's Novem�
ber declaration, all were felt in the mood of the congress and in the
speeches. Both Semaoen and Darsono were in jail and yet ISDV'ers
could not be disregarded. The congress decided to establish regional
committees to supervise local Sis more closely and to prepare for the
eventual banning of the CSI. Tjokroaminoto rejected all "isms" from
socialism to nationalism and appealed for the unity of the SI. Soerjopranoto took
over the position of Sosrokardono and proposed the
establishment of a true Volksraad constituted with the Eerste Kamer
(First Chamber), the trade union federation, the PPKB, and the Tweede
Kamer (Second Chamber), the Political Concentration composed of the
member parties of the Radical Concentration and the ISDV. A major
reshuffling of the CSI central committee took place for the first time
since the 1914 SI congress with the new central leadership composed
of the following members (in parenthesis are the local SI affiliated,
the responsibility, the organizational base, and other qualifications,
if any):
61"Redevoering van zijne Excellentie den GG bij gelegenheid van het openbaar gehoor
op i
September 1919," De lndische Gids 41 (1919)) PP- I438~I439-
62For the Afdeeling B affair, see McVey, The Rise ofIndonesian Communism, pp. 40-
41;
William A. Oates, "The Afdeeling B: An Indonesian Case Study," Journal ofSoutheast
Asian
History 9, no. 1 (Mar. 1968), pp. 107-117; Proces Verbaal (Tjokroaminoto), Mr.
184X/21.
For the disgrace of Tjokroaminoto in Dutch ethici's eyes, see Kwantes, De
Ontwikkeling van
de Nationalistische Beweging: 1917-medio 1913, pp. 2.20-2.22.
The Age in Motion 115
Chairman: Tjokroaminoto (Surabaya; editor-in-chief of Oetoesan Hindia)
First vice-chairman: Abdoel Moeis (Bandung; in charge of Outer Islands;
editor-in-chief of Neratja)
Second vice-chairman: Soerjopranoto (Yogyakarta; in charge of Java; chair�
man of the PFB/Arbeidsleger-Adhi Dharma)
Secretary: Sosrokardono (Surabaya; chairman of the PPPB; in prison)
First deputy secretary: Brotosoehardjo (Surabaya; editor of Oetoesan Hindia)
Second deputy secretary: Rachmat (Surabaya; Sosrokardono's brother)
Treasurer: Tjokroaminoto
Deputy treasurer: Brotosoehardjo
Commissioners: Hasan Djajadiningrat (Serang; in charge of Banten; adviser to
Tjokroaminoto)
Hadji Agoes Salim (Yogyakarta; in charge of trade unions; adviser to
Tjokroaminoto)
Brotonoto (Palembang; in charge of South Sumatra; in prison)
Alimin Prawirodirdjo (Batavia; in charge of Priangan; vice-chairman of the
PPPB)
Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso (Surabaya; Tjokroaminoto's brother)
Soekirno (Batavia; in charge of Batavia and Cirebon; in prison)
Semaoen (Semarang; in charge of Semarang; chairman of the VSTP; editorin-chief of
Sinar Hindia)
Marco Kartodikromo (Semarang; in charge of journalism; editor of Sinar
Hindia)
Hadji Fachrodin (Yogyakarta; in charge of Yogyakarta; secretary of the
Moehammadijah)
Hadji Ahmad Sjadzili (Sampang; in charge of Madura)
Mohammad Samin (Medan; in charge of East Coast of Sumatra)
Amir Hamza (Banjarmasin; in charge of Kalimantan)
Advisers: Djojosoediro (Batavia; editor of Neratja', well-known theosophist)
K. H. Dahlan (Yogyakarta; chairman of the Moehammadijah)
On the surface, Tjokroaminoto's faction occupied the majority of
the central leadership, but it was only on paper. Abdoel Moeis was
paralyzed. Hasan Djajadiningrat soon died. Sosrokardono, Brotonoto,
and Soekirno were in jail. Alimin also went to jail soon. Brotosoehard�
jo, Rachmat, and Abikoesoeno Tjokrosoejoso were no more than
Tjokroaminoto's attendants without their own power base. Only Salim
was an intellectual force in his own right who could rival Semaoen, and
as such he was seen as the only positive and reasonable person among
the CSI leaders by Dutch ethici.63 With Salim as his brain, Tjokroami6?Hadji Agoes
Salim, born in Kota Gedang, Bukittinggi, in 1884, was the son of the
Hoofddjaksa of Tanjung Pinang in Riauw and graduated from the HBS in Weltevreden in
1904. In 1905-12 he worked at the Dutch consulate in Jidda and then at the Public
Works
Department and the Volkslectuur in Batavia. He joined the SI in 1915, worked as an
editor of
the government-subsidized Neratja under the chief editorship of Abdoel Moeis and of
the
Bataviaasch Nieuwsblad, edited by H. J. Kiewiet de Jong in 1917-18. When the
Volksraad
election was held in early 1918, he was a member of the NIVB and soon thereafter
joined the
ii6 An Age in Motion
noto now tried to play off Semarang and Yogyakarta SI leaders to
maintain his position. But with his power base in collapse and his
financial position precarious, the age of Tjokroaminoto's supremacy
was clearly over and the days of his downfall and the SemarangYogyakarta rivalry
for the hegemony of the SI movement were about
to begin.64
ISDP. He reportedly learned socialism and trade unionism from S. Koperberg, a
leader of the
ISDP. He emerged as a leading figure of the CSI in late 1918 because of his
activities
concerning food shortage, the Radical Concentration, and the reorganization of the
Garut SI
after the Afdeeling B affair. Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische
Beweging:
1917-medio 1923, pp. ZZ9-Z30. See also Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement, pp.
109-111.
64For the 1919 Surabaya CSI congress, see Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Na�
tionalistische Beweging: 1917-medio 1923, pp. Z16-Z50. See also Proces Verbaal
(Tjokroaminoto), Mr. 184X/Z1.
4 The Insulinde and Peasant
Strikes in Surakarta
In 1917-19, the age and the world were felt to be in motion no less
strongly in Surakarta than anywhere else in the Indies. The opening of
the Volksraad, the rise of Semaoen and the Semarang SI, the Djawa
Dipa movement, the TKNM, the trade union movement, the rise of the
PFB and Soerjopranoto-all these and other developments influenced
the pergerakan in Surakarta, which started to regenerate in 1918. In
Surakarta, however, this age in motion first manifested itself in the
rehabilitation of Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo on the main stage of the
pergerakan as an appointed Insulinde member of the Volksraad and in
the emergence of Hadji Mohammad Misbach as a leading reformist
muballigh (Islamic propagandist). It was this combination of Indies
nationalist Tjipto and muballigh Misbach who guided the Insulinde,
not the SI, as the major "revolutionary" pergerakan force in Surakarta.
Therefore, in this and the next chapter let us first look at Tjipto and
Misbach, and then discuss the pergerakan they led in Surakarta in
1918-20.
Tjipto, a Ksatrya
Dr. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo was one of the best Western-educated
members of the native intelligentsia and had been a well-known per�
gerakan figure even before his emergence as vice-president of the IP in
1912 and his exile to Holland in 1913. Tjipto was born in 1886 in
Ambarawa, Central Java, the eldest son of a Malay-language teacher of
the government native school who later became a school head and then
worked as an administrative aide with the Semarang Municipal Coun�
cil. Tjipto and his brothers enjoyed the best Western-style education
n8 An Age in Motion
then available in the Indies. He graduated from the ELS, entered the
STOV1A in 1899, and graduated in 1905. He then worked as a govern�
ment-employed indische arts (native doctor) in Banjermasin and DeDemak in 1906-9
and became a private physician in Surakarta. When
plague infested Malang in 1910, he volunteered for government service
to fight the disease and was decorated in early 1912 with the Ridderkruis (Knight's
Cross, a Dutch medal of honor) of the OranjeNassau Order by the government. Since
his STOVIA years, and indeed
throughout his life, he was known for his simplicity, unpretentious�
ness, honesty, and sincerity; he seemed totally unconcerned with his
personal life. When he was in the STOVIA, a student was required to
wear his regional clothing. While his Javanese friends wore Javanese
dress made from batik cloth, Tjipto dressed in clothes usually worn by
kromo, his hair coming out from beneath the songkok (the Javanese
fezlike cap made of cloth) and smoking kretek incense cigarettes.1
When he was fighting the plague in Malang, his colleagues wore masks
and gloves and took all necessary precautions not to be infected by the
disease. But he took no special precautions, because "he surrendered
himself to fate."2 As Marco made a point of his modernness by wear�
ing Western-style dress like a sinyo, Tjipto too made his point by his
clothes: his simplicity, honesty, sincerity, his total unconcern with
things of his own. Tjipto thus showed that his moral standard was
higher than that of many Javanese priyayi who indulged in extrava�
gance. Just as Marco was decorated by Soewardi with a satria-kruis in
his open letter, Tjipto too decorated himself by adopting a baby girl
orphaned by the plague and naming her Pesjati (Pest or plague-jati).
And when he encountered the pretensions, pomp, and extravagance of
others, he showed his disregard in a straightforward way. When he was
in Surakarta in 1909, he rode his carriage in the square in front of the
sunan's palace because only sunan's and princes' carriages were al�
lowed there at the time, and by so doing he intentionally upset palace
officials and angered the sunan and Kasunanan aristocrats.3
Tjipto was one of the first of the native intelligentsia who con�
sciously thought about the question of native progress in terms of
political domination and subordination. He started to express his ideas
openly in 1907 by contributing writings to the Semarang-based liberal
Dutch-language newspaper De Locomotief. When the BO was estab�
lished in 1908, he was elected a commissioner at its first congress.
!Balfas, Dr. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo: Demokrat Sedjati, p. 29. D.M.G. Koch, who met
Tjipto in the early 1920s, also noted his simple, unimpressive outward appearance
"with his
songkok, his simple Javanese costume made of a striped shirt and a sarong, and with
his bare
feet in native slippers." Koch, Batig Slot, p. 148.
2Balfas, Dr. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, p. 46.
3Ibid., pp. 45-47. See also Savitri Scherer, "Harmony and Dissonance," pp. 106-128.
The Insulinde and Peasant Strikes 119
At the congress, he urged BO members to work in the political field
and he debated with Dr. Radjiman. His proposal was defeated. Soon
he left the BO. At the BO congress, however, he met Douwes Dekker
and three years later joined him as coeditor of the IP organs, De Expres
and Het Tijdschrift, and as vice-chairman of the IP. In his Bandung
days in 1912-13, he learned the craft of journalism from Douwes
Dekker. But the IP was short-lived. Tjipto then established the Comite
Boemipoetra with Soewardi to protest the centennial celebration of the
Dutch liberation from France and to demand the establishment of a
Parliament. In July 1913 he and Soewardi were arrested because of
Soewardi's article "If I Were a Dutchman," and in early September
they were banished to the Netherlands.4
Tjipto returned to the Indies in the middle of 1914 because of illness.
He settled down in Surakarta and joined the Insulinde, successor of the
IP, which was headquartered in Semarang. Being one of the tripartite
IP leadership who had proved his sincerity for his cause through exile,
his prestige was high not only among Insulinde members but also
among what Rinkes called IP'ers. They called him "onze Tjip" (our
Tjipto) with affection and saw him as "a resolute and undaunted
fighter, a satria without fear or blame."5 In 1914-16 he was a member
of the Insulinde central committee and editor-in-chief of successive
Insulinde organs, Goentoer (Thunder), Goentoer Bergerak (Thunder
in motion), Modjopahit, De Voorpost (The outpost), and De lndier. In
these years, however, Tjipto was an ex-banneling (former exile) and
leader of the "revolutionary" IP in the eyes of the Dutch and native
administrative officials. His writings were repeatedly confiscated and
his propaganda activities openly harassed. In 1915 alone he was twice
prosecuted and his pamphlets Persdelict (Press offense) and Ik beschuldig (I
accuse) were confiscated.6 When he made a propaganda
tour in Juana in the middle of 1916, the request of the Insulinde central
leadership to hold an open-air propaganda rally was turned down by
the assistant resident, the Juana Insulinde branch Tjipto established
was forced to dissolve by the local authorities, and he was interrogated
by the resident of Semarang as due procedure for the resident to pro�
pose that the governor general banish him again from Java. Threatened
4For Tjipto's early career as a pergerakan figure, see Balfas, Dr. Tjipto
Mangoenkoesoemo;
Savitri Scherer, "Harmony and Dissonance," pp. 114-12.8; "Tjipto," De Indische Gids
40
(1918), pp. 248-251. For Tjipto's activities in the IP and the Comite Boemipoetra,
see van
der Wal, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 99-106, 304-311, 318-341,
353-357-
5Wd. Adivseur voor Inlandsche Zaken (Hazeu) aan GG, 21 Aug. 1919, Mr. 1856/16.
6Resident van Surakarta (Gelpke) aan GG, 26 Feb. 1915, Mr. 483/15, Vb. 17 Sept.
1915,
No. 46. Assistent Resident van Surakarta aan Resident van Surakarta, 22 Feb. 1915,
Mr.
483/15, Vb. 17 Sept. 1915, No. 46.
120 An Age in Motion
with a second banishment, he was forced to quit the Insulinde central
committee and the chief editorship of De Indier in the middle of 1916.7
Throughout these years Tjipto lived in Surakarta as a practicing
physician, except for his brief stay in Semarang in early 1916. As a
theosophist, he must have frequented the theosophical lodge, a pres�
tigious meeting place of Dutch, Indos, Chinese, Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran
princes, aristocrats, and high-ranking officials in Surakar�
ta. But here again he was ignored by Western-educated progressive
Surakartan aristocrats who controlled the BO central leadership, be�
cause as Dwidjosewojo once remarked, Tjipto was "incorrigible."8
Perhaps Tjipto's straightforwardness, outspokenness, and biting crit�
icism ofJavanese cultural tradition were too much for culturally proud
but politically timid BO leaders. Yet neither BO leaders nor Dutch
ethici denied his "honest character, absolute unselfishness, and readi�
ness to sacrifice himself." Tjipto was, as Hazeu once wrote in a letter to
the governor general, a leader "who stands by a remarkably higher
[moral] standard than most others who are at the vanguard of the
`movement' in this age."9
In these years, then, Tjipto was "onze Tjip" for IP'ers, "incorrigible"
for BO leaders, and "ex-banneling" for the Dutch and native admin�
istrative officials. Yet throughout these years, and perhaps throughout
his life, Tjipto himself was remarkably unchanged despite his meeting
with Douwes Dekker, his banishment, his disappointment with fellow
native kaum muda, and all sorts of harassment he suffered from the
authorities. At bottom, what he was most concerned with was the
improvement of people's welfare in the Indies or, as he often put it,
characteristic of a practicing physician, "a healthy development for the
country." In his view, the Indies was the only relevant political entity in
terms of which to talk about people's welfare, because Java, however
rich in history and culture, had long lost its sovereignty. In this sense,
Tjipto clearly shared with Dutch ethici and with SI leaders the essen�
tially Batavia-centric colonial/national perspective of the Indies. But it
was not simply for this reason that Tjipto was seen and saw himself as
a leading proponent of Indies nationalism. More important, he always
tried to write his prescriptions for a "healthy" development of the
Indies in terms of domination and subordination. It was his concern
with this that remained remarkably unchanged throughout his career
as a pergerakan thinker. When he joined De Expres and Het Tijdscbrift
"Assistent Resident van Juana (Evertsz) aan Resident van Semarang (Kern), 17 July
1916;
Resident van Semarang (Kern) aan GG, 27 July 1916; Verklaring van Soetedjo, all in
Mr.
1621/16. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, "Ten afscheid, kameraden," De Voorpost, 5 Aug.
1916, included in Mr. 1856/16.
8Nagazumi, The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism, p. 90.
9Wd. Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken aan GG, 21 Aug. 1916, Mr. 1856/16.
The Insulinde and Feasant Strikes 121
in 1912, he published his open letter and announced that in his view
"the fundamental antithesis lies neither in East and West nor in Indiers
and non-Indiers but in domination and subordination of whatever
form."10 And in the 1920s he still saw the question of the Indies'
progress in these terms.
What were Tjipto's prescriptions for Indies progress, then? What did
"progress" mean in his language? One may gain insight into Tjipto's
ideas by looking at a letter he wrote (in Dutch) in early 1916 to a Dutch
friend:
Why is it that the Dutchman, who after all in other respects is not dullwitted, has
needed so much time to realize where he must go with his
colonies, even though he should have been able to think it out long ago?
The answer to this question lies, I think, primarily in the docile nature of
the Javanese, who has always said ja and amen to whatever was laid on
his shoulders, without ever having an inkling that as a human being he
also has inalienable human rights; in the sugar districts especially, he is all
too often trampled on. To put it more clearly, it is our lack of a spirit of
resistance that has made us "without rights" in the direct and indirect
senses.
So, imperceptibly, I have come to the second point I want to discuss
with you-so that you do not misjudge me, perhaps attributing to me
virtues that I do not possess.
The remedy for any malady is pretty simple once the malady is under�
stood. In our case it is now pretty obvious, I think, [that the problem] is
lack of a spirit of resistance. Javanese culture does not permit criticism of
the policies of the power holder-on the contrary, this culture requires
that we subject ourselves unconditionally to the views of our superiors.
The Soesoehoenan [Sunan], for example, is permitted to claim descent
from Adam and Ardjoena, for no other reason than to assure himself a
divine provenance, to keep us under control, and to make us feel that we
simple earthlings, descendants of Kromo or Soeto, can never hope for
success in any rebellion. Since the gods are the ancestors of the Soesoe�
hoenan, it goes without saying that they stand on the side of this power
holder.
But let me return to our remedy. I can point to none other than "the
organization of discontent," as De Locomotief would put it. Opposition
must be carried on against the power holders, naturally, where possible,
with [real] knowledge of affairs, but if this proves impossible then op�
position for the sake of opposition as such. Please don't take this as an
expression of my antipathy for Dutch domination, for 1 would carry on
the same opposition if the Javanese ruled. You know better than I that in
the BB [Binnenlandsch Bestuur, Interior Administration], for example,
there are officials who are frightened of nothing so much as hostile crit-
*�De Indische Gids 35 (1913), pp. 2.41-Z42..
122 An Age in Motion
icism. To be honest, that is exactly why I do it [that is, express hostile
criticism] in the first, second, and third instance. After all, fear is a splen�
did means for preventing abuse of power.11
In this letter to Tjipto s unknown Dutch friend, two things imme�
diately stand out. The first is his candidness and friendship for his
Dutch friend. In the 1910s it was not surprising for a pergerakan leader
to have Dutch and Indo friends. Tjokroaminoto had Rinkes, Semaoen
had Sneevliet, and Soerjopranoto had van Hinloopen Labberton. Even
Marco had his Dutch and Indo allies when he was prosecuted. But it
seems Tjipto established more deeply personal, equal, and intimate
friendships with Dutch and Indo friends. Perhaps in his friendships
with certain Dutchmen and Indos there was an element of calculation,
but it also showed his loneliness among the natives, because in this preumversity
age few natives could really talk on equal terms with as welleducated a person as
Tjipto. In fact, he started this letter with amice
(dear friend), friendly and intimate address, and elsewhere he talked of
personal matters about himself and his wife, Mrs. Vogel, an Indo batik
entrepreneur and theosophist. In this sense, Tjipto was no doubt a son
of the high Ethical period of the prewar years.
The second and more substantial point in this letter is his discussion
of "the malady" and "the remedy" for it. What does he mean by "the
malady and why does he think that "the organization of discontent"
can be the only remedy for "the malady"? At first glance, the answer
seems simple. As he writes, "the malady" is "the docile nature of the
Javanese, their lack of a spirit of resistance," which made the Dutch�
man not realize where he must go with his colonies" and allowed
"abuse of power." The remedy is therefore to nurture "a spirit of
resistance by the organization of discontent," which would make the
Dutch come to their senses. Superficially, then, what he says in this
letter is not very different from what he explained about the IP in early
1914. In "De Indische Beweging [The Indies movement]," which he
contributed to De Indische Gids from Holland, he writes about the IP:
It [the II ] is intended to be a party for all those who care about a healthy
development for the country. It understands very well that no such devel�
opment can be expected as long as the present colonial relationships are
maintained. The antithesis is, and can be none other than, the dominator
on the one side and the dominated on the opposite side. The IP has
appealed to all those who feel themselves dominated in the richly blessed
land of the Indies, and has bidden them to close ranks and to organize
1 `Wd. Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken aan GG, 21 Aug. 1916, Mr. 1856/16. The letter
is
dated 19 Jan. 1916. Though Hazeu deleted the name of the person to whom Tjipto
wrote the
letter, it is very likely that he himself received it. Italics in the original.
The Insulinde and Peasant Strikes 123
themselves. Like the social democrats, the leaders of this great party
believe that a bloodless class struggle is possible only when the dominated
get political power into their hands. With some bitterness it therefore
reminds its followers, day in and day out, that one can only speak of a
parliamentary struggle once we actually have a Parliament at our dis�
posal. As of now we have no such Parliament, so that if the IP-ers wish to
influence the governance of the country, they are directed toward the
conquest of political participation.12
In this context, Tjipto's argument about "a spirit of resistance" can be
understood as essentially political. Nurturing "a spirit of resistance" is
meant to be a means to change "the present colonial relations" by
making the Dutch realize the necessity of establishing a Parliament and
then of guiding the Indies to self-government and eventual indepen�
dence on an evolutionary and parliamentary path. In this sense, Tjipto
was, as Savitri Scherer argues, a "harmless dissenter" who believed in
the constitutional and parliamentary path to change colonial rela�
tions.13 But if we see in Tjipto only a "harmless dissenter," we will miss
the more important point Tjipto raised in his writings, because if he
were concerned only with changing the colonial relations, he would
have said that "the malady" was the colonial relationship and that the
IP was a party for the liberation of the Indies from Dutch colonial
domination. But what he in fact said was that the IP was "a party for
all those who care about a healthy development for the country."
What, then, did he mean by a healthy development of the Indies and
why did he see "the organization of discontent" as the only way to
remedy "the docile nature of the Javanese"? To answer these ques�
tions, we have to look at two booklets he wrote: lets over den Javaan
(Some remarks on the Javanese), which he read at the first Indiers
congress in 1913, and De Wayang (The wayang), which he read at the
eleventh Indiers congress in 1923.14
In lets over de javaan, Tjipto extensively discusses "the moral decay
of the Javanese" under Dutch colonial domination and argues that the
Javanese completely lost "their independent and firm character" be�
cause of the authoritarian nature and capitalist exploitation of Dutch
colonial rule. He then asks, "Whose will should we inherit with great
pride in such a time of decay?" and argues that it is the will of Dipanegara as a
fighter against moral decay:
12 Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, "De Indische Beweging," De Indische Gids 38 (1914),
p. 11.
12See Savitri Scherer, "Harmony and Dissonance," pp. iz8-170.
14Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, lets over den Javaan: Zijn Geschiedenis en zijn Ethiek,
rede
uitgesproken op het Eerste Indiers Congres gehouden te Semarang (21-n Maart 1911)
(Semarang, 1913); De Wayang als Kultuurniting van ons Volk: Inleiding voor het Xle
Indiers Congres (Bandung, 19Z3).
124 An Age in Motion
What are we to see in Prince Dipanegara? An ordinary rebel who, driven
by lust for profit or by ambition, delivered his country to that scourge of
every people-war? Was it stupid fanaticism that led him to unfurl the
banner of insurrection? I believe I am justified in answering these ques�
tions in the negative. There was a noble task to be carried out. He felt that
he was destined to carry out this task. Well then! With great tenacity and
energy he followed the [destined] course of his life. He failed, but I think
that you, as well as I, should not judge anyone's work exclusively in terms
of its success. Besides, it was less my intention here to subject Dipanegara's
strength to judgment than to show that, in contrast to what
some people believe, the Javanese really have a sound ethical foundation
on which they should be able to build-a moral fund that should make us
cheerfully optimistic of the possibility of a revival of our golden years.15
Here Tjipto's concern is essentially moral, and he clearly sees in the
example set by Prince Dipanegara the way to revive "a moral fund" on
which a "healthy development" of the Javanese could take place.
In the booklet De Wayang, he discusses Abimanyu and his grand�
father in the same spirit. In the wayang story of Abimanyu, there is an
episode in which Abimanyu, learning that his father is Arjuna, asks his
grandfather, pandita Abiyasa, to give him permission to go to Arjuna.
The grandfather s answer is no, but Abimanyu continues to press his
request. Tjipto describes and analyzes Abimanyu's conversation with
his grandfather:
Then he renews his request.
-No, grandfather! You cannot refuse to grant my request, for I have
now made up my mind to seek my father. If you tie me up, I'll tear myself
loose. If you lock me up, I'll find a way to break out.
With satisfaction the grandfather looks at his youthful grandson. He
takes pleasure in the fact that his upbringing has borne fruit.
Good, my son! I see that I have not taught you the qualities of
ksatrya in vain. In your decision I recognize your ksatrya-nature, which
cannot be thwarted by any kind of hardship-nay, more, which in every
hardship finds a mighty spur to still greater efforts. Once again, you do
honor to your caste by your determination. Go, go with my blessing. But
go in the company of Semar and his sons, who will know how to show
you the way.
An analysis of this episode and the lesson contained in it.
Here the puppet master teaches us that firmness of character befits a
man, at least he who would deserve the lofty title of "man" in the fullest
sense of the word. Nothing can divert him from a plan once he has
conceived it. No difficulty is too great to be overcome. So each difficulty
must serve as a spur for us to make still greater efforts. The divinity has
, 5Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, lets over de Javaan, p. zi.
The Insulinde and Feasant Strikes 12-5
placed difficulties in our path in order to exercise our powers, and thus to
make us conscious of these powers hidden within us.16
Here again Tjipto's concern is essentially moral and ethical, and as
he sees in Dipanegara a fighter against moral decay, he reads in the
wayang story of Abimanyu the supreme importance of firmness of
character. It was character building in this sense, tempering the Jav�
anese into ksatrya like Dipanegara and Abimanyu by placing them in a
series of difficulties, which Tjipto saw as the remedy for "the docile
nature of the Javanese." And he called Javanese-reincarnated-ksatrya
Indiers who would become "citizens" of the future independent In�
dies.17
Therefore, if we put it schematically, Tjipto's idea was composed of
four major ingredients. First, he was primarily concerned with a
"healthy" development of the Indies, especially the Javanese, from
deadly docility to awakened evolution. In this sense he was indeed a
son of his time, the age of progress, and his perspective was Batavia�
centric colonial/national. Second, however, he addressed the question
of progress not primarily in terms of Western-style education but in
political and moral terms. The question of political domination and
subordination was central to his thinking because it was the system of
domination that suffocated the initiative and creativity of the natives.
From this perspective, he called for democratization of the system and
the eventual independence of the Indies on the constitutional and par�
liamentary path. Third, however, he addressed the question of Indies
progress not only in an evolutionary political perspective but also in a
revolutionary moral perspective. It was revolutionary because he saw
the possibility of Javanese moral regeneration from moral decay and
docility in "the reincarnation of the Javanese into the Indiers," the
ksatrya, that is, the revolutionary transformation of "feudal" Javanese
civilization. Fourth, therefore, in Tjipto's view nurturing "a spirit of
resistance"-"where possible, with [real] knowledge of affairs, but if it
proves impossible then opposition for the sake of opposition as
such"-was the only remedy for "the docile nature of the Javanese"
and the key to "a healthy development of the country," not only be�
cause "resistance" would make "power holders" realize the need to
reform and democratize the system but also because only "resistance,"
which would naturally entail difficulties and trials, would temper the
Javanese into ksatrya, Indier, "`man' in the fullest sense of the word."
What was the difference between Tjipto's idea of ksatrya and Mar16Tjipto
Mangoenkoesoemo, De Wayang, pp. 2.7-28.
17Ibid., pp. 41-42.
126 An Age in Motion
co s idea of true satria (satria sedjati), then? Simply put, Marco's idea
of satria derived from the realm of spoken Javanese, while Tjipto's idea
of ksatrya came from the realm of written Dutch. Marco voiced and
acted out what a true satria should be like in the pergerakan, based on
the popular notion of satria in the wayang world, and never bothered
to discuss "Javanese civilization," "the wayang as a living Javanese
tradition, or Javanese history. Though Tjipto's idea of ksatrya had
much in common with Marco's, he studied and wrote in Dutch about
Javanese ethics, history, and tradition. To study and write about these
matters, he read not only Javanese historical writings such as Babad
Tanab Jawi but also, and more extensively, books and articles written
by Dutch Javanologists and theosophists. He might have enjoyed
watching wayang, but more often as a theosophist went to the "origi�
nal" Indian epic, the Mahabbarata, and to the Bbagavad Gita.18 By the
twentieth century, Javanese cultural tradition had long been conquered
by Dutch Javanology. Thus Tjipto also studied Babad Tanab Djawi,
Bbagavad Gita, Maulud Nabi Mobammad, and other works under the
tutorship of van Hinloopen Labberton, a leading theosophist and
Javanese-language teacher at the Willem III grammar school, and he
based his argument in lets over de Javaan on the "scientific" writings
of Dutch Javanologists and Islamologists such as Hazeu, Brandes,
Veth, Snouck Hurgronje, and van Hinloopen Labberton. His discus�
sion on Dipanegara as "a fighter against moral decay" was also built
on P. H. van der Kemp's article on Dipanegara published in 1896.19
Despite his biting criticism of colonial relations and "feudal" Jav�
anese civilization, Tjipto thus shared with the Dutch the common lin�
guistic world of Dutch and a fundamental understanding of the Jav�
anese tradition. Therefore, while Marco was simply gek (crazy) in
Dutch eyes, Tjipto was intelligible and hence respectable.20 Dutch ethici deplored
Tjipto gone astray, because he was charmed by his "wick�
ed spirit, Douwes Dekker. But in their eyes, it was Douwes Dekker
who should be blamed, while Tjipto remained respectable. Thus when
the Volksraad was established and van Limburg Stirum tried to make it
as representative as possible to refute the mockery of "puppet show"
and comedy, it was natural for the governor general to appoint
Tjipto to the Volksraad, not only because he welcomed its establish�
ment as a first step on the constitutional and parliamentary path to
Ki Hadjar Dewantara [Soewardi Soerjanmgrat], "Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo," Dari
Kebangunan Nasional sampat Proklamasi Kemerdekaan: Kenang-Kenangan Ki Hadjar De�
wantara (Djakarta: Endang, 1952.), pp. 215-228.
19Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, lets over de Javaan. See also P. H. van der Kemp, "Di�
panegara, eene geschiedkundige Hamlettype," Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en
Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-lndie 46 (1896), pp. 281-433.
20"Marco," De lndische Gids 39 (1917), pp. 1079-1082.
The Insulinde and Feasant Strikes 127
Indies independence but also because he was a respectable revolution�
ary whose high moral standard Dutch ethici could well understand.
Misbach, a Muballigh
Whereas Tjipto was a Western-educated member of the intel�
ligentsia, a well-known pergerakan figure who read, spoke, and wrote
in Dutch and had Dutch and Indo friends, H. Mohammad Misbach
was a pesantren-educated muballigh, relatively unknown in the per�
gerakan, who read not Dutch but Arabic and had no Dutch friends.
Misbach, who first emerged as a leading figure of the Islamic kaum
muda in Surakarta in the mid-i9ios, was born in about 1876 in Kauman, Surakarta,
and brought up there as the son of a wealthy batik
trader. When he was a child, he was called Achmad; he changed his
name to Darmodiprono when he got married, and changed his name
again to Hadji Mohammad Misbach after he completed his pilgrimage
to Mecca. Kauman, where he spent most of his life, lay on the west side
of the northern square in front of the sunan's palace, near the Great
Mosque, and was the quarter where the sunan's religious officials
lived. As pergerakan writings on Misbach invariably put it, his house in
Kauman was located facing the main street, "just in front of the Sur�
akarta prison." Misbach's father was not a religious official. But born
and brought up in the most deeply religious quarter of the city of
Surakarta, he was largely educated in pesantren, though he did attend a
second-class government native school for eight months. When he
reached the age to earn his own livelihood, he too started to be engaged
in batik trade, as did most of the people in Kauman. He soon estab�
lished his own batik workshop and became a successful batik entrepre�
neur.21 When the SI was born in Surakarta in 1912, he also became
a member, but was not very active. In 1912-13 he was neither a mem�
ber of the branch leadership nor a wargo pangarso.22 He became
actively involved in the pergerakan in 1914, when he joined Marco's
IJB (League of Native Journalists). Marco later described his meeting
with Misbach:
When I published the weekly newspaper Doenia Bergerak in Solo
(1914)-it was the official organ of the Inlandsche Journalisten Bond-1
got to know H. M. Misbach, because he was a member of the association
21"Kisah Almarhoem H. M. Misbach," Medan Moeslintin 12 (192.6), pp. 295-304;
Rangsang, "Tjatatan Singkat Tentang Kawan Hadji Misbach," Medan Moeslintin 10
(1926),
pp. 211-213.
22Rangsang, "Tjatatan Singkat Tentang Kawan Hadji Misbach," Medan Moeslintin 10
(1926), p. 211.
128 An Age in Motion
and subscribed to the newspaper. At that time he was a man of Islam
who aimed to spread Islamness with the methods of the present agepublishing an
Islamic newspaper, setting up an Islamic school system
and holding gatherings to discuss the Religion of Islam and social life!
In 1915 H. M. Misbach put out the monthly newspaper Medan
Moeslimin, the first issue of which was dated January 15, 1915. It was at
this moment that H. M. Misbach took the first step to join the pergerakan
and to hold the banner of Islam. Everywhere he made propaganda for
Islam and liked to be friendly with all men. In Misbach's view there was
no difference between a common thief and a man with high rank; or
between the rebana [tambourine for Islamic-style music] and klenengan
[informal Javanese gamelan concert]; between the bok Hadji [wife of a
aj] who veils her face, and a woman who becomes a butterfly of the
night [prostitute]; between those who wear the Arab-style turban and
those who wear the Javanese headcloth. That is why he preferred to wear
the headcloth rather than the Turkish petji [fezlike velvet hat] or the
turban fancied by most of those who are styled "Hadji." Sometimes, if
need be, Misbach, with a swarm of kids around him, would listen to
klenengan accompanied by the sweet, melodious voice of the tandak
[ ancing girl]. Nor did he forget to provide the gamelan with the vocal
prelude for gamelan composition. Among the kids he was a friend to go
out and have fun with, and among wayang orang people he was more
popular than their director. That is why Misbach had friends in every
group of the Rajat [People] who could carry on his pergerakan. But
among those people who claim to be [good] Muslims, yet attach more
lmjportana to amassing wealth than helping the Rajat in their distress,
Misbach was like a tiger among a group of small animals. For he was
never afraid to denounce the behavior of those who claimed to be good
Muslims but who continually sucked the blood of fellow members of the
community.23
Marco wrote this recollection in 1924 when the cultural rivalry
etween kaum putihan and kaum abangan was increasingly politicized
by the ideological feud between the CSI-Moehammadijah, which ap�
pealed to the symbols of Islam, and the PKI-SR, which based its claim
to legitimacy on the Rajat (People). Therefore, Misbach's Islamness is
low-key and assimilated to his Rajatness in the description above. But
as Marco tells us, Misbach, a pious orthodox Muslim in the very
Javanese city of Surakarta, started to move "with the methods of the
present age" by publishing Medan Moeslimin (Forum of Muslims) in
1915 and Islam Bergerak (Islam in motion) in 1917; establishing Hotel
Islam, a bookstore, and a modern-style religious school; and holding
tabligh (Islamic propaganda) gatherings. In terms of his concerns and
activities, therefore, Misbach had much in common with Kyai Hadji
-3Marco Kartodikromo, "Korban Pergerakan Rajat: H. M. Misbach," Hidoep, Sept.
IQ n A �x
The Insulinde and Peasant Strikes 129
Dahlan, the founder of the Moehammadijah, and in fact was closely
associated with him and his disciple, Hadji Fachrodin. But the Islamic
reformists in Surakarta were formed in a different way from their
counterparts in Yogyakarta, and therefore the social and ideological
position in which Misbach and his reformist allies found themselves
was also different from that of Dahlan and his proteges.
In Yogyakarta the Moehammadijah Dahlan established in Kauman
in late 1912 formed the central focus of progressive devout Muslims.
Most of the Moehammadijah leaders and activists came from the sul�
tan's religious official families. Dahlan's father was Chatib Amin of the
sultan's Great Mosque, his mother a daughter of the chief religious
official, Pengulu, and he himself became Chatib Amin in the 1900s.24
Moehammadijah propagandists of Fachrodin's generation were largely
sons and daughters of religious officials. In Yogyakarta as well as
elsewhere in Java, the religious bureaucracy was essentially an instru�
ment of the state, and the religious officials' authority came not from
their personal knowledge of Islam but from the offices they held.
Though many of them made haj to Mecca and were trained in Islam,
their religious learning was not necessarily great and their prestige was
lower than that of kyai who presided over their own pesantren inde�
pendent of the state. What Dahlan did with the Moehammadijah was
to train his disciples as "true" Muslims and to reform (purify) and
modernize their religious practices and understandings. As the name
Moehammadijah (the Followers of the Prophet Muhammad) suggests,
he stressed the direct learning and independent understanding (ijtihad)
of Holy Scriptures and urged bringing the faith back into the form of
purity as was taught and practiced by the Prophet and the four caliphs
after him.25 He also propagated the teachings of Islam "in the way of
the present age." The Moehammadijah schools were established, mod�
eled after the government native school, where Islam as well as secular
subjects were taught. Tabligh gatherings were regularly held, where
Moehammadijah propagandists read passages of the Koran and ex�
plained their meaning in Javanese. At that time the Friday sermon
(cbotbah) was still done in Arabic, more as a ritual prayer than as a
working instruction.26 The tabligh and the schools were thus geared to
the direct learning of what the Prophet Muhammad conveyed. For
Dahlan and his disciples, therefore, to work for the Moehammadijah
meant to live as true Muslims. What was good to the Moehammadijah
24For more on Dahlan and Moehammadijah leaders of Fachrodin's generation, see
Alfian,
"Islamic Modernism in Indonesian Politics," pp. 228-230, 325-329.
25Ibid., pp. 7-8, 116-132.
26Steenbrink, Pesantren, Madrasah, Sekolah, pp. 24-31, 50-52; Alfian, "Islamic
Modern�
ism in Indonesian Politics," pp. 243-266; Betoro Soerjo, "Boeah Fikiran," Medan
Moeshmin 3 (1917), pp. 182-186.
130 An Age in Motion
was seen as good to Islam. The Islamic reformists, with their strategic
position right in the middle of the Yogyakartan religious establish�
ment, thus saw the Moehammadijah as embodying that vast and amor�
phous unimat Islam (the community of Islam) and could confidently
work for the cause of Islam.
In Surakarta no such leading and authoritative figure as Dahlan
emerged and no such association as the Moehammadijah was estab�
lished. It was partly because one of the first modern-style religious
schools in Java, the Madrasah Adamba oel Oeloem (the Source of
Knowledge), was established by the patih, R. Adipati Sosrodiningrat,
in 1906 and partly because the SI was there as an association of Mus�
lims for those concerned with the advancement of Islam. Instead, pro�
gressive religious officials, kyai, Koranic teachers, and batik traders
found their common forum in Medan Moeslimin, expressed their often
different opinions there, and called themselves Islamic kaum muda.
While the Moehammadijah was both modernist and reformist, the
Islamic kaum muda in Surakarta were modernist but not necessarily
reformist. In Medan Moeslimin and later also in Islam Bergerak, mat�
ters concerning the religion of Islam were widely discussed and the
need to modernize religious education was emphasized. But hardly any
distinction was drawn between the Madrasah Mamba'oel Oeloem,
which was headed by progressive but orthodox kyai, K. Arfah and
K. H. Adnan, and the Moehammadijah schools. And while one article
was warning against the exercise of ijtibad, another article called for
the direct learning of the Koran and hadith. The common ground on
which they stood was "progress" and their forum, Medan Moeslimin,
was itself a belated effort of pesantren-educated pious Muslims to
follow their Western-educated brothers in the age of progress.27
In early 1918, however, the TKNM launched by Tjokroaminoto
brought about a deep schism among Islamic kaum muda in Surakarta
and eventually led to the emergence of muballigh Misbach and the
establishment of a reformist Islam tabligh association, the SATV (Sidik Amanat
Tableg Vatonah, To Confirm, Convey, and Propagate
Goodness). As we have seen, the occasion on which Tjokroaminoto
launched the TKNM was Martodharsono's publication of an article in
Djawi Hiswara. Martodharsono was a well-known guru and old SI
leader close to Samanhoedi and Sosrokoernio. When the article ap�
peared in Djawi Hiswara, it did not arouse any protest in Surakarta.
But once the issue was taken up by Tjokroaminoto "nationally" and
See, for instance, Sastrosoegondo, "Pertimbangan bagi toean toean goeroe mengadji
di
kampoeng kampoeng ataoe di pondok," Medan Moeslimin i (1915), p. 34; Dos, "Apakah
Igama Islam merintangi akan kemadjoean kita," Medan Moeslimin 1 (1915), pp. 2-3.
See
also Haroenrasjid s recollection of what Islamic kaum muda were like in
Haroenrasjid,
"Soa'l Djawab," Medan Moeslimin 10 (1924), p. Z03.
The Insulinde and Feasant Strikes 131
the call for the defense of Islam publicly made in Oetoesan Hindia,
Islamic kaum muda in Surakarta could no longer ignore it. In early
February 1918 Medan Moeslimin published Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso's article for
Oetoesan Hindia and Misbach distributed pamphlets
that attacked Martodharsono and Djojodikoro and called for the or�
ganization of a protest rally and the establishment of a TKNM sub�
committee.28 On February 9 the Surakarta SI executive meeting de�
cided to convene a protest rally on February 24 as called for by
Tjokroaminoto. The driving force behind the anti-Martodharsono,
anti-Djawi Hiswara campaign in Surakarta was composed of Mis�
bach; H. Hisamzaijnie, CSI adviser; and R. Ng. Poerwodihardjo, a
teacher of the Kasunanan native school and leader of the teachers'
union, the PGHB. As the day of the rally approached a rumor circu�
lated that Misbach would confront Martodharsono on the stage of the
rally. Held in Sriwedari and attended heavily by more than twenty
thousand, it was a great event for devout Muslims in Surakarta.
Tjokroaminoto sent to Solo his most trusted proponents of the TKNM,
H. Hasan bin Semit and Sosrosoedewo, respectively publisher and edi�
tor of the Surabaya Islamic journal Sinar Islam.29 Contributions wrere
collected and the establishment of a TKNM subcommittee was decided
on. Hisamzaijnie was elected chairman and Poerwodihardjo secretary,
while Arabs, kyai, and Kasunanan religious officials were appointed as
treasurers, commissioners, and advisers. At the rally, Poerwodihardjo
appealed for the expansion of TKNM activities from the antiMartodharsono, anti-
Djawi Hiswara campaign to the fight against
Christian missionary activities and was cheerfully supported with loud
applause.30
The appeal Poerwodihardjo made for anti-Christianism was some�
thing new in Surakarta. Though Christian missionaries had been active
in Surakarta since 1910 with the establishment of a Christian mission�
ary school and the opening of a clinic, anti-Christianism was not
voiced by the SI in its early years, and in fact some Surakartan SI
28Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso, "Si Djahat menghina Nabi kita (s.a.w.)," Medan Moeslimin
4
(1918), pp. 51-53. This article was originally published in Oetoesan Hindia, 31
Jan. 1918.
De Regeeringscomissaris voor Inlandsche en Arabische Zaken (Schrieke) aan. GG, 16
Feb.
1918, Mr. 70X/18.
29Sosrosoedewo, born in Madiun, joined the Surabaya SI in 1916 and in May 1917
established with Hasan bin Semit a printing firm, Tjahja Islam, and published Sinar
Islam.
Hasan bin Semit was a wealthy Arab merchant in Surabaya and a CSI commissioner in
1915 - 18. In April 1918 he quarreled with Tjokroaminoto and quit the CSI and the
TKNM.
After that Sosrosoedewo broke with Hasan bin Semit and became the administrator of
Oetoesan Hindia and the printing firm Setia Oesaha under Tjokroaminoto.
,()"Vergadering Moeslimin jang besar di Solo," Medan Moeslimin 4 (1918), pp. 7^-77;
Resident van Surakarta (Harloff) aan GG, 4 Mar. 1918, Mr. 8zx/i8.
31For Christian missionary activities in Surakarta, see van der Wal, De Opkomst ran
de
Nationalistische Beweging, pp. 87, 188, 383.
132. An Age in Motion
leaders sent their children to the school.31 Nor was Medan Moeslimin
anti-Christian. Though published as a response to the publication of a
Christian missionary journal, Mardi Rahardjo, it published no antiChristian
articles in its first years. On the contrary, its first issue pub�
lished an article that appealed to the Muslims to "advance Islam" as
Christian missionaries were doing-publishing a journal, establishing
schools and clinics, and holding gatherings.32 What Poerwodihardjo
meant in his call for anti-Christianism was perhaps not very different
from this, because he called for the establishment of a modern-style
Islamic teachers training school as a measure to combat Christian
missionary activities.33 What was new in his call was the very language
of anti-Christianism. By calling for a fight against Christian mission�
ary activities, he introduced a new marker, "Christian," in the pergerakan
discourse to discriminate not whites from natives but kaum
abangan from kaum putihan. Everyone knew that Martodharsono was
not a Christian, but this was not the point. He was a "Christian"
because he profaned the Prophet. Peorwodihardjo's call for the fight
against Christian missionary activities was the call for true Islam.
The TKNM thus embarked on its fight for the defense of Islam with
full support of devout Muslims in Surakarta. It soon became apparent,
however, that the TKNM took no action except collecting contribu�
tions and sending cables to the governor general and the sunan to
demand the punishment of Martodharsono and Djojodikoro. In the
middle of 1918, shortly after Tjokroaminoto quietly dropped the antiMartodharsono,
anti-Djawi Hiswara campaign and a squabble took
place between Tjokroaminoto and H. Hasan bin Semit regarding
TKNM money, resulting in Hasan bin Semit's leaving the TKNM and
the CSI, Muslims started to express their anger in Islam Bergerak and
Medan Moeslimin. "Mr. Zahid," for instance, wrote in his article
"Feeling about the Situation of the Committee of the TKNM": "Funds
of the Committee became the sate [small pieces of barbecued meat
roasted on a skewer over an open fire], which was eaten by black�
headed pest [plague] and now what remains is only the spit. Remem�
ber, the leaders of the Committee, other peoples have already created
enormous strength, which increases day by day. And how have you
been doing, leaders of the Committee? Comfortable and quiet. Don't
be silent, leaders of the Committee."34
Here Mr. Zahid compares the leaders of the TKNM to pest (plague)
and says that the TKNM leadership betrayed its cause for the defense
^-Dos, Apakah Igama Islam merintangi akan kemadjoean kita," Medan Moeslimin i
(1915)-
^Regeeringscommissaris voor Inlandsche en Arabische Zaken (Hazeu) aan GG, 5 Mar.
1918, Mr. 90X/18.
MMr. Zahid, "Perasaan tentang Adanja Comite Tentara K. N. Mohamad," Islam
Bergerak, io June 1918.
The Insulinde and Feasant Strikes i33
of Islam and corroded it. In his view, those religious officials, kyai,
Koranic teachers, and Arabs who led the TKNM were no different
from Martodharsono and Djojodikoro, who profaned the Prophet and
Islam.
It was under these circumstances that Misbach replaced Hisamzaijnie, TKNM chairman,
as editor-in-chief of Medan Moeslimin and
wrote his first article, "Our Appeal." Here Misbach made his "appeal"
to the readers of Medan Moeslimin:
Medan-Moeslimin is an instrument for us Muslims to convince [people]
of the breadth [that is, broad spread] of the religion of Islam. But even
though we know our religion of Islam is a weapon for our humanity, if
we do not put our knowledge into practice, we may say that MedanMoeslimin is
useless, while anti-we, robbers of the religion of Islam, ever
more actively rampage in our country the Indies. The Government also
ignores the appeal of us Muslims about the fate of our religion here in the
Indies.
The Dutch Indies Government has recognized that the native people
here are people of Islam. But the government has also opened up the
country just like a market, both for business and for religion. Therefore
the government does not like, and is unwilling, to prohibit any religion
from being propagated in the country of a people of Islam, because, the
government says, it is neutral and does not take sides with regard to
religion. Thus it is very easy for any religion to use its tricks to deceive our
Muslim people. Therefore we Muslims must think for ourselves; we need
not beg the government. Readers after all know very well that the fate of
us natives is truly twisted left and right by those with power so that they
can more easily suck [our blood].
It is now clear that our religion of Islam here in the Indies gets no help
from anyone. Many wealthy Muslims do not care to fulfill the command�
ments of their religion. That is, they do not like to contribute their wealth
to the strengthening of our Islamness. Likewise those who are clever and
knowledgeable about Islam do not care to spread their learning to those
who are still in darkness-it is as if their learning is all their own doing.
There are even those who use their learning to cloak deceits or tricks for
their own gain. This is the reason why many of our Muslim people, who
are still ignorant, are ruined by the schemes of those who deliberately
exploit us: that is, those who get many of us Muslims to abandon the
religion of Islam and follow another religion. Anti-we-Islam knows that if
the natives are united, the religion of Islam will certainly become strong,
and they will not easily let their blood be sucked. Therefore anti-we
[forces] use deceit to prevent the natives from being united in Islam.
Brothers in Islam, remember these words and heed the commandment
of God in the Koran, which reads:
[Arabic text follows, in Arabic, and then in Roman script: The true
believers are those that have faith in Allah and His apostle and never
doubt; and who fight for His cause with their wealth and persons. Such
are those whose faith is true (49:15).]
134 An Age in Motion
This means: Truly the believers are all those who have faith in Allah
and Allah's Messenger and no longer doubt the faith of the believers;
contribute your wealth and your persons to walk on the path to Allah. So
it should be if you sincerely profess the faith.
Well, now it is clear that God commands us to move together; those
who are rich should contribute wealth, those who are learned should
contribute their learning and their persons, so that our people of Islam do
not get deceived by those who deliberately undermine the religion of
Islam.
Back to the nature of the government! If we accuse the government of
taking the side of the Christian religion, of course the government will say
No. Not now, with the new model [policy]. The government does not
meddle in matters of religion. But we know that the Christian religion
here in the Indies is being helped by some capitalism-not the govern�
ment, but the capitalists. These capitalists get protection from the govern�
ment. Isn't this an elegant conjuring trick?
As you readers well know, our organ, medan-moeslimin, so far has
been a place for only polite discussions. We praise this very much. But
now our voice is compelled to be no longer polite in the ears of the
government, because the times are now very difficult and oppressions
become ever more numerous and severe. The politique that is now carried
out in the Indies does not understand people. The religion of Islam in the
Indies is in chaos. The tone of voice of the press and the movement in the
land of Java is getting sharper and sharper. . . .
Therefore it may also obstruct our Islamic movement, because the
practice of justice here is not one that treats human beings equally; it is
only the justice of power. Thus, so long as we Muslims do not have
power, our religion here in the Indies will certainly not bear good fruit for
us Javanese. Brother Muslims, let us heed the commandment of God we
described above: that is, contribute our wealth and our persons to walk
on the path to Allah. For if we do not practice this commandment of
God, it is certain that the religion of Islam here in the Indies will get
increasingly thin [emaciated] because of the many obstructions that in�
tentionally split the feelings [of unity] of Muslims. This is the reason we
Muslims must resist them as strongly as possible, following the example
of movement set by our lord His Highness the Prophet Moechamad
(s.a.w.), who carried out the word of God without caring about any
difficulties he encountered, who was never afraid of pain and death [in
his effort to] free men from despotism, and who guided us human beings
to walk in the path of excellence-so that there should be no one who
torments his fellow men!
For the moment, perhaps this is sufficient for our appeal to you read�
ers, above all to those who are helping us. As to what our direction is, as
described above, I hope you will understand it for yourselves!
Whoever robs the religion of Islam, him are we obliged to destroy.35
Misbach, Sroean Kita, Medan Moeslimin 4 (1918), pp. 281 - 283. Italics in the
original.
The Insulinde and Peasant Strikes 135
Misbach's article, if translated as it is, loses much of the power of the
original, because Misbach as a muballigh writes as if he were talking at
tabligh gatherings and because the power of his writing can be best
appreciated when it is read aloud and heard. Yet we may still notice in
the way his argument proceeds the tabligh style of his writings: the
argument flows into the passage he quotes from the Koran and then
again flows out of it just like reading, translating, and explaining the
meanings of passages from the Koran at tabligh gatherings. To under�
stand Misbach's idea, then, we need to look at two components of his
argument, the passage he quotes from the Koran and his extensive
explanation of its meaning. First, as it is clear in his translation and
interpretation of the passage he quotes from the Koran, he transforms
a general description of who the true believers are into an imperative of
what the true believers should do. Notice the original meaning of the
sentence "[the true believers are those] who fight for His cause with
their wealth and persons" is transformed into "contribute your wealth
and your persons to walk on the path to Allah." It is this transforma�
tion that furnished him moral justification and led him to emphasize
deeds, acts to "put Islam in motion" (menggerakkan Islam).36
Second, in his extensive explanation which is built on his interpreta�
tion of the Koranic passage and in turn locates its meaning in the
context of "us, Muslims" in the Indies, he analyzes the situation of
Islam in the Indies in sociological terms. To put it schematically, the
logic of his analysis is: the government is neutral in matters of religion
but protects Dutch capitalists; Dutch capitalists help Christian mis�
sionaries; and Christian missionaries deceive Muslims and destroy Is�
lam, so that Muslims remain weak, Dutch capitalists can easily exploit
Muslims, the natives of the Indies, and the government perpetuates the
justice of power. In his view, therefore, to act on the teachings of Islam
meant to fight against Christian missionaries, Dutch capitalists, and
the government. To confess the faith and yet not to act on the teachings
of Islam was certainly an act of betrayal, but in his view it was also
wrong to fight against, say, Christian missionary activities, but not
against capitalists and the government.
At about the same time that Misbach published "Our Appeal," to�
gether with other pious Muslim batik traders such as Koesen, Harsoloemekso, and
Darsosasmito he established a tabligh association,
Sidik Amanat Tableg Vatonah (SATV), and was joined by the younger
generation of santri (those who studied at a pesantran) such as
Haroenrasjid, K. Moechtar Boechari, Sjarief, and Ahmad Dasoeki.3"'
36The translation of the original Koran is from The Koran, trans. N. J. Dawood, 4th
rev.
ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1918).
37For the SATV, see "S.A.T.V.," Medan Moeslimin 5 (1919), p. 99; "Perasaan," Islam
Bergerak, 10 July 1918; "Congres Islam," Islam Bergerak, 10 Apr. 1919. Koesen was
the
!36 An Age in Motion
Misbach became chairman, Darsosasmito vice-chairman, and Harsoloemekso secretary.
As the name suggests, the purpose of the SATV
was above all to "confirm the goodness" of Islam and to "advance
Islam, and as such it was modeled on the tabligh branch of the
Moehammadijah. Their activities were not very different from what
Moehammadijah propagandists did. They organized tabligh gather�
ings, established a modern-style native school with religious teachings,
and started to translate the Koran and classical Arabic religious texts
into Javanese. Medan Moeslimin and Islam Bergerak became SATV
organs and their pages were turned into tabligh on paper. Yet the
SATV was different from the Moehammadijah in two important re�
spects. First, while the Moehammadijah occupied the strategic position
squarely in the middle of the Yogyakartan religious establishment, the
SATV was led by pious Muslim batik traders who felt betrayed by the
religious establishment and "corroded" by the "deceits" and "tricks"
of the government, capitalists, and Christian missionaries. And second,
therefore, while the Moehammadijah propagandists' militancy derived
from their confidence that to work for the Moehammadijah was to live
as true Muslims, the militancy of the SATV muballighin came from
their fear of corrosion and their desire to prove their "Islamness" by
their own deeds. In their eyes anyone whose deeds betrayed his words
were fake. They attacked the Surakartan religious establishment, above
all those who led the TKNM Surakarta subcommittee, in these terms,
saying that they were not "true Islam" (Islam sedjati) but "Islam lamisan (pseudo-
Islam), "Islamic scholars who say what is expedient or
ingratiating only to make names for themselves."38 The basic thrust of
editor-in-chief of Islam Bergerak and a batik trader in Kauman. Darsosasmito was a
Kasunanan official and batik trader. Harsoloemekso was the administrator of Medan
Moeslimin and a wealthy batik entrepreneur in Keprabon. Haroenrasjid was born in
1897 in
Pacitan and educated in pesantren Jampes (Kediri) and Mangunsan (Nganjuk) after he
graduated from a second-class native school. In 1917, at the age of twenty, he
joined Hasan
bin Semit s Sinar Islam as an editor. Sjarief was born in 1898 in Ponorogo and
graduated
from a second-class native school atJetis. He worked as a clerk at the Naib's
office at Gontor
and then as a clerk at a plantation in Madiun. He joined the SATV in 1918 and soon
became
the administrator of Islam Bergerak and later its editor. Meochtar Boechari was
born in 1899
in Kauman, Surakarta, graduated from a second-class native school and the Madrasah
Islamijah Arabijah, and was educated at pesantren Tremas, Pacitan. He joined the
SATV in
1918 and became an editor of Medan Moeslimin. Achmad Dasoeki was born in 190Z in
Keprabon and educated at the Mamba'oel Oeloem, pesantren Jamsaren, and pesantren
Kasingan (Rembang), and joined the SATV in 1919. Wirjosandjojo (father of Satiman
and
Soekiman Wirjosandjojo), Sontohartono (a batik entrepreneur in Keprabon),
Sastrositojo
and Trihardono (both batik traders in Kauman), R. M. Temanggung Parikrangkungan of
Kampung Sewu (a sunan s official and editor of Darma Kanda), K. H. Moh. Idris of
Kauman,
and Murjadi Djojomargono of Keprabon also were founding members of the SATV.
58"Pro betoel-betoel Pro," Medan Moeslimin 5 (1919), pp. 16-18. For attacks on the
Surakarta religious establishment, see, for instance, "Menjoekoep permintaan t.
Caero,"
The Insulinde and Peasant Strikes i37
the SATV was "to put the Religion of Islam in motion" or as one of the
SATV organs signified, Islam Bergerak-Islam in motion. Misbach
emerged as a leading muballigh of the SATV not because of his words
but because of his deeds to "put Islam in motion"-organizing tabligh
gatherings, publishing journals, establishing schools, and fighting
against costly government anti-plague measures and all forms of "op�
pression and exploitation."
The Rise of the Insulinde, 1
Misbach's emergence as a leading muballigh of "Islam in motion"
and Tjipto's reemergence on the main stage of the pergerakan as a
Volksraad member proved to be major factors in the rise of the In�
sulinde in Surakarta. In early 1918 the Insulinde Surakarta branch was
still a tiny association with its membership largely confined to Indos,
Western-educated Dutch-speaking Peranakan Chinese, and profession�
al priyayi. In late 1918 and especially in early 1919, however, it ex�
panded rapidly and on an enormous scale. In a year its membership
exceeded ten thousand, and by June 1919 it became the largest branch
with its membership greater than that of all the other Insulinde
branches combined.39 This huge expansion was due to its success in
mobilizing peasants in rural Surakarta. Such success was unique in two
respects. First, it was the Surakarta Insulinde alone that succeeded in
peasant mobilization in the whole pergerakan in 1918-20. Despite the
call for the organization of workers and peasants at the 1918 CSI
congress, the SI remained successful only in mobilizing workers. But
the success of the Surakarta Insulinde in mobilizing peasants created its
own problems. Peasant mobilization unleashed peasant radicalism,
which proved beyond the control of the Surakarta Insulinde leadership
and eventually invited government suppression of the Insulinde. Sec�
ond, the Surakarta Insulinde was unique because it successfully trans�
formed itself into a huge native association, while the Insulinde central
leadership as well as most of the other branches, especially those in
major administrative and commercial centers such as Surabaya, Ba�
tavia, and Bandung, remained largely Indo. As we shall see, this struc�
tural imbalance between the huge native Surakarta Insulinde and the
Indo-dominated central leadership, once confronted with government
Medan Moeslimin 5 (1919), pp. 56-57; S.R., "Perasaan" and Koesen's comment on this
article in Islam Bergerak, 10 July 1918.
39Procureur Generaal (G. W. Uhlenbeck) aan GG, 2.4 June 1919, Mr. 39 ix/19, Vb. 6
Sept.
1919, No. F7. Uhlenbeck says that the Insulinde membership in June 1919 was
approxi�
mately twenty-three thousand.
138 An Age in Motion
suppression, proved fatal and eventually led to the demise of the Insulinde and its
successor, the Nationaal Indische Partij-Sarekat Hindia
(NIP-SH, National Indies Party-Association of the Indies). Why then in
Surakarta alone did the Insulinde, an association of Indos who shared
"Douwes Dekker's dream of `the Indies for Indiers,'" emerge as a huge
native pergerakan force?40 Why in Surakarta alone was the Insulinde
so successful in mobilizing peasants? What roles did Misbach and
Tjipto play in leading this "revolutionary" Surakarta Insulinde?
In the middle of 1918, when Misbach established the SATV and the
Volksraad opened in Batavia, the pergerakan forces in Surakarta were
still extremely fragmented. On the one hand, there was the Javanese
nationalist BO, controlled by young Western-educated Kasunanan and
Mangkunegaran aristocrats, above all, Prince Mangkunegara Prang
Wedana, R.M.A. Woerjaningrat, and Pangeran Hadiwidjojo. The BO
Surakarta branch was not only the largest and wealthiest among the
BO branches but also the strongest and most respectable group in
Surakarta. As elsewhere, the BO in Surakarta was the party of loyal
priyayi Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran officials and princes as well
as government priyayi-and its de facto organ, Darma Kanda, pub�
lished in Javanese three times a week, was the largest in circulation and
financially most sound among Surakartan newspapers.
On the other side stood the Indies nationalist Insulinde. In the mid�
dle of 1918 the Insulinde Surakarta branch leadership was still in the
hands of old-guard members from the IP days, with Galestien as chair�
man and Soetadi, a teacher at a government native school, as secre�
tary.41 But Tjipto's rehabilitation as a pergerakan leader had already
made itself felt at that time. Because he was appointed by the governor
general to be a Volksraad member and because he could now attack
the local authorities in the Volksraad with parliamentary immunity,
harassment of his activities significantly decreased. Though he was not
yet a member of either the Insulinde central committee or the branch
leadership, he now attended branch executive meetings regularly and
started to publish the Javanese-language Insulinde organ, Panggoegah
(Awakener), three times a month. In editing and publishing Pang�
goegah, Tjipto was joined by such second-class native school graduates
as Moedio Wignjosoetomo, Sismadi Sastrosiswojo, and Doellatib.42
40Quoted from Teeuwen's speech at the tenth Indiers congress in May 1921, reported
in
Pemberita dari kongres kaoem Indier jang ke-10," Persatoean Hindia, 21 May 1921.
41Soetadi was also a leading member of the PGB (Assistant Teachers' Union) and the
BO
Surakarta branch.
4-Sismadi Sastrosiswojo was born in Yogyakarta in 1893 and graduated from a
secondclass native school at Madiun. He started his career as a journalist and
pergerakan activist by
joining Pewarta Soerabaja, a Chinese-owned Malay-language newspaper, as a
proofreader in
1917. In 1918 he joined Panggoegah as an editor and Islam Bergerak as
administrator.
Doellatib was born in Kepatihan, Surakarta, in 1895 and graduated from a second-
class
The Insulinde and Peasant Strikes i39
The Panggoegah office in Keprabon became a meeting place of Tjipto's
proteges and radical-minded SI activists.43
Tjipto's rehabilitation was felt not only among Insulinde members
but also by BO leaders. Since Tjipto was a Volksraad member and
equal in that respect with BO representatives and Prang Wedana, BO
members could no longer disregard him simply as "incorrigible." Even
before the opening of the Volksraad, Soetatmo Soeriokoesoemo, a
leading proponent of Javanese nationalism and leader of the Commit�
tee for Javanese Nationalism, had exchanged polemics with Tjipto as
to Javanese versus Indies nationalism. And in July at the congress for
Javanese cultural development held in Surakarta under the sponsor�
ship of the BO central leadership with Prang Wedana as honorary
chairman, Tjipto again debated Soetatmo as to the nature of Javanese
cultural tradition and its relevance in the modern age. In these debates,
Tjipto attacked Javanese nationalism of the BO as an ideology of res�
toration that reified kaula-gusti (man-God/subject-king) relations as
the essence of Javanese culture.44 Despite the apparent ideological dif�
ference between the Javanese nationalist BO and the Indies nationalist
Insulinde, not a few Javanese had maintained dual membership by the
middle of 1918. But as the disputes made the ideological gulf between
the two parties wide open, it became increasingly untenable to main�
tain dual membership.
Aside from the BO and the Insulinde, there were also various groups
that were loosely related to the now only nominally existent Surakarta
SI. Though the boundaries of these groups were ambiguous and not a
few belonged to several as well as the BO and the Insulinde, we may
still roughly distinguish them in terms of leading personalities, major
orientations, and connections with pergerakan forces outside Surakar�
ta. First, there was the group that included Samanhoedi and other
Lawean batik entrepreneurs who had played important roles in the
Rekso Roemekso. Martodharsono, editor-in-chief of Djawi Hiswara
and Djawi Kanda, also remained close to this group. Although hardly
active in pergerakan politics in Surakarta, because of their wealth and
because the SI was their creation and Samanhoedi the founding father,
this group always occupied a central place in the Surakarta SI leadernative school
and a technical school in Semarang. After working at the NIS for some time as a
boilerman, he returned to Surakarta, joined the Insulinde, and became administrator
of
Panggoegah. Little is known about Moedio Wignjosoetomo, except that he was an
editor of
Panggoegah, was Tjipto's most trusted protege and Sosrokardono's brother-in-law,
and that
he lived in Mangkunegaran, Surakarta.
43Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 19Z0, Mr. 66 ix/1910.
44For the debates between Tjipto and Soetatmo, see Takashi Shiraishi, "The Disputes
between Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Soetatmo Soeriokoesoemo: Satria vs. Pandita,"
In�
donesia 32 (Oct. 1981), pp. 93-108.
140 An Age in Motion
ship if only nominally, and constituted a solidly anti-Tjokroaminoto
faction. The second was the group of religious officials, kyai, and
Arabs who dominated the TKNM Surakarta subcommittee. This
group was not very active in pergerakan politics either; it neither held
rallies nor published an organ. Yet Poerwodihardjo, secretary of the
TKNM subcommittee, replaced Sosrokoernio as secretary of the Sur�
akarta SI, and together with Hisamzaijnie, chairman of the TKNM
subcommittee and CSI adviser, represented the pro-Tjokroaminoto
kaum putihan force in Surakarta. The Surakarta SI leadership was
controlled by these two groups in an uneasy coalition; or, rather, we
may say that these two groups could effectively deny any other group
taking over the SI leadership and move in the name of the SI. Under
their control, the Surakarta SI had no money, no membership list,
published no organ, convened no meetings, and remained comfortably
dormant.45
In opposition to this Surakarta SI leadership stood Misbach's SATV,
with Medan Moeslimin and Islam Bergerak as its organs. The Toenggal Boedi, which
came into being in May 1918 with the Djawa Dipa
propaganda by Tirtodanoedjo and Sosrokardono in Surakarta, also
joined the SI opposition forces. The leading figures of the Toenggal
Boedi were Djojopanatas, father-in-law of Sosrokardono and Moedio
Wignjosoetomo, and Soedarman, a leader of the Surakarta branch of
the Native Pawnshop Workers' Union, the PPPB. The Toenggal Boedi
called for the use of Djawa Dipa language and the organization of
workers.46 The Surakarta branch of the PKBT, an arm of the ISDV and
the Semarang SI that was intended to expand their influence on local
Sis, also joined SI opposition forces. It was led by R. Santoso, Opiumregie
official and editor-in-chief of Koemandang Djawi (Echo ofJava),
a weekly Javanese-language newspaper.47 And acting as a mediator of
all these opposition forces was Sosrokoernio, who as a former Surakar�
ta SI secretary maintained extensive personal connections and pub�
lished Paso Pati, a bimonthly Javanese- and Malay-language news�
paper, together with Marco, now in Semarang.48
From August 1918 onward, the cooperation of these SI opposition
forces was gradually worked out at the initiative of Sosrokoernio. The
first occasion was the outbreak of the printers' strike led by Santoso at
the BO printing firm. This was the first major strike in the city of
Surakarta and as such marked the opening of the age of strikes there.
41 For the general picture of the Surakarta SI in 1918-19, see Resident van
Surakarta aan
GG, 11 Apr. 1919, Mr. 300X/19, Vb. 30 Dec. 1921, No. E14.
46For Toenggal Boedi, see "Statuten dari Perhimpoenan Toenggal Boedi di
Soerakarta,"
Islam Bergerak, no. 9, 20 May 1918. Tirtodanoedjo, a leading proponent of Djawa
Dipa and
former editor of Darma Kanda, became adviser of the Toenggal Boedi.
47Kwantes, De Opkomst van de Nationalistische Beweging, p. 16.
48Persoverzicht: Jan.-medio Maart 1918, 264X/18.
The Insulinde and Peasant Strikes 141
Immediately after the strike broke out, the Fonds Samarasa was estab�
lished at Sosrokoernio's initiative to support striking workers finan�
cially.49 As the name suggests, those who joined the Fonds Samarasa
looked to Marco and the Semarang SI as their example, but in the
Surakartan pergerakan context, it was the first organizational ex�
pression of SI opposition forces and radical-minded Tjipto's proteges
joining hands in response to the coming of the age of strikes. Then in
September and October Santoso successfully organized printers, Opiumregie
officials, and government pawnshop workers into the PKBT and
established its circles (kring, "subbranch") in Kartasura, Sragen, and
Baki. His propaganda activities were so successful that when the PKBT
central leadership in Demak collapsed after Soehario's arrest in Octo�
ber, it was reconstructed in Surakarta with Santoso as chairman and
Misbach as vice-chairman. Misbach provided much-needed financial
help for Santoso's PKBT and made the Medan Moeslimin office and
his newspaper Islam Bergerak available to the PKBT as its office and its
organ.50
Based on the success of the PKBT, SI opposition groups, supported
by the Semarang SI and the Surakarta Insulinde, made their first and
last bid to take over the Surakarta SI leadership in early April 1919. At
the initiative of Semaoen and Marco, the CSI executive meeting held in
Surabaya on February 15 decided to reconstruct the Surakarta SI w'ith
Marco as chairman, Misbach as vice-chairman, and R. Hadiasmara as
secretary. The CSI decision was immediately announced in Surakarta
on February 18 at the joint rally of the PKBT and the Surakarta In�
sulinde.51 Marco started to publish a new weekly "Surakarta SI or�
gan," Medan Bergerak (Forum in motion). In early March Hadiasmara
and other pro-Semarang SI activists sent an open letter to the Surakarta
SI leadership, asking to convene a general meeting and to reconstruct
the SI on the condition that Samanhoedi be appointed honorary chair�
man without supervisory power, that the Surakarta SI join the CSI and
"move" in the field of politics, and that the Surakarta SI "put Islam in
motion."52 The general meeting was held on April 6 in Sri Wedari. By
that time, however, peasant strikes had been taking place in the Kasunanan
countryside, and the Insulinde and the PKBT led by Misbach
had been accused not only by the authorities but also by the Surakarta
49For the printers' strike at the BO printing firm, see "Pemogokan," Islam
Bergerak, i
Sept. 1918. For the Fonds Samarasa, see S. Wojo [Sismadi Sastrosiswojo], "Bakal
Diadakan
`Fonds Samarasa,"' Islam Bergerak, zo Aug. 1918; S. Wojo, "Fonds Sama-Rasa," Islam
Bergerak, 1 and 10 Sept. 1918.
50Santoso, "Akan Pindah ke Solo," Islam Bergerak, i Nov. 1918; "Pendahoeloean" and
"Oesikan," Islam Bergerak, zo Oct. 1918.
5Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 11 Apr. 1919, Mr. 300X/19, Vb. 30 Dec. 19Z1,
No. E14.
s2Darma Kanda, 3 Mar. 1919, IPO, 10 (1919).
142. An Age in Motion
BO of instigating peasant protest actions. Alarmed by the prospect that
the Surakarta SI might be taken over by Marco and Misbach, Samanhoedi and other
Lawean batik traders, Kasunanan officials (their old
allies), kyai, religious officials, and Arabs of the dormant TKNM sub�
committee came to Sri Wedari en masse and dominated the meeting.
Samanhoedi was elevated to honorary chairman with supervisory
power, Hisamzaijnie and R.M.A. Poespodiningrat, former chairman of
the SI Committee for the Department for Central Java, were elected
advisers, while R. Ng. Wirokoesoemo, sunan's court official, Poerwodihardjo, TKNM
secretary, and M. H. Abdoelsalam, a Lawean
batik entrepreneur, were elected chairman, secretary, and treasurer.53
After this general meeting, the Surakarta SI again went into dormancy
and the chance for the Surakarta SI to become a vehicle of radical SI
forces was lost.
SI opposition forces, however, had been joining the Surakarta Insulinde well before
the April 1919 SI general meeting. In those days
there was nothing unusual about dual membership in the SI and the
Insulinde. Though the Insulinde was an association to work for "the
Indies for Indiers" irrespective of race and religion, while the SI was an
association of Indies Muslims, their difference was hardly ideological.
As the existence of IP'ers in the SI attests, the IP/Insulinde ideal of the
independent Indies was widely shared by SI members. What kept SI
members from joining the Insulinde was rather the fact that the In�
sulinde was seen as an association of Indos. But this did not hold in
Surakarta, especially after Tjipto was rehabilitated and started to pub�
lish the Javanese-language Insulinde organ Panggoegah. Tjipto was a
well-known pergerakan figure in Surakarta with "revolutionary" cre�
dentials that no one could deny. Aside from police harassment, the
only reasons he had been isolated by the middle of 1918 were his
domineering aloofness and the inaccessibility of his largely Dutch writ�
ings to many pergerakan activists. With the publication of Panggoegah
the problem of his inaccessible writings, if not his person, was elimi�
nated. In Panggoegah, Tjipto discussed and rendered meaningful in
plain language a wide range of issues from fast-changing world devel�
opments to such issues discussed in the Volksraad as food shortages
caused by the suspension of rice imports from British India (Burma),
the reduction of sugarcane planting in favor of increased foodstuff
production, and the establishment of municipal and village councils.
Tjipto was thus increasingly seen as an important source of intellectual
inspiration by radical-minded SI activists, and in their eyes the Surakar�
ta Insulinde was increasingly identified with Tjipto.
j3For the new Surakarta SI leadership, see Islam Bergerak, 20 Apr. 1919. See also
Medan
Bergerak, 24 Apr. 1919, IPO, 20 (1919), and Soerjosasmojo, "Verslag pendek S.I. di
Soerakarta," Islam Bergerak, 20 Apr. 1919.
The Insulinde and Feasant Strikes i43
Misbach in this context played a crucial role in inducing SI radicals
to enter the Surakarta Insulinde. He himself joined the Insulinde in
March 1918. The reason he did so was fortuitous. In March the Sur�
akarta Insulinde established a committee to investigate grievances
about anti-plague compulsory housing improvements and other exces�
sive administrative measures. Misbach, being an active representative
in Kauman, joined the Insulinde and acted as a major figure of the
committee. At that time, plague infested the city of Surakarta and
extended westward to the areas of Kartasura and Delanggu. The Sur�
akarta Insulinde leadership appointed Misbach a commissioner and
authorized him to hold propaganda rallies against anti-plague govern�
ment measures in the name of the Insulinde and to set up Insulinde
circles outside the city of Surakarta. Attacking government anti-plague
measures and the financial burdens caused by compulsory housing
improvements, Misbach soon organized the Kartasura Insulinde circle
with Atmokertanto, a pawnshop official, as chairman, and H. Bakri, a
batik trader, as secretary. Misbach's campaign against compulsory
housing improvements was so successful that after he organized a huge
rally in May, people in Kartasura completely stopped their repayment
of government loans for compulsory housing improvements. At that
time, however, the Insulinde branch leadership was still in the hands of
Galestien and Soetadi, who, frightened by the assistant resident's warn�
ing, ordered Misbach and the Kartasura circle leadership to stop all
their activities and convened yet another rally to apologize to the au�
thorities.54 If all else had been equal, Insulinde's retreat from the cam�
paign against anti-plague government measures would have alienated
Misbach from the Insulinde for good. But all else was not equal. Mis�
bach became more deeply disillusioned with the TKNM and the Sur�
akarta SI. Misbach remained in the Insulinde as a commissioner. And if
Tjipto was attractive to SI radicals because of his brilliant writings,
Misbach was attractive because of his warmness, openness, friendli�
ness, and the way his words matched his deeds. Given the dormancy of
the Surakarta SI, this combination of Tjipto and Misbach worked well
to make the Insulinde look genuinely "revolutionary," hence attractive
to SI radicals.
The general meeting of the Surakarta Insulinde held in early Decem�
ber 1918 marked the turning point of its rise as the only "national"
"revolutionary" association in Surakarta. At the meeting, all the oldguard leaders
resigned and a completely new leadership was elected.
Tjipto himself did not become an executive member, because he had to
be in Batavia for more than half a year as a Volksraad member. In54Resident van
Surakarata aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr. 661X/20. For Misbach's activities as
a representative to voice people's grievances on anti-plague government measures,
see Panewoe District Kota (Soetosoesastro), "Rapport," 8 May 1920, Mr. 661X/20.
144 An Age in Motion
stead, Mrs. Vogel, Tjipto's wife, became chair, and under her the new
leadership was composed of:
Chair: Mrs. Vogel
Vice-chairman: H. Mohammad Misbach (chairman of the SATV, editor-inchief of Medan
Moeslimin, editor of Islam Bergerak)
First secretary: Soedarman (secretary of the Toenggal Boedi, leader of PPPB
Surakarta branch)
Second secretary: R. Gatoet Sastrodihardjo (editor of Panggoegab)
Commissioners: Moedio Wignjosoetomo (editor of Panggoegab)
Sismadi Sastrosiswojo (editor of Panggoegab, administrator of Islam
Bergerak)
Doellatib (editor of Panggoegab)
Noeriman (administrator of Panggoegab)
Harsoloemekso (secretary of the SATV, administrator of Medan Moeslimin)
R. Ng. Darsosasmito (vice-chairman of the SATV, editor of Medan
Moeslimin)
Koesen (SATV member, editor-in-chief of Islam Bergerak)
R. M. Partowinoto (SATV member)
Aside from Mrs. Vogel, all the members of the new Insulinde Surakarta
leadership had either joined the Fonds Samarasa or were Tjipto's pro�
teges, or both. To underline Misbach's leadership, the meeting autho�
rized him to lead Insulinde propaganda activities outside the city of
Surakarta, to issue membership cards on his own responsibility, and to
set up Insulinde circles in the name of the Surakarta Insulinde.55
As the composition of the new leadership clearly shows, it was the
realization of what Soewardi had urged at the 1913 SI Surakarta con�
gress: Sarekat Hindia, an association of those who work for the prog�
ress of the Indies irrespective of race or religion. Though Soewardi had
yet to return to the Indies in August 1919, the emergence of the Sur�
akarta Insulinde as a virtual Sarekat Fiindia was very good news to
Douwes Dekker, who had been in the Indies since August 1918. Fie
was then in Semarang as the deputy secretary of the Insulinde central
leadership and editor-in-chief of De Beweging, a Dutch-language In�
sulinde organ. Determined to reconstruct the IP, he had been urging the
Insulinde central leadership to expand its social base from Indos to
natives. But the Insulinde central leadership in Semarang, as well as the
major branches in Batavia, Bandung, and Surabaya, were in the hands
of Indos, and though loyal to Douwes Dekker, they were not very
enthusiastic about his idea, mainly because the improvement in their
social and economic position in the war years made Indo members
more conservative than in prewar years.56 In Douwes Dekker's plan to
^Resident van Surakarata aan GG, 23 May 1919, Mr. 322X/19.
>6See Hoofdbestuur van Insulinde aan GG, 18 Dec. 1917, Mr. 14X/18; Procureur
Generaal
aan GG, 9 May 1919, Mr. 303X/19, Vb. 9 July 1919, No. 61.
The Insulinde and Feasant Strikes 145
transform the Insulinde into the IP, the Surakarta Insulinde thus oc�
cupied a special position as a vanguard, all the more so because Tjipto,
his trusted friend, was there. Shortly after the general meeting, Douwes
Dekker, in the name of the Insulinde central leadership, authorized the
Surakarta Insulinde to carry out propaganda activities freely at its own
initiative and independent of the central leadership.
In the Surakartan pergerakan context, the Surakarta Insulinde was
the united front of opposition forces to the priyayi establishment that
controlled the BO and the religious establishment and Lawean batik
entrepreneurs who controlled the Surakarta SI. Its significance can be
more clearly understood if we compare the Surakarta Insulinde to the
Yogyakarta SI, which was then also emerging as a center of the SI
movement. In Yogyakarta, as we have seen, the SI was led by Soerjopranoto, with his
organizational base in the Arbeidsleger-Adhi Dharma and the PFB, and Fachrodin,
with his base in the Moehammadijah,
especially in its dynamic tabligh branch. Soerjopranoto was a member
of the Paku Alam house and thus sat at the lesser apex of the Yogya�
karta priyayi order. The Arbeidsleger-Adhi Dharma was a patronage
association of Paku Alaman aristocrats, and the PFB the union of
skilled sugar factory workers employed on a regular basis. Fachrodin
was the son of a sultan's religious official. The Moehammadijah en�
joyed the solid support of sultan's religious officials as well as batik
entrepreneurs in the city of Yogyakarta and Kota Gede. Thus the social
bases of the Yogyakarta SI lay in Paku Alam aristocrats and priya�
yi, the Kasultanan religious establishment, batik entrepreneurs, and
skilled sugar factory workers. In contrast, both Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran
aristocrats and priyayi were under the influence of the BO.
Tjipto's attack on the Javanese nationalism of the BO only alienated
them from the Insulinde. Nothing illustrates this more than the fact
that Soetadi, secretary of the Surakarta Insulinde and commissioner of
the BO Surakarta branch, simply quit the Insulinde at the general
meeting in December. Tjipto and his younger proteges were only on
the periphery of the Solonese priyayi order. Likewise, Misbach and the
SATV were in opposition to the religious establishment. Besides, the
SATV found its support among batik traders in the central parts of
the city, while Lawean batik entrepreneurs remained aloof and some�
times hostile to the SATV. Workers, especially printers and govern�
ment pawnshop and Opiumregie officials, joined the Toenggal Boedi
and the PKBT, but in this royal city of Surakarta, they were also
marginal. The Surakarta Insulinde was a united front of orang par�
ticular, reformist Muslims, and workers, all marginal in the Surakar�
tan social hierarchy. As long as the Surakarta Insulinde confined its
activities to within the city, it could not expect to expand its constitu�
ency. But peasant discontent was growing in the countryside. The out�
breaks of peasant strikes were reported both in the Kasunanan and in
146 An Age in Motion
the Mangkunegaran. Peasant strikes themselves were not new, but
their frequency was alarming. From August 1918 on, peasant strikes
were reported in Pucangsawit, Dukuh, Pojok of Sukoharjo and Gulon
of Calamadu.57 All these peasant strikes were small-scale and ended
quickly. Their causes were everywhere similar: peasants refused to
perform corvee labor for the plantation and demanded an increase in
wages for paid corvee labor (glidig), because the steep price rise of
necessary commodities made the current wage level utterly untenable.
Shortly after the Insulinde general meeting, the Kartasura circle, which
had been suspended since May, was reactivated by Misbach. He start�
ed his propaganda activities as an Insulinde propagandist and SATV
muballigh in the tobacco and sugar plantation areas of the Kasunanan
with the Kartasura circle as his outpost. And it was there in the coun�
tryside that the Surakarta Insulinde experienced dazzling expansion.
The Rise of the Insulinde, 2
Toward the end of 1918 Misbach started his propaganda activities
in Kartasura, Banyudono, and Ponggok. After the reactivation of the
Kartasura Insulinde circle, the expansion of the Insulinde in this area
was spectacular. On December 29, 1918, the Karangduren branch of
the Kartasura circle was organized on the Tegalgondo tobacco planta�
tion (district Banyudono, regency of Boyolali), some 4 kilometers from
the town of Kartasura. On February 16, 1919, the Nglungge circle was
established in district Ponggok (regency of Klaten), some 12 kilometers
from Kartasura. In March the Klaseman branch of the Kartasura circle
and the Pundung circle were organized on the Tegalgondo plantation
(district Kartasura, regency of Surakarta) and on the Manjung tobacco
plantation (district Ponggok). In April the Gawok circle was estab�
lished in district Kartasura, and by the end of May two more circles
were organized on the Polanharjo tobacco plantation (district Pong�
gok).58 For reasons we shall see, neither Misbach nor the Surakarta
Insulinde leadership knew how many joined Insulinde circles. Even if
estimated very modestly, however, membership exceeded ten thousand
in less than half a year. Peasant strikes in Nglungge and on the Tegal�
gondo tobacco plantation took place during this expansion. To under-
'7For the peasant strike in Pucangsawit, see Islam Bergerak, io Aug. 1918. For the
strikes
in Dukuh and Gulon (Mangkunegaran), see Islam Bergerak, 10 Sept. 1918, and 10 Nov.
1918. For the strike in Pojok, see Islam Bergerak, zo Oct. 1918. Also see Sismadi
Sastrosiswojo's remark on the age of strikes in Islam Bergerak, 10 Oct. 1919.
>s"Chronologische Volgorde der Feiten" in Resident van Surakarta aan GG, Z3 May
1919,
Mr. 3ZZX/19 (hereafter Chronologische Volgorde, Mr. 3ZZX/19). Resident van
Surakarta
aan Procureur Generaal, 3 July 1919, Mr. 474X/19.
The Insulinde and Feasant Strikes 147
stand why the Insulinde grew so rapidly and on such an enormous
scale, and why the Insulinde expansion was accompanied by growing
peasant unrest, we have to examine peasant grievances in the Kasunanan countryside,
the nature of circle leadership, and the way circle
leaders organized peasant discontent in their propaganda for the In�
sulinde. But before going into these questions, let us first examine how
Misbach saw the peasant situation in rural Surakarta and what he
called for by circle leaders and peasants.
To understand Misbach's ideas about the peasant situation, the basic
message he conveyed to peasants, as well as the role he assigned himself
in leading Insulinde circles, a cartoon published in the April 20 issue of
Islam Bergerak will give us a good starting point. In this cartoon (see
Figure 1), the most visible exploiter and oppressor is the Dutch "kapltalist." He
sucks the blood of the peasant through the pipe fixed to the
peasant's stomach, while saying, "Ha, it tastes sweet." The half-visible
exploiter and oppressor is the government commanded by the resident
of Surakarta. The government oppresses the voice of peasant protest
and grievances by gripping the peasant's head tightly by the hand, on
which is written "Articles 154 and 156 of the criminal law," articles
that regulate the freedom of speech and press. The government op�
presses the voice of the peasant not only because the capitalist comaD
(33
�ri _
bCO m
c* *
a � a
#*-s e p,
SD-- �>
e s
S< trt
o K
bo
a
o
S
A \V aS!!!
Docloe pakoekoe, sckarang saot`lik<�t*J
Doeloe tocwaukoe, sekarang njata moosoehkoe!!!
Figure 1
148 An Age in Motion
mands "You grip [him] tightly so that I can easily suck him," but also
because the government itself exploits the peasant by taxation, de�
picted as the datjinan (one of the weights used for balancing an oldfashioned
scale) he has around his neck that is inscribed "padjeg"
(tax). Thus the government commands the peasant: "Don't raise your
voice. Raise the weight you bear." If the capitalist and the government
are visible oppressors and exploiters, the third oppressor and exploiter
is invisible, but written in the sentences below the cartoon: "Watch
out!!! Formerly my nail, now my dead weight! Formerly my master,
now clearly my enemy!!!" The key to understanding the sentences is
the word, "nail" (\pakoe), which signifies the Susuhunan Pakubuwana
X, the Nail of the World. These sentences thus mean that he who was
once the nail of the world, the center of the universe, the sunan, has
now become the dead weight that prevents the peasant from liberating
himself from the yoke of oppression and exploitation by the capitalist
and the government and that therefore the sunan, once the master, has
now become the enemy. The cartoon is carefully done, because it dem�
onstrates the perverted Kasunanan agrarian system in which the cap�
italist was fully visible, the government half visible, and the sunan
invisible. Yet as the cartoon clearly tells us, it is the trinity of the
capitalist, the government, and the sunan that oppresses and exploits
the peasant. What, then, was the message Misbach conveyed to the
peasant? This is also shown in the cartoon. The peasant says in despair
to himself, "Alas! This is our fate. Who will help [us]?" A voice then
comes from outside, from outside the peasant world for sure, but
perhaps also from outside the human world itself: "Don't be afraid."
Why did Misbach tell the peasant "Don't be afraid"? What did he
mean by "Don't be afraid"? In his article "An Ignorant Person Is Also a
Creature of God, therefore High Thought Can Also Be in His Brain,"
he extensively explains this idea of "Don't be afraid." In this article, he
first makes it clear that "though the Government says it protects the
people, it is clear to us that it is total nonsense [omong kosong]" and
that "the Government only protects the capitalists [kaum kapitalisme],
while peasant people or Kromos remain their prey." Then he asks,
"How can we attain the harmony to win over our freedom?" The only
way to "be harmonious," Misbach says, is "to hold on to the law [wet;
waton, reason], which can apply to all human beings," that is, the
human law based on God's commandment, the Koran. He continues:
But you readers must remember that once we are united in our harmony,
we are bidden by God in the Koran as follows:
[lines in Arabic script]
It means: Call what is right right, call what is error error, even ifthe
one in error hates you.
The Insulinde and Peasant Strikes 149
It is clear that we human beings are bidden to take care that no one
shall continually do actions that are not right. If we have faith, then
certainly we will no longer hesitate to heed God's commandment. Even
if we are hated by those who act in error, we are still bidden to cor�
rect them, irrespective of their nation or whether their rank is high or
low. No matter if they are kings, or governments, or ulama, or kyai, or
anyone else, if their conduct is not as it should be, we are bidden to
correct them.
To be sure, it is difficult for us to do this at present, for in the world of
today the land ofJava is filled with nothing but oppression upon us. No
matter how the oppressed cry out, it seems that they are not heeded. All
that is offered us is might. If we are unwilling to be put under the yoke,
then the weapons of that might confront us. That is why [conditions in
the] Indies today are like the conditions in Mecca in olden times. For
where life was indifferent to the oppression around it, there God spoke.
Put into Malay, He said, more or less: Why are you all unwilling to fight
the perang sabil [Holy War], and help those men, women, and children
who are in wretchedness and who beseech Allah thus: Lord God! May
the Lord deliver us His servants from this city of Mecca where men only
torment one another! And may the Lord grant us a Mukmin [guide] who
will lead us and help us.
Well! It is now clear enough that God's command obliges us to help
whoever is oppressed-to the point that if the oppression is not stopped
beforehand, we are obliged to fight.59
As in "Our Appeal," here again Misbach's writing style is that of
tabligh. It is as if he is speaking, and his argument flows into and out of
the Koranic passages he quotes. As in "Our Appeal," therefore, much
of the power of his argument comes from the interplay between the
Koranic passages and his explanation. And this interplay comes to its
rhetorical height when he draws the parallel between the Indies here
and now and Mecca in olden times and quotes the Koranic passage as
the call for perang sabillilah-fight for the cause of Allah. In the stan�
dard English translation this Koranic passage is rendered: "And how
should you not fight for the cause of Allah, and for the helpless old
men, women, and children who say: `Deliver us, Lord, from this city of
wrongdoers; send forth to us a guardian from Your presence; send to
us one that will help us'?" (4:75). Misbach's translation differs from
this in two respects. First, "how should you not fight for the cause of
Allah" is rendered "why are you all unwilling to fight the Holy War."
The addition of "all" transforms the obligation of each Muslim to fight
for the cause of Allah into the collective obligation of Muslims. Second,
accordingly, "send forth to us a guardian from Your presence; send to
59Misbach, "Orang bodo djoega machloek Toehan, maka fikiran jang ringgi djoega bisa
didalam otaknja," Islam Bergerak, io Mar. 1919. Italics in the original.
150 An Age in Motion
us one that will help us" is rendered "may the Lord grant us a Mukmin
[guide] who will lead us and help us." Here again the addition of "lead
us" transforms a Mukmin from a savior to a leader, who will not only
"help us" but also "lead us" in "our" collective fight for the cause of
Allah. And in this article, in a way more pronounced than in "Our
Appeal," this interplay of the Koranic passages and his explanation is
reinforced further by the subtle inner interplay of all-inclusive kita
(we), which could simultaneously mean Misbach the writer, Misbach
and the reader, and the people in the land ofJava and in the Indies. In
this inner interplay of "we," Misbach is obliged and commits himself
to the obligation to heed God's command, not to be afraid to "call
what is right right, call what is error error," to fight for the cause of
Allah, and to follow the Prophet Muhammad. And again in this inner
interplay of "we," Misbach is assured that if only he conveys God's
command by his words and deeds, people would join him, would
emerge as Islamic soldiers to fight for the cause of Allah and annihilate
all the exploitation, wretchedness, and oppression. Misbach said "Don't
be afraid" because that was the only way to heed God's command, but
his message "Don't be afraid" and his call to fight for the cause of
Allah were directed to Misbach himself as much as to the reader and
"peasant people or Kromos." And it was the reason the cartoon's
message, "Don't be afraid," came not only from outside the peasant
world but also from outside the human world-that is, from God.
For Misbach, then, to make propaganda for "our freedom," "free�
dom of our country," was the same as making propaganda for Islam,
and in that sense he was indeed a muballigh-cum-Insulinde propagand�
ist. As a propagandist, he carried out his activities in the countryside by
presiding over meetings and talking to the people. He lived in Kauman,
came to the countryside to attend and speak at meetings, and after the
meetings were over went home. Misbach was a figure at the meetings
and as such was highly visible in the countryside. Thanks to the im�
proved efficiency of the Kasunanan administrative and police appara�
tus, we now have fairly detailed information about when and where he
attended meetings, roughly what he talked about, and what the meet�
ings he led were like, though not very much about circle leaders' ac�
tivities and the meetings they independently organized.
According to the resident's report to the governor general, from the
last days of December 1918 to May 7, 1919, when Misbach was taken
into preventive custody, he led eleven Insulinde meetings in the Ka�
sunanan countryside, of which six were the inaugural meetings of In�
sulinde circles.60 An examination of the resident's report brings two
60Resident van Surakarta, "Rapport nopens het door de bevolking gepleegd lijdelijk
verzet
tegen het presteeren van verplichte diensten in de afdeeling Soerakarta, Klaten en
Bojolali," in
Resident van Surakarta aan gG, 23 May 1919, Mr. 322.x/19 (hereafter "Rapport," Mr.
322X/19).
The Insulinde and Feasant Strikes 151
things to our attention.61 First, from late December 1918 to midMarch 1919, when
the growing wave of peasant strikes started to meet
ever harsher suppression by the local authorities, Misbach, and for that
matter all the Surakarta Insulinde leaders who attended meetings in
rural Surakarta, never touched on concrete peasant grievances about
taxes, corvee labor, wages, and rent.62 Neither did they attack the
royal regulations stipulating peasant obligations of corvee labor nor
call for peasant strikes. Misbach's central appeal was invariably
"Don't be afraid," above all don't be afraid of the local authorities and
the police; he cited passages from the Koran, explicating the example
set by the Prophet Muhammad, and located the purpose of the In�
sulinde, "freedom of our country," in this context. Only after peasant
strikes started and the local authorities began to suppress them by
arresting Insulinde circle leaders and intimidating striking peasants did
Misbach begin to discuss and openly confirm the justness of peasant
grievances, to attack the royal regulations, and to urge peasants to
persist in their strike actions. Yet even then Misbach never led strikes
and never negotiated with the authorities and plantation administra�
tors. It was circle leaders who led peasant strikes, negotiated with the
authorities and plantation administrators, and were arrested once the
authorities turned to the suppression of strikes.
Second, all the meetings Misbach led were closed-door members'
meetings (ledenvergaderingen), which the police did not have the legal
authority to attend or intervene in. The reason all the meetings were
organized as members' meetings was partly technical, because holding
a members' meeting required no prior permission from the local au�
thorities. And yet, all the same, Kasunanan administrative officials and
the police insisted on attending meetings, and thus very often confron�
tation between Misbach and the authorities took place there. As we
will see, this was of crucial importance in understanding the role Mis�
bach played, for he acted out his message, "Don't be afraid," in his
confrontations with the authorities. At the same time, however, the
very fact that all the meetings were held as members' meetings suggests
that many peasants had joined Insulinde circles prior to Misbach's
propaganda, for the members' meeting could be held only when those
who came to the meeting had membership cards already in hand and
could show them at the start of the meeting to the police. Therefore,
unlike the early SI days, when the vast majority joined the SI at openair public
rallies, peasants had joined Insulinde circles before Insulinde
meetings were held. And it was again circle leaders who played the
major role in organizing peasants into circles they led.
61 "Rapport," Mr. 322X/19, and Chronologische Volgorde, Mr. $22.\/i9.
fe2To be precise, rent, or kasepan, is the money paid by the plantation to
compensate for
use of the land leased by the plantation an extra month beyond the period
stipulated by the
land-lease contract.
152. An Age in Motion
Who, then, led the Insulinde circles? How did circle leaders mobilize
peasants? To answer these questions, we must first recall the profound
transformation brought about by the reorganization of the Kasunanan
that had been implemented since 1912. As we have seen, the reorgani�
zation consisted of four basic measures: the abolition of the appanage
system and the bekelship; the formation of the village as an administra�
tive unit with village officials appointed from among the bekel; the
transformation of the kuli (coolie) under the bekel into the kuli kenceng with his
share in the village communal land; and the revision of
land-lease regulations. The reorganization profoundly affected life in
the countryside. First, with the abolition of the appanage system, ap�
panage holders were deprived of their appanages and were given in�
stead salaries and allowances in cash. The majority of appanage hold�
ers lived in the city and thus their relations with the countryside were
cut off for good. But some of the appanage holders did live on their
appanages and continued to live there after the introduction of the
reorganization. Though they were given allowances in cash, in a time
of rapid inflation like 1918-19, their allowances tended to be far from
sufficient. Besides, the former appanage holders in the countryside now
had to live under village administration. This meant that they came
under the authority of their former bekel. Their social and economic
position thus displaced, they deeply resented the new order and often
came into conflict with village and administrative officials.
Second, the majority of bekel were no less displaced in their social
and economic positions than the former appanage holders. Though all
the village officials were appointed from among the bekel, those ap�
pointed village officials amounted to about one-third of the former
bekel. Since it made a big difference whether one could become a
village official with his salary land and all the privileges that accom�
panied it, former bekel who were not appointed village officials re�
sented the reorganization all the more. And finally, the social and
economic positions of former kuli who now became kuli kenceng with
their shares in the village communal land were in no significant way
improved. Their land rights in the village communal land were closely
tied to their obligation to pay taxes and to perform corvee labor. The
corvee labor required for the village and the state was not reduced.
Though unpaid corvee labor for the plantation was abolished by the
new land-lease regulations, paid corvee labor was maintained as a
transitional measure and the wages for the paid corvee labor stipulated
by the local authorities were outrageously low, suspended throughout
the war years and in a time of rapid inflation. The reorganization that
was intended by the Indies government to bring the Kasunanan admin�
istrative and agrarian system from "the medieval age" to the twentieth
century thus created widespread discontent in the countryside, if only
temporarily.
The Insulinde and Peasant Strikes i53
In 1919 the reorganization was still in progress in Klaten, while it
had been completed in all other parts of the Kasunanan domain by
April 1918. Krapyak, the area set aside exclusively for sunan's service
which extended over wide areas in district Banyudono (regency of
Boyolali), Kartasura (regency of Surakarta), Delanggu and Ponggok
(regency of Klaten), was the first where the reorganization was imple�
mented in 1912 and to which the Tegalgondo tobacco plantation and
village Nglungge belonged. Three Insulinde circles (Karangduren,
Klaseman, and Nglungge) were established there. In subdistrict Gawok
(district Kartasura), where another Insulinde circle was established, the
reorganization had been brought to completion by April 1918. In dis�
trict Ponggok, where three more Insulinde circles (Pundung, Polan, and
Bintaran) were established, the reorganization was planned to be im�
plemented by April 1921. But here again, map making completed and
the boundaries of future villages fixed, selection of future village offi�
cials from among bekel and distribution of shares in the communal
land to future kuli kenceng were already under way.63 Everybody
knew that the reorganization was about to begin and a sense of ner�
vousness and uncertainty was more profound there than in the areas
where the reorganization had already become a reality.
The expansion of the Insulinde took place against this backdrop of
the profound structural change of the Kasunanan. Displaced by the
reorganization or upset by the prospect of their displacement in the
very near future, bekel and former bekel not appointed village officials
made up the majority of circle leaders in all the Insulinde circles, except
perhaps in the Kartasura circle, where pawnshop workers and pious
Muslim batik traders controlled circle leadership. Insulinde circles
were organized in two different ways. In Karangduren and Klaseman,
which were located an hour's walk from Kartasura, circles were estab�
lished first as branches of the Kartasura circle by pawnshop workers
and batik traders familiar with the PKBT and the SATV, and then
transformed into independent circles as peasants joined the circles in
increasing numbers and former bekel came to play increasingly impor�
tant roles. In contrast, the other circles-Pundung, Gawok, Polan, and
Bintaran-were established independently by bekel, former bekel, and
displaced former appanage holders. In Nglungge, Pak Ngabid, alias R.
M. Probowigoto, was the central figure in the circle. His wife was a
great-granddaughter of the patih and he himself was an appanage
holder until the reorganization was introduced in Nglungge in 1912.
The reorganization degraded Pak Ngabid from an appanage holder to
6,"Algemeene Hervorming van de Maartschappelijke en Agrarische Toestanden in de
Vorstenlanden," Mededeeling der Regeering omtrent enkele Ondenverpen van Algemeen
Belang, 1921, p. 42. Also see Resident van Surakarta, "Vervolg verslag omtrent den
stand der
hervormingen in de Zelfbestuursgebieden Soerakarta en Mangkoe-Negaran in het Gewest
Soerakarta over het jaar 1919," 20 Aug. 1920, Exh. 22 Nov. 1920, No. 44.
154 An Age in Motion
a kuli kenceng with all the obligations to pay taxes and to perform
corvee labor for the village and the state. His request to be exempted
from these obligations was turned down by the local authorities. After
this, he repeatedly came into conflict with the village head and the
district head of Ponggok and acted as a pokrol bambu, an informal
mediator between peasants on the one hand and the local authorities
and the plantation on the other, maintaining as a former appanage
holder wide personal connections with native administrative officials,
plantation managers, local toughs, and bekel and former bekel in the
area. In Gawok, it was the son of Pak Ngabid, R. M. Soemoloekito,
who became chairman of the Gawok circle.64 In Polan and Bintaran,
M. Demang Kartosoediro and H. Moehammad Tajib, both influential
bekel with some administrative functions, led Insulinde circles.65 All
were rural figures with hardly any connections with the city or the
pergerakan. But they were literate, read the Javanese-language Panggoegab, if not
the Malay-language Islam Bergerak, and knew what was
going on in Surakarta, in the Indies, and in the world.
It was these Insulinde circle leaders who did real propaganda work
in rural Surakarta and organized peasants into circles. The general
meeting of the Surakarta Insulinde in December 1918 had authorized
Misbach to issue membership cards and to set up circles outside the
city of Surakarta. In December alone, Soedarman and Gatoet Sastrodihardjo, first
and second secretary, handed over more than one thou�
sand blank membership cards to Misbach. Misbach asked those future
circle leaders to propagandize for the Insulinde and then handed over
blank membership cards to them. In Gawok, for instance, Misbach
first wrote to Soemoloekito in February, asking him to become an
Insulinde propagandist, and gave him blank membership cards. Soe�
moloekito then made propaganda for the Insulinde, explaining that the
Insulinde meant setia mardika, loyal to freedom, and promising that
once people paid twenty-five cents as an entrance fee and became
members, they would become free from night watch and patrol obliga�
tions for the village and the plantation. He also asked his friend Martosentono to
become a propagandist and gave him blank membership
cards, promising him that he would get 10 percent of the entrance fees
he collected from new members.66 Likewise, in Polan and Bintaran,
Misbach asked Mas Demang Kartosoediro and H. Mohammad Tajib
to propagandize for the Insulinde and issued more than fourteen hun�
dred blank membership cards. They in turn recruited peasants into the
Insulinde by promising them that once they paid twenty-five cents and
64"Rapport," Mr. 322X/19.
Resident van Surakarta aan Procureur Generaal, 3 July 1919, Mr. 474X/19
66"Rapport," 322X/19.
The Insulinde and Peasant Strikes 155
Map 3. Center of Insulinde/NIP-SH actions
156 An Age in Motion
became members, their corvee labor obligations for the plantation
would be alleviated and their wages and rent raised.67 Nowhere did
circle leaders bother themselves with keeping membership lists. Thus
neither Misbach nor the Surakarta Insulinde leadership knew how
many people actually joined the Insulinde. They knew only the num�
ber of blank membership cards they issued, which exceeded ten thou�
sand.68
The Insulinde circles in rural Kasunanan thus expanded beyond the
control of Misbach and the Surakarta Insulinde leadership almost from
the beginning. When Misbach came and attended meetings to inaugu�
rate Insulinde circles, circles were already there with thousands of
peasant members. At their inaugural meetings, Misbach presided at the
election of circle leaders, but it was in fact nothing but Misbach's
formally recognizing de facto circle leaders. There were no means
available to Misbach to control them even if they called for actions
neither Misbach nor the Surakarta Insulinde leadership intended to
call for. And indeed what circle leaders said to peasants was different
from what Misbach called for at the meetings. Whereas Misbach said
"Don't be afraid," circle leaders voiced peasant grievances about taxes,
corvee labor, wages, and rent, and promised to alleviate those griev�
ances. They were economic in nature and peasants could calculate how
effectively the Insulinde would redress their grievances. For instance,
circle leaders promised that if they paid twenty-five cents and became
members, their wages would be raised. It was a simple matter to know
whether the Insulinde would be successful or not. If the wages were
increased, it would mean circle leaders kept their words. If not, it
would be circle leaders who should be blamed. As peasants joined the
Insulinde in increasing numbers and pressed circle leaders to keep their
word, circle leaders started to call for strikes openly and to demand
that local authorities and plantation administrators raise wages and
rent and alleviate peasant corvee duties for the village, the state, and
the plantation.
Facing this growing militancy of Insulinde circles, there were basical�
ly two options available to Misbach: to ride the tide of peasant unrest
or to retreat. But actually to retreat-that is, to call a halt to peasant
strikes-was out of the question. First, even if Misbach had instructed
circle leaders not to strike, it was entirely up to them whether they
would follow his instructions. Most likely, he would lose any means of
influencing them. And in all likelihood the authorities would blame the
Surakarta Insulinde for peasant strikes anyway. Second and much
more important, to call a halt was morally unacceptable to Misbach.
#^Resident van Surakarta aan Procureur Generaal, 3 July 1919, Mr. 474X/19
68"Rapport," 3Z2X/19.
The Insulinde and Peasant Strikes i57
To retreat meant to run away. To run away meant to betray by his own
deeds what he had been asking of circle leaders, peasants, and above all
himself. If his deeds betrayed his words, it would prove that he was
also "pseudo-Islam," no different from the kyai and religious officials
he had been criticizing. Rather, the growing peasant unrest provided
the stage for him to act out his true Islamness. He thus accepted all the
risks that this entailed: the suppression of peasant strikes and the In�
sulinde by the local authorities and his own arrest. How, then, did
peasant strikes proceed in Nglungge and on the Tegalgondo planta�
tion? How did Misbach act out true Islam in the peasant strikes?
Misbach and the Peasant Strikes
In the village of Nglungge, where the Insulinde circle was established
on February 16, 1919, peasants struck on February 23. In Nglungge,
where no plantation operated, all the peasants were given half a bau of
rice field each of the village communal land and were required to pay
land tax for their housing plots and rice field and to perform corvee
labor for the village and the state. As for the corvee duties for the state,
they had to labor once a week for the maintenance of the public road
and provide night watch and patrol on the public road once every
thirty-five days. As for the corvee duties for the village, they were
required to perform night watch every five days. Thus, in total, each
peasant was required to perform corvee labor every three days. Village
officials were exempted from all corvee duties.69 The striking peasants
demanded of the local authorities three things: that the night watch
and patrol obligations for the village and the state be reduced; that
corvee labor for the maintenance of the public road be paid for; and
that village officials should also be required to perform corvee labor.
Strikes were illegal, but the response of the local authorities to them
was extremely slow, because there was no plantation in Nglungge. The
peasants' demands went unheeded and the strikes went on unchecked.
It was only in early April, more than a month after the strikes started,
that the assistant resident of Surakarta warned Mrs. Vogel and Mis�
bach of the illegality of the strikes in Nglungge; and on April 19, after
peasant strikes started on the Tegalgondo tobacco plantation, the resi�
dent sent the controller for agrarian affairs and the regent polisi (native
police chief) of Klaten to Nglungge to remind the striking peasants of
the illegality of their actions.70 In the meantime, everything went on
peacefully. No one was arrested. Many Insulinde gatherings were held
69Ibid. For the peasant income and the tax and corvee duties, see also Tjipto's
speech on
June z6, 1919, at the Volksraad in Volksraad Handelingen, 1919, pp. 73-74.
70Chronologische Volgorde, 3ZZX/19.
i58 An Age in Motion
without police intervention. The Surakarta Insulinde leadership was
careful not to provoke the authorities. When it convened a members'
meeting on March 11, the resident was notified of the plan beforehand,
and both Tjipto and Misbach mildly advised Nglungge circle members
to resume corvee labor.
The situation changed after April 19 when an official attempt to
persuade the striking peasants to resume corvee labor failed. Soon
after, the authorities arrested Pak Ngabid and six other circle leaders
on the charge of instigating illegal actions and let village administration
deprive them of their shares in the village communal land. In response,
Misbach convened a meeting on April 27, in which he attacked the
authorities for the arrests and urged peasants to persist in their strike
actions. Three days later, the trial of the seven arrested circle leaders
was held at the native court of Klaten. Some 180 peasants, including
perhaps almost all the striking peasants of Nglungge, attended the trial
and demanded that either the arrested leaders be released or all the
striking peasants be punished. Four more circle leaders, including
Soemoloekito, chairman of the Gawok circle and son of Pak Ngabid,
were arrested and the peasants were dispersed by force. After this
incident, the strikes in Nglungge fizzled out by the middle of May.71
On the Tegalgondo plantation, where Insulinde circles were estab�
lished in Karangduren and Klaseman, all 170 peasants of Dimoro (the
village of Klaseman) struck on April 10, refusing to perform corvee
labor for the plantation, demanding an increase in wages, and an�
nouncing that they were all Insulinde members. Peasants of the village
of Tempel struck on April 16. On April 20 the Karangduren circle
convened a gathering, and responding to circle leaders' call to "follow
Dimoro," some ninety peasants of village Karangduren also went on
strike.72
Faced with peasant strike actions, the plantation manager was con�
ciliatory from the beginning. Fie visited Dimoro and proposed to set up
a prapat on the day after peasants struck there. The prapat, which
consisted of two representatives each of the peasants and the planta�
tion, was a traditional institutional device to arbitrate conflicts and in
this case to decide how many man-days would be needed for tobacco
cultivation as a basis for wage calculation. To show his goodwill, the
plantation manager furthermore proposed to set as a basis of wage
calculation thirty cents for one day of eight hours' labor, which was a
50 percent increase from the current wage level. The Klaseman circle
leadership agreed to the establishment of a prapat but demanded that
'For peasant protest actions in Nglungge, see also "De Verzetsbeweging in Solo,"
Mededeeling der Regeering omtrent enkele Onderwerpen van Algemeen Belang, 1920, pp.
19-21; Misbach's speech reported in "Protest Vergadering di Semarang," Persatoean
Hindia, 14 Feb. 1920.
72"Rapport," Mr. 322X/19, and Chronologische Volgorde, Mr. 322X/19.
The Insulinde and Feasant Strikes i59
fifty cents be set as a basis of wage calculation. The situation seemed in
control, and the plantation manager asked the assistant resident of
Surakarta to send the controller for agrarian affairs and the regent
polisi to propose formally the establishment of a prapat.73
The authorities also responded swiftly to the strikes. On the Tegalgondo tobacco
plantation, as well as on other plantations in the Kasunanan, the land-lease period
had just begun on April 1, and in the
months of April, May, and June, rice fields were to be converted into
tobacco fields and tobacco seeds were to be planted. To obtain highquality tobacco,
it was imperative that tobacco leaves be harvested
before the coming of the rainy season, ideally in November and De�
cember, and at the latest in January. Since tobacco cultivation needed
seven months on average, and sheds for drying tobacco leaves had
limited capacity, conversion of rice fields into tobacco fields and the
planting of seeds had to be done as quickly as possible, at the latest by
the middle ofJune. For this reason peasant strikes most frequently took
place in the months of April and May, and the authorities responded
swiftly. On April 18, a week after the plantation manager made his
proposal to the Klaseman circle leadership in Dimoro and when strikes
were still confined to Dimoro and Tempel, the controller and the re�
gent polisi visited Dimoro and formally proposed the establishment of
a prapat. If the strikes were traditional ones, perhaps this would have
ended them altogether. In fact, both in Dimoro and Tempel, there were
signs that the strikes were starting to fizzle out. Klaseman circle leaders
accepted the proposal and sent two representatives to work in the
prapat. Though they did not call off the strikes, striking peasants start�
ed to return to work in the tobacco fields.74
It was in this situation that Misbach appeared on the scene for the
first time. On April 23, after the arrest of Nglungge circle leaders, the
Klaseman circle convened a meeting to inaugurate the circle formally
and invited Misbach and other Surakarta Insulinde leaders to attend.
Whatever Klaseman circle leaders intended, Misbach was determined
to attack the authorities. The meeting was held in Dimoro at the house
of Wongsosoediro, a major Klaseman circle leader, and was attended
by some four hundred members. Opening the meeting, Misbach an�
nounced that it was a members' meeting, that it could therefore be held
without the police in attendance, and that the police were allowed to
attend "by favor." The police report describes the meeting:
Speaker: Misbach
[Misbach said] that Insulinde had no desire to instigate people to go on
strike, but people had to understand and feel what caused the deficiencies
in their livelihood and then make efforts to eliminate all these difficulties.
73"Rapport," Mr. 32.ZX/19.
74Ibid.
160 An Age in Motion
But it is true that the newspaper Panggoegah is for the strikes. [Loud
applause]
He asked the members what their grievances were. Wirosoekarto and
Martosenomo (Dimoro) complained about the low pay for planting to�
bacco and the meager wages. After an extensive explanation of the gov�
ernment s decision, given by the Mantri of Gatak, Chairman Misbach
proclaimed to the members that the fulfillment of their demands de�
pended on the strength they could put behind them. After that, he spoke
about village corvee labor and appointed the circle leadership.
Ng. Darsosasmito [SATA/ commissioner] urged the members to
fear Toewan Allah and His Messenger, and also to obey the government.
But [he said] Toewan Allah does not force men, everything depends
completely on man himself. For example, when someone rents out a rice
field or trades in goods, or glidig-if there is no agreement between the
parties, the deal will not go through. So it is with all the [government's]
regulations. If the little man does not agree with them, they do not have
to be carried out, for all such things are made by other human beings
[that is, not by Allah]. The proof is, who can distinguish between the
skulls of Kings and beggars?75
After the meeting, peasants again stopped working on tobacco fields.
Circle leaders started to sabotage the workings of the prapat. Strikes
started to spread to other villages. The day after the meeting, H. Bakri,
the Karangduren circle leader, and Wongsosoediro, the Klaseman cir�
cle leader, organized a meeting in Kagokan, and peasants of Kagokan
went on strike. Peasants of Wironangan followed on April 25. Peasants
of other villages soon joined, and by early May peasants of seventeen
villages, more than two thousand in total, were on strike on the
Tegalgondo plantation and demanding an increase in wages. The au�
thorities turned to suppression. The first arrested were Wongsosoediro
of Dimoro and H. Bakri. Then massive arrests followed. More than
eighty, including almost all circle leaders in Karangduren, Klaseman
(Dimoro), Tempel, Sraten, Wironangan, and Kagokan, were arrested
by early May. On May 7 Resident A.J.W. Harloff convened an emer�
gency meeting with the assistant residents of Surakarta and Boyolali,
the controller for agrarian affairs, and the regent polisi, and discussed
measures necessary to put an end to the strikes. On the same day,
Misbach, Darsosasmito, and Gatoet Sastrodihardjo (Surakarta Insulinde secretary)
were taken into preventive custody. Armed police
were dispatched to the villages.76 Frightened, remaining Insulinde cir-
^Chronologische Volgorde, Mr. 322X/19. Italics in the original. For the April 23
meeting
in Klaseman, see also Panggoegah, 12 May 1919, IPO, 20 (1919).
76"Rapport," Mr. 322X/19. Resident van Surakarta aan GG, Telegram aangeboden te
Surakarta, 7 May 1919, Mr. 249X/19. For peasant strikes on the Tegalgondo, see also
"De
Verzetsbeweging in Solo," Mededeeling der Regeering omtrent enkele Onderwerpen van
Algemeen Belang, 1920, pp. 21-23; Islam Bergerak, 20 May 1919.
The Insulinde and Peasant Strikes 161
cle leaders apologized to the authorities and promised to cooperate
with the prapat. By the middle of May peasant strikes on the Tegalgondo plantation
came to an end.
Both in Nglungge and on the Tegalgondo plantation, peasant strikes
thus took place in the expansion of the Insulinde and ended under the
reign of terror created by the massive arrests of Insulinde circle leaders
and police intimidation of peasants. Because strikes took place in the
midst of the Insulinde expansion and were led by Insulinde circle lead�
ers, Resident Harloff argued in his report that strikes occurred not
because of peasant grievances but due to Insulinde propaganda, that
with the approval of the Insulinde central leadership and the Surakarta
Insulinde leadership, Misbach "irresponsibly" masterminded strikes,
and that circle leaders under his guidance systematically organized and
spread peasant strikes. Harloff was ready to admit that the adminis�
trative and agrarian system of the Kasunanan was rotten and old-fash�
ioned, because it was the official justification for reorganization to
improve peasant conditions in the Vorstenlanden. But he argued that
peasant grievances did not necessarily lead to strikes and that clear
evidence of this was the fact that no peasant strikes took place on the
sugar plantation areas of Klaten. Therefore, by his reasoning, to be
blamed were Misbach, circle leaders, and the Insulinde as a whole.77
But as we have seen, Harloff's allegations were largely unfounded,
except that it was indeed circle leaders who led strikes. Misbach did
not mastermind strikes. No strikes might have taken place on the sugar
plantation areas of Klaten in 1919, but Harloff conveniently forgot
that the strike was a typical form of peasant protest. Given the low
wage level in a time of rapid inflation, strikes would have taken place
on the Tegalgondo without Misbach and without Insulinde propagan�
da. Too eager to find culprits who threatened to stain his career as an
administrative official, Harloff fell back on a conspiracy theory and
failed to ask one important question: how and why Misbach and circle
leaders had "undermined the rust en orde." Harloff must have noticed,
however, that the peasant strikes in Nglungge and especially on the
Tegalgondo were no ordinary peasant protest of the sort with which
the local authorities were familiar. The questions we must ask are:
what were the differences between the strikes led under the banner of
the Insulinde and the peasant protest without any political background,
and what role Misbach did play in making the differences? To answer
these questions, we have to examine what peasant protest was like
"without any political background."
In the Vorstenlanden, collective peasant protest traditionally took
77"Rapport," Mr. 322X/19. Also see Tjipto's criticism of Harloff's theory in his
speech at
the Volksraad on June 26, 1919, in Volksraad Handelingen, 1919, pp. 72-81.
161 An Age in Motion
two forms: nggogol and strike (mogok). In legal terms, nggogol was
legal, while strike was illegal in the sense that it was a transgression of
royal regulations. But in reality, this made little difference. In nggogol,
peasants went en masse to the office of the plantation manager, the
regency office, and sometimes to the Kepatihan to voice their griev�
ances, and when their grievances were heard by high-ranking Dutch
and Javanese officials they went home. In strikes, high-ranking Dutch
and Javanese officials came to the village and heard peasant grievances.
In either case, officials proposed the establishment of a prapat to arbi�
trate conflicts between the peasants and the plantation. The peasants
agreed to the establishment of the prapat and went home if on nggogol
and went back to work if on strike. Usually no one was arrested and
the authorities did not resort to force. Both forms of peasant protest
took place almost every year. Since nggogol and strikes were familiar
to and dealt with in a routine fashion by Dutch and Javanese officials,
reports on nggogol and strikes rarely found their way to The Hague.
The peasant protest on the Bantul sugar plantation in 1918 was in this
sense a rare case, for the resident's report reached the Ministry of
Colonies because peasant protest actions there as well as elsewhere in
the regency of Bantul, Yogyakarta, were sensationally reported by a
Dutch journalist in Het Soerabajaasche Handelsblad and as a result the
regent of Bantul was dismissed in the middle of his term. But as the
resident of Yogyakarta stressed in his report, there was nothing ex�
traordinary about the protest actions and they were certainly "without
any political background."
The form the peasant protest on the Bantul sugar plantation took
was nggogol.78 The first nggogol took place on June 28, 1918, when
some five hundred peasants led by a former mandur (foreman),
Troenopawiro, went en masse to the office of the plantation manager
and demanded compensation for unpaid corvee labor and a wage in�
crease for paid corvee labor. The local authorities responded swiftly.
Phoned by the plantation manager, the Dutch controller stationed in
the town of Bantul rushed to the scene, promised that the authorities
would hear their grievances later, and ordered them to go home. Peas�
ants obeyed. This assured the authorities that the nggogol was an
ordinary one. The controller then investigated peasant grievances by
conducting hearings both with the plantation manager and with
Troenopawiro. His investigation established that the plantation indeed
"8The following account of the peasant protest on the Bantul sugar plantation is
based on
Assistent Resident van Yogyakarta (Hunger) aan Resident van Yogyakarta (Canne), 30
July
1918, Mr. 286X/18, Vb. 25 July 1919, No. 14; Resident van Yogyakarta aan GG, 3 Nov.
1918, Mr. 140X/19; and "Rapport omtrent het voorgevallene op enkele
landbouwondernemingen in het gewest Jogja in het jaar 1918," behoort by geheim
brief van den Resident
van Yogyakarta aan GG, 10 Aug. 1918, Mr. 140X/19.
The Insulinde and Feasant Strikes 163
had violated the land-lease regulations and that the plantation had
exploited peasant unpaid corvee labor in doing what should have been
done by paid corvee labor. Based on these findings, he proposed the
establishment of a prapat to decide how much compensation the plan�
tation should make to the peasants. Troenopawiro agreed. The con�
troller instructed all the bekel on the Bantul plantation to come to the
regency office on July 3 to hear his pronouncement.
On that day, however, fifteen hundred peasants came to the regency
office in much the same way as in nggogol. The controller pronounced
his judgment on the peasant grievances and announced the establish�
ment of the prapat. But the peasants "demanded the decision there and
then" and defied his order to go home. Alarmed, the controller phoned
the assistant resident of Yogyakarta, and both the resident and the
assistant resident rushed to the regency office. Though the plantation
manager urged the resident to disperse the peasants by force, he saw
their action as legitimate and the use of force as "untactful." He prom�
ised quick redress of their grievances and ordered peasants to go home.
They obeyed his order. Shortly afterward, the prapat was officially
inaugurated, worked under the supervision of the controller and the
newly appointed regent of Bantul, and submitted its proposals to the
resident in August. The proposals were formally approved and autho�
rized by the resident and conveyed by the controller and the regent to
the peasant representatives as the government's decision. The case was
over. Throughout the affair, peasants on the Bantul did not strike, and
planting and harvesting sugarcane proceeded smoothly.
In 1918 reorganization had not yet been introduced in Bantul. This
was the reason peasants on the Bantul sugar plantation demanded the
mitigation of unpaid corvee labor and its conversion to paid corvee
labor as well as a wage increase. But this difference in the content of
peasant grievances between the peasant protest on the Bantul and the
strikes on the Tegalgondo was minor. The more important difference
lay in the forms in which peasant grievances were expressed and dealt
with by the authorities. On the Bantul plantation, peasant grievances
were expressed in nggogol and redressed by the prapat set up by the
authorities. On the Tegalgondo plantation, peasants went on strike,
and though the prapat was established, it did not work until after the
police arrested circle leaders and intimidated peasants. Of these two
differences in form, that between nggogol and strike was, as we have
seen, superficial. The crucial difference lay in the fact that the prapat
worked as an institutional device of arbitration on the Bantul, while on
the Tegalgondo the prapat was neutralized by Insulinde meetings and
did not work.
What was the prapat, then? It was a traditional institution to arbi�
trate conflicting interests in rural Surakarta, above all between the
164 An Age in Motion
peasants and the plantation, and at the same time to enact the state
authority. In the prapat it was always the officials embodying the state
authority who occupied the pivotal position. High-ranking Dutch and
Javanese officials proposed the establishment of a prapat, appointed as
members two representatives each nominated by the peasants and the
plantation, supervised its operation, officially sanctioned its proposal,
and pronounced it as the government decision. In the prapat, therefore,
high-ranking Dutch and Javanese officials appeared as neutral public
arbiters who transcended conflicting private interests, and the state
authority was legitimized in this public-transcending neutrality. In this
light, the role Troenopawiro played in the peasant protest on the Bantul plantation
can be understood more clearly. Not only did he lead the
peasant protest, but more important, he knew how to pay respect to
the officials and the state authority they represented in his proper use
of high Javanese and deferential behavior. He thus represented in the
protest at once peasant private interests and their subordination to
state authority.
By contrast, in the peasant strikes on the Tegalgondo the prapat was
neutralized by Insulinde meetings that worked not to legitimize but to
delegitimize state authority. We can see how state authority was delegitimized at
Insulinde meetings in three respects. First, leaders, above
all Misbach, always confronted the police, insisting that they had no
right to attend and rejecting their demand for a list of the circle leader�
ship. Second, it was not the state authority but the Insulinde embodied
in the person of Misbach that occupied the pivotal position in the
meetings. Circle leaders and peasants voiced their grievances about
taxes, corvee labor, wages, and rent, which were heard not by the
officials but by Misbach. Sometimes, as it happened at the April 28
meeting in Dimoro, an official stood up and explained the decisions
taken by the authorities after circle leaders and members had voiced
their grievances. But this did not dislodge the Insulinde from its pivotal
position. On the contrary, it was again Misbach who heard the "offi�
cial" explanation and then pronounced that "the fulfillment of their
demands depended on their strength they could put behind them."
Misbach thus dislodged the state from the position of public-tran�
scending neutrality and the officials were relegated to a position repre�
senting one side of the conflicting private interests, the guardian of the
interests of the plantation. Finally and most important, Misbach and
other Surakarta Insulinde leaders deprived the state authority of its
awesomeness by invoking the fear of death. In confronting the police,
Misbach called for and acted out "Don't be afraid," not because he
was not afraid, but because both he and the people he talked to were
afraid of the authorities. Misbach demonstrated his suppression of this
fear by invoking the fear of death, by quoting Koranic passages, for
The Insulinde and Feasant Strikes 165
quoting from the Koran was the same as saying, "Bear in mind your
life hereafter" and "Don't be afraid of the authorities because you have
to be more afraid of Allah and His messenger." Darsosasmito did the
same thing in his speech at the Dimoro Insulinde meeting. He asked the
audience, "Who can distinguish between the skulls of kings and beg�
gars?" His message was clear: gaze at death, and there is nothing you
are afraid of. And indeed, in the eyes that gazed at death, the awesome�
ness of the state evaporated.
It was such multiple assaults that delegitimized the state authority
and deprived it of its awesomeness at Insulinde meetings. This does not
mean that peasants suddenly were no longer afraid of the authorities
because Misbach said and acted out "Don't be afraid." Their wages
low, the prices of necessary commodities rising steeply, food shortages
elsewhere rumored, and death felt close because of rampant plague,
they were already nervous, restless, reckless, and utterly determined to
pursue their demands. What Misbach did was to locate the meaning of
their actions in the new pergerakan context of "freedom" (mardika,
merdeka) and expose the emptiness of the state authority. And in this
Misbach was indeed effective. He was a figure seen only at the meet�
ings and foreign to everyday life in rural Surakarta. His huge, strongly
built body dressed in all-white Western-style clothes that reminded
people of a Dutchman, his deep convinced voice, his eyes gazing some�
where beyond this world, his pointed attacks on and confrontation
with the authorities-all reinforced his foreignness and otherworldli�
ness, and made his invocation of the fear of death so powerful. And the
peasants experienced their taste of "freedom" in the suppression of
their shared fear of the state.
The Insulinde meetings led by Misbach thus made the state authority
stand naked, devoid of its legitimacy and its awesomeness. In the void
of the state authority, the prapat naturally could not function. This was
what the resident understood as "undermining the rust en orde." In�
sulinde circle leaders sabotaged the prapat. Peasants persisted in their
strikes. Strikes spread. To recapture their authority, the government
had no alternative but to resort to and show force. Massive arrests
followed. The armed police roamed on the Tegalgondo plantation and
in Nglungge. And to seal the source of this "unrest," Misbach was
arrested.
Tjipto, Douwes Dekker, and the Polanharjo Affair
The government suppression of Insulinde circles and strikes that
culminated in the arrest of Misbach and other Surakarta Insulinde
leaders placed Tjipto in a difficult position. He had been away from
166 An Age in Motion
Surakarta since January, and returned to Surakarta from Batavia in
late April. The government suppression not only threatened Insulinde
circles and the Surakarta branch but also upset the central leadership
and many of the Indo members. Back in Surakarta, Tjipto took the
Surakarta branch leadership into his own hands and tried to avoid the
arrest of circle and branch leaders as much as possible. He asked for
the help of the central leadership in Semarang to obtain the quick
release of those arrested. He also instructed Misbach to stop his propa�
ganda activities in the countryside in order to avoid arrest.79 All these
efforts proved futile. By May 7 the Insulinde circles in Nglungge, Karangduren, and
Klaseman were in collapse, and Misbach as well as
more than eighty circle leaders and members were in jail.
In this situation Tjipto started to steer the Surakarta Insulinde and its
volatile circles onto a new course by shifting the arena of Insulinde
propaganda activities away from the countryside to the city of Surakar�
ta and to the Volksraad building in Batavia, while establishing closer
cooperation with the central leadership, especially Douwes Dekker.80
The reasons for this are not difficult to see. First, it was now apparent
that continued Insulinde propaganda activities in the countryside
would be suicidal and almost certainly would invite further govern�
ment clamp-down. Second, the widely publicized militancy of the Sur�
akarta Insulinde and the government suppression it invited had upset
many Indo members. By that time, Douwes Dekker had already an�
nounced his plan to transform the Insulinde into the Nationaal Indische Partij-
Sarekat Hindia (NIP-SH) at the coming Indiers congress
scheduled on June 7-9. To make the congress successful, it was imper�
ative to allay the fears of Indo members, and therefore further govern�
ment suppression of the Surakarta Insulinde had to be avoided. And
finally, Tjipto was not Misbach. He was not the kind of person who
could ride the tide of peasant protest, but one who jealously guarded
himself from being swept away by forces he himself could not control.
Given his position as a Volksraad member, it was natural that he
would attack "rotten" agrarian conditions in the Volksraad and not
in the countryside. The new course onto which Tjipto tried to steer
the Surakarta Insulinde was in essence that of honorable retreat, to get
the Insulinde out of its direct involvement in peasant protest actions
in the countryside and to continue its actions by other means. The
problem was that neither Surakarta Insulinde leaders nor circle leaders
were ready to accept his new course.
In the first place, the mood of the Surakarta Insulinde, above all the
79Chronologische Volgorde, Mr. 322X/19.
80Douwes Dekker and Jeekel, a commissioner of the central leadership, came to
Surakarta
on May 13 and together with Tjipto met Resident Harloff to demand release of those
arrested. Islam Bergerak, 20 May 1919.
The Insulinde and Peasant Strikes 167
SATV group, was militant. When Misbach was arrested, Harsoloemekso and K. H. Dahlan
immediately sent cables to the governor
general separately and demanded his quick release in the name of the
SATV and the Moehammadijah.81 SATV activists saw Misbach as a
true muballigh who propagated Islam not only by his words but also
by his deeds.82 And in Islam Bergerak, Koesen, editor-in-chief and
leading SATV propagandist, wrote that "they-Misbach, Darsosamito, and others-were
put in jail not because they committed rob�
bery, theft, holdup, killing, or fraud, but because they resisted those
who acted arbitrarily, or to put it more precisely, bandits who always
harm the public welfare."83 With Misbach and his activities so strongly
approved of and supported, it was all too easy for Tjipto's honorable
retreat to be construed as betrayal. But Tjipto coped with this problem
shrewdly. In the May 12 issue of Panggoegab, the first issue after
Misbach was arrested, Tjipto wrote about the arrest:
My beloved brother Mas Hadji Misbach has now been in jail for several
days. Although my heart bleeds to learn that no rights exist for us, I can
only cry in my own heart, for if I were to voice the feelings of my heart, I
would be charged with the same offense. Although it is as if the punish�
ment of my brother is meant for me, I regard it as God's mercy, for He
has found it good that Mas Hadji should suffer to pay for his offense. My
feeling is that the time has not yet come for me to go to jail on purpose.
My request to my brothers is that they do not lose courage, do not
abandon the field of battle, and do not silently flee-so that there will
still be brothers who can take over Mas Hadji's work. . . .
Come, brothers, let us stand by him, now that he is being punished, by
eating little and sleeping less.
He who dares to lead the life of an ascetic has a great advantage: his
wish will be fulfilled. "All obstacles must be surmounted. All barriers
must be broken down."84
This was characteristic of Tjipto. The rhetoric is unambiguously mil�
itant and Misbach's justness is fully acknowledged by Tjipto's con�
scious comparison of Misbach to a satria who goes to an ascetic retreat
in the wayang world. Here ksatrya Tjipto was in full accord with
Misbach. But he also stated that "the time has not yet come for me to
go to jail on purpose" and made it clear that he did not intend to follow
81 Islam Bergerak, 20 May 1919.
82See, for instance, Soemantri, "Pembela Agama Islam, Pembela Boemipoetra," Medan
Moeslimin 7 (1919), pp. 139-140; Koesen, "Ditahan pendjara," Islam Bergerak, 20 May
1919.
83Koesen, "Sebabnja ditahan pendjara," Islam Bergerak, 20 June 1919.
H4Panggoegab, 12 May 1919, IPO, 19 (1919). In the next issue of Panggoegab, Tjipto
compared Misbach and others in jail to Abimanyu in his search for his father,
Arjuna.
Panggoegab, 19 May 1919, IPO, 21 (1919).
168 An Age in Motion
Misbach in his propaganda activities in the countryside. Here the real�
ist Tjipto was trying to dissociate himself from Misbach.
Shortly thereafter, Tjipto opened a new "field of battle" to succeed
Misbach in his task by other means. It was the anti-vorsten (kings)
campaign that Tjipto launched in Panggoegab and in the Volksraad.
He attacked the triad of the sunan, the government, and the plantation
in this campaign. But he attacked the sunan most, the government
next, and the plantation least, shifting the issue and creating a wholly
different political context of the pergerakan in Surakarta. We will
examine Tjipto's anti-vorsten campaign in detail in the next chapter.
At the moment, it will suffice to keep two things in mind. First, the
anti-vorsten campaign was characteristically Tjipto's one-man show
and in that sense very much in his style. And second, the political
context of the pergerakan he created by his attack on the sunan guar�
anteed him the position of the supreme leader of the Insulinde, which
by that time was transformed into the NIP-SH.
Although Tjipto was successful in leading the Surakarta Insulinde in
a new direction, guiding Insulinde circles and coping with peasant
protest actions were a totally different matter. Here Tjipto faced forces
he himself could not control. Yet the success of his honorable retreat
ultimately depended on his success in guiding those forces. In rural
Surakarta, even after the suppression of the circles and strikes in
Nglungge and on the Tegalgondo, circles in other areas continued to
expand; and since circle leaders made propaganda by voicing peasant
grievances about wages, rent, and corvee labor, peasant members'
pressure on the circle leaders to organize protest actions was mount�
ing.85 The center of this growing peasant unrest was the Polanharjo
tobacco plantation (district Ponggok, regency of Klaten), where the
Polan and Bitaran circles led by Mas Demang Kartosoediro and H.
Tajib expanded on such an enormous scale that by mid-June the situa�
tion was, as Tjipto remarked in the Volksraad, like "a volcano" whose
"eruption can be expected in a matter of time."86 Just as there is no
way to control the eruption of a volcano, there were hardly any meth�
ods available to Tjipto and his ally, Douwes Dekker of the central
leadership, to control circle leaders. If they ordered circle leaders not to
go on strike, their order would not be obeyed. If they left circle leaders
to themselves, their strike actions would be suppressed, the circles
crushed, and they would be blamed by the government for instigating
strikes all the same. They had to go along with circle leaders and guide
their actions. Yet with their ultimate aim being honorable retreat, their
85See Islam Bergerak, 20 May 1919; Kaoem Moeda, 14 May 1919, IPO, 20 (1919).
86Tjipto s speech at the Volksraad on June 26, 1919* in Volksraad Handelingen,
1919,
p. 72.
The Insulinde and Feasant Strikes 169
style of leading peasant protest actions was entirely different from
Misbach's.
On the Polanharjo tobacco plantation, disputes had been simmering
over wages and unpaid corvee labor. When the negotiations between
Insulinde circle leaders and the plantation manager deadlocked, a
prapat was established on June 1 and its proposal was scheduled to be
authorized and pronounced as the government decision by the resident
on July 1. The situation changed in this one month. While peasants
joined the Insulinde circles in increasing numbers, it became increasing�
ly clear to them that the proposal the prapat was likely to make would
not satisfy their demands. Pressure to do something mounted on circle
leaders. When Tjipto convened an executive meeting of the Surakarta
Insulinde on June 15, the Polan and Bintaran circles sent Kartosoediro
and Hadji Tajib as their representatives and they told Tjipto that
strikes on the Polanharjo were imminent. Two days later some six
hundred peasants struck all over Polanharjo and refused to perform
corvee labor for the plantation.87
When Tjipto learned of the imminent strike actions on the Polanhar�
jo, he decided to convene an open-air propaganda rally of peasant
members in the city of Surakarta. The date was set for June 22 in view
of the coming Volksraad sessions. The Volksraad was scheduled to
begin its full sessions on June 21 and Tjipto's speech was scheduled
sometime between June 24 and 27. His plan was clear. The peasant
rally would adopt a resolution demanding that the government redress
peasant grievances in Surakarta. With this resolution in hand, Tjipto
would voice their grievances about taxes, royal regulations, corvee
labor duties, and rent, and propose the establishment of a parliamen�
tary commission to investigate peasant grievances and agrarian condi�
tions in the Kasunanan.
The plan, however, proved abortive. When the Surakarta Insulinde
announced the open-air propaganda rally in the city of Surakarta,
Resident Harloff immediately summoned Mrs. Vogel to his office and
banned the rally. Tjipto had already left for Batavia to attend the
Volksraad. In his absence, Mrs. Vogel convened yet another executive
meeting and decided to comply with the resident's order. But circle
members in the countryside did not know of the cancellation of the
rally. On June 22 some fifteen hundred peasant members came to the
city on foot carrying membership cards issued by the Polan and Bin�
taran circles. If the cancelled rally was called an open-air peasant rally
by the Surakarta Insulinde leadership, it was understood by peasant
members as a variant of nggogol, an occasion to go to the city en
K7Resident van Surakarta aan GG, Telegram aangeboden te Surakarta, June 1919.
Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 3 July 1919, Mr. 474X/19.
170 An Age in Motion
masse, voice their grievances, and demand quick redress. But the au�
thorities did not see their actions as nggogol. The police barricaded the
western entrance to the city. Peasants tried to force their way into the
city, and repeated skirmishes took place with the police. In the end,
Moedio Wignjosoetomo, a commissioner of the Surakarta Insulinde,
came to the scene at the assistant resident's request and explained to
the peasants that the rally was "postponed." Only then did peasants
start to go home. Some one hundred peasants were arrested. Angered,
Resident Harloff banned all Insulinde meetings, open-air propaganda
meetings as well as closed-door members' meetings, on the same day.88
Soon after that, the authorities started to suppress the strikes by
force. On June 25 the authorities arrested Kartosoediro, Hadji Tajib,
and six other circle leaders. Armed police were sent forth to "protect
those willing to go back to work." With the arrest of leaders and the
police intimidation, the strikes started to crumble. Of 600 peasants
who had been on strike since June 17, 15 returned to work on June 27,
65 on July 1, and 216 on July 3.89
In the meantime, Tjipto spoke in the Volksraad on June 26, the day
when he also learned of the arrest of circle leaders by a cable sent by the
Surakarta Insulinde leadership. In his speech, he attacked the govern�
ment for its failure to improve "rotten" agrarian conditions and pro�
posed the establishment of a parliamentary commission to investigate
peasant grievances and agrarian conditions in Surakarta. The commis�
sion had to be established immediately as a neutral third party, Tjipto
argued, because both the government and the Insulinde were "par�
tisan."90 He then went to Semarang, asked the Insulinde central leader�
ship to send its representatives to Surakarta to investigate the strikes on
the Polanharjo, and in the same day went back to Solo to restrain
Surakarta Insulinde leaders and activists from getting directly involved
in the protest actions.91 In the Volksraad, the establishment of a parlia�
mentary commission was motioned by van Hinloopen Labberton,
Tjipto's guru in theosophy, and J.J.E. Teeuwen, an Insulinde repre�
sentative, on June 28, opposed by the government representatives and
Dr. Radjiman as unnecessary meddling by the Volksraad in the author�
ity of the government, and defeated overwhelmingly on July 2.92
It was on July 3, after Tjipto's maneuvers failed to shift the arena of
peasant protest from the countryside to the city of Surakarta and the
Volksraad, that the Insulinde central leadership sent Douwes Dekker
88Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 3 July 1919, Mr. 474X/19. See also Sismadi
Sastrosiswojo's report in Islam Bergerak, 1 July 1919.
89Resident van Surakarta aan GG, Telegram aangeboden te Surakarta, 30 June 1919,
Mr.
474X/I9.
90Volksraad Handelingen, 1919, pp. 72-81.
91Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 28 July 1919, Mr. 531X/19, Vb. 8 Jan. 1920, No. 2.
91Volksraad Handelingen, 1919, pp. 161 - 163, 171 - 187.
The Insulinde and Peasant Strikes 171
and van der Kasteele to Surakarta to "investigate" the strikes on the
Polanharjo. Accompanied by Mrs. Vogel and Moedio Wignjosoetomo,
they went to the Polanharjo by car, flying a tiny Insulinde flag on its
front. They first visited Polan, where Douwes Dekker talked to some
fifty peasants hastily gathered by circle leaders. Douwes Dekker spoke
in Malay and Moedio translated his speech into Javanese. In his
speech, he "advised" the peasants that once they started strikes they
should persist in their actions, while cautioning them "not to make any
disturbance," and declared that the Insulinde bore no responsibility for
the strikes, because they struck at their own initiative without any
strike fund and without choosing an opportune time to strike. They
then visited the plantation manager at his office, where Douwes Dek�
ker proposed that if wages were raised from the current 4.0 guilders a
bau for nine months to 8.5 guilders, the Insulinde central leadership
would be ready to persuade peasants to return to work. The planta�
tion manager accepted his offer and promised to discuss the matter
with the board of directors. After that, they visited Bintaran and met
with the peasants gathered by Bintaran circle leaders. He told them
that the plantation manager had promised him to raise wages, that they
should persist in their strike actions until he formally offered a wage
increase, and that once the offer was made they should report to the
Surakarta Insulinde leadership whether or not they accept the offer.
Then they went back to the city of Surakarta and that same day Dou�
wes Dekker and van der Kasteele returned to Semarang by train.93
Douwes Dekker's activities on the Polanharjo were thus different
from Misbach's both in content and in style. While Misbach acted out
"Don't be afraid," Douwes Dekker cautioned peasants not to make
any disturbance and tried to cope with the strikes in a businesslike
fashion. While Misbach's foreignness reinforced his effectiveness in
suppressing their shared fear of the state, Douwes Dekker appeared to
be refusing to share anything with peasants, and his remoteness was
most clearly demonstrated by his Malay, which Moedio had to trans�
late into Javanese. As his negotiations with the plantation manager
clearly showed, all his activities were aimed at getting the striking
peasants back to work, back to normalcy, with some tangible econom�
ic gains, the only way to maintain the credibility of the Insulinde in the
eyes of peasants while getting the Insulinde out of its direct involve�
ment in peasant protest actions.
After Douwes Dekker's visit to the Polanharjo, peasants again re�
fused to perform corvee labor out of the expectation that the planta�
tion manager would soon offer a wage increase. Douwes Dekker's
93Persatoean Hindia, 14 Feb. 1920. For Douwes Dekker's activities on the Polanharjo
tobacco plantation, see also Persatoean Hindia, 22 May 1920, and 12 June 1920;
Resident
van Surakarta aan GG, 28 July 1919, Mr. 531X/19, Vb. 8 Jan. 1920, No. 2.
172. An Age in Motion
"meddling," the plantation manager's deal with him, and the renewed
vigor of the strikes all angered Resident Harloff. He strongly criticized
the plantation manager for his disregard of the authorities and made
him retract his promise to raise wages. He also immediately sent the
regent polisi to the Polanharjo with the reinforced armed police until
the strikes ended. Insulinde circle leaders were either arrested or placed
under close police surveillance. The armed police intimidated striking
peasants and "protected" those willing to go back to work. The strikes
soon crumbled. By July 14 the strikes were virtually over and the Polan
and Bintaran circles were in collapse. And soon thereafter, police in�
timidation and harassment also crushed the remaining Insulinde circles
in Pundung and Gawok.94
The repercussions of the Polanharjo affair were not confined to the
Surakartan countryside. Immediately after Resident Harloff learned of
Douwes Dekker's visit to the Polanharjo, he asked the prosecutor gen�
eral to place Douwes Dekker, van der Kasteele, and Tjipto under police
surveillance, while he himself placed Mrs. Vogel and Moedio under
surveillance in Surakarta. Soon after that, Douwes Dekker resigned as
NIP-SH secretary and editor-in-chief of De Beweging because of "ill�
ness" and moved to Bandung. But his last-minute maneuver to avoid
arrest was futile. In August, he was taken into preventive custody and
prosecuted on the charge of instigating criminal acts on the Polanhar�
jo.95 Government suppression placed the newly formed NIP-SH central
leadership under great strain. The Insulinde had just been transformed
into the NIP-SH at the Indiers congress held in Semarang on June 7-9.
At the congress, Douwes Dekker had called for "spiritual revolution"
and a united front of all forces on the basis of "national ideals" and
"nationalist ideology." It was his high point since his return. His call
swept the congress. He was elected secretary of the newly formed NIPSH central
committee, together with his trusted allies Tjipto, as a com�
missioner, and G. L. Topee, as chairman. Though Indo members
agreed to the transformation of the Insulinde into the NIP-SH, their
fear of being accused of being "revolutionary" lingered on. The con�
gress praised Misbach as a "hero," but declared at the same time that
the Insulinde had nothing to do with the peasant protest actions in
Surakarta.96 The Polanharjo affair and the arrest of Douwes Dekker
94Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr. 66ix/20. See also "De
Verzetsbeweging in Solo," Mededeeling der Regeering omtrent enkele Onderwerpen van
Algemeen Belang,
1920, pp. 23-25; Darma Kanda, 14 July 1919, IPO, 29 (1919); Panggoegah, 7 July
1919,
IPO, 28 (1919).
95Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr. 66ix/20; "Kentering," De Indische
Gids 41 (1919), pp. 1307-1308; Persatoean Hindia, 31 Jan. 1920.
96Panggoegah, 22 June 1919, IPO, 26 (1919); Darma Kanda, 25 June 1919, IPO, 26
(1919); Sinar Hindia, 14 June 1919, IPO, 24 (1919). For Douwes Dekker's speech at
the
congress, see Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr. 661X/20. See also
The Insulinde and Peasant Strikes i73
frightened Indo members. Many of them openly voiced their dissatis�
faction with the central leadership, while others simply quit the party.
In late August all the members of the central committee except Tjipto
resigned. Tjipto took on the position of secretary "as a temporary
measure." But many Indo leaders were hesitant to support him. Soon
Tjipto announced the reorganization of the NIP-SH. He elevated the
Surakarta branch and its circles to the Surakarta central committee and
branches.97 Since the central leadership in Semarang was in collapse,
the reorganization of the NIP-SH virtually meant the independence of
the Surakarta branch and its circles under Tjipto's leadership.
By the end of August 1919 the NIP-SH was thus in disarray. The
central leadership was in collapse and branch leaders in major urban
centers except Surakarta were in confusion. Only the Surakarta branch
remained strong, but there again its circles were in collapse. This situa�
tion proved temporary, however. Soewardi was on his way back. On
his return to the Indies, he settled down in Semarang, assumed the NIPSH
chairmanship, and succeeded in reconstructing the central leader�
ship by the end of September. Thanks to the right of association and
assembly that the government introduced in November and to the
renewed vigor of the pergerakan in general, the NIP-SH under Soewardi's leadership
regained some strength by early 1920.
In Surakarta, Insulinde circles in the countryside started to revive
toward the end of 1919 as NIP-SH branches. There were basically two
reasons for their revival. First, as we have seen, the circles and the
peasant strike actions had been crushed by July 1919. Peasants' fear of
the authorities was the key to the restoration of rust en orde. Resident
Harloff banned all Insulinde meetings, stationed the armed police in
trouble spots, let the police intimidate Insulinde peasant members, and
kept circle leaders under preventive custody without trial. But such
police measures could not be maintained for long. For one thing, the
right of association and assembly, a child of the government's Novem�
ber declaration, was finally put into effect on November 1 and elimi�
nated the legal basis of the resident's ban on Insulinde meetings. The
armed police were gradually pulled back. And toward the end of 1919
imprisoned circle leaders finally started to return to their villages. Sec�
ond, though the protest actions were crushed by force, peasant griev�
ances remained. It is not that grievances were not redressed. Though
the resident blamed the Insulinde for protest actions, he was well aware
that wages were too low, that plantations could afford a wage increase,
that peasant strikes would do more harm than a wage increase to
"Stroomingen onder de Inlandsche Bevolking," Mededeeling der Regeering omtrent
enkele
Onderwerpen van Algemeen Belang, 1920.
97Islam Bergerak, 20 Aug. 1919; Panggoegab, 25 Aug. 1919, IPO, ^7 (1919).
174 An Age in Motion
plantations, and that strikes would undermine state authority, if only
because the authorities could not punish all the peasants who joined
illegal strikes.98 In the wake of strikes, the resident thus pressed the
plantations to raise wages by 50 percent and also took measures to
mitigate corvee obligations for the state. But these measures did not
work as the resident expected. For one thing, in a time of rapid infla�
tion such as 1919-20, a 50 percent wage increase, which might have
been barely satisfactory to peasants in early 1919, became irrelevant by
early 1920. And for another, peasants saw such limited gains due to
their protest actions and the sacrifice Insulinde circle leaders made.
When circle leaders returned to their villages, they thus found them�
selves warmly supported by the peasants they had led in protest ac�
tions, even though they did not dare to strike again, at least for the
moment.
Toward the end of 1919 and especially in early 1920, therefore, the
Surakarta NIP-SH could again become the major force in the pergerakan both in the
city and in the countryside. But this time the NIPSH movement proceeded in a
different political context created by
Tjipto's anti-vorsten campaign. It was this anti-vorsten thrust as well
as the success in mobilizing peasants that made the NIP-SH uniquely
"revolutionary" in the year to come.
98See "Algemeene Hervorming van de Maatschappelijke en Agrarische Toestanden in de
Vorstenlanden," Mededeeling, 1921, p. 49.
5 Solo in the Pergerakan
Tjipto in Motion
Tjipto started his anti-vorsten campaign in June 1919, shortly after
the authorities suppressed the circles and the strikes in Nglungge and
on the Tegalgondo plantation and arrested Misbach and other Sur�
akarta Insulinde leaders. That Tjipto attacked the sunan (and by im�
plication the Mangkunegaran, the sultan, and the Pakualaman) was
not surprising, for his distaste for the sunan and "feudal" Javanese
tradition was almost legendary ever since he had run his carriage into
the square in front of the sunan's palace. Nor were the Javanese royal
houses held in high esteem among pergerakan activists except BO
members, because in an age when the tsar was slain and the kaiser fled
his country, the monarchy was seen as out-of-fashion and out-of-date.1
Yet Tjipto's anti-vorsten campaign was unique in two respects. First,
Tjipto's attack on the sunan assumed profound political significance
largely because of its timing and location. He attacked the sunan in the
Volksraad when Misbach was arrested and the militant mood of the
Surakarta Insulinde ran high. His anti-vorsten campaign was thus ap�
plauded by radical-minded pergerakan activists and invited fury
among royalists, opening a new "field of battle" that increasingly po�
larized the pergerakan in Surakarta between the Insulinde/NIP-SH and
the anti-Tjipto royalist forces. And second, Tjipto singled out the sun�
an as the target of his attack, when SI leaders, dismissing the monarchy
as out-of-date, focused their efforts on the anticapitalist "economic
struggle." In his anti-vorsten campaign, therefore, we can see not only
'See, for instance, Sanjoto, "Rahasia jang terdapat oleh tanah Vorstenlanden,"
Islam
Bergerak, io Aug. 1918, and Soerjosasmojo, "Witte Bloemke," Islam Bergerak, 10 Apr.
1919.
175
176 An Age in Motion
his idea about the Javanese kings and nobility but, more important,
Tjipto in motion, Tjipto the leader who guided the Surakarta
Insulinde/NIP-SH into the "political struggle."
Tjipto attacked the sunan in Panggoegab and in the Volksraad. In
the June 9 issue of Panggoegab, he argued that the people in Surakarta
were overburdened with their obligation to maintain two royal houses
and proposed either to pension off the sunan (and the Mangkunegaran) with a monthly
stipend of two thousand guilders or to return
Madiun to the Kasunanan.1 2 In the next (June 16) issue of Panggoegab,
he again made a similar proposal and argued that Amangkurat II and
his descendants were feudal vassals of the VOC (East India Company)
and its successor, the Dutch Indies state.3 He dealt with the issue most
extensively and eloquently in his Volksraad speech on June 26 and
made his attack on the sunan a major issue in pergerakan politics in
Surakarta.4
In this speech, he started his discussion with analyzing the causes of
the peasant strikes in Nglungge and on the Tegalgondo. What led
peasants to their protest actions? In his view it was the very low living
standard of peasants in Surakarta, who barely lived at the subsistence
level. The reorganization would never improve their living standard, he
argued, because the agrarian and administrative reforms were designed
in such a way that peasants were not allowed to earn more than
enough to live at the subsistence level. The root cause for this lay deep
in the very structure of the "rotten" and "medieval" system of the
Vorstenlanden:
The Surakarta region lives beyond its means. It goes without saying that
the two royal households there must prey on the population; that they
cannot sustain themselves without squeezing the people to the bone,
without turning the taxation screws so tight that in the final analysis it is
only thanks to the gentle nature of the Javanese that a movement of
resistance by the population against their own nobility and government
has not developed earlier. I mention the nobility and the government in
one breath because they must be regarded [jointly] as the root cause of
the abuses there. . . .
Well then! Our beyond-all-praise government has deprived the Native
rulers of their real power, without even indirectly making them under�
stand that they [now] have to make ends meet like anyone else. On the
contrary, all appearances suggest that it is attempting to pacify the Native
rulers exactly like a small child, by permitting them the proverbial Orien�
tal pomp and ceremony, without which, it seems, an Oriental monarch
1Panggoegab, 9 June 1919.
?Panggoegab, 16 June 1919. Tjipto continued his attack on the sunan in Panggoegab
and
at Insulinde/NIP-SH rallies. See Panggoegab, 30 June 1919, 14 July 1919, and 20
Oct. 1919.
4For his speech, see Volksraad Handelingen, 1919, pp. 72-81.
Solo in the Pergerakan 177
cannot exist. Any close acquaintance with the ostentatious show that, for
example, the Soesoehoenan [sunan] puts on will arouse feelings of dis�
gust, if for no other reason than that ultimately the cost of the show will
have to be paid for out of the pocket of the little man; and yet it still
cannot conceal the seedy clothing of a ruler truly "in low water"-"low
water here meaning [the absence of] real political say and power in his
own realm. It is not only formally that the kingdom of Surakarta is a
fief of the Government; for it is obvious in every respect that the Native
rulers are vassals and nothing more. Pomp and display are thus here in
stark contrast with real power; indeed the former have been used to
conceal the lack of the latter. But they are necessary to suggest to the
coolie-Javanese that his king is still what his title means: "nail of the
world. I who am by no means wholly unacquainted with the native
world can assure you that it is only the lowest, most ignorant stratum
of indigenous society that cannot see through this transparent haze of
pomp and circumstance. . . .
[But] I find this ostentation objectionable for Surakarta, where it must
be paid for out of the purse of the little man in the village-for in the end
it is the little man who has to "keep alive" the king with his retinue of
princes and half-princes, regents and half-regents.5
Tjipto thus in effect said that to "keep alive" the sunan, with his
proverbial Oriental pomp and ceremony" and "with his retinue," was
a waste of money. This was already a strong and novel attack on the
sunan, because nobody had ever questioned, and perhaps thought,
about the monetary cost of keeping the politically impotent sunan. But
to keep alive the sunan was in his view not just a waste of money. It
was also in the combination of "pomp and ceremony" with the sunan's
political impotence that lay the secret of the "medieval" system of the
Vorstenlanden: first because it was the royal decrees issued in the name
of the sunan that obliged the little man, the coolie-Javanese, to pay
taxes, perform corvee labor, and hand over his land to the plantation
and that provided the legal basis for the government to suppress peas�
ant protest; and second, because it was in the name of the sunan that
his subjects were "sold out" to Dutch plantations and the sunan could
get easy money from them.
But the system was long out-of-date, Tjipto argued, especially in
the age of trade unions and strikes." And now the peasant strikes in
Surakarta exposed the fundamental contradiction between the nobility
and the population. He explained:
Now two parties stand opposed to each other: the party of the people,
who, stirred by the "Spirit of Renaissance," are determined to win for
themselves a life more worthy of human beings; and the party of the
5Ibid., pp. 76-77.
i78 An Age in Motion
nobility, who intend to insist on their God-given right to an easy life paid
for by Kromo in the village with his sweat and share of happiness in life.
It is already rather easy to predict which party will carry off the palm of
victory. Kromo has behind him the Zeitgeist, which throughout world
history has always eventually prevailed, no matter how powerful the
adversary may have appeared at the outset.
On the side of reaction is now ranged the BB [Binnenlandsch Bestuur]
corps, which represents the Government in Solo. This corps has declared,
via the lips of the Resident himself, that conditions are "rotten," yet it
lacks the courage to intervene. In the final analysis, the BB officials are
slaves of legal ordinances-their Gospel. . . .
How can we secure for the Javanese of Solo a life that better befits our
century? ... If one wants to create healthier conditions there, it is selfevident
that one has to begin by easing the burden on the population,
which under the present system of regulations is much too heavy. . . .
The Sunan wants to compensate for the loss of his political power by a
show of more than regal pomp-to give the people the illusion that he is
still a ruling monarch. This situation can, and should, be otherwise. The
Government should make this after all insignificant king realize that he
must, in the interest of the people, restrain himself, both in his private life
and in his administration of his realm.6
At the end of his speech Tjipto proposed either to pension off the
sunan, to return Madiun to him, or to return to him the profits the
Indies government made by such state enterprises as salt and opium
monopolies and pawnshops. By making this proposal, he made it clear
that he did not mean Surakarta should be incorporated into the directly
ruled government region. Nor was he so naive as to see his proposal
feasible. He in fact never formally introduced his proposal in the
Volksraad. As his language was sarcastic-"a ruler truly `in low
water,'" "our beyond-all-praise government," "princes and half�
princes," "their Gospel"-his proposal was a joke, a rhetorical device
to attack the sunan and the government in a form proper to a "parlia�
mentary" speech.
Tjipto's attack on the sunan in the Volksraad and in Panggoegah
was undoubtedly the most devastating expose ever done of the sunan's
political impotence and his pomp, and by arguing that the sunan had to
make ends meet "like anyone else" he literally brought the sunan, the
descendant of Adam and Ardjuna, down to the same level as the little
man. By the late 1910s, however, the sunan's political impotence had
become common knowledge to the Western-educated, and SI leaders
were dismissing the question of the Javanese royal houses as far less
important than that of capitalism. Was Tjipto making a scandal of the
sunan's extravagant waste of money to shift the issue away from the
6Ibid., pp. 79-80.
Solo in the Pergerakan *79
peasant protest in the Kasunanan? Though an element of scandal was
certainly there in his speech and he was indeed trying hard to disengage
the Surakarta Insulinde from the direct involvement in protest actions
in the countryside, we should also remember that his attack on the
sunan was consistent with the argument he made in his letter to his
unknown Dutch friend, in which he discussed the docile nature of the
Javanese and argued that resuscitating the "spirit of resistance" was
the only remedy for a "healthy development" of the Javanese. He
approached the question of the "medieval" system of the Vorstenlanden in this moral
perspective and attacked the "root cause" epito�
mized by the sunan, while seeing in protest actions a sure sign of
popular awakening, the "renaissance" of the Javanese. And character�
istic of his way of thinking, his revolutionary moral perspective was
accompanied by his evolutionary historical perspective. As his usage of
such words as "renaissance," the "medieval" system, "fief," and "vas�
sals" suggests, he drew a historical parallel with European medieval
history in his analysis and showed once again that he fundamentally
shared his evolutionary historical perspective with Dutch ethici, who,
as Deputy Adviser for Native Affairs R. A. Kern typically put it, saw in
the Surakartan peasant protest "the efforts so touching and dramatic
the population make to throw off the oppression of thinly veneered
slavery."7 The idea Tjipto expressed in his attack on the sunan was
therefore characteristically his: give a "big push" to the Javanese to
resuscitate his spirit of resistance, and he will return to the normal
evolutionary path of human progress.
If his idea was original, the way he put it was also characteristically
his. His sarcastic and sometimes violent language aside, there are essen�
tially two elements to note. First, the timing and location was impor�
tant. He attacked the sunan in Panggoegab and in the Volksraad. In
Panggoegah he could reach a wide audience literate in Javanese. And in
the Volksraad high-ranking Dutch officials would hear his speech.
Besides, he started his anti-vorsten campaign not only at a time when
peasant protest actions ran high in Surakarta but, more important, at a
time when reorganization was still in progress and all appanage hold�
ers not on active duty were summarily pensioned off. Therefore, even if
he intended his proposal to pension off the sunan as a joke, it was
threatening enough to the Solonese nobility. Second, Tjipto's attack on
the sunan had a double edge that could cut either way. If one argued
that the sunan was a ruling monarch worthy of his pomp and ceremony,
everyone would know one was lying. And if one said that not the sunan
but the Indies government ran the Kasunanan and that therefore the
sunan should not be held responsible for the agrarian conditions in
7Wd. Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken aan GG, 18 Aug. 1920, Mr. 1090X/20.
180 An Age in Motion
rural Surakarta, it was tantamount to underlining Tjipto's argument
that the sunan was impotent and that keeping him alive was a waste of
money.
Tjipto's attack on the sunan caused fury among royalists and imme�
diately invited violent counterattacks from royalist forces. In the van�
guard were the BO organ Darma Kanda and Martodharsono's Djawi
Kanda and Djawi Hiswara. At first they retorted that not the sunan
but the government was responsible for all administrative measures in
the Kasunanan, that his attack on the sunan was therefore wide of the
mark, and that there was a hidden motive in his attack to replace the
sunan as the head of Surakarta. By arguing back, however, they found
themselves forced to underline the sunan's political impotence. Their
counterattack thus soon went wild, branding Tjipto as "crazy," warn�
ing readers that they would get contaminated by his "craziness" by
arguing back, and demanding that the government silence Tjipto.8
Among the Surakartan pergerakan forces, the BO and the SI emerged
as the major anti-Tjipto royalist forces. In July 1919 Samanhoedi,
probably with Martodharsono as his adviser, convened a meeting in
Lawean to discuss what position Lawean batik traders should take on
Tjipto's proposal to pension off the sunan. Those at the meeting de�
cided to establish the Comite Keslametan Rahajat Vorstenlanden (Com�
mittee for the People's Welfare in the Vorstenlanden), more commonly
called the Anti-Tjipto Committee, with Samanhoedi as chairman and
M. Prawirosoemardjo, editor of Djawi Kanda and Djawi Hiswara, as
secretary. They also sent a cable to the governor general to oppose the
abolition of "self-government" in the Vorstenlanden. Not only did
Kasunanan officials ally with Samanhoedi but also Poerwodihardjo,
secretary of the Surakarta SI and the TKNM subcommittee and an
enemy of Martodharsono, joined the Anti-Tjipto Committee.9 The
Surakarta BO also counterattacked. At the BO annual meeting in
Semarang in September, the Surakarta branch headed by Pangeran
Hadiwidjojo strongly urged the BO to organize "little men" to fight
against Tjipto's anti-vorsten campaign and the Insulinde/NIP-SH. The
meeting authorized the Surakarta branch to set up circles in rural
Surakarta. Soon circles were established in Karangwungu, Ngaran,
Polan (all in district Ponggok, regency of Klaten), Kacangan, Banyudono (both in
district Banyudono, regency of Boyolali), and Kartasura-in short, the very area
where the Insulinde circles were orgasSee, for instance, Djawi Hiswara, 4 July
1919, IPO, 27 (1919); zo Aug. 1919, IPO, 34
(1919); Darma Kanda, 3 Sept. 1919, IPO, 36 (1919).
4Djawi Kanda, 10 July 1919, IPO, 28 (1919). For the Anti-Tjipto Committee, see also
Persatoean Hindia, 6 Mar. 1920; Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 9 Oct. 1919, Mr.
754*/i9-
Solo in the Pergerakan 181
nized in early 1919. The often celebrated move of the BO to the people
thus started as a defensive measure against Tjipto.
Tjipto's anti-vorsten campaign also dragged the Indies government,
the Kasunanan, and the Mangkunegaran into the fray. After he bitterly
attacked the sunan, the Mangkunegara, and the resident in his Volksraad speech on
November 25, Prince Mangkunegara Prang Wedana,
himself a Volksraad member, dropped his aloof posture and asked the
government what role it would assign the self-governing principalities
in a future autonomous Indies. Government representatives had thus
far ignored Tjipto's attack on the sunan in the Volksraad, because
arguing back was, in their view, tantamount to taking note of his argu�
ment. Prang Wedana's question gave the government a good oppor�
tunity to state its position unequivocally. Government representative
W. Muurling announced in the Volksraad: "Whoever tries to under�
mine the authority and the position of the self-governing principalities
of Java, the government sets itself against."10
By the end of 1919, Tjipto thus pitted himself and the Insulinde/NIPSH against the
sunan, the Mangkunegara, the royalist BO and SI
forces, and the Indies government. By that time, however, the NIP-SH
had been on the rise once again both in the city and in the countryside.
Accordingly, Tjipto embarked on his anti-vorsten campaign in a new
form, not in the Volksraad but at NIP-SH rallies. The new form he
chose to deny the sunan his moral and historical claim to kingship was
ketoprak (Javanese popular opera) theater. He reportedly composed a
number of ketoprak plays, all based on Mataram historical episodes
such as the destruction of the palace of Pajang by Panembahan
Senopati, the battle of Panembahan Senopati with Pangeran Madiun,
Trunojoyo's war with Susuhunan Amangkrat I, and Pangeran Puger's
accession to the throne in Semarang as Susuhunan Pakubuwana I.11
But none of the plays he reportedly wrote is available now, and we do
not even know whether they were ever written. What we do know is
that he composed a play, Kiageng Mangir, the story line of which he
explained at the Surakarta NIP-SH congress held on March 21, 1920.
Sismadi Sastrosiswojo reports in Persatoean Hindia Tjipto's explana�
tion of the play:
The speaker [Tjipto] then told of a certain tale, a course of conduct taken
by a King in the land of Java in the olden days. The speaker did not
explain where the King ruled or what his name was. He only said that the
king was always intent on expanding his colonies and power. In a certain
l0For Tjipto's speech, see Volksraad Hattdelingett 9 (1919), pp. 159-165. For
Muurling's
announcement, see p. 359.
#'"Rapport hal SH," Mr. 397X/20.
182 An Age in Motion
place, also in the land of Java, there was a young man with the title of
"Kiageng." This Kiageng ruled the population of the villages in his area
of residence, and he warned the King that he would not submit to him. So
the King became angry and was displeased with Kiageng, but the King
also did not dare fight him. For Kiageng was famous for his magical
power, [especially] because he possessed a lance imbued with extraordi�
nary magical power. That was the reason the King hesitated to fight him.
But the Great King did not give up. He constantly looked for tactics and
tricks to kill the young magically powerful Kiageng.
The Great King then ordered his eldest daughter, who was still unmar�
ried, to disguise herself as a common ronggeng [female dancer-singer]
and perform at young Kiageng's residence. His aim was that Kiageng
would feel great desire for his daughter the ronggeng and eventually
make her his wife; once that happened, the King would order his daugh�
ter the ronggeng to coax Kiageng to come with her to call upon the Great
King. In short, the aim of the Great King was fulfilled. On their journey
to call on the Great King, Kiageng and his wife took along his army,
complete with all their weapons, while his magic lance was never absent
from his hand. But when Kiageng had almost reached the Great King's
palace, a Regent on guard approached him and said that when calling on
the King Kiageng was forbidden to take along his army or his weapon.
This ban Kiagenig obeyed. And Kiageng was permitted to proceed to his
audience with the King. Finally, after Kiageng had presented himself
before the Great King, he was suddenly killed by the Great King while
still kneeling down and paying his respects. After the death of Kiageng,
the Great King felt satisfied, since he no longer had an enemy.
Now, at that time Kiageng's wife, the King's daughter, had just be�
come pregnant. When she heard that her husband had been killed by her
father, she was extremely angry with her father.
This was what toean Tjipto told about the conduct of a King in the
land of Java in the olden days.
After that, toean Tjipto said that the conduct of the King as he had just
described it was contemptible and cowardly. The King, in opposing his
enemy, resorted to treacherous methods, selling his own daughter and
killing his adversary in an underhanded way. This is not the custom of a
satria. The custom of a true satria must be to oppose his enemy with
courage and in a straightforward, open way.12
Tjipto based his play on Babad Kiageng Mangir, published by the
Volkslectuur. He reinterpreted the official version "in terms of revolu�
tionary art" and cast his version in a theatrical form so that "the
history" could be more accessible to the people.13 What did he mean
by "revolutionary," then, and what was "revolutionary" in his play?
First and rather superficially, Tjipto presented Panembahan Senopati,
-Persatoean Hindia, 19 June 19ZO. This was also published in Islam Bergerak, 10
June
1920.
nProces Verbaal (Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo), 3 Nov. 1920, Mr. 1365X/20.
Solo in the Pergerakan 183
the founder of Mataram, as a fake satria whose conduct was "con�
temptible" and "cowardly" and whose custom was "treacherous" and
"underhanded." If the founder was a fake, all his descendants, includ�
ing the Susuhunan Pakubuwana X and the Mangkunegara VII, were
also fakes. The moral and historical claim of Mataram kings to kingship would be
denied.14
Second and more important, the "revolutionary" quality of his play
lay in Tjipto's expose of Senopati's "tricks." In ketoprak theater, the
story is usually told in such a way that, however just the rebel's cause,
he is at the end defeated and tranquillity reigns.15 In Tjipto's play,
however, even though the king defeats Kiageng, tranquillity never reigns.
The king's daughter gets angry at her father and the king's "tricks" are
exposed. What are the tricks, then? The tricks become what they are
only when there are three parties. First, there must be one who uses the
tricks, in this case the king. Second, there must be one who gets trapped
by the tricks, in this case Kiageng. But there needs to be one who sees
the tricks and says they are tricks. It is this third party transcending the
two in conflict, in this case the king's daughter and Tjipto the story�
teller, who exposes the tricks and makes them what they are. In the
hierarchy the play represents, Tjipto thus sits at the apex and flattens
the hierarchy under him. It is this structure that is revolutionary. Misbach's
comments on the play are instructive:
The SH on purpose composed a history of ancient and modern times,
because it is necessary to demonstrate the strange habits of the upper
class and the kings. . . . There are kings who have no human feelings and
continually torment the blind. They have the blind play tag-and when
they bump into trees they make fun of them. They have the blind eat rats'
flesh and ask them what kind of meat they have enjoyed. Not knowing it
is rats' flesh, the blind answer that it tastes good. Then they are told that
they have eaten rat meat and are ridiculed in the bargain.16
Here Misbach makes essentially the same point as Tjipto. The SH will
expose "the strange habits" of the nobility and the kings in order that
the blind can see their tricks. It is this exposing that makes the SH
revolutionary. Therefore, if we return to Tjipto's attack on the sunan in
the Volksraad, it is now clear why it was so powerful. People might
know that the sunan was politically impotent. They also might know
l4See also "Tjipto als Dramaturg," De Beweging, 13 Mar. 1920.
lsBarbara Hatley, Ketprak Theater and the Wayang Tradition (Melbourne: Center of
Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1980), pp. 14-16.
16"Vertaling van een verslag eener vergadering der Sarekat Hindia (NIP)," 5 May
1919,
Mr. 508X/20. See also Sastrosiswojo, "Vergadering Besar di Solo," Persatoean Hindu,
19
June 1920. In this speech Misbach also announced that the Surakarta SH had
commissioned
Tjipto to write plays based on hahad (history).
184 An Age in Motion
of his extravagant pomp and ceremony. What Tjipto did was to expose
the link between the two, that the sunan was using tricks to cover up
his impotence with his pomp and ceremony.
Tjipto planned to stage the play at the Surakarta NIP-SH congress
on March 21, 1920, and recruited the sunan's wayang orang troupe of
Sriwedari for that purpose. He also asked the authorities for permis�
sion to stage it. Judging the play "quite innocent," Resident Harloff
granted permission.17 But royalists rightly sensed the danger. A few
days before the congress, Pangeran Hadiwidjojo, learning of Tjipto's
plan independently from a spy he had sent to the SH, warned the
resident that the play would "put the palace to shame," that "princes
would feel themselves put to shame because their ancestors were
shamed, and that if it was ever staged, "they might cause disturbances
at the theater."18 The patih also asked the resident to ban the play.
Harloff cancelled his permission.19 By so doing he played into Tjipto's
hands. Since the play was based on Babad Kiangeng Mangir, which
was published by the government, and the story was the same, by
banning the play Harloff contradicted government policy. Tjipto natu�
rally pointed out the inconsistency, which angered Harloff.20
Tjipto thus frontally attacked the sunan, upset the hierarchy, and
angered the resident. By exposing the sunan's and Senopati's tricks, he
told "the blind" that they were fake. As the name of his newspaper
suggests, he was indeed an awakener (panggugab), making people see
what they had been unable to see. And when people started to see what
they had not been able to see, they saw Tjipto above the sunan and the
hierarchy upside down. Royalist accusations that he was "crazy" and
that one would get contaminated by his "craziness" was in this sense
correct. Tjipto was the aucter intellectuals (brain) of the Insulinde/
NJP-SH, because it was the party who saw Tjipto above the sunan.
Tjipto's anti-vorsten campaign thus made the Surakarta Insulinde/NIP-SH
uniquely revolutionary. Yet it was characteristically his show from
beginning to end. What he did was create a revolutionary context in
which his party moved. But the resurgence of the party itself was
largely due to factors other than Tjipto's attack on the sunan.
The Resurgence of the Sarekat Hindia
The Surakarta Insulinde/NIP-SH branch and circles started to
move again in October 1919 in the midst of the growing polarizaResident van
Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 19ZO, Mr. 66ix/zo.
Regent Kota (Mangoennagoro) aan Resident van Surakarta, 17 Mar iqzo Mr
66 ix/zo.
Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 19Z0, Mr. 66ix/zo.
See the tone ol his language in his letter to the governor general. Ibid.
Solo in the Pergerakan 185
tion of Surakartan pergerakan politics caused by Tjipto's anti-vorsten
campaign. Three events marked the opening of this new phase, the
resurgence of Tjipto's party. First, an SH rally was held and attended
by two thousand in the city on October 15, for the first time since the
Insulinde peasant rally was banned by the resident in June. Though it
was convened by Tjipto in the name of the Surakarta NIP-SH branch,
the major figures were Soewardi Soerjaningrat and Tjokroaminoto. It
marked Soewardi's public debut on the stage of the pergerakan since
his return from Holland. As chairman of the NIP-SH central commit�
tee, he called for "cooperation and mutual help" between the SH and
the SI. In response, Tjokroaminoto also expressed his hope for "coop�
eration and mutual help" of the SI with the SH. Interestingly, neither
Soewardi nor Tjokroaminoto touched on Tjipto's attack on the sunan
or attacked the Solonese nobility.21 But their joint appearance at the
rally and their pledge of cooperation and mutual help were read in the
Surakartan pergerakan context and understood as the formation of a
united front of the SH and the SI, "associations of kromo," against the
royalist forces and the nobility. Jubilant, Koesen, editor-in-chief of
Islam Bergerak and commissioner of the SATV and the Surakarta SH,
wrote on the significance of the rally:
With all our strength we must oppose and fight against any association
aiming to increase our oppression, even if the association is established by
people of our own nation of Indiers. Remember, brother Kromo! Why
have we Indiers become a nation oppressed, humiliated, and bled white?
It is because of the deeds of [people of] our nation, whose character has
been to encourage greed and evil. That is why we Kromo were sold, along
with all our property rights, to the people of money, and eventually we
were oppressed and bled white to the point of emaciation, as we are at
present.22
Second, on the same day that the rally was held in Surakarta, Douwes Dekker was
acquitted at the Council of Justice (Raad van Justitie)
in Semarang. Though he was hardly a well-known figure in Surakarta,
the reason for his acquittal was important. The Council of Justice
pronounced that Article 102 of the Indies Criminal Law, on the basis
of which Douwes Dekker was prosecuted for instigating criminal acts
on the Polanharjo, did not apply to the royal regulations issued in the
Vorstenlanden.21 Following this pronouncement, the native court of
Surakarta simply dropped Misbach's case a week later. He was re�
leased on October 22. This was a major victory of the Surakarta SH.
21Koesen, "Vergadering Jang Tenting Haroes Djadi Peringatan," Islam Bergerak, i
Nov.
1919. Also see Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 192.0, Mr. 661X/20.
22Koesen, "Vergadering Jang Penting Haroes Djadi Peringatan," Islam Bergerak, 1
Nov.
1919.
2,Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr. 661X/20.
186 An Age in Motion
Misbach showed an "example" of what "a true satria" should be like
and emerged victorious from prison, his ascetic retreat. Soerjosasmojo,
editor of Islam Bergerak, wrote:
For six months our hero was in prison, separated from his children and
wife, from friends and from the people, from the pergerakan and prog�
ress, like a myna bird in a cage.
For six months our brother lived in ascetic retreat, because he was
deprived, in fact robbed, of his freedom without justification. Even a
watch was forbidden to him, although a watch is very useful for showing
the times to perform the prayers of our religion of Islam, in other words
to serve it.
This brother is a true ksatrya, not a ksatrya like most-that is, sons of
kings and the like. Very dangerous are those of our nation who attack the
efforts of our ksatrya, and it would be only fitting for these people,
district chiefs or ministers of the king, for example, to be given hell in this
world.24
To honor Misbach, the Surakarta SH held feasts evening after evening.
In the well-attended feasts a big portrait of Misbach was displayed up
front, speeches were made to honor him, music was played, and food
served. Surakarta SIT leaders also rented a car and organized a parade
in front of the residency office, the Kepatihan office, and the assistant
resident's office.25 Shortly after that, Misbach replaced Mrs. Vogel as
chair of the Surakarta SH, while Tjipto remained as secretary.
And finally and most important, the law of the right of association
and assembly finally took effect on i November 1919. Official permis�
sion was no longer required to form an association. Though prior
permission of the head of the local authorities was required for public
assembly, any other type of gathering could now be held without per�
mission. The police were authorized to attend a public assembly and to
intervene if it was deemed in conflict with the rust en orde. But they no
longer had the authority to attend a closed-door members' meeting
without consent of the organizer of the meeting. Especially important
in this connection was the introduction of Article 173 of the Indies
Criminal Law, which stipulated that "he who obstructs an allowed
public assembly by force or by threat of force shall be punished with
imprisonment of a maximum of one year." Now pergerakan leaders
could remind the police of the article whenever they tried to inter�
vene.26 Before the law went into effect, the resident asked the prosecu24Foreta
[Soerjosasmojo], "Merdeka poela," Islam Bergerak, 10 Nov. 1919. See also Islam
Bergerak, 1 Nov. 1919.
2sResident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr. 661X/20.
26F�r the right of association and assembly, see "Wijziging van Art. in van het
Regeeringsreglement," Mededeelingen der Regeering omtrent enkele Onderwerpen van
Algemeen Belang, 1920, pp. 16-17.
Solo in the Pergerakan 187
tor general to suspend the right of association and assembly in the
residency of Surakarta. But his request was turned down, because there
was no "serious and immediate threat" to the rust en orde to justify the
suspension.27
From November 1919 on, the Surakarta SH carried out its propa�
ganda with renewed vigor in Panggoegah and Islam Bergerak and in
organizing members' meetings. Fueled by labor discontent over meager
wages in a time of rapid inflation, trade unions formed the vanguard of
the Surakarta SH. In the city, unions were led by Toenggal Boedi
activists. Djojopanatas, chairman of the Toenggal Boedi, together with
Moedio, his son-in-law, propagandized among Mangkunegaran police
personnel and secretly organized the Politiebond (Police Union).
Soedarman, SH commissioner and Toenggal Boedi secretary, orga�
nized the Typografenbond (Printers' Union). And wdien workers of the
Solonese Electricity Company struck in December 1919, they were led
by Djojopanatas and other Toenggal Boedi leaders.28
In the countryside, PFB (Sugar Factory Workers' Union) branches
became the vanguard of the Surakarta SH. Though the PFB formed
Soerjopranoto's power base in his rise to the CSI vice-chairmanship in
1919, the establishment of PFB branches in Surakarta went hand in
hand with the resurgence of the SH. The first PFB branch was orga�
nized by Soemodihardjo, PFB secretary, at the Cokrotulung sugar fac�
tory in Klaten on November 30.29 In December and January six more
PFB branches were established in Klaten, Boyolali, Surakarta, and
Sragen. By the end of March 1920, PFB branches were there at all of
the sixteen sugar factories in the residency of Surakarta. Though local
PFB leaders naturally looked to Soerjopranoto for leadership, they also
turned to the Surakarta SH for guidance, for Santoso was there as PFB
consul for the region of Surakarta.30
Former Insulinde circle leaders, who had been held in preventive
custody since early 1919, also started to return to their villages toward
the end of 1919. Embittered by their arrest and warmly supported by
those they led in the strikes, they demanded the return of their shares in
the village communal land and attacked village officials. The Surakarta
SH leadership openly backed their actions. When H. Sirat, a former
Insulinde Klaseman circle leader, was imprisoned for eight days be27Resident van
Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr. 661X/20.
28For the Politiebond, see Assistent Resident van Surakarta (van Helsdingen) aan
GG, 9
Oct. 1919; Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr. 661X/20. For the strike
at the
Solonese Electricity Company, see Persatoean Hittdia, 27 Dec. 1919; Darma Kanda, 14
Jan.
1920, IPO, 3 (1920).
2yResident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr. 661X/20.
After he reconstructed the PKBT central committee in Surakarta in 1918, Santoso was
transferred by the Opiumregie to Sragen. Then, sometime in the middle of 1919, he
quit the
job as an Opiumregie official and joined the PFB as a consul. See Persatoean
Hindia, 29 Feb.
1920.
i88 An Age in Motion
cause of his action, Misbach and other SH leaders brought him back to
his village by car upon his release and held a feast to honor his action.31
In rural Surakarta, SH branches were thus organized by PFB activists
and/or former Insulinde circle leaders. The Delanggu SH branch, for
instance, was led by Tjitrosoedarmo (Wonosari PFB leader) Padmotenojo (Delanggu PFB
leader), and H. Tajib (former Insulinde Bintaran circle chairman). The Kartasura SH
branch was established by
former Insulinde Kartasura circle leaders and Bangak PFB activists.
And the Tegalgondo SH branch was formed by former Insulinde circle
leaders.32 In the months from November to February 1920, however,
the expansion of the SH in the countryside had not yet started in full
The season for tobacco planting and sugar planting and harvesting had
yet to come. Peasants were still afraid of the authorities and stayed
away from the SH. It was in the months from March to May that
Surakarta saw the "revolutionary" actions under the banner of the SH
both in the city and in the countryside.
"The Age of the World Upside-Down"
In the city, the Surakarta SH congress held in Keprabon on March
21 marked the opening of a new phase.33 The congress was chaired by
Misbach and attended by a thousand, predominantly Javanese, with
only one Jndo, two Chinese, and six Arab members. The PFB sent
consul Santoso as its representative. Mas Marco Kartodikromo, who
had just been elected a CSI commissioner at the 1919 CSI congress,
represented the CSI and the Semarang SI. The Parakan SI, the Adhi
Dharma, and the Moehammadijah from outside Surakarta as well as
the SATV, the Fonds Sama Rasa, the Delanggu SI, the Delanggu,
Bangak, and Mojosragen PFB branches, the PPPB, and several other
unions were also represented at the congress. Though eventually
banned by Resident Harloff, the Surakarta SH had announced that it
would stage Tjipto's play Kiageng Mangir at the congress and caused a
^ Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr. 661X/20. For the activities of
former
Insulinde Gawok and Klaseman circle leaders, see Mantn Onderdistnct Wonosari aan
Panewoe District Delanggu, 6 Jan. 1920, Mr. 661X/20.
-Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr. 66ix/20. Padmotenojo, born in 1901
graduated from a second-class native school in Yogyakarta and worked as a
laboratory
worker at the Delanggu sugar factory after 1917. When the Delanggu PFB was
established
ne became secretary and soon he was also elected chairman of the Delanggu SH.
Tjitro�
soedarmo, secretary of the Wonosari PFB, became Delanggu SH secretary.
"For the congress, see Sastrosiswojo, "Sarekat Hindia Solo," Persatoean Hindia 10
Apr
t9z�; Sastrosiswojo, "Vergadermg Besar di Solo," Persatoean Hindia, 24 Apr. 1920;
8, 22
and 29 May 1920; 19 June 1920; Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr!
66ix/20; "Vertaling van een verslag eener vergadering der Sarekat Hindia (NIP)," s
Mav
192-0, Mr. 508X/20. v 3 y
Solo in the Pergerakan 189
commotion among royalists. The congress was thus held amid rumors
that Misbach and Tjipto would be banished and that royalists would
break it up. The building was heavily guarded by the police. The assi�
stant resident of Surakarta, the regent polisi, the police commissioner,
and other police officers all attended the congress. The mood of the
congress was tense, which reinforced the sense that the SH was the
association of kromo fighting against the nobility and the government.
The congress was opened by Misbach. The main speaker was Tjipto,
who first climbed the stage and then descended to the floor, right in the
middle of the audience, while saying that he did so "in order that his
speech can be heard from Kedunglumbu [the name of the kampung
located closest to the sunan's palace] and from Bogor [where the gover�
nor general resided]."34 After explaining the story of Kiageng Mangir,
Tjipto stressed the importance of the right of association and assembly.
He then compared the Indies government to Pandita Duma and the
sunan to the king of Ngastina in the wayang of the Mahabharata cycle
and said that the purpose of the SH was to fight, like Pandawa, against
the Indies government and the nobility for the freedom of the Indies.
Tjipto's speech set the theme of the congress, what the SH was fighting
for and against. Misbach then rose to the stage. Sismadi Sastrosiswojo
reports his speech:
[Misbach said:] The SH will fight with all its strength against every [kind
of] oppression and exploitation from whatever quarter. The speaker
stated that the SH praises-and hopes that all associations of the Indies
people will cooperate with the SH to attain the goal of achieving the
freedom of the land of the Indies. . . .
The speaker reminded all his brothers in Islam to remember and to
imitate the character and stance of our revered leader, the Prophet
Mohamad s.a.w., when he preached the Religion of Islam. How great
were the sufferings and dangers that beset him, but our Prophet paid
them no mind and had no fear; he did not retreat on account of these
great dangers. In Arabia in the olden days there was much oppression by
the Idolaters of their fellow men. Our Prophet, who showed the path of
truth, was persecuted by the Idolaters, who intended to kill him by drag�
ging him into a cave and hurling huge stones across its entrance. For
several days our Prophet had nothing whatever to eat, not even a single
mouthful. It may be that in this present age our Prophet would be called
an "Agitator," like the leaders of the people in the Indies right now, and
would constantly be menaced with imprisonment and banishment. But
actually, by comparison with the suffering of our Prophet when he car�
ried out his duty to lead the people in Arabia in the olden days, the
dangers and sufferings that beset the leaders of the people in the Indies
are, in the speaker's view, insignificant and bearable. For in prison or in
^Sastrosiswojo, "Vergadering Besar di Solo," Persatoean Hindu, 24 Apr. 1920.
190 An Age in Motion
banishment these leaders still get food and are never stoned like our
Prophet.
Therefore those brothers in Islam who truly love and carry out the
commands of their religion Islam will naturally not be afraid of joining
the SH, which aims to oppose all oppression, slander, and exploitation-
for the aim of the SH is the same as that of Islam. Therefore it is not right
for Muslims to sit quietly when they see the kind of oppression that today
besets the people of the Indies.35
Misbach set the tone of the congress by his speech, saying to himself
and the audience that "we" should suppress the fear of being jailed and
banished by reminding "ourselves" of graver sufferings "our revered
leader the Prophet Mohamad" underwent. He thus said in effect that
"we" could follow the Prophet Mohamad only through suffering and
dangers.
After Misbach, Surakarta SH leaders and others one after another
stated their determination to fight with courage for the freedom of the
Indies. They expressed it either in the language of wayang like Tjipto or
in the language of Islam like Misbach. But this difference was of little
significance. Important was the courage to fight against oppression and
exploitation, repeatedly expressed in the words "Don't be afraid of
being jailed, banished, and hanged."36 As the procession "jailed, ban�
ished, and hanged which is a procession to death-indicates, "courage was displayed
in the very act of mentioning the fear, gazing at the
sources of fear that end with death. Then Marco climbed the stage.
Sismadi Sastrosiswojo reports:
Mr. Marco then rose to say that after listening to all the previous
speeches he felt astonished that, although the leaders of the pergerakan
had repeatedly exposed how heavy [government] oppression now was,
people continued to do nothing. When they listened to the leaders'
speeches at rallies, they seemed to agree with them, but this agreement
and courage appeared to exist only at rallies. Once home from the rallies,
everything heard and agreed to at the rallies simply vanished. . . . The
speaker added that, just as the Chairman had announced earlier on,
sixteen leaders of the pergerakan in the Indies were about to be banished,'
with the speaker himself likely number i on the list. Nonetheless the
speaker said he was not dismayed, for so it must be-a leader's task is to
stand before the [rest of the] pergerakan.37
Murco s speech fixed the tone Masbach had set. It was not the words
spoken and heard at the congress, but the deeds that mattered. The
^'Sastrosiswojo, "Sarekat Hindia Solo," Persatoean Hindia, io Apr. 1920.
^Sastrosiswojo, "Vergadering Besar di Solo," Persatoean Hindia, 29 May 1920
J Ibid.
Solo in the Pergerakan 191
task of a leader was to go first and to set an example, so that people
could suppress their fear, follow their leaders, and fight against oppres�
sion and exploitation.
With the congress, the confrontation of Tjipto's party with the royal�
ists and the authorities peaked. Tjipto kept attacking the sunan, the
Mangkunegara, and the resident in Panggoegah and in De Beweging.
Though the resident frustrated Tjipto's attempt to stage his play, nei�
ther the local authorities nor the royalists were sure what Tjipto would
do next. It was a war of nerves in which the local authorities and the
royalists became increasingly defensive. The police and the Narpowandojo, the
association of Kasunanan princes headed by Pangeran
Hadiwidjojo, sent spies to the SH, who in turn supplied fantastic infor�
mation to their masters. Rumors circulated. One rumor said that Misbach had
secretly organized local toughs and ordered them to assassi�
nate the assistant resident of Surakarta. Another rumor said that Tjipto
had established a secret society and ordered its members to blow up the
resident's office, the Kepatihan office, the Java Bank, and the post
office with dynamite. Yet other rumors said that Tjipto had secretly
contacted Japanese businessmen to obtain their financial help and that
it was secretly agreed that once Java was liberated Tjipto would divide
the land with other pergerakan leaders.38 All these rumors were no
doubt unfounded and most of them perhaps were invented by the
opposition. Yet one thing was certain. All the rumors concerned "se�
cret" moves Tjipto and Misbach made, but there was no way to know
whether they made such "secret" moves. This created a sense of their
omnipresence and reinforced the feeling that the authorities and the
palace were under siege.
In this psychological state, rumors produced an even more bizarre
incident in early April. A spy sent to the SH by Pangeran Hadiwidjojo
brought him the information that Tjipto and his proteges were plan�
ning to cut off the electricity in the sunan's palace on April 10, his
birthday, and to kill him at the birthday party in darkness. Panicked,
Hadiwidjojo immediately convened an emergency meeting of the Narpowandojo and
invited the patih to discuss how to defend the sunan
against Tjipto's assassination plot. Those at the meeting decided to ask
the resident to place the palace under special police guard. Hadiwidjojo
and the police commissioner discussed measures, and on the sunan's
birthday the police force was for the first time in history brought into
the palace.39 All these measures were supposed to be taken secretly and
38Rapport van 19/20 maart 1920 betreffende hetgeen door my (ons) op dien dag is
verricht; Ontvangen rapport op 5 Mei 1920: Inlichtingen omtrent de S.H.; Regent
Kota (Mangoennagoro), Geheim rapport van 21 Mei 1920 betreffende Sarekat Hindia,
all in Mr.
661X/20.
39Bericht omtrent de slechte voornemens van Dr. Tjipto; Resident van Surakarta aan
GG,
8 June 1920, both in Mr. 661X/20.
192 An Age in Motion
without the knowledge of the sunan. But to Resident Harloff's and
Hadiwidjojo's embarrassment, they were reported by a Dutch journal�
ist, H. C. Zentgraaf, in Het Soerabajaascbe Handelsblad and became a
target of Tjipto's mockery.40
The existence of the Police Union, Rekso Prodjo (Politiebond), set up
secretly by Djojopanatas and Moedio, finally surfaced in this atmo�
sphere. The membership of Rekso Prodjo was small, perhaps a little
more than ten, but it included both Kasunanan and Mangkunegaran
police personnel. This greatly alarmed the resident, who immediately
dismissed all the Rekso Prodjo members from the police and ordered
the police commissioner to investigate the government, Kasunanan,
and Mangkunegaran apparatus, as well as the NIS (Netherlands Indies
Railway), to uncover SH members.41 To the resident's dismay, the
police commissioner's investigation uncovered the existence of more
than thirty SH members among the soldiers of the Mangkunegaran
Legion. SH members were also found in the Opiumregie, the govern�
ment pawnshops, the Post and Telegraph Service, and the NIS. Several
Kasunanan princes were also found to be SH members. All the SH
members of the Mangkunegaran Legion were summarily dismissed.
Pressures were exerted on others to quit the SH. Yet the number of SH
members continued to grow in the Opiumregie, the pawnshops, and
the Post and Telegraph Service. And in the middle of April two strikes
broke out, one at the Solonese Electricity Company again and the other
at the royalist BO printing firm, both under the leadership of Toenggal
Boedi leaders Djojopanatas and Soedarman.42
While a war of nerves was fought in the city, sugar factory workers
and peasants organized into the SH, the PFB, and the Delanggu SI
increasingly came to threaten the Dutch Javanese colonial order in the
countryside from March to May. The central arena of this united front
action was the tobacco and sugar plantation areas in Ponggok and
Delanggu (regency of Klaten) and an old Insulinde stronghold on the
Tegalgondo tobacco plantation. The first open-air public rally in rural
Surakarta was held in Delanggu on February 29. It was a combined
rally of the SH, the PFB, and the Delanggu SI, led by Misbach, Tjipto,
Soerjopranoto, Padmotenojo (secretary of the Delanggu SH and the
Delanggu PFB), and Mangoenatmodjo (chairman of the Delanggu SI)
and attended by some four hundred. Tjipto stressed the importance of
40Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, "Hoe men ons in Solo bestrijd," De Beweging, 24 Apr.
1920.
41Panggoegah, 9 Feb. 1920, IPO, 8 (1920). Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June
1920,
Mr. 66ix/20.
42For the SH members in the Mangkunegaran Legion, see also Rapport betreffende de
vereeniging S.H., 20 Mar. 1920; Mantri Polisi aan Commissaris van Politie der lste
Klasse te
Surakarta, 12 Mar. 1920, both in Mr. 66ix/20. For the strike at the BO printing
firm and the
SH members among princes, see Mantri Polisi, "Rapport," 17 Apr. 1920; Onder-Regent
aan
Assistent Resident van Surakarta, 25 May 1920, both in Mr. 66ix/20.
Solo in the Pergerakan i93
the right of association and assembly and told the audience not to fear
police intervention in the rallies and meetings. Soerjopranoto attacked
the police and the authorities for their intervention in PFB strikes and
called for the establishment of fighting funds for future PFB strike
actions. Characteristically, Tjipto did not touch on the "economic
struggle" of the PFB and in turn Soerjopranoto dealt with Tjipto's
attack on the sunan lightly.43 But their difference was buried by the
militant tone set by Misbach:
Now an association named the SH has been established so that the people
will no longer be oppressed and have their blood sucked by the other side.
For after all the little man still does not understand that the government is
sucking his blood. Just think, who really has the land? Obviously it is not
the Queen or the Government. Where is there a Queen or a Government
that has land? If it were so, our lives would depend on a single person.
And remember this also: in olden times it was our own ancestors who
held the land-that is why we must think again about the land. Besides, if
a kingdom is ruled by a single person, what they call a Queen, that is
obviously not good, because the Queen will think only of her own body.
The present age can rightly be called the djaman balik boeono [age of
the world-upside-down]-for what used to be above is now certainly
under.
It is said that in the country of Oostenrijk [Austria], which used to be
headed by a King, there has now been a balik boeono. It is now headed by
a Republic, and many bureaucrats have been killed by the Republic. A
former bureaucrat only has to show his nose for his throat to be cut, and
so on.
So, Brothers, remember! The land belongs to no one other than our�
selves! And willy-nilly, this land will return to us one day. True, it may
not come back to us in my lifetime, but if I die, it means one is dead but
ten are certain to spring up in my place; and if ten die, then a hundred will
spring up . . . and so on, and so on.44
The question of land that Misbach addressed was in itself of crucial
importance to the peasants, all the more so because preparatory mea�
sures had been under way in district Delanggu in view of the formal
introduction of the reorganization in April 1921. Questions of who
would be appointed village officials and who would get a share in the
village communal land had created a lot of uncertainties among bekel
and peasants there. But the power of his speech was reinforced bv his
phrase djaman balik boeono, which captured the very essence of peas�
ant uncertainties. The phrase signifies two things: it means, as 1 trans�
lated, "age of the world upside-down," but boeono (buwana) also
4}Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 192.0, Mr. 661X/2.0.
44"Pepriksaan Hadji Misbach, I," Persatoean Hindia, 18 Sept. 192.0.
194 An Age in Motion
implies the Susuhunan Pakubuwana X, and in this case the phrase
literally means "the age when the sunan falls down." With the tradi�
tional, if perverted, appanage system about to be abolished, djavnan
balik boewono thus visually captured the essence of the time and rein�
forced Misbach's call for taking back the land to "ourselves" from the
queen and the government.
Pergerakan propaganda activities in the countryside began in earnest
after the Delanggu rally with a rising wave of open-air public rallies
and members' meetings. From March to May 20 when the right of
association and assembly was suspended in the residency of Surakarta,
more than seventy open-air propaganda rallies and many more mem�
bers' meetings were held in Ponggok and Delanggu alone.45 This does
not mean that the Delanggu rally suddenly changed the mood in the
countryside. When these rallies and members' meetings started to be
organized in late March and early April, people were still very much
afraid of the authorities. Open-air rallies were always heavily guarded
by the police, who also checked membership cards of those who at�
tended members' meetings. Police intimidation and harassment were
common. As Misbach complained at the Surakarta SH congress in
March, "The police demanded they [villagers] show bewijs [evidence,
that is, a membership card] of their being SH members and noted down
their names. If members did not want to show their bewijs, they were
threatened by abusive and intimidating words. There is even a person
who was so afraid that he planted his bewijs beneath the land. 46 The
story tells us how a reign of terror worked in the countryside. As long
as people feared the police in their isolation and transferred the ob�
ject of their fear from the police to the SH, they would stay away from
the SH and the authorities would be held in awe. But this situation
started to change in April. The breakthrough was accomplished by PFB
branches.
By the end of March, PFB branches had been established at all the
sugar factories in Surakarta. The expansion of the PFB was happening
all over the sugar plantation areas in Java, and by the end of February
PFB branches had been formed at 153 sugar factories out of 192. In
Surakarta, as elsewhere, PFB branches were established by local sugar
factory workers, whose militancy arose out of their grievances over
wages and labor conditions. Wages had been frozen in the war and
postwar years of rapid inflation, so that even by the government s
^Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 192.0, Mr. 66ix/zo. Of the seventy rallies
the
resident mentions in his report, thirty-nine were PFB rallies, twenty-six combined
rallies of
the SH and the SI, three combined rallies of the PFB, the SH, and the SI, and the
remaining
two were the rallies organized by the Adhi Dharma/PKT (Persenkatan Kaoem Tam, Peas�
ants' Union). See also Persatoean Hindia, 13 Apr. 19Z1.
46Sismadi Sastrosiswojo, "Sarekat Hindia Solo," Islam Bergerak, 10 Apr. 192.0.
Solo in the Pergerakan 195
estimate, a 50 percent wage increase would not be enough to restore
wages to the prewar level.47 As Soerjopranoto once wrote, "The work�
ers' grievances are like the steam in a kettle, so heated that it is about to
blow up the kettle."48 Since late 1919 PFB strikes had been taking
place elsewhere, and thanks to the government's benevolent neutrality
and because sugar factories generally made huge profits in the postwar
boom years of 1918 and 1919, most of their strike actions proved
successful. Sugar factory workers in Surakarta also followed their fel�
low workers' examples and from mid-March onward went on strike at
one sugar factory after another.
The first PFB strike in Surakarta took place at the Bangak sugar
factory (district Banyudono, regency of Boyolali) on March 16. One
hundred and twenty factory workers and foremen of field coolies
struck and demanded a wage increase and reinstatement of dismissed
workers. The Donation Committee (Comite Derma) was organized by
the Kartasura SH to support the striking workers. The second PFB
strike took place on April 1 at the Wonosari sugar factory (district
Delanggu, regency of Klaten). It was triggered by the dismissal of PFB
members by the factory management. The striking workers demanded
cancellation of their dismissal and a wage increase. The Donation
Committee was organized by the Delanggu SPI. Then the Delanggu
PFB struck on April 5. It was again triggered by the dismissal of PFB
members. Workers at the Mangkunegaran sugar factory in Tasikmadu
and at the Karanganom sugar factory in Klaten also struck soon.49
Everywhere striking workers' demands were similar. They demanded a
wage increase of 50 to 100 percent, a 30 percent cost-of-living allow�
ance, a six-month bonus, reinstatement of dismissed workers, and rec�
ognition of the PFB as the representative of sugar factory workers.
Factories were generally willing to make concessions on wage mat�
ters, but flatly rejected reinstating dismissed workers and recognizing
the PFB as the representative of sugar factory workers. Once strikes
started, factories employed either one of two tactics. Management
sometimes locked out and set a certain date for the striking workers to
return to work, while making it clear that if they did their demands on
wages would be met. In April and May, however, factories rarely used
this tactic, because with the season of sugarcane harvesting and milling
approaching its peak period, management could not afford to lock
workers out. More commonly, factories summarily dismissed all the
47Algemeene Secretaris (Erdbrink) aan Directeur van Landbouw, 24 June 1910, Mr.
68ox/zo, Vb. 19 Jan. 1921, No. 67.
4sCirculaire van den P.E.B. aan de Directies enz. van Cultuur-ondernemingen, Mr.
1248X/20.
49For the PFB strikes in Surakarta, see Persatoean Hindia, 24 Apr. 1920; 1 and 20
May
1920; Resident van Surakarta aan GG, Telegram aangeboden te Surakarta, 7 Apr. 1920,
Mr.
1035X/20.
196 An Age in Motion
striking workers and tried to break strikes by employing new workers
at higher wages. SH branches and donation committees played an
important part in countering this tactic. Donation committees raised
money to support dismissed workers. The SH, which organized work�
ers both in the countryside and in the city, saw to it that no workers
would take jobs at sugar factories when factories dismissed the striking
workers and sought to employ new workers.
Whenever sugar factory workers struck, the resident dispatched the
armed police to "maintain the public order." But because the governor
general explicitly instructed the local authorities not to intervene in
workers' strikes of an "economic nature unless asked to by both the
workers and management, the police did not directly step in to break
PFB strikes and arrest PFB leaders.50 This favored the striking workers.
Deeply dissatisfied with their meager wages and embittered by the
dismissal of fellow workers, they persisted in their strike actions. PFB
branches, sometimes independently and sometimes in combination
with the SH and the Delanggu SI, organized open-air public rallies.
Misbach and others then turned rallies into an occasion in which peo�
ple suppressed their commonly shared fear of the authorities and made
their very suppression of fear a new basis of solidarity. In a cable that
the resident sent to the governor general, he described Misbach at the
joint rally of the SH, the Delanggu SI, and the PFB on April 4:
Joint rally SH SI and PFB April 4 in Delanggu attended by 2200 persons
at which Misbach harangued [that the] government buys rice for 9
guilders and sells to the little man for 18 guilders then asked who pockets
the profit whereupon whole rally shouted the Government. The Govern�
ment manufactures salt cheap and sells it dear to the common people[.]
Who pockets the profit whereupon yells of the Government, the Govern�
ment. The Government continuously expands the police[.] Who pays the
cost whereupon the masses roared the little man, the little man. By police
expansion the jails are filled up and prisoners forced to make all sorts o
articles which the Government [then] sells[.] Who pockets the profit
whereupon the mob howls the Government, the Government.51
In this speech Misbach in effect said that the government was a thief,
the point Marco made in his poem "Sama Rasa dan Sama Rata. But
while Marco wrote his poem in jail and it was read by others in silence
and perhaps in solitude, Misbach voiced this sentiment and his voice
was heard and joined by thousands. This difference was crucial, for
5�See the letter of the Algemeene Secretarie to the Residents of sugar plantation
areas dated
1 Apr. 1920, Mr. 355X/20, Vb. 19 Jan. 1921, No. 67. . , v.
5Resident van Surakarta aan GG, Telegram aangeboden te Surakarta, n May 192.0 Vb.
10 Sept. 1920, No. 11. For Misbach's speech at the rally, see also Persatoean
Hindta, 19 June
1920.
Solo in the Pergerakan 197
while Marco's silent voice was shared by the reader in silence, Misbach's voice,
heard and joined, became an expression of solidarity
experienced here and now in the suspense generated by the very act of
defiance of the authorities.
With PFB strike actions and the rising wave of rallies and meetings,
the grip of the authorities on the public order began to slip away.
Because so many members' meetings were held almost every day and
sometimes many at a time, the police lost track of them and stopped
checking membership cards at the opening of members' meetings.
Though the police attended public rallies, Dutch police officers could
hardly intervene in rallies, because speeches full of wayang imagery
and quotations from the Koran were beyond their comprehension.52
Javanese officials did understand these speeches, but they could not
control the rallies either. As the resident somewhat apologetically re�
ported to the governor general, "Confronted by seasoned demagogues
speaking eloquently, reminded by them of the sanctions stipulated for
the hindrance of an assembly, uncertain about the legal boundaries of
their authority, surrounded by a crowd who, agitated by their leaders,
saw them as their natural enemy, and supported only by a tiny, even if
armed, police force, it is understandable that native officials sat un�
easily and felt powerless to take any strong action."53 This does not
mean that the police sat helpless at the rallies. They diligently attended
rallies, took down what leaders said, sometimes word for word, and
sent their reports to the resident and the prosecutor general. Acting on
the reports, the resident and/or the prosecutor general eventually pros�
ecuted leaders on charges of speech offenses and took them into pre�
ventive custody. But this took time. In the meantime, SH, PFB, and
Delanggu SI leaders triumphantly presided over rallies without being
interrupted or arrested by the police. Peasants and workers, tasting
freedom and solidarity at the rallies, joined the SH and the Delanggu SI
and became ever more defiant of the authorities.
The Sarekat Abangan
The Delanggu rally on February 29, which marked the beginning of
a rising wave of rallies and meetings and PFB strike actions, also sig�
naled the emergence of the Delanggu SI as a powerful ally of the SH
52Assistent Resident van Surakarta (van Helsdingen) aan Resident van Surakarta, 28
May
1920, Mr. 66ix/20.
53Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr. 661X/20. What he meant by "the
sanctions stipulated for the hindrance of an assembly" was Article 173 of the
Indies Criminal
Law. The assistant resident of Surakarta even said that pergerakan leaders
"intimidated"
officials and policemen. Assistent Resident van Surakarta aan Resident van
Surakarta, 28
May 1920, Mr. 66ix/20.
198 An Age in Motion
and the PFB in the tobacco and sugar plantation areas of Ponggok and
Delanggu. The leader of the Delanggu SI was Mangoenatmodjo, a
guru, whose teaching he named Islam Abangan.54 He was a rural
figure who was born and lived in village Karangwungu, subdistrict
Polanharjo, district Ponggok, regency of Klaten. He was in his mid�
thirties in 1920. He had been a bekel until the reorganization was
introduced in 1912 in Karangwugu, and then deputy village head (kamitua) until he
was dismissed from the job in late 1919* Though his
formal education was limited to one year of schooling at a private
native school in Surakarta, he was not an unknown figure among the
literary circle in the city. In 1910 he wrote Serat Kalabrasta [Time of
extermination]," an interpretation of Ranggawarsita s Serat Kalatida,
which was published in the leading Surakartan Javanese-language
newspaper of the day, Darma Kanda.55 He was not an unknown figure
in the pergerakan either. When the Delanggu SI was established in
1915, he was elected a commissioner.56 In the mid-i9ios, he started to
teach Islam Abangan, which he claimed was based on the true Islam
taught by Seh Siti Jenar, a heretic Islamic saint of Java who was killed
by other saints for his disclosure of the essence of divinity-there is
no Allah. And indeed the name of his teaching, Islam Abangan, made
this point explicit, for Seh Siti Jenar was also known as Seh Lemah
Abang.57 Mangoenatmodjo thus taught that "Allah can not be per�
ceived and therefore does not exist ; that all sacred texts were fakes to
rule and oppress people with ease, that "prophets, saints, kings,
thieves, all are the same, because if one dies nothing remains"; and that
there would be no final judgment in the hereafter.5^ His teaching only
sounded archaic. Though he claimed that Islam Abangan was based on
the teaching of Seh Siti Jenar, Siti Jenar himself left no writings of his
own, and therefore there was no way for Mangoenatmodjo to base his
teaching on the authentic teaching of Seh Siti Jenar. But this did not
bother him. He based his teaching on "Serat Sitidjenar," which was
originally written by R. Pandji Natarata, alias R. Sasrawidjaja, a highly
54The following account of Mangoenatmodjo, Islam Abangan, and Sarekat Abangan is
based, unless otherwise noted, on Assistent Resident van Klaten (A. H. Neijs) aan
Resident
van Surakarta, 27 Aug. 1920, Mr. 1335X/20. . .
55Bratakesawa, Falsafah Siti Djenar (Jajasan Penerbitan "Djojobojo, Surabaja, 1954b
p. 9. Bratakesawa, who was known as Gatoet Sastrodihardjo in 1919-20, was the
second
secretary of the Surakarta Insulinde in 1919 and a commissioner of the Surakarta SH
in
1920 In his book he never mentions the name of the guru of what he calls Sarekat
Abangan,
but the last sentence he quotes from "Serat Kalabrasta" ("Kang amangoen dwidjaning
atmadja tama") tells us it was indeed written by Mangoenatmodjo (Mangoenatmadja).
56Sosrokoernio, "S.I. Delanggoe," Sarotomo, pp. 59-60.
57Ki Sabdapalon (Mangoenatmodjo) wrote that there were two kinds of Islam in Java,
Islam Poetihan and Islam Abangan, and that Islam Abangan was originally taught by
Sech
Lemah Abang. Panggoegah, 12 May 1919, IPO, 20 (1919).
58Bratakesawa, Falsafah Siti Djenar, p. 10.
Solo in the Pergerakan 199
regarded Yogyanese literatus and Ranggawarsita's contemporary,
and was published in 1913 and 1914 in Almanak H. Buning by his dis�
ciples.59
Mangoenatmodjo's Islam Abangan was therefore a child born out of
the marriage between Javanese literature in the age of Javanese politi�
cal impotence and print capitalism. As such there was nothing unusual
or disturbing about his teaching in the eyes of the authorities. In fact,
though the authorities knew he had been teaching Islam Abangan for
some time and that his disciples were there in Ponggok, Delanggu, and
Kartasura, no action was taken to stop his teaching. Yet Mangoenatmodjo emerged as
the leader of the Delanggu SI in early 1920, and as
Bratakesawa notes, his teaching came to be seen as "Javanese national�
ist, pro-radja [king] (feudal), and revolutionary."60 Why then did
Mangoenatmodjo, a mystic, emerge as a pergerakan leader and why
did his "Javanese nationalist, pro-radja (feudal)" teaching become
"revolutionary"?
That Mangoenatmodjo joined the pergerakan in 1919-20 was per�
haps accidental. In 1919 and early 1920 the Surakarta SH, the Sur�
akarta BO, and the PFB/Adhi Dharma under Soerjopranoto all sought
their future propagandists in the Surakartan countryside to expand
their influence and organize circles and branches. Mangoenatmodjo
was one of them, because having been a Delanggu SI commissioner and
as a subscriber of Darma Kanda and Panggoegah, he was known
among pergerakan leaders in the city. The first that contacted him was
perhaps the Surakarta BO, for one of the first circles it established in
1919 to counter Tjipto's anti-vorsten campaign was in Karangwungu.
Though it might be a reason Bratakesewa called his teaching "Javanese
nationalist" and "pro-radja," this certainly did not mean that Man�
goenatmodjo committed himself to the BO.
In 1919 and 1920 there was also a lot of uncertainty and discontent
among people in Delanggu and Ponggok. The peasant strikes of early
1919 were still vivid in their memories. They knew the reorganization
was about to begin and were uncertain about what would happen to
them. They also knew that the price of rice rose steeply in 1919, but
they did not benefit from it. Because of ijon (literally, "green," the
practice by which middle men, usually Chinese, bought paddies by
extending credit while they were still green), the profit from the price
rise of rice went to Chinese middle men and rice dealers and millers in
Delanggu.61 In September 1919 Mangoenatmodjo established the Roe59Ibid., pp. 16-23.
R- P- Natarata, alias Sasrawidjaja (i8io?-9o), was a Kasultanan
aristocrat, taught Javanese at the teacher's training school in Surakarta in the i
86os, and had
many disciples both in Surakarta and in Yogyakarta. Martodharsono was one ol them.
60Bratakesawa, Falsafah Siti Djenar, p. 8.
61 Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 1 3 June 1919, Mr. 849X/19, Vb. 16 Apr. 1920, No.
37.
200 An Age in Motion
koen Desa (Village Harmony), a peasant cooperative. It was intended
to break ijon and bypass middle men by extending credit to peasants in
return for their future repayment in paddies, and by selling paddies
directly to Chinese rice dealers and millers in Delanggu. The initial
capital for the Roekoen Desa was reportedly provided by Mrs. Vogel,
chair of the Surakarta SH. Mangoenatmodjo then asked for official
permission to form the Roekoen Desa. But the local authorities con�
strued it as an attempt for Mangoenatmodjo to retain his control over
peasants. The request was denied and the patih ordered him to dissolve
the Roekoen Desa and to stop teaching Islam Abangan. Mangoenat�
modjo did not obey the order, and in November he was dismissed as
the deputy village head.62 After that, he all the more persistently ran
the Roekoen Desa and taught Islam Abangan. Yet his influence then
was very much confined geographically. The Roekoen Desa operated
only in Karangwungu and neighboring villages and he taught Islam
Abangan at his house to those who came to learn his teachings in a
small congregation. The membership of the Roekoen Desa and the
number of his disciples remained small, at most several hundred. It was
only after he started to appear on the stage of pergerakan rallies as the
Delanggu SI chairman that his influence grew rapidly and enormously
and his "Javanese nationalist, pro-radja (feudal)" teaching became
"revolutionary."
The Delanggu SI was established in early 1920 with Mangoenat�
modjo as chairman after the CSI had announced its plan to form the
Delanggu and Ceper Sis in December 1919.63 Though the CSI an�
nounced that Tjokroaminoto would lead the establishment of the two
Sis, it was probably Soerjopranoto who asked Mangoenatmodjo to
head the Delanggu SI. The Ceper SI, which in the CSI plan was to be an
independent SI, was eventually set up as a circle of the Delanggu SI.
Mangoenatmodjo emerged as the chairman of the Delanggu SI for the
first time at the joint rally of the SH, the SI, and the PFB held in Delang�
gu on February 29. Thereafter, he appeared and spoke on the stage of
more than twenty open-air rallies held in Ponggok and Delanggu by
May 20. Though he opted for leading his own association, the Delang�
gu SI, rather than joining the Delanggu SH, which had been there for
some time, he worked closely with SH leaders, as is indicated by the
fact that all the rallies he attended were joint rallies of the SI and the
SH.64 In less than three months Mangoenatmodjo learned not only
how to talk at rallies but also what to say and became the most power�
ful pergerakan figure in the countryside; his influence extended beyond
the Delanggu SI to the peasant members of the SH and the Adhi Dhar62Resident van
Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr. 661X/20.
6iDarma Kanda, 10 Dec. 1919, IPO, 50 (1919).
64Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr. 661X/20.
Solo in the Pergerakan 201
ma. The resident reported to the governor general what Mangoenatmodjo said at the
rallies and members' meetings:
To judge from the three attached bundles of the interrogation reports of
89 persons carried out by the native officials and police personnel in�
volved, the essence of what Mangoenatmodjo and his two closest disci�
ples said is as follows:
a. Java actually belongs to the Javanese. The Dutchmen are here only
for the time being. Through common agreement and unity the Natives
will in the end be able to chase the European race away.
b. Do not obey any orders given by the legal authorities or by the
police that do not seem fair and just to the native. For in fact the admin�
istration is in the service of capital and has no sense of justice.
c. Once the membership has grown sufficiently strong, it will set up a
parliament of its own (with Mangoenatmodjo presumably as its chair�
man) to administer justice and to promulgate laws for the population.
d. People should make excessive wage and other demands of the Euro�
pean planters and try to create confusion and unrest by means of
strikes-after which it will be easy for the population to overthrow the
Government and take authority into its own hands.
e. Existing contributions and levies will in the future be used for the
purchase of sugar factories and the establishment of [native] pawnshops,
so that the native will not be exploited as he is at present.
f. Those unwilling to become members shall be ostracized by their
fellow villagers; and in no respect whatever will they [be allowed to]
share in the benefits that the members will enjoy once the Europeans have
been driven out.
g. Do not be afraid of the authorities' weapons, of punishment, or of
fines, or even of death, for according to the teachings of Islam Abangan
these penalties are in reality of little importance.
h. There will be no taxes to pay, still less corvee labor to perform, once
people have firmly united to reflect these impositions. After all, the land
belongs neither to the King nor to the Government, but to the Native
alone.
i. At the signal of a single beat [monotone] on the kentongan [village
warning device: a bamboo or wooden tube one bangs with a stick to
produce signals] at Ronowaskito's [Mangoenatmodjo's leading disciple]
house all members should arm themselves and come to help, because (it
will mean] danger is threatening the leaders.
j. If the administration or the police initiate an investigation in the
village to discover the causes of strikes and try to arrest the leaders, all
members of the village must obstruct them, if need be by force.65
As is always the case with interrogation reports, they tell us more about
what officials and the police wanted to hear than what the interrogated
65Assistent Resident van Klaten aan Resident van Surakarta, 27 Aug. 1920, Mr. 1 \
ysx/20.
202 An Age in Motion
said, heard, did, or wanted. The resident proposed in the report to
banish Mangoenatmodjo and his two leading disciples, and so he was
only interested in showing how dangerous Mangoenatmodjo was to
the rust en orde.66 His language-"to chase the European race away,"
"to create confusion and unrest by means of strikes, to overthrow
the Government"-testifies to this. But this does not mean that the
resident's report was totally unfounded. We can make at least two
points with some confidence. First, what Mangoenatmodjo said was a
fantastic mixture of current topics often discussed by SH and CS1
leaders and peasants' grievances voiced privately, if not publicly. "A
parliament of its [that is, our] own" was a fond topic of CSI leaders, as
Soerjopranoto called for the establishment of the Eerste and Tweede
Kamers (First and Second Chambers) at the 19*9 CSI congress. ^The
purchase of sugar factories" was a pet topic of Tjokroaminoto s. The
administration is in the service of capital" was a point often made by
Semarang and Yogyakarta SI leaders. And "the land belongs neither to
the King nor to the Government, but to the Natives alone" was what
Misbach said at the February 29 Delanggu rally. Mangoenatmodjo
blended such topics with peasants' grievances over taxes, corvee labor
duties, rent, and abusive exercises of power by plantation managers,
officials, and the police and made himself a pergerakan leader in the
age of strikes.
Second, Mangoenatmodjo made two points from his own teaching,
Islam Abangan. The first point was "Do not be afraid of the au�
thorities' weapons, of punishment, or of fines, or even of death. On
the surface this was the same point Misbach always stressed. But while
Misbach, a muballigh of reformist Islam, told people to suppress their
fear of the authorities by invoking the fear of death, Mangoenatmodjo
a guru, told people not to be afraid of the authorities because death
meant nothing. As one of his leading disciples testified, this was central
to Mangoenatmodjo's teaching. He taught that "there exists nothing
before birth and after death" and that "people need not be afraid or
death because when the time comes one dies anyway wherever one is.
Therefore, he taught, "There is no point to fear the authorities and the
police " all the more so because "what kills people are not officials or
policemen, but bullets."67 The second point he made was that "the
King is a tiger, greedy and cruel."68 Though the resident interpreted it
as "the authorities are exploitative and oppressive," he missed the most
66See Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 4 Dec. 1920, Mr. 1335X/20.
67Assistent Resident van Klaten aan Resident van Surakarta, 27 Aug. 192.0, Mr# i33
5x/20.
Misbach was perhaps aware that Mangoenatmodjo's Islam Abangan was very different,
to
say the least, from his idea of Islam. But deeds mattered more to him than words So
he
praised disciples of Islam Abangan as "courageous soldiers" at a rally held in
Delanggu.
68Ibid.
Solo in the Pergerakan 203
important point. What Mangoenatmodjo had in mind was perhaps
that famous metaphor, "The whole populace can be likened to a forest
and the king to a lion whose security lies in the denseness of the
thicket ... so it is agreed that a king should love his people like the
tiger the woods."69 He thus said that now that the king was "greedy
and cruel" and no longer loved the people, they were no longer re�
quired to provide security for the king.
Mangoenatmodjo discussed these things in the rallies and meetings,
where, different from the small congregation in which he used to teach,
hundreds and sometimes thousands could hear him simultaneous�
ly. His disciples increased to a fantastic degree from March on and
exceeded twelve thousand by the middle of May.70 Besides, unlike
Misbach, Tjipto, or Soerjopranoto, Mangoenatmodjo lived in the
countryside, always available to those who sought his teaching and
advice. After a day's labor on a rice field, a sugarcane field, or a
tobacco plantation, peasants in a small group came to his house in
Karangwungu, a walk of several hours sometimes. His disciples now
called themselves members of the Sarekat Abangan and Mangoenat�
modjo president, though the Sarekat Abangan was nothing but an
amorphous congregation of disciples, collecting no fees, keeping no
membership list, issuing no membership card, without statutes, and
without its elected leadership. Yet it was a real force. Mangoenatmodjo's disciples
joined not only the Delanggu SI but also the SH and
sometimes the Adhi Dharma. It was the Sarekat Abangan that formed
a common basis, common soil on which the SH, the SI, and the Adhi
Dharma grew.
The Government Strikes Back
With the rise of the Sarekat Abangan and the increasing mobilization
of peasants, peasant strikes also began to take place. In late March
peasants of village Ngaran struck on the Polanharjo tobacco planta�
tion, demanding a wage increase. The resident sent forth a platoon of
armed police. Yet peasants persisted in their strike actions, and when
the assistant resident of Klaten and the regent polisi came to investigate
their grievances, two sheds for drying tobacco leaves were set on fire
as if to defy the authorities.71 In early April peasants on the Ponggok
69Soemarsaid Moertono, State ami Statecraft in Old Java, p. zz, quoting from k.
Jasadipura, Serat Rama (Semarang, 1919), p. 43.
70Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 19ZO, Mr. 66ix/zo.
7'For the strike in Ngaran, see Resident van Surakarta aan GG, Telegram aangeboden
te
Surakarta, 11 May 19Z0, Mr. 5i6x/zo; Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June t9zo,
Mr.
66ix/zo; Panggoegah, Z4 May 19ZO, IPO, Z7 (19Z0).
204 An Age in Motion
and Ceper (Pangkalan branch) sugar plantations organized a series of
rallies under the leadership of the Delanggu SI and decided to strike,
though their protest actions were temporarily averted in the face of the
armed police sent forth by the assistant resident of Klaten.72 And in
early May peasants in the old Insulinde stronghold of the Tegalgondo
tobacco plantation struck and demanded a wage increase for convert�
ing rice fields into tobacco fields.73
In late April and early May the situation in Ponggok, Delanggu,
Kartasura, and Banyudono thus became increasingly "revolutionary."
The police began to lose their grip on the rust en orde. PFB strike
actions persisted. Rallies and members' meetings were held almost
every day, where the sunan, the authorities, and the police were at�
tacked openly. No one was arrested. In this "world upside-down"
there now arose a real chance for peasants to join sugar factory work�
ers' strike actions. In late 1919 and early 1920 the PFB and the CSI
tried to organize into the Peasants' Union (PKT) and the General
Workers' Union (PKBO) peasants who leased land to sugar plantations
and who worked as field and transportation coolies at sugar planta�
tions. But nowhere was the mobilization of peasants as successful as in
the Kasunanan countryside. Even in Yogyakarta, the very base of Soerjopranoto's PFB
and Adhi Dharma, there was no sign of peasant un�
rest.74 It was SH branches and above all Mangoenatmodjo's Sarekat
Abangan/Delanggu SI that made peasants a powerful ally of PFB-led
sugar factory workers in Surakarta. In early May workers were on
strike at the Ceper, Ponggok, Delanggu, and Wonosari sugar factories
in the districts of Delanggu and Ponggok, as well as at the Bangak
sugar factory in district Kartasura and the Tasikmadu sugar factory in
the Mangkunegaran. 5 If peasants ever struck, sugar plantations would
be all but crippled. And signs of peasant protest were there on the
Ceper and Ponggok sugar plantations as well as on the Polanharjo and
Tegalgondo tobacco plantations. With sugarcane harvesting and mill�
ing as well as tobacco planting approaching its peak period, an oppor�
tune moment was also coming for peasants' and sugar workers strike
actions.
The "revolutionary" situation in the Kasunanan countryside placed
72Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr. 66ix/20.
73Mantri Onderdistrict aan Panewoe District Kartasoera, 14 May 1920, Mr. 661X/20.
74See, for instance, Tweede circulaire, Mr. 1248X/20. The only areas where PKB
activists
had some success in mobilizing field and transportation coolies were Pekalongan and
Cirebon. See Mr. 902X/20, Mr. 1076X/20, and Mr. 1163X/20. For the situation in
Yogyakarta,
see Resident van Yogyakarta aan GG, 10 Apr. 1920, Mr. 603X/20; Resident van
Yogyakarta
aan GG, 5 June 1920, Mr. 673X/20.
75In early May, workers were on strike at eighteen sugar factories all over Java,
of which
one-third were located in Surakarta. Chef van Algemeene Recherchedienst (van der
Lely) aan
Procureur Generaal, 17 May 1920, Mr. 725X/20.
Solo in the Pergerakan 205
Resident Harloff in an increasingly difficult position. First, pressures
were mounting on the government and the resident to do something to
end labor unrest. H. D. Rubenkoning, chairman of the Vorstenlanden
Agricultural Association (Vorstenlandsche Landbouwvereeniging),
had already asked the governor general on March 30 to suspend the
right of assembly in the residencies of Surakarta and Yogyakarta to put
an end to PFB strike actions.76 The assistant resident of Klaten had also
reported on April 9 that "without means of force the situation can
no longer be controlled" and asked the resident to propose the suspen�
sion of the right of assembly to the governor general.77 But the mobili�
zation of peasants had just started. Confident that he could control the
situation, the resident overrode the assistant resident of Klaten and on
the same day cabled the prosecutor general, G. W. Uhlenbeck, that PFB
strike actions did not threaten the rust en orde and that the right of
assembly need not be suspended. Based on his report and the report of
the resident of Yogyakarta to the same effect, the Indies government
turned down Rubenkoning's request on May i.78 Yet the situation had
changed substantially by that time. It had become increasingly clear to
Resident Flarloff that the police could not control rallies and meetings
and that there was a real chance of PFB strike actions being joined by
peasant strikes. Yet to say this was tantamount to saying that he was
wrong.
Second, police reports on rallies finally began to reach the prosecutor
general toward the end of April. He was not only alarmed at poor
police performance in controlling rallies, but also became angry be�
cause Resident Harloff had never informed him of the situation and
had never proposed to prosecute SH, SI, and PFB leaders on charges of
speech offenses. Bypassing the resident, he directly instructed the assi�
stant resident of Klaten on April 30 to investigate the cases and if
possible to prosecute Misbach and Soerjopranoto, as well as such Delanggu SH and
local PFB leaders as Sastropanitro, Padmotenojo, and
Tjitrosoedarmo.79 Now Harloff knew his career as an administrative
official was at stake.
It was under these circumstances that Resident Harloff received a
spy report on the PFB executive meetings held in Yogyakarta on May
8-9. The PFB central leadership decided at the meetings to demand
that the sugar syndicate and the boards of directors of sugar factories
reinstate all workers who were dismissed because of their strike actions
and that the PFB be recognized as the representative of sugar factory
76Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van cie Nationalistische Beweging: 1917-medio 192), pp.
270-271.
77Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr. 661X/20.
78Procureur Generaal aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr. 661X/20.
7yProcureur Generaal aan Assistent Resident van Klaten, 27 Apr. 1920, Mr. 516X/20.
206 An Age in Motion
workers. If the demands were not met, the PFB leadership decided, the
PFB should launch a general strike at all the sugar factories in Java in
late June or early July, during the peak period of sugarcane harvesting
and milling.80 This gave Harloff an excellent excuse to change his
mind. On May n, the day he received the spy report, he sent a long
cable to the governor general and proposed to suspend the right of
assembly in the residency of Surakarta. The government should take
this measure, Harloff argued, because "PFB economic actions" were
increasingly joined by "political actions by the SH and the SI" in
Surakarta, above all in the regency of Klaten, and if rallies and meet�
ings of "revolutionary associations" were not prohibited as quickly as
possible, "not only [the] orderly progress [of the] reorganization [of
the] Vorstenlanden [will become] impossible, but above all [there are]
legitimate serious fears that during the sugarcane harvesting and mill�
ing soon [to] begin excesses in [the] form of numerous cane burnings
[will take place]."81 The prosecutor general expressed surprise, but
did not oppose Harloff's proposal.82 On May 19 the Council of the
Indies (Raad van Indie) was convened and approved Resident Har�
loff's proposal to suspend the right of assembly in the residency of
Surakarta.83
In the meantime, the assistant resident of Klaten started to arrest SH,
SI, and PFB leaders. Mangoenatmodjo and his two leading disciples
were arrested on May 11. Padmotenojo and Sastropanitro, both Delanggu SH leaders,
also were arrested.84 Then Misbach was arrested on
May 16 at Balapan NIS station when he returned from his propaganda
tour in Kebumen.85 Tjipto immediately issued a declaration in the
name of the Surakarta SH.
If the bugle sounds for battle
And the kentongan and beri loudly sound
Batoro Kolo demands a sacrifice
Brother Mas Hadji Misbach
On May 16, 1920 is once again put behind bars.
Fighters of the SH, Unite!
Eggs from the same nest,
If one breaks, the others also break
We are thus obliged to give evidence of our participation
80Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 13 May 192.0, Vb. 10 Sept. i9zo, No. 11. No NIP-SH
representatives attended the meetings. r vT
81Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 11 May 1920, Mr. 516X/20, Vb. 10 Sept. 1920, No.
n.
82Procureur Generaal aan GG, 26 May 1920, Mr. 516X/20.
83De bepalingen betreffende de uitoefening van het recht van vereemging en
vergadering in
Ned. Indie voor de residentie van Soerakarta, Mr. 516X/20.
84Assistent Resident van Klaten aan Procureur Generaal, 12 May 1920, Mr. 516X/20.
85Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr. 66ix/20.
Solo in the Pergerakan 207
Here is my breast:
Where is your breast?86
Batoro Kolo (Batara Kala), the son of Batara Guru, the king of gods, is
a huge raksasa (monstrous giant) whose magical power is stronger
than any god in the wayang world. This was an apt metaphor of the
state that was now resolved to strike back. Tjipto expected his own
arrest. The NIP-SH central committee in consultation with Tjipto ap�
pointed Soewardi to lead the Surakarta SH and instructed the Surakar�
ta branch leadership to stop organizing all open-air rallies.87 The days
of government suppression of the SH had begun.
The Collapse of the Sarekat Hindia
The "temporary" suspension of the right of assembly in the residen�
cy of Surakarta was declared by the governor general on May 20. All
rallies and meetings were prohibited without prior permission by the
head of the local authorities.88 Upon the suspension of the right of
assembly, Resident Harloff immediately took two measures. First, the
resident pressed the boards of directors of sugar and tobacco planta�
tions and the Vorstenlanden Agricultural Association to make substan�
tial wage increases. In early June all the sugar factories in the residency
of Surakarta raised wages for the workers employed on a regular basis
by 25 to 30 percent with a five-month bonus.89 Extensive measures
were also taken to appease peasants. The unpaid night watch and
patrol duties for the plantation were abolished. Corvee labor duties for
the village and the state were reduced by 50 percent. Wages and rent
were raised substantially. The minimum daily wage on the sugar plan�
tation was raised from twenty-five cents to forty, and the rent from
forty-five guilders a bau to seventy-five. The nine-month wages on the
tobacco plantations were raised from twelve guilders a bau to twenty
to thirty, and the rent from twenty-five guilders a bau to fifty.90
S6Panggoegah, 17 May 1920, IPO, 26 (1920).
87Rapport ontvangen op den 17 den Mei 1920, Mr. 661X/20. Persatoean Hindu1, 22 May
1920.
88De bepalingen betreffende de uitoefening van het recht van vereeniging en
vergadering in
Ned. Indie voor de residentie van Soerakarta, Mr. 516X/20. Royalist associations-
the BO,
the Surakarta SI, the Jong Java, BO-affiliated trade unions-were exempted from the
suspen�
sion of the right of assembly. See Resident van Surakarta aan Procureur Generaal,
13 June
1921, Mr. 609X/20; Soerjosasmojo, "Ra'jat di Soerakarta tidak bebas poela," Islam
Bergerak, 10 June 1920.
89Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 16 Feb. 1921, Mr. 206X/21, Vb. 1 Jan. 1922, No.
111.
90For the measures to appease peasants, see "Algemeene Hervorming van de
Maatschappelijke en Agrarische Toestanden in de Vorstenlanden," Mededeelingen der
Regeering, 1921,
208 An Age in Motion
Second, the police force was strengthened. In 1919 the Kasunanan
and Mangkunegaran police force aside, the force level of the general
police was 276 and that of the armed police 100. The recherche (detec�
tive) section of the general police which was primarily in charge of
pergerakan matters under the central command of van der Lely in the
prosecutor general's office was extremely thin with at most fifteen
detectives. After the suspension of the right of assembly, the general
police was expanded by 50 percent, and the recherche section to one
hundred. The armed police were also strengthened. The prosecutor
general dispatched three detachments of mobile armed cycle riders
(gewapende wielrijders) to the regency of Klaten, where the resident
also transferred the armed police stationed in the Mangkunegaran.91
Detectives placed SH, Delanggu SI, and local PFB leaders under sur�
veillance and watched for any breach of the suppression of the right of
assembly. Since SH, SI, and PFB leaders tried to organize meetings in
the guise of slametan and pengajian (recitation of Koran verses) meet�
ings, detectives indiscriminately broke up gatherings of any kind.
The wage increase, combined with high-handed police measures,
proved effective in breaking sugar factory workers' strikes. By the end
of May both the Delanggu SH and the Delanggu SI were in collapse,
and most of their leaders, including Sastropanitro and Padmotenojo
(both Delanggu SH and Delanggu PFB leaders), Tjitrosoedarmo (De�
langgu SH and Wonosari PFB leader), Ngadino (PFB consul), and
Mangoenatmodjo (Delanggu SI chairman), were under preventive
custody. With the remaining pergerakan activists deprived of their
propaganda means and under police surveillance, the wage increase
coupled with the threat of dismissal effectively sealed the fate of PFB
strike actions. All the sugar factory workers' strikes ended by the mid�
dle of June and PFB branches were in disarray.92
Peasants were more difficult to cope with. Police intimidation un�
doubtedly prevented many of them from going on strike.93 The armed
police also crushed strikes by force as in Ngemplan and Teguan on the
Tegalgondo plantation.94 Yet serious protest actions took place in earp. 42;
Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 15 May 1920, Mr. 582X/20, Vb. 19 Jan. 1921, No.
67; Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 9 May 1920, Mr. 1761/20; Resident van Surakarta
aan
GG, 6 June 1920, Mr. 1883/20; Resident van Surakarta aan beheerders der
ondernemingen,
19 Aug. 1920, Mr. 952X/20.
91Procureur Generaal aan GG, 26 May 1920, Mr. 516X/20. The force level of one
detach�
ment of the armed police was fifty.
92Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr. 661X/20; Panggoegah, 31 May 1920,
IPO, 28 (1920).
93See, for instance, an abortive strike action on the Baki sugar plantation
reported in
Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr. 66ix/20.
94Panggoegah, 14 June 1920, IPO, 33 (1920).
Solo in the Pergerakan 209
ly June on the Ketandan and Ceper sugar plantations in Ponggok.
Peasant grievances had been simmering there since early April, when
the authorities suppressed strikes still in the planning stage by sending
forth the armed police. On June 5 peasants of the Ceper plantation
(Pangkalan branch) went to the town of Klaten en masse and com�
plained to the assistant resident about their wages and rent. The assi�
stant resident responded to this nggogol swiftly. Two days later he
visited Ceper with the regent polisi and, bypassing prapat arbitration,
announced that the management had agreed to increase their wages
and rent from 70 guilders a bau per year to 132. Yet peasants were not
satisfied, and on the same day more than one thousand on the Ceper
and Ketandan sugar plantations struck. The resident immediately sent
forth three detachments of mobile armed cycle riders. Slametan and
pengajian meetings were broken up and local SH and SI activists were
arrested. On June 10, peasants of the Ceper plantation, seven hundred
in all, tried to go to the city of Surakarta to make another nggogol, but
the resident saw their actions as "demonstrations." They were dis�
persed by force on the way to Surakarta and more leaders were ar�
rested. The next day, the assistant resident and the regent polisi again
visited the area and ordered the striking peasants to return to work by
the next day. Most of the peasants obeyed the order, and those who did
not were arrested. The protest actions on the Ceper and Ketandan were
over.95
The crushing of the SH, the Delanggu SI, and the PFB in the coun�
tryside and the suppression of sugar factory workers' and peasants'
strikes did not satisfy Resident Harloff. He considered Tjipto and Misbach
responsible for all the unrest and "revolutionary instigations" in
the countryside. On June 8 he sent a very long report to the governor
general, proposing to invoke Article 47 of the Constitutional Regula�
tion for the "internment" of Tjipto and Misbach. He justified his pro�
posal on two grounds: the absolute necessity of the rust en orde for the
successful and orderly progress of the reorganization, and the attack
Tjipto and Misbach made on the sunan and the Mangkunegaran,
whose support the government pledged officially at the Volksraad. But
there was in his proposal a strong element of revenge on the two who
had stained his career as an administrative official by their "irresponsi�
ble revolutionary instigations." He thus made it absolutely clear in his
proposal that "[in the event of the internment] a solitary post on the
Outer Islands should be assigned to them as their residence where they
9SFor the protest on the Ceper and Ketandan plantations, see Resident van Surakarta
aan
GG, Telegram aangeboden te Surakarta, 12 June 1920, Mr. 653X/20; Spion-rapport van
25
May 1920, Mr. 661X/20; Panewoe District Ponggok aan Regent van Klaten, 5 June 1920,
Mr. 66ix/20; Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 11 June 192.0, Mr. 674x720.
210 An Age in Motion
can do no evil and in no case should they be allowed to stay in Hol�
land."96
Harloff's proposal to intern Tjipto placed Governor General van
Limburg Stirum in a difficult position.97 Not only did Harloff criticize
the government's "tolerance" of the pergerakan in general, but he also
explicitly denounced the prosecutor general for his dismissal in Octo�
ber 1919 of Harloff's proposal to suspend the right of association and
assembly in the residency of Surakarta and to prosecute Tjipto on the
charge of speech offenses.98 Besides, Tjipto was part of Governor Gen�
eral van Limburg Stirum's past, for it was he who had appointed Tjipto
to the Volksraad. Harloff was certainly aware of it, but perhaps he had
his own calculation. By the middle of 1920 the political climate in the
metropolis had clearly turned against van Limburg Stirum, and in the
Tweede Kamer D. Fock, a strong candidate for next governor general,
had made a pointed attack on him by arguing he had gone too far in his
November government declaration. In view of the fact that van Lim�
burg Stirum's tenure as governor general would end in March 1921,
proposing the internment of Tjipto was an excellent way for Harloff to
establish himself as a hard-liner, a different breed from those ethici in
Buitenzorg. Prosecutor General Ulenbeck questioned the validity of
Harloff's argument that Tjipto was responsible for the unrest in Sur�
akarta and ascribed the unrest to poor police performance under the
resident's command.99 Deputy Adviser for Native Affairs R. A. Kern
did not question Harloff's argument but pointed out Tjipto's "high
moral standard."100 But neither of them opposed his proposal to intern
Tjipto, because his attack on the sunan and the Mangkunegara was
undeniable and the rust en orde was considered an absolute precondi�
tion for successful reorganization. Instead, both of them proposed that
Tjipto be prohibited from staying in the Vorstenlanden and the neigh�
boring residencies of Kedu and Madiun. But the Council of the Indies
96Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr. 661X/20. The sunan also asked the
governor general to banish Tjipto and Misbach from Java on June 28, 1920. Kwantes,
De
Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging: 1917-medio 192.3, p. 2.79.
97Misbach's case was not as difficult as Tjipto's. In early September he was
sentenced to
two years' imprisonment at the native court of Klaten on the charge of speech
offenses at the
February 29 Delanggu rally. Because Article 47 was to be invoked as a rule as the
last
measure after all the other legal means had been exhausted, the decision of the
native court of
Klaten effectively put an end to the issue of Misbach's internment. The governor
general
dismissed Harloff's proposal to intern Misbach in early October. 1st. Gouvernement
Secretaris (Ch. Wolter) aan Raad van Indie, 6 Oct. 1920. For Misbach's trial at the
native court of
Klaten, see "Pepriksaan Hadji Misbach," Persatoean Hindia, 18 and 25 Sept. 1920;
"Perkara
Saudara Misbach," Islam Bergerak, 1 Nov. 1920; 20 Dec. 1920.
98Resident Harloff proposed in August 1919 to prosecute Tjipto on the charge of
instigat�
ing criminal acts, but his proposal was dismissed by the prosecutor general for
lack of
evidence to support the case. See Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 8 June 1920, Mr.
66ix/20.
"Procureur Generaal aan GG, 28 July 1920, Mr. 844X/20.
100Wd. Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken aan GG, 18 Aug. 1920, Mr. 1090X/20.
Solo in the Pergerakan zn
convened on October 15 and dismissed their advice, instead recom�
mending that the governor general intern Tjipto in Timor. Governor
General van Limburg Stirum immediately rejected this recommenda�
tion. The result was a compromise. The Council of the Indies again
convened and decided to recommend that the governor general pro�
hibit Tjipto from living in the Javanese-language area of Central and
East Java. Van Limburg Stirum accepted the recommendation.101
Resident Harloff interrogated Tjipto on November 3 as a formal
procedure for his internment.102 Though he had undoubtedly expected
it, Tjipto now learned for certain that he would be interned and that
there was no way to avoid it. Yet he submitted his letter of defense to
the government to put his resistance on record. In this letter, dated
November 9, he wrote:
After yet again reading through the questions [all the questions asked
by the resident in his interrogation of Tjipto were formulated beforehand
and approved by the governor general] I have come to the only possible
conclusion: that what is now in question is my "spirit" or my "men�
tality." The authorities have no concrete grounds on which to indict me.
Thus the questions are put in the vaguest terms so that answering them is
very difficult-or they are concerned with so-called misdeeds for which
there are no [legal] penalties. The accumulation of all these unpunishable
misdeeds must therefore do to convince the Government of my ripeness
(!) for internment.
If this conclusion is correct-and it is correct!-I would like here to
issue a protest, and at the same time a warning. We are now headed back
to the Middle Ages, when the Catholics believed they had to oppose the
Reformation with the stake. As long as it has not been legally and
convincingly demonstrated that I have caused all the unrest in Solo, I
shall consider myself, in the event of internment, as a martyr for a sacred
cause, the liberation of the Javanese people.103
Tjipto's cooperation, his submission of his letter of defense, nicely
completed the procedure for his internment. On December 14 the gov�
ernment announced its decision to prohibit Tjipto from staying in the
residencies of Surakarta, Yogyakarta, Kedu, Banyumas, Pekalongan,
Semarang, Rembang, Surabaya, Kediri, or Madiun.104 Resident Har-
,01Advies van de Raad van Ned. Indie van 15 Oct. 1920, Mr. 1194X/20; Advies van de
Raad van Ned. Indie van 5 Nov. 1920, Mr. 1235X/20. Van Limburg Stirum was of
opinion
that it was enough to prohibit Tjipto from staying in the Vorstenlanden, Kedu,
Semarang,
Madiun, and Rembang when he turned down the recommendation of the Council of the
Indies in October.
l02Proces Verbaal (Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo), 3 Nov. 1920, Mr. 1 365X/20.
1(Hljipto Mangoenkoesoemo aan Resident van Surakarta, Memorie van Verweer, S Nov.
1920, Mr. 1365X/20.
l04Uittreksel uit het Register der Besluiten van den GG van Ned. Indie, 14 Dec.
1920, Mr.
1365X/20.
212 An Age in Motion
loff ordered Tjipto to leave Surakarta by the end of December, but
upon Tjipto's request that he be allowed to stay longer because his
daughter was critically ill he was allowed to stay for two more weeks.
But on January 4, 1921, Harloff suddenly changed his mind, cancelled
his permission, and ordered Tjipto to leave Surakarta within twentyfour hours.
Persatoean Hindia, the NIP-SH Malay-language organ,
reports Tjipto's confrontation with the police:
Because he was convinced of the invalidity of Resident Harloff's order,
he decided to reject it physically, that is, he would not leave his residence
unless he was taken by force [by the police]. Because he wished to have a
reliable witness, he asked the secretary of the Hoofdbestuur [central
committee], brother Soewardi Suryaningrat, [to come] from Semarang.
On that day [the afternoon of January 4] brother S.S. came to Solo and
also stayed over at brother Tjipto's house.
[In the early morning of January 5 Tjipto, Mrs. Vogel, Soewardi, and
other Surakarta SH leaders waited for the police while drinking coffee.
Then came the regional secretary, accompanied by the chief commis�
sioner, the commissioner, the police inspector, the chief agent, and forty
policemen. The secretary read the resident's order before Tjipto, who
rejected the order on legal grounds.]
The language of toean secretary and the other police officials who
joined in was polite, that is, refined, so that exile Tjipto expressed his
rejection in a civilized way. It was clear to us that the behavior of Resi�
dent Harloff's envoys could be called proper, such that all crudeness was
avoided.
At that time brother Tjipto was not yet dressed, he was wearing only a
kimono. From the outset he had been unwilling to change his clothes
because he wanted to have it seen that the police suddenly came to his
house and took him away, to cast him out of the land now forbidden to
him. But after brother Soewardi stated that he had witnessed Dr. Tjipto's
rejection, which could now be said to be validated, brother Tjipto then
got dressed and was taken away by the police in a car.105
This was the final act he staged in Surakarta to inscribe "Tjipto a
lone ksatrya" in a page of pergerakan episodes. On the same day, he
was taken by the police from Surakarta to Yogyakarta by car and then
put on a train bound for Bandung. Tjipto left Surakarta for good and
stayed in Bandung till he was finally interned in Banda in 1927. His
days on the main stage of the pergerakan were over when he left
Surakarta.
With Tjipto gone for good and Misbach in prison, the Surakarta SH
soon collapsed. When he left Surakarta, Tjipto entrusted the Surakarta
SH and its organ, Panggoegah, to Soewardi. Under his tutelage, the
105"Resident Harloff dan Banneling Tjipto," Persatoean Hindia, zz Jan. 1921.
Solo in the Pergerakan 213
Surakarta SH was led by Moedio Wignjosoetomo, Tjipto's most trust�
ed protege and editor of Panggoegah, and Sismadi Sastrosiswojo, ad�
ministrator of Islam Bergerak and editor of Panggoegah.106 Placed
under surveillance, SH rallies and meetings banned, and anyone who
visited the Panggoegah office questioned and intimidated by detectives,
however, there was not much room for them to move except in pub�
lishing Panggoegah. Besides, the majority of SATV propagandists came
under Moehammadijah's influence in Misbach's absence. Though
"Misbach in prison" was highly respected and kept as an editor of
Islam Bergerak and Medan Moeslimin, Fachrodin became the editorin-chief of Medan
Moeslimin, while H. Soedjak, his brother and the
chairman of the Moehammadijah tabligh branch, joined Islam Berge�
rak as an editor. Under their leadership, both journals increasingly
devoted their pages to purely religious questions and came to be seen as
"moderate" by the authorities. SATV tabligh gatherings followed the
same pattern. Though tabligh meetings organized at the Great Mosque
by SATV propagandists such as Harsoloemekso, Ahmad Dasoeki,
Haroenrasjid, and Moechtar Boechari were banned by the Pengulu,
SATV tabligh meetings elsewhere were allowed by the authorities on
the condition that no SH propaganda would be made.107 Thus left
were Tjipto's proteges and a few SATV propagandists. Yet most of
them were journalists with no money. With its subscribers intimidated
and printing firms in Surakarta no longer willing to print it because of
government pressure, the financial position of Panggoegah deterio�
rated and it was forced to be printed at the Soerjopranoto's PPPB
printing firm in Yogyakarta. In late 1921 the Panggoegah office, the
last vestige of the Surakarta SH, with most of Tjipto's proteges, moved
to Yogyakarta in the neighborhood of the Pakualaman palace under
Soewardi's patronage. The Surakarta SH died.108
The SH, the Delanggu SI, and the PFB met the same fate in the
Surakartan countryside. Local pergerakan leaders arrested in May and
June came out of prison from August 1920 on, one after another. But
with rallies and meetings banned, sugar factory workers and peasants
106Panggoegah, 10 Mar. 1921, IPO, 18 (1921); 20 Mar. 1921, IPO, 19 (1921).
107From late 1920 to early 1922 Medan Moeslimin was published under the editorship
of
"Misbach in prison," Darsosasmito (SATV) and H. Fachrodin as editors-in-chief,
Moechtar
Boechari (SATV), M. A. Hamid (of Pekalongan), K. H. Dahlan, Haroenrasjid (SATV) as
editors, and Harsoloemekso as director/administrator. Islam Bergerak was published
with
Koesen as editor-in-chief, Harsoloemekso as director, and Sismadi Sastrosiswojo as
admin�
istrator, while editors were H. Fachrodin, H. M. Soedjak, Soerjosasmojo, Sjarief,
Achmad
Dasoeki, and Ks. Digdo (of Madiun). For SATV tabligh meetings, see Islam Bergerak,
10
Oct. 1921; Panggoegah, 10 and 20 July 1921, IPO, 32 (1921).
108With its move to Yogyakarta, Panggoegah was changed from the organ of the N1P-SH
to the organ for all those who "fight for the freedom of the Indies," and it became
an
instrument of Soewardi and Soerjopranoto to reunify "Communists" and "Islamists."
See
Panggoegah, 1 Dec. 1921, IPO, 2 (1922), and 1 Jan. 1922, IPO, 5 (192*).
214 An Age in Motion
avoiding them out of fear of the police, and their movements watched
by detectives and village officials, they either opted for cooperation
with the authorities and sugar factories, sunk into inactivity, or left the
area. Mangoenatmodjo and his leading disciples were in and out of
prison in late 1920 and 1921 on minor charges and eventually sunk
into inactivity.109 Tjitrosoedarmo, the Delanggu SH and Wonosari
PFB leader, joined the Politiek Economische Bond (Political Economic
Union, PEB) established by A.J.N. Engelenberg and financed by the
Sugar Syndicate and transformed the Wonosari PFB into a PEB cir�
cle.110 Sastropanitro (Delanggu SH and Delanggu PFB leader) and H.
Sirat (Tegalgondo SH leader) moved to the city and joined Panggoegah
and Islam Bergerak respectively.111 Ngadino and Padmotenojo, both
PFB propagandists, moved to Yogyakarta.112 And many others whose
footsteps we cannot trace perhaps stayed in the area, deprived of their
shares in village communal land or dismissed from their jobs and their
movements watched by village officials.
The collapse of the Surakarta SH also marked the beginning of the
end of the NIP-SH. What proved fatal was the conservative reaction of
Indo members against the radical native Surakarta SH and their fear of
government suppression. Since August 1919, when the party central
committee was restored by Soewardi, it had let the Surakarta SH run
its affairs independently under the leadership of Tjipto and Misbach.113 Many Indo
members thought that this hands-off policy
dragged the entire party unnecessarily in a "revolutionary" direction
on the heels of the Surakarta SH. The party's plight was symbolized in
their eyes by that of Douwes Dekker. Acquitted at the Council of
Justice in Semarang in October 1919, he was taken into preventive
custody in January 1920 on the same charges, only to be acquitted
again in May. Yet on the same day he was arrested once again on
different charges of press offenses and sentenced to nine months' im�
prisonment in August.114 Seeing the NIP-SH as the party that shared
Douwes Dekker's dream of "Indies for Indiers," they blamed the Sur�
akarta SH as much as the government for the plight of Douwes Dekker
and the party. Isolated in the Indo-dominated party central committee,
Soewardi announced his resignation from the chairmanship on May 1,
109For Mangoenatmodjo, see Panggoegah, 14 June 1920, IPO, 33 (1920); 10/20 May
1921, IPO, 26 (1921); 10/20 July 1921, IPO, 32 (192.1)*
110Panggoegah, 1 Oct. 1921, IPO, 41 (1921). For the PEB, see "De Actie in de
Suiker," De
Indische Gids 42 (1920), pp. 543-544; "De Suiker op het Oorlogspad," De Indische
Gtds 42
(1920), pp. 544-545.
xxx Panggoegah, 10 Nov. 1920, IPO, 50 (1920).
112Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 12 Nov. 1920, Mr. 1267X/20.
113It is most clearly seen in the fact that the Surakarta SH never handed over
money to the
central leadership. See Persatoean Hindia, 14 Feb. 1920; 13 Mar. 1920.
114For Douwes Dekker's plight, see Panggoegah, 2 Feb. 1920, IPO, 8 (1920);
Persatoean
Hindia, 7 Feb. 1920; 25 Sept. 1920; 22 Dec. 1920.
Solo in the Pergerakan 2.15
only to retract it on May 16 after Tjipto persuaded him to remain in
the position in the wake of Misbach's arrest.115 After the right of
assembly was suspended in Surakarta, however, Soewardi himself was
arrested on May 24 on the charge of press offenses. Frightened that the
government might clamp down not only on the Surakarta SH but also
on the entire party, the central committee instructed all the branches on
May 29 to stop holding rallies ``as a protest against government sup�
pression."116
After that, the NIP-SH simply went downhill. When the eighth Indiers congress was
convened in August 1920, most of the branches did
not report their activities and the central committee could not make its
annual report on party activities from June 1919 to July 1920. Though
the congress elected Soewardi' secretary and Tjipto commissioner, no
discussion was held on the Surakarta SH and no resolution adopted to
protest the arrest of Surakartan SH leaders. Instead, Indo members
criticized the central leadership for its "pro-Bolshevist" position.117
The congress could neither allay the fears of Indo members nor prove
its "revolutionary" credentials to native members. The membership
dwindled and the party's financial position deteriorated. Having lost
any hope for the future of the party, Soewardi left Semarang for
Yogyakarta in January 1921 and joined Soerjopranoto in running the
Adhi Dharma school. Shortly after that, both Soewardi and Tjipto
resigned from the party central committee. This practically marked the
death of the NIP-SH, the IP reincarnated, with its hybrid dream of the
Indies for Indiers.118 Yet IP'ers, those who the IP/Insulinde/NIP-SH
under the tripartite leadership of Douwes Dekker, Tjipto, and Soewar�
di had inspired, survived, and joined other parties in 1921-23, while
being engulfed in the bitter political and ideological feuds between
"Communists" and "Islamists" in the age of reaction.
115For Soewardi's announcement, see Persatoean Hindia, i May 1920.
116For the decisions taken at the NIP-SH central committee meeting on May 29, see
Persatoean Hindia, 5 June 1920; 17 July 1920.
ll7For the 1920 Indiers congress, see "Pidatoe pemboeka dikatakan oleh wd.
Voorzitter
dari `Sarekat Hindia' (NIP) Ketika Vergadering tahoenan jang ke-9, pada 1 Augustus
1920,"
Persatoean Hindia, 31 July 1921; "Verslag Pendek: Algemeene Vergadering jang ke
sembilan
dari perhimpoenan Sarekat Hindia (NIP) diadakan pada 1 Augustus 1920," Persatoean
Hindia, 7 Aug. 1920.
118The NIP-SH nominally survived for two more years, until May 1923, when the parry
formally decided to dissolve itself after its request for government recognition of
the party
statutes was turned down. Doenia Baroe, 4 July 1923.
6 The Age of Reaction,
the Age of Parties
The pergerakan underwent a profound transformation from 1920 to
1923. This can best be understood by two phrases: "the age of reac�
tion" and "the age of parties." The age of parties dawned in these
years. The BO, the Insulinde, and the CSI all had been transformed into
political parties in 1917 when they decided to participate in the newly
opened Volksraad and drew up party programs. Yet they were political
parties in a strictly legal sense. Though there were differences in their
programs, they were not ideologically charged. Though they were dif�
ferent in their membership qualifications, they were not mutually ex�
clusive; and many, including leading figures, in fact maintained multi�
ple membership in the BO, the Insulinde, and the SI as well as in the
Dutch-dominated ISDV and ISDP (Indies Social Democratic Party).1
Nor did any party have its own party emblems-party songs, party
flag, party literature. Rather, the parties were personified by a few
central figures- Tjokroaminoto of the SI; Tjipto, Soewardi, and Douwes Dekker of
the IP/Insulinde/NIP-SH; and Dwidjosewojo of the
BO-and people distinguished their differences loosely in terms of
their major constituencies: the SI as an association of Muslims, the
IP/Insulinde/NIP-SH as a party of Indiers, and the BO as an associa�
tion of government priyayi.
All this started to change in early 1920. Soewardi, a recent returnee
from the Netherlands and knowledgeable about the latest political
fashion in Europe, established the NIP-SH party song, the NIP-SH
#To cite a few examples: Soerjopranoto, vice-chairman of the CSI, was a
commissioner of
the BO central committee and a member of the NIP-SH. Alimin was a commissioner of
the
CSI as well as a member of the ISDV and the NIP-SH. H. Agoes Salim was a
commissioner of
the SI and a member of the ISDP. And major Semarang SI leaders such as Semaoen and
Darsono were members of the ISDV.
2l6
Age of Reaction, Age of Parties 217
party flag, and the NIP-SH party publishing house and library, Indo�
nesia. Drawing up the new party statutes, he introduced partij disci�
pline (party discipline), which forbade its members from joining the
other parties.2 The BO and the ISDV, whose name was changed to the
Perserikatan Kommunist di India (PKI, League of Communists in the
Indies) in May 1920 and whose leadership came into the hands of
native members, Semaoen and Darsono, for the first time, soon fol�
lowed the NIP-SH and introduced party discipline. But all three of the
parties made one important exception: party discipline did not apply to
the SI. It was the introduction of party discipline in the SI that marked
the dawn of the age of parties. But this proved to be a bitter, protracted
process. The issue, first raised in the middle of 1920, was irrevocably
"solved" only in early 1923. In the process, it increasingly divided the
pergerakan, involving an ideological feud between Islamism of the
CSI/PSI (Partij Sarekat Islam, Party of the Association of Islam) and
communism of the PKI/Red SI.
There was another important issue confronting the pergerakan:
what to do in the face of the government's increasingly tough and
hostile posture toward the pergerakan. From 1918 to early 1920 the
"economic struggle" of trade unions proved successful not only be�
cause workers were restless and determined to improve their wages and
labor conditions but also because the government took a position of
benevolent neutrality toward labor conflicts. But its changing position
was revealed first in August 1920 when the government made clear its
disapproval of the planned PFB general strike. Then Governor General
van Limburg Stirum was succeeded by Dirk Fock, a colonial expert of
the Liberal party, who proved liberal indeed in his high-handed police
measures to suppress the pergerakan. Pergerakan leaders understood
this new era in Newtonian terms: wherever there is an action there is a
reaction, hence the age of reaction (zaman reactie). The question was
what to do in the age of reaction: confront the government and go on
fighting "capitalism," or retreat? This issue was closely intertwined
with the issue of party discipline, because the deepening political and
ideological rivalry between the CSI/PSI and the PKI/Red SI took place
precisely when Fock's tough measures destroyed one major trade union
after another and demonstrated the dangers of confronting the govern�
ment.
The age of parties dawned in the age of reaction. The pergerakan in
Surakarta after Misbach's release from prison in August 1922 can only
be understood by keeping in mind this profound transformation of the
pergerakan. Therefore, let us examine the age of reaction in this chap2For
Soewardi's explanation of the NIP-SH party flag, see Persatoean Hindia, 6 Dec.
1919.
The NIP-SH statutes and regulations are published in Persatoean Hittdia, 5 Mar.
1921.
2l8 An Age in Motion
ter, and leave the discussion of the pergerakan in Surakarta after Misbach's return
for Chapter 7.
Deepening Schism
The 1919 CSI congress marked a turning point of the SI movement.
The Afdeeling B affair and the subsequent clamp-down on local Sis in
West Java frightened away loyalists, Arabs, and pious Muslim native
traders from the SI and led to the collapse of Tjokroaminoto's power
base. He also lost the blessing of Dutch ethici. The need to "purify" the
SI was voiced by Alimin in the pamphlet Purify Ourselves, which he
distributed at the congress, and the establishment of the regional com�
mittees was decided on. With the success of the "economic struggle,"
trade unionism became the most important component of the SI move�
ment and led to the rise of Semaoen, the Semarang SI and VSTP (Rail�
way and Tramway Workers' Union) chairman, and Soerjopranoto, the
Yogyakarta SI and PFB (Sugar Factory Workers' Union) chairman.
Developments after the congress underlined the significance of all these
changes for the pergerakan.
First, the collapse of Tjokroaminoto's power base was soon exposed
more starkly. With the mass desertion of loyalists, Arabs, and native
Muslim traders, his financial sources dried up. CSI coffers were empty
by May 1920 and Tjokroaminoto was forced to make a "loan" of two
thousand guilders to the CSI while taking as collateral the car that
treasurer Tjokroaminoto had bought for twenty-eight hundred guil�
ders for the sake of chairman Tjokroaminoto.3
Second, the need to "purify" the SI which was voiced at the congress
was translated into an effort of partijtucht (party discipline), a project
to strengthen CSI control over local Sis and their rank-and-file mem�
bers by organizing regional committees and training cadres (wargo
roemekso) loyal to the CSI.4 If successful, it would have transformed
the SI into a well-organized cadre party and restored Tjokroaminoto's
leadership position. But it proved unsuccessful. Though regional com�
mittees were established in several residencies, they essentially re�
mained a place of consultation for local SI chairmen and vice-chairmen
without any muscle to discipline and control local Sis and were totally
dependent on them financially. Nor was any serious effort made
to train cadres except for a brief unsuccessful attempt in Garut. In�
stead, another component of partijtucht became ever more important.
Though never stated openly, as central to partijtucht as the strengthen3See
Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging: i^iy-medio 1923, pp.
2.2.4-225; Proces Verbaal (Tjokroaminoto), Mr. 184X/21.
4Process Verbaal (Tjokroaminoto), Mr. 184X/21. Also see Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling
van
de Nationalistische Beweging: i9iy-medio 1923, p. 219.
Age of Reaction, Age of Parties 219
ing CSI control over local Sis was the idea that local Sis and their rankand-file
members be kept within the limits of the colonial rust en orde
in order to restore credibility of the CSI under Tjokroaminoto in the
eyes of Dutch ethici in Buitenzorg. Crucial to this problem was the
question of what to do with "Communists," especially the Semarang SI
under the leadership of Semaoen and Darsono.5
H. Agoes Salim emerged as a grand architect of the new CSI strategy
in this context. Salim had risen to CSI commissioner and key adviser to
Tjokroaminoto at the 1919 CSI congress because of his extensive and
excellent personal connections with Dutch ethici. He was a former
protege of C. Snouck Hurgronje, the first adviser for native affairs,
worked at the Dutch consulate in Jidda in 1905-12 and mastered
Arabic (his fluent Arabic impressed ulama and kyai), and worked on
the staff of the Volkslectuur under Dr. Rinkes in 1917-19. He was the
only SI member appointed to the Carpentier Alting commission for
constitutional reforms of the Indies state and had ready access to such
high-ranking Dutch bureaucrats as W. Muurling, former Political In�
telligence Service (PID) chief and government representative to the
Volksraad; D. Talma, director of finance who was soon to become the
chairman of the Sugar Syndicate; and R. A. Kern, the deputy adviser
for native affairs who succeeded Hazeu in early 1920.6 A "genius"
who graduated third in his class (1904) at Batavia HBS, Salim was
fundamentally in tune with Dutch ethical thinking. After the 1919
congress he sought, together with Hasan Djajadiningrat, to forge an
anti-PKI/Semarang SI coalition with Tjokroaminoto as figurehead
leader and to guide the SI on the basis of Islam. The first step was taken
in May 1920 when Tjokroaminoto and Salim concluded a pact with
the Moehammadijah central leadership to help each other with the SI
"moving" in politics and the Moehammadijah in religious, education�
al, and social fields. Shortly after that, the Moehammadijah revised the
statutes, expanded its activities beyond the residency of Yogyakarta,
and soon emerged as a strong, pious Muslim force in the anti-PKl/
Semarang SI coalition.7
And finally as the third point, the rivalry between Semaoen and
5Adviser for Native Affairs Hazeu, for instance, repeatedly expressed his worries
about
Semaoen and Darsono to Tjokroaminoto in 1919. See Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de
Nationalistische Beweging: 19 iy-medio 1913, pp. 118-119, '44-145.
6Though another CSI commissioner, Hasan Djajadiningrat, also was appointed to the
commission, he was soon replaced by Ch. G. Cramer of the ISDP. D.M.G. Koch,
Verantwoording: Een Halve Eeuw in Indonesia (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1956), pp. 101-
102. For
biographical information on Agoes Salim, see Solichin Salam, Hadji Agoes Salim
(Djakarta:
Djajamurni, 1961). For a warm recollection of Salim, see also Mohamad Roem, Buttga
Rampai dari Sejarah (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1983), Vol. 3, pp. 29-59. I thank
Audrey
Kahin for bringing this book to my attention.
7For the CSI-Moehammadijah pact, see Bintang Islam, 10 June 1927, IPO, 29 (19^7).
See
also Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging: 19ly-medio 1923,
pp.
400-401.
220 An Age in Motion
other Semarang-based VSTP leaders and PFB chairman Soerjopranoto
intensified after the 1919 CSI congress, and the PFB came to form a
major force in the anti-PKI/Semarang SI coalition by early 1920. The
event that triggered this intense rivalry was the formation of the trade
union federation, the PPKB (Persatoean Perserikatan Kaoem Boeroeh,
Concentration of Trade Unions, or Vakcentrale), agreed on at the 1919
CSI congress. The meeting to set up the PPKB was convened in Decem�
ber 1919 in Yogyakarta. Though Soerjopranoto expected to be elected
chairman at the meeting, he was outmaneuvered by Semaoen, and
Sosrokardono, PPPB chairman in prison, was elected chairman with
Semaoen as his deputy.8 Semaoen then organized the PPKB provisional
central committee in Semarang at the VSTP office with Piet Bergsma
and Najoan. Though twenty-two unions representing seventy-two
thousand workers (as of August 1920) joined the federation, the major
unions were the PFB (with a membership of thirty-one thousand), the
VSTP (eleven thousand), and the PPPB (fifty-five hundred). With Soerjopranoto's PFB
sabotaging any cooperation with the PPKB and the
PPPB (Pawnshop Workers' Union) under Alimin not very enthusiastic
about it, the PPKB as a coordinating body of trade unions hardly
functioned. No major unions except the VSTP bothered to report on
their activities or make contributions to the PPKB. The first PPKB
congress, initially scheduled for April 1920, was forced to be post�
poned, and when it was eventually held on August 1, 1920, a deal was
made at Tjokroaminoto's mediation between Semaoen and Bergsma
on the one hand and Soerjopranoto and Salim on the other. PPKB
headquarters was moved from the VSTP office in Semarang to the PFB
office in Yogyakarta. The new PPKB leadership was organized with
Semaoen as chairman, Soerjopranoto as vice-chairman, Salim (PFB
secretary) as secretary, Bergsma as treasurer, and Alimin (PPPB chair�
man) and Tedjomartojo (PPPB secretary) as commissioners.9 By that
time, however, the PFB general strike had become the issue of the day,
the outcome of which was not only to seal the fate of the PPKB but also
to bring to the surface the issue of party discipline in the SI.
The PFB General Strike Fiasco
The PFB, whose branches had increased to ninety and its total mem�
bership to ten thousand by the end of 1919, continued to expand in the
8In a circular Soerjopranoto sent to the PFB branches in November 1919, he called
himself
chairman of the PFB and leader of the PPKB.
9For more on the PPKB, see Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische
Beweging:
1917-medio 1923, pp. 241, 251-255; Wd. Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken (R. A. Kern)
aan GG (van Limburg Stirum), 21 Aug. 1920, Mr. 976X/20. By the time the PPKB
congress
was held in August, Salim had become PFB secretary, PPPB commissioner, and Sarekat
Postel
secretary.
Age of Reaction, Age of Parties 221
first half of 1920 with its branches established at 179 out of 192 sugar
factories all over Java and its membership reaching thirty-one thou�
sand.10 This enormous expansion was due to the success of PFB-led
sugar factory workers' strike actions, and the success of strikes in turn
was due to sugar factory workers' militancy in persisting in their ac�
tions and the government's policy of benevolent neutrality toward the
"economic struggle." But the very success of PFB-led strike actions
brought its own problem to the PFB. As strikes brought substantial
gains to sugar factory workers, they started to fear employer retaliation
against PFB members after the 1920 season of sugar harvesting and
milling was over. This fear surfaced at the executive conference of the
PFB central committee with its consuls and branch delegates in
Yogyakarta on May 8-9, 1920, in which a delegate of the Bantul PFB
in Yogyakarta opposed Soerjopranoto's "revolutionary" rhetoric and
said, "We should never utter words like `Don't be afraid of being
hanged, jailed, or banished'!"11
The PFB central leadership was well aware of this new restlessness
and uneasiness among members. The only way to alleviate their fears
and to secure the future for the PFB was to get the Sugar Syndicate's
recognition of the PFB as a union of sugar factory workers. As early as
April 1920 Soerjopranoto demanded such recognition, but the Sugar
Syndicate simply ignored his demand.12 The issue was raised again by
Soerjopranoto at the PFB executive conference on May 8-9, where he
proposed to demand of the Sugar Syndicate that all workers dismissed
for their strike actions be reinstated and that the PFB be recognized as
the representative of sugar factory workers. If the demands were not
met, he further proposed, the PFB should launch a general strike at all
the sugar factories in Java in late June or early July during the peak
period of sugarcane harvesting and milling. The conference adopted his
proposal, but nothing came of it. Though delegates agreed to Soer�
jopranoto's proposal, the feelings of disapproval voiced by one repre�
sentative of the Bantul PFB over his "revolutionary" rhetoric were
widely shared. The PFB strike funds were as usual depleted. The gov�
ernment and the Sugar Syndicate called the PFB's bluff, and indeed
Soerjopranoto's call for a general strike proved to be empty words.1'
From May to July things worsened for the PFB central leadership.
10Ibid., p. 308. The following account of the PFB is based, unless otherwise noted,
on Wd.
Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken aan GG, 29 Sept. 1920, Mr. 1248X/20.
"Chef van Algemeene Recherchedienst (van der l.ely) aan Procureur Generaal (G. W.
Uhlenbeck), 17 May 1920, Mr. 725X/20.
,2Het Hoofdbestuur van PFB aan het Bestuur van het Suikersyndicaat te Soerabaja, 14
Apr. 1920, Mr. 498X/20; De Voorzitter van Algemeen Syndicaat van Suikerfabrikanten
in
Ned. Indie (Hirsch) aan GG, 21 Apr. 1920, Mr. 498X/20.
"For the PFB executive conference on May 8-9, see Wd. Chef der Algemeene Recherche�
dienst aan Procureur Generaal, 17 May 1920, Mr. 725X/20. Also see Resident van
Yogya�
karta (P. W. Jonguiere) aan GG, 19 July 1920, Mr. 819X/20.
222 An Age in Motion
For one thing, sugar factories raised wages by 20 to 50 percent, which
tempered workers' militancy and increased their fear of employer re�
taliation. And for another, the government's position toward the PFB
was changing. When the government sent a circular to the residents in
the sugar plantation areas in April 1920, it still maintained a position
of benevolent neutrality. The government considered the wage level of
sugar factory workers to be too low and instructed the residents that
the local authorities should not intervene in PFB strikes unless asked by
both sides, that the government was not bound by the Sugar Syndi�
cate's position not to recognize the PFB as a union of sugar factory
workers, and that the local authorities might deal with PFB consuls and
branch leaders if necessary and if striking workers recognized them as
their representatives.14 The government maintained this position on
the understanding that their strike actions were essentially "economic"
in nature and due to workers' discontent with meager wages. The
substantial wage increases for sugar factory workers from May to July
thus strongly affected its position toward PFB-led strikes. Besides, as
time passed so did an opportune moment for the PFB to launch a
general strike.
It was under these circumstances that Soerjopranoto once again
raised the issue of a PFB general strike at the PPKB trade union federa�
tion congress on August 1. The congress supported a PFB strike in
general terms and left the decision to its member unions as to whether
they should go along with the PFB. On August 9 Soerjopranoto, Salim,
Semaoen, and Bergsma, in the name of the PFB and the PPKB, sent an
"ultimatum" to the Sugar Syndicate, demanding the recognition of the
PFB, the reinstatement of workers dismissed for their strike actions,
and a 100 percent wage increase, and announcing that the PFB and
other PPKB-affiliated unions would go on general strike unless the
Sugar Syndicate entered into negotiations with the PFB by August 17.15
On the same day the PFB central leadership instructed all PFB branches
to set up strike committees and to prepare for the coming general
strike.16
It is not clear whether Soerjopranoto and Salim really intended to
lead the PFB to a general strike or meant it as another bluff. But one
thing was certain: if launched, the general strike would have been a
disaster. Though the "ultimatum" declared that pressure was mount14Algemeene
Secretaris aan Resident van Semarang, Surabaya, Yogyakarta, Surakarta,
Madiun, Kediri, Pasuruan, Cirebon, Pekalongan, Banyumas, Kedu, and Besuki, i Apr.
1920,
Mr. 335X/20, Vb. 19 Jan. 1921, No. 67.
15Het Hoofdbestuur van PFB aan Voorzitter van het Suikersyndicaat te Surabaya, 9
Aug.
1920, Mr. 1248X/20.
16Schrijven aan de afdeelingen van den P.F.B. om zich voor de staking gereed te
houden, 9
Aug. 1920, Mr. 1248X/20. Also see Schrijven van de Vakcentrale aan de vakbonden,
opwekkend tot steun bij e.v. staking, Aug. 1920, Mr. 1248X/20.
Age of Reaction, Age of Parties 223
ing from below for a general strike, the majority of PFB branches were
in no mood to strike. Though it emphasized that the PFB actions were
"economic" in nature, the government saw the call for a general strike
not as "economic" but as "political" and instructed the residents in the
sugar plantation areas on August 15 to warn PFB "local leaders and
agitators" that the authorities would not tolerate any disturbance of
order and would take tough measures against the general strike once it
was proclaimed.17 On August 16 the executive committee of the Sugar
Syndicate met in Surabaya and decided, as expected, to reject the PFB
ultimatum. S. J. Hirsch, chairman of the Sugar Syndicate, immediately
notified the government of its decision.18 The assistant resident of
Yogyakarta phoned Soerjopranoto in the evening and asked about his
plan without informing him of the Sugar Syndicate's decision. Soer�
jopranoto answered: "The general strike will not go through. In no
case in Yogyakarta. We have sent an ultimatum to the Syndicate only
to intimidate them." But this was his personal opinion, he added, and
the final decision had to be made at the meeting of the PFB central
leadership and consuls.19
As the news of the Sugar Syndicate's decision spread in the late
evening and the night, PFB branches went on strike. By the morning of
August 17 fifty branches were either on strike or about to strike, in�
cluding many that had been on strike since before August 9. Upon the
instructions of the government secretary, the resident of Yogyakarta
summoned Soerjopranoto and Salim to the residency office and
warned them that the government would not tolerate the general
strike. When Soerjopranoto expressed his fear of employer retaliation
against PFB members after the sugar-cane harvesting and milling sea�
son was over, the resident said that "the government would listen to
legitimate grievances of factory workers."20 This was perhaps more
than what Soerjopranoto and Salim had expected of the resident, for
they now obtained not only an excellent excuse to back down from the
strike, but more important, the resident's promise, if vague, to protect
PFB members from employer retaliation. In the afternoon, the PFB
central leadership decided to "postpone" the general strike.21
17Aanteekening omtrent het optreden der Regeering naar aanleiding van de
voorgenomen
algemeene staking van de arbeiders in de suikerindustrie in Augustus 1920, Mr. 131
ix 20.
. 18Namens het College van Bestuur van den Java Suiker Werkgeversbond De Voorzitter
(S. J. Hirsch) aan het Hoofbestuur van den P.F.B. te Yogyakarta, 17 Aug. 1920, Mr.
1248X/20. The following account is based on documents included in \lr. 980.x 20 and
Mr.
131 ix/20.
lyAssistent Resident van Yogyakarta (van Hengel) aan Resident van Yogyakarta, 25
Oct.
1920, Mr. 131 ix/20.
20Resident van Yogyakarta aan GG, 21 Aug. 1920, Mr. 980X/20.
21De houding van het P.F.B. Hoofdbestuur, De Hoofdambtenaar voor de Volkslectuur
(D. A. Rinkes) aan den Regeeringsgemachtigde voor Algemeene Zaken bij den Volksraad
(W.
Muurling), 4 Oct. 1920, Mr. 1311X/20.
224 An Age in Motion
The PFB general strike fiasco proved crucial to the transformation of
the pergerakan in the early 1920s. It marked the end of the govern�
ment's benevolent neutrality toward the "economic struggle." It was
not that the government formally abandoned its position of neutrality
in labor conflicts, but that it never again saw strike actions as "eco�
nomic" in nature. But the effect was the same. In the eyes of workers
and pergerakan leaders, the government was now on the side of capi�
tal. This haunted workers, and the PFB suffered disastrously from it.
Though the PFB central leadership stressed that the government
"promised" to "protect the rights of sugar factory workers," this did
not alleviate the fear of employer retaliation among PFB members. In a
few months many members stopped paying fees to the PFB, quit it
altogether, and/or joined the Politiek Economische Bond. By the time
the second PFB congress was held at the end of the year, the PFB was in
serious trouble. Though 107 branches sent delegates, this did not nec�
essarily mean that the branches they supposedly represented still ex�
isted. The PFB central leadership was in heavy debt and the consuls had
not been paid for several months.22
The PFB general strike fiasco also raised the issue of party discipline
in the SI for the first time. As sugar factory workers started to desert
the PFB en masse, Soerjopranoto and Salim desperately tried to save it.
But now that there was no way to get the Sugar Syndicate's recognition
of the PFB, "the PFB has to place all its hope on the Government,"
Soerjopranoto and Salim wrote in the letter they sent to the governor
general on September 10 to request an audience, "to ward off the
misfortunes factory workers fear."23 The audience was to be given on
October 20. To obtain a more clearly worded promise of protection for
the PFB members from the governor general than the previous one they
had obtained from the resident of Yogyakarta, they had to establish
their credibility in the eyes of the government by taking some positive
measures. "Communists" in the PPKB and the SI were clearly a dis�
pensable liability for this purpose. It was in this context that the issue
of party discipline surfaced for the first time in the SI. It had nothing to
do with the partijtucht, a project to strengthen CSI control over local
Sis. "Party discipline" meant purification, ridding the SI of "Commu�
nists."
22For the second PFB congress, see Persatoean Hindia, 15 Jan. 1921; Sinar Hindia, 4
Jan.
1921, IPO, 2 (1921); Wd. Chef der Algemeene Recherchedienst aan Procureur Generaal,
22
Jan. 1921, Mr. 128X/21. For the PFB's decline in 1921, see Wd. Chef der Algemeene
Re�
cherchedienst aan Procureur Generaal, 30 June 1921, Mr. 659X/21; Legercommandant
bij
afwezigheid de Generaal Majoor (F. J. Kroesen) aan GG, 1 Apr. 1921, Mr. 356X/21.
23Floofdbestuur van den P.F.B. (Soerjopranoto and Salim) aan GG, 10 Sept. 1920, Mr.
1311X/20.
Age of Reaction, Age of Parties 225
The CSI Split
The issue of party discipline was raised at the CSI executive meeting
in Yogyakarta on September 30, 1920. It was convened by Soerjopranoto and Salim,
overriding Tjokroaminoto's objections, to dis�
cuss matters concerning the 1920 CSI congress, and attended by nine
CSI central committee members.24 Tjokroaminoto could not attend,
because he had to be in Ciamis to attend an Afdeeling B trial as a
witness. Semaoen also could not come and sent Darsono in his place.
But Darsono was refused admission on the ground that, being a CSI
propagandist, he was not a full member. Soerjopranoto and Salim
staged a coup at the meeting. The central committee decided to deprive
Tjokroaminoto of all his powers and shelved him as the figurehead
chairman "in charge of CSI general propaganda." His proteges were
dismissed from the CSI central committee. CSI headquarters was
moved from Surabaya to Yogyakarta, and the new standing committee
was organized by vice-chairman Soerjopranoto, secretary Salim, and
treasurer Fachrodin. It was also decided at the meeting to convene the
1920 CSI congress in Surabaya on October 16 and to introduce party
discipline into the SI. The decision to convene the congress in such a
haste with only two weeks' notice makes sense only if we recall that
Soerjopranoto and Salim's audience with the governor general was
scheduled for October 20. Introducing party discipline into the CSI
was the gift they were to bring to van Limburg Stirum.25
Things, however, did not proceed as Soerjopranoto and Salim had
envisioned. Shortly after the meeting, Darsono struck back by publish�
ing his article "The CSI Leadership under Scrutiny" in the October 6,
7, and 9 issues of Sinar Hindia.26 In this article, Darsono attacked
Tjokroaminoto and Brotosoehardjo, the previous CSI standing com�
mittee members just ousted at the CSI executive meeting, to prevent
"corrosion" of the SI and "in the hope of [its] purification." What he
meant by "purification," however, had nothing to do with party disci�
pline. This was clear from the way in which he attacked them. Darsono
attacked Brotosoehardjo for embezzling and gambling away CSI
money and Tjokroaminoto for his two-thousand-guilder loan to the
CSI while taking the car CSI treasurer Tjokroaminoto had bought for
24Soerjopranoto (vice-chairman), Abdoel Moeis (vice-chairman), Brotosoehardjo
(deputy
secretary I), Salim (commissioner), H. Fachrodin (commissioner), Hasan
Djajadiningrat
(commissioner), Soekirno (commissioner), H. Ahmad Sjadzili (commissioner), and k.
H.
Dahlan (adviser) attended the meeting.
2SOnly Soekirno opposed the introduction of party discipline into the SI at the
meeting. For
the CSI executive meeting, see Proces Verbaal (Tjokroaminoto), Mr. 1S4X 10.
26Sinar Hindia, 6, 7, and 9 Oct. 1920.
226 An Age in Motion
chairman Tjokroaminoto as collateral and for his extravagant spend�
ing, again demonstrated by his purchase of a three-thousand-guilder
car and jewelry for his second wife. In other words, Darsono exposed
Tjokroaminoto's and Brotosoehardjo's scandals. A scandal can be�
come what it is when one's inner being betrays one's outward appear�
ance. Darsono demonstrated this by showing how money had worked
on them, how the temptation of and the greed for money had turned
them from satria to "poison" (racun) that corroded the SI body. His
call for "purification" thus meant to "purify" the SI of the "corroding"
influence of money, not money itself but the "poison" that money
secreted. In this sense, it was similar to Tjipto's attack on Goenawan as
"thief satria" (satria mating), and it was based on the commonly
shared idea of what a pergerakan leader should be like. Darsono thus
wrote: "Why is it that the CSI has no money and that Tjokroaminoto
has so much? . . . Kromo must have as [his] leader an honest and
eminent man with firm convictions, high ideals, and blameless con�
duct. The native movement is now going through difficult times. It is a
time of self-purification to rectify our errors."27
Darsono's attack proved devastating both for Tjokroaminoto and
for the new CSI leadership. Tjokroaminoto's image as a satria was
irreparably tarnished and soon mengTjokro (do like Tjokro) came to
mean "to embezzle" in pergerakan discourse. It also destroyed the
agenda the new CSI leadership had set for the coming congress by
shifting the issue from party discipline to Tjokroaminoto's manage�
ment of CSI money. By the time Darsono concluded his article on
October 9, local SI delegates had been arriving at Surabaya not only
from Java but also from the Outer Islands. But on the same day Soerjopranoto,
Salim, Fachrodin, and Hasan Djajadiningrat conferred in
Yogyakarta and instructed Brotosoehardjo in Surabaya to "postpone"
the CSI congress.28 Soerjopranoto and Salim's plan to introduce party
discipline into the SI and then have an audience with the gover�
nor general was aborted. They left empty-handed for Buitenzorg
on October 18 and obtained nothing substantial from van Limburg
Stirum.
Darsono's attack was a brilliant tactical strike to prevent the CSI
leadership from introducing party discipline into the SI, but it even�
tually did more harm than "purification" to the SI. Though Darsono
made his attack without any prior consultation with Semaoen,
Bergsma, and other Semarang-based PKI leaders, it was widely seen as
a Communist attack on the CSI leadership and soon led to a bitter
squabble between Semaoen and Bergsma, who led the PKI, the Se27Sinar Hindia, 9 Oct.
19ZO.
28Wd. Chef der Algemeene Recherchedienst, 1 Nov. 1920, Mr. 1239X/20. See also
Oetoesan Hindia, 19 Oct. 1920, IPO, 42 (1920).
Age of Reaction, Age of Parties 227
marang SI, the VSTP, the Communist wing of the PPKB, and Soerjopranoto, Salim and
Fachrodin, who controlled the CSI leadership,
the Yogyakarta SI, the PFB, the PPPB, and the non-Communist SI
faction in the PPKB. Soerjopranoto accused the PKI of trying to "break
up the CSI" and terminated all relations of the PFB with the Commu�
nist faction of the PPKB. The PPPB followed suit.29 The PPKB col�
lapsed. Fachrodin also attacked communism as antithetical to Islam by
linking Darsono's attack on Tjokroaminoto with Lenin's thesis on PanIslamism and
the Pan-Asian movement published in the November 20
issue of Het Vrije Woord, the Dutch-language PKI organ. In his article,
"Watch out," he interpreted Pan-Islamism as "the movement for the
unity of Islam," attacked Communists as "enemy in the armpit" and
"thief inside the hut," and accused Darsono of trying to "destroy our
religion of Islam" and to "break up the SI and blind the eyes of SI
members so as not to trust Tjokro anymore."30
Semaoen, Bergsma, and other communists struck back. Semaoen
and Bergsma reproached Soerjopranoto and argued that a pergerakan
leader should be a "servant" and not a "king" of the people, alluding
to his nickname "Strike King."31 "Arjo Troenodjojo" branded Fach�
rodin as "slanderer" and "hypocrite."32 The whole squabble had lit�
tle to do with ideological differences between the PKI and the CSI
leadership. But abusive words traded between the two camps-racnn
(poison), jabat (evil), penjual bangsa (one who sells out the nation),
pembantu kapitalist (servant of the capitalist), pengecut (coward),
tukang fitnab (slanderer), munafik (hypocrite), penyakit (disease),
tukang cuci tangan (hand washer), and many others-made, as Se�
maoen lamented, "SI leaders, big and small, hot and angry."33 The
more abusive words were traded and the hotter and angrier SI leaders
became, the more SI members were alienated from the SI. Darsono's
attack and the subsequent squabble thus upset the SI and threatened its
very existence. Both camps wanted to end the squabble. Yet one thing
needed to be done. Though many disapproved of the way in which
29See Soerjopranoto, "Tentoekan dan tetapkanlah haloean!" Persatoean Hindia, 5 Nov.
192.0; "Doenia S.I. Bergontjang: Kommunis contra S.I.," Persatoean Hindia, 27 Oct.
1920;
McVey, Indonesian Communism, pp. 94-96.
30Fachrodin, "Awas," Islam Bergerak, 10 Dec. 1920. See also McVey, Indonesian Com�
munism, p. 95.
3'Semaoen and Bergsma, "Tetapkanlah Haloean Bersatoe Ati," Persatoean Hindia, 20
Nov. 1920.
'#-Arjo Troenodjojo, "Critiek Darsono," Islam Bergerak, 1 Feb. 1921. See also
Fachrodin,
"Djawaban," Islam Bergerak, 1 Mar. 1921; Pandito Sidik Pramono, "Boenoeh Diri!"
Islam
Bergerak, 1 Mar. 1921; Tjitrosoebono, "Islam dan Kommunisme," Oetoesan Hindia, Mar.
1921, IPO, 10 (1921); Arjo Troenodjojo, "Pendidikan M.D.," Islam Bergerak, 10 Mar.
1920.
"Semaoen and Bergsma, "Tetapkanlah Haloean Bersatoe Ati," Persatoean Hindia, 20
Nov. 1920.
zz8 An Age in Motion
Darsono attacked Tjokroaminoto, especially his timing (Tjokroaminoto was in trouble
because of the Afdeeling B affair), they also de�
manded a full investigation of Tjokroaminoto's management of CSI
money. Unless something was done about this, the SI could not get out
of the mess. The CSI executive meeting in January 1921 and the CSI
congress in March were held solely for this purpose.
The CSI executive meeting was held in Yogyakarta on January 17
and attended by Soerjopranoto (CSI vice-chairman), Salim (CSI secre�
tary), Fachrodin (CSI treasurer), Marco (CSI deputy secretary), Reksodipoetro
(PPPB), Tedjomartojo (PPPB treasurer), Sjahboedin Tatif
(PFB secretary) and Soemodihardjo (PFB consul) from Yogyakarta;
and Semaoen (CSI commissioner), Darsono (CSI propagandist), and
Piet Bergsma (PPKB treasurer) from Semarang. Though it was con�
vened to discuss matters concerning the coming CSI congress, no mem�
bers of the CSI central committee other than those from Yogyakarta
and Semarang attended and most likely they were not invited to the
meeting. Instead, nonmembers of the CSI central committee (Reksodipoetro,
Tedjomartojo, Sjahboedin Latif, Soemodihardjo, and Dar�
sono) and even an SI nonmember (Bergsma) attended the meeting. It
was a CSI executive meeting in name only, in reality a meeting of the
two major pergerakan factions based in Yogyakarta and Semarang.
The CSI was broken into two camps. The Yogyakarta CSI faction was
based on a coalition whose major components were the dying PFB, the
PPPB, and the Moehammadijah, while the Semarang "Communist"
faction represented the PKI, the Semarang SI, the VSTP, and the Com�
munist wing of the now defunct PPKB. Restoring a semblance of unity
between the two camps was an absolute precondition for the restora�
tion of the CSI. Those at the meeting decided to bring the squabble to
an end, convene the CSI congress in March 1921 in Yogyakarta, take a
vote of confidence in Tjokroaminoto, and bury the issue raised by Dar�
sono.34
The CSI congress was held as scheduled, attended by delegates of
fifty-seven local Sis, and ended successfully as planned at the CSI ex�
ecutive meeting. Darsono voiced self-criticism. A vote of confidence in
Tjokroaminoto was passed. A committee was set up to investigate his
use of CSI money, but was understood to be a formality. More impor�
tant was the adoption of the new CSI declaration of principles drawn
up by Salim and Semaoen. It stated that the SI was based on the
principles and precepts of Islam and that "the SI is convinced that the
evil of national and economic domination is considered a result solely
of capitalism, so the people of this colony have to be liberated from the
34Tjokroaminoto was notified of the decision the next day. For the meeting, see Wd.
Chef
der Algemeene Recherchedienst aan Procureur Generaal, 6 Feb. 192.1, Mr. 181X/21;
Legercommandant bij afwezigheid der Generaal Majoor aan GG, 31 Mar. 1921, Mr.
360X/21.
Age of Reaction, Age of Parties 229
evil and have to fight against capitalism, if necessary, with all powers
and capabilities, above all by trade unions and peasant associations."35
The Semarang group was satisfied with the declaration, because it was
Communist enough in content if the embellishment of Islam was taken
away. Yet Yogyakarta CSI leaders were also satisfied, because commu�
nism was "written down" in the language of Islam and if they wanted
they could now turn it against Communists, saying they did not believe
in God and the religion of Islam. It was also agreed in the congress that
the question of party discipline should be discussed at the coming
special congress scheduled to be held in August 1921.36
Once the congress was over, CSI leaders quickly moved to strength�
en their position and to dislodge Communists from the CSI. First,
Moehammadijah leaders, assisted by Salim, started their activities to
expand the Moehammadijah outside the residency of Yogyakarta.
Soon branches were established in Surabaya, Madiun, Garut, and else�
where. In such places as Kepanjen, Pekalongan, and Kedin, the Moe�
hammadijah and local Sis organized joint rallies, in which the
Moehammadijah was portrayed as "the bulwark of the SI."37
Second, the PFB and the PPPB, whose leadership overlapped with
CSI leadership, pushed the schism in the trade union movement into a
final institutional form. The occasion was an informal PPKB meeting in
June 1921 in Yogyakarta convened and attended by delegates of nine�
teen unions in order to look for a way to restore the PPKB, the trade
union federation. The meeting was ruined from the beginning by quar�
rels between the Semarang faction represented by Semaoen and
Bergsma and the CSI faction led by Soerjopranoto, Salim, and Tedjomartojo. The
question at issue was whether the PPKB leadership
elected at the first PPKB congress on August 1, 1920, was still valid.
The CSI faction called for the resignation of the old PPKB leadership
and the election of a new one. In response, Semaoen and Bergsma
resigned. But to their anger, Soerjopranoto, Salim, and Tedjomartojo
refused to resign on the grounds that the meeting was informal; instead
they announced that now that the Communists had resigned from the
PPKB leadership they would remain in office and convene the PPKB
congress simultaneously with the coming PPPB congress scheduled in
vsAdviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken aan GG, 14 Mar. 1921, Mr. 281X/21.
36For the March 1921 CSI congress, see McVey, Indonesian Communism, pp. 97-100;
Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Bewegtng: 19 ly-medio 192?, pp.
39^-
400; Oetoesan Hindia, 18 Mar. 1921, IPO, 13 (1921), and 26 Mar. 1921, IPO, it
(1921);
Sinar Hindia, 12 Mar. 1921, IPO, 12 (1921); Persatoean Hindia, 16 Apr. 1921, and 2t
July
1921; Semaoen, "Haloean bersatoe ati ditetapkan oleh Congres C.S.I.," Islam
Bergerak, 1
Apr. 1921.
17For Moehammadijah activities in this period, see Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling t an de
Nationalistische Beweging: 1917-medio 192], pp. 401-402, 449; Islam Bergerak, 10
Dec.
1921; Persatoean Hindia, 19 Mar. 1921; Oetoesan Hindia, 18 Apr. 1921, IPO, 17
(1921),
and 29 Apr. 1921, IPO, 18 (1921).
230 An Age in Motion
July. Enraged, Semaoen and Bergsma organized a rump meeting on the
same day and established the Revolutionaire Vakcentrale (Revolution�
ary Center of Trade Unions).38 The PPKB congress, on the other hand,
was convened in Yogyakarta in July, and it was formally decided to
terminate all relations with the Communist-led unions. But a major
power shift among CSI leaders also surfaced in the congress. With
the PFB in collapse, the congress dropped Soerjopranoto from the
PPKB leadership and decided that the PPPB central leadership under
Abdoel Moeis (vice-chairman), Tjitrosoebono (secretary), Tedjomartojo (treasurer),
and Salim (commissioner) concurrently serve as the
PPKB leadership.39
And finally, unexpected help also came from the government to the
CSI in the form of Tjokroaminoto's arrest on August 30. The arrest
made Tjokroaminoto an instant martyr and gave him an excellent
chance of ascetic retreat to cleanse and purify himself of whatever
faults he had committed. In Yogyakarta, the Comite Menegoehkan
Keberanian Ra'jat (Committee to Consolidate the People's Courage)
was established the next day to support Tjokroaminoto and others
who sacrificed themselves for the pergerakan (korban pergerakan) 40
All these developments strengthened the position of the Yogyakarta
CSI faction vis-a-vis the Semarang PKI faction, but not the SI as a
whole. Many local SI leaders and members were committed neither to
the CSI nor to the PKI. They were alienated by the maneuvers of the
CSI leadership to dislodge the PKI from the CSI and further sank into
inactivity. Symptomatic of their alienation was Marco Kartodikromo,
who had moved from Semarang to Yogyakarta in December 1920 in
the wake of Darsono's attack on Tjokroaminoto and had joined the
CSI faction as deputy secretary. In September 1921, he quit the SI,
retired from the pergerakan altogether, and left for Salatiga to write a
book on the history of the pergerakan.41 Marco once said in the early
SI days that a man's significance could be judged only when he died. In
this light the implication of his plan to write a book on the history of
the pergerakan was clear: the pergerakan was dying.
38Fifteen unions joined the Revolutionaire Vakcentrale. The central leadership was
com�
posed of Semaoen (chairman), Bergsma (treasurer), and Boedisoetjitro (secretary).
39For the PPKB split and the formation of the Revolutionaire Vakcentrale, see
McVey,
Indonesian Communism, pp. 100-102; Wd. Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken aan GG
(Fock), Mr. 713X/21; Soerjopranoto, Salim, and Tedjomartojo, "Vakcentrale PPKB:
Circulaire," Persatoean Hindia, 25 June 1921; Semaoen, Boedisoetjitro, Bergsma,
Wignjo,
Soekindar, and Soegeng, "Manifest Revolutionaire Vakcentrale," Persatoean Hindia,
25
June 1921.
40It was led by Marco (CSI deputy secretary), Soetadi (commissioner of the BO
central
committee), and Tjitrosoebono (PPPB secretary). For more on the committee, see
Sinar
Hindia, 15 Sept. 1921, IPO, 38 (1921); Mededeelingen der Regeenng omtrent enkele
Onderwerpen van Algemeen Belang, 1922, pp. 2-3.
41Persatoean Hindia, 17 Sept. 1921.
Age of Reaction, Age of Parties 231
The special CSI congress to discuss party discipline was finally held
in October 1921 in Surabaya. Though the CSI registered 196 local Sis,
only 3 6 sent delegates. The congress was dominated by Agoes Salim
and Abdoel Moeis. The question of party discipline was discussed on
October 8. Semaoen and Tan Malaka (PKI representative) pleaded for
an exception for the PKI in introducing party discipline. But Salim and
Abdoel Moeis were adamant. With the SI declaration of principles in
hand, Salim argued for the introduction of party discipline to consoli�
date the CSI. The proposal was put to a vote and passed overwhelm�
ingly. Semaoen and four other Communist delegates resigned from the
CSI.42 The CSI split now became a reality. But this did not immediately
lead to the split of the SI, because the decision applied only to the CSI.
To introduce party discipline in the local Sis, each local SI had to
follow the same procedure, which many local leaders and members
were reluctant to do. Besides, neither CSI nor PKI leaders wanted to
push the matter further. The reason was new Governor General Fock's
economy drive and his hostility toward the pergerakan. Both CSI and
PKI leaders were aware that they had to cooperate with one another.
Yet it was the very basis for cooperation between the PKI and the CSI
that was to be destroyed in 1922.
The Age of Reaction
The new governor general, Dirk Fock, came to the Indies in April
1921. Fock, with his long experience as a lawyer in the Indies, was a
leading proponent of Ethical policy at the turn of the century and rose
in Dutch parliamentary politics as a leading colonial expert of the
Liberal party. But when he returned to the Indies in 1921 as governor
general, the ethicus who had been forty-two years old at the turn of the
century was now sixty-two, and the Indies was no longer what he had
known. Though he might still see himself as an ethicus, his view of
what should be done for the Indies was definitely much more conserva�
tive than that of his predecessor, van Limburg Stirum. In fact, after the
November declaration in 1918, Fock, then speaker of the Tweede
Kamer, became a major opponent of van Limburg Stirum's liberal
policy of state reforms and finance. Besides, when Fock arrived, the
postwar economic boom in the Indies was over. The export of planta�
tion products had declined and so had state revenue. The new taxation
42Aside from Semaoen, four other Communist delegates were Mohammad kasan
(kaliwungu), Soeprapto (Salatiga), Soediro (Selo), and Sardjono (Sukabumi). For the
October
1921 CSI congress, see McVey, Indonesian Communism, pp. 103-104; kwantes, De
Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging: 1917-medio 1923, pp. 405-41 3;
Persatoean
Hindia, 22 Oct. 1921.
232 An Age in Motion
measures van Limburg Stirum introduced after long being held up by
the minister of colonies had not yet begun to improve the state's reve�
nue, and the public works he implemented had aggravated the state's
financial position. In this situation, Fock's policy was predicated on his
conviction that "the Indies"-not only the Indies state, Dutch busi�
ness, and Dutch residents but also the natives and other population-
"would fare better if Western business flourished and if the export of
products of Western [plantation] agriculture increased every year." He
thus sought to balance the state budget by introducing a series of
draconian financial measures, cutting public expenditures to the bone
and increasing taxes considerably, without affecting Dutch private
business activities. And in this endeavor, he found in Simon de Graaff,
minister of colonies, a strong ally.43
Fock's financial policy met stiff opposition from the pergerakan. But
the liberal Fock's attitude toward the pergerakan was characteristically
one of high-handed authoritarianism, which was again in sharp con�
trast with the aristocrat van Limburg Stirum's liberalism. In his view,
in which the welfare of the Indies was equated with that of Dutch
business, the pergerakan calling for anticapitalism was nothing but
evil, fomented by "agitators," "instigators," "malevolents," and the
sort who "sowed unrest among natives."44 Accordingly, whereas the
pergerakan was dealt with as a political matter during Idenburg's and
van Limburg Stirum's tenure, it was now primarily seen as a police
matter. This new perspective manifested itself most clearly in the shift
of bureaucratic power in Weltevreden and Buitenzorg. On the one
hand, the office of the adviser for native affairs lost much of its power
as an adviser to the governor general on pergerakan matters. In Iden�
burg's and van Limburg Stirum's era, Dr. Rinkes and Dr. Hazeu medi�
ated between their masters and pergerakan leaders and tried to "guide"
the pergerakan onto a path not wholly unacceptable to the government
by persuasion, cooptation, and thinly veiled intimidation. But after Dr.
Hazeu resigned in early 1920, Fock never appointed a successor and
the office of the adviser for native affairs, run by deputy advisers R. A.
Kern (1920-22, 1923-26) and E. Gobee (1922-24), never achieved
the importance it had enjoyed in the 1910s. Instead, the Algemeene
Recherchedienst (General Investigation Service) assumed increasing
importance in Fock's reign. It was established in 1918 as a secret intel�
ligence service and directed by the then Batavia police commissioner,
van der Lely, attached to the office of the prosecutor general. In Fock's
era, the Algemeene Recherchedienst was greatly strengthened and
made into a special political police apparatus, directly responsible to
43Koch, Batig Slot, pp. 27-34.
44Ibid., p. 31.
Age of Reaction, Age of Parties 2-33
the prosecutor general and with its staff stationed all over the Indies.
This fundamentally changed the way the government gathered intelli�
gence on the pergerakan. In the 1910s it was Dutch administrative
officials of the Binnenlandsch Bestuur, native officials of the Pangreh
Pradja, and advisers for native affairs who gathered information on the
pergerakan. In Fock's era, however, their reports became marginal,
and the main body of information on the pergerakan was collected and
processed by the Algemeene Recherchedienst, which operated ever
more extensive networks of paid informers to gather intelligence on the
pergerakan. With the political police mainly in charge of pergerakan
matters, the pergerakan in the age of reaction was to face more liberal
suspension of the right of assembly, more liberal invocation of Article
47 of the Constitutional Regulation, and the introduction and applica�
tion of tougher legal measures to suffocate the pergerakan by banning
strikes, severely limiting the rights of association and assembly, and
toughening the press law.
The beginning of the age of reaction, coupled with the deepening
schism in the pergerakan epitomized by the CSI split, generated a deep
sense of crisis among pergerakan leaders and activists, native intellec�
tuals, workers, and others. On the one hand, Fock's administration,
whose toughness first revealed itself in burying the recommendations
submitted by the Carpentier Alting commission for the constitutional
reform of the Indies state, made the prospect of an evolutionary path to
autonomy very dim. Fock's economy drive also made workers, espe�
cially state employees, restless. On the other hand, the deepening
schism in the once colossal SI, the very symbol of native solidarity,
further heightened the hope for national unity. It was at this juncture in
1921 that the word "Indonesia" emerged for the first time in per�
gerakan discourse to signify the Indies (Fhndia) and solidarity of its
natives. Intellectuals started to talk about an "Indonesian state," and in
the Volksraad Malay, which had already become the dominant lan�
guage in the pergerakan, began to be used by native members.45
Yet the real basis for national unity in the pergerakan was quickly
disappearing. Of decisive importance in this context was the PPPB
strike in January and February 1922.46 It was the first major strike in
Fock's era. Though Fock's economy drive, above all planned layoffs
and wage cuts, had threatened pawnshop workers since the middle of
1921, the immediate cause of the strike was a quarrel over requireMcdedeelingen der
Regeering omtrent enkele Onderwerpen run Algetneen Belung, 1922,
p. 3.
46The following account of the pawnshop workers' strike is, unless otherwise noted,
based
on McVey, Indonesian Communism, pp. 120-124; Nagazumi, "1922 nen no kokuei Shichiya
Rodo-kumiai to Indonesia Shoseito," Ajia Afrika Gengo Btmka Kenkyu 4(1971), pp.
113_I2-9; Mededeelingen der Regeering omtrent enkele Onderwerpen run Algemeen
Belung,
1922, pp. 21-32.
234 An Age in Motion
ments that employees carry articles from the pawnshop to the place of
auction. This had been an irritating issue for pawnshop officials, who
saw themselves as priyayi and manual labor as degrading, and who
until recently had "servants" to do this job. Under Fock's economy
drive, however, "servants" were quickly abolished and pawnshop offi�
cials had to do the job themselves. The PPPB central leadership was
reluctant to act on this issue, not only because it was not negotiable but
also because it smelled of a petty priyayi mentality and looked reac�
tionary in the age of pergerakan. But the PPPB leadership could not
afford to lose the allegiance of pawnshop workers, because the PPPB
was the last stronghold of the CSI-controlled trade unions, and the
Communist-led Semarang and Bandung PPPB branches were challeng�
ing the central leadership. The resultant position of the PPPB central
leadership was a halfhearted commitment to the pawnshop workers'
cause: if workers struck, the PPPB would support them.
The actual strike started on January n, 1922, at the Ngupasan
pawnshop in the vicinity of Yogyakarta, where on the day a "servant"
was dismissed an official who refused to carry an article was suspended
from his job on the spot and some forty workers walked out to protest
his suspension. On the next day workers at four more pawnshops in
Yogyakarta went on strike. Thereafter, the strike spread rapidly but in
a ragged fashion in the residency of Yogyakarta and beyond and in two
weeks some one thousand out of the total five thousand pawnshop
workers were on strike at 79 out of 360 pawnshops in the residencies
of Cirebon, Pekalongan, Kedu, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Rembang,
Kediri, Surabaya, and Pasuruan. At first PPPB chairman Abdoel Moeis
tried to end the strike peacefully by negotiating with the government.
At the rally organized by the PPPB central leadership in Yogyakarta on
January 17, Moeis demanded the reinstatement of dismissed workers
and called on the government to set up a commission to investigate
pawnshop workers' grievances. But the government was adamant from
the beginning. It ignored Moeis's plea, promptly dismissed all the strik�
ing workers, and pushed the PPPB leadership into a corner without any
option but to confront the government.
The strike quickly became a "national" struggle against the govern�
ment. Not only the CSI leadership but also the PKI and the Revolutionaire
Vakcentrale led by Tan Malaka and Bergsma, the BO, the
Moehammadijah, and other trade unions came to their aid. The Revolutionaire
Vakcentrale called on all the workers in the Indies to support
the strike and hinted at a general strike. The Moehammadijah tabligh
branch announced its support for the strike and explained its signifi�
cance at tabligh meetings.47 BO central committee members, especially
Soetadi (commissioner) and Soetopo (deputy secretary) emerged prom47Resident van
Yogyakarta aan GG, 2 Feb. 1922, Mr. 208X/22.
Age of Reaction, Age of Parties 235
inently at the rallies held in Yogyakarta every two or three days. The
Yogyakarta SI organized "freedom fighters" and Soewardi established
the Comite Panata Pangoeripan Mardika (Committee for Independent
Life), condemning state employees as "slaves" and praising strikers as
"commanders fighting against greed."48
With this upsurge of support for the strike and the government's
adamant attitude toward it, the PPPB central leadership finally decided
to go on a general strike in early February. Moeis and Reksodipoetro
(PPPB commissioner) left for their propaganda tour, which was to
culminate in the PPPB rallies in Yogyakarta on February n and 12.
But soon after they were arrested in Garut, and the right of assembly
was suspended in Yogyakarta on February 8, effectively preventing the
scheduled PPPB rallies on February n and 12. These measures sealed
the fate of the strike. Salim convened PPPB meetings in Semarang,
called for a general strike, and expelled from the PPPB all the members
who did not join the strike. But his call was not followed by any real
effort to organize a general strike. The Moehammadijah and the BO
backed down. Tan Malaka and Bergsma were arrested and banished
from the Indies. By the end of February, the strike was over. Almost
one thousand pawnshop workers were dismissed and the PPPB col�
lapsed.
The defeat of the pawnshop workers' strike was an immense shock.
It destroyed the last major CSI-controlled union and starkly demon�
strated how dangerous it was to confront the government. Pergerakan
leaders were now faced with one question of great importance: should
they continue to confront the government or should they retreat? Left
with the Moehammadijah as its only remaining organizational base,
the CSI leadership under Salim and Fachrodin opted for retreat, quietly
abandoning trade unionism. Angered by their betrayal and bitter
against the government, trade union activists in turn started to drift to
the PKI.49
Subsequent developments further destroyed any remaining basis for
cooperation between the PKI and the CSI leadership. On the one hand.
Communist influence increased in the trade union movement. This was
due not only to the drift of trade union propagandists, especially PFB
and PPPB propagandists, to the PKI but, more important, to workers'
sense of insecurity caused by Fock's economy drive.50 The rationaliza�
tion plan the government announced in 1922-layoffs of "redundant"
48Procureur Generaal (Wolterbeek Muller) aan GG, 13 Apr. 192$, Mr. 390X/25, Vb. 19
Feb. 1924, No. L2.
49This was most evident among PPPB propagandists. Tedjomartojo (treasurer),
Djajengsoedarmo (commissioner), and Soerat Hardjomartojo (commissioner) soon joined
the PKI,
founded the PKI Yogyakarta branch in June 1922, and formed the Communist faction in
the
Yogyakarta SI.
50For Fock's economy measures, see Mededeelingen der Regeering omtrent enkele
Onderwerpen van Algemeen Belang, 1922, pp. 57-81.
236 An Age in Motion
workers, cuts in wages, cost-of-living and housing allowances, and
other fringe benefits-threatened workers, especially state employees.
They pressed trade union leaders and propagandists for action. Semaoen and other
PKI trade union propagandists rode on their restless�
ness and sense of insecurity. The VSTP had lost more than half of its
members in Semaoen's absence in the Indies from October 1921 to
May 1922, and its leadership was in disarray after Bergsma's banish�
ment in February. Returning from Russia in late May, Semaoen went
on a propaganda tour from June to August, organizing VSTP meetings
and rallies and calling for the consolidation of organizational strength.
The tour proved highly successful. Railway workers, especially those of
the State Railway, returned to the ranks of the VSTP, bringing it back
to its former strength both in membership and financial terms.51 The
recovery of the VSTP was accompanied by an increase in Communist
strength in other trade unions. The Sarekat Postel once headed by
Salim fell under the leadership of Soedibijo, PKI/Semarang SI/VSTP
leader. The PFB was also restored in Semarang in 1922 by Soedibijo
and Ngadino (former PFB consul).52
On the other hand, CSI leaders increasingly focused their appeals on
the unity of Islam. A good case in point was Tjokroaminoto. Released
from prison in April 1922, he established his headquarters with Soerjosasmojo
(former Madiun SI secretary and editor of Islam Bergerak)
in Kedungjati, a small town strategically located at the railway junction
between Semarang and Yogyakarta, and tried to establish his own
organizational base independent of the Moehammadijah. In the middle
of 1922 a move was under way to restore the PPPB with the establish�
ment of the Comite Pembangoenan Persatoean (Committee for the
Construction of Unity) by Soerjopranoto, Soerat Hardjomartojo, Djajengsoedarmo, and
several other PPPB propagandists. Tjokroaminoto
took advantage of this move and restored the PPPB under his leader�
ship in August; he nullified the decision made at the PPPB meeting in
February to expel all the PPPB members who did not join the strike and
called for the reconciliation of pawnshop workers for the sake of unity.
Attracting pawnshop workers to the PPPB once again was a shrewd
maneuver, as was attaching to himself former PPPB propagandists who
were still active in local Sis.53 Yet his maneuver proved unsuccessful.
51For Semaoen's activities, see McVey, Indonesian Communism, pp. 125- 138;
Procureur
Generaal aan GG, 18 Nov. 1922, Mr. 1225X/22; Verslag Hoofdbestuur vergadering VSTP
te
Semarang, Mr. 1225X/22; 1st Gouvernement Secretaris, Rondschrijven, 12 Feb. 1923,
Mr.
141X/23; Procureur Generaal aan GG, 2 Mar. 192.3, Mr. 216X/23.
52For an increase in Communist strength in the trade union movement, see Procureur
Generaal aan GG, 2 Mar. 1923, Mr. 216X/23. For an attempt by Soedibio and Ngadino
to
revive the PFB, see Procureur Generaal aan GG, 6 Jan. 1923, Mr. 26X/23; Procureur
Gener�
aal aan GG, 2 Mar. 1923, Mr. 216X/23; Sinar Hindia, 18 to 26 Dec. 1922, IPO, 52
(1922).
5?,Boedi Oetomo, 14 June 1922, IPO, 26 (1922); Islam Bergerak, 10 July 1922; Doenia
Baroe, 23 Aug. 1922.
Age of Reaction, Age of Parties 2*37
With the defeat of the strike still fresh in their memory, pawnshop
workers showed little enthusiasm for the union. Besides, many PPPB
propagandists, including two secretaries of the central committee
(Soerat Hardjomartojo and Djajengsoedarmo), had become PKI mem�
bers. Tjokroaminoto could not turn the PPPB into his own base, and
soon he was back in the Yogyakarta CSI camp.54
Tjokroaminoto then turned to Islam. In September he started to
publish the serialized article "Islam and socialism" in Soeara Boemipoetra and
attempted to base his view of socialism on Islam. He also
emerged as chairman of the A1 Islam congress organized by Salim,
Fachrodin, and A1 Irsjad chairman Moehamad Soerkati in Cirebon
from October 31 to November 2. As Salim defined its significance, the
congress was an effort "to strive for the unity and mutual cooperation
of Muslims" and saw in Kemal Ataturk an exemplary leader for the
unity of Islam, which in Salim's language was equated with Pan-Islamism.55
The A1 Islam congress marked the emergence of Tjokroaminoto as a
leader for the unity of Islam. He then embarked on his propaganda
tour, visiting most of the SI locals still showing some signs of life and
organizing local SI rallies and meetings. He made two points in his
speeches. First, the SI was based on the religion of Islam and because
Communists "do not believe in God and do not confess the religion of
Islam," he declared, communism was incompatible with the SI. Party
discipline adopted at the October 1921 CSI congress should therefore
be maintained and further introduced into the local Sis. Second, he
disclosed his idea of the Partij Sarekat Islam (PSI), made up of cadres
(iwargo roemekso) loyal to the central leadership.56 The organization
of cadres was an idea he entertained after the 1919 CSI congress to
strengthen CSI control over local Sis. Now this idea reemerged as a key
ingredient to form the PSI, a cadre party, out of the SI, a dying mass
movement. For the time being, the PSI should concurrently serve as the
CSI leadership and PSI branches lead local Sis. But eventually, he ex�
plained, the CSI and local Sis should be absorbed into the PSI. The
majority of local Sis he visited supported his proposal. Encouraged,
54Communist strength was more pronounced at the branch level. The Bandung branch
was
led by Mohammad Sanoesi and Goenawan and the Semarang branch was under Soegeng.
Doenia Baroe, z3 Aug. 1922.
55For the A1 Islam congress, see Adjunct Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken (R. A. Dr.
Hoesein Djajadiningrat), Verslag van het ie A1 Islam Congress, gehouden te Cheribon
van 3 1
Oct.-2 Nov. 1922, Mr. 85X/23; S.H., "A1 Islam congress," Islam Bergerak, Nov. 11,
1922;
"A1 Islam Congress," Medan Moeslimin 21 (1922), pp. 718-724; "Verslag pendek dari
openbare openlucht vergadering Sl-Pekalongan pada tanggal 23-24 December 1922,"
Islam
Bergerak, 1 Jan. 1923.
56For Tjokroaminoto's propaganda activities at local SI rallies, see Assistent
Resident van
Kediri aan Procureur Generaal, 29 Oct. 1922, Mr. 1225X/22; "Verslag pendek dari
openbare
openlucht vergadering SI Pekalongan pada tanggal 23-24 December 1922," Islam
Bergerak,
1 Jan. 1923; McVey, Indonesian Communism, pp. 141-142.
238 An Age in Motion
Tjokroaminoto and his adjutant, Soerjosasmojo, started to publish
Pemberita PSI (PSI reporter) in January 1923 in Kedoengjati as a text�
book for all leaders and members of the PSI. In its first issue, Pemberita
PSI announced that the CSI congress would be convened in Madiun
and that the PSI standing committee (Tjokroaminoto and Soerjosasmo�
jo) would propose the establishment of the PSI and the introduction of
party discipline.57 The final day for SI schism was coming. As a last
gesture of reconciliation, Semaoen offered to hold the CSI congress in
Semarang, but this was simply ignored by Tjokroaminoto.
The CSI congress was convened in Madiun on February 17-23,
1923, and attended by 117 delegates representing 40 local Sis. Though
the Semarang SI as well as the Communist-led Madiun, Cepu, Nganjuk, and Bandung Sis
sent delegates, the PKI had already expected the
result and Semaoen did not attend the congress.58 Salim explained the
organization of the PSI. Tjokroaminoto announced forty-five out of
fifty-two local Sis that participated in the congress were for the organi�
zation of the PSI. Delegates of the Madiun and Nganjuk Sis introduced
a proposal to make an exception of party discipline for the PKI, but
interrupted by angry voices from the floor, neither could finish their
speeches. Salim argued that the PKI "endangered the unity of Islam"
and Tjokroaminoto declared that "the SI entrusts everything to Allah
and the PKI is neutral to Allah." Party discipline was maintained. The
establishment of the PSI was decided. And the new PSI/CSI leadership
was elected with Tjokroaminoto as chairman, Sjahboedin Latif and
Soerjosasmojo as secretaries, and Fachrodin as treasurer.59 After the
congress, the PSI/CSI leadership called on all the local Sis to establish
PSI branches and announced that it would appoint propagandists for
the PSI and organize courses to train cadres. Tjokroaminoto also an�
nounced that he would visit places where SI locals were under Commu�
nist control and set up rival Sis and PSI branches.60
S7Pemberita PSI, Jan. 1923, IPO, 2 (1923).
58The Semarang SI/PKI sent Soekindar as their representative, while the Nganjuk,
Madiun,
and Bandung Sis sent Soenarjo, Soekirno, and Mohammad Sanoesi as their delegates.
59The other members of the PSI/CSI central committee elected at the congress were
Agoes
Salim, Soerjopranoto, Brotonoto, and Soeroso (chairman of the Garut SI) as
commissioners
and Djojosoediro and Maharadja Sajoeti Loebis (chairman of Bandjarmasin SI and
editor of
Islam Bergerak) as advisers. Shortly after the congress Soerjopranoto announced
that he did
not agree with party discipline and the formation of the PSI and refused to accept
the position
of commissioner. He was replaced by H. Mansoer, a rising Moehammadijah leader in
Sur�
abaya. Sjahboedin Latif, a Minangkabay born in Panaman of West Sumatra in 1899, was
Salim's protege and had first emerged in pergerakan politics as second secretary of
the PFB in
I92�.
60pOr the CSI Madiun congress, see Kort Verslag van het verhandelde op het congres
der
CSI te Madiun van 17-20 Feb. 1923, Mr. 294X/23; Oetoesan Hindia, 28 Feb. 1923, and
1
Mar. 1923, IPO, 10 (1923); Matahari, 22 Feb. 1923, IPO, 9 (1923); Sinar Hindia, 21
Feb.
1923, IPO, 9 (1923); Islam Bergerak, 20 Mar. 1923; Si Bodo, "Pemandangan Congress
C.S.I.," Doenia Baroe, 21 Feb. 1923; McVey, Indonesian Communism, pp. 144-145.
Age of Reaction, Age of Parties 239
In response to the Madiun CSI congress, the PKI central leadership
convened a congress of the PKI and Red Sis (SI merah) in early March
1923 in Bandung and Sukabumi.61 Semaoen presided over the con�
gress. Sixteen PKI branches and fifteen out of twenty-one Red Sis sent
delegates. There were two important things to note about the congress.
First, the PKI now presented itself as the party to work for the "true"
interests of the people of the Indies and attacked "SI Tjokro" (Tjokro's
SI). Semaoen declared that the CSI was "under the influence of capital"
(read: money) and said:62 "However small the party still is, it is already
feared by enemies and many of our leaders were indeed banished. The
party is still small and consists of 200 members. Yet the party has been
attacked because the purpose of our party is in full accord with the true
interests of the People. Therefore the party will always obtain a place
among the People. . . . The spirit of Communism is already planted in
the People. Our purpose is not to follow the road of anarchism but the
road of true Communism." The whole point of Semaoen's speech was
his emphasis that the PKI was the party "feared by enemies." It was
feared and thus attacked by enemies, not because the party resorted to
anarchist actions but because of the "spirit of Communism" that
would guide the party to work for "the true interests of the People" of
the Indies and, as Soekindar said in his speech, to create a "new world"
{dunia baru). Sukabumi SI chairman Sardjono attacked Tjokroaminoto for being "not
pure." And as we will see later in detail, Misbach,
for the first time emerging as a propagandist of the PKI and Red Sis,
explained that the basic principle of communism was "solidarity and
equality" (sama rasa sama rata) and thus in accord with Islam, and
attacked Tjokroaminoto as "poison."63
Second, the PKI, in response to the formation of the PSI, introduced
a major organizational change in its relationship with local Sis. The
decision adopted at the congress in Sukabumi reads:64
The PKI and true Sis have become one. Therefore the Congress of the PKI
and Red Sis (true Sis) on March 6 in Sukabumi has decided regulations
that read:
1. In each place where there is a Red SI, a PKI branch must be established.
2. The Red SI and the PKI branch in one place must work together.
61The following account of the PKI and Red SI congress is based on Uittreksel uit
een
rapport van den Wedana Landjoemin gelar Datoe' Toemenggoeng ter beschikking van den
wd. Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken over het PKI Congres gehouden op 4 Maart te
Band�
ung, 6 Maart 1923 te Sukabumi [hereafter abbreviated as Uittreksel], Mr. 28 ;x 2;;
NlcVey,
Indonesian Communism, pp. 155-158; Wd. Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken aan GG, 1 ;
Mar. 1923, Mr. 283X/23.
62IPO, 11 (1923), pp. 544-545.
63Uittreksel, Mr. 283X/23.
64Islam Bergerak, 20 Mar. 1923. See also McVey, Indonesian Communism, p. 13-.
240 An Age in Motion
3. In working together, they have to oppose capitalism.
4. All major matters have to be referred by the PKI branch and the Red SI
in one place to the PKI central committee in Semarang, addressed to
chairman Semaoen in Semarang.
5. Once a year or whenever necessary, the PKI will hold a congress, where
the delegates of the Red Sis and the PKI will determine positions to
defend the needs of the people of the Indies.
6. The Red SI locals need not pay dues to the PKI. They must only pay the
costs of sending delegates to the annual congress.
7. PKI funds will be obtained from PKI branches.
8. The Red Sis will thus be in a financial position to defend the interests
of their members, for they need not contribute to the PKI central
committee nor need they pay the expenses of such PKI and Red SI
propagandists as Hadji Misbach, Darsono, Abdoelrachman, etc.: their
travel costs will be paid by the PKI central committee.
9. Wherever there is a Capitalist SI a la Tjokroaminoto, the PKI will
establish a PKI branch and a Sarekat Ra'jat (SR) [Association of the
People], which will work together in the same way the PKI and the Red
Sis in other places do.
As McVey observes, this decision reversed the position of the PKI on
the mass movement: whereas the PKI had previously acted as a bloc
within the mass movement, it now set itself openly at its head.65 The
basic idea and the inner drive to this was the same with Tjokroaminoto's PSI: the
creation of a disciplined and ideologically cohesive
cadre party and the subjugation of mass participation to the party.
With the Madiun CSI congress and the PKI and Red SI congress, the
age of parties dawned and both the PKI/Red Sis and the PSI/CSI were
ready to compete for the hegemony of the pergerakan. Yet shortly after
the congress of the PKI and Red Sis, the age of reaction made itself felt
once again. This time, it was the VSTP, the major pillar of the PKI-led
trade unions, which was hit.66
What drove railway workers, especially State Railway workers, to
strike was Fock's economy drive. The VSTP had recovered to its for�
mer strength in the middle of 1922 thanks to Semaoen's energetic
propaganda activities among railway workers who felt threatened by
the government's rationalization plan. The new trade union federation,
Persatoean Vakbonden Hindia (Unity of Indies Trade Unions), had
also been formed by the end of 1922 to oppose the government's
rationalization plan and joined by the VSTP and other Communist-led
unions as well as the VIPBOW (Union of Native Public Works Employ65McVey,
Indonesian Communism, pp. 157-158. Also see Wd. Adviseur voor Inlandsche
Zaken aan GG, 27 Nov. 1923, Mr. 1152X/23, Vb. 29 May 1928, No. H9.
66The following account of the VSTP strike is based on McVey, Indonesian Communism,
pp. 146-154; and John Ingelson, "Bound Hand and Foot: Railway Workers and the 1923
Strike in Java," Indonesia 31 (Apr. 1981), pp. 53-87.
Age of Reaction, Age of Parties 241
ees), the PGHB (Netherlands Indies Teachers' Union), and other nonCommunist unions.
Trade union leaders knew a strike would be suici�
dal. Semaoen in fact never called for a strike in his propaganda but
urged workers to consolidate their organizational strength. Yet work�
ers became ever more restless about layoffs and cuts in wages, cost-ofliving
allowances and other fringe benefits, and pressed leaders for
action. Trade union leaders in turn tried hard to obtain concessions
from the government and private companies by negotiations and with�
out going on strike. But both the government and private companies
were adamant and trade union leaders were increasingly pushed into a
corner with only two options available: to fight and be defeated, or to
retreat and lose their credibility in the eyes of workers. Under these
circumstances, the VSTP led by Semaoen occupied a central place,
because it was the largest and most well organized. Toward the end of
1922, van der Lely, the chief of the Algemeene Recherchedienst, noted
the growing restlessness among workers and expected a VSTP strike.
The government instructed residents to draw up contingency plans to
"intervene immediately" once the VSTP struck.67
On January 1, 1923, the government introduced the first cost-ofliving reduction and
announced the complete elimination of cost-ofliving allowances on June 1. The VSTP
congress was held in February
1923. Local delegates were overwhelmingly in favor of a strike and the
congress decided that the VSTP would strike if negotiations with the
government, the Netherlands Indies Railway, and other private railway
companies failed. But the government and the private railway com�
panies refused to concede on any of the points raised by the VSTP and
by the middle of April the negotiations broke off. On April 23 Semaoen
sent a circular instructing all VSTP branches to prepare for a strike,
while warning the government that if any one of the VSTP leaders was
arrested the union would immediately strike. His warning gave Fock
an excellent chance to provoke the strike before the VSTP was fully
ready for one and to crush it before the peak season of sugarcane
harvesting and milling in June. On May 8 Semaoen was arrested. The
next day railway workers started to strike, and within a few days more
than ten thousand railway workers were on strike in Semarang,
Yogyakarta, Madiun, Surabaya, Pekalongan, Tegal, and Cirebon. The
government immediately dismissed all the striking workers, established
military control over the rail lines, and suspended the right of assembly
in the residencies of Semarang, Kediri, Madiun, Pekalongan, Priangan,
and Surabaya. On May 10 the government introduced Article 16ibis
of the Indies Criminal Law, which banned not only incitement to strike
67Procureur Generaal aan GG, 18 Nov. 1922, Mr. 1225X/22; Procureur Generaal aan
Hoofden van Gewestelijk Bestuur, 21 Nov. 1922, Mr. 1226X/22.
242 An Age in Motion
but also support or encouragement of strikes. Many VSTP leaders were
immediately arrested under the article. The VSTP central leadership as
well as branch leaderships were crippled. These measures crushed the
strike. On May 22 the VSTP standing committee called off the strike
and admitted defeat. The VSTP collapsed, with its membership falling
from thirteen thousand in early May to less than one thousand in early
June. The government also decided Semaoen s internment with an�
other option to leave the Indies. In early August Semaoen left for Hol�
land at the age of twenty-four.
With the defeat of the strike, three major unions that had formed the
vanguard of the pergerakan in the age of strikes-the PFB, the PPPB,
and the VSTP-were destroyed. Article 16ibis banning strikes rang
the death knell of the age of strikes. Though there still remained a
number of unions, Communist-led unions were in disarray, because
their leaders often concurrently served as VSTP leaders. Non-Commu�
nist union leaders now learned the lesson and the unions such as the
PGHB and the VIPBOW all withdrew from "politics," disassociating
themselves from Communist-led unions and retreating from confronta
tions with the government.
The suppression of the strike, the collapse of the VSTP, and the
banishment of Semaoen were a severe blow to the PKI. Not only did
the PKI lose its most important union and its ablest leader but the
entire PKI was in trouble. Though the PKI standing committee was led
by Aliarcham (Semarang SI chairman) and Boedisoetjitro (Semarang SI
adviser) under Darsono's tutelage after Semaoen was banished, it hard�
ly functioned.68 In the wake of the strike, many PKI leaders were in
prison-Darsono estimated that as many as fifty PKI members, 25
percent of its membership, were arrested-and the entire organization
was in disarray.69 Besides, bombing incidents that took place in Se
marang, Yogyakarta, Madiun, and Surakarta in June to October led to
the arrest of Aliarcham, Boedisoetjitro, and others, and Sinar Hindia
was forced to announce that the PKI standing committee could not
lead the branches.
Now the great majority who had been active in the pergerakan were
frightened of state power and fell into inactivity. The pergerakan had
been born when there emerged those who dared to raise their voices in
writings and speeches. The age of strikes had been ushered in when
there had emerged those who dared to strike. Now in the age of reac68Semaoen
resigned as Semarang SI chairman in April 1923 to devote himself to leading
the PKI and the VSTP. Aliarcham and Soemantn, both Semarang SI schoolteachers,
became
chairman and vice-chairman of the newly elected Semarang SI leadership. Procureur
Generaal aan GG, 19 Nov. 1923, Mr. nux/25. , _
69Verslag van het 9de Kommunisten Kongres (PKI) gehouden te Batavia op 7, 8, 9, en
10
June 1924, Mr. 501X/24. Suara Ra'jat, 1 July 1923, IPO, 30 (1923)- See also Islam
Bergerak,
10 Sept. 1923.
Age of Reaction, Age of Parties M3
tion the state demonstrated its power by crushing the strikes, destroy�
ing major unions, and suspending the right of assembly in major pergerakan centers;
they made people realize how dangerous it was to
raise their voice and to strike. Only those who still dared to raise their
voice, strike, and go on confronting the government and "capitalism"
remained in the pergerakan. The pergerakan as a mass movement was
dying, leaving behind only the most active and militant remnants com�
mitted to the revolutionary cause.
The Age of Parties
Whereas the CSI leadership abandoned the trade union movement
after the defeat of the pawnshop workers' strike and the PSI/CSI never
regained the ground the CSI had lost, the PKI/Red Sis survived the
defeat of the railway workers' strike and emerged triumphant in its
rivalry with the PSI/CSI for the hegemony of the pergerakan in late
1923 and early 1924. The reason was perhaps simple, and the PSI/CSI
failure and the success of the PKI/Red Sis represented two sides of the
same phenomenon. The PSI/CSI atrophied because those who still
dared to confront the government and capitalism saw its appeal to the
unity of Islam (Pan-Islamism) as retreat in the guise of Islam. In this
respect, the PKI campaign against the PSI/CSI-attacking Tjokroaminoto for his
mengTjokro (embezzlement), Salim as a former PID spy
and hadji londo (Dutch haji), and the Moehammadijah as a sort of
Djamiat'oel Chasanah, the religious arm of the Sugar Syndicatefinanced Politiek
Economische Bond-proved effective. On the other
hand, the PSI/CSI appeal to the unity of Islam and its campaign against
the PKI/Red Sis ("Communists do not believe in Allah and do not
confess the religion of Islam") was marginally successful only in attach�
ing pious Muslims to the party, while militants joined Misbach in his
attack on "SI Tjokro" and "the MD" (Moehammadijah) for being
"fakes" and "hypocrites," and religious officials, ulama, and kyai ei�
ther stayed away from the PSI/CSI or joined the Djamiat'oel
Chasanah.70 The PSI/CSI plan to appoint propagandists and organize
cadre-training courses never got off the ground, its "textbook," Pemberita PSI,
ceased publication, and Tjokroaminoto had to close his
headquarters in Kedungjati by the end of 1923 because of his financial
trouble.71 As Darsono triumphantly remarked, the PSI/CSI had, by the
middle of 1924, "no organization, no organ, no administration, and no
office, and can hold no congress." Almost totally dependent on the
70iste Gouvernement Secretaris, Rondschrijven, 12 Feb. 1923, Mr. 141X/23.
71 Resident van Semarang (van Gigch) aan GG, 28 Jan. 1924, Mr. 99X/24, Vb. 29 May
1928, No. H9. See also McVey, Indonesian Communism, pp. 166-167.
244 An Age in Motion
Moehammadijah for its survival both financially and organizationally,
it virtually transformed itself into a political arm of the Moehammadi�
jah.72
The PKI success was the other side of the same phenomenon. The
PKI and Red Sis succeeded in attaching to themselves those who still
dared to fight. The ideological appeal of communism was secondary.
"Those who may join and become members are those who are coura�
geous, because they are in the right, and not bootlickers [pendjilat]"
was what the PKI and Red Sis stressed in their rallies.73 In this respect,
major forces that contributed most to the PKI success in winning mass
support that still remained were those who got out of prison after three
to four years' imprisonment for their involvement in the Afdeeling B
affair in West Java and former PFB, VSTP, PPPB, and other trade
union activists. In late 1923 and early 1924 they worked as propagand�
ists for the PKI and Red Sis.74 In Central Java, Information offices
(Informatie Kantoor) were established in Semarang, Kendal, Madiun,
Surakarta, and Cirebon to "help people in their needs and to raise their
grievances with the authorities." SI schools, initiated by Tan Malaka in
Semarang in 1921, were established in Semarang, Salatiga, Kendal,
Demak, and Pati (all in the residency of Semarang), Bandung and
Sukabumi (in the residency of Priangan), and Madiun and Nganjuk.
Information offices and SI schools served, together with offices of now
largely defunct trade unions, as outposts of PKI and Red SI propagan�
da.75 New SRs were established and Red Sis were transformed into
SRs. In Central Java, the center of Communist activities was the red
city of Semarang, from where Communist influence spread in its
vicinity and to smaller towns along railroad lines-to Pati, Demak,
and Purwodadi to the east; to Salatiga, Boyolali, and farther to Madiun
and Nganjuk to the south; and to Pekalongan, Brebes, Tegal, and
Cirebon to the west. And in Priangan of West Java, Bandung and
Sukabumi emerged as centers of Communist activities.76
72Verslag van het 9<de Kommunisten Kongres (PKI) gehouden te Batavia op 7, 8, 9, en
10
June 1924, Mr. 501X/24. Though Darsono's remark on the PSI/CSI was generally
correct, he
was wrong on one point. The PSI/CSI managed to hold its congress in August 1924 in
Surabaya. Kemadjoean Hindia, IPO, 34 (1924). After the collapse of his headquarters
in
Kedungjati, Tjokroaminoto eventually settled down in Kauman, Yogyakarta, in the
middle
of 1924.
73Resident van Pekalongan (J. E. Jasper) aan GG, 30 Oct. 1923, Mr. 1062X/23.
74Api, 16 and 17 Dec. 1924, IPO, 52 (1924). See also McVey, Indonesian Communism,
pp. 168-170; Djamaluddin Tamm, "Sedjarah P.K.I." (mimeo, n.d.), p. 3.
75For SI schools, see Resident van Semarang aan GG, 20 Jan. 1923, Mr. 105X/23; iste
Gouvernement Secretaris, Rondschrijven, 12 Feb. 1923, Mr. 141X/23; Sinar Hindia, 10
Dec.
1923, IPO, 51 (1923). For Information Offices, see Procureur Generaal aan GG, 19
Nov.
1923, Mr. 244X/24; Resident Semarang aan GG, 28 Jan. 1924, Mr. 99X/24, Vb. 29 May
1928, No. H9.
76Verslag van het 9de Kommunisten Kongres (PKI) gehouden te Batavia op 7, 8, 9, en
10
June 1924, Mr. 501X/24; McVey, Indonesian Communism, pp. 181-182; Resident van
Age of Reaction, Age of Parties 245
By the middle of 1924 the PKI thus emerged triumphant over the
PSI/CSI and as the only party that could genuinely claim to have a mass
following, though its size was tiny if compared with that of the SI in the
1910s. Yet intense rivalry between the two parties in the age of reac�
tion brought about a profound transformation of the pergerakan. For
one thing, ideological rivalries between communism of the PKI and
Islamism of the PSI/CSI became pronounced. Though the PKI took a
position of neutrality toward Islam, attacked the PSI/CSI for its retreat
and for coming under "the influence of capital [money]," and stressed
capitalist fear of communism (the "Spirit of Communism" scaring
capitalists), the PSI/CSI all the same attacked Communists for their
"irreligiosity." "Communists do not believe in Allah and do not con�
fess the religion of Islam" became an anti-Communist cliche. Also,
more Malay-language Communist literature became available. As late
as 1921 the two most important and influential pieces of Malaylanguage Communist
literature, aside from articles published in the
PKI organ, Soeara Ra'jat, were Semaoen's novel Hikajat Kadiroen
(Story of Kadiroen), in which he explained communism and the pur�
pose of the PKI in the mouth of "PK [Partij Kommunist] propagandist
Tjitro" at a rally, and his brochure on trade unionism.77 In 1922 the
first major Malay-language theoretical work was added to the Com�
munist literature with the publication of Tan Malaka's "Soviet atau
Parlement [Soviet or parliament]."78 In 1923 Partondo's first Malay
translation of The Communist Manifesto was published, first serially
in Soeara Ra'jat and subsequently as a pamphlet.79 And after that an
increasing number of tracts on communism were published in Malay.
In 1923 initial attempts to train cadres also began. After demonstrating
their loyalty, SR/Red SI activists were required to go through a series of
courses to become PKI members. ABC (Analphabetisme Bestrijdings
Comite) courses also began to fight illiteracy, and the elementary
knowledge of communism was taught to SR/Red SI members.80
Though party building was still in its initial stage and a lot still
remained to be desired about PKI organization and discipline, the feaSemarang aan
GG, 28 Jan. 1924, Mr. 99X/24, Vb. 29 May 1928, No. H9; Chet der Algemeene
Recherchedienst, Extracten uit besloten vergaderingen in rapport 1924, Mr. 607X/24.
77Semaoen, Hikajat Kadiroen (Semarang: Kantoor PKI, 1920). Semaoen, Penoentoen
Kaoem Boeroeh dari Hal Sarekat Sekerdja (Surakarta: Pesindo Surakarta, 1946),
originally
published in May 1920 in Semarang.
78Harry Poeze, Tan Malaka Levensloop van 1897 tot *94 5-' Strijder voor Utdonesie's
Vrijheid (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976), p. 134.
79McVey, Indonesian Communism, pp. 433-434.
80iste Gouvernement Secretaris, Rondschrijven, 12 Feb. 1923, Mr. 141X/23. See also
McVey, Indonesian Communism, pp. 191-192. For the initial and unsuccessful PKI
attempt
to organize cadre-training courses, see Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de
Nationalistische
Beweging: 1917-medio 1923, pp. 353-360.
24 6 An Age in Motion
tures and the mood of rallies changed definitely. At a PKI congress,
portraits of Marx, Lenin, Sneevliet, Tan Malaka, Semaoen and others
now lined the red-festooned walls of the congress hall, together with
the red flag with hammer and sickle. Slogans ("Workers all over the
world, unite!" "Oppose exploitation!" "Bury capitalism!" "Long live
communism!" "Raise the red flag!") also lined the walls. PKI/Red SI
members began singing the "Internationale" at rallies and meetings.
Though Dutch members of the ISDV/PKI undoubtedly knew the song,
it was perhaps pupils of the Semarang SI school who first started
singing it, after learning it from Tan Malaka, a recent returnee from the
Netherlands and the founder of the Semarang SI school. Wearing red
scarves inscribed "Rasa Merdeka [Taste of freedom]," they sang the
"Internationale" and raised money for the SI school.81 Adults learned
it from children. At SR/Red SI rallies and meetings, "Darah Ra'jat
[Blood of the people]" and several other songs were also sung.
While portraits of Communist heroes, the red flag, and Communist
songs and slogans heightened the sense of party solidarity, this went
along with the disappearance of the kind of native solidarity people
had felt at SI rallies in its early days. Whereas a merry festive mood
characterized early SI rallies as Marco described them, now debate
between feuding party propagandists accentuated rallies and meetings.
Soemantri, then Semarang SI vice-chairman and PKI leader, published
a novel, Rasa Merdeka (Taste of freedom), in 1924, in which he de�
scribed the speech of "internationalist" Soedarmo (who started his
speech with saudara-saudara [brothers]) and his debate with "na�
tionalist" Moehammad Abdoelgani (who started his speech with assala
moe'alaikoeml) in the chapter titled "Debat [Debate]." In the story,
Soedarmo argues Moehammad Abdoelgani into silence and the rally
comes to an end with his victory. Soemantri then writes:
What do you think about that debator?" asked Nji Endang as they
walked along.
"Oh . . . nothing special, zus [sister]! We often get such opposition
from people who don't yet understand. But actually this is a good thing,
because with debates like these we can explain things further, till people
really understand them."
"A pity . . . isn't it, mas [elder brother, used by wife to husband], . . .
that man," said Nji Endang to her husband with a sigh.
"Why?" replied Soedarmo, before Sastro [Nji Endang's husband]
could answer.
"He must be embarrassed because he could not answer."
"That's his affair," replied Soedarmo, laughing and shrugging his
shoulders.82
81Poeze, Tan Malaka, pp. 121-127.
82Soemantri, Rasa Merdeka: Hikajat Soedjanmo (Semarang: Drukkerij VSTP, 1924),
p. 91. Soemantri was born in Rengel (Tuban) in about 1899. After working as a clerk
at the
Age of Reaction, Age of Parties 2-47
Whatever nostalgia people felt for the old SI, those days were gone.
Soedarmo's attitude toward other parties ("that's his affair") trickled
down from PKI leaders and propagandists to PKI members and farther
down to SR/Red SI rank-and-file members.
In June 1924 the PKI central leadership convened the PKI congress in
Batavia.83 The PKI victory over the PSI/CSI was already a fact and
the PKI was the only party with a mass following. Thirty-two PKI
branches and twenty-eight SRs and Red Sis sent their delegates to the
congress. In two respects, however, the congress marked the turning
point of the pergerakan into its final phase. First, the major theme of
the congress, organization and discipline, reflected the shifted emphasis
in the pergerakan. In announcing the congress, Soeara Ra'jat wrote:
The time of mere agitation-namely, the time to raise voice at gather�
ings and in newspapers-is now gone and the moment has come to form
an organization. If there is no organization, the party cannot lead the
important struggle. In view of the present situation, it will certainly not
be long before the great struggle takes place here. . . .
[After proclaiming the PKI Victory over the PSI/CSI] the purpose of
the communist movement is not to destroy the CSI but to destroy capital�
ism. Will it be so easy to destroy capitalism as to destroy the CSI by
means of writings and words?
Those who think it possible to destroy capitalism by mere sharp argu�
ments and thoughts do not wholly understand the essence of commu�
nism.
Capitalism has a strong organization and discipline. Therefore we
must also form a strong organization and discipline to destroy it [capital�
ism]. As capitalism can subject all its members to discipline, so must our
party also make sure that all the members of the PKI subject themselves
to the party decisions taken by the majority of the members. The PKI
must uplift [its members] to be its soldiers, who place the interests of the
party above everything else. The PKI has to train members so that they
are always ready to carry out all the orders of the party, as a soldier
follows the orders of his senior.84
The idea of a party whose interests transcend everything else was some�
thing new in the pergerakan. Undoubtedly it was conceived as the only
way to survive in the age of reaction and to go on fighting against the
Regional Council of Semarang, he joined the pergerakan in Semarang as an SI
schoolteacher
and in April 192.3 emerged as vice-chairman of the Semarang SI. In 192.4 he became
an editor
of Api (formerly Sinar Hindia) and chairman of Sarekat Pegawai Pelaboean dan Laoet
(Seamen's and bockers' Union) and then the director of Pemberita in 192.5-26.
Soemantri
was banished to Digul in 1927.
83The following account of the 1924 PKI congress is based on Wd. Adviseur voor
lnlandsche Zaken, Verslag van het 9de Kommunisten Kongres (PKI) gehouden te Batavia
op 7,
8, 9, en iojuni 1924, Mr. 501X/24; McVey, Indonesian Communism, pp. 192-196; Soeara
Ra'jat, 20 June 1924, IPO, 28 (1924).
H4Souara Ra'jat, 30 May 1924, Mr. soix/24.
248 An Age in Motion
government and capitalism. Though the reality of the PKI and SRs
never lived up to this ideal, the idea of the party transcending every�
thing else marked the beginning of the final phase of the pergerakan-
the death of the pergerakan and its replacement by the party. The time
of agitation at rallies and meetings and in newspapers was over and so
also the days when people talked in the first person. Now was the time
of uplifting PKI members to become Communist soldiers who would
submit to the commanding voice of the party, which was only possible
when the first-person voice was suppressed. The congress ratified the
new PKI program and statutes and changed its name to Partai Komunis
Indonesia (Communist Party of Indonesia) as the first political party in
the Indies to use the word "Indonesia." Neither the new program nor
the new statutes, however, were substantially different from the old
program and statutes. But this did not matter, for by changing its
name, its newness marked the new era, the age of the PKI as the
successor of the pergerakan.
The second way the congress marked the turning point of the per�
gerakan was by electing a new central committee. It was now headed
by Winanta, a former State Railway employee and Bandung PKI lead�
er, as chairman, and Boedisoetjitro as secretary/treasurer. The congress
also decided to move the PKI headquarters from Semarang to Batavia.
These changes were politically significant. It is not that Semarang was
no longer the largest center of Communist activities. It still was. The
two most important PKI journals, Sinar Hindia and Soeara Ra'jat,
were published in Semarang, and many Communist-led unions and
other associations were headquartered there. The position of "Semarangers" thus
still weighed heavily in the PKI. The very fact that
Boedisoetjitro and Aliarcham were elected secretary/treasurer and
commissioner underlines this. But now, with "non-Semarangers" Wi�
nanta, Sardjono, Alimin, and Moesso increasing their influence in the
party leadership, and the headquarters moved to Batavia, the PKI cen�
ter moved westward, leaving PKI branches, Red Sis, and SRs in Central
Java in a marginal position and without easy access to the center,
geographically or personally, except through formal channels.
In the age of reaction the age of parties dawned, and with the victory
of the PKI over the PSI/CSI the pergerakan arrived at its final phase. It
was in these years of profound transformation of the pergerakan that
Misbach returned and "moved" as a PKI/Red SI propagandist and that
Marco, succeeding Misbach, "moved" as chairman of the PKI Surakar�
ta section and the Surakarta SR.
7 Islamism and Communism
Misbach was released from Pekalongan prison on August 22, 1922,
and returned home to Kauman, Surakarta, on the same day. Two years
and three months had passed since his arrest, during which time the age
of strikes had ended and the age of reaction and the age of parties had
dawned. Fock was governor general and implementing his economy
measures. The pawnshop workers' strike had been defeated and the
CSI leadership under Salim and Fachrodin was deserting the trade
union movement. The CSI split was a reality. Despite a call for national
unity, the SI was moving to its final split. In this age of reaction and
parties, Misbach broke with his former ally, the Moehammadijah, in
late 1922, emerged as a PKI/Red SI propagandist in March 1923,
argued the fundamental compatibility of Islam and communism, and
after a brief period of activity as a PKI leader in the Vorstenlanden, was
arrested and banished to Manokwari in July 1924. Misbach in this
period is commonly remembered as one of the most prominent Islamic
Communists. The label Islamic Communist is not wrong, when one
considers that he was a leading pergerakan figure concerned with
"advancing Islam" who joined the PKI. But the label is misleading,
because he never talked about Islamic communism as though there
were several kinds of Islam, such as Islamic communism, Islamic capi�
talism, and Islamic imperialism, and because he remained a Muslim
whose utmost concern was to prove his true Islamness to himself and
to his fellow Indies Muslims by word and deed. Why, then, in this age
of reaction and parties, did he break with the Moehammadijah and
become one of its fiercest opponents? Why did he join the PKI? Why,
despite the PSI/CSI position that Communists do not believe in God
and confess Islam, did Misbach see communism as guiding Muslims
down the road of true Islam? What did he understand as communism?
Let us discuss these questions by examining his words and deeds.
249
250 An Age in Motion
Misbach's Return
When Misbach was released from prison, his return was hailed both
in Islam Bergerak and in Panggoegah. Islam Bergerak called him "sol�
dier of Islam" and Panggoegah "hero."1 But much had changed while
he was in prison. The SH was long in collapse and Tjipto was gone for
good. The Panggoegah group-Tjipto's proteges such as Moedio
Wignjosoetomo, Sismadi Sastrosiswojo, and Doellatip who formed the
SH leadership after Tjipto left for Bandung-had already moved to
Pakualaman, Yogyakarta. The SATV was no longer there either. The
majority of SATV muballighin had joined the Moehammadijah and
transformed the SATV into its Surakarta branch. The only thing that
remained unchanged was that the right of assembly had been sus�
pended throughout these years. This gave the authorities convenient
leverage for controlling the pergerakan, bestowing favor on loyalists
and suffocating the others. Resident Harloff was already a member of
the Council of the Indies, appointed by Fock in April 1922, and was
succeeded by van der Marel. But with reorganization still in progress in
the regency of Klaten, the new resident successfully argued, the rust en
orde was an absolute condition for its success. The suspension of the
right of assembly was maintained and only its application was some�
what softened. The resident permitted loyalist/royalist associations
such as the Narpowandojo and the BO freely to hold rallies and meet�
ings. But neither SH rallies and meetings nor those in which SH and/or
Djawa Dipa leaders participated were allowed in the city of Surakarta.
And in the countryside, no rallies and meetings of any kind were per�
mitted, so that no "agitators" could ever "instigate" peasants into
protest actions.2 Peasant strikes did take place here and there. But with
the authorities jealously guarding against pergerakan activists from the
city, peasant strikes sprang up and ended as isolated events. Surakarta
was calm and the pergerakan showed little vigor.
Though Misbach returned to Surakarta only to discover the rust en
orde reigning supreme, what moves he would make were all the same
closely watched by the authorities. The prosecutor general named Mis�
bach one of the ten most important pergerakan figures the government
should watch, and from the very day of his release he was indeed
watched by detectives under van der Lely's direction.3 In Surakarta,
Resident van der Marel also showed his keen interest in Misbach.
Shortly after his return, he invited Misbach to the residency house and
gave him his "advice" to "improve [the lot of] the people of Surakar1 Islam
Bergerak, i Sept. 1922. Panggoegah, 30 Aug. 1922, IPO, 39 (1922).
2Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging: medio 1923 - 1928,
pp. 82-104. See also Panggoegah, 26 Sept. 1923, IPO, 41(1923).
3Procureur Generaal (Wolterbeek Muller) aan GG (Fock), 18 Nov. 1922, Mr. 1225X/22.
Islamism and Communism 2*51
ta." He advised Misbach "not to move in the field of politics or to
gather people in the countryside as he once did." Instead, the resident
told Misbach, "whenever there are problems that cause people's mis�
ery, policies that are wrong, and wrongdoings on the part of the BB
[Binnenlandsche Bestuur], he should tell [mengaturkan] the resident."4
As the word mengaturkan, or rather its Javanese equivalent, ngaturake, indicates-
one can only mengaturkan to someone superior to
oneself-what the resident advised Misbach was not to confront the
government and "undermine" the state authority (politics) but to ac�
cept the established order as peasant nggogol leader Troenopawiro
once did in the Bantul affair. Misbach did not answer, but the meeting
ended in a friendly atmosphere.
For some time after his return, Misbach remained neutral in the CSIPKI rivalry and
tried to learn what had happened to the pergerakan
while he was in prison. He read back issues of Medan Moeslimin and
Islam Bergerak. He met Soewardi, the mentor of the Panggoegah
group, in Yogyakarta, talked with Tjipto and Douwes Dekker in Band�
ung, and stayed with Semaoen in Semarang. He also went to Kedungjati, met
Tjokroaminoto and Soerjosasmojo, and joined Tjokroaminoto in attending and talking
at local SI rallies. At the SI rallies held in
Kebumen on September 30 through October 2, Misbach stressed the
equality of all before God and explained his experience of prison and
its significance. But the tone of his speech was so militant that at one
rally Tjokroaminoto had to pass him notes three times to remind him
to tone down his speech.5
Misbach, however, could not maintain his neutrality toward the
CSI-PKI feuds for long, because the schism had already spread to for�
mer SATV muballighin, and the journals he had founded, Medan
Moeslimin and Islam Bergerak, were openly on the side of the CSI and
the Moehammadijah. As we may recall, while Misbach was in prison
and after Tjipto had left Surakarta, the Surakarta SH forces were re�
duced to two core groups, the Panggoegah group and SATV Islamic
propagandists. The Panggoegah group, looking to Soewardi for guid�
ance, moved to Yogyakarta toward the end of 1921. Thus left in the
city of Surakarta were SATV activists. In Misbach's absence, the ma�
jority of them gradually came under the influence of the Moehammadi�
jah. Medan Moeslimin was edited by Moechtar Boechari, a rising
Moehammadijah muballigh in Kauman, Surakarta. Though Koesen
remained editor-in-chief of Islam Bergerak, Fachrodin became its lead�
ing voice and in fact published his article "Watch Out" there. In Janu�
ary 1922, in response to the expansion of the Moehammadijah beyond
4"Saudara H. M. Misbach dan Resident Solo," Medan Moeslimin 9 (1913), p. 219.
5Wd. Referendaris (Vink), Extract uit het geheim rapport no. 31 A.R. van 2 Sept,
t/m 31
Oct. 1922, Mr. 1227X/22.
252. An Age in Motion
the residency of Yogyakarta, SATV members transformed the SATV
into the Moehammadijah Surakarta branch under the leadership of
M. Ng. Sastrosoegondo (chairman), M. Moechtar Boechari (vicechairman), M.
Harsoloemekso (secretary), and M. Sontohartono (trea�
surer).6 The majority of the Surakarta Moehammadijah leaders were
wealthy batik entrepreneurs of Misbach's generation. They were ready
not only to raise money but also to contribute their own money for
various projects-publishing a new journal, establishing a new Moe�
hammadijah school and a library, and organizing tabligh meetings.7
The driving force in tabligh activities was the young, energetic
Moechtar Boechari, who not only read Arabic and was well versed in
religious texts but also read Dutch. As opposed to Misbach, who once
acted out "Don't be afraid" in his tabligh activities in the countryside,
Moechtar Boechari carried out his tabligh activities among younger
members of Kasunanan officials and among students of the HIS (Dutch
Native Schools) and the Normaalschool (Native Teachers Training
School), who were mostly sons of Solonese priyayi. His knowledge of
Dutch proved effective in his activities. As a graduate of the Mamba'oel Oeloem, he
was joined in his effort by "progressive" kyai and
religious officials such as R.K.H. Adnan of Pangulon, K. H. Moham�
mad Edris of pesantren Jamsaren, and K. H. Mashoed and K. Mawardi
of Mamba'oel Oeloem-the very people who had once led the TKNM
Surakarta subcommittee and were being attacked by Misbach for their
"pseudo-Islamness."8 Tabligh activities, which were also called Islamic
courses, under Moechtar Boechari's leadership quickly changed the
social and political nature of the SATV/Moehammadijah Surakarta
branch. Whereas the SATV under Misbach was anti-religious estab�
lishment and its membership was largely confined to batik traders in
the central part of the city, the SATV/Moehammadijah under the lead�
ership of Sastrosoegondo (teacher of the Kratonan second-class native
school) and Moechtar Boechari established rapport with progressive
elements of the religious establishment and expanded its influence
6Verslag Moehammadijah, p. 16.
7The Moehammadijah Surakarta branch published Al Islam in January 1922 under the
editorship of M. Ng. Parikrangkoengan, K. Iman Bisri, and Moechtar Boechari, and
Tjahaja
Islam in May 1922 under the editorship of Moechtar Boechari, M. A. Hamid, and
Haroenrasjid. Darma Kanda, 10 Jan. 1922, IPO, 3 (1922); Islam Bergerak, 20 May
1922. Its
education branch founded a Moehammadijah school in Keprabon under the leadership of
Siswosoedirdjo (teacher of the Kepatihan HIS), Sastrosoegondo, and teachers of
Mamba'oel
Oeloem. The library was established by the library branch led by Parikrangkoengan
and
Moechtar Boechari. Darma Kanda, 14 Aug. 1922, IPO, 38 (1922).
8The tabligh/propaganda section of the Moehammadijah Soerakarta branch was the
third
largest among Moehammadijah tabligh branches. For the leading propagandists in
Surakar�
ta, see Verslag Moehammadijah, pp. 29-31. Adnan, Mashoed, and Mawardi were not
Moehammadijah members, but all the same joined Moechtar Boechari in running tabligh
meetings and Islamic courses. Islam Bergerak, 20 Oct. 1922.
Islamism and Communism 253
among younger members of Kasunanan priyayi.9 As it became "re�
spectable" socially, so too did it become politically: active in the re�
ligious, educational, and social fields, but shying away from politics, as
did the Moehammadijah of Yogyakarta. And this was understandably
encouraged by the resident, who permitted the Moehammadijah to
organize tabligh meetings without police attendance.
The social and political transformation of the SATV/Moehammadijah Surakarta branch,
however, did not proceed without dissension.
Those who raised the dissenting voice were editors of Islam Bergerak.
Unlike SATV/Moehammadijah propagandists who equated "advance�
ment of Islam" with organizational expansion of the Moehammadijah,
they saw their journal as expressing the voice of the larger imagined
community of Islam. The event that triggered dissension and brought it
to the surface was a series of articles written by Sismadi Sastrosiswojo,
an editor of Panggoegah now in Yogyakarta as well as an editor of
Islam Bergerak, in the wake of the defeat of the pawnshop workers'
strike in early 1922. In these articles, Sismadi attacked the Moeham�
madijah central leadership on three issues. First, he attacked it for
lending four thousand guilders with interest to the PPPB central leader�
ship. Second, he accused it of deserting the PPPB in its strike actions
once the right of assembly was suspended and the resident of Yogya�
karta warned it against "meddling" in the strike. And finally, he ac�
cused it of being more afraid of the resident than of Allah and of
retreating from fighting against "slander" (fitnah). In Sismadi's lan�
guage, "the Moehammadijah says that it uses the principle of the
Koran, but its Islam is based on servitude to fellow humans who do not
like the religion of Islam, and it does not deem it necessary to organize
against enemies who chain Islam." In his view, therefore, the Moeham�
madijah was using Islam as a "mask" and in that respect was no
different from the Djamiat'oel Chasanah, which was expanding its
influence especially in West Java by lavishly funding projects such as
building mosques and establishing religious schools and by recruiting
haji, sayid, kyai, ulama, pengulu, and other religious officials.10
9For Moechtar Boechari, see "Kenangkan Jasanya Aim. Kyahi Muchtar Buchary," Adil,
p. 23. 1 am grateful to Haji Surono Wiroharjono for his guidance on the early
history of the
Moehammadijah Surakarta branch and on the important role played by Moechtar
Boechari.
H)Islam Bergerak, io and 20 Mar. 1922; "Moehammadijah dan S.I.," Islam Bergerak, 10
Apr. 1922. As a matter of fact, Sismadi's attack on the Moehammadijah for lending
money to
the PPPB at interest and thus committing haram (forbidden by Islam) was unfair. As
a
member of the Moehammadijah later explained, the Moehammadijah central leadership
acted as an intermediary between a money lender of Pasar Cede (Kota Ciede,
Yogyakarta)
and the PPPB central leadership, on the one hand borrowing 4,000 guilders from a
money lender at 18 percent interest a year while using three cars in the possession
of the
Moehammadijah as collateral, and on the other hand lending 4,000 guilders to the
PPPB on
conditions written in the contract that the PPPB central leadership repay 60
guilders a month
from March 1922 to February 1923 and 4,000 guilders in March 192$, d total of 4,720
2-54 An Age in Motion
Medan Moeslimin, headed by Moechtar Boechari, ignored the issues
raised by Sismadi's articles. But Koesen, editor-in-chief of Islam Bergerak,
together with its editors, Soerjosasmojo, Ahmad Dasoeki and
Sjarief, took up the issues and joined Sismadi to criticize "partij MD"
(the party of Moehammadijah) to help "the MD purify itself of all filth
that has perched on the body of MD."11 The way Sismadi and others
attacked the Moehammadijah was similar to the way in which Darsono had attacked
Tjokroaminoto. It was an expose of scandals. But
whereas Darsono had attacked Tjokroaminoto in the name of satria
and demonstrated the corrosive influence of money on Tjokroaminoto,
they attacked the Moehammadijah in the name of "true Islam" and
demonstrated that the Moehammadijah was not living up to the teach�
ings of Islam-committing haram (forbidden by Islam) by lending
money at interest, being more afraid of the resident than of Allah,
staying away from "politics," and not fighting against "slander." Their
very refusal to call the Moehammadijah by its name and their insis�
tence on calling it the MD made this point clear, for Moehammadijah
signifies followers of Muhammad, while MD could mean, Mundur
Diri (retreat) or Musibat Dunia (disaster of the world).
The Moehammadijah, both the central leadership and the Surakarta
branch, naturally regarded these attacks as intended to "bury the
Moehammadijah." Fachrodin immediately quit Islam Bergerak, and
Harsoloemekso, director of Islam Bergerak and secretary of the
Moehammadijah Surakarta branch, tried to stop Islam Bergerak edi�
tors from attacking the Moehammadijah.12 Referring to the division
of labor between the Moehammadijah central leadership and the CSI
agreed on at the May 1920 CSI executive meeting, "Koewali-KenengSibat" argued that
the Moehammadijah was a religious, educational,
and social association and that the Islam Bergerak editors' attack was
therefore misplaced. Fachrodin also categorically denied the charge
that the Moehammadijah committed haram by lending money to the
PPPB at interest.13
guilders (4,000 plus 720 guilders at 18 percent interest), to the Moehammadijah and
that the
Moehammadijah be entitled to purchase the PPPB printing firm for an additional
19,000
guilders if the PPPB could not repay the 4,720 by March 1923. H. A. Asis, "M. D.
dan
P.P.P.B.," Doenia Baroe, 16 Aug. 1922.
''Redactie, "Islam-Bergerak selaloe dalam padang kesoetjian," Islam Bergerak, 10
May
1922. See also Sjarief, "Nasihat," Islam Bergerak, 10 May 1922; Dag. Red. (atas
namanja
Soerjosasmojo), "Critiek kita kepada Hoedbestuur Moehammadijah di Djogjakarta,"
Islam
Bergerak, 20 May 1922.
12Fachrodin, "Hatoer pamit saja," Islam Bergerak, 10 May 1922. "N. B. dari Dag.
Red.,"
Islam Bergerak, 10 May 1922.
13Koewali-Keneng-Sibat, "Moehammadijah dan S.I.," Islam Bergerak, 20 Apr. 1922.
Fachrodin, "Sekedar penerangan," Doenia Baroe, 16 Aug. 1922.
Islamism and Communism 2 5 5
The disputes between Islam Bergerak and the Moehammadijah went
on from March to July 1922. Though many issues were raised and
abusive words traded, the heart of the dispute lay in the question of
whether one could be "true Islam" without putting Islam in motion in
politics and more specifically whether or not the Moehammadijah
should "move" in "politics" and whether to fight against the govern�
ment and capitalism in this age of capital and in this country colonized
by non-Muslims. Since the Moehammadijah was the only organiza�
tional base of the CSI leadership under Salim and Fachrodin, the dis�
putes drew wide attention from pergerakan newspapers and Islam
Bergerak emerged as the vanguard of the anti-Moehammadijah cru�
sade and was joined by anti-Salim/Fachrodin forces. In a series of
articles published in Sinar Hindia, "Botja Pakoealaman" produced a
new classification of Islam-Islam sama rasa sama rata (solidarity and
equality)/Islam communism, Islam capitalism, and Islam imperialism
as Islam understood by kromo, the rich, and the nobility, respective�
ly-and based on this "class analysis" of Indies Islam, argued that the
Moehammadijah was Islam capitalism, while the SI was Islam sama
rasa sama rata/Islam communism.14 Doenia Baroe, headed by Soewardi and
Soerjopranoto, also accused the Moehammadijah of deserting
the pawnshop workers' strike and, following Botja Pakoealaman,
branded it Islam capitalism. Articles were also published in Oetoesan
Hindia questioning the Moehammadijah about its lending money to
the PPPB at interest.15 Increasingly annoyed, the Moehammadijah fi�
nally resorted to a coup in early August to end the disputes. Harsoloemekso fired
Soerjosasmojo from the editorial board and demoted
Koesen to the position of adviser/special editor without power. Sismadi
Sastrosiswojo and Ahmad Dasoeki were by then in prison be14Botja Pakoealaman,
"Islam dan Gerakannja," originally published in Sinar Hindia, 8
May 1922, and then adopted in Islam Bergerak, 20 May 1922, with an extensive
commen�
tary by Respati. Botja Pakoealaman explains Islam sama rasa sama rata, Islam
capitalism,
and Islam imperialism as: "a. Kromo who get oppressed and exploited understand that
Islam
commands them to prevent oppression and exploitation by daring means risking death
and
loss. [Islam] also stipulates that all human beings are equal in standard and in
their rights and
that therefore there is no right to be master or servant (solidarity and
equality'), b. The
nobility (people who enjoy ranks) are convinced that Islam commands them to be
loyal and
obedient to whatever ordered by their master even if the world is destroyed because
of this.
Islam therefore stipulates the existence of master and servant (Imperialism), c.
People who
enjoy wealth (the rich) understand that Islam commands all human beings to seek
wealth and
that the accumulation of riches does not become obstacles as long as they pray.
Sinfulness
thus goes on. They are convinced that there must exist the poor and the rich
(Capitalism)."
See also Botja Pakaoelaman, "Sarikat Islam dan Moehammadijah," Islam Bergerak, 10
June
1922. Soerjosasmojo, "Gelanggang Islam," Islam Bergerak, 1 and 10 July 1922.
15See, for instance, Doelah Rasi, "Djaman tida keroean," Doenia Baroe, 26 July
i9ii; i
and 9 Aug. 1922. For the attacks on the Moehammadijah made in Oetoesan Hindia, see
Fachrodin, "Sekedar penerangan."
25 6 An Age in Motion
cause of their press offenses. Though Sjarief was kept on as an editor,
Islam Bergerak now was placed firmly in the hands of the Moehammadijah and abruptly
ceased its attacks on the Moehammadijah.16
When Misbach returned to Surakarta, Islam Bergerak as well as
Medan Moeslimin were thus under the control of Moehammadijah
leaders, especially Moechtar Boechari and Harsoloemekso. But the
deep schism that had developed among former SATV muballighin re�
mained. Issues raised in the disputes, above all the questions on the
Moehammadijah's position toward "politics" and what one should do
to be true Islam," remained, together with the repercussions the dis�
putes had generated among pious Muslims still concerned with the
pergerakan. From the day he returned to Surakarta, these questions
confronted Misbach. When he finally returned to the editorial board of
Medan Moeslimin and Islam Bergerak in October, he had already
made up his mind about what he should do as "true Islam" and what
position he should take toward the Moehammadijah and "politics." In
the October 15 issue of Medan Moeslimin, in which he returned to its
editorial board, he wrote his first article since his return, "Assalamoe'alaikoem
Waroeh matoe'Lohi wa-barekatoeh":
Brothers and readers of MM [Medan Moeslimin], above all brother Mus�
lims! Know this! I have been separated from my beloved MM and IB
[Islam Bergerak] for two years and three months. I really regret this very
much. I need not explain the reasons, for you readers already know them
very well. Although I served such a long sentence, and although imprison�
ment is seen by the public as a hardship and ruinous for one's self, and
one's wife and children, to my way of thinking it is nothing. The opposite
is also true. Happiness and enjoyment of life in this world are also nothing. Human
beings who live in this world-if they indeed feel that they
have been commanded by God to become human beings and they do not
lose the feeling of humanity-especially those who call themselves moekmin [the
faithful] and Islam, must willingly put truth and courage into
practice. This stance I strongly affirm, because I observe it deriving from
the meaning of the verses of the Koran. I am convinced that what can be
regarded as a safe way of life for human beings who live in this world
until the world hereafter is a way whereby we do not stray from the path
of goodness, truth, and justice, pursued with freedom of thought and also
with the courage to make sacrifices of deeds, thoughts, possessions, and
even life. All the more is this so for writers and leaders of Islam. They
must dare to express their thoughts at meetings and in newspapers on the
basis of verses from the Koran. Yet the verses they explain are in many
cases intended only for show. The evidence is that [these people] are not
prepared to carry them out. Therefore the character of their claim to be
Islam Bergerak, i Aug. 1922. Soerjosasmojo then joined Tjokroaminoto in Kedungjati.
See also the editors note in Islam Bergerak, 20 Aug. 1922.
Islamism and Communism 2-57
moekmin and Islam is merely like the character of the moenafik [hypo�
crites]. Such is my explanation. I hope, brothers, that you who claim to
be moekmin and Islam, above all the leaders of Islam, will pay attention
to my explanation above. Beware, brothers, beware! If there is one who
calls himself a moekmin and Islam, especially a leader, but who yet has
the character of a moenafik, don't be startled, he will certainly get a kick
from me.17
As the title "Assalamoe'alaikoem [Peace be unto you]" suggests, this
article is Misbach's greeting to the reader of Medan Moeslimin and
marks his return to the forum of Muslims. "I" send this greeting, and if
the reader returns his greeting by saying "Alaikoem salam" in his
mind, "I" and the reader become "we." Misbach essentially says two
things to this "we." First, he repeatedly says, "It is nothing." His
imprisonment is nothing. His, his wife's, and his children's sufferings
are nothing. And happiness and enjoyment of life in this world is
nothing either. This repeated "It is nothing" has the same structure as
his earlier slogan: "Don't be afraid." By saying "Don't be afraid," he
said, "Be afraid of Allah." In the same way by saying "It is nothing,"
he says nothing matters but God's command-be human beings and
do not lose the feeling of humanity. Second, as he once wrote in "Our
Appeal," he again draws a sharp line between mukmin (the faithful),
who sacrifice everything-which is nothing-for God's command, and
munafik (hypocrites), who claim to be mukmin and Islam but use Islam
only for show. Substantially this distinction between mukmin and
munafik is the same as the distinction Misbach once made: Islam sejati
(true Islam) and Islam lamisan (pseudo-Islam). Only his language is
harsher and he now declares that he will "kick" (tendang) them.
In "Assalamoe'alaikoem," his greeting to the reader of Medan
Moeslimin, he did not explain what he meant by mukmin and munafik
except in the most general terms and did not reveal who he saw as
munafik. But in fact, as we will see soon, it was the Moehammadijah,
led and represented by such former allies as K. H. Dahlan and H.
Fachrodin of the central leadership and Sastrosoegondo, Harsoloemekso, and Moechtar
Boechari of the Surakarta branch, which Misbach
had in mind when talking about munafik. Therefore, what he meant by
munafik was not, as he once wrote in "Our Appeal," simply those
wealthy Muslims "who do not like to contribute their wealth to the
strengthening of our Islamness" and "those who are clever and knowl�
edgeable about Islam" who "do not care to spread their learning to
those who are still in darkness," because no one could deny that people
of the Moehammadijah were contributing wealth and knowledge to
17H. M. Misbach, "Assalamoe'alaikoem Waroeh matoe'Lohi wa-barekatoeh," Medan
Moeslimin 20 (1922), p. 700.
258 An Age in Motion
"advance Islam." Rather, Misbach's idea of mukmin and munafik was
his answer to the questions of what "true Islam" should do and what
attitude Indies Muslims should take toward "politics" and to the pergerakan in this
age of capital and in the Indies colonized by nonMuslims. In "Front of Islam in
motion: Our attitude," he explains:
Our IB [Islam Bergerak] has repeatedly explained what attitude we, the
people of the Indies, above all the Muslims who live in the Indies, should
take as to the steps and actions needed to pursue the general welfare,
which also means to live together as Allah wills in the Koran.
Let me explain my viewpoint here, so that you, respected readers, can
judge! And in the end we can then get deep understanding and enjoy its
fruits.
First of all, we should know what is the fate of a colonized people, as
here in this Indies. A colonized people may be understood as an enslaved
people. All the rules work as their masters please, no matter whether
[these masters] are Buddhists, Christians, Muslims, or others. Although
many of the rules do not accord with the people's desires, or are in
conflict with the intent of their religion, the people are compelled and
even [morally] obliged to embrace them. It is this that makes us think
deeper. . . .
Above I explained what the fate of a colonized people is like. One
could say that it is like a bird in a cage, a cage that is also shackled with
various chains that are so strong. Certainly, then, its freedom-of-life is
destroyed if it is unable to gain freedom from all these chains.
Destruction of the people's freedom also means destruction of Faith in
Allah ta'ala [to Whom be honor], unless they are determined and assem�
ble their strength to prevent all these social chains. Because: first, living
together is disturbed; second, they are no longer free to perform Allah's
commands, which are written down in the Koran, if they want to practice
these commands; and third, they are compelled to obey many commands
that do not accord with or are in conflict with the intent of the Koran.
Living together means that there are no differences in the rights of
human beings, and that only God is higher. For if there are some whose
rights are higher than those of their fellow human beings, certainly there
will be human beings whose rights are lower. This goes on and on till in
the end the world is in chaos. Here I only take up the main points of the
greed of capitalism and imperialism, for it is they who make use of tricks
by the methods of slander [fitnah], oppression, exploitation, and so on.
In view of what has been mentioned above, can the Muslims in these
Indies carry out the true will of Islam, if our freedom is still shackled
within the grip of capital or by the power of slander, and if they [sic] do
not assemble their strength to free themselves from the above causes?
Guess, hey, you readers!
The religion of Islam flourishes in the Indies. The fragrance of the
religion of Islam wafts all over the Indies. So says a person who is simply
intoxicated with words. Thus the association of the white capitalists, the
Islamism and Communism 2-59
PEB [Politiek Economische Bond], feels it necessary to establish an Is�
lamic association called Djamiat'oel Chasanah; and the Javanese capital�
ists are called the Moehammadijah (MD). The steps and actions taken by
these two associations are not different. What they stress is spreading the
religion of Islam without waging war against slander, even though those
who are oppressed remain oppressed and those who oppress continue to
oppress. They do not care, as long as they spread the religion. In fact, as
repeatedly reported here in the IB, there are even those who become
rentiers.18
We can perhaps best understand this article if we visually imagine
what Misbach says. As he wrote in "Assalamoe'alaikoem," he takes
"the general welfare" or "living together peacefully" as central to
God's command conveyed by the Prophet Muhammad and written
down in the Koran and makes this the point of departure and of
destination to explain "our" attitude-Misbach's attitude, the attitude
of Misbach and the reader, and the attitude of Indies Muslims. Here,
"we" are listening to God's voice, commanding "us" to "live together
peacefully." But in what situation are "we" the "colonized people in
the Indies"? Misbach takes great pains to explain this "lot," invoking a
series of images: "enslaved people," "a bird in a cage," "shackled with
various chains that are so strong." The key to these images is "chains"
that shackle "us" and deprive "us" of freedom to obey God's com�
mand and to follow His messenger the Prophet Muhammad. Why are
"we" chained? What are the "chains"? And who chains "us"? It is
"capitalism and imperialism" that chain "us." And "we" are chained
because "capitalism and imperialism" make use of "tricks by the meth�
ods of slander, oppression, exploitation, and so on." It is the au�
thorities, especially the police, who "oppress," and capitalists who
"exploit." The authorities and capitalists are therefore clearly "our"
enemies. But what about "slander"? Fitnah commonly means "slander,
calumny, and libel" in Indonesian/Malay. In Islam, however, the basic
idea of fitnah is that of temptation, permitted or sent by God to test the
believer's faith, which for the man wedded to his desires would have
the appearance of an invitation to abandon the faith. Fitnah, therefore,
has the sense of both temptation and a trial of faith. But fitnah is not a
matter of an inner secret temptation but of external circumstances.19
He who makes fitnah is therefore attempting to distance Muslims from
Allah and he who fights fitnah is proving his faith as mukmin. What is
fitnah and who makes fitnah here and now in the Indies? In Misbach's
view, it is "the greed of capitalism and imperialism" that is fitnah,
because "the greed" distances Muslims from God. In this sense, fitnah
18H. M. Misbach, "Pebarisan Islam Bergerak: Sikap kita," Islam Bergerak, 20 Nov.
1912.
19"Fitnah," Encyclopaedia of Islam, vol. 2, pp. 930-931.
z6o An Age in Motion
is the essence of "capitalism and imperialism," and to live in this world
of capital is indeed a whole series of trials to prove "our" faith. Mis�
bach's idea of munafik comes in this context. Munafik are those who
confess mukmin and Islam but do not fight against fitnah, capitalism
and imperialism. The Moehammadijah is munafik in this sense.
Munafik are dangerous, Misbach would say more dangerous than the
authorities and capitalists, who are clearly "our" enemies, because
munafik deceive "us" so as not to fight against "capitalism and imperi�
alism." What is the identity of "capitalism and imperialism," then?
Misbach says, "Guess!" for "we" can see through the whole complex
scheme as Misbach does only if we "guess" with independent thought.
And indeed it is not difficult to guess. It is Satan. And in "Moekmin
and Moenafik," which Misbach wrote right after "Front of Islam in
motion: Our attitude," he underlines the correctness of "our" guess.
He quotes from the Koran: "Hey, all the moekmin. Enter the religion
of Islam. Don't follow the way of Satan, because Satan is clearly your
enemy."20
Returning to Medan Moeslimin and Islam Bergerak in the middle of
October, Misbach immediately took two measures to "kick" munafik.
First, Medan Moeslimin and Islam Bergerak decided not to send dele�
gates to the A1 Islam congress convened by Tjokroaminoto and Salim
in Cirebon and attacked the congress as a second TKNM.21 Second,
Misbach sent a letter to the staff of Medan Moeslimin and Islam Ber�
gerak and asked if they were ready to sacrifice everything to fight
against fitnah. In response, all the Moehammadijah members (Harsoloemekso, Moechtar
Boechari, K. H. Dahlan, H. Fachrodin, and H.
Soedjak) resigned. Instead, Misbach, who now became director, was
joined by Sjarief as administrator, Haroenrasjid as editor of Medan
Moeslimin, and Sismadi Sastrosiswojo, Ahmad Dasoeki, Koesen, and
Ks. Digdo of Madiun as editors of Islam Bergerak.22 The resignation of
Moehammadijah members from Medan Moeslimin and Islam
Bergerak marked Misbach's split with the Moehammadijah. As his
SATV had once been a splinter group from the Surakartan Islamic
kaum muda, Misbach's group once again formed a splinter group of
politically committed pious Muslim pergerakan activists from the
20M. Misbach, "Moekmin dan Moenafik," Islam Bergerak, 20 Dec. 1922. See also H.A.H.
Rangkuty, "Islamisme dan Communisme di Hindia," Doenia Baroe, zS Feb. 1923; 14 and
21 Mar. 1923, which is an extensive commentary on Misbach's argument.
21 "A1 Islam Congres," Medan Moeslimin 21 (1922), pp. 718-724. S. H., "A1 Islam
Congres," Islam Bergerak, 20 Nov. 1922.
22Misbach, "Pebarisan Islam Bergerak: Pembatja kita," Islam Bergerak, 10 Nov. 1922;
"Medja Redactie," Islam Bergerak, 10 Nov. 1922. See also Medan Moeslimin 23 (1922),
pp.
740-741; S. H., "Pebarisan Islam Bergerak: Makin terasa," Islam Bergerak, 20 Dec.
1922;
H. M. Misbach, Sjarief, Haroenrasjid, "Kesalahan itoe haroes dibenarkan," Medan
Moesli�
min 2 (1923), p. 29.
Islamism and Communism 261
Moehammadijah. They did not see themselves as a splinter group but
as the true Moehammadijah. Announcing his return to Islam Bergerak,
Ahmad Dasoeki wrote, "Actually I cannot but be a Moehammadijah
and I feel it as my obligation to be a true Moehammadijah, not the
party of H. Dahlan and Harsoloemekso."23 Misbach, commenting on
K. H. Dahlan's resignation from Medan Moeslimin, said:
Now you readers can think [this out] for yourselves. It is quite clear that
H. A. Dahlan [note: Misbach deliberately drops the title K(yai) from in
front of Dahlan's name] and the attitude of the Moehammadijah at the
present time is to cast away the IMAM [guidance, leadership] of the
Koran. It is also possible that H. A. Dahlan blames the attitude of the
Lord Prophet Moehammad, since the Lord Prophet did not care to lick
the boots of the idolaters in Mecca, and brought much suffering to his
wife, his children, and to many others by fleeing from Mecca to Medi�
na.24
Moehammadijah means followers of Muhammad. In the age of capi�
tal, the only way to follow Muhammad and to be Moehammadijah
was, in Misbach's view, to fight against capitalism.
Misbach's split with the Moehammadijah, however, did not imme�
diately mean his break with Tjokroaminoto and the CSI. From Novem�
ber 1922 to January 1923, he still attended and spoke at local SI rallies,
opposing party discipline, urging the maintenance of the unity of the
SI, and arguing that communism was in the principle of Islam and that
there was nothing wrong with PKI neutrality toward religion because it
meant that communists did not use Islam as a "mask."2> But the CSI
Madiun congress destroyed his hope for SI unity in its fight against
fitnah, "capitalism and imperialism." Like so many pergerakan activ�
ists who had not been committed either to the CSI/PS1 or to the PKI,
Misbach had to decide which side he should choose. He made his
decision clear by appearing as a PKI/Red SI propagandist at the con�
gress of the PKI and Red Sis held in Bandung and Sukabumi in early
March 1923. Datoek Toemenggoeng Landjoemin, once a colleague of
Salim at Neratja in the late 1910s, then an official attached to the office
of the adviser for native affairs, and soon to become instrumental in
banishing H. Batoeah and Natar Zainuddin, Communist leaders in
23Ahmad Dasoeki, "Pebarisan Islam Bergerak: Kepada Moehammadijah," Islam
Bergerak, io Jan. 1923. Also see Dasoeki's letter dated 15 Nov. 1922, published in
Islam
Bergerak, 10 Nov. 1922. M. Misbach, "Verslag," Medan Moeslimin 24 (1922), pp. 761-
762; N. N., "Moehammadijah dan Regeering," Islam Bergerak, 20 Dec. 1922.
24Misbach, "Verslag," Medan Moeslimin 24 (1922), p. 761.
25See his speech at the Pekalongan SI rally on December 23-24, 1922. "Verslag
pendek
dari openbare openlucht vergadering Sl-Pekalongan pada tanggal 23-24 December
1922,"
Islam Bergerak, 1 Jan. 1923.
262 An Age in Motion
West Sumatra, as an agent of the Algemeene Recherchedienst, reports
on Misbach at the congress:26
To prolonged applause Hadji Mohammad Misbach then climbed to
podium.
The speaker began by introducing himself: I am not a Hadji, but
[merely] Mohammad Misbach, a Javanese, who has fulfilled his duty as a
Muslim by making the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina.
The speaker, basing himself on the Koran, made an argument for
several points of agreement between the teachings of the Koran and those
of communism. For example, the Koran declares that it is the duty of
every Muslim to acknowledge the rights of human beings, and this point
also appears in the principles of the communists' program.
Furthermore, it is God's command that [we] fight against oppression
and exploitation. This is also one of communism's objectives.
Thus it is correct to say that he who cannot accept the principles of
communism is no true Muslim. And this is why the Almighty strongly
condemns the ibadat [observance of religious duties] and the salat [the
five daily prayers] of the PEB: for every believer is duty-bound to stamp
out oppression, suppression, and exploitation, and this is just what the
religious section of the PEB neglects.
Communism tolerates no discrimination between ranks and races, and
likewise condemns the existence of classes in society. Its slogan is: sama
rata, sama rasa [equality, solidarity]!
Misbach then starts to attack Tjokroaminoto.
It is deeply regrettable that the SI, which was intended to be a mass
association, has created division and schism in the popular movement,
because of the introduction of party discipline. . . . The speaker had once
talked with Tjokroaminoto in the train, asking him how he got the idea
of introducing party discipline. Tjokroaminoto answered that it was the
wish of the local Sis. To the speaker this seemed highly implausible. He
thus expressed his surprise, whereupon Tjokroaminoto said that [actual�
ly] the introduction of party discipline was purely his own will. (A shout
from the audience: "Tjokro wants to be King! Where's the money of
Tjokro's SI gone?"
When the speaker explained that it [party discipline] was in conflict
with the teachings of Islam, Tjokro replied that he had taken this action
because of the dangerous campaign Darsono had launched against him.
Thus one can see, honored brothers, said Hadji Misbach, how person�
al quarrels endanger an association ....
What is also very strange is that the CSI is in collusion with the
Mohammadijah. What have we seen occurring? When Darsono began his
public campaign against the financial policies of the CSI, its headquarters
had to be moved with the greatest speed from Surabaya to Yogyakarta.
26Uittreksel, Mr. 283X/23.
Islamism and Communism 263
And what caused great surprise was the fact that when the audit was
done the necessary money was found in the Si's account. People muttered
that it had come from the treasury of the Moehammadijah. Now, we all
know that the Moehammadijah is a capitalist association and is deeply
under the influence of capital. It does not concern itself with politics.
Now, an association that does not take a stand against capitalism is
naturally supported by capital. Such is also the case with the religious
section of the PEB.
It seems that it is now the fashion for everyone to call themselves a
Muslim, even if they do not fulfill the obligations that Islam imposes. One
even finds all over the place [establishments called] "Islamic hotel," "Is�
lamic shop," and so on. In this way people are abusing the name of Islam
simply in order to enrich themselves.
Misbach's speech, which was in Malay, was translated into Sundanese
by Mohammad Sanoesi. When he attacked Tjokroaminoto, there was
a commotion in the audience. Many demanded to speak. As is often
told, sometimes as if it were the only event worth mentioning Mis�
bach's name, Soekarno climbed to the podium at this moment. Landjoemin reports:
[Soekarno complained that] the speaker had made a violent attack on
someone who was not present at the Congress. Such behavior is unthink�
able from a true Muslim, who ought to be honorable and honest. Had the
attack been made on the policies of Tjokroaminoto as leader of a great
popular movement, then the speaker would not have asked to speak.
Here, however, was a personal attack and a casting of aspersions on
someone who was not even present at the meeting. The speaker asks
Hadji Misbach and Sanoesi directly whether such behavior is in accord
with the dignity of a ksatrya? (Prolonged applause resounded as the
speaker left the podium.)
Hadji Misbach said he had felt compelled to expose Tjokroaminoto's
attitude to the public, yet he had no intention of being offensive or
hurting his feelings. If any such impression had been given, then he owed
the Congress his apologies.
Undoubtedly Soekarno understood Misbach's attack on Tjokroami�
noto as basically the same in nature as Darsono's attack. That was the
reason he asked Misbach whether his attack was "in accord with the
dignity of a ksatrya" and Misbach apologized for whatever wrong
impressions his attack unintentionally caused to the congress. But in
two respects, Soekarno's understanding was superficial. First, Mis�
bach, unlike Darsono, did not attack Tjokroaminoto for his unsatrianess. Nor for
that matter was his attack primarily intended to expose
his "pseudo-Islamness," though it was certainly a part of it. Flis attack
was, rather, aimed at exposing the link that connected
Tjokroaminoto's attitude, the introduction of party discipline and the
264 An Age in Motion
organization of the PSI, and the CSI's being in collusion with the
Moehammadijah. Second, to this aim, an attack on Tjokroaminoto
was, as Misbach himself said, "compelled," inevitable, for the connect�
ing link Misbach intended to expose was, like Darsono's attack on
Tjokroaminoto, money, and Misbach had to demonstrate how money
worked on Tjokroaminoto. We can understand these points more
clearly by looking at Misbach's more violent attack on Tjokroaminoto
in his article "Magic Lamp: Party Discipline of Tjokroaminoto's SI
Becomes Poison of the Indies People's Movement." He writes:
I and other people know very well that Tjokroaminoto is responsible for
introducing Party Discipline into the SI. I charge that this introduction of
PD is poison for the pergerakan of the ra'jat [people], because
Tjokroaminoto instituted the rule of Party discipline in the SI simply as a
profit-making business for himself and his household. He treats the
whole Bestuur [executive/management] as his personal property. He feels
he has great influence, and thereby can easily extract money from the
various Locals for his own needs and those of his household. . . .
That was the reason why brother Darsono, unable to restrain his
feelings any longer, attacked Tjokroaminoto about the management of
CSI money. Tjokroaminoto then created an organization to maintain the
SI as his kingdom by means of slandering Communism.
Because brother Darsono unmasked him, Tjokroaminoto exploits the
name of Islam to keep out and to kick out the Communists. That is why
he went so far as to fawn on the Moehammadijah in Yogya [karta]. All of
a sudden the CSI was moved to Yogya, and immediately went into action
by instituting Party Discipline-which I regard as poison to the per�
gerakan of the people.
After Tjokroaminoto got out of prison, I met regularly with him at his
house (Kedungjati) and at rallies. It was clear to me what he wanted: all
his activities since he got out of prison had been to make money-to
satisfy the desires and ambitions of his ex-tandak [professional enter�
tainer] wife.
Tjokroaminoto's intention is to use Party Discipline to prevent other
parties from entering his SI and thereby possibly blocking his [private]
goals. I regard the SI as merely a means to rum and fleece all the mem�
bers. I do not need to go into any further details. But readers, especially
those who have already been ensnared and bound inside the fences of the
PSI, above all the PSI locals, will certainly feel this for themselves. . . .
I call Tjokro's SI party discipline poison for the pergerakan of the
people because: (a) The People in Tjokro's SI will be trapped into the
PEB. (b) The People in Tjokro's SI will have their money manipulated.27
There are a number of factual mistakes in Misbach's accusation against
Tjokroaminoto. For instance, it was not really Tjokroaminoto but
27H. M. Misbach, "Semprong Wasiat: Partij Discipline S.I. Tjokroaminoto Mendjadi
Ratjoen Pergerakan Ra'jat Hindia," Medan Moeslimin 9 (1923), pp. 156-157, 175-176.
Islamism and Communism 265
Salim and Soerjopranoto who were the driving force in introducing
party discipline in the CSI. Nor for that matter did Darsono attack
Tjokroaminoto because he was "unable to restrain his feelings any
longer," but to prevent Salim and Soerjopranoto from convening the
1920 CSI congress and introducing party discipline. But these were
things of the past which Misbach himself did not personally experience
and therefore did not really matter to him. Misbach carried the revolu�
tionary elan he had breathed in 1919-20 to the age of reaction and
parties. The point Misbach tried to make in this article was, as the title
"Magic Lamp" suggests, to illuminate the working of money: that
"Tjokroaminoto's faith is in money"28 and that money led him to
introduce party discipline and organize the PSI and to ally the PSI/CSI
with the Moehammadijah. Tjokroaminoto's SI party discipline was
"poison" for the pergerakan, because it was money that excreted poi�
son and guided human beings astray. In this sense, Misbach conceived
money in a very similar way as Darsono, who talked about the tempta�
tion of and the greed for money which corroded Tjokroaminoto. But
while Darsono was content with his expose of the corroding influence
of money on Tjokroaminoto, Misbach, who identified "capitalism and
imperialism" with Satan, went further. He saw in money Satan's
"tricks" to trap human beings and to distance them from Allah. Thus
he wrote: "At the time when our father the Prophet Adam (on whom
be peace) was [still] in paradise, Satan deceived him and brought about
his downfall by pretending to be conveying God's command. To�
day . . . O. S. Tjokroaminoto will deceive Adam's children by pretend�
ing to be a leader active in the Islamic way."29
Released from prison and returning to the pergerakan in the age of
parties, Misbach thus took the side of the PKI/Red SI and against the
PSI/CSI. Yet he was essentially unchanged. He was concerned with
obeying God's command, following the example set by the Prophet
Muhammad, and proving his true Islamness. To fight against "capital�
ism and imperialism" was in his view identical to fighting against Satan
and proving his faith to Allah. The difference lay in the fact that
whereas he had once acted out "Don't be afraid" in riding waves of
peasant strikes and in depriving the state of its awesomeness by invok�
ing the fear of death, he now "put Islam in motion" against the
Moehammadijah, Tjokroaminoto, and the PSI/CSI. This was neces�
sary, Misbach would say, because the times had changed and now the
Moehammadijah, Tjokroaminoto, and the PSI/CSI were deceiving
people, above all Muslims, in the Indies. But the age of parties was also
the age of reaction. The majority of those who remained active in the
pergerakan joined the PKI/Red Sis because they were eager to take
2SH. M. Misbach, "Islam dan Gerakan," Medan Moeslimin 9 (1923), p. 24
29lbid., pp. 243-244. For more on "Satan's temptation," see "Sja'ir zaman oewang,"
Doenia Baroe, 3 Jan. 1922, and Semaoen, Hikajat Kadiroett, pp. 88-89.
266 An Age in Motion
revenge against "capital." Misbach's words and deeds were seen and
read in the context of the party rivalry between the PKI/Red SI and the
PSI/CSI, and in the context of taking revenge against "capital."
Solo in the Age of Reaction
Misbach's emergence as a PKI/Red SI propagandist at the congress
of the PKI and Red Sis in early March 1923 marked his return to the
pergerakan. This did not mean that the pergerakan in Surakarta started
to regenerate under his leadership. In fact, though Misbach "repre�
sented" the PKI Surakarta branch at the congress, he was perhaps the
only PKI member there. As Resident van der Marel later recalled,
Surakarta was "calm."30 It was so because there were, and the resident
made sure there would be, no meetings, no rallies, and no strikes.
Shortly after Misbach emerged as a PKI/Red SI propagandist, the resi�
dent invited him to his office for a second time. He again gave Misbach
his advice "not to move in the field of politics." This time, however,
Misbach made his attitude clear. He answered that he "cannot get out
of the political movement because people who are weak and afraid
keep silent when oppressed and exploited." Therefore, he continued,
"in view of people's sufferings he will go on mobilizing people and
helping them as he should." To this answer, van der Marel frankly
conceded that no one could be prevented from entering the political
movement but also made clear that he would not grant Misbach per�
mission to hold rallies and meetings.31 Police surveillance on Misbach
and his house-which served as the office of Medan Moeslimin and
Islam Bergerak-was reinforced. Misbach was now watched by two
detectives in a team working day and night, who followed him wherev�
er he went, noted down whomever he met, and questioned those who
frequented his house. Police raids were carried out casually for harass�
ment. In May when the VSTP went on strike, for instance, not only was
Misbach directly warned by the resident not to "meddle" in the strike
but also his house was raided on three consecutive days by the police to
look for VSTP propagandists who reportedly came from Madiun to
lead railway workers on strike.32
Prohibited from organizing rallies and meetings and closely watched
and harassed by the police, there was little room for Misbach to
"move" except for writing articles in Medan Moeslimin and Islam
Bergerak and his occasional propaganda tours outside the residency
of Surakarta. In Medan Moeslimin and Islam Bergerak, Misbach
30Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 29 Oct. 1923, Mr. 1052X/23, Vb. 30 Apr. 1924, No.
4.
31"Saudara H. M. Misbach dan Resident Solo," Medan Moeslimin 9 (1923), p. 219.
32"Boekan di tangkap, tjoema di panggil," Medan Moeslimin 9 (1923), p. 158.
Islamism and Communism 267
launched violent attacks on the Moehammadijah and Tjokroaminoto.
Hardest hit was the Moehammadijah. Many members of the Moeham�
madijah Surakarta branch, in whose eyes Misbach's credentials as
"true Islam" were undeniable, fell into confusion, and though only a
few actually changed sides and joined Misbach, many sank into in�
activity and some even accused Harsoloemekso of being a "fanatic" to
the Moehammadijah cause.33 The plan to establish a Surakarta SI/PSI
branch also fizzled. Shortly after the Madiun CSI congress, Parikrangkoengan and
several other Moehammadijah leaders, together
with former BO members among Kasunanan officials, formed a provi�
sional committee to establish the Surakarta SI. Confronted with Mis�
bach's attack, however, the majority of the committee members simply
stopped their activities, two leading members changed sides and joined
Misbach, and the SI/PSI Surakarta branch never got off the ground.34
Misbach also made himself felt at the Moehammadijah congress held
in Yogyakarta in April 1923. There he proposed that the Moeham�
madijah change its name to the Perserikatan Ra'jat (People's Associa�
tion) or the Perserikatan Manoesia (Association of Human Beings).
This was not, however, what Misbach primarily intended. As he
certainly expected, the Moehammadijah central committee simply
shelved his proposal, saying that it was not on the agenda of the
congress. But Misbach made his point very clearly. As Gobee reports,
"Although Hadji Misbach was supported only by a few followers and
the audience hostile to him tried to stop his speech and to jeer him off
the stage at one point, he finished his speech with remarkable skill and
completely unmoved by the voice hostile to him. . . . That he always
demonstrated himself to be a soldier of Islam undoubtedly influenced
the attitude of the central committee attacked by Hadji Misbach."35
He was "a soldier of Islam" fighting against munafik, and he proved it
in his very actions. But all the attacks he made on the Moehammadijah
did not help Misbach persuade Moehammadijah members to join him,
and even though it may have confused many, it also hardened the
33See, for instance, Sewoekampoeng, "Satoe kali lagi, `Apakah dia bilang roegi?'"
Medan
Moeslimin 9 (1923), pp. 45-47, which was written by a member of the Moehammadijah
Surakarta branch in response to Harsoloemekso's "Djawaban," Medan Moeslimin 9
(1923),
pp. 31-32-
34The provisional committee of the Surakarta SI/PSI branch was formed at the
propaganda
rally held at H. Oemar's house in Kauman on February 18, 1923, with chairman
Wiromardjojo, vice-chairman Djiwopradoto, first secretary Parikrangkoengan, second
secretary Djojosentono, first treasurer H. Oemar, and second treasurer Samsoeri.
But Oemar and Samsoeri
soon quit the Moehammadijah and joined the Surakarta SR when it was formed by
Misbach
in October 1923. Doenia Baroe, 21 Mar. 1923.
35Verslag der jaarvergadering van de vereeniging Moehammadijah van 28 Maart-i April
1924, Mr. 644X/24. Gobee wrote on Misbach at the 1923 Moehammadijah congress to
demonstrate Marco's ineffectiveness in his attack on the Moehammadijah at the 1924
con�
gress.
268 An Age in Motion
attitude of committed Moehammadijah members and deepened their
antagonism toward him. As Misbach told Marco at about that time,
"many friends left."36 And whatever attacks he made on the Moeham�
madijah and Tjokroaminoto, this did not bother the authorities. Sur�
akarta remained "calm."
This "calmness," however, started to disappear in June 1923. It was
not that Misbach started to organize rallies and meetings. With him
under surveillance, the police could easily prevent such moves. It was
rather rumors, words that move freely from one mouth to another
while transforming themselves wildly, that started to undermine
"calmness." After the defeat of the VSTP strike in May, many dis�
missed VSTP activists and railway workers became unpaid or lowly
paid PKI/Red SI propagandists in their workplaces or in their birth�
places. Not a few of them moved into Surakarta, the city located in the
middle of the three former VSTP strike centers of Semarang, Madiun,
and Yogyakarta. And among them, there were not a few who were
eager to take revenge and were prone to sabotage and terrorist actions
because of their embitterment with their dismissal and the high-handed
government suppression of the strike. Their actions generated rumors.
In the middle of June two attempts were made to derail trains in
Surakarta. Then on June 20 a bomb was thrown at a train from Poerwosari to
Wonogiri. The police were convinced that these acts were
committed by dismissed railway workers, but they could not solve the
cases. The first bomb ever thrown in Surakarta in the age of pergerakan further
generated rumors, as did the very inability of the police
to resolve the case. One rumor predicted that a railroad line would be
hit next, another that an electric line would be cut. And according to
yet another rumor, the next bomb would be thrown at the sunan. Such
wild speculation reminded Kasunanan princes and officials of the days
of Tjipto's anti-vorsten campaign. The Narpowandojo formed "the
committee of anti-Communist activities" and, though the resident did
not buy the story, informed him that Misbach was behind all these
cases.37
Misbach established the PKI Surakarta branch in the midst of these
wild rumors. Sometime in June Misbach, together with Moetokalimoen, Partoatmodjo,
Sastropanitro, Sandjojo, Soewarno, Sjarief, Hardjodiwongso, and perhaps a few
others, established the PKI Surakarta
branch. Partoatmodjo (former first secretary of the Semarang PPKB
committee and VSTP propagandist), and Sandjojo (an employee of a
Dutch commercial firm in Semarang) came to Surakarta from Se36Marco Kartodikromo,
"Korban Pergerakan Rajat: H. M. Misbach," Hidoep, Sept.
I9M3 Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 29 Oct. 1923, Mr. 1052X/23, Vb. 30 Apr. 1924,
No. 4.
Islamism and Communism 269
marang in the wake of the VSTP strike.38 Sastropanitro, former Delanggu PFB and SH
leader, came back to Surakarta from Yogyakarta
and soon moved to Sribit (district Ponggok, regency of Klaten) to carry
out propaganda activities for the PKI. Soewarno, a construction con�
tractor in Kauman, and Sjarief, administrator of Medan Moeslimin and
Islam Bergerak, were former SATV members and Hardjodiwongso, a
batik worker in Lawean, was a former SH member. No announcement
was made about the establishment of the PKI Surakarta branch and its
membership was kept secret. But two of Misbach's moves revealed its
existence. First, together with the establishment of the PKI Surakarta
branch, Islam Bergerak was made its formal organ in June and accord�
ingly there was a major reshuffling of its editorial board. "As a party
decision," Misbach resigned as an editor "to devote himself to propa�
ganda activities as a PKI/Red SI propagandist." Sandjojo, a twentyyear-old
"Semaranger," became editor-in-chief. Misbach's longtime al�
lies Ahmad Dasoeki, Koesen, and Ks. Digdo were dismissed because
they were not PKI members. Instead, Soerat Hardjomartojo (chairman
of the PKI Yogyakarta branch), Boedisoetjitro (member of the PKI
standing committee), and Partoatmodjo were appointed editors of Is�
lam Bergerak, together with Sismadi Sastrosiswojo, who was by then a
member of the PKI Yogyakarta branch. Though this "party decision"
was reportedly made on Sandjojo's insistence, it was also in line with
the desire of the PKI standing committee to impose its will on the
Surakarta branch through trusted "Semarangers." Initially Misbach
acquiesced, but he soon asserted himself. After two issues of Islam
Bergerak had been published, Sandjojo was dismissed by Misbach be�
cause of his "ineptitude as editor-in-chief" and replaced by Partoat�
modjo.39 Second, Misbach and Partoatmodjo also established the In�
formation Office (Informatie Kantoor) Bale Tanjo in June. This was
modeled after the Soera Dipa Information Office in Semarang run by
the Semarang SI and was meant to supply all sorts of information to
people and to give legal aid to those involved in both civil and criminal
cases. The Information Office Bale Tanjo also made nurses available to
the needy and opened courses on bookkeeping in Javanese and Malay.
38Partoatmodjo first emerged as a pergerakan activist in 1920 when he was elected
first
secretary of the Semarang regional committee of the PPKB. He was then appointed
consul in
charge of the residency of Semarang at the 1921 PFB congress and became a leading
figure in
an attempt to revive the PFB under the leadership of Soedibio and Ngadino.
Moetokalimoen,
born in about 1894 in Kampung Kidul, Surakarta, and educated at the second-class
native
school in Kepatihan, joined the pergerakan in Semarang as a VSTP propagandist in
1919 or
1920 after being a railway worker in Malang and Semarang. In 1920 he was elected
second
secretary of the Semarang regional committee of the PPKB. Sandjojo (born 1903) was
a
graduate of a technical school and, after working at Algemeene Distributie
Maatschappij in
Semarang, started his journalism career as an editor of Tjipto's Sapoe D/agaii,
published in
Badung.
Islam Bergerak, 20 June 1923. Islam Bergerak (special issue), IPO, ^5 (192?).
270 An Age in Motion
The office was set up at Misbach's house and Misbach became direc�
tor. Under him, Partoatmodjo ran the office on daily basis.40 It became
a major meeting place of pergerakan activists and dismissed VSTP and
other trade union activists, and as such was frequently visited by detec�
tives and informers. Some pergerakan activists joined the office staff,
and perhaps also some police spies.
Yet the emergence of the PKI Surakarta branch, indicated by the
transformation of Islam Bergerak into a PKI organ and the establish�
ment of the Information Office, in no sense led to the regeneration of
the pergerakan in Surakarta. The very presence of the "secret" PKI
branch and the observable fact that something was going on at Mis�
bach's house and that it was being watched by the police generated and
fed rumors and undermined calmness. But the Algemeene Recherchedienst located all
the PKI members in Surakarta-less than thirty-and
placed all of them under surveillance, each one followed day and night
by two detectives. The resident thus literally knew where they were and
whom they met, if not what they discussed "privately," as long as they
were in Surakarta. The surveillance was so thorough and the harass�
ment of PKI activities so complete that people simply stayed away from
Misbach and other PKI members. Those PKI members who were still
engaged in business-for instance, construction contractor Soewarno-were forced out
of business, and some students of the Normaalschool who frequented Misbach's house
were expelled from the
school.41
Under these circumstances, Misbach put more of his efforts into
propaganda activities outside the residency of Surakarta, leaving the
publication of Islam Bergerak and the running of the Information
Office to Partoatmodjo. Here Misbach was much more successful. He
made propaganda tours to Nganjuk, Madiun, Magelang, Yogyakarta,
Kebumen, and many other places in the Vorstenlanden and vicinity.42
In these places there were many dismissed VSTP and other trade union
activists and members, unemployed, embittered over their dismissal
and the government suppression of strikes, and eager to take revenge
against "capitalism." Misbach did not need to tell them "Don't be
afraid." He also carefully avoided attacking the government directly,
not only to avoid his own arrest on the charges of press and speech
offenses but also to avoid exciting those who were eager to take direct
action. At rallies and meetings, Misbach urged two things: first, to
40Islam Bergerak, 10 July 1923. Ra'jat Bergerak, 4 Oct. 1923.
41Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 29 Oct. 1923, Mr. 1052X/23, Vb. 30 Apr. 1924, No.
4.
Also see iste Gouvernement Secretaris aan Directeur van Onderwijs en Eeredienst, 7
Nov.
1923, Mr. 1052X/23, Vb. 30 Apr. 1924, No. 4.
42For Misbach's propaganda activities outside the residency of Surakarta, see, for
instance,
Kemadjoean Hindia, 16 Oct. 1923, IPO, 43 (1923).
Islamism and Communism 271
establish SRs and, in places where Red Sis were already there, to trans�
form Red Sis into SRs; and second, to "fight against fitnah" and to
"bury capitalism." In urging these things, Misbach was true to himself.
To "fight against fitnah" meant to Misbach to utter these very words
at rallies and in his writings and to establish SRs. But his words were
militant and daring. When he called on them to "fight against fitnah,"
he often added "to the death." His words, constantly reminding the
audience of death, were immensely popular among those who were
determined and eager to take revenge. In a few months Misbach was
the unrivaled PKI leader in the Vorstenlanden and its vicinity.
In early October Misbach also led the establishment of the Surakarta
SR. A provisional committee was established by Misbach, Moetokalimoen, Soewarno,
Wiromartono (batik entrepreneur in Kauman), and
several others; and on October 8 Moetokalimoen, as chairman of the
committee, announced the establishment of a Surakarta SR. Though
Moetokalimoen was appointed chairman, Misbach was, and was seen
as, the real leader. The office of the SR was located at Misbach's
house.43 Now Misbach's house served as the office of Islam Bergerak/Rajat Bergerak,
Bale Tanja, and the SR. PKI and Red SI/SR mem�
bers as well as dismissed trade union activists not only from the city of
Surakarta but more often from Klaten, Madiun, Yogyakarta, and
many other places frequented his house.
The clearest sign of Misbach's emergence as PKI leader in the
Vorstenlanden and its vicinity was the transformation of Islam Berger�
ak into Ra'jat Bergerak (People in motion) and the incorporation of the
de facto Malay-language Yogyakarta PKI organ, Doenia Baroe (New
world), into Rajat Bergerak in September 19 23.44 The transformation
of Islam Bergerak into Ra'jat Bergerak signified the expansion of Mis�
bach's emphasis from Islam to people. As his article "Assalamoe'alaikoem" clearly
indicated, Muslims (Islam) were those who
would send back their greeting by saying " Alaikoem salam" if Misbach
sent his greeting, "Assalamoe'alaikoem." Misbach initially spoke of
this community of "we" that would take shape in an imagined way
through the reverberation of the exchange of this Islamic greeting. This
"we" remained his primary concern. The way he addressed the reader
in his writings, "brothers, above all brother Muslims, in the Indies,"
underlines this. He was also aware, however, that there were those
who would not reply "Alaikoem salam" but would still fight against
fitnah. These "brothers" (saudara-saudara) were in his view more true
in obeying God's command than munafik, even if they did not per43Ra'jat Bergerak, n
Oct. 1923.
44Ra'jat Bergerak, 20 Sept. 1920. See also "Persatoean Islam Bergerak dan Doenia
Baroe
djadi Ra'jat Bergerak," Medan Moeslimin 9 (1923), pp. 319-320.
272. An Age in Motion
form, say, the five daily prayers. They, together with "we," formed the
Ra'jat (People) in motion, who Misbach was to lead in "our" fight
against capitalism. About that time, Misbach also changed his style of
clothing. He continued to wear a white jacket, white trousers, and
shoes. But he changed his white peci into a Javanese-style headcloth. It
was part of his silent message, which we may paraphrase: "I am not
Hadji but Mohammad Misbach, a Javanese communist, who is fulfill�
ing his obligation as a Muslim."
While the change of Islam Bergerak into Ra'jat Bergerak was sym�
bolic, the incorporation of Doenia Baroe into Ra'jat Bergerak was
substantial. In Yogyakarta, the PKI branch was formed in March 1923
out of two distinct groups. The first comprised former PPPB propagan�
dists, most notably Soerat Hardjomartojo, Tedjomartojo, and Djajengsoedarmo, who
had once organized the Keroekoenan Yogya (Har�
mony of Yogyakarta) after the defeat of the pawnshop workers' strike
and formed the driving force in reconstructing the PPPB in August
1922 together with Soerjopranoto and Tjokroaminoto. In the national
pergerakan context, they drifted to the PKI in the course of 1922, while
pressing Tjokroaminoto to drop party discipline. In the Yogyakartan
pergerakan context, they were close to Soerjopranoto, found the place
to voice their opinion in Doenia Baroe headed by Soejopranoto and
Soewardi, lived in Pakualaman, and formed the Communist faction of
the Yogyakarta SI together with its treasurer, H. Oemar Fakih, a batik
entrepreneur who lived in Pakualaman. Shortly after the Madiun CSI
congress, they quit the Yogyakarta SI and established the Yogyakarta
Red SI on March 1, and then on March 20 established the PKI
Yogyakarta branch with Soerat Hardjomartojo as chairman and Ted�
jomartojo as secretary/treasurer. Though they made Doenia Baroe the
de facto Malay-language PKI organ in Yogyakarta, their financial posi�
tion was weak and their control of Doenia Baroe depended very much
on the favor of Soerjopranoto (who took a position of neutrality to�
ward the party rivalry between the PKI/Red Sis and the PSI/CSI
throughout 1923) and Soewardi.45
The second group that joined the PKI Yogyakarta branch was the
Panggoegab group, most notably Sismadi Sastrosiswojo, Doellatip,
45The PKI Yogyakarta branch, first established in March 1921 with van Bunnk as
chair�
man, declined after van Burink left Yogyakarta. Wd. Chef der Algemeene
Recherchedienst
aan Procureur Generaal, 2 Apr. 1923, Mr. 216X/23. Soerat Hardjomartojo and others
formed an embryonic PKI branch and a Communist faction within the Yogyakarta SI in
June
1922 with the publication of the "Yogyakarta PKI organ," Kromo Mardika, and the
"Yogyakarta SI organ," Tjablaka. But these two newspapers soon ceased publication.
For the
establishment of the PKI Yogyakarta branch and the Yogyakarta Red SI, see Islam
Bergerak,
10 and 20 Mar. 1923; Doenia Baroe, 18 Apr. 1923. Doenia Baroe began publication in
April
1922 with Soerjopranoto as editor-in-chief, Soewardi and Sjahboedin Latif as
editors,
Troenodjojo as proofreader, and Gatoet Sastrodihardjo as administrator. Doenia
Baroe, 5
Apr. 1922.
Islamism and Communism 273
and Padmotenojo (former Delanggu PFB and SH leader). Nationally,
they continued to look up to Tjipto as their mentor and tried to live up
to the satria ideal.46 In Yogyakarta, however, they lived in Pakualaman, were close
to Soewardi, joined his Comite Pangoeripan Mardika,
and published Panggoegah under Soewardi's chief editorship. Shortly
after the NIP-SH decided to dissolve itself in May 1923, they joined the
PKI as "the reincarnation of the NIP-SH spirit" and made Panggoegah
the de facto Javanese-language PKI organ under Soewardi's nominal
leadership.47 The Panggoegah group was always close to Misbach and
in fact its major figure, Sismadi, had been an editor of Islam Bergerak
since Misbach took control of it. The incorporation of Doenia Baroe
into Ra'jat Bergerak therefore meant that now Misbach and his
brothers-in-arms from the Surakarta SH days controlled the only re�
maining PKI organs in the Vorstenlanden and Madiun. The Javaneselanguage Panggoegah
was virtually under Sismadi's control. And Rajat Bergerak was under Misbach as
editor/adviser/director, with edi�
tors Soerat Hardjomartojo and Djajengsoedarmo, formerly of Doenia
Baroe, Sismadi Sastrosiswojo and Padmotenojo of Panggoegah,
Boedisoetjitro of the PKI standing committee, and Partoatmodjo as
Misbach's adjutant.
The rise of Misbach as the major PKI figure in the Vorstenlanden
and vicinity was a mixed blessing to Aliarcham and Boedisoetjitro,
who steered the PKI standing committee under Darsono's tutelage. On
the one hand, Misbach's energy as a PKI/Red SI propagandist and his
and his friends' financial contributions to the PKI were very valuable.
Largely due to his activities, the Red Sis of Yogyakarta, Madiun,
Nganjuk, and several other places transformed themselves into SRs.
The Surakarta SR was also founded under his leadership and in Klaten
former Normaalschool students who joined the PKI under his influence
were trying to establish the Klaten SR. Continued publication of Rajat
Bergerak was impossible without Misbach. On the other hand, Mis�
bach's understanding of capitalism and imperialism as yet another of
Satan's attempts to distance Muslims from Allah and his conception of
the Communist struggle against capitalism as "tests" to prove Muslim
faith to Allah troubled the PKI central leadership, above all the doc�
trinaire internationalist Darsono, all the more so because his words
sounded as if they proposed daring direct actions and because he was
always ready to criticize fellow PKI members as well as the central
leadership if their pronouncements on Islam were not in agreement
with his convictions. For instance, when Arkiman (a PKI member in
46For a telling case of this, see the Gatoet Sastrodihardjo affair in Islam
Bergerak, 10 Feb.
1923, and Doenia Baroe, 21 Feb. 1923.
47Panggoegah, 18 July 1923, IPO, 31 (192.3). For Soewardi's attitude toward the PKI
and
the PSI/CSI, see Panggoegah, 1 Aug. 1923, IPO, 34 (1923).
274 An Age in Motion
Yogyakarta) and Soemantri (Semarang PKI and Red SI leader) wrote
articles in Panggoegah and Sinar Hindia, respectively, arguing that the
PKI should "not use Islam," because this would alienate people of
other religions, Misbach simply declared that "if the advice and teach�
ings of Islam are truly put in motion, there will certainly be no antago�
nism between Muslims and believers of other religions." He continued:
We Muslims are obliged to bury all slanders. If these slanders resist our
aim to bury [destroy] them, we are bidden to have the strong will, desire,
and deeds to fight against them to the death. Because what is meant by
salvation in Islam is not simply salvation in this world, but also salvation
in the world hereafter.
Sabil [the Path] is a rule of Islam that is important and efficacious. To
be victorious in the Perang Sabil [Holy War] is certainly fortunate, but to
die because of Sabil also means good fortune in the world hereafter. If we
do not have such strong will and understanding, that is a sin.48
For Darsono, who expected the revolution to take place first in Ger�
many, then to spread to Holland, and finally to the Indies,49 Misbach's
sabillilahism (the path-to-Allah-ism) was not only annoying but also
extremely dangerous. But neither Darsono nor the PKI standing com�
mittee could do anything about it. In the first place, Misbach was
immensely popular among dismissed trade union activists and others
who were, as Aliarcham once put it, "in a rage" and eager to take
revenge against "capitalism."50 Misbach's daring words in his writings
and in his speeches at rallies and meetings embodied their spirit. In the
second place, Misbach owed nothing to the PKI central leadership.
The PKI Surakarta branch, Rajat Bergerak, the Information Office,
the Surakarta SR-all were his own creations. Though Boedisoetjitro
sat on the editorial board of Rajat Bergerak, his name was more a sign
to tell the reader that it was an "official" PKI organ.
While Misbach's sabillilahism troubled the PKI central leadership,
this was also the very reason for his popularity among those who were
"in a rage." They read and/or listened to Misbach's words and then
translated his call, "fight against fitnah," into actions of their own
understanding. Misbach never called on them to take direct action, and
the majority of them understood his call "correctly," working as
PKI/Red SI propagandists, establishing SRs, and transforming Red Sis
into SRs, while writing and contributing ever more militant and daring
articles to PKI organs. But there were also many who resorted to
48H. M. Misbach, "Islam dan Gerakan," Medan Moeslimm 9 (1923), p. 243. See also
H. M. Misbach, "Islam dan Atoerannja," Medan Moeslimm 9 (1923), pp. 289-291.
49McVey, Indonesian Communism, p. 165.
50Verslag van het 9de Kommunisten Kongres (PKI) gehouden te Batavia op 7, 8, 9, en
10
June 1924, Mr. 501X/24.
Islamism and Communism 2-75
independent direct action on the periphery of the PKI and Red SIs/SRs
in Semarang, Yogyakarta, Surakarta, Madiun, and many other Central
Javanese towns. In the months after the defeat of the VSTP strike,
many threw filth in front of government offices, took down portraits of
Queen Wilhelmina, smeared filth and wrote abusive words on her
portraits, and burned certificates of second-class native school and
books published by the Vokslectuur and the Moehammadijah through�
out Central Java.51 Several attempts were made to derail trains in
Yogyakarta, Surakarta, and Madiun. When the governor general vis�
ited Yogyakarta in May, a bomb was thrown at a train in Surakarta.
These incidents increased in the period preceding Queen Wilhelmina's
jubilee festivities in late August and early September. In Yogyakarta, a
train was derailed in July. In Madiun, an SR activist and former State
Railway worker was killed and another wounded when a bomb they
were making suddenly exploded in late August. In Semarang, eight
bombs were thrown in late August and early September.52 In Madiun,
SR leaders and SI schoolteachers were rounded up in connection with
the case. But elsewhere the police could not resolve the cases and no
one was arrested.
In Surakarta, such incidents temporarily increased after the jubilee
and toward the Sekaten, the court festivity celebrating Muhammad's
birthday, which happened to take place in mid-October, 1923. First
there were a number of cases of arson in the middle of September. A
shed built for the jubilee and kept for the Sekaten was set on fire and
burned down. A pile of wood for the construction of a government
school and the Mangkunegaran mosque were also set on fire. In the
countryside, two sheds for drying tobacco leaves burned down on the
Manang plantation in Polanharjo.53 Again the police were unable to
solve the cases. No one was arrested and the rumors only fed on
themselves. Darma Kanda reminded the reader of "the age of Tjipto."54 Kasunanan
princes and high-ranking officials were fearful of
"Communists" and repeatedly informed the resident that Misbach was
behind the troubles. Spies supplied information to the resident and the
police that Misbach had formed an organization called Sabotage to�
gether with other Communists from Semarang, Surakarta, and Yogya�
karta and was training "soldiers" to carry out bombings, arson, rob�
beries, derailings, and other sabotage and terrorist actions.55 And in
5,Resident van Semarang (van Gigch) aan GG, 28 Jan. 1924, Mr. 99X/24, Vb. 29 May
1928, No. H9.
52"Spoor tabrakan!" Medan Moeslimin 9 (1923), p. 219. Panggoegah, 19 Sept. 1923,
IPO,
43 (1923). Sinar Hindia, 4, 13, 20, and 22 Oct. 1923, all in IPO, 43 (1923).
53"Apakah Solo akan mendjadi kota api?" Medan Moeslimin 9 (1923), p. 331. Sinar
Hindia, 2 Oct. 1923, IPO, 43 (1923).
54IPO, 44 (1923).
55Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 29 Oct. 192.3, Mr. 1052X/23, Vb. 30 Apr. 1924, No.
4.
276 An Age in Motion
early October mimeographed pamphlets with the symbol of the ham�
mer and sickle imposed on a picture of a human skull which warned
the reader not to go and see the Sekaten festivities were widely dis�
tributed in the city by unknown persons. Given the fact that the resi�
dent and the police obtained pamphlets when only a few had been
distributed in the city, perhaps Medan Moeslimin was correct in argu�
ing that they were made by agents provocateurs.56 Yet in a curious way
the pamphlets illuminated the meaning of "Communists" in Surakarta,
where "calmness" was terribly undermined by the widespread and
disquieting fear generated by a series of acts of arson and wild rumors
that told people what would happen next. The pamphlets, by superim�
posing the hammer and sickle on a human skull, said that Communists
were death. If Misbach had once deprived the state of its awesomeness
by invoking the fear of death, now the logic was turned around.
"Calmness" could be restored only if they could get rid of "Commu�
nists."
The police repeatedly raided the houses of Misbach, Moetokalimoen, Partoatmodjo,
Soewarno, and several other PKI and leading SR
members only to obtain nothing. Police surveillance was reinforced.
While Misbach and other PKI members had previously been followed
by two detectives, now each of them was assigned four.57 Spies of the
patih, the Narpowandojo, the Algemeene Politie, and the Algemeene
Recherchedienst visited Misbach's house in one disguise or another.
The Sekaten, from October 14 to 23, was unusually tightly guarded
and policed. Those who owned or leased sheds to see the Sekaten
procession were obliged to keep water on hand in case of fire. Yet on
the eve of the Sekaten, Sitinggil, the main audience hall on the northern
square of the palace, was set on fire. Then on October 17 bombs were
thrown at the wall of the Mangkunegaran Palace, the car of a highranking court
official, and the villa of another high-ranking Kepatihan
official. And on October 20 bombs were thrown at the sunan's car and
the villa owned by R.M.A. Woerjaningrat, former BO chairman and
brother of the patih. Most of the bombs did not explode and damages
were minimal. No one was arrested on the spot. Though neither re�
peated police raids nor detectives on surveillance duty produced evi�
dence to implicate Misbach or other PKI leaders in bombings and other
incidents, van der Lely, chief of the Algemeene Recherchedienst, was
convinced from the beginning that the incidents were a concerted ter56Medan
Moeslimin 9 (19Z3), p. 332. "Soerat selebaran rahasia berhamboeran dalam kota
Solo. Perboeatan si Chianat. Politie riboet! Main geledah dan beslag!" Ra'jat
Bergerak, 18
Oct. 1923.
^"Geledahan," Medan Moeslimin 9 (1923), pp. 331-332. "Pendjagaan Kantoor M. M.,"
Medan Moeslimin 9 (1923), p. 331. "Geledahan, tangkapan dan pendjagaan ke II,"
Medan
Moeslimin 9 (1923), pp. 354-355.
Islamism and Communism 2-77
rorist operation run by Misbach under Darsono's instruction. Resident
van der Marel did not go so far in his speculations but was still con�
vinced that the culprits were Communists and/or dismissed railway
workers. In consultation with the prosecutor general and the resident
of Semarang, Resident van der Marel authorized the police to arrest
Misbach, Soewarno, Moetokalimoen, Hardjodiwongso, and Hardjosoemarto (staff at the
Information Office Bale Tanjo) on October
20.58 On the same day, on the authorization of the resident of Se�
marang, the police arrested Aliarcham, Boedisoetjitro, Partondo
(editor-in-chief of Sinar Hindia), and three other Semarang SI leaders.
In Yogyakarta, Soerat Hardjomartojo and Padmotenojo were also ar�
rested.59 Though all the arrests were made on residents' authorization,
it was the Algemeene Recherchedienst that was in charge. Van der Lely
appointed Koster, adjunct chief commissioner of the Semarang police
(recherche section), to investigate the case. Accordingly, all those
arrested in Surakarta and Yogyakarta were sent to Semarang on the
same day.
The arrests dealt a severe blow to the PKI. In Surakarta, the PKI
branch and the SR were instantly crippled. Misbach's activities as a
leading pergerakan figure in Surakarta ended. The Information Office
collapsed and Ra'jat Bergerak ceased publication. Only Medan Moeslimin continued to
appear through the efforts of Haroenrasjid and
Sjarief with "Misbach in prison" as editor-in-chief. In Semarang, the
PKI central leadership collapsed with the arrest of Aliarcham and
Boedisoetjitro. Shortly after October 20 the PKI provisional standing
committee formed under Darsono's tutelage frankly admitted that the
PKI central leadership was in confusion and incapable of leading
branches.60 Sinar Hindia also announced a Semarang SI rally to be held
on October 28. At the rally, Darsono lectured on the communism of
Karl Marx and the anarchism of Bakunin. After having explained that
anarchism was a teaching that preached that a group of one hundred to
two hundred persons could take power if they had courage to kill kings
and ministers by bombs, Darsono said: "With regard to the person
who threw the bombs, it can be said that it is someone who is truly
daring and who does not shrink from arbitrary actions. I pay homage
to people who have demonstrated the courage to want to deliver man�
kind by these methods. But the bombings cannot be approved by the
Communists and they do not accord with the political line of the
58Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 29 Oct. 192.3, Mr. ios2x/2}, Vb. 30 Apr. 1924, No.
4.
"Bom . . . Bom . . . lagi . . . lagi . . . Bom," Ra'jat Bergerak, 25 Oct. 192.3.
"Toned
Vorstenlanden: Awas! Awas!" Ra'jat Bergerak, 25 Oct. 192 V " I angkapan-Masoek
Boei,"
Medan Moeslimin 9 (1923), p. 349.
syuTangkapan-Masoek Boei," Medan Moeslimin 9 (1923), p. 349.
k0Sinar Hindia, 22 Oct. 1923, IPO, 43 (1923).
zy8 An Age in Motion
Communists."61 Darsono was well aware that it was the same people
who were working as PKI/Red SI propagandists who resorted to "an�
archist" actions. That was the reason he was careful not to denounce
"anarchists" outright. But he must have thought that his fear about
Misbach's sabillilahism had come true. He neither mentioned nor de�
fended Misbach in his speech.
Journey to Manokwari
Though the police arrested PKI and Red SI/SR leaders and activists
in Semarang, Surakarta, Klaten, Yogyakarta, and Madiun in connec�
tion with the derailings, arson, and bombings, the matter of who actu�
ally committed these acts remains unclear to this day. On the one hand,
the PKI soon took the position that the incidents were engineered by
agents provocateurs. Though agents provocateurs undoubtedly played
a part, this argument contradicts the fact that an SR activist and former
State Railway worker was killed in Madiun by the explosion of a bomb
he was making. The Madiun SR paid homage to him by organizing his
funeral and burying him in a coffin wrapped in the red flag with
hammer and sickle.62 PKI newspapers, in denouncing agents provoca�
teurs, conveniently ignored this fact. On the other hand, the Algemeene
Recherchedienst pursued its investigation on the assumption that inci�
dents were one grand terrorist operation centrally directed by Misbach
under Darsono's instructions. The underlying assumption was that the
PKI was a militarylike organization working under the command of
the central leadership and in accordance with instructions issued by the
Comintern. But this was simply not true. In support of this assumption
was the fact that all the bombs used were of the same type: fulminate
bombs. But pamphlets that explained how to make a bomb circulated
widely in Central Java at the time. The ingredients needed-chloric
potassium, nitrate, sulfur, nitrolead, carbonic acid lime, and realgar-
were easily obtainable at pharmacies. Yet the Algemeene Recherche�
dienst chose to believe that all the incidents were part of a grand
terrorist operation.63 This eventually led it no further than to collect
dubious information strong enough to invoke Article 47 of the Con�
stitutional Regulation and to banish Misbach to a solitary outpost on
the Outer Islands.
In Surakarta, the investigation into arson and bombings started im�
mediately after the October 20 arrests. In charge was wedana polisi
61Procureur Generaal aan GG, 30 Nov. 1923, Mr. iox/24.
62Panggoegah, 19 Sept. 1923, IPO, 43 (1923).
63Chef der Algemeene Recherchedienst aan Procureur Generaal, 9 Mar. 1924, Mr.
244X/24.
Islamism and Communism 279
Soesatijo of the Semarang police (recherche section), who came to
Surakarta with Hardjosoemarto, who had been "arrested" on October
20 together with Misbach and others. The wedana polisi (native police
officer) started his investigation by further arresting a number of pergerakan
activists: Partoatmodjo, chief-of-staff at the Information Of�
fice Bale Tanja, where Hardjosoemarto had been working as a volun�
teer; Sastropanitro, who had unsuccessfully been working as a PKI/
Red SI propagandist in Sribit, district Ponggok; Moedio Wignjosoetomo, who had only
recently returned to Surakarta from Bandung
and had never joined the PKI and the SR; Sandjojo, who had also
returned to Surakarta from Bandung only a few months before (after
being expelled from Islam Bergerak in June he had moved to Bandung
and joined Tjipto's newspaper, Sapoe Djagad, as an editor, together
with Moedio); and Darmosoesastro, a former State Railway worker
who had very recently come to Surakarta from Semarang and had
hardly known Misbach or other Surakarta PKI leaders. Many more
PKI and SR leaders and activists were also detained for interrogation.
The way the wedana polisi carried out his investigation was thoroughly
conventional. He was not so much interested in clearing up the cases as
in extracting testimony from pergerakan activists in Surakarta and its
vicinity to sustain the prosecution of Misbach and other PKI leaders at
the native court.64 Hardjosoemarto's usefulness lay here. He knew
who was active in Surakarta and who visited the Information Office
frequently. He mentioned their names and the wedana polisi sum�
moned, arrested, or detained them for interrogation. Even if arrested or
detained, some-for instance, Sandjojo-flatly refused to give the
wedana polisi the testimony he wanted. But many others told him what
he wanted to hear, out of the fear that they themselves might otherwise
be implicated in the cases. Partoatmodjo told the wedana polisi that the
Information Office had the secret aim of carrying out underground
activities and that he had "heard" Misbach saying that Soewarno was
making bombs. Sastropanitro said Misbach established "the Bandieten
Bond" (Bandits' Union) and testified that he was instructed by Mis�
bach in April 1923 to throw a bomb at the district chief of Delanggu
but did not carry it out. Hadikoesoemo, a batik trader in Kauman and
a founding member of the Surakarta SR, also testified that he had
"heard" that Misbach had sent Soewarno to Semarang and Yogyakarta to teach how to
make bombs and that he was "convinced" Misbach
commanded the bombing operation. Several Madiun SR activists also
testified that they had "heard" that Misbach, Boedisoetjitro, Djojodihardjo (Madiun
SR chairman), and Soemono (the Madiun SR ac�
tivist killed in a bomb explosion) had discussed the bombing opera64IPO, 48 (1923),
pp. 440-443; 50 (192-3)* PP- 533-536.
280 An Age in Motion
tion.65 And Moedio and Darmosoesastro gave the most detailed
testimony to the wedana polisi, which said in effect that Misbach had
ordered Soewarno to make bombs, that Misbach ordered Hardjodiwongso and Sandjojo to
throw bombs, and that they had witnessed
Hardjodiwongso throw bombs in Surakarta and Sandjojo in Yogyakarta.66
Soon thereafter, however, Moedio and Darmosoesastro disclosed to
Sismadi the written contract they had made with Hardjosoemarto that
said that they had given false testimony at Hardjosoemarto's request
and that Hardjosoemarto would pay them for their services. Moedio
and Sismadi further disclosed in Panggoegah that Hardjosoemarto was
a paid informer working for the Surakarta police (recherche section)
and argued that it was Hardjosoemarto who distributed the pamphlets
with the hammer and sickle superimposed on a human skull, set the
Mangkunegaran mosque and Sitinggil on fire, and threw a bomb at the
wall of the Mangkunegara Palace.67 Moedio and Darmosoesastro were
soon prosecuted on charges of perjury. Sismadi Sastrosiswojo was also
arrested.68 But the expose in Panggoegah severely damaged the inves�
tigation, making Moedio's and Darmosoesastro's valuable testimony
useless and wedana polisi Soesatijo's whole investigation dubious.
Hardjosoemarto soon disappeared from Surakarta. The investigation
stalled. By mid-December 1923 the prosecutor general was already
pessimistic about the prospect that the investigation could ever pro�
duce strong enough evidence to support the prosecution of Misbach
and others in the native court, and he started to entertain the idea of
invoking Article 47 to banish Misbach.69 By the end of December the
wedana polisi was called back to Semarang. Those arrested were re�
leased from prison one after another.70 By the end of April 1924 all
were released but Misbach and Hardjosiwongso.
Though wedana polisi Soesatijo's investigation led nowhere, he still
collected strong enough testimony to apply Article 47 to Misbach. To
save the Algemeene Recherchedienst from total failure, Prosecutor Gen63Chef der
Algemeene Recherchedienst aan Procureur Generaal, 9 Mar. 192.4, Mr.
244X/Z4.
66Haroenrasjid, "Penangkapan Hadji Moehammad Misbach ketoea M.M.," Medan
Moeslimin 9 (1923), pp. 357-359.
67Panggoegah, 16 Jan. 1924, IPO, 4 (1924); 23 Jan. 1924, IPO, 5 (1924); 6 Feb.
1924,
IPO, 7 (I924)> IZ Mar. 1924, IPO, 12 (1924). See also "Penangkapan Hadji Moehammad
Misbach Ketoea M.M.," Medan Moeslimin 9 (1923), pp. 357-359; "Perkara H. M. Mis�
bach dan Lainnja," Medan Moeslimin 9 (1923), pp. 369-371; "Ketoea H. M. Misbach dan
da'wa Bob-boman: Siapakah jang salah?" Medan Moeslimin 10 (1924), pp. 60-62, 78-80,
158-160, 175-176, 192.
68Panggoegah, 12 Dec. 1923, IPO, 51 (1923). Kemadjoean Hindia, 15 Dec. 1923, IPO,
51
(192.3)-
69Procureur Generaal aan Resident van Surakarta, 15 Dec. 1923, Exh. 28 June 1924,
No.
U15.
70Panggoegah, 16 Jan. 1924, IPO, 4 (1924).
Islamism and Communism 281
eral Wolterbeek Muller instructed van der Lely, chief of the Algemeene
Recherchedienst, to compile a dossier on Misbach, so that he could
duly propose to the governor general that he invoke Article 47 and
banish Misbach. Van der Lely submitted his report on Misbach to the
prosecutor general on March 9, 1924. Based on the assumption that all
of the incidents were one grand terrorist operation centrally directed by
Misbach under Darsono's instructions, he organized his report from
four types of information: dossiers on Misbach from 1918 to 1920,
above all Resident Harloff's long report proposing that Governor Gen�
eral van Limburg Stirum "intern" Tjipto and Misbach "to a solitary
outpost on the Outer Islands"; a Dutch-language summary of Mis�
bach's articles prepared by the Volkslectuur under Dr. Rinkes; numer�
ous reports on the PKI and Red SIs/SRs produced by the Algemeene
Recherchedienst; and (false) testimony made by Hardjosoemarto,
Sastropanitro, Partoatmodjo, and other Surakarta and Madiun pergerakan activists.71
On March 25 the prosecutor general proposed that
the governor general apply Article 47 to Misbach.72 After that, the
process to "intern" Misbach went smoothly and in a routine fashion.
Deputy Adviser for Native Affairs R. A. Kern, Director of Justice
F.J.H. Cowan, and Resident of Semarang J. van Gigch were consulted
on the matter and raised no objections. On May 16 the Council of the
Indies was convened and decided without much discussion to advise
the governor general to intern Misbach "in a small post in the Moluc�
cas or on New Guinea where all his doings can be closely supervised."
On June 14 the resident of Semarang interrogated Misbach, asking
questions prepared beforehand based on van der Lely's dossier on him.
Misbach denied most of the charges by simply saying no. Though
entitled to submit a letter of defense to the governor general, Misbach
did not do so. On June 27 the government announced the internment
of Misbach to Manokwari on northern New Guinea, in the residency
of Amboina.73 Though pergerakan newspapers reported that Misbach
would ask for permission to go abroad, possibly to Mecca, Misbach
did not do so.74 Misbach's wife and three children also decided to
accompany him to Manokwari. Since his arrest, Misbach had been
kept in the Semarang central prison and allowed to read only the
Koran. On July 2 and 3 Misbach was briefly allowed to return to
7'Chef der Algemeene Recherchedienst aan Procureur Generaal, 9 Mar. 19:14, Mr.
2.44X/24.
7iProcureur Generaal aan GG, 25 Mar. 1924, Mr. 244.X/24.
75See related letters in Mr. 244X/24 and Mr. 513X/24. For the text that announced
the
"internment" of Misbach, see Uittreksel uir het Register der Besluiten van den
Gouverneur
Generaal van Ned. Indie, 27 June 1924, Mr. 513X/24. Questions the resident of
Semarang
relied on to interrogate Misbach were compiled by the prosecutor general's office.
See Mr.
428X/24. For Misbach's proces verbaal, see Mr. 513X/24.
74Hindia Baroe, 9 July 1923, IPO, 29 (1924).
z8z An Age in Motion
Surakarta, to take care of his household matters and to say good-bye to
his relatives and the staff of Medan Moeslimin. Then he was trans�
ferred to Surabaya and on July 18 left for Manokwari together with his
wife, thirteen-year-old daughter, and eight- and six-year-old sons. The
police guard was very tight. While Misbach was briefly back in Sur�
akarta, only Sjanef and Haroenrasjid of Medan Moeslimin, aside from
his relatives, were allowed to meet and talk with him. From Semarang
to Surabaya, the police transferred him not by tram but by car. In
Surabaya, no one was allowed to see him. Surabaya PKI and SR mem�
bers and Sismadi of Yogyakarta went to the harbor to send him off, but
the effort was in vain because he was confined to his cabin. Misbach
left Java in solitude.75
Upon his departure, Misbach sent his farewell to the readers of
Medan Moeslimin. His article "Pamitan Saja [My farewell]" reads in
its entirety:76
May it be known to the readers of Medan-Moeslimin, especially the
subscribers, that now it has [finally] happened that I am banished by the
government, from the land of my birth to "Manoekwari."
Therefore I send to all of you, above all the subscribers, my greetings
and respects.
Let not my banishment for one moment dishearten our friends, the
people of the pergerakan, or all the readers of Medan-Moeslimin.
If there were time enough, I would very much wish to explain my
thoughts here in the journal MM; but since there is no time at all, I will
reveal what have become my ideals later, when I have arrived at my new
place of residence.
After I reach Manoekwari, 1 will announce my address here in MedanMoeslimin. And I
promise that I will write on "Islamism and Commu�
nism" as clearly as I can, so that it can be a means of enlightenment to
you Muslims and to the Communists; and this writing should then be
published in our journal Medan-Moeslimin.
May this be granted by Allah the All-Merciful.
I hope that the readers will pray to Allah the Most Compassionate that
I am granted safe passage from the land of my birth to my new place of
residence, and also for as long as I live with my wife and children.
My pardon:
H. M. Misbach.
Upon Misbach's departure, Haroenrasjid appealed to the readers of
Medan Moeslimin to contribute money to support Misbach and his
^^Haroenrasjid, "H. M. Misbach tentoe di Boeang," Medan Moeslimin io (1924), p.
209.
See also Misbach's letter to Haroenrasjid, dated 6 July 1924, published in Medan
Moeslimin
10 (i9z4)> PP- 2.I3-214, under the title "Ketoea H. M. Misbach waktoe dalam boei:
Mis�
bach kepada Haroenrasjid."
^6Misbach, "Pamitan Saja," Medan Moeslimin 10 (1924), pp. 214-215.
Islamism and Communism 283
family in Manokwari, while reminding the readers of the story of the
Prophet Muhammad, "who was chased from Mecca to Medina by the
greedy and destroyers, but did not Retreat [Moendoerkan Diri] even a
step."77 In Yogyakarta, Soewardi, Tedjomartojo (chairman of the PKI
Yogyakarta branch), and Sismadi Sastrosiswojo established the Comite
Kemanoesiaan (Committee of Humanity) to raise money for Misbach.78 Panggoegab
published an article, evoking Ranggawarsita's
poem "Serat Kalatida":
In a mad age the man who is normal is disregarded, and those who are
mad are esteemed. This crazy time will [only] get better if the normal men
in this age devote themselves heart and soul to strengthening the defenses
and the ranks of the people. Hadji Misbach is a man who has earnestly
fought for the general welfare; who is faithful to his religion, Islam; and
who has the firm conviction that Islam leads to happiness. In order to be
able to make the lives of the masses happy in these capitalist times, a true
Muslim must have the courage to stand at the head of the ranks of the
poor, to give them leadership in the struggle against the greedy, the
insatiable amassers of wealth, and the power hungry. It is Misbach's
opinion that the general welfare can only be obtained by struggle, by the
measuring of [each side's] powers, and never via advice and education."*9
Other PKI newspapers also attacked Article 47 as the "law of power"
and called for the strengthening of "our organization" and "the perfec�
tion of our members."80 But the PKI central leadership now in Batavia
did not form a committee, as had Medan Moeslimin and Soewardi in
Surakarta and Yogyakarta to raise money to support Misbach.
On August 7, after a twenty-day voyage, Misbach and his family
arrived at Manokwari "with peace and happiness." On August 11 he
sent his first letter to the readers of Medan Moeslimin and told of his
journey:81
Friday, July 18, at 11 o'clock, moved to the big ship, Pijnacjer Hordijk. . . . On
the ship I was always guarded by several policemen. At 12
o'clock noon the ship set out. . . .On its way from Surabaya to Manok�
wari for 20 days, the ship stopped 17 times.
1. The port of Buleleng-Communists already there.
2. The port of Ampenan-Communists not yet evident.
77Haroenrasjid, "H. M. Misbach tentoe di Boeang," Medan Moeslimin 10 (1924), pp.
209-211.
7HPanggoegah, li June 1924, IPO, 27 (1924); 9 July 1924, IPO, 29 (1924).
7l)Panggoegah, 23 July 1924, IPO, 32 (19^4)-
80See, for instance, ABC, "Wa-Sjawirhoem Fi'lamri: Hak memboeang orang dan
kedjadiannja," Medan Moeslimin 10 (1924), pp. 241-243, adapted from Sinar Hindu.
8,"Soerat dari Ketoea H. M. Misbach di Manokwari," Medan Moeslimin 10 (1924), pp.
278-279. Italics in the original.
284 An Age in Motion
3. The port of Hadji-Communists not evident.
4. The port of Makasser-Communists already numerous. My wife
and three children went ashore and were welcomed by our friends,
men and women alike, and were given the honor of dining together
in the SR Office. On their return to the ship they were accompanied
by these brothers and sisters, bringing dried fish and some cigarettes.
5. The port of Leksola-Communists not yet evident.
6. The port of Ambon-Communists already numerous. But the name
is still Sarekat Ambon. Next month will discuss changing it to
Sarekat Rajat. My wife and three children went ashore and were
given the honor of dining together. On their return to the ship, they
were accompanied only by brothers [male comrades].
7. The port of Namlea-Communists not yet evident.
8. The port of Sanomo-Communists already numerous. Could be
seen coming down together to the harbor, greeting us only by wav�
ing, because the ship moored too far off shore.
9. The port of Batjan-no Communists yet.
10. The port of Ternate-Communists are already widespread. My
wife and three children went ashore and were greeted by our friends,
hundreds of men and women; they were honored by music and by
dining together at the SR office. On their return to the ship, they
were escorted by some brothers and sisters who crowded on board.
All these friends gave us donations that amounted to about 25
guilders.
11. The port of Galela-Communists not yet evident.
12. The port of Tobelo-Communists already there.
13. The port of Patoni-no Communists yet.
14. The port of Weda-no Communists yet.
15. The port of Sorong-Communists not yet evident.
16. The port of Manokwan-Communists evident.
This is all the report I have made so far on my journey. But in the
future I intend to send accounts of events that have occurred in Manokwari which
are suitable for publication in our organs Medan-Moeslimin,
Api, etc. My views on Communism and Islamism [will appear] in MM
[Medan Moeslimin]. I say frankly that I cannot retire from the ranks of
our so lofty Pergerakan; as long as the world is still in chaos, and as long
as I am still alive, I will continue to move, unbowed. May my brothers be
ready to take this as a mirror [example]!!!
Misbach was not the first pergerakan leader to whom Article 47 of the
Constitutional Regulation was applied in the age of the pergerakan
(Soewardi, Tjipto, Tan Malaka, and Semaoen preceded him), but he
was the first who actually went to the land of his exile within
the Indies. By his journey to Manokwari, he witnessed by his own eyes
the existence of "Communists" in places previously unknown to him,
who read about him in PKI newspapers and perhaps his own writings
Islamism and Communism 285
in Islam Bergerak and Medan Moeslimin. It is the reason perhaps that
Misbach's strange "report" on his journey gives us the impression that
only "Communists" were in sight. But there was another side to his
report. If non-"Communists" were not seen, it was because they did
not show up and because Misbach meant nothing to them. In Surakar�
ta, Misbach was a part of the landscape, even if people stayed away
from him. The journey to Manokwari was the journey through which
Misbach became "no one," ending only with his own death and leav�
ing his deeds and words as a "mirror" (example) to those who would
remember him.
Islamism and Communism
As he promised to the readers of Medan Moeslimin in "My Fare�
well," Misbach started to send his writings on Islamism and commu�
nism from late 1924 on; they were published serially in the first and
subsequent issues of Medan Moeslimin in 1925 under the title "Islamisme dan
Kommunisme [Islamism and communism]." In the first
article, after explaining the reasons for being late in fulfilling his
"promise" (the illness of his wife and his eldest son), he began his
discussion on Islamism and communism:
In fact my writing on Islamism [and] Communism is important for those
who profess themselves true Muslims and communists-that is, those
who are willing to carry out what they are duty-bound to do by the
religion of Islam and by communism. Conversely, by those who falsely
profess Islam, like the Mohammadijah and the SI Tjokro, this writing is
certainly regarded as pure poison. These two groups [the MD and the SI
Tjokro] surely do not at all put in motion the true religion of Islam. To be
sure, they always make a display of their Islamness, but actually it is only
on their lips. To be sure, they perform the precepts of the religion of
Islam, but they pick and choose those precepts that suit their desire.
Those that do not suit them they throw away. Put bluntly, they oppose
or defy the commands of God Allah Samioen'alim [?], and rather fear
and love the will of Satan-that Satan whose evil influence is apparent in
this present age in [the system of] Capitalism.
Likewise, all our friends who profess themselves communists but still
like to express opinions aimed at abolishing the religion of Islam-these
people, / am not afraid to say it, are not true Communists, or they do not
yet understand the communist position. In turn, those who profess Islam
but reject Communism, I am not afraid to say that they are not true
Muslims, or they do not yet properly understand the position of the
religion of Islam.
A people's movement \pergerakan ra'jat| which really fulfills its duty
to bury slanders \fitnah\-which do nothing but insult and manipulate
286 An Age in Motion
human souls-as has happened already in Europe, certainly regards itself
as the enemy of such slanders.
For this reason, may our friends read carefully and thoroughly the
explanations I give below, until they understand them fully.82
The basic thrust of Misbach's argument is given in this introduction.
Human beings live in this world to live together peacefully. That is
God's command. And to live together peacefully, "we," human beings,
have to perform all of God's commands. If one chooses from God's
commands what one wishes to perform, while discarding the others, he
is fake and in the hands of Satan. Satan is "our" enemy and he now
works through capitalism in this age. Capitalism is slander, the tempta�
tion to discard "our" faith in Allah and the test to prove "our" faith.
Communism that teaches "us" to fight against capitalism is therefore
in Islam. Those Communists who "express opinions aimed at abolish�
ing the religion of Islam" and those who "profess Islam but reject
Communism" are both wrong. "I" as a Muslim and Communist ex�
plain this. Misbach then begins his explanation with a discussion of
communism:
In olden times, before toewan Karl Marx entered the field of the peo�
ple's movement, the word and the language of "Communist [m]" did not
yet exist in the world. But oppression and slander raged tumultuously
over this earth. Such slander arose from the feudalists (the nobility ... or
the ningrat) and from the capitalists. But the people's thinking was still
closed and they did not really understand the causes of the misery in this
world. Human beings already felt oppressed and offered resistance. But
resistance in those times did not yet understand about true organization,
because [people] did not properly know which quarter was the cause of
the ruin of the world.
When toewan Karl Marx took the leadership as Journalist, he truly
paid attention to the Jot of the people; he was deeply drawn to the
problems of Economie and the situation of the poor. Thus toewan Karl
Marx could clearly understand the fundamentals or the sources of the
chaos in the world. The causes or the sources of the chaos are as follows:
i. The world of poverty is caused by the existence of Capitalism.
Capitalism is a science for seeking gain and making it the property right
(the ownership) of a few persons. Poverty exists because of the exploita�
tion and oppression that come from Capitalism. A poor man's body gets
ruined and is easily the victim of the diseases developing in his body. A
man who has fallen into poverty lives his life in vain, because he has
neither house, nor clothes, nor sufficient food [to live] as a human being.
Those who become utterly destitute wander about along the roads, seek�
ing shelter in the marketplaces, beneath trees, under bridges, and so on.
*2Misbach di Manokwari, "Islamisme dan Kommunisme," Medan Moeslimin n (1925),
p. 4. Italics in the original.
Islamism and Communism 287
As it happens, those who are extremely poor (beggars) and who get no
help, are then arrested by the police and put in prison. There they
do forced labor for fourteen days because they do not have a permanent
home.
Among the poor there are also those who commit crimes such as
swindling, theft, robbery, looting, and so on. Among the women there are
many who destroy and sell their own honor, that is, they become whores
(prostitutes), etc.
To help all of these [people] is very difficult unless capitalism is elimi�
nated from the world. The reason for the above situation is that these
people do not have the means to live and cannot gain the means, even if
they seek them.
Prisons and police are established in this world to guard against crime,
etc.-but they do not work. The proof is that though prisons have been
around for a long time, crimes etc. have not diminished. Indeed it turns
out that prisons and police also do not decrease, but rather are constantly
expanding.
Bury Capitalism!
2. Human beings in the age of Capitalism have had their morality
(their minds) or sense of humanity destroyed, even if they obtain high
education. Because of this destruction, it is very easy for these people to
be manipulated as the instruments of Capitalism. Whatever Capitalism
orders them to do, they feel obliged to carry it out, even if the order is
insulting and brings misfortune on themselves. The clear evidence is that
in Europe millions of human beings have died because they were manipu�
lated by capitalism, and because they were victimized to glorify and
uphold the criminality of capitalism, which is always in competition to
expand its unlimited greed. Because of greed, they fought over Economie
and various Industries, etc.83
Capitalism simultaneously pauperizes people and destroys their mo�
rality and humanity. Capitalism destroys human beings, both physi�
cally and mentally. This is, Misbach says, the essence of what Marx
called "the causes or the sources of the chaos" in the world. But as he
once said at the Surakarta SH congress in March 1920, it was always
his conviction that "misery exists" because there are "those who create
it." But what he learned from Marx or more precisely from Commu�
nist literature, above all Semaoen's writings, is not simply that the
culprit was capitalism. What he learned from communism was rather
how and why capitalism simultaneously destroys human beings, both
physically and mentally:
Kapitalistisch: Character of seeking profit solely for one's own desires
and needs.
Kapital: Things useful for seeking or producing profit.
83Ibid., pp. 4-5. Italics in the original.
z88 An Age in Motion
Kapitalist: Persons who own the means for seeking profit. The profit is
only for a few, and these people can decide all the prices. (To be lowered
or to be raised.)
Manual jobs in the past or today constantly decrease or vanish alto�
gether, squeezed out by the presence of machines that produce the same
things and are established by the capitalists to gain profits easily and
speedily.
One can easily see that machines made to produce whatever there is in
the present age are not constantly the same. They are always being im�
proved, perfected, so as to yield more and to decrease the number of
workers.
For instance, the first machine [may] yield 10,000 pieces a day by 100
persons. But then comes a second machine that is more perfect and can
yield 50,000 pieces with only 50 persons. Thus 50 workers are neces�
sarily dismissed. They become people who have no livelihood any longer
and are forced to subject themselves to the company and to compete with
its work force. Thus over time the workers' pay declines. This situation
continues until the workers become people whose livelihood is totally
dependent on the people of capital (Kapitalist). They are called "Proletar."
The capitalist who owns the first model of the machine can fall, that is,
go out of business, because he is squeezed out by the arrival of the second.
His fall causes a number of people to starve. Small traders, whose goods
are usually bought by the workers using the first model of the machine,
also go out of business. . . .
The people of capital (Kapitalist) with their greed continue to produce
things, without measuring the needs of the inhabitants of their country.
Because of this, the things produced exceed the [inhabitants'] needs.
Various goods pile up and do not sell within the country because people
do not need to buy clothes and other materials every day . . . etc. Because
of this situation, factories (machines) that produce these goods are closed
down and hundreds of workers must be dismissed and have no livelihood
any longer. This also increases the destruction of the humanity in people,
and many transgress the prohibitions of their religion.
The ambitions of the people of capital are to increase their profits
continually, every day. They do not want to suffer even the smallest loss.
Therefore, capitalists always want to decrease the numbers of their work�
ers and to cut their wages. Above all, they look for countries to serve as
markets where they can sell their piled-up goods and things that are
newly produced. Furthermore, in seeking materiel (raw materials that are
used in factories), the capitalists have to look in other countries. In order
that the people of capital can sell their goods without anyone obstructing
them, countries that are made into markets must be totally subjugated
and become their colonies, either peacefully or by force of war (killings).
Because of the advent of machine-made goods that look nice, are
elegant in shape, and are cheap in price, native businesses that produce
only by hand are destroyed. The natives' freedom also greatly declines, or
disappears completely. As the years pass, poverty in the colonized coun�
try gets ever harsher. (Editor: Feel this and remember, Indonesia!)
Islamism and Communism 289
The search for colonies as markets for their goods or their capital
easily leads to killings (war) between one group of capitalists and an�
other, because of their competition.84
This is Misbach's explanation of capitalism, proletarianization, the
transformation of capitalism into imperialism, and imperialist war, for
which he heavily relies on Semaoen's Hikajat Kadiroen.85 Yet what is
characteristic of Misbach's explanation is his stress on greed. He sees
that "the people of capital (^Capitalist) with their greed continue to
produce things, without measuring the needs of the inhabitants of their
country." And he says "the ambitions of the people of capital are to
increase their profits continually, every day." The process of pro�
letarianization and the transformation of capitalism into imperialism
are not simply "mechanical." It is the greed that works through "com�
petition" and brings about proletarianization and the transformation
of capitalism into imperialism. To put it succinctly, the engine of
capitalism is, in Misbach's view, greed. Thus he continues:
Therefore we know that the aims of the people of capital are merely to
increase their profits without a thought for the thousands of other human
beings who are in misery. All the time and all the energy of the workers
are forcibly expended in order to gain profits for the people of capital-
for they are bound by the rules of the people of capital.
The people of capital exploit workers without regard for nation and
religion, and do not give a rap about the religious laws that must be
carried out by people with religion. . . . Everywhere the workers, who
have already sacrificed their labor, their thought . . . etc., in addition
sacrifice their religion, which is also destroyed by capitalism.
Thus it was because of the matters mentioned above that toewan Karl
Marx could get his idea that capitalism is evil and he could corrode
capitalism with historische materialisme. In that time toewan Karl Marx
wrote the book entitled "Kommuni[sti]sche Manifest" in 1847, in the
city of Paris.
In this Manifest, we can say for ourselves what is the position of the
communists.
Toewan Karl Marx explains that Communism grows from the seeds
sown by Capitalism deep in the hearts of the people, above all the
workers.
How could toewan Karl Marx say that Communism grows from the
seeds of Capitalism? Because it is born purely from the spirit of capital,
because the spirit of capital is so evil that it sows the seeds of hatred and
courage. [Communism] is created by capitalism itself and is summoned
up by capitalism solely in order to oppose it.
84Ibid., pp. 5-6. Italics in the original.
85Compare, for instance, Semaoen's discussion on proletarianization in Hikajat
Kadiroen,
pp. 97-98, with Misbach's.
290 An Age in Motion
The seeds of hatred and courage created by capitalism, that is what
toewan Karl Marx named "Communist."
People call Communism a hantoe [specter] or memedi [evil spirit], that
is, something that is frightening. Such an opinion is as it should be. For it
is self-evident that if we sow goodness we will reap goodness in return,
and if we sow rottenness (oppress, exploit, humiliate . . .) we will also
experience the fruits, that is, "Resistance." . . .
In the age of Capitalism, money becomes fundamental for human life.
Thus most people fall in love with money, so much so that they may be
called blindly in love. Their faces are made blind by money [literally,
coins], so that they forget their humanity and surrender their bodies and
souls to money alone.
We communists already know about all the conjuring tricks of capital�
ism, so capitalism cannot manipulate us, for Communism is truly a spec�
ter that emerges from capitalism. But aside from communists, other peo�
ple easily become the tools and playthings of capitalism. They see
capitalism as good and true, as something helpful and to be praised.
Indeed! We too know that capitalism is cunning and has various tricks,
with theories and tactics that are flexible and subtle, so it can turn every
religion into its tool.86
The engine of capitalism, or if we follow Misbach, "the spirit of
capital," is greed. In the age of capitalism, this greed, the spirit of
capital, takes the form of money. Capitalism uses various "conjuring
tricks" to "bind" people. But the key here is money, because most
people fall "blindly in love" with money and thus "their faces are made
blind by money." It is money, the temptation and greed money gener�
ates, that destroys human beings. What Misbach learned from "toewan Karl Marx" was
how money works in the age of capitalism and
his historische materialisme, which states that "Communism grows
from the seeds of Capitalism." Marx's Kommuni[sti]sche Manifest
struck Misbach by its very first sentence-"A specter is haunting
Europe-the specter of Communism." Literally reading "specter" as a
hantoe (specter) or memedi (evil spirit), Misbach located communism
in his view of human history since God created Adam. In his second to
fifth writings on Islamism and communism, he thus turned to his ex�
planation of "Religion" (Agama) and of why capitalism was yet an�
other attempt of Satan to tempt the faithful away from God.
Misbach gave his second to fifth writings on Islamism and commu�
nism the subtitle, "Islamism in the Face of Communism." Here his
purpose was to explain "what the religion of Islam commands in the
face of Communism." But before explaining this, he saw it as impera�
tive to explain "the position of the true religion of Islam," in order that
86Misbach di Manokwari, "Islamisme dan Kommunisme," Medan Moeslimin 11 (1925),
pp. 6-7. Italics in the original.
Islamism and Communism 291
"we who embrace different religions can understand and know clearly
the truth of life in this world."87 For reasons we will see, Misbach
stopped writing on this subject before finishing his excursion, but we
can still see in his writings why he saw capitalism as another of Satan's
temptations to get the faithful to discard their faith in God. He begins
this explanation with a discussion of the meaning of religion:
Brothers, know this!
Most human beings in this world embrace religions. Religions differ
from one another in what they acknowledge as true. Thus there occur
wars among believers of different religions to pursue and achieve the
truth that is acknowledged. Such happenings are not, however, the intent
of religion, but simply result from misguided human thinking. The expla�
nation is this:
religion means: Guidance from Almighty God for all the human
beings in the world. Now, there is only one Almighty God. Therefore, in
fact, there is only one true religion. Because there are not two, three, or
more Gods, so there are not two, three religions that are true.
It is said the Koran, Soerat Ali `imron a[jat], 19 [Imrans 3:19, in
Arabic script, then in Roman script, Innaddina `indallohil islam, the only
true faith in Allah's sight is Islam]. This means: The only religion ac�
knowledged by Allah is Islam.
Because of this verse, most people feel that the religion of Islam is the
only one that was brought by our Lord Prophet Moehammet S.a.w. Thus
there are some people of Islam who get arrogant and feel that only they
are in the right; thus they force those who embrace other [religions] to
hold their own faiths high and elevate their own leaders (Competition
among religions). Such opinions are actually darkness; what is bright
[clear] is this:
Religion means guidance from God.
Islam means Selamat. [The Javanese word for Islam is Selam\ selamat
means well-being.]
Therefore the Religion of Islam is guidance on the road that strives
toward well-being. That is the religion acknowledged by God.88
Why, then, are there many religions of different names and different
origins? Misbach reminds the readers that "God revealed religion, but
did not name it," and explains what this means. When God created
Adam and made him His first messenger, the religion conveyed by the
Prophet Adam is called the religion of Adam after his name. So are the
religions of "Ibrahim," "Boedo" (Buddha), and "Konghoetjoe" (Con�
fucius). The religion conveyed by the Prophet Moeso (Moses) is called
"Jahoedi." The religion conveyed by the Prophet Isa (Jesus) is
87Misbach di Manokwari, "Islamisme dan Kommunisme II: Katerangan Islamisme jang
terhadap kepada Kommunisme," Medan Moeslimin 11 (19x4), p. 34.
88Ibid., pp. 34-35.
292 An Age in Motion
called "Nasaroni" after the name of the land, "Nasaret," and is also
called "Kristen (Christian)" because Isa was crucified. And finally,
God revealed religion through the Prophet Muhammad. The religion
he conveyed is called "Islam," because this is the purpose of religion,
the guidance from God. Thus, "there is only one true religion that
guides human beings to live together peacefully in this world and in the
world hereafter." The very fact that God sent tens of prophets at
various times shows, Misbach says, "His great help to guide human
beings to well-being."89
By saying that all the religions were revealed by God, Misbach does
not mean that all religions are one and the same. Though he cautions
"some people of Islam who get arrogant" because of the Koranic verse
"The only religion acknowledged by Allah is Islam," there is no doubt
in his mind that the religion of Islam is the truest. By quoting from the
Koran-"When Allah made His covenant with the prophets, He said:
'Here are the Scriptures and the wisdom that I have given you. An
apostle will come forth to confirm them. Believe in him and help him.
Will you affirm this and accept the burden I have laid on you in these
terms?' They replied: `We will affirm it.' `Then bear witness,' He said,
`and I will bear witness with you'" (Imrans 3)-he underlines this
truest quality of the religion of Islam. But he does not dwell on it. He
then asks why religion revealed by God, which should be only one, has
become "various and fragmented."90 Misbach says this is because of
Satan:
Because of presence of Satan or of human beings who have Satan's
thoughts, the one true religion became fragmented. From the feudal age
onward, human beings fought over preeminence, money, power, and
grandeur (rank). Such people caused destruction of religion from within.
Those of religion's commands that were not in accord with the spirit of
Satan were easily thrown away. They chose to become merely hypocrites,
that is, professing religion with their mouths, but following Satan in their
hearts.91
Who are "human beings who have Satan's thoughts"? What is the
spirit of Satan? In Misbach's view, it is "none other than the spirit of
the nobility, the feudal people, and capitalism, the spirit that goes
astray from the truth, of those who make books that teach us to
distance ourselves from the truth of the true religion."92 He explains:
89Ibid., p. 35.
90Misbach di Manokwari, "Islamisme dan Kommunisme II: Katerangan Islamisme jang
terhadap kepada Kommunisme," Medan Moeslimin n (1925), pp. 70-71.
91Ibid., pp. 50-51.
92Ibid., p. 53.
Islamism and Communism 2-93
Now what will be narrated is the life of human beings when they were
still under the leadership of Adam, Prophet of Allah. They gathered fruits
from trees that grew of their own accord. With his leadership they also
did some planting of whatever could become human food. They also
covered their genitals with leaves and bark. Marriages between those
born from the same father and mother were still permitted, because the
number of human beings was still small.
At that time there were already human beings who did not want to
follow God's guidance. They had no religion. At that time there were
already killings over women. Because of all this, human beings got sepa�
rated from one another, brothers from brothers.
As the years went by, so the life of human beings progressed more and
more. For instance, [they developed] tools for cultivation, for cooking,
for hunting animals in the jungle or in the sea, and so on; also tools for
improving clothes. At that time there was still no system of buying and
selling, because there was no money yet. Everything proceeded by the
exchange of goods from one person to the next, according to what each
liked. All was under the guidance of the various Prophets sent by God.
As the years passed, the multitude of human beings constantly in�
creased. Thus their habitation was no longer in one place, as it had been
when they were still few; thus [human beings] formed communities and
settlements. In due course, relations between men became distanced and
the feeling of human brotherhood or unity vanished, except among those
who received the leadership of God's Messenger. These kept their feeling
that all human beings are still kinsmen, descending from one person, that
is Adam, Prophet of Allah.
Now, the story goes that because the spirit of Satan constantly planned
and desired to corrupt mankind, and above all to change mankind's belief
in God Allah, a way of thinking arose among human beings that tended
toward evil. They demonstrated their strength and boldness, they subju�
gated members of their own kinfolk, both those who lived with them and
those living elsewhere. They behaved like this because of the existence of
greed, and because they knew that powerful animals oppress and rob
weak animals of their possessions. From this time onward, people clearly
desire rights in property.
Events such as those mentioned above caused the appearance of lead�
ers or heads of communities or settlements, which were fragments of
what was at bottom still one family. Each community under a head then
organized itself with regulations, most of which, however, were meant
only for gaining influence. Those who became heads were the strongest
and dominated the rest. Each group also had different customs and differ�
ent beliefs. . . .
Because of the fragmentation [of mankind], there constantly developed
enmities, collisions, and violent quarrels. In the end, [these] led to the
establishment of Kings. In the age of kings, the system of government was
called Absolutemonarschie, which meant there were no restraints what�
ever on the government. All power was in the hands of the king, and not
one of his desires was obstructed. Even if his desire was to seize other
294 An Age in Motion
men's children, wives, or possessions, or even to kill them, it was fulfilled.
All the land was owned by the king and all the people were merely his
workers.
As the years went by, the regulations and various desires of the king
were ever more deeply felt by the people. Because this deep inner feeling
was not at all pleasant, it produced a desire to resist kings and their
retinues. Finally, revolts took place that destroyed them [the kings].
After government by kings (Absolutemonarcbie) was abolished, gov�
ernment by feudalists was set up, that is, [government by] the aristocracy
(the princes). Conditions in this age were also unpleasant for the people.
And in due course, the people gathered together, united, revolted, and
overthrew the feudal government, which had acted as it pleased. After the
fall of this feudal government, the [new] government established laws
that put an end to the arbitrary conduct of the aristocracy toward the
people. But these laws, too, did not generally please the people, because
they were written by the aristocracy and benefited and pleased only the
aristocracy; they did not decrease the eminence and grandness, both of
which could throw dust in the people's eyes.
Because these laws did not please the people, approximately in 1764
[sic] a Revolautie [Revolution] took place in Paris. It eliminated the
slander perpetuated by the servants of the laws which brought misfortune
to the people. With that, a [new] government was set up in Paris (a
Repiblik [s/c]), one ruled by the people. Groups of the people could
choose representatives and send them to the Parlement. . . . But the Parlement was
not pleasing either, since only the strong and powerful got
many votes. The representatives of the people, who genuinely put for�
ward the needs of the people, did not get many votes and in fact were
disregarded.
Though the Volksch raad [s/c] in Indonesia is merely a shadow parlia�
ment, or parleminan [puppet parliament], because it cannot decide any�
thing that it discusses, we ourselves know full well how one-sided it is,
that is, there is no voice of the people [to be heard] at all. Members who
side strongly with the people are not elected, and up till today it [the
Volksraad] is filled solely by [representatives of] the PEB. In short, if rule
by parliament were good for a country, the world would not be like it is
at present (chaotic, ruined, and with populations of whatever nationality
and religion all in misery). [If the reader wishes to know about this
clearly, let him read the text "Parlement atau [or] Sovjet," written by
Brother Datoek Ibrahim Tan Malaka. Ed[itor] M.M.)93
Here it does not matter how accurate or wrong Misbach's account of
absolutism, feudalism, and the French Revolution are in our terms.
What strikes us here is the smoothness and naturalness with which his
account moves from mythical to historical time, from the story of
93Misbach di Manokwari, "Islamisme dan Kommunisme II: Katerangan Islamisme jang
terhadap kepada Kommunisme," Medan Moeslimin 11 (1925), pp. 70-71. Italics in the
original.
Islamism and Communism 2-95
Adam's time to the story of the French Revolution. This shows that
Misbach read the Koran and The Communist Manifesto in the same
way, not metaphorically but literally. And in his reading, the story of
Adam, the story of the Prophet Muhammad, the specter of commu�
nism, the capitalists who had substituted naked, shameless, direct, bru�
tal exploitation for exploitation veiled by religions and political illu�
sions, and the Indies in which Misbach lived-all assumed the same
force of realness. Mythical time thus permeated historical time. There�
fore, though many things changed as years went by, one thing re�
mained constant in his eyes. "The spirit of Satan [has] constantly
planned and desired to corrupt mankind, above all to change man�
kind's belief in God Allah." In the past tempted by their desires for
preeminence, money, power, and grandeur, human beings-kings, the
nobility, feudal people, servants of law-became Satan's agents. Capi�
talism, whose spirit takes its form in money, is nothing but the latest
model of Satan's attempt to corrupt human beings and let them aban�
don their faith in God. Therefore, in his eyes, capitalism is slander and
as such provides a test-Misbach would perhaps say the test-to
prove one's faith in God. To abandon faith in God only invites God's
wrath. He writes:
The guidance of God Allah, which was brought by the Prophet Noech
[Noah] was denied even by some of his friends. Truly God Allah is
always merciful to His servants; and because of his Mercy God provides
evidence for the unbelievers, so as to draw them to His commandments,
which surely will make them live selamat [in well-being] in this world and
the world hereafter.
So, at one time, the Prophet Noech received a command from God to
make a Boat for himself and for his friends to board. After that, God sent
[down] much water, called the Great Flood. All those who denied God's
commands died because of that flood, but the Prophet Noech and his
friends were all selamat [saved].
God Allah has brought danger to mankind, to convince them of the
truth, not just that once, but many times over, as is explained by the
following:
Koran, section 8, verse 6z [Heights 62].
Those who denied My [Allah's] commands, their hearts were blind,
[and] I destroyed them all. I drowned them in the flood that is called
hurricane. Only the Prophet Noech and his friends, who boarded the
boat together, did I save.
When God ordered the Prophet Saleh to spread His religion, those
people who denied him were also visited with danger. So it is described in
the Koran, section 8, verse 75 [Heights 75).
The haughty ones, who violated God's proscriptions, spoke as follows:
"Hei, Prophet Saleh, if you are truly one sent by God, bring down the
menace of God of which you speak." At that very moment down came
296 An Age in Motion
the troops of God-thunder and tremendous earthquakes, and several
thunderbolts which struck them. They fell down unconscious and died
there on the spot.
The same thing happened with the Prophet Loet [Lot], as is mentioned
in the Koran, section 8, verse 81 [Heights 81]:
"I [God] delivered the Prophet Loet and his friends, who were believ�
ers, with the exception of his wife. The rest I punished severely by letting
loose a shower of stones [upon them] and turning their land upside
down. From this, behold the fate of those who commit sins."
The examples just mentioned are meant to remind human beings not
to stumble into conduct that is misguided, has the spirit of Satan, and is
like [that of] animals-that is, thinking only about their own bodies
rather than helping one another. Those who have gone astray are those
who want only to get food or profit, without considering what is wrong
and what is right. Thus their deepest fear is fear of those who give them
food.94
At this point, Misbach stopped writing and although he promised to
explain more about Islamism and communism, his subsequent writings
on the subject never appeared in Medan Moeslimin. Neither Misbach
nor Haroenrasjid, deputy editor-in-chief ("Chairman Misbach in Manokwari" remained
the editor-in-chief), explained why, but the reason
was perhaps the illness of Misbach's wife, whose tuberculosis seriously
worsened after she arrived in Manokwari. Yet the basic message Mis�
bach hoped to convey was already in sight in his fifth article. It was
"Don't be afraid of fellow human beings" and "Be afraid of God
Allah." Here to "Be afraid of God Allah" meant "to carry out all His
commands." All the appeals he made in Surakarta and in Manok�
wari-Courageous because in the right! Call what is right right, wrong
wrong! Don't be afraid! Fight against slander! Bury capitalism!-had
the same meaning: Be afraid of Allah.
Shortly after Misbach stopped writing on Islamism and communism,
he requested permission to go abroad in May 1925, if possible together
with his wife and children, and if not, alone, sending his family back to
Surakarta. The primary reason for this was the illness Misbach, his
children, and above all his wife suffered in Manokwari, though the
news that the Communist Party of Holland named him a candidate for
the Tweede Kamer (Second Chamber) in the coming election might
also have encouraged him to do so.95 But government permission was
slow to come. In July Misbach's wife died. Two months after that
Misbach was allowed by the government to go abroad at his own
expense. Haroenrasjid called on the readers of Medan Moeslimin to
contribute money to finance Misbach's journey to Europe. The PKI
^Misbach di Manokwari, "Islamisme dan Kommunisme II: Katerangan Islamisme jang
terhadap kepada Kommunisme," Medan Moeslimin n (1925), pp. 82-83.
9'"H. Misbach di kandidatkan lid Tweede Kamer," Medan Moeslimin 11 (1925), p. 152.
Islamism and Communism 297
central leadership also started its own campaign to raise money.96 But
the money Haroenrasjid raised and sent to Misbach was far from
enough. The PKI central leadership did not send money to Misbach.
Misbach remained in Manokwari and kept "moving." Though the
membership never reached more than twenty because of police intim�
idation and harassment, he nonetheless established the Manokwari SR.
He also continued to send articles to Medan Moeslimin on conditions
in Manokwari.97 And in early 1926 he wrote the article "Advice,"
which was published in the April 1, 1926, issue of Medan Moeslimin.98
In this article he briefly explained his views on Islamism and commu�
nism:
Hai, brothers! Know this! I am a person who professes to be faithful to
Religion and also enters the field of the communist movement. I also
acknowledge that my thinking with regard to the truth of the commands
of the Islamic Religion became more and more opened wide only after I
studied the science \ilmoe\ of communism. Therefore I now dare to say
that the welfare of this world has been in chaos up to the present because
of the devils of capitalism and imperialism with their cruel spirit. Because
of them not merely our well-being and our freedom-of-life in this world
are being ruined but even our belief in Religion.
Since I obtained this knowledge, I have always been thinking in my
heart about its relationship to Religion, because I feel that the communist
science is a new discovery. And I have come to think-and thus the
feeling of my heart can dare to decide-that the commandments of Re�
ligion must also be used to explain the regulations of the communists.
So that we may continuously understand the articles of God's com�
mands that are written down in the Koran, let us get some verses [from
the Koran] that [are connected with] the communist science. Such things
can increase the enlightenment in my heart.
This enlightenment arouses a deep feeling in my heart, such that our
tears come out, and these tears increase our fear of God. In turn, all this
can replace with new thoughts those [old] thoughts that we had been
carrying out for such a long time; for our deeds that were judged as being
based on religion were [actually] very far from the true commandments
of religion.
Religion is based on equality and solidarity, submission to God Al�
mighty, and equal rights for all human beings in this world in social
matters. Human beings are really high or low only in relation to their
spirit of humanity. Of spirits there are three kinds:
96"H. M. Misbach ke Eropa," Medan Moeslimin 11 (1925), p. 238. "Ra'iat Indonesia
teroetama jang Islam, tolonglah, ketoea kita H. M. Misbach diloeloeskan pindah ke
Europa," Medan Moeslimin n (1925), pp. 254-256. Njala, 21 Oct. 1925, IPO, 4?
(1925).
See Misbach, Djawa-Manokwan Baik di ketahoei, Medan Moeslimin 10 (1924), pp.
331 ~"332-; "Hal jang kedjadian di Manokwari," Medan Moeslimin 10 (1924), p. 333;
`'Man�
okwari bergontjang, Reactie oentoek communist tenroe dan soedah bijasa," Medan
Moeslimin n (1925), pp. 156-159; "Foja-Foja: Sikapnja wakil pemerintah Manokwari,"
Medan Moeslimin n (1925), pp. 271-272.
>8Misbach, "Nasehat," Medan Moeslimin 12 (1926), pp. 145-148.
298 An Age in Motion
1. a spirit of humanity 2. a spirit of animality 3. a spirit of deviltry. A
spirit of humanity is one that is based on a feeling for the public well�
being. A spirit of animality is one that pursues well-being only for one's
self, one's family, and one's descendants and does not like to think about
other people even a little. A spirit of deviltry is one that constantly ruins
and destroys human beings or, more precisely, destroys the public wel�
fare.
Hai, all our friends! When we enter the field of the pergerakan we must
base ourselves on the principles of true religion, so that we do not suffer
losses in this age of resistance, and [so that] we are fortunate in victory or
fortunate in the life hereafter. Sacrifice your riches and your lives to
pursue truth and justice with respect to our social life in this world.
Human beings are obliged to practice truth and justice only while
living in this world. But the deeds we do in this world will be investigated
and handled by God with perfect justice on the Last Day. It is then that
we will know and feel how great the difference is between suffering and
delight in that world, according to what we have done in this one.
This is why I entered the field of the pergerakan, never forgetting the
principles of true religion; and [why] I must perform the religious duties
laid upon us, as indeed I have been doing."
This "advice" literally became Misbach's will. Shortly thereafter he
suffered malaria and died on May 24, 1926. Misbach was buried by a
small group of Manokwari SR members in the Penindi cemetary, Manokwari, alongside
his wife.100
"Ibid., pp. 146-147.
100The next day, Haroenrasjid received Misbach's last letter, sent in early May, in
which
Misbach thanked Haroenrasjid for sending money he had raised and asked him to
inquire of
the PKI central leadership as to what had happened to the money it raised in the
name of
sending Misbach to Europe. "Soerat dari H. M. Misbach jang achir sendiri jang di
terima
sesoedahnja dia wahat," Medan Moeslimin 12 (1926), pp. 266-268. Misbach's three
chil�
dren returned to Surakarta in late July, accompanied by Sakimin, a Manokwari SR
member
who remained loyal to Misbach to the end. "H. M. Misbach dan wakil-wakil pemerintah
dalam oeroesan pelajaran," Medan Moeslimin 12 (1926), pp. 315-316; "Wafatnja
Almarhoem H. M. Misbach," Medan Moeslimin 12 (1926), pp. 316-317; "Isteri ketoewa
H. M. Misbach al-marhoem," Medan Moeslimin 12 (1926), p. 316; "Tiga anak jatim
piatoe
dari aim. H. M. Misbach poelang dari pemboewangan," Medan Moeslimin 12 (1926), pp.
3I7-3I9-
8 Final Years
On August 20, 1924, shortly after Misbach was banished to Manokwari, the right of
assembly was restored in the city of Surakarta. This
liberalization measure in the age of reaction provided an unexpected
opportunity for pergerakan activists to "move" in Surakarta. In early
September Marco Kartodikromo returned from Salatiga and revived
the PKI Surakarta section and the Surakarta SR. Nine years after he
had left for Semarang prison, he was back again in Solo and was to
remain there for the last two years of his career as a pergerakan leader,
until his arrest and final banishment. But these were difficult years for
Marco and his comrades-in-arms. The Indies government was now
determined to crush communism and took every legal, police, and
administrative measure to suffocate the pergerakan. In reaction, the
PKI decided to make a revolution at the end of 1925, went into the illfated revolts
in late 1926 and early 1927, and collapsed. In these final
years of the pergerakan, Marco led the resurgence of the PKI and the
SR in Surakarta and then helplessly witnessed their demise. What was
the pergerakan Marco led in Surakarta like? What did he witness when
he gradually lost control over the pergerakan in 1926? Who joined him
in his effort to revive the pergerakan? Why did Marco return to Sur�
akarta in the first place? Let us follow Marco's journey to Digul to
witness the final years of the pergerakan in Surakarta.
Marco's Return
Marco was a leading figure of the Surakarta SI in its early days; he
achieved his "national" eminence by waging "a war of voice" in the
journal he published in Surakarta in 1914-15. He was not a Solonese,
299
300 An Age in Motion
but as a satria who started his pergerakan career in Solo, he always
overshadowed the pergerakan there, even when he was away from
1915 to September 1924. Every time the CSI wanted to revive the
Surakarta SI, the task was given to Marco. Every time Solonese at�
tempted to revive the SI, he was on the executive committee. But after
he left Surakarta in 1915, Marco's journey was literally from prison to
prison and his credentials as a pergerakan leader were built not on
whatever power base he might have in Surakarta but on this journey.
Marco served his first prison terms from July 1915 to March 1916 in
Semarang prison, and then after his five-month sojourn in Holland,
went back again to prison, this time in Weltevreden, from February
1917 to February 1918. Upon his release from prison, he joined Semaoen in Semarang
and became a commissioner of the rising Semarang
SI and an editor of its organ, Sinar Hindia. In the exciting age of trade
unions and strikes, he remained a journalist-turned-pergerakan leader.
Though he was given the post of chairman of the Semarang SIcontrolled Foresters'
Union (Wono Tamtomo) to "eat," the only thing
he did for the union at his own initiative was to put out its organ, Soero
Tamtomo. He continued to build his career as a journalist, writing
what he wanted and going to prison on the charge of press offenses. He
edited Sinar Hindia and Soero Tamtomo, published Student Hidjo, and
wrote poems such as "Sama Rasa dan Sama Rata [Solidarity and
equality]" and "Mardika [Freedom]." As the Semarang SI rose as a
new center of the SI, so did his star. At the 1919 CSI congress, he was
elected a CSI commissioner, characteristically in charge of journalism.
Marco never became an ISDV/PKI member in his Semarang days.
Though he raised a militant voice, his militancy came not from his
ideological conviction as a Communist but from his desire to say what�
ever he wanted to say without holding back anything that was on his
mind. He was and tried to remain a satria, and as such he was as close
to Soewardi, who perhaps understood him best, as to Semaoen. But all
the same his militancy annoyed the Dutch. Reporting on the 1919 CSI
congress, P. J. Gerke, an official attached to the adviser for native
affairs, concluded that the CSI was not "morally" strengthened and
cited Marco's appointment as a CSI commissioner as evidence. In his
view, it would "compromise" the CSI as seriously as the retention of
Sosrokardono and Soekirno, who were arrested, respectively, for the
involvement in the Afdeeling B affair and the embezzlement of SI
money.1 The government then provided a helping hand for the CSI to
strengthen itself "morally." In April 1920 Marco was prosecuted for
the third time on the charge of press offenses, for his poem "Sjairnja
Sentot [The poem of Sentot]" and the old article he wrote in 1914 in
^wantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging: 1917-medio 1923, p. 230.
Final Years 301
Doenia Bergerak, "Regent Bergerak [Regent in motion]." As he point�
ed out in his letter of defense, "Sjairnja Sentot" was the same in content
with "Sama Rasa dan Sama Rata." It was not, however, the content
but the title that sounded provocative to Dutch ears. It reminded the
Dutch not of Sentot, a hero in the Java War who later served the Dutch
in the Padri War, but of Roorda van Eijsinga's bloody poem
"Vloekzang: De laatste dag der Hollanderen op Java door Sentot
[Curse song: The last day of the Dutchmen in Java by Sentot]." It was a
grave enough offense. Marco was sentenced to six months' imprison�
ment and stayed in the hotel vrij (free-of-charge hotel)" from April to
October 19 20.2
When Marco was released from prison, the pergerakan was in con�
fusion because of Darsono's attack on Tjokroaminoto and the subse�
quent squabbles between the Semarang PKI faction and the Yogyakarta CSI faction.
Dismayed by Darsono's unsatrialike attack on
Tjokroaminoto, Marco left Semarang, joined the CSI faction in Yogyakarta, and
emerged as the deputy secretary of the CSI and an editor of
the newly started CSI organ, Pemberita CSI, in December 1920.3 But
his career as the CSI deputy secretary turned out to be brief. Initially he
joined other CSI leaders in attacking the Communists. Along with
Fachrodin he published a brochure, Pan Islamisme, and criticized the
Communists for destroying "the movement for the unity of Islam." But
the government did not allow the volksmisleider (people's misleader)
to raise his voice. His brochure Rahasia Kraton Terboeka (The secret
of the palace exposed), his novel Matahariah, and the new journal he
started with Soerjopranoto and Soewardi, Pemimpin (Leader), all were
confiscated by the police as soon as they appeared.4 As Marco himself
put it, the message was clear: he had to keep quiet.5 Besides, and
perhaps more important, he found himself increasingly marginalized
and isolated in the CSI as Agoes Salim and Abdoel Moeis came to
dominate the CSI leadership and maneuvered to expel the PKI mem�
bers from the CSI. In late August 1921, two months before the CSI
congress introduced party discipline, Marco resigned as CSI deputy
secretary and announced his retirement from the pergerakan. He made
this decision, he explained, because "I no longer have many friends
who share the same feeling, the same purpose, the same striving, and so
2Marco, "Soerat Perlawanan Persdelict," Persatoean Hindu, 7 Aug. 1910. See also
Persatoean Hindia, 20 Mar. 1920; 4 Sept. 1920.
3Pemberita CSI was published by the CSI standing committee composed of
Tjokroaminoto
(chairman), Soerjopranoto (deputy chairman), Agoes Salim (secretary), Marco (deputy
secre�
tary), Fachrodin (treasurer), and K. H. Ahmad Dahlan (adviser). Pemberita CSI, Dec.
17,
1920, IPO, 1 (1921).
4Boedi Oetomo, 1 July 1921, IPO, 27 (1921). Oetoesan Hindia, 27 July 1921, IPO, 31
(1921).
sSinar Hindia, 20 Aug. 1921, IPO, 34 (1921).
302 An Age in Motion
forth with me and there is no way to purify myself other than to
remove myself from this depraved world." He continued: "In the near
future something will happen, [but] I myself will remain neutral and
gather the names of our leaders from newspaper reports and add to
them strange events that happened in the Indies, so that they can later
become the remembrance for our children and grandchildren."6 Marco
clearly saw the death of the pergerakan in the CSI split. His plan was to
retire from his life as a satria, become a pandita (sage) at his ascetic
retreat in Salatiga, and write a history of the pergerakan.
Marco moved to Salatiga in September 1921, but had hardly any
time to embark on his new project. In December he was once again
prosecuted on the charge of press offenses for Rabasia Kraton Terboeka, Matabariab,
and the articles he wrote in Pemimpin and was
sentenced to two years' imprisonment.7 He served his prison terms in
Weltevreden and returned to Salatiga in December 1923. But he was
no longer in retirement. By that time the PKI and Red Sis were emerg�
ing triumphant over the CSI/PSI as the unifying force of the pergera�
kan. Like many others who remained active in the pergerakan and
chose the PKI in 1923 and 1924, Marco also joined the party and made
his first public appearance as a PKI member at the Salatiga Red SI rally
in February 1924.8
The only remaining star who joined the PKI in the Vorstenlanden
and their vicinity, Marco tried to reassemble forces Misbach had once
led in late 1922 and 1923. He attended the Moehammadijah congress
in Yogyakarta in 1924 as a PKI representative and, urging political
action, said, "If the Moehammadijah is willing to follow not only
three-quarters or a half of the Koran like at present but all its precepts,
it should set to work in politics." But Marco was not Misbach.
Whereas Misbach, a muballigh, caused a commotion and invited a lot
of jeering at the 1923 Moehammadijah congress, Marco, a theosophist, was simply
ignored. The Moehammadijah central leadership let
him say whatever he wanted to say and then called on all the Muslims
in the Indies to remember that communism was not in accord with
Islam and instructed its branches to sever relations with the Commu�
nists.9
6Persatoean Hindia, 17 Sept. 1921. For a slightly different text of Marco's
announcement,
see Boedi Oetomo, 9 Sept. 1921, IPO, 37 (1921); Sinar Hindia, 20 Aug. 1921, IPO, 34
(1921).
7Islam Bergerak, 10 Dec. 1921. Soeara Ra'jat, 31 May 1922, IPO, 30 (1922). See also
Marco Kartodikromo, Persdelicht dan Soerat Perlawanan dari Marco Kartodikromo
(Djok�
jakarta: Tijp Sneidrukkerij Sri Pakoealaman, 1922).
sSinar Hindia, 26 Feb. 1924, IPO, 9 (1924).
9Verslag der jaarvergadering van de vereeniging Moehammadijah van 28 Maart-i April
1924, Mr. 644X/24. See also Sinar Hindia, 16 Apr. 1924, IPO, 17 (1924).
Final Years 303
Returning to the pergerakan, he again started his own journal.
Hidoep (Life), in July 1924, assisted by H. Djabir Moeda (Yogyakarta
Red SI treasurer) and Rangsang (editor of Senopati, a Javaneselanguage weekly
published in Surakarta), and began to write a history
of Java and the pergerakan.10 But diverging from his original plan, the
project he set out to write was a history ofJava from the Hindu period
to the present and to compile biographies of pergerakan leaders. He
named his history ofJava "from the Hindu age to the present age of the
pergerakan" "Babad Tanah Djawa [Chronicle of the land of Java]."
Though the title might remind us of Babad Tanah Djawi, compiled
under the reign of Mataram, and lead us to think that Marco's "Babad
Tanah Djawa" was an attempt to replace the old dynastic history of
Java with a "national" history, this was not what Marco primarily
intended. He explained his purpose in writing "Babad Tanah Djawa"
in the following way:
We badly need to know the babad [chronicle] of our land and people,
because although some of our goals do not stress matters of kebangsaan
(.nationalisme), still it is essential that we know about all this so that we
can more easily proceed to the field of progress. It is still more important
for the kaoem kebangsaan (nationalisme) [nationalists]. In a [particular]
babad story, very often they do not tell what really happened, but take
sides, since most of the babad writers are under the influence of other
people or of money. That is why each person's knowledge about the
babad is different from everyone else's. Furthermore, the babad that we
describe here is more [a collection of] explanations and quotations taken
from babad books that I have read; whether the contents of this book are
true or not, that is up to you readers to decide for yourselves.11
As Marco said, his history was indeed filled with "explanations and
quotations" from history books and journal articles written by Dutch
Javanologists such as Veth, Stutterheim, Brandes, Kern, and Hazeu.
And the point he made in writing "Babad Tanah Djawa" lay in this
very fact. He filled his history with "explanations and quotations"
from history books and articles written by Dutch Javanologists, but
they were now in Indonesian. Old Javanese culture and history had
long been conquered by Dutch Javanologists since the nineteenth cen�
tury. It was the conquest of Javanese-language world by Dutch. "The
truth" was now in Dutch and thus became inaccessible to the great
majority ofJavanese. Marco's project was an attempt to take back "the
truth" to "us" Indonesians by translating Dutch explanations and quo10Hidoep, 1
July 19Z4.
"Redacteur-Uitgever [Marco], "Hidoep," Hidoep, 1 July 19M-
304 An Age in Motion
tations into Indonesian. That was the reason it was "we" who would
describe the babad and it was "up to you readers to decide" "whether
the contents of this book are true or not."
While Marco wrote his history, he also started to write a collection
of biographies under the title "Martyrs of the People's Movement." He
explained his purpose this way:
Maybe it is now time to make a book of remembrance about the
journey of those leaders of the People in Indonesia who together have
made the sacrifice of being banished or imprisoned. The truth is that
notes of this kind ought not to be published before these men die, for, as
long as a human being lives, his journey is not yet over.
The Europeans have long composed stories of this type-what they
call biography, notes about the journeys of famous people. [But] to make
notes of this type, [one] has to get information from these persons them�
selves, or from their families and their friends, and also from the news�
papers.
Although the following information is not yet truly complete, I think it
is enough to understand the journeys of leaders of the People whose
names are well known among the People. This writing is only a
beginning-something the People in Indonesia will of course be able to
perfect.12
While "Babad Tanah Djawa" was Marco's attempt to take back the
history of Java from Dutch to Indonesian, "Martyrs of the People's
Movement" was his attempt to compose a hagiography of pergerakan
leaders and to leave their journeys as "mirrors" (examples). Indonesianization of
Javanese history and hagiographical compilations of In�
donesian national heros thus began with Marco's projects. Yet he com�
pleted neither "Babad Tanah Djawa" nor "Korban Pergerakan Rajat."
He stopped writing "Babad Tanah Djawa" in the middle of his discus�
sion on the coming of the Dutch and the establishment of Batavia, and
he wrote notes and collected newspaper articles only on Misbach and
Semaoen under the title "Korban Pergerakan Rajat," due to his move
to Surakarta to become the chairman of the Surakarta PKI and SR. By
so doing, he made his final decision. He chose to become not a pandita
but a satria, a leader whose journey would end with offering himself as
a "mirror" and sacrifice for the people's movement.
Why then did he decide to return to Surakarta? Though Marco never
12Marco Kartodikromo, "Korban Pergerakan Rajat," Hidoep, i Sept. 19x4. This project
was soon taken up by the Communistische Kantoor van Volkslectuur in Bandung with
the
publication of Semaoen's biography. Nota betreffende de door den Resident van
Kediri
aanbevolen wijze van bestrijding der communistische propaganda door contra-
propaganda,
uitgaande van Volkslectuur, 17 Dec. 192.4, Mr. 7X/Z5.
Final Years 305
explained it explicitly, there are perhaps two reasons. First, it was his
conviction that all the meanings of life were in the pergerakan. In
explaining the reason to publish Hidoep, he says in his introduction:
As all you readers know, the word "Hidoep" [Life] has two meanings:
first, the name of the originfal force] that is able to create the world and
its contents; second, the name of a condition. That is why it is not wrong
to say that: wherever there is life, there too there is movement [perger�
akan]; every movement inevitably entails sacrifice; every sacrifice inevita�
bly brings some good. . . .
The reason I named this newspaper "Hidoep" is none other than that
those who feel "alive" can quickly concentrate their determination to
move, in order to achieve our true "life," glorious and holy, unstained by
despicable thoughts. . . .
In view of the current of the world [today] and to fulfill our obligations
as human beings, we must not despair of striving to perform [our] obliga�
tion to hold our humanity up high.13
The key to understanding Marco lies in his association of life with
pergerakan and sacrifice. As Soewardi put in relief satna Marco in his
open letter in 1915, Marco here again is saying that the meaning of
"life" can be sensed only when one sacrifices oneself for the imagined
"we" and suppresses oneself for what "we" represents. But in one
important respect, he had to change. In 1915 "we" shared the imag�
ined hierarchy of inner excellence, but not the commanding voice that
represented the hierarchy. One could prove his satriahood only by
voicing what one thought was right and by acting on one's words. But
the PKI was there in 1924 as the party whose commanding voice was
leading the pergerakan and whose eventual victory over capitalism was
assured by "the current of the world." "The party" demanded that its
members suppress their first-person voice in the name of organization
and discipline and required them to be Communist soldiers. Marco had
to be a Communist soldier to be a true satria. He returned to the
pergerakan not to act out his words but to suppress his first-person
voice for the sake of the people the party represented. And to "move"
as a Communist soldier, Surakarta was an ideal place for Marco, for he
could prove himself to be a "friend" of Misbach. In concluding his note
on Misbach in his article "Korban Pergerakan Rajat: Hadji Moehammad Misbach," Marco
wrote:
In January 1923, when I was still serving [myl prison sentence at
Vrijmetslaarsweg in Weltevreden, Misbach needed to come and see me
together with a woman and a man.
13Redacteur-Uitgever [Marco], "Hidoep," Hidoep, 1 July i9M- Italics in the
original.
306 An Age in Motion
"Many of our friends ran away because of fear, but I must work for
the pergerakan till [my] death." So said friend Misbach to me.14
The other reason Marco chose Surakarta for his arena was an unex�
pected opportunity opened up there in 1924. The right of assembly was
restored in the city of Surakarta as well as in the residency of
Yogyakarta on August 20. There were two reasons for this measure.
First, the government always understood that the suspension of the
right of assembly was a temporary measure to eliminate a serious and
immediate threat to the public order. Even in "red" Semarang, there�
fore, the suspension of the right of assembly declared in May 1923 was
lifted in October 1923. In this light, lifting the suspension of the right
of assembly in the Vorstenlanden, which had been in effect since May
1920 in Surakarta and February 1922 in Yogyakarta, was long over�
due. Second, the administrative and agrarian reforms in the Vorsten�
landen had finally been brought to completion in early 1924. In the
absence of any serious threat to the public order, the completion of
reorganization eliminated any convincing ground to justify the con�
tinued suspension of the right of assembly. Yet the government was
cautious not to let a situation like that in 1919-20 arise again in the
Surakartan countryside. And there were reasons for caution. The tran�
sitional five-year measure that entitled plantations to procure peasant
labor for the cultivation of plantation crops in the form of paid corvee
labor was to expire in the regency of Klaten after 1925. The local
authorities expected many disputes to arise between plantations and
peasants over wages and rent. Former bekel were still there, displaced
from their privileged positions and resentful of the authorities. Wide�
spread peasant grievances over wages, rent, and corvee obligations to
the state and the village, in combination with the presence of many
displaced bekel, formed a fertile ground for SR propaganda. The brief
activities of the Klaten SR in late 1923 and early 1924 demonstrated
this danger, because Klaten SR leaders, voicing peasant grievances over
taxes, corvee obligations, rent, and wages, succeeded in organizing
circles in Delanggu and Jatinom in a month or two. The Klaten SR was
soon crushed by the police.15 The suspension of the right of assembly,
for the violation of which the police arrested Klaten SR members,
proved to be a powerful weapon. The authorities also learned the
14Marco Kartodikromo, "Korban Pergerakan Rajat: H. M. Misbach," Hideop, i Sept.
192-4-
15Established in December 1923 under the leadership of Djoewardi, Ngaliman, S.
Moechamad, and Moedjiman, the Klaten SR succeeded in organizing a circle on the
Wonosari sugar
plantation (district Delanggu) in December 1923 and another in Jatinom in early
January
1924. But the police soon learned of their existence and destroyed the SR by
arresting
members or forcing them to surrender their membership cards to the authorities.
IPO, 4
(192.4), PP- 151-153, 162, 165; 7 (1924), p. 302; 9 (1924), p. 384; 14 (192.4), P-
2.7.
Final Years 307
lesson that there were grievances among peasants that could be suc�
cessfully exploited by SR leaders and activists. Besides, while planta�
tions were concentrated in the vicinity of the city in Yogyakarta, they
were spread out all over the residency of Surakarta, especially from the
city to the west, to Delanggu, Klaten, and Prambanan. If the right of
assembly was restored in the countryside and SR activists were allowed
to "move" freely, the authorities rightly understood, it would be ex�
tremely difficult for the police to control their propaganda activities.
The suspension of the right of assembly was thus lifted only in the city
of Surakarta, while it was lifted all over the residency of Yogyakarta.16
Yet it was still a great opportunity for Marco as well as other PKI/SR
leaders and activists to "move."
In early September 1924 Marco thus returned to Surakarta and
settled down in Keprabon in the central part of the city. On September
14, three weeks after the right of assembly was restored, the first SR
members' meeting was organized. The house where the meeting was
held could accommodate five hundred persons. Though SR member�
ship cards were sold as tickets in advance as well as in front of the
house, Marco was perhaps not sure if enough Solonese would show up
to fill the house. He mobilized 150 Salatiga SR members. But as it
turned out, more people came than the house could accommodate and
those who could not enter the house were forced by the police to go
home. The gathering was presided over by Marco, chairman of the
preparatory committee of the Surakarta SR, who declared that the SR
would "strive for obtaining rights for the People in political and eco�
nomic fields" and called for the cooperation of Communists and Mus�
lims. From Yogyakarta came Sismadi Sastrosiswojo as the representa�
tive of the Yogyakarta PKI and SR; he attacked the Moehammadijah
for its harassment of Yogyakarta SR rallies. In response, Kyai Iman
Bisri, a leading muballigh of the Moehammadijah Surakarta branch,
announced that he would not oppose the SR, that he agreed with its
principles, and that the purpose of communism was not incompatible
with Islam. It was a good sign. The establishment of the Surakarta SR
was agreed on, and the meeting successfully ended.*~ Shortly after that
the PKI Surakarta section was revived by Marco on September 20.
Marco became chairman, while Respati became secretary, Wiromartono treasurer, and
Moetokalimoen and Soewarno commissioners.18
16See Kwaantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging: medio 1923-1928,
pp. 169-184.
X7Api, 18 Sept. 1924, IPO, 39 (1924). See also Api, 13 Sept. 1924, IPO, 38 (1924),
for the
announcement of the meeting.
18A brother of Soemono, the Madiun SR activist who was killed in a bomb explosion
in
1923, Respati was born in 1902, graduated from an HIS, and after four years of
schooling at
the Kweekschool in Weltevreden, worked at a postal office in Semarang, at the
Nlangkunegaran Legion, and then as a trader dealing in sugar, tea, and rice. He
first emerged as a
308 An Age in Motion
The Surakarta SR was formally established two months later on
November 22. Alimin came from Batavia as the representative of the
PKI central leadership and declared that the purpose of the SR and the
PKI was to "demolish" capitalism. "Misbach in Manokwari" still very
much overshadowed the meeting. Two themes were emphasized about
the SR and the PKI. Echoing Misbach, local SR activists argued that the
path to Allah lay in communism and that "we true Muslims" should
join the SR and the PKI. The other theme was the world character of
communism. Medan Moeslimin reports Alimin's speech:
[Alimin said] that the right hand of the PKI is the railways, and its left
hand all the ports (Batavia, Tjeribon, Semarang, Soerabaja, Makasar,
Padang, etc., for instance). Its chest is the Post and Telegraph Of�
fice . . . etc. If we Communists should once be able fully to master all of
these, then the world of Capitalism will easily be turned upside down and
become a world of Communism. . . .
The organizations Sarekat Ra'jat and PKI [Partij Kommunis Indo�
nesia] exist not only in Indonesia but in big cities all over the world.
[There are] the PKL (London Communist Party), the PKR (Russian CP),
the PKD (German CP), the PKJ (Japanese CP), the PKM (Egyptian CP),
the PKI (Irish CP), the PKP (Paris CP), the PKN (Netherlands CP), the
PKA (American CP). . . .
The population of the world after the Great War of 1914-18 was
19,000,000,000. The number of Communists in the world at the time of
the Conference in Kanton [Canton] was 14,000,000.19
Everywhere, all over the world, there are Communists, and their num�
bers are increasing. If only "we Communists" closed ranks, "the world
of Capitalism will easily be turned upside down and become a world of
Communism" and "true Muslims" would be able to liberate them�
selves to follow the path to Allah. That was the theme of the SR rally.
The meeting also elected the Surakarta SR leadership. Marco became
chairman and Haroenrasjid (deputy editor-in-chief and adviser on re�
ligious matters of Medan Moeslimin) vice-chairman, while Moetokalimoen (chairman of
the VSTP Surakarta branch), Koenkijat alias Masjoedoelhaq (editor of Medan
Moeslimin), H. Oemar (batik entrepre�
neur in Kauman), and Wirosoeharto (batik entrepreneur in Lawean)
were elected first and second secretary and first and second treasurer,
pergerakan activist in 1922 as an ally of Islam Bergerak editors attacking the
Moehammadijah. Wiromartono was born in Pasar Kliwon, Surakarta, in about 1893, and
after three years
of schooling at the HIS he became a batik trader in Lawean.
19"H. M. Misbach di Boeang: Ra'jat Solo teroes bergerak," Medan Moeslimin 10
(1924),
PP- 330-331-
Final Years 309
respectively.20 Under Marco, two major forces were represented in the
SR leadership: trade union activists represented by Moetokalimoen
and Islamic propagandists of the Moe'alimin movement who saw the
path to Allah in communism following "Misbach in Manokwari."
The establishment of the Surakarta SR was then followed by vig�
orous propaganda activities. SR open rallies and members' meetings
were organized almost every week. The SR mobilized its members to
welcome back PKI/SR activists released from prison. When Hardjodiwongso was
acquitted at the native court in December 1924, after
having been held in prison for fourteen months since his arrest along
with Misbach, some five hundred SR members led by Marco greeted
him in front of the native court building singing the "Internationale."21
In late 1924 the Surakarta SR also started up publication of its organ,
Habromarkoto, with Marco as editor-in-chief.22 By early 1925 Marco
thus established himself as the leader of the Surakarta PKI and SR. He
led both SR public rallies and members' meetings, and he edited and
published the Surakarta SR organ. PKI/SR activists who attacked him
(for instance, S. Moechamad, editor of Habromarkoto) were expelled
from the party. The SR membership exceeded seven hundred. Yet the
government had already begun to move against the PKI and the SRs. In
reaction, the PKI central leadership had also started to move toward
making a revolution. These developments were to have a profound
influence on the pergerakan in Surakarta and they led to Marco's loss
of control over the Surakarta PKI and SR and the collapse of the
pergerakan in 1926.
The Government versus the Party
As Darsono triumphantly declared at the June 1924 PKI congress in
Batavia, the PKI and Red SIs/SRs emerged victorious over the PSI/CSI
in their struggle for the hegemony of the pergerakan by the middle of
1924. This development placed the pergerakan in a new political con20Ibid., p. 330.
H. Samsoeri (a batik entrepreneur in Tegalsari), Sastrowidjono (a tailor in
Kauman), Kartopandojo (a batik printer in Lawean), Atmosoemarto (a batik
entrepreneur in
Lawean), and Hardjomaroeto became commissioners.
2'Api, 8 Dec. 192.4, IPO, 51 (1924).
22It was originally started by Sandjojo in August 1924 as Senopati. When it was
trans�
formed into the Surakarta SR organ under the new name Habromarkoto, S. Moechamad
(former Klaten SR leader) and Sastrodihardjo (former administrator of Doenia
Merdeka, the
Klaten SR organ) replaced Sandjojo as the chief editors. But soon after that, S.
Moechamad
drifted to the Soediro's SR and Marco took over its chief editorship. See Senopati,
16 Aug.
1924, IPO, 38 (1924); 27 Sept. 1924, IPO, 53 (192.4); 25 Oct. 1924, IPO, 48 (1924);
Habromarkoto, 8 Nov. 1924, IPO, 50 (1924); 8 Jan. 1925, IPO, 6 (1925).
3io An Age in Motion
text. The government now equated the pergerakan with the communist
movement. It was certainly aware that Red Sis and SRs were little
different from former Sis. But the PKI was a different matter. The
government saw communism as alien to the native society and the PKI
under the command of the Comintern. In the eyes of the Indies govern�
ment, therefore, the combination of indigenous Red Sis and SRs with
alien communism looked extremely dangerous to the colonial order.23
In early September 1924 Governor General Fock convened the Council
of the Indies specifically to discuss measures to "control" communism.
The meeting was followed by a series of legal, police, and administra�
tive measures to deny the Communists the means to "move."24
First, the prosecutor general instructed the local authorities and the
police to "act tougher" toward Communist gatherings-public rallies,
members' meetings, and cadre-training courses. Youths under eighteen
years old were legally prohibited from attending gatherings. At SR
members' and cadre-training meetings, the police required participants
to show their SR membership cards, noted down their names, and
compiled SR membership lists. More policemen attended SR public
rallies, more frequently stopped speeches when speakers voiced some�
thing "harmful" to the public order, and sometimes ordered rallies to
dissolve altogether. More speakers were arrested on the charge of
speech offenses and were sentenced to longer prison terms. In some
places, especially in Madiun and Priangan, the police broke up SR
gatherings by force.
Second, the government started to control Communist newspapers
more tightly. Editors of PKI and SR organs were more liberally pros�
ecuted on the charge of press offenses and it became a part of life for
editors to spend several months a year in prison. Every time editors
were arrested, their offices and houses were raided by the police and
the newspapers they edited were confiscated. As the prosecutor general
reported to the governor general in May 1925, "the confiscation of
extremist newspapers" took place "on the order of the day."25
Third, the government issued a circular in September 1924 to clarify
the "muzzling circular" and prohibited state employees from criticizing
the state authority in both overt and covert fashion on threat of dis�
missal. To suffocate ra'jat schools run by SRs, the government also
took measures to deprive ra'jat schoolteachers of their teaching certifi�
cates. Combined with the compilation of PKI and SR membership lists,
23See Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging: medio 1923-1928,
pp. 240-248.
24The following account of government measures to "control" communism is based on
Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging: medio 1923-1928, pp.
199-
239, 249-300, 328-364.
25Ibid., p. 306.
Final Years 311
these administrative measures proved highly effective. Many who had
something to lose started to stay away from the SRs and Communistled trade unions.
By the middle of 1925 Communist influence among
native administrative officials and police personnel, as well as in the
military, virtually died out.26 Most ra'jat schools, whose number had
exceeded one hundred in the middle of 1924, closed down. Though the
VSTP and the Sarekat Postel (the State Railway workers and the Postal
and Telegraph Service personnel were state employees) maintained
their precarious existence, here again many members quit the unions
because of their fear of dismissal.
Along with these measures, agents and informers of the Algemeene
Recherchedienst ever more deeply penetrated the PKI and SRs. How
thorough was this penetration can be glimpsed from the fact that the
Algemeene Recherchedienst obtained all the secret instructions the PKI
central leadership sent to the sections from September 1924 to June
1925.27 And though not immediately adopted, the idea of eliminating
PKI and SR leaders and propagandists from their home bases by mass
banishment started to be entertained among high-ranking government
officials. In January 1925 J. J. Schrieke, the government respresentative
for general affairs at the Volksraad, proposed to the governor general:
For the recognized PKI propagandists there is practically no choice but
that between propaganda and prison. ... A humane way out is opened
up by application of the exorbitant rights. . . . These circumstances
should make possible the establishment of a special place of residence for
such persons, on an island that is uninhabited (or whose population has
been evacuated), not unhealthy, not too big, situated in the deep sea, easy
to guard, offering space for about one hundred families, without a post
office-where each internee can be provided with a hut and a plot of land
for his permanent dwelling.28
The government was joined in its effort to "control" communism by
other associations and groups. The Sugar Syndicate established its own
intelligence network to monitor the pergerakan in Java in 1923 and
started to exchange intelligence with the Algemeene Recherchedienst
on a regular basis.29 In late 1925 the Sugar Syndicate furthermore
instructed its members to dismiss all the PKI, SR, and SBC� (Sarekat
Boeroeh Goela, Sugar Workers' Union) members.30 Anti-Communist
26Ibid., p. 329.
27Ibid., p. 331.
28Ibid., p. 275.
29Most of the Sugar Syndicate's intelligence reports can be found under the title
"Overzicht
nopens de Inlandsche Beweging in de Suikerstreken op Java (O.I.B.)."
30Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging: medio 1921-1928,
p. 415.
312 An Age in Motion
associations also became active. In West and Central Java in late 1924
and early 1925, the Sarekat Hidjo and other similar associations were
set up at the initiative of the local authorities, who broke up SR meet�
ings, beat up SR leaders and propagandists, and terrorized SR mem�
bers. The Sarekat Hidjo dealt an especially severe blow to the PKI and
SRs in Priangan, where many quit SRs and several SRs collapsed in
early 1925.31 In East Java, the Politiek Economische Bond financed by
the Sugar Syndicate and assisted by the authorities made anti-Communist
propaganda.32 And in Yogyakarta, the only remaining PSI/CSI
stronghold, the Moehammadijah harassed SR rallies by having their
members occupy the front seats at SR rallies, jeer at speakers, demand
debate, and call on Muslims to leave the rallies.33
In late 1924 and 1925 government anti-Communist measures and
activities of anti-Communist associations and groups increasingly
pushed the PKI into a corner. The less intransigent Communist follow�
ing was eaten away by discouragement, while the more irascible PKI
adherents got increasingly impatient with the party's failure to attack
the existing order by means stronger than words.34 Under these cir�
cumstances, the PKI central leadership in Batavia started to change its
course. Shortly after the governor general convened the Council of the
Indies to discuss measures to "control" communism in September
1:924, the PKI central leadership met to discuss countermeasures and
then sent its secret instructions to the sections on September 29: first,
not to organize public rallies but to concentrate on members' meetings
and cadre-training courses in order to avoid further arrest and prosecu�
tion of PKI and SR propagandists on the charge of speech offenses;
second, not to establish SRs anymore but to intensify efforts among
workers, particularly in plantation, railway, communications, harbor,
mining, and oil enterprises; and third, to "let those who want to be SR
members become PKI candidate members" and to "select from among
SR members those who can be incorporated as PKI members."35 Ap�
parently, the instructions were opposed by PKI sections. Soon the PKI
central committee sent new instructions, clarifying that the September
31For the Sarekat Hidjo and other anti-Communist organizations in WestJava, see
McVey,
Indonesian Communism, p. 295; Heather Sutherland, "Pangreh Pradja: Java's
Indigenous
Administrative Corps and Its Role in the Last Decades of Dutch Colonial Rule," pp.
353-
372-
32Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging: medio 1923-1928,
pp. 413-415.
?3For Moehammadijah's anti-Communist activities, see Api, 1 Sept. 1924, IPO, 37
(1924);
22 Sept. 1924, IPO, 40 (1924); 2 Oct. 1924, IPO, 41 (1924).
34For the effectiveness of anti-Communist measures taken by the government, see
Hoofd
der Algemeene Recherchedienst, "Geheim Rapport," Vb. 29 Apr. 1926, No. Q7.
3""Hoofdbestuur PKI aan alle Sectie-besturen der PKI en SR, Spoed Circulaire,
Weltevreden, 29 Sept. 1924," Mr. 1002X/24. See also OIB no. 14 (Oct. 1924), Mr.
1002X/24.
Final Years 3i3
29 instructions were meant to be its proposal at the coming PKI confer�
ence in Yogyakarta in December 1924.36 Yet it clearly signaled the
coming change in the party line.
On December 11-15, 1924, the PKI conference was held in Kota
Gede, Yogyakarta.37 Ninety-six delegates representing thirty-eight PKI
sections (1,140 members) and forty-six SRs (31,000 members), includ�
ing S. Moechamad representing the Surakarta PKI section and Marco
and Moetokalimoen as the Surakarta SR delegates, attended the con�
ference. Aliarcham explained the proposals of the PKI central commit�
tee: to abolish the petit bourgeois SRs; to expand and discipline the
PKI through the formation of cells based on the ten-man system; and to
intensify efforts to organize workers into revolutionary trade unions.
But the proposal to abolish the SRs met strong opposition from Darsono and other
Semarang PKI leaders. The result was a compromise.
The conference decided that the SRs should be retained, without
adding new members, until its adherents were winnowed out. But the
shift of PKI activities was now clear. The emphasis was on organizing
trade unions and transforming the PKI from a cadre party into a mass
party. Second, the new PKI central committee was elected. Sardjono
(chairman), Boedisoetjitro (secretary), Winanta (treasurer), Alimin and
Aliarcham (commissioners) formed the standing committee. Soewarno
of the Surakarta PKI was elected a commissioner representing PKI
sections in the Vorstenlanden and vicinity. Third, the PKI now justified
its new line in terms of a revolution it would make in the near future.
The language ran amok and passed the threshold beyond which no one
could tell for sure what was rhetorical and what was really meant. The
last issue of Soeara Ra'jat, which was entirely devoted to the confer�
ence, declared: "Since nothing further was to be gained by legal revolu�
tionary action, the party must attempt to revolt. ... If the general wiil
to revolutionary deeds is already strong among workers, among peas�
ants, and also among the petit bourgeoisie in Indonesia, the will to
power must grow every day to the point where it will become a great
fire that will destroy all the oppressive capitalist domination. . . . The
task of the PKI must be the vanguard of the People to destroy the old
social order and to replace it by the new."38
After the conference, the PKI central leadership sent a series of in36McVey,
Indonesian Communism, p. 262.
37The following account of the PKI Kota Gede conference is based on McVev,
Indonesian
Communism, pp. 262-275; 16 and 17 Dec. 1924, IPO, 52 (1924); 20 Dec. 1924, IPO,
52 (1924); Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging: medio 1923-
1928, pp. 264-266; De Regeeringsgemachtigde voor algemeene zaken hi) den Volksraad
(J. J. Schrieke) aan GG, 30 Jan. 1925, Mr. 125X/25; Procureur Generaal aan Hoofden
van
Geweestelijk Bestuur, Rondschrijven, 19 Feb. 1925, Mr. 214X/25; Chef der Algemeene
Recherchedienst, "Geheim Rapport," Vb. 29 Apr. 1926, No. Q7.
3HSoeara Ra'jat, 17 Dec. 1924, IPO, 52 (1924).
314 An Age in Motion
structions to the sections to guide the party along the new line. Instruc�
tion number 1, dated February 26, 1925, told the sections to organize
not cadre-training courses but cell meetings led by heads of groups of
ten and to organize local toughs into cells to fight back against the
Sarekat Hidjo and other anti-Communist associations.39 In instruction
number 2, dated March 24, the party leadership called on the sections,
the SRs, and the Communist factions in the unions to strengthen
discipline-"no member is allowed to deviate from the line decided by
the party and the central leadership"-and instructed the formation of
cells in factories and enterprises and in kampung (city quarters), while
cautioning that "kampung populations are composed of various
groups and classes, namely workers, petit bourgeoisie, officials, spies,
etc., and the strength that resides in kampung is not strong enough to
build a communist society."40 Instructions number 3, 4, and 5, issued
in April and May, again called for the formation of cells on the basis of
the ten-man system, and in instruction number 6b, dated June 5, 1925,
the party leadership told the sections that the SR executive committee
was to be transformed into the SR commission and be completely
subjugated to the section leadership for the sake of "democratic
centralization" and "strong and lasting discipline" and that cells based
on the ten-man or five-man system and subsections composed of cells
should be formed in the section.41
If all these instructions had been followed by the sections as the party
leadership had hoped, SR members would perhaps have been incorpo�
rated into the PKI as disciplined party cadres capable of carrying out
underground activities. But the instructions were hardly followed.
Some sections did form subsections on a territorial basis. But organiz�
ing cells on the basis of the ten-man or five-man system and putting
aside the SR were wholly different matters. SRs, too important for
sections to put aside, continued to exist. The section leadership needed
cadres with loyalty and discipline strong enough that they could be
completely trusted to form cells. Yet it was those qualified cadres that
were in short supply. Thus, along the lines agreed on at the Kota Gede
conference, most PKI sections did only one thing: they called on SR
members to join the PKI as candidate members and eventually as mem�
bers. PKI ranks swelled. The result was the transformation of the PKI
from a cadre party into an undisciplined mass party.
While the PKI unsuccessfully tried to reorganize itself, it also
inten39Hoofdbestuur P.K.I. aan alle secties van de P.K.I., "Instructie No. 1,
Spoed," Mr.
761X/25.
40Hoofdbestuur P.K.I. aan de secties, onderbouws en fracties der communisten in de
vakbonden, "Instructie No. 2, Zeer Geheim," 24 Mar. 1925, Mr. 761X/25.
41"Instructie No. 3," Mr. 761X/25; Hoofdbestuur P.K.I. aan de Secties der P.K.I.,
18 Apr.
1926, Mr. 761X/25; Hoofdbestuur P.K.I. "Instructie No. 5," 13 Apr. 1925, Mr.
761X/25;
Hoofdbestuur P.K.I. aan het sectiebestuur der P.K.I., "Instructie No. 6b," 5 June
1925, Mr.
761X/25.
Final Years 3i5
sified its work to organize workers into revolutionary trade unions.
Shortly after the Kota Gede conference, top party and union leaders
met in Surabaya on December 20-21 and decided to join the PKIcontrolled unions in
the Secretariat of Red Indonesian Labor Groups
under the chairmanship of Aliarcham. In February 1925 the existing
Indonesian seamen's and dockers' unions were merged into one organi�
zation, the Sarekat Pegawai Pelaboehan dan Laoet (SPPL, Seamen's
and Dockers' Union). Efforts were also made to revive the VSTP, the
Sarekat Postel, and the Sugar Workers' Union (SBG). Various machineshop and metal
workers' locals were combined into the Union of Ma�
chine Shop Workers. The Printers' Union, the Chauffeurs' Union, the
Coachmen's Union, and many other groups also were revived. But it
was a prelude to disaster. The success of union activities lay in the
restiveness and disaffection of workers, who had been hit for so long
by recessions and by Fock's economy drive. Once unions were in place,
workers pressed union leaders for action to improve their economic
conditions and went on wildcat strikes. From the middle of 1925 on
workers struck-dockworkers, nurses, and printers in Semarang;
printers in Batavia and Bandung; and finally machine-shop workers
and nurses in Surabaya. But the government was ready to crush strikes
with Article 161 bis of the Indies Criminal Law. The right of assembly
was suspended. Striking workers were dismissed. Union leaders and
propagandists were arrested. By the end of 1925 the strikes were over
and Communist-led unions were largely in collapse.42
In the wake of strikes, the government took further measures to
control communism. Aliarcham (PKI commissioner), Mardjohan (PKI
commissioner and "strike dictator" in Semarang), and Darsono were
arrested and banished.43 In November and December 1925 the govern�
ment also denied the right of assembly to the PKI, the SR, the VSTP,
and several other Communist-led unions and associations. Then on
May 1, 1926, the government introduced Article 153bis and ter of the
Indies Criminal Law, which subjected to stiff punishment those who
"intentionally express in word, writing, or illustration-be it oblique�
ly, conditionally, or in disguised terms-approval of the disturbance of
the public peace or overthrowing or interference with the established
authority in the Netherlands or the Netherlands Indies, or who create
an atmosphere favorable to this" and those who "distribute, exhibit, or
publicize" materials of this sort.44 With the denial of the right of
assembly to the PKI, the SR, and other Communist-led unions and
42For the activities of Communist-led trade unions in 1925, see McVey, Indonesian
Com�
munism, pp. 275-277, 305-310; "Overzicht der Inlandsche Beweging over het jaar
19^5,
Mr. 432X/26.
43Kwantes, De Ontwikkeling van de Nationalistische Beweging: medio 191s- iqzS,
pp. 365-381.
44McVey, Indonesian Communism, p. 326.
316 An Age in Motion
associations and the introduction of Article i53bis and ter, the three
major means and forms of the pergerakan-strikes, rallies and meet�
ings, and newspapers-were denied to the PKI. By that time, however,
the PKI central leadership had already decided to "move" people by
other means. On December 25, 1925, major PKI leaders-Sardjono,
Boedisoetjitro, Winanta, Moesso, and several others-met at Prambanan, decided to
make concrete plans for insurrection, and called on
party members for the creation of an underground party structure.45
The PKI was heading for a revolution that was to seal the fate not only
of the PKI but also of the pergerakan.
The Surakarta PKI and SR in Motion
When the Surakarta PKI and SR under Marco started to organize
rallies and meetings and to publish its organ in the last months of 1924,
the government had already set out to control communism and the
party leadership was heading for a new party line-to make a revolu�
tion. These developments shaped the larger context in which the Sur�
akarta PKI and SR under Marco carried out their propaganda ac�
tivities. But while it took time for the Surakarta PKI to follow the new
party line, anti-Communist measures that the government adopted
were immediately felt by the Surakarta PKI and SR. As soon as the PKI
section and the SR were formed in Surakarta, Marco and several other
leaders were placed under surveillance. SR members' meetings and
cadre-training courses were tightly controlled by the police, with par�
ticipants of these meetings being required by the police to show their
SR membership cards and have their names noted down, and whenever
one could not produce a membership card meetings were declared
open and ordered to dissolve. The police also repeatedly raided the
printing firm Sie Dhian Ho, which printed the SR organ, Habromarkoto, and
confiscated not only the newspaper but also the type for
printing it. By early February 1925 the firm was no longer willing to
print Habromarkoto, and since no other printing firms were available,
the organ ceased publication.46
In the countryside, the right of assembly remained in suspension as a
reminder that any propaganda activity for the SR would invite harsh
police suppression. Yet Surakarta PKI and SR propagandists did at�
tempt to organize peasants into SR circles. In Tempel, near the border
of the Semarang residency, an SR circle was established in late 1924
and it led peasants in their disputes with the Tempel plantation.47 In
45Ibid., pp. 312-313.
46Panggoegah, 4 Feb. 1925, IPO, 8 (1925).
47Resident van Surakarta (Nieuwenhuys) aan GG, 30 Jan. 1925, Mr. 138X/25.
Final Years 3*7
May 1925 Hardjodiwongso, a leading trade union propagandist of the
Surakarta PKI, also made propaganda for the SR among peasants on
the Manang tobacco plantation just south of Lawean, and those who
joined the SR demanded a wage increase by threat of strikes.48 In both
cases, however, the authorities acted swiftly, arresting SR members and
crushing SR circles. Indeed, the authorities had by then come to see
peasant strikes not as a form of peasant collective protest but as actions
instigated by SR propagandists, and thus they clamped down on strikes
indiscriminately.49 As Resident Nieuwenhuys remarked at the resi�
dents' meeting in January 1925, Surakarta was "calm," if not in the
city, definitely in the countryside.50
In the city, PKI and SR leaders carried out their propaganda ac�
tivities with SR public rallies and members' meetings as the major
vehicle. From late 1924 on, gatherings were organized almost every
week. Public rallies attracted eight hundred to fifteen hundred people,
while members' meetings usually were attended by two to three hun�
dred. Twice at the opening and closing of a gathering, the "Interna�
tionale" and sometimes "Darah Ra'jat" were sung. Usually three to six
speakers made speeches. Aside from Marco, major stars were Siswomintardjo (a former
ra'jat schoolteacher from Semarang who moved to
Soerakarta as an editor of Habromarkoto in early January 1925),
Sastrowidjono (a tailor in Kauman and a commissioner of the SR),
Ahmad Dasoeki (a teacher of the Madrasah Soennijah Mardi Boesono
in Keprabon), and Woro Soemarisah (chair of the women's branch of
the Surakarta SR), though Soewarno (commissioner of the PKI central
committee and the Surakarta section), Moetokalimoen (Surakarta PKI
commissioner and SR secretary), Sandjojo (SR propagandist),
Wirosoeharto (Surakarta PKI and SR treasurer), and several others did
appear on the stage once in a while. Each speaker had his or her pet
topic. Siswomintardjo stressed the importance of "independent" edu�
cation and called for the establishment of a ra'jat school.51 Woro
Soemarisah talked about women's role in the pergerakan.'2 Sastrowid�
jono and Ahmad Dasoeki, quoting passages from the Koran, explained
that the path to Allah lay in communism.53
Marco always chaired these rallies and meetings and echoed the
4HApi, IPO, 22 (1925), p. 374. On the Manang plantation, nine SR members were
arrested
and sentenced to forty days' imprisonment in May 1925.
49See the fate of a peasant strike on the Wonosari sugar plantation in Klaten,
reported in
Boedi Oetomo, 27 Dec. 1924, IPO, 1 (1925).
50Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 30 Jan. 1925, Mr. 138X/25.
51See, for instance, his speech at the SR public rally held on Feb. 8, 192.5, in
Darma Kanda,
11 Feb. 1925, IPO, 8 (1925).
52"H. M. Misbach di Boeang: Ra'jat Solo teroes bergerak," Medan Moeslimin 10
(1924),
p. 330.
53"Solo dan Gerakannja," Medan Moeslimin 10 (1924), pp. 62-63.
318 An Age in Motion
commanding voice of the PKI central leadership. At a public rally held
on February 2, 1925, at the wayang orang theater in Purwodiningratan, Marco voiced
the party decision of the Kota Gede conference
to transform the PKI from a cadre party to a mass party. Darma Kanda
reports: "Marco gave a description of various [current] situations in
Europe, particularly in Russia, and of the spread of communist organi�
zations all over the world. He concluded his speech by urging SR
members to join the PKI in the interest of uniformity and for the sake
of making the acquaintance of members of communist organizations
outside Indonesia."54 When the PKI central leadership started to cam�
paign for the support of "Chinese revolution" after the death of Sun
Yat-sen in March 1925 and the Shanghai incident in May, he loyally
launched a campaign for the support of "Chinese revolution." At a
public rally held on July 19, 1925, attended by representatives of Kong
Sing, Comite Sjanghai-fonds (the Shanghai fund-raising committee),
Tjong Hoa Hwee Kwan, and several other Chinese associations, Mar�
co, together with Alimin and Njo Joe Tik of Kong Sing, called for the
support of the Chinese revolutionary movement.55
Public rallies and members' meetings proved highly successful in
mobilizing support for the PKI and the SR. The SR membership in�
creased from seven hundred in January 1925 to seventeen hundred in
May in Resident Nieuwenhuy's estimate and reached three thousand
by the end of the year. This alarmed the resident. The patih issued a
"muzzling" circular in May 1925 prohibiting the sunan's princes, rela�
tives, and officials from joining the PKI, the SR, and other PKIaffiliated unions
and associations.56 But it was hardly effective, be�
cause few of them had joined the SR to begin with. As the emergence of
Kauman, Keprabon, and Lawean as three major Communist centers in
the city indicates, those who joined the SR and contributed to its
expansion were batik workers, especially batik printers, and pious
Muslim entrepreneurs, traders, and craftsmen.
The emergence of batik workers as a major force of the pergerakan
was something new in Surakarta. Following the new party line, the PKI
Surakarta section started to organize workers into trade unions after
the Kota Gede conference. Trade union propagandists revived or
formed unions such as the VSTP, the Union of Machine Shop and
Electrical Workers, the Sarekat Postel, the Printers' Union, and the
Chauffeurs' Union. The Sarekat Boeroeh Batik (SBB, Batik Workers'
Union) was one of the unions established in the middle of 1925 with
Hardjodiwongso (a batik printer) as chairman and Soegito (former
government schoolteacher who became a batik printer after being disS4Darma Kanda,
11 Feb. 1925, IPO, 8 (1925).
55Api, 20 July 1925, IPO, 31 (1925).
36Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 19 May 1925, Mr. 490X/25.
Final Years 3i9
missed from his teaching job) as secretary/treasurer. Batik was the
major industry in the city of Surakarta, and batik traders and entrepre�
neurs had played an important part in the pergerakan since the early SI
days. Yet batik workers played no major role in the SI in the 1910s.
Nor did they form a major force in the Insulinde and the NIP-SH in
1918-20. No batik workers' union was established in the age of
strikes. But they were not left out for long. With their wages substan�
tially raised in the boom years of 1919 and 1920, batik workers,
especially young, unmarried, relatively well-paid batik printers, had
ready cash. And if they had formerly spent their money for opium,
gambling, and killing time at a stall, they now followed a new
fashion-dressed in white shirt and trousers, riding a bicycle, and
going to Sriwedari and other theaters to see films, wayang orang, and
ketoprak. They looked and behaved like, as de Kat Angelino put it,
"petty priyayi."57 But the days of economic boom did not last long.
The recession started in 1922 and the Surakarta batik industry was hit
severely. From then on, batik workshops largely stopped production in
the slack season and operated at less than half of their total productive
capacity even in the months from June to August, when peasant de�
mand for batik clothes was high. Batik workers' wages went down.
And as the recession dragged on, they were gradually laid off. In 1925
and 1926 the recession was particularly severe, and even in the peak
season of 1925 batik workshops operated only at 20 to 30 percent of
their total capacity.58 The pergerakan reached batik workers in this
situation. Batik workers, especially batik printers, attended SR gather�
ings and joined the SR and the SBB. No major batik workers' strikes
took place, perhaps because they knew that batik entrepreneurs were
also in trouble. Yet their plight was real, and because they remembered
the boom days in 1919-20, they knew things could be otherwise. It
was "the system of capitalism" that should be accused and attacked.
As de Kat Angelino writes in Batikrapport, "Almost all the printers
were members of the PKI action."59 By the end of 1925 the SBB be�
came the largest Communist-led union in Surakarta, with its member�
ship exceeding five hundred. Sondakan, Lawean, and Purwosari were
the centers of SBB activity and batik workers functioned as unpaid SR
propagandists in their workplaces and in their villages when they were
laid off or had no cloth to work on.
The Comite van Vakbonden (Committee of Trade Unions) was
formed sometime in the middle of 1925, with batik printers as its
vanguard. It was a Solonese version of the Secretariat of the Red Indo�
nesian Labor Group, established in Surabaya in early 1925 to coordi57Batikrapport,
vol. 2, p. 109.
58Soerachman, Het Batikbedrijf, pp. 48-50. Batikrapport, vol. 2, pp. 98-101.
59Batikrapport, vol. 2, p. 101.
320 An Age in Motion
nate trade union activities. It was led by Soendoro (former administra�
tor of Sinar Hindia/Api who moved from Semarang to Surakarta in
early 1925), Moetokalimoen (VSTP Surakarta branch chairman),
Hardjodiwongso (SBB chairman), Soegito (SBB secretary/treasurer),
Sjarief (administrator of Medan Moeslimin and chairman of the
Sarekat Postel), and several other trade union propagandists.60 The
workers the Comite van Vakbonden organized were not many, at most
one thousand. But the formation of the Comite itself was a major
achievement of the Surakarta PKI along the new party line decided at
the Kota Gede conference.
Devout Muslims-religious teachers, batik entrepreneurs, traders,
and craftsmen-joined the SR by way of the Moe'alimin movement.
The Dutch wrongly understood that the Moe'alimin movement was a
tabligh branch of the Mardi Boesana to carry out Communist propa�
ganda among pious Muslims in the guise of Islam and that the Mardi
Boesana was a Communist-front organization established by the PKI
Surakarta section with the Moehammadijah as its model.61 But there
was no such association as the Mardi Boesana and the Moe'alimin
movement started after Misbach's arrest in October 1923 and before
the establishment of the Surakarta PKI and SR in September 1924.62
As the word Moe'alimin, the plural form of Moe'alim, which means
"(religious) teacher," indicates, the Moe'alimin movement was an Is�
lamic missionary movement in which a group of Moe'alimin "pro�
pagandists" organized tabligh gatherings ("Islamic courses"), read pas�
sages from the Koran and hadith in Arabic, translated them into
Javanese, and interpreted and explained their meanings in the context
of the Indies and in a "revolutionary" way, using "the science of com�
munism" (ilmoe communisme).63 It was not an association in a formal
sense. It had no central committee, no treasury, no office, and no
membership. Anyone could attend its gatherings, which, being reli�
gious in nature, were allowed to be held without much police harass�
ment in 1924 and 1925.
The Moe'alimin movement derived its distinct identity from two
sources. First, it was identified with a group of propagandists
(mualimin). In Keprabon, teachers of the Madrasah Soennijah Mardi
Boesana-Ahmad Dasoeki, his brother Oesmoeni, K. H. Mawardi,
and his brother K. H. Mashoed-were leading Moe'alimin propagand�
ists and regularly organized gatherings at the Madrasah. In Kauman,
60Resident van Surakarta aan Directeur van Justitie (D. Rutgers), 14 Feb. 19Z7, Mr.
416X/26.
61See Wd. Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken (R. A. Kern) aan GG, 23 Feb. 1926, Mr.
416X/26.
62Proces Verbaal (Sastrowidjono), Mr. 5 5oax/27.
63See Marco's explanation of Moe'alimin gatherings in Voorzitter (Marco) namens het
bestuur van PKI-Solo aan het Hoofdbestuur van PKI te Weltevreden, 24 Feb. 1926,
trans�
lated by Wedana Polisi te Surakarta (Ramelan), Mr. 521X/26.
Final Years 321
Haroenrasjid (deputy editor-in-chief of Medan Moeslimin), Wiromartono (a batik
entrepreneur and a founding member of Misbach's
SR), Atmosoemarto (a batik entrepreneur), and Sastrowidjono (a tai�
lor) led Moe'alimin gatherings at the Winogan prayer house. When the
Surakarta SR was established, most Moe'alimin propagandists joined
the SR and formed the majority of the SR executive committee mem�
bers: Haroenrasjid (vice-chairman); Koenkijat, alias Masjoedoelhag
(second secretary); H. Oemar (first treasurer); Wirosoeharto (second
treasurer); H. Samsoeri, Sastrowidjono, Kartopandojo, and At�
mosoemarto (commissioners). The Moe'alimin movement thus
emerged as an ally of the Surakarta PKI and SR, while maintaining its
autonomy as demonstrated by the fact that it found its de facto organ
in Medan Moeslimin which remained independent of the Surakarta
PKI and SR throughout 1924-26.
Second, the Moe'alimin movement derived its own ideological iden�
tity as a movement of "Revolutionary Islam" (Islam Revolutioner)
from its thrust of "fighting against fitnah" and from Misbach's
writings, especially "Islamism and Communism." Ahmad Dasoeki, a
leading "theoretician" of the Moe'alimin movement and an editor of
Medan Moeslimin, echoed Misbach in his explanation of "Revolution�
ary Islam" this way:
Brothers! As a Muslim I feel obliged to help or join the ranks of the
pergerakan of Communism because I also feel that this pergerakan will
help our Religion. As a Muslim I also feel obliged to take my hat off from
afar, as a sign of gratitude to Karl Marx and others who have become
guides to show us how we can perform Allah's commands. Though K.
Marx and others are said by many people to be infidels, they are the
reason we are able to learn about the biggest obstacle to our Religion, the
obstacle we must fight with all our strength as long as we are still ob�
structed by this obstacle, that is, the system of capitalism, which sucks the
blood and sweat of us, the great majority of the people. And furthermore
we find a hadith in the text "Djami'oessoghir," which says "Irmallohalajoe'
ajjidoel Islama biridjalin mahoem min ahlibi." This means: "God
Allah will confirm the Religion of Islam through men who are not Mus�
lims." Therefore even if K. Marx and others are not people of Islam, I am
convinced that the opposition organized by K. Marx and others will
surely make it easy for us to perform, and bid men to perform [the
commandments of] our Religion. Therefore I have joined the ranks of
Communism, with the sole intent of defending our Religion. So I ask all
the brothers who are convinced that Communism does not violate the
law of the Religion of Islam-let us be ready to join the pergerakan of the
PKI with the aim of defending our Religion, and let us also follow' the
commands of our Religion.64
64Verslaggever, "Peladjaran Agama Islam Loeas. Islam Revoloutioner Solo
diperhatikan
orang. (Koempoellah hei kamoe ra'jat Indonesia diatas barisan jang akan
mengantjoerkan
322 An Age in Motion
The number of Moe'alimin propagandists was perhaps quite small,
at most thirty to forty. Unharassed by the police, however, Moe'alimin
gatherings became ever more popular in the course of 1925, attracting
increasing numbers of pious Muslims, and spreading from Keprabon
and Kauman to the east to Gandekan, Sewu, and Pasar Kliwon, and to
the west to Purwosari and Lawean. Because of the nature of the move�
ment, there is no way to know how many attended Moe'alimin gather�
ings regularly, but one thing was clear: as Deputy Adviser for Native
Affairs R. A. Kern noted, the Moehammadijah Surakarta branch lost
much of its following to the Moe'alimin in 1925.65
This is where the uniqueness of the Surakarta PKI and SR and the
reason for its success lay, as will become clearer if we compare
the Surakarta PKI and SI with the Yogyakarta PKI and SR.66 The
Yogyakarta PKI and SR, led by Tedjomartojo (PKI and SR chairman;
former PPPB secretary), Djadi (PKI vice-chairman; former government
school assistant teacher), Sastrosoedirdjo (PKI secretary/treasurer and
SR vice-chairman; VSTP Yogyakarta branch chairman), and Ngadiman (SR
secretary/treasurer; SBG propagandist), was as successful as
the Surakarta PKI and SR in mobilizing popular support in 1924 and
early 1925, and the Yogyakarta SR membership increased from one
hundred in May 192-4 to two thousand in May 1925. But its success
was due to different factors. In Yogyakarta, the Moehammadijah
stronghold, where an anti-Communist united front of devout Muslims,
the Oemat Islam (Community of Islam), was formed with Moeham�
madijah propagandists as its vanguard, the PKI and SR made little
inroad among pious Muslims.67 Instead, PKI and SR propagandists
carried out their propaganda activities in the countryside after the right
of assembly was restored in August 1924 and succeeded in mobilizing
peasants into SR circles.
The propaganda activities for the SR in the countryside centered on
the Gesikan sugar plantation in Bantul, where an SR circle was estab�
lished in April 1925. But the Gesikan SR circle followed a life cycle
segala fitnah!), Medan Moeslimin n (1925), pp. 172-173; See also Haroenrasjid's
expla�
nation of Islamism and communism in Haroenrasjid, "Soa'l Djawab IV," Medan Moelimin
10 (1924), pp. 201-207.
65Wd. Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken aan GG, 23 Feb. 1926, Mr. 416X/26. See also
Regent Kota kepada Assistent Resident Surakarta, 28 Jan. 1926, Mr. 416X/26.
66The following account of the Yogyakarta PKI and SR is based, unless otherwise
noted,
on Adjunct Hoofdcommissaris van Politie (Feurstein) aan Resident van Yogyakarta, 8
Jan.
I9Z5* "Verslag betreffende de ontwikkeling van de SR te Djogja in het jaar 1924";
testi�
monies of Yogyakarta PKI and SR leaders, propagandists, and members arrested after
November 1926 in Mr. 1310X/26; Procureur Generaal aan GG, 6 Jan. 1926, Mr. 42X/26.
67The Oemat Islam was established on September 29, 1924, with R. H. Hadjid, a
Moehammdijah leader, as chairman, and joined by some three hundred kyai, ulama, and
representatives of religious schools. Bendera Islam, 16 Oct. 1924, IPO, 44 (1924).
Final Years 32.3
similar to that of Insulinde circles in the Surakartan countryside in
1919.68 In the beginning, several former sugar factory workers spread
propaganda for the SR among peasants, promising them that once they
joined the SR they would no longer be required to pay taxes and to
perform corvee labor and that their wages and rent would be raised. In
a month or two peasants swelled the ranks of the SR circle. Then they
pressed SR circle leaders for an action to obtain wage and rent in�
creases from the plantation and went on strike in late May under the
SR circle leadership. The local authorities responded swiftly. The field
police were immediately sent forth; they arrested SR circle leaders as
well as PKI and SR propagandists from the city and broke up SR
members' meetings by force. A few days after the strike started, the
regent of Bantul convened gatherings in various places on the planta�
tion, ordered the striking peasants not to listen to "the outside agita�
tors," and instructed the police to arrest all the peasants who did not
want to return to work. This sealed the fate of the strike and the
Gesikan SR circle. The strike was over by early June, more than seven
hundred SR members surrendered their membership cards to the local
authorities, and the SR circle collapsed. After this incident, the local
authorities never again tolerated propaganda activities for the SR in the
countryside.
Once the countryside was closed, the Yogyakarta PKI and SR were
doomed to failure. With both Kasultanan and Pakualaman officials
and devout Muslims solidly anti-Communist, the Yogyakarta PKI sec�
tion concentrated its work among workers. The VSTP, the SBG, the
Printers' Union, the Batik Workers' Union, the Chauffeurs' Union, the
Public Workers' Union, the Peasants' Union, the Tailor's Union-in
fact, all sorts of unions were formed under the leadership of the Secre�
tariat Locale Arbeiders/Vakbonden Merah Indonesia (Local Secre�
tariat of Workers/Indonesian Red Unions). But Yogyakarta, like Sur�
akarta, was not an industrial center, and the only major industry was
batiking. Batik workers, especially batik printers in Kota Gede, thus
formed the only force in the Yogyakarta PKI. But they had no money.
Panggoegah, the Yogyakarta PKI and SR organ under Sismadi Sastrosiswojo, ceased
publication in November 1925 for lack of money.69
Then, in February 1926, most of the Yogyakarta PKI and SR leaders
were rounded up in connection with an abortive bombing incident at
the military warehouse. Since they concurrently served as leaders of the
Secretariat Locale Arbeiders/Vakbonden Merah Indonesia and of
68See Resident van Yogyakarta (Dingemans) aan GG, 20 May 1915, Mr. 526X/25. Resi�
dent van Yogyakarta aan GG, 27 May 1915, Mr. 529X/25. Panggoegah, 20 and 27 May
1925, IPO, 26 (1925). Darma Kartda, 17 June 1925, IPO, 26 (1925). Apt, 15 June
1925, IPO,
26 (1925).
69See Sismadi Sastrosiswojo's testimony in Mr. 55oax/z7.
324 An Age in Motion
unions under its command, their arrest crippled the Yogyakarta PKI
and its affiliated organizations, and the party never recovered from the
blow.
What made the Surakarta PKI and SR different from the Yogyakarta
PKI and SR was their success in mobilizing devout Muslims' support
for the party through the Moe'alimin movement and in assigning
Moe'alimin propagandists and trade union activists to the SR and the
Comite van Vakbonden under the section leadership headed by Marco.
The Surakarta PKI and SR thus continued to grow both in membership
and financial terms, even though the countryside was virtually closed.
The SR membership reached three thousand by the end of 1925. The
party also set up its own printing firm, Mardika, in November 1925
and started to publish its new organ, Mawa (Glowing charcoal fire), in
December, with Hardjodiwongso as editor-in-chief and Siswomintardjo and Sismadi
Sastrosiswojo as editors.70 And it was undoubtedly due
to its success, above all its financial strength, that the PKI central
leadership decided to hold the VSTP and IPO congresses (Organisatie
Pemoeda Indonesia, Indonesian Youth Organization) in Surakarta in
December 1925, though the congresses did not come to pass because of
the denial of the right of assembly to the VSTP and IPO.
In the last months of 1925, however, there were already signs that
foretold the disastrous fate of the Surakarta PKI and SR under Marco.
The PKI central leadership was about to decide to make concrete plans
for an insurrection at the Prambanan conference. Many PKI and SR
members were no longer satisfied with words alone and were eager to
take action. They were militant and some were even reckless. We may
get some sense of this militancy from the article "How the People of
Indonesia Should Pursue Freedom," written by "Api" (Fire) and pub�
lished in the October 1 issue of Medan Moeslimin. It goes in part as
follows:
The word "free" can be heard [resounding] from every direction.
Wherever people gather, there we hear people talking about freedom. We
want to sit free, sleep free, eat free, work free, talk free, play free, have a
good time ... is there anything that people do not want [to do] freely? In
short, to be free is generally understood to mean "not to be interfered
with," "not to be prohibited from," etc. Thus people who pursue free�
dom can fall into violent, brutish, and ill-considered ways, and sometimes
thus become people who are indifferent, or senseless.
If one seeks freedom, [one should] not simply dare to speak ngoko
[low Javanese], dare to quarrel, dare to go on strike, and dare to make a
big hoo-hah in brothels and hotels, but first of all one must have serious70Mawa,
30 Nov. 1925 and 4 Dec. 1925, IPO, 50 (1925).
Final Years 32.5
ness (desire) to study the science of true freedom and to perform all the
obligations thereby involved. . . .
Yes, readers! People think that this world was given by God to all
human beings, with people living free everywhere. Men are given legs,
hands, and mouths by Allah, to walk free, to take free, and to talk free.
But, ya . . . Allah, people from here, going there, must [now] carry a
pass, may not go here, cannot walk there. Our hands may not take hats
that are piled up in a store if we do not leave money behind. In short,
everything in this world is owned by a group of human beings who at this
moment possess the strength of cannon.
Those who possess a lot of cannon-it is they who control the world,
and it is they who regulate all the rights of human beings in the world.
How can public freedom be realized in this world if the world is
dominated by only some of the human beings who fill the world? . . .
In order to bring freedom here, it is no longer enough for us to shout at
meetings, make motions, make requests, send deputations, protest, offer
criticism in newspapers and study communism until one's head becomes
bald; we must organize our strength according to the theory, and with
organization and discipline (not happy-go-lucky discipline).71
This was a call for theoretically correct, disciplined, well-organized
revolutionary action and not for direct "anarchist" actions, which the
PKI central leadership disapproved of. But its activist orientation was
apparent. And once activism was called for, it was difficult for the
party leadership-both the central leadership and the section
leadership-to restrain PKI and SR members from taking their own
daring direct actions. By late September 1925, during the Sekaten fes�
tivities, bombs had been thrown, burglary committed, arson attacks
made, and several SR members, including a local tough in Pasar
Kliwon who possessed a revolver, were arrested.72 Judging from the
fact that Marco accused Soewarno in his report to the party central
leadership of directing actions that led to the disruption of party ac�
tivities in the last months of 1925, Soewarno might have been involved
in these direct actions.73 Though no major Surakarta PKI and SR
leaders were arrested, surveillance was further tightened in the wake of
the incidents. The Surakarta PKI leadership stopped organizing SR
public rallies altogether, and Marco and other section leaders stopped
appearing at SR members' meetings to avoid being arrested. But the
government further tightened its control over Communist activities,
denying the right of assembly to the PKI and the SR in late November
71Api, "Tjara bagaimana Ra'jat Indonesia akan tjari kemerdekaan," Medan Moeslimiti
i 1
(1925), pp. 261-262. Italics in the original.
71Darma Kanda, IPO, 43 (1925), p. 160. See also Api, 28 Sept. 1925, IPO, 41 (1925).
73Rapport van de Sectie der PKI te Solo over de maand Januari 1926, Solo, 1 Feb.
1926,
namens het bestuur van de PKI te Solo, Marco, Mr. 521X/26.
326 An Age in Motion
and to the SBG (Sugar Workers' Union), the VSTP, the SBB (Batik
Workers' Union), and other PKI-affiliated trade unions in early Decem�
ber.74 Moe'alimin propagandists continued to hold gatherings. Trade
unions also maintained their existence in Surakarta, and activists, espe�
cially batik printers, continued to propagandize for the SR at stalls and
slametan. Marco, as chairman of the Surakarta PKI and SR, tried to
work out a new division of labor among the section leadership, the
Moe'alimin movement, and the Comite van Vakbonden, while main�
taining communication with the PKI central leadership in Batavia and
publishing Mawa as the voice of the section leadership. But in the face
of ever tougher anti-Communist measures applied by the government
and the increasing militancy of PKI, SR, and trade union members,
which found its expression in "anarchist" actions, Marco's efforts
proved futile and the pergerakan in Surakarta under the banner of the
PKI was to meet a disastrous end in late 1926.
The Final Year
When the right of assembly was denied the PKI, the SR, the VSTP,
the SBB, and other Communist-led unions, the Surakarta PKI leader�
ship directed Ahmad Dasoeki, Sastrowidjono, and other Moe'alimin
propagandists to propagandize for the SR at Moe'alimin gatherings.
Non-Moe'alimin SR propagandists also began to appear and talk
about the PKI and the SR at the gatherings.75 As a result, Moe'alimin
gatherings suddenly started to be held much more frequently in late
December 1925 and early January 1926, almost every evening and
many simultaneously on Thursday evenings and in many places where
no gatherings had been held before. Though the major event at the
gatherings remained the reading of passages from the Koran and
hadith, the sudden increase in Moe'alimin activities invited police at�
tention, and the authorities began to see Moe'alimin gatherings as SR
gatherings in disguise. Accordingly, the regent warned Moe'alimin
leaders Dasoeki, Atmosoekarto, and Rochani in early January that
"only purely religious discussions may be held at these gatherings" and
that the regent would "call on the help of the police if subjects of a
communist kind are discussed."76 The police began to attend the gath�
erings, and a Moe'alimin gathering was broken up by the police on
January 17 for the first time, because speakers touched on the princi74Procureur
Generaal aan GG, 4 Dec. 1925, Mr. 1210X/25.
'Rapport van de Sectie der PKI te Solo over de maand Januari 1926, Solo, 1 Feb.
1926,
namens het bestuur van de PKI te Solo, Marco, Mr. 521X/26.
^Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 23 Feb. 1926, Mr. 416X/26. See also Assistent
Resident
van Surakarta (Ament) aan Resident van Surakarta, 29 Jan. 1926, Mr. 416X/26.
Final Years 32-7
pies of the PKI. The participants obeyed the police order and went
home peacefully while singing the "Internationale."
From then on Moe'alimin propagandists organized gatherings all the
more energetically. The police for their part also diligently attended the
gatherings, made reports on them, and stopped speeches whenever
speakers merely mentioned words such as "revolutionary" and "com�
munism" or drew a parallel as Misbach once did between the Indies
here and now and Mecca in olden times. Sometimes the police even
prohibited the audience of a gathering from uttering accoord (agreed)
to speakers because it sounded political.77 As the police acted tougher,
so did Moe'alimin propagandists. Moe'alimin propagandists saw in the
police the very embodiment of the obstacle to Islam, "the obstacle that
we have to fight against with all our strength," "the system of capital�
ism that sucks blood and sweat out of us, the great majority of people,"
and persisted in their missionary activities. When the police ordered the
administrator of the Winongan prayer house, the center of Moe'alimin
gatherings in Kauman, to close the gate at five in the evening to prevent
gatherings, Moe'alimin propagandists simply ignored the administra�
tor and held gatherings there anyway.78 When the authorities sent
many policemen to a Moe'alimin gathering to intimidate participants,
Moe'alimin propagandists stopped holding large-scale gatherings and
started small-scale gatherings attended by thirty to fifty people and
held simultaneously in many places. The police report on one such
Moe'alimin meeting held on January 24, 1926:
Detectives Somohardjoko, Somosoeratno, and Darmosentono report that
on the evening of Sunday the twenty-fourth of this month [January] a
public meeting of the Moe'alimin was held at the Winogan prayer house.
Approximately three hundred attended, most of them male and female
members of the SR in Surakarta. The meeting was led by chairman
Rochani (a member of the SR) from kampung Kauman, assisted by:
1. Salam [more correctly, Salamoen], Kauman (SR member)
2. [Ahmad] Dasoeki, Keprabon (SR member)
3. Doelmadjid
4. Martorahardjo
5. Soepojo, Keprabon (SR circle leader)
6. Sastrosidjono, Keprabon (SR propagandist).
The meeting was opened by the chairman at 9 o'clock in the evening.
Discussion went as follows:
a. [The chairman] formally opened the meeting and asked all those
attending not to argue like before, that is, arguing like that printed in the
newspapers Mawa or Api.
b. Salamoen, using Djawa Dipo language, followed. This hook lthe
77See IPO, 1926, pp. 448-450.
78Mantri Onderdistrict Pasarkliwon, 22 Jan. 1926, Mr. 416X/26.
328 An Age in Motion
Koran] was made by Lord Allah but in the course of time has become like
this. Brothers, may we all carry out [the commands of] the Religion of
Islam together, because if [we] do not, we will certainly not get much
benefit. Most of you brothers are alike in your misery, because you do
not heed this book. Misery exists because [we] are squeezed by the in�
fidels. You surely already know for yourselves that the infidels always
live in comfort, their houses are large brick houses, and they are feared.
Therefore, brothers, unite strongly everywhere to get rid of these infidels.
Remember, brothers, all of us now are equally oppressed and exploited.
Therefore, don t be afraid of death, because death feels more pleasant
and delicious [than our present lives]. Brothers, may we quickly be able
to get rid of the infidels.
The title Pengoeloe is a misnomer. To be correct it should be pengoental (slikker
[gobbler]). His big belly is a sign that he thinks only of his
own well-being and not at all about the wretched life of the people of
Islam.
All those brothers present and all the brothers in Islam who do not
understand and do not carry out my lesson will remain mad forever, from
generation to generation, all of them.
c. Dasoeki followed and using the language of Djawa Dipo ex�
plained. . . . Understand, brothers, that the means to subsist are [now]
terribly difficult. Remember, wherever there is a meeting, nothing else is
talked of but survival. Clever people can get a high education, but it is
only for their own benefit-that the people are suffering never occurs to
them.
Before human beings existed, Lord Allah already existed. Then [Lord
Allah] set many human beings down on earth so that [they could] help
one another. Later the situation was no longer like that.
To be banished like Hadji Misbach, that's very good, because it means
fulfilling the religion of Islam. Brothers, don't be afraid or worried if
someday there is a Holy War. The detectives have their ears cleaned out
every day, but they have no feeling. . . .
h. Salamoen followed. He pointed to a white cotton cloth on which
was stamped in black a picture of hammer and sickle. He said: Brothers,
don't go away just yet. This is our picture. Is it all right or not, brothers?
The people all answered: Right!" At 11:40 the meeting was closed by the
chairman, and then broke up.79
Toward the end of January 1926 it became increasingly clear that
the police could hardly control Moe'alimin meetings, held almost every
day and many at a time. On February 1 the resident of Surakarta
proposed that the government deny the right of assembly to "the Mardi Boesana and
its tabligh branch, the Moe'alimin," while instructing
the police to act tougher, if necessary, arresting Moe'alimin propagan9Mantri
Politie, 25 Jan. 1926, Mr. 416X/26. Italics in the original.
Final Years 329
dists and breaking up meetings by force.80 Soon Salamoen was ar�
rested, and K. H. Mawardi and several other Moe'alimin propagandists
were detained and interrogated. The police became extremely watchful
not only of Moe'alimin meetings but also of all kinds of religious
gatherings. They visited prayer houses, mosques, and religious schools
every evening, questioned whether a meeting was being held whenever
they saw people gather for prayer or for Koranic reading, and some�
times ordered them to go home, telling them to obtain prior permission
from the authorities to congregate. Even darusan (reading verses from
the Koran aloud) at prayer houses or mosques was placed under police
supervision. As Persatoean Ra'jat, a non-Communist newspaper, sar�
castically commented, police intervention at religious gatherings was
so extensive that the only thing the police had yet to do was to confis�
cate the Koran.81
Tough and high-handed police intervention in religious gatherings
angered not only Moe'alimin followers but also wider groups of pious
Muslims. When three leading Moe'alimin propagandists, Oesmoeni,
Atmosoemarto, and Rochani, were arrested on February 18, rumors
immediately circulated in the city that the Moe'alimin were planning to
stage a demonstration the following day to protest their arrest and
police intervention in religious gatherings. The PKI Surakarta section
leadership had nothing to do with the plan, and even Marco did not
know who passed along word on the demonstration.82 February 19 fell
on a Friday. At noon more than ten thousand people came to the Great
Mosque in Kauman for Friday communal prayers-more than three
times as many as usual. Though the resident reported that most of
them were SR members, including those who had seldom attended
Friday prayers, the majority were in fact devout Muslims who had
nothing to do with the SR and the Moe'alimin but had been angered by
police intervention at religious gatherings. Many could not enter the
mosque and prayed in the garden. Around the mosque, there were
more onlookers, including many Chinese, waiting for something to
happen. Not only detectives and general police forces armed with guns
and sabers but also the field police on horses and in cars surrounded
the mosque and its vicinity. After the prayers were over, most of those
who participated in the prayers-kyai, santri, religious-school teach�
ers, haji, batik entrepreneurs, traders, craftsmen, workers, and
80Resident van Surakarta aan GG, i Feb. 1926, Mr. 416X/26.
81IPO, 1926, pp. 71, 212-213. Persatoean Ra'jat was published by Sosrokardono in
Surakarta.
82Voorzitter (Marco) namens bet bestuur van PKI-Solo aan het Hootdbestuur van PKI
te
Weltevreden, Solo, 24 Feb. 1926, translated by Wedana Politic te Surakarta
(Remelan), Mr.
521X/26.
330 An Age in Motion
Arabs- exited through the north gate toward the Surakarta prison,
turned east in front of the prison, and headed for the assistant resi�
dent's office, with women and children in front, followed by men, and
all chanting, "Lailahhailaloh Moehammad Roesoelloellah [God is
great and Muhammad is His messenger]." The police ordered them to
disperse, but demonstrators jeered and went on. When they ap�
proached the assistant resident's office, the police took action. Driving
horses and cars into the demonstration, shooting guns into the air, and
drawing sabers, the police forcefully broke up the demonstration in
fifteen minutes after brief skirmishes.83
The demonstration, the first ever staged in the city of Surakarta,
marked the end of the Moe'alimin movement. The fact that more than
ten thousand people participated demonstrated the danger of the
movement. The authorities immediately moved to crush it. On the
same day Ahmad Dasoeki, Wiromartono, and two other Moe'alimin
propagandists were arrested. On the next day eight more propagand�
ists, including H. Samsoeri and Sastrowidjono, were arrested and three
others were detained and questioned.84 In late February and early
March fifteen more Moe'alimin propagandists were arrested on vari�
ous charges, and though not arrested, two leading "theoreticians," K.
H. Mawardi and K. H. Mashoed of the Madrasah Soennijah Mardi
Boesana, were dismissed from the sunan's religious school, the Mamba'oel Oeloem.
With more than thirty Moe'alimin propagandists in
prison and religious gatherings tightly controlled by the police, remain�
ing Moe'alimin propagandists stopped organizing tabligh gatherings.
In early April the prosecutor general comfortably advised the governor
general that the right of assembly did not need to be denied to "the
Mardi Boesana and its tabligh branch, the Moe'alimin."85 The Moe'a�
limin movement was dead, and with its death, the backbone of the
Surakarta SR was broken.
The collapse of the Mce'alimin movement was a crippling blow to
the Surakarta PK1 but by no means meant the collapse of the Commu�
nist movement in Surakarta. The PKI section leadership as well as the
SBB and other trade unions under the Comite van Vakbonden re�
mained intact and went underground. After the Prambanan decision
on December 25, 1925, representatives of the party central committee
and leaders of its sections met at PKI headquarters in Batavia in Janu�
ary 1926 and affirmed that legal political activity was no longer possi83For the
Moe'alimin demonstration, see Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 21 Feb. 1926,
Mr. 521X/26; IPO, 1926, pp. 428-429, 436-438, 448-450, 568-571.
84"Tangkapan Kaoem Moeslimin di Solo," Medan Moeslimin 12 (1926), pp. 276-277.
85Procureur Generaal aan GG, 12 Apr. 1926, Mr. 416X/26. See also Wd. le
Gouvernement
Secretaris (W. G. Stroband) aan Resident van Surakarta, 12 May 1926, Mr. 521X/26.
Final Years 33i
ble and that revolution was the only hope.86 Marco attended the meet�
ing as the representative of the Surakarta section, and the section
leadership worked out a plan to go underground on his return. The
plan consisted of two elements. First, the section leadership headed by
Marco (chairman), Respati (secretary), and Wirosoeharto (treasurer)
remained aboveground to direct the printing firm Mardika and publish
Mawa as the voice of the section leadership, to maintain communica�
tion with the PKI central leadership in Batavia, and to lead the Sarekat
Penolong Kesengsaraan Indonesia (SPKI, Association of Helpers of
Indonesian Misery) to raise money for the support of arrested SR and
PKI members and their families. Marco was clearly the man in charge
of the aboveground party activity, because Soewarno, commissioner of
the party central committee, was suspended from his position for his
alleged involvement in direct actions in late 1925.
Second, the Comite van Vakbonden, the proletarian core of the
Surakarta PKI, was reorganized into the Raad van Vakbonden (the
Council of Trade Unions) to direct underground party activity. The
meeting to effect this change was held on January 31 and attended by
Soendoro (chairman of the Comite van Vakbonden), Moetokalimoen
(secretary of the Comite van Vakbonden and chairman of the VSTP
Surakarta branch), Sjarief (treasurer of the Comite van Vakbonden,
administrator of Medan Moeslimin, and chairman of the Sarekat Postel
and the Shoemakers' Union), Soegito (chairman of the SBB), Soemono
(secretary of the SBB and the Pawnshop Workers' Union), Soetarto
(chairman of the Sarekat Tani [ST], Peasants' Union), Siswomintardjo
(editor of Mawa), and Kasimin (commissioner of the Chauffeurs'
Union, the Coachmen's Union, and the SBB). The meeting elected the
executive committee of the Raad van Vakbonden, composed of Soen�
doro (chairman), Moetokalimoen (secretary), Sjarief (treasurer), and
Siswomintardjo (commissioner), and decided to reorganize SR mem�
bers into trade unions headed by PKI members according to their
occupation-peasants became ST members, bakers became members
of the Rotibond (Bakers' Union), odd job workers became members of
the Sarekat Boeroeh Tidak Tetap (Irregular Workers' Union), house
servants became members of the Bediendenbond (Servants' Union),
market traders became members of the Pasarbond (Market Union),
and so on-and to place all the unions under the Raad van Vak�
bonden.87 Soon after, the PKI office was moved from Marco's house in
Keprabon to Sjarief's house in Kauman. Trade union activists under
the command of the Raad van Vakbonden started their underground
86McVey, Indonesian Communism, p. 32.3.
87Resident van Surakarta aan Directeur van Justitie, 14 Feb. 19Z7, Mr. 5 5oax/z7.
332. An Age in Motion
propaganda work at stalls and slametan, organizing kuda kepang
(dance with bamboo plaitwork horses) troupes to propagandize in the
countryside, exchanging SR for trade union membership cards, collect�
ing contributions, and recruiting new members.88
The plan of the Surakarta PKI to go underground might have
worked if the PKI central leadership had remained intact; the PKI, SR,
and trade union members in Surakarta had remained disciplined and
loyal to the section leadership and the Raad van Vakbonden; and
the police had not further cracked down on Communist activities. But
these conditions did not obtain. As McVey demonstrated, the PKI
central leadership became increasingly divided over the Prambanan
decision and disintegrated. There were three PKI centers by the end of
August: Tan Malaka in Singapore, denouncing the Prambanan deci�
sion and demanding its abrogation; the Comite van de Revolutie (the
Committee of the Revolution) in Batavia, pressing for revolt; and the
nominal PKI central committee elected at the Kota Gede conference in
December 1924, which was now located in Bandung (moved from
Batavia in May 1926) and whose members were not only divided over
the Prambanan decision but also heavily depleted by arrests.89 Instruc�
tions of the party central committee ceased to reach the section leader�
ship and Njala, the organ of the PKI central committee, ceased publica�
tion with the introduction of Article 153 bis and ter on May 1. Though
the new PKI underground organs, Communique and Pemberita, did
reach the Surakarta section once in a while, the section leadership
under Marco was largely left to itself, without any party central com�
mand to which to represent the section or whose voice to communicate
to the section members.
While the PKI central leadership disintegrated, the Surakarta PKI
section leadership collapsed in the midst of a mounting wave of terror�
ist actions that Surakarta PKI, SR, and trade union members initiated
independently of the section leadership and the Raad van Vakbonden.
There was little room for the aboveground section leadership to
"move" in 1926. All the leaders were under surveillance and their
houses were repeatedly raided. Mawa was more often confiscated than
published, and its editors, Hardjodiwongso, Siswomintardjo, and Sismadi
Sastrosiswojo, were arrested one after another from January to
March. Though Mawa maintained its precarious existence until Article
153 bis and ter was introduced, its effectiveness as the voice of the
88OIB No. 31 (Mar. 1926), 13 Apr. 1926, Mr. 534X/26.
89For the disintegration of the PKI central leadership, see McVey, Indonesian
Commu�
nism, pp. 316-343. In October 1926 of all the PKI central committee members elected
at the
Kota Gede conference in December 1924, only one, Koesno of the Bandung PKI section,
remained active. Bekendmaking van Hoofdbestuur van de PKI, Bandung, Oct. 1926, Mr.
1077X/26.
Final Years 333
Surakarta PKI had been lost months before it formally ceased publica�
tion.90 Under these circumstances, there was little the section leader�
ship could do to control PKI and SR members when they started their
own independent direct actions. In Pasar Kliwon, Kauman and Keprabon, Soewarno,
ignoring the section leadership, organized local
toughs into the SR. Respati, section secretary, who was "like a brother
of Soewarno's," went along with him. From June onward, numerous
incidents of arson took place. In the city, a number of houses, including
the sunan's villa, were set on fire. In the countryside, especially on
plantations in district Kartasura and the Mangkunegaran sugar planta�
tion Calamadu, sheds for drying tobacco leaves and sugarcane fields
were set on fire. The police arrested six SR members in early August
and repeatedly raided the houses of PKI and SR leaders. Yet arson
attacks continued and even increased in early September during the
Sekaten festival.91 In late July and early August, SR members were also
arrested for robbery attempts. The police singled out as culprits the
SPKI under the aboveground section leadership. On September 6 Mar�
co, Wirosoeharto, and twenty other PKI members were arrested.92
Shortly after that, perhaps in retaliation against the police crack-down
on the SPKI and the PKI section and against the severe sentences given
to the Moe'alimin propagandists (the Moe'alimin trials were con�
cluded in late August), the president of the Surakarta Native Court was
shot and wounded at his house, and in early October a detective was
shot and killed while on patrol. Immediately, the second wave of ar�
rests followed, and Soewarno, Respati, and many other PKI and SR
members were arrested.93 By the middle of October, more than fifty
PKI and SR members were in prison in connection with terrorist ac�
tions from June to early October. With all the section leaders except
Moetokalimoen in jail, the PKI Surakarta section leadership collapsed.
Massive arrests of Communist leaders and activists in September and
October dealt a severe blow to the underground Raad van Vakbonden
and the trade unions under its command. With many trade union
leaders in jail, most of the unions were left leaderless and thrown into
disarray. Yet the Raad van Vakbonden under Moetokalimoen survived
and regrouped some of the remaining PKI and SR/trade union mem�
bers under its leadership, both in the city and in the countryside.
90Hardjodiwongso was arrested in January 1926, Sismadi Sastrosiswojo in early
March,
and Siswomintardjo in late March. After their arrest, Woro Siti Aminah, a former
palace
official who was dismissed in late 1925 because of her PKI propaganda activities,
became the
editor-in-chief of Mawa until it ceased publication.
91"Keadaan di Indonisia, Solo," Medan Moeslimin 12 (1926), pp. 398-399.
92Procureur Generaal aan GG (de Graeff), 27 Oct. 192.6, Mt- 1077X/26.
93"Moordaanslag op den President van den Landraad te Surakarta, Mr. Andree \\
iltens en
moord op een rechercheur," Adjunct Hoofdcommissaris van Politic (J. Gottlieb) aan
Assistent Resident van Surakarta, 15 Oct. 1926, Mr. 1042X/26.
334 An Age in Motion
In the countryside, where attempts to organize SR circles had been
unsuccessful in 1925, propaganda activities for the Peasants' Union,
the ST, under the direction of the Raad van Vakbonden obtained some
measure of success in 1926 thanks to the activities of laid-off batik
printers of the SBB who had returned to their villages in late 1925 and
1926.94 On the Calamadu sugar plantation, as well as on several other
plantations nearby, secret ST propaganda meetings were held in June
and July, and on the Trucuk plantation in Klaten an ST circle was
established in September with three hundred members. But the police,
watchful of any ST/SR propaganda, soon detected the presence of ST
propagandists, arrested them, and crushed ST circles. But in district
Sawahan (regency of Boyolali) and its neighboring districts, Genolong
(regency of Sragen) and Calamadu (regency of Karanganyar), an ST
circle survived and managed to organize more than four hundred peas�
ants.
The center of ST propaganda in the area lay in subdistrict Nogosari
(district Sawahan), and the central figure of the ST circle was Imandimedjo, a
former bekel, who joined the ST in early 1926 when
Soetarto, a batik printer and chairman of the ST, briefly propagandized
for the ST in the area. He was the first person who joined the ST and as
such was appointed "promoter no. 1" (pengajeng warga no. 1) by the
ST Surakarta branch leadership and given the authority to issue ST
membership cards and accept new members. Imandimedjo recruited to
the ST a number of peasants, including several displaced former bekel,
from various villages and appointed them "promoters no. 2." In village
Jetak (subdistrict Nogosari), for instance, Karjosemito became a "pro�
moter no. 2," who recruited new. members, collected entrance fees and
monthly contributions (0.35 guilders for a month), and issued ST mem�
bership cards. From May to November he recruited some forty peas�
ants into the ST in his and neighboring villages, and in order to main�
tain a communication network, appointed "promoters no. 3" as the
head of ST members in each village. Though the circle Imandimedjo
headed was called the ST Nogosari circle, it spread out well beyond
subdistrict Nogosari and was knit by the hierarchy of "promoters."
It is not entirely clear why the Nogosari ST circle survived, while
other circles were detected and crushed by the police. One plausible
explanation is that it started to gain momentum as a circle very late,
from September on, and led its members into a revolt in November
before the local authorities learned of its existence. Like Insulinde cir�
cles established in 1919 in the countryside, displaced former bekel
94The following account of the ST activities in the countryside, above all the ST
Nogosari
circle, is based on Assistent Resident van Boyolali (G. A. Danekes) aan Resident
van Surakar�
ta, 22 June 1927, and testimony of ST Nogosari circle members in Vb. i Nov. 1927,
No.
Final Years 335
played an important role in the Nogosari ST circle. But there was one
crucial difference: while Insulinde circle leaders almost solely voiced
peasant grievances over wages, rent, taxes, and corvee labor obliga�
tions to the state and the village, "promoters" of the Nogosari ST circle
also voiced their dreams of a new and free world after "we" took over
state power. Karjosemito explained the purpose of the "Sarekat-Rajat"
this way:
If all of us are united in agreement, we will eventually be able to ride
trains and cars free. Imandimedjo did not explain how this would happen
and I did not ask about it. . . . But from what I could understand and
gather, what Imandimedjo meant by these words was:
"We means we who are members of the Sarekat-Rajat [that is, Sarekat
Tani]."
United means we are united in agreement to fight against the state."
"We ride cars and trains free-this is because as things are now, the
railways and cars belong to the state, to companies (NIS), or other people
[that is, not us]. But if these things or objects come into Imandimedjo's
possession or if the Sarekat-Rajat succeeds in seizing state power, we of
the Sarekat-Rajat will be able to ride trains and cars free, because of the
power of the SR."95
Leaders of the Nogosari ST circle and perhaps many of its members
thus understood the purpose of the ST in power terms. Once "we"
seize state power, our dreams will come true: riding trains and cars
free, living in big houses free, paying no taxes, performing no corvee
labor, "letting plantations go," and taking back land in our own
hands.
In the city, Moetokalimoen tried to regroup remaining PKI and
SR/trade union members into locals under the command of the Raad
van Vakbonden in late October and early November. The locals were
organized on a kampung basis. Moetokalimoen appointed three to five
PKI members from among trade union activists in one kampung to
form a local committee, which in turn was given the task of regrouping
all the remaining PKI and SR/trade union members in the kampung
into the local. In terms of organizational principles, the local was little
different from the SR circle, though members of the local now kept
variegated trade union membership. Upon Moetokalimoen's instruc�
tions, local committees were formed in Sorogenen, Ngemplak, Sondakan, and several
other quarters in Lawean in the western part of the
city and in Kepatihan, Gandekan, Sewu, Nusukan, Pucangsawit, and
other districts in the central and eastern parts of the city. Communist
strength was so decimated by arrests in September and October in the
95Proces Verbaal (Karjosemito), Vb. i Nov. 1917, No. D17. Italics in the original.
33^ An Age in Motion
former Communist centers of Kauman and Keprabon that no attempts
were made to form locals there. Of all the local committees, only a few
achieved some measure of success in organizing remaining PKI and
SR/trade union members into locals. The Sondakan local committee
organized batik workers of the SBB into the local. The Sorogenen local
succeeded in regrouping members of the Coachmen's Union, the Mar�
ket Union, and the VSTP. In Nusukan and Gandekan, members of the
Tailors' Union organized tailors and ST peasant members into the
locals. In other city quarters, however, local committees achieved little
success before the fatal revolt started in West Java in November.96
The Communist revolt in West Java started on the night of Novem�
ber 12, 1926, and the news of the revolt-the first news was on the
collapse of the revolt in Batavia-reached Surakarta on November
13.97 Though it is not clear whether Moetokalimoen was aware of the
plan of the Comite van de Revolutie for the revolt, he instructed local
committees, once the news reached Surakarta, to prepare for a revolt
and a general strike "to show sympathy" for the revolt in West Java.98
The date for the revolt was set for the night of November 17 and the
general strike was to follow on November 18. On the same day,
November 13, Moetokalimoen's instructions were also sent to Imandimedjo of the ST
Nogosari circle through an ST member belonging
to the Nusukan local.
Rumors of the imminent Communist revolt in Surakarta ran through
the city in a few hours. Three members of the Kepatihan local also
reported to the Mangkunegaran Legion headquarters that Communists
were planning to go into action on the night of November 17 by
cutting off telephone and telegraph lines, destroying railway lines, and
attacking government offices and high-ranking officials, above all po�
lice officers. In response to the news of the Communist revolt in West
Java and to the intelligence reports on the planned revolt in Surakarta,
Resident Nieuwenhuys immediately took precautionary measures on
the same day to counter a possible Communist revolt and a general
strike. Security measures at government offices, the prison, and the
telegraph, telephone, and postal office were tightened. The police were
sent to guard the Solo electricity company. The field police were posted
96Resident van Surakarta aan Directeur van Justitie, 14 Feb. 1927, Mr. 55oax/27.
See also
testimonies of local committee leaders in Mr. 55oax/27.
97The following account is based on: Resident of Surakarta aan Procureur Generaal
(Duyfjes), 20 Nov. 1926, Mr. 1132X/26; Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 26 Nov. 1926,
Mr.
20X/27; Resident van Surakarta aan GG, 7 Feb. 1927, Mr. 230X/27; Geheim Politiek
Rap�
port over het Tijdvak van 11 tot en met 20 Nov. 1926, 26 Nov. 1926, Mr. 1220X/26;
Lembaga Sedjarah PKI, Pembrontakan Nasional Pertama di Indonesia 1926, pp. 66-68.
98The Comite van de Revolutie decided to go into the revolt at the meeting held in
Batavia
in late October. Before the meeting, it sent Heroejoewono to Surakarta to ask if
the Surakarta
PKI section would go along with it. But there is no evidence that he ever got into
touch with
Moetokalimoen.
Final Years 337
at major road entrances to the city. The police patrolled the city and
arrested known PKI, SR, and trade union activists. Plantation admininistrators were
notified of possible Communist attacks and the Mangkunegaran Legion was mobilized
to maintain security in Klaten. The
First Division in Magelang was also alerted at the resident's request to
guard railway lines against a possible railway workers' strike.
The actual revolt started on the night of November 17 as Moetokalimoen instructed,
but in a disorganized way. In district Sawahan, Imandimedjo led about four hundred
members of the ST Nogosari circle
in attacking the district chief of Sawahan and were joined by ST mem�
bers from the Nusukan local and santri led by Amat Semangil, who
called for "a Holy War" against Dutch infidel power. But the local
authorities had learned of the attack through spy reports, and the field
police were there at the district office. In a brief skirmish, the field
police shot and killed one and wounded three. The other attackers ran
away. After that, no more attacks were attempted, and more than four
hundred ST members were rounded up in Sawahan by the local au�
thorities, village officials, and the field police by November 23.
In the city and its vicinity, many meetings were organized by local
committees on the night of November 17. In Kandangsapi, the local
committee gathered some eighty members and called on them to cut off
electric lines, to destroy railway lines, and to kill the kampung head.
The police raided the gathering and arrested twenty-two members.
Some, trying to escape, jumped into the nearby river and drowned. In
Petoran, Wonosaren, and Pucangsawit, meetings were held, but no
further action followed. Upon Moetokalimoen's instructions, Koesen,
a former NIS worker, also convened VSTP members to organize a
strike. But fewer than ten railway workers responded to his call and
nothing came of the meeting. In the city and its vicinity, therefore, only
sporadic sabotage actions took place. Electric lines were cut in several
places and sheds for drying tobacco leaves were set on fire on the
Manang tobacco plantation south of Lawean.
On the next day, November 18, coachmen went on strike. Though a
railway workers' strike was rumored, nothing happened. Rumors also
said that the PKI was planning to hold a huge rally in Prambanan. A
detachment of the field police was sent forth but found nothing there.
In the evening, the Gandekan local committee organized a rally and
some fifty to sixty members attacked a mantri polisi (native police
officer) in Gandekan. The attack was unsuccessful, and two members
were shot and killed. On the night of November 18, Sondakan local
members attacked the house of a detective and killed him and his
father-in-law. This was the last major attack organized by local com�
mittees. From November 20 to 23 arson attacks continued against
houses and tobacco sheds. The administrator of the Manang planta-
338 An Age in Motion
tion was shot. But these were all isolated actions. By November 23
some one thousand PKI, SR, and Communist-led trade union members
were arrested in the residency of Surakarta, irrespective of their par�
ticipation in the revolt. Almost all the members of the Raad van Vakbonden and
local committees, including Moetokalimoen, were ar�
rested. The revolt was over. The pergerakan born in the age of progress
met its violent death in an attempt to seize power and to make popular
dreams of a new and free world come true under the banner of the PKI.
In the wake of the revolt, the PKI was crushed by mass arrests,
imprisonment, and banishment. Thirteen thousand were arrested all
over the Indies. A few were shot for having been involved in killings.
Five thousand were placed in preventive detention, of whom forty-five
hundred were sentenced to prison terms after trial. Sixty-seven hun�
dred were released after brief detention and interrogation. The remain�
ing thirteen hundred were banished to Boven Digul, a camp specifically
set up for them on the upper reaches of the Digul River in New Guinea.
The great majority of PKI, SR, and PKI-affiliated trade union leaders
and activists were sent to Digul.
The revolt in Surakarta was a side show to what happened in Banten
and West Sumatra. But the PKI and its mass following there were
destroyed as thoroughly as elsewhere. In total, some one thousand
were arrested, of whom five hundred were released after detention and
interrogation. Four hundred seventeen were sentenced to imprison�
ment after trial. Eighty-three were banished to Digul. All the leading
figures of the PKI Surakarta section, the Moe'alimin movement, and
the Raad van Vakbonden-Marco, Wirosoeharto, Respati, and
Soewarno of the section leadership; Ahmad Dasoeki, Wioromartono,
Sastrowidjono, and Atmosoemarto of the Moe'alimin movement;
Moetokalimoen and other local committee leaders of the Raad van
Vakbonden; Haroenrasjid and Sjarief of Medan Moeslimin; Hardjodiwongso, Sismadi
Sastrosiswojo, and Siswomintardjo of Mawa-
were banished to Digul. Though he joined neither the PKI nor the
SR/ST, Mangoenatmodjo, the guru of Islam Abangan, was also in�
cluded in the list. Some of them-Haroenrasjid, Sismadi Sastrosiswojo,
and Ahmad Dasoeki, for instance-survived their long exile in Digul
and eventually returned to Surakarta in the early days of the revolu�
tion. But the others perished. Marco was one of them. He died in Digul
in 1932 from malaria.
Epilogue
The Communist revolts in Java in November 1926 and in West
Sumatra in January 1927 marked a watershed in the history of the
pergerakan. With the destruction of the PKI and its mass following, the
most active and committed elements of the pergerakan were eliminated
from the political arena. The pergerakan, born with the rise of the SI in
the age of progress, met its violent death in an attempt to seize state
power and to create a new and free world. With the Indies govern�
ment's extensive and effective surveillance apparatus ever watchful of
and ready to crush any "subversive" movement, and the fearful image
of Boven Digul in faraway western New Guinea dangling about popu�
lar fantasies of liberation, the popular movement did not rise again in
Indonesia until after World War II.
What remains to be asked is: what was the pergerakan after all? It
should be obvious by now that the pergerakan signified something
larger and more complex than the rise of Indonesian nationalism. An
element of nationalism-or more precisely the Batavia-centric coloni�
al/national perspective-was certainly there from the beginning and
formed an important thread of the pergerakan. But equating the per�
gerakan with the rise of Indonesian nationalism is a gloss that can
hardly do justice to its richness and complexity, for pergerakan leaders
more often thought and talked about a new and free world and in
"pan" terms (Islam and communism), and Dutch, Indos, and Chinese
figured as prominently as natives in the pergerakan. What, then, was
the pergerakan?
First, the pergerakan was a complex and dynamic process of transla�
tion and appropriation. When Raden Adjeng Kartini was writing letters
to her Dutch pen pals in Dutch, rallies, strikes, parties, and demonstra�
tions were unheard of in the Indies and no such words as vergaderitig
339
34� Epilogue
(gathering), voordracbt (speech), accoord (agreed), vakbonden (trade
unions), mogok (strike), partij, communisme, Islamisme, cursussen
(courses), or debat (debate) made any sense to the natives. It was in the
course of the pergerakan that all of these words, which signified new
forms of politics, became rooted in Malay/Indonesian. We need only re�
call Tirtoadhisoerjo to understand this point. Tirto was an archetypal
pergerakan leader who published his own newspapers (Medan Prijaji,
Poetri Hindia, and others), established his own associations (Sarekat
Prijaji and Sarikat Dagang Islamijah), and ran a hotel business and a
legal agency. But the ideas of, and the models for, his newspapers, his
associations, his company, and his legal agency were all there in Dutchand Malay-
language newspapers published by Dutch, Indo, and
Chinese journalists and already known to their readers. What he did
was to put the ideas in motion, appropriating and if necessary translat�
ing these ideas and models into Malay. So did Douwes Dekker, who
brought home the idea of rally and organized the first rally ever held in
the Indies, and Tjokroaminoto, who learned its power from the IP rally
and turned the form into a powerful weapon for the SI. Semaoen
learned trade unionism and socialism from Henk Sneevliet. Soewardi
Soerjaningrat and Tan Malaka brought home the idea of a disciplined
party. Tjipto turned the parliamentary forms of speech and the politi�
cal exposes into weapons. And Hadji Misbach learned from Karl Marx
and preached that the path of Islam was in communism. It was this
dynamic process of translation that made the pergerakan something
entirely new, exciting, and lively and made people realize that they
could "say" what they had been unable to "say." The Dutch also
realized that they were witnessing something new in the Indies, but
since they were familiar with all the major forms in which the per�
gerakan found its expression-newspapers, rallies, strikes, and
parties-they found the pergerakan simply "modern" and understood
it as native awakening.
But this dynamic process of translation meant more than native
awakening and was in fact revolutionary, precisely because it provided
a whole series of new forms and languages in which people could "say"
what they had been unable to "say." Rallies not only led to the enor�
mous expansion of the SI but generated all sorts of "disturbances,"
"irregularities," and "confusions." The Insulinde/NIP-SH propaganda
in the Surakartan countryside not only expanded its circles but also led
to waves of peasant strikes and demonstrations. Mangoenatmodjo, a
guru, emerged as the leader of the Sarekat Abangan, which formed
common soil on which the SH, the SI, and the Adhi Dharma grew in
the Surakartan countryside. And the PKI's call for a revolution gener�
ated all sorts of direct "anarchist" actions and eventually led the per�
gerakan to its violent death. Newspapers, boycotts, rallies, strikes, and
Epilogue 34i
other forms of the pergerakan thus mobilized ever wider segments of
the population and unleashed waves of popular radicalism. And it was
this surge of popular radicalism that made the pergerakan genuinely
popular and that tested the "genuineness" of pergerakan leaders,
forced them to reflect on the pergerakan, confronted them with the
state, and led some of them to the formation of parties.
By the time the pergerakan met its violent death in its attempt to
seize state power and to create a new world, however, all the ideas and
forms of the pergerakan had become common knowledge in Malay/
Indonesian, natives had become Indonesians, and political parties or�
ganized along ideological lines had become normal. And in the years in
between, the exciting days of the popular movement in which individu�
al pergerakan leaders thought, wrote, talked, acted in the first person,
rode waves of popular radicalism, and confronted the state had faded
into the past.
When the PKI and its mass following were destroyed in late 1926
and early 1927, the new generation of nationalist intelligentsia, whose
political consciousness was shaped in the early 1920s, emerged on the
scene and started to "move" from where the older generation had
reached. The Indonesian national consciousness, with Malay/Indo�
nesian as their political language, newspapers, rallies, strikes, and ideo�
logically divided parties-all were inherited by the new generation as
the pergerakan tradition. In the last months of 1926 Soekarno, a lead�
ing figure of the Bandung Algemeene Studieclub (Bandung General
Study Club), wrote a serialized article under the title "Nationalism,
Islam, and Marxism" and called for the unity of nationalist (that is,
non-Islamic and non-Communist), Islamic, and Communist parties in
the struggle against Dutch colonial rule to achieve Free Indonesia.1
Soekarno's call marked the opening of a new era, not only because he
was to become a leading figure of the new generation but also and
more important, because he voiced a new consciousness. This becomes
immediately clear if we compare Soekarno's call with Tjipto's. In Com�
munism in Indonesia, which he published a month after the Commu�
nist revolts were crushed, Tjipto called on all revolutionaries to form a
united front against the Dutch Indies state.2 Tjipto thus made his call
to individuals, not parties. But Soekarno called for the unity of na�
tionalist, Islamic, and Communist parties, parties and party members
ideologically divided and classified. This classification of nationalism,
Islam, and communism was certainly not of Soekarno's creation, lm-
^ukarno, Nationalism, Islam and Marxism, trans. Karel H. Warouw and Peter D.
Weldon, with an introduction by Ruth T. McVey, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1
ranslation Series (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1970).
2Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, Het Communisme in Indonesie: Naar Aanleiding van de
Relletjes (Bandung: Algemeene Studieclub, 1927), pp. 18-19.
3 4 2 Epilogue
portant was not Soekarno's originality but the fact that it was there in
pergerakan discourse and was widely enough shared for Soekarno to
make his call on this basis. So was the gloss of the pergerakan as an
Indonesian national awakening. And so were the theories of party
building (mass party versus cadre party) to harness popular radicalism.
And once this classification and this gloss became rooted in Indone�
sian, it remolded the pergerakan history of the older generation. News�
papers, rallies, and strikes were no longer seen as novelties. Parties were
seen as being there from the beginning. Pergerakan figures were seen as
party figures and in due course some of them became Indonesian nation�
al heroes. The BO, an association ofJavanese priyayi, became national�
ist and the day of its establishment was made the day of the Indonesian
national awakening. The SI became an Islamic association, the ancestor
of the PSI but not of the PKI and SRs. Tirtoadhisoerjo was forgotten.
Tjipto became a nationalist together with his enemies, Dr. Radjiman,
R.M.A. Woerjaningrat, and Pangeran Hadiwidjojo. Tjokroaminoto
and Soerjopranoto, a theosophist, became as Islamic as K. H. Dahlan,
H. Fachrodin, and H. Agoes Salim. Semaoen and Darsono were Com�
munists who "penetrated" the SI. And though he was a PKI member
only for the last three years of his career as a pergerakan leader, Marco
became as Communist as Sneevliet, Baars, and Semaoen.
Yet as we have seen, this is a fallacy. In this classification, Misbach
remains an enigma, because Misbach was a pious Muslim PKI/SR
propagandist, and his idea of Islamism and communism is unclassifiable. But if we
follow the words and deeds with which he illuminated
the world he lived in, he is not an enigma at all. He was a pious Muslim
Javanese who tried to prove his genuine Islamness by fighting all the
slanders revealed to him by toean Karl Marx. Misbach thus reminds us
of the fallacy of the classification of nationalism, Islam, and commu�
nism and cautions us against the nationalist gloss. And if we discard
this classification and this gloss and guard against teleology, the per�
gerakan of the first quarter of the twentieth century reemerges with its
own unique shape. In the age of the pergerakan, pergerakan leaders
thought, wrote, said, and acted in the first person, and in the illumina�
tions of their words and deeds people saw the world and moved. And
we can still see their world by following their words and deeds in�
scribed in the writings they left behind.
Selected Bibliography
This bibliography lists the main sources used for this study. Periodi�
cals and articles are included only if they are cited extensively.
Archives
The main collection used was that of the former Ministry of the Colonies, held in
the Algemeene Rijksarchief, The Hague. Unless otherwise specified, documents
identified as Mr. (Mailrapport, Mail Report), Vb. (Verbaal), and M.v.O. (Memorie
van Overgave) are from this collection. Other archives consulted were the
collection of the Royal Institute for the Tropics, Amsterdam, and the Arsip
Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta.
Contemporary Periodicals
Boeroeh Bergerak. Yogyakarta, 1920. Issued by the Personeel Fabriek Bond (PFB).
Doenia Baroe. Yogyakarta, 1922-23. Issued by the Arbeidsleger Adhi Dharma.
Doenia Merdeka. Purwokarta and Klaten, 1924. Issued by the Purwokarta and
Klaten SRs.
Hidoep. Salatiga, 1924-25. Published by Marco Kartodikromo.
De Indische Gids. 1905-26.
Islam Bergerak. Surakarta, 1917-23. Published by Medan Moeslimin.
Medan Bergerak. Surakarta, 1919-20. Published by Wiromardjojo and Marco
Kartodikromo.
Medan Moeslimin. Surakarta, 1915-26. Published by Medan Moeslimin.
Persatoean Hindia. Semarang, 1919-21. Published by the Nationaal Indische
Partij-Sarekat Hindia.
Ra'jat Bergerak. Surakarta, 1923. Published by the Surakarta SR.
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Index
Abdoelfatah, Raden Hadji. See Ngabdoelpatah, Mas Hadji
Abdoel Moeis (Abdul Muis), 32, 57, 58n,
75, 78, 95-96, 10511, io8n, 113, 115,
2250, 230-235, 301
Abendanon, J., 58
Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso (Abikusno
Tjokrosujoso, Abikusuno Cokrosuyoso),
106, 115, 131
Abimanyu, 124-125, 16711
Aboebakar, Said, 76
Achmad, Raden, 54, 73-75
Adhi Dharma, 110-112, 115, 145, 188,
199-201, 203-204, 215, 340
Adiwidjojo, Raden, 51, 54
administrative and agrarian reforms. See
reorganization
Adnan, Raden Kyai Hadji, 130, 252
adviser for native affairs, 69, 82, 104,
113-114, 179, 210, 219, 232-233,
261, 281, 300, 322
Afdeeling B, 113-114, n6n, 218, 225,
228, 244, 300
Ahmad Sjazili, Hadji, 75, i05n, io8n,
115, 225n
Algemeene Recherchedienst, 232-233,
241, 262, 270, 276-278, 280-281, 311
Aliarcham, 242, 248, 273-274, 277, 313,
3i5
Alimin Prawirodirdjo, 107-108, 113,
115, 2i6n, 218, 220, 248, 308, 313,
318
A1 Irsjad, 106-107, 136
A1 Islam congress, 237
Amat Semangil, 337
Amir, Hadji, 49, 57
anarchism, 239, 277-278, 325-326, 340
Andong, Mas, 51
anti-Christianism, 131-132
Anti-Tjipto Committee. See Comite Keslametan Rahajat Vorstenlanden
Api, 2470, 284, 320, 324, 327
appanage holder, 9, 11, 13 - 16, 18-19,
21-22, 152-154, 179
Arab, 2-3, 25-26, 35, 37, 39, 52-"54, 57,
58n, 60, 65, 106-107, 114, 127-128,
131, 133, 140, 142, 188-189, 218, 330
Arbeidsleger. See Adhi Dharma
Ardiwinata, 74-75, 78, 1050
Ardjoena. See Arjuna
Arip, Mohammad Hadji, 75, 1050, io8n
Arjuna, 44, 121, 124, i67n, 178
Arsad, Hadji Mohammad, 33
Article 47, 209, 233, 280-281, 283-284,
288
Article m, 94n, i86n
Article 153 bis and ter, 315-316, 332
Article 161 bis, 241-42, 315
Ataturk, Kemal, 237
Atmokertanto, 143
Atmosoemarto, 309n, 321, 326, 329, 338
BB, 121, 178, 251
BO, xi-xii, 7n, 34-35, 38-39, 74, 76-77,
79-81, 92, 94-98, no, 119-120, 138,
139-142, 145, 175, 180-181, 199,
216-217, 234-235, 250, 267, 276, 342
Bakri, Hadji (of Kartasura), 143, 160
Bakri, Hadji (of Kauman, Surakarta), 39
Bakrie, Mas Hadji, 82
Bakunin, 277
Bandung, 24-25, 32-33, 37, 43, 47", 49,
52, 58-59, 81-82, 103-104, 113-115,
119, 137, 144, 172, 239-^40, *44,
248, 261, 315, 33*, 341
Bandung Algemeene Studieclub, 341
355
356 Index
Bantul, 13, 162-164, 221, 251, 322-323
Banyudono, 146, 153, 180, 195, 204
Batavia, 8, 24, 27, 31-37, 49, 51-52, 67,
74, 97, 103-105, 120, 125, 137-138,
I43-I44* 166, 169, 147-48, 183, 283,
308-309, 312, 315, 326, 330-332,
336, 339
batik, 23-27, 36, 39, 41, 43, 46, 51, 55-
57, 65, 79-8o, 82, 118, 122, 127, 130,
t36, 139, i42-i43> 145* x53, 180,
252, 269, 271-272, 279, 308, 30911,
318, 332, 334, 336
Batoro Kolo (Batara Kala), 207
bekel, 13-20, 22, no, 152-154, 193,
306, 334
Bergsma, Pieter, 220, 222, 226-229, 230,
234-236
Beweging, De, 144, 172, 191
Bijl, K. J., 70
Bima, 64, 90
Boechari, Kyai Moechtar (Mukhtar
Bukhari), 135, 13611, 213, 251-252,
2.54, 256-257, 260
Boedisoetjitro (Budisutjitro, Budisucitro),
23011, 242, 248, 269, 273-274, 277,
279, 3i3� 3i6
Bolshevik, 93, 215
Bond van Mindere Marinepersoneel, 93
Boven Digul, 247^ 299, 338-339
boycott, 36, 40, 44-48, 53, 55, 340
Boyolali, 2, 8, 12, 81, 146, 153, 160, 180,
187, 195, 244, 334
Brandsteder, J. A., 93
Bromartani, 7
Brotonoto, 115, 238n
Brotosoehardjo, 54, io8n, 115, 225, 226
CSI, 54, 73-75* 77-8o, 85, 91, 94-97,
99n, 100, 104-108, no, 113-115,
128, 137, 140-141, 187-188, 200,
202, 204, 216-219, 224, 229~23i,
2.33-2.40, 243, 249, 251, 261, 264,
300-302; congress, 104-105, 107-
108, no, 113-116, 202, 218-220,
225_23x, 237-239, 247, 2.54-255,
261-262, 272, 300-301; for West Java
and Sumatra, 78-79
Calamadu, 12, 146, 333-334
capitalism, 8, 104, 107-108, in, 134-
x36, 147-148, 175, x78, 199, 2I7,
228-229, 232, 24�, 243, 2.46-2L49,
254-255, 2.58-261, 263, 265, 270-
274, 2.85-292, 295-297, 305, 308,
319, 32I� 327
Carpentier Along, J. H., 97, 219, 233
Carpentier Alting commission, 97
Ceper, 47, 200, 204, 209
Chinese, xv, 2-3, 5, 7, 25-26, 32-41,
43, 46-47, 52-53, 55-56, 60-68, 120,
x37, 13811, 188, 199-200, 318, 329,
339-340; market strike, 37, 42n, 46,
52; nationalism, 37; revolution, 36-37,
39, 46, 318
Christian, 43, 80, 131-132, 134-136,
258, 292
Comintern, xii, 278
Comite Boemipoetra, 63, 71, 78, 119
Comite Kemanoesiaan, 283
Comite Keslametan Rahajat
Vorstenlanden, 180
Comite Menegoehkan Keberanian Ra'jat,
230
Comite Panata Pangoeripan Mardika, 235
Comite Pangoeripan Mardika, 273
Comite Pembangoenan Persatoean, 236
Comite Sjanghai-fonds, 318
Comite van de Revolutie, 332, 336
Comite van Vakbonden, 319-320, 324,
326, 330-331
committee for freedom of the press, 98,
101, 103
Committee for Javanese Nationalism, 96,
139
communism, xii-xiii, xv, 215, 219, 224,
226-229, 237, 239, 243-247, 249,
25 5, 258, 261-262, 264, 277, 282,
284-287, 289-290, 295-297, 299,
302, 307-312, 315-317, 32.1, 325,
339-342.
Communist Manifesto, The, 245, 289,
2-95
Communist revolt, xv, 336, 339
Communist soldier, 247-248, 305
Cramer, Ch. G., 97
Dahlan, Chatib Amin Kyai Hadji Ahmad,
51, 56, 73, 75, IQ5n, !o8n, 112, 115,
129, 167, 2i3n, 225n, 257, 260-261,
3�m, 342
Darah Ra'jat, 246, 317
Darma Hatmoko, 68
Darma Kanda, 38, i36n, 138, i4on, 180,
198-199, 318
Darma Loemekso, 49, 57
Darmo Soesastro, 279-280
Darnakoesoema (Darnakusuma), 76, 82,
86
Darsono, 2i6n, 217, 219, 225-228, 230,
240, 242-243, 244n, 254, 262-265,
273 - 274, 277~278, 281, 301, 309,
3i3, 315, 342
Darsosasmito, Raden Ngabehi, 135, 136,
144, 160, 165, 167, 2i3n
Dasoeki (Dasuki), Ahmad, 135, i36n,
2I3, 254-255, 260-261, 269, 317,
320-321, 326-328, 330, 338
Index 357
Dekker, H. W., 99
Delanggu, 143, 153, 188, 192-195, 197-
zoo, 202, 204, 2ion, 214, 269, 273,
306, 307
demonstration, 36, 209, 329-330, 339-
340
Dewa Ruci, 64, 90
Digul. See Boven Digul
Dipanegara, 123-126
Dipomartono, Raden, 51
Dirdjoatmodjo, Raden, 32, 381
Djabir Moeda, Hadji, 303
Djadi, 322
Djajadiningrat, Hasan, 70, 73, 75, 96,
i05n, io8n, 115, 219, 225n, 226
Djajengsoedarmo, 235n, 236-237, 272-
273
Djami'at al-Chair, 35
Djamiat'oel Chasanah, 243, 253, 259
Djawa Dipa, 105-107, 117, 140, 250,
327-328
Djawi Hiswara, 38, 47n, 81, 106, i07n,
130-132, 139, 180
Djawi Kanda, 32, 38, 47n, 81, 139, 180
Djojodihardjo, 279
Djojodikoro, 106-107, 131-133
Djojomargoso, Raden Ngabehi, 40, 42-
43, 49, 5i, 56
Djojopanatas, 140, 187, 192
Djojosoediro, R., 32, 75, io5n, io8n,
115, 238n
Doellatib, 138, 144, 250, 272
Doelmadjid, 327
Doenia Baroe, 255, 271-273
Doenia Bergerak, 79-90, 112, 127, 301
Doenia Merdeka, 309
Dommering, E. J., 48
Douwes Dekker, E. F. E., xiii, 35, 49, 53,
58-59, 63-64, 119-120, 126, 138,
144-145, 165-166, 168, 170-172,
185, 214-216, 251, 340
Dwidjosoewojo, R. Ng., 95, no, 120,
216
ELS, 9, 81, 118
Engelenberg, A. J. N., 70, 214
ethical policy, 28, 84, 231
ethicus, 27, 34, 58, 60, 62, 69, 95, 113-
115, 120, 126-127, 210, 219, 231
Europeans, xii, 2-3, 5, 9-11, 13, 17, 2.6,
30, 36, 39, 46-47, 50, 65, 60-68, 81,
88, 93, 94n, 95, 98-99, 104, HD x79,
201-202, 216, 287, 304
Expres, De, 52-53, 57-59, 63, 119, 121
Fachrodin, Hadji, 112, 115, 129, 145,
213, 225-228, 235, 237-238, 249,
251, 254-255, 257, 260, 301, 342
First Class Native School, 28-29, 99
fitnah, 227, 253-254, 258-260, 264,
271, 274, 285-286, 294, 321, 342
Fock, Dirk, 210, 217, 231-235, 240-
241, 249-250, 310
Fonds Samarasa, 141, 144, 188
Foreign Oriental, xii, 3, 34, 67
Foresters' Union, 300
French Revolution, 294-295
Galestien, 138, 143
Garut, 113-114, n6n, 218, 229, 235
Germany, 92-93, 274
Gesikan, 322-323
glebagan, 15
Gobee, E., 232, 267
Goenawan, 226, 237n
Goenawan, Raden, 45n, 51-52, 57, 64,
70-75, 77-79, 88, 100, 105
Goentoer Bergerak, 85, 119
guru, 47, 202, 338, 340
HBS, 29-30, 81, ii5n, 219
HIS, 29, 252, 307^ 3o8n
Habromarkoto, 309, 316-317
Hadiasmara, Raden, 141
Hadisoebroto, 112
Hadiwidjojo, Pangeran, 7n, 80, 138, 180,
184, 191-192, 342
Hardjodiwongso, 268-269, 277, 280,
309, 317-318, 320, 324, 332, 333n,
338
Hardjosoemarto, 43, 277, 279-281,
Harloff, A. J. W., 160-161, 169-170,
172-173, 184, 188, 192, 205-207,
209-212, 250, 281
Haroenrasjid, i29n, 135, i36n, 213,
2130, 252n, 260, 277, 282, 296, 298n,
308, 321, 338
Harsoloemekso, 135-136, 144, 167, 213,
252, 254-257, 260-261, 267
Hasan Ali Soerati, Hadji, 52, 54, 57
Hasan bin Semit, Hadji, 54n, 75, i05n,
106, 131-132, i36n
Hazeu, G. A. j., 69, 104, 108, 113, 120,
126, 219, 232, 303
Heutsz, J. B. van, 34
Hidoep, 303, 305
Hindia Sarekat, 59
Hinloopen Labberton, D. van, 122, 126,
170,
Hisamzaijnie, Hadji, 51, 75, 80, 1050,
131, 133, 140, 142
Holy War. See perang sabil
hypocrite, 227, 243, 292. See also
munaiik (moenafik)
358 Index
IJB, 82, 112, 127
IP, xii-xiii, 48, 52, 57-60, 69, 72, 82, 91,
ii7, xx9, 12.2-123, 138, 142., x45,
215-216, 340
IP'er, 64, 85, 100, 102, 104, 119-120,
123, x42, 2.15
ISDP, 97, n6n, 216
ISDV, xii-xiii, 85, 90, 93, 98-99, 102,
10511, 108, 114, 140, 216, 217, 246
ISDV'er, 104, 108, 114
Idenburg, A. W. F., 34~35, 5�, 68, 73,
85, 92, 94-95, 97, 2.32
ijtihad, 129-130
Iman Bisri, Kyai, 252n, 307
Imandimedjo, 334-337
imperialism, 249, 255, 258-261, 265,
273, 289, 298
Indian National Congress, 74
Indier, De, 119-120
Indiers congress, 59, 123, i38n, 166, 172,
215
Indies nationalism, 96, 117, 120, 138-
139, 185, 2.15
Indo, xii-xiii, xv, 2-3, 7, 32-34, 38, 47,
58-59, 99, 120, 122, 127, 137-138,
M2-143, 166, 172-173, 188, 214-
2X5, 339-340
Indonesia, xi-xiv, 32, 217, 233, 248, 289,
2-94, 303-304, 308, 313, 339-342
Indonesian nationalism, xi-xiii, 339, 341-
342
Information office, 244, 269-270, 274,
2-77, 2.79
Insulinde, xii, 59, 76, 79, 82, 90-91, 95-
98, 117, 119-120, 137-143, 151-152,
157, 172.-174, !92., 215-216, 319,
32.3, 334-335, 340; Bintaran,i53-154,
168-169, 171-172, 188; Gawok, 146,
153 -154, 158, 172; Karangduren, 153,
158, 160, 166; Kartasura, 143, 146,
188; Klaseman, 146, 153, 158-160,
166, 187; Nglungge, 146, 153, 150-
159, 166, 168; Polan, 153-154, 168-
169, 171-172; Pundung, 146, 153,
172; Surakarta, 119, 137-176, 179-
181, 184-185, 187-188, i98n
Internationale, 246, 309, 317, 327
Islam, xi-xiii, xv, 34, 43, 45, 56-57, 60-
62, 64-67, 80, 106-107, I28-i37,
141, 150, 167, 186, 189-190, 202,
219, 227-229, 236-239, 243, 245,
253-259, 261-265, 271, 274, 283,
285-286, 290-292, 301-302, 327-
328, 339-342; pseudo, 136, 157, 257,
263; true, 132, 136, 198, 254-258,
267
Islam Abangan, 198-202, 338
Islam Bergerak, 128, 130, 132, 136, 137,
T38n, 140-141, 144, 147, 154, 167,
185-187, 213, 214, 236, 250-251
Islamic soldier, 150, 202n, 250, 267
Islamism, 2i3n, 215, 217, 249-298, 321,
342
Japanese, 36, 92
Javanese nationalism, 7n, 96, no, 138-
x39, M5� 199-200
Javanologist, 6-7, 126, 303
Javanology, 6-7
Joesoef, Raden Mohammad, 32, 51, 56,
7i, 75, 99, 100-103, i05n, io8n
jongkok, 53, 62, 66, 100
Kaoem Moeda, 49, 57, 58n
Karjosemito, 334-335
Kartadiredja, Raden Boerhan, 51
Kartasura, 141, 143, 146, 153, 180, 198,
204, 333
Kartini, Raden Adjeng, xi-xii, 27, 58, 339
Kartodikromo, Mas Marco, 25, 30, 37,
55-56, 65, 70, 76, 79, 81-91, 93, 98-
105, 112, 115, 118, 122, 125-128,
140-142, 188, 190, 196-197, 228,
230, 246, 248, 267n, 299-309, 313,
317-318, 324-326, 331-333, 338,
342
Kartopandojo, 309, 321
Kartosoediro, Mas Demang, 154, 168-
170
Kartowihardjo, 43
Kasan, Mohammad, 105, 23m
Kasteele, van der, 171-172
Kasultanan, 1-3, 13, 15, 19, 38, no,
M5, 323
Kasunanan, 1-4, 6-7, 12-13, x5, 19-20,
38-39, 41, 47, 51, 55, 79-8o, 118,
120, 131, i36n, 141-142, 145-148,
x5�-153, x56, x59, x6i, 169, 176,
179-181, 191-192, 204, 252-253,
267
kaum abangan, 107, 128, 132
Kauman (Surakarta), 3, 23-25, 39, 80,
82, 127, i36n, 143, 150, 249, 251,
267, 269, 271, 308, 317-318, 320,
322, 327, 329, 331, 333, 336
Kauman (Yogyakarta), 56, 129
kaum muda, 30-33, 37, 53, 58, 62, 64,
66, 74, 76, 79-81, 84, 92, 96, 100,
104, 108, 120, 127, 130-131, 260
kaum putihan, 106-107, x28, 132, 140
Kedungjati, 236, 238, 243, 251, 256n,
264
Keprabon, 24-25, 80, i36n, 139, 188,
25211, 307, 317-318, 320, 322, 327,
33x, 336
Index 359
Kern, R. A., 179, zio, 219, 232, 281,
3�3, 322, 323
Keroekoenan Yogya, 272
ketoprak, 181, 183, 319
Kiageng Mangir, 181-184, 188-189
Klaten, 2, 12, 55, 68, 81, 146, 153, 157-
158, 161, 168, 180, 187, 192, 195,
198, 203-204, 206, 208-209, 2ion,
250, 271, 273, 306-307, 3i7n, 334,
337
Koemandang Djawi, 140
Koenkijat. See Masjoedoelhaq
Koesen, 135, 144, 167, 185, 2i3n, 251,
254, 260, 269
Koesoemo Joedo, Raden Mas Tumenggung Ario, 95
Koesoemo Oetojo, Raden Mas Tumenggung, 32-33, 95
Kong Dji Hing, 68
Kong Sing, 39-41, 318
Kota Gede, 56, 145, 3x3-315> 3l8, 3zo>
3Z3,33z
Krapyak, 47, 153
kromo, 64, 66, 76-77, 79, 84, 118, 121,
148, 150, 178, 185, 189, 226, 255
kromo (high-Javanese), 105
ksatrya. See satria
kuda kepang, 332
kuli, 14-15, 22, 63, 68, 152, 177, 195
kuli kenceng, 20-22, 152-154
kyai, 105, 129-132, 140, 142, 149, 157,
219, 243, 252-253, 261, 329
Landjoemin, Datoek Toemenggoeng, 261,
263
Lawean, 24-26, 39-43, 46, 51, 71, 80,
139, 142, 145, 180, 269, 308, 317-
319, 322, 335
Lely, A. E. van der, 92n, 208, 232, 241,
276-277, 281
Lenin, V. L, 227, 246, 250
Limburg Stirum, J. P. graaf van, 92, 94,
95, 97-98? Iz6> 210-211, 217, 225,
226, 231-232, 281
Lokomotief, De, 118, 121
MD, 254, 259. See also Moehammadijah
(Muhammadyah)
Madiun, 45, 49, i36n, i38n, 176, 178,
181, 210, 229, 236, 238-244, 268,
270-271, 273, 275, 281
Madrasah Mamba'oel Oeloem, 38, 130
Madrasah Soennijah Mardi Boesono, 317,
320, 330
Manang, 275, 309, 317, 337
mandur, 17, 162
Mangkunegara, 2-5, 12, 80, 95, 138,
181, 191, 211, 280
Mangkunegara VII, 7n, 183
Mangkunegaran, 1-3, 6n, 12, 19-20, 38,
47, 68, 80, 120, 138, i39n, 145-146,
175-176, 192, 195, 204, 209, 275-
276, 280, 333
Mangkunegaran Legion, 46, 192, 307n,
336-337
Mangoenatmodjo, 192, 198-204, 206,
208, 214, 338, 340
Mardi Kiswa, no
Mardi Rahardjo, 80, 132
Mardjohan, 315
Marel, J. van der, 250, 266, 277
maron, 15-16
Martodharsono, Raden, 38, 40, 42-47,
55, 81-82, 106, 130-133, 139, 180,
I99n
Marx, Karl, 246, 277, 286-287, 289-
290, 321, 340, 342
Marxism, 100, 341
Mashoed, Kyai Hadji, 252, 320, 330
Masjoedoelhaq, 308, 321
Mawa, 324, 326-327, 331-332, 333n,
338
Mawardi, Kyai Hadji, 252, 320, 329-330
Mecca, 127, 129, 149, 261-262, 281-
283, 327
Medan Moeslimin, xv, 80, 128, 130-134,
136, 140-141, 144, 213, 251, 254,
256-257, 260-261, 266, 276-277,
282-285, 297, 308, 320-321, 324,
33G 338
Medan Prijaji, 33-34, 38, 45, 47n, S6~
57, 58n, 60, 80-81, 340
Misbach, Hadji Mohammad, xv, 80, 90-
91, 117, 127-138, 140-151, 154,
156-161, 164-169, 171-172, 175,
183, 185-186, 188-194, 196-197,
202-203, 205-206, 209, 2ion, 212-
215, 217-218, 229-230, 243, 248-
252, 256-299, 302, 304-306, 308-
309, 320-321, 327-328, 340, 342
Modjopahit, 62, 100, 119
Moe'alimin (mualimin), 309, 320-322,
324, 326-330, 333, 338
Moechamad, S., 3o6n, 309, 313
Moedio Wignjosoetomo, 138, 139m 140,
144, 170-172, 187, 192, 213, 250,
279-280
Moehammadijah (Muhammadyah), xii,
51, 56, 112, 115, 128-129, 136, 145,
167, 188, 213, 219, 228-229, 234-
236, 238n, 243-244, 249-257, 259-
265, 267, 268, 275, 285, 302, 307,
312, 320, 322
Moetokalimoen, 268, 269n, 271, 276-
277, 300-309, 313, 317, 320, 331,
333> 335-338
360 Index
muballigh, in, 117, 127, 130, 135-137,
1:46, 150, 167, 202, 250-251, 256, 302
mukmin (moekmin), 149-150, 256-260
munafik (moenafik), 227, 257-258, 260,
267, 271
Muurling, W., 9211, 181, 219
NIP-SH, xii, 91, 138, 166, 168, 172-176,
180-181, 184-185, 207-217, 273,
319, 340. See also SH
NIS, 8, 65, 81, 98-99, 13911, 192, 206,
335, 337
Najoan, O, 220
Narpowandojo, 80, 191, 250, 268, 276
Natarata, Raden Pandji. See Sasrawidjaja,
Raden
National Congress. See SI, congress
nationalism, xi-xiii, xv, 87, 114, 172, 246,
303, 339, 341-342.
native militia, 74, 80, 88, 92, 103-104
Nederlandsch-Indische Vrijzinnigenbond,
95
Neratja, 115, 261
Ngabdoelpatah, Mas Hadji, 51, 73, 75
Ngabehi, Pangeran, 7n, 51, 55
Ngabid, Pak. See Probowigoto, Raden
Mas
Ngadiman, 322
Ngadino, 208, 214, 236, 269n
nggogol, 17-18, 162-163, 169-170, 209,
2-51
ngoko, 63, 105, 324
Nieuwenhuys, J. H., 317-318, 336
night watch. See ronda
Njala, 332
Noeriman, 144
Normaalschool, 252, 270, 273
November declaration, 97, 109, 114, 173,
2-31
OSVIA, 29, 53-54, 81, no
Oemar, Hadji, 267n, 308, 321
Oemar Fakih, Hadji, 272
Oemat Islam (Ummat Islam), 322
Oesman, Pangeran, 33
Oesmoeni, 320, 329
Oetoesan Hindia, 49, 51-54, 85, 106,
115, 131, 255
Opium Farm, 5, 35, 39
Opiumregie, 37, 140-141, 145, i87n,
19Z
Organisatie Pemoeda Indonesia, 324
orang particulier, 27-28, 37-38, 57, 64-
65, 106, 145
PEB, 214, 243, 259, 262-263, 2.94
PFB, 91, 109-113, 115, 145, 187-188,
192.-200, 204-206, 208-209, 2.13-
214, 218, 220-224, 2.27-230, 235-
236, 242, 244, 269, 273; general strike,
206, 217, 220-224
PGHB, 105, 140-141, 145, 153, i87n
PID, 92, 219
PKBO, 204
PKBT, 105, 140-141, 145, 153, i87n
PKI, xii-xiii, 128, 217, 226-231, 234-
240, 242-249, 251, 261, 265-266,
268-279, 2.81-283, 2-975 2.99-302,
305, 308-327, 331-333, 335, 342;
congress, 239-240, 246-248, 261-
266, 309; Semarang, 230, 236, 238n,
240, 242n, 301, 308, 313, 315; Sura�
karta, 248, 268-270, 274, 277, 299,
304, 309, 313, 316-322, 324-326,
32.9-3335 338; Yogyakarta, 269, 272,
2-83, 307, 32.2.-324
PKT, 204
PPKB, 113-114, 220-222, 224, 227-
230, 268
PPPB, 107, 109-110, 113, 115, 140, 144,
188, 213, 220, 227-230, 233, 235-
237, 242, 244, 253-255, 322, 331
PSI, 217, 237-240, 243, 245, 247, 249,
261, 264-267, 302, 309, 312, 342
Padmotenojo, 188, 192, 205-206, 214,
273> 2-77
Padokan, no
Pakualam, 13, 35, 145
Pakualaman, 1-2, 3n, 13, 38, 56, no,
r75� 2.13, 250, 272, 323
Pakubuwana, 181
Pakubuwana X, 148, 183, 194
pandita, 124, i39n, 302, 304
Panggoegah, 138-139, 142, 144, 154,
160, 167-168, 176, 178-179, 184,
187, 191, 212-214, 2.50-251
Pangreh Pradja, 27, 33, 53, 57, 233
Pan-Islamism, 227, 237, 243, 301, 339
Pantjaran Warta, 49, 51, 57, 78, 88
Parikrangkungan, Raden Mas Temanggung, i36n, 252n, 267
partijtucht. See party discipline
Partoatmodjo, 268-270, 273, 276, 279,
281
Partondo, 245, 277
Partowinoto, Raden Mas, 144
party discipline, xiii, 217-218, 220, 224-
226, 229, 231, 238, 245, 247, 261-
265, 272, 301, 340
patuh. See appanage holder
pawnshop workers, 140-141, 145, 153,
234-2-37, 2.43, 2.49, 253, 255, 272
Pemberita, 332, 247n
Pembenta CSI, 301
Pemberita PSI, 238, 243, 247n
Pemimpin, 301-302
Index 361
pengajian, 208-209
perang sabil, 149, 274, 337, 338
pergerakan, xi-xv, 32, 34-35, 39, 48, 54,
56-57, 59-6i, 64, 76, 78-82, 87, 90-
9i, 93, 95-96, 98, 100-103, 108-110,
112-113, 117, 120-122, 126-128,
I3Z, i37-i4z, 145, T54, 168, 174-
176, 180, 185-186, 190-191, 194,
198-200, 202, 208, 210, 213, 216-
218, 224, 226, 228, 230-235, 240,
242-243, 245, 247-251, 256, 258,
260-261, 265-266, 268, 270, 272,
z77, z79, 2.82, 284, 298-306, 309-
311, 315-319, 321, 326, 338-342.
Persatoean Hindia, 181, 212
Persatoean Vakbonden Hindia, 240
pesantren, xv, 80, 127, 129-130, 135,
i36n, 252
Pewarta Hindia, 32-33, 58n
Pewarta Prijaji, 32-34
Pleijte, Th. B., 94, 97n
Poerwodihardjo, Raden Ngabehi, 131-
132, 140, 142, 180
Poespodiningrat, Raden Mas Ario, 51,
56-66, 142
pokrol bambu, 154
Polanharjo, 146, 168-172, 17m, 198,
203-204, 275
police, 14, 17, 37, 40-42, 46, 48, 66-67,
92n, 114, 150-151, 158-159, 164-
165, 170, 172-173, 186-187, 189,
191-194, 196-197, 201-205, 208-
209, 212, 217, 232-233, 266, 268,
270, 275-280, 282-283, 2-87, 299,
306-307, 310-311, 316, 322-323,
326-334, 336-337
Ponggok, 146, 153-154, 168, 180, 192,
194, 198-200, 203-204, 209, 279
Prambanan, 6, 307, 316, 324, 330, 332,
337
Prang Wedana, Pangeran Adipati Ario
Prabu, 80, 95-96, 138-139, 181. See
also Soerjosoeparto (Soerjosoeparta),
Raden Mas
prapat, 17-18, 158-165, 169, 209
Prawiradiredja, Raden Adipati Ario, 33
priyayi, 27, 33-35, 37-38, 53, 57, 64-
65, 68, 71, 79, 81, 84, 99-100, 105-
106, no, 118, 137-138, 145, 216,
234, 252-253, 319, 342
Probowigoto, Raden Mas, 54-55, 158
Raad van Vakbonden, 331-335, 338
Rachmat, 115
Radical Concentration, 97, 114, ii6n,
Radjiman Wediodipoero, Raden Ngabehi,
80, 95, 119, 170, 342
railway workers, 98-99, 236, 240-241,
266, 268, 275, 277-279, 312, 327
Ra'jat Bergerak, 271-274, 277
ra'jat school, 310-311, 317
Ranggawarsita (Ronggowarsito), Raden
Ngabehi, 7-8, 27, 93, 198-199, 283
Rangsang, 303
Rasa Merdeka, 246
Ratu Adil, 66-67
recherche, 208, 277, 279-280
Red Guardist, 93, 98
Red SI, 217, 239-240, 243-249, 261,
265-266, 268-269, 2.71-275, 278,
281, 302-303, 309-310
Regentenbond, 95
regent polisi, 159-160, 172, 189, 203,
209
Reksodipoetro, 228, 235
Rekso Roemekso, 40-43, 45, 55, 73, 139
reorganization, 15, 18-22, 47, 152-154,
161, 163, 176, 179, 193, 198-199,
206, 209-210, 250, 306
Respati, 307, 331, 333, 338
Retnodhoemilah, 32, 38
Revolutionaire Vakcentrale, 320, 324
Rinkes, D. A., 64, 69-72, 77, 82-84,
100, 113, 119, 122, 219, 232, 281
Rochani, 326-327, 329
Roebaja bin Ambarak bin Thalib, Sech,
107
Roekoen Desa, 199-200
ronda, 21, 41-46, 48, 53, 105, 157
Ronowaskito, 201
Rubenkoning, H. D., 205
Russia, 88, 93, 236, 318
rust en orde, 5, 14, 22, 27, 47-48, 5�,
68, 102, 161, 165, 173, 186-187, 202,
204-205, 209-210, 219, 250
SATV, 130, 135-138, 140, 144-146,
153, 160, 167, 185, 188, 213, 250-
253, 260, 269
SBB, 318-320, 326, 331, 334, 336
SBG, 311, 315, 322-323, 326
SDAP, 93, 98, 107
SDI, 42-43
SH, 183-185, 187-189, 191-194, 197,
202-203, 206-215, 25�i z69, 340; Delanggu, 188, 192, 195-200, 205-206,
208, 214, 273; Kartasura, 188, 195;
Surakarta, 1830, 185-188, 190, 194,
199-200, 207, 212-215, 251, 287;
Tegalgondo, 187
SI, xii, 34-35, 40, 4211, 44-57, 59-79,
82, 90-91, 98-106, 113-116, 120,
127, 130-131, 137, 139-143, 153,
175, 178, 181, 185, 203, 216, 217-
219, 224-231, 233, 237-239, 249-
362 Index
SI (cont.)
251, 261-262, 275, 285, 340, 342;
Bandung, 52, 50-59, 70-71, 73, 75,
78, 238; Batavia, 49, 51-52, 57, 72,
75, 78, 107; committee for the depart�
ment, 50-56, 73; congress, 49-51, 72-
78, 80, i04n, 114-115, 145; Delanggu,
188, 192, 196-200, 203-204, 208-
209; school, 244-245; Semarang, 49,
56, 60, 71, 75, 77, 88, 90-91, 96-101,
103, 105, 107, 109, 113-114, 116-
117, 140-141, 188, 202, 218-219,
226-229, 2.36, 238, 242, 246, 2470,
277, 300; Surabaya, 49, 52, 54, 56-57,
70, 73-75, 78, 99, 105-106, 109;
Surakarta, 34, 41-49, 51-57, 68, 70,
73, 75, 78-81, 86, 131, 139-145, 180,
206-215, 2-67, 299-300; Yogyakarta,
56, 72.-75, 91, no-114, 116, 145,
202, 218, 226-230, 235, 272-273
SPKI, 331, 333
SR, 128, 240, 244-245, 240-248, 271,
*74-2-75, 2.78, 281, 290-298, 307-
318, 320, 329, 331-338, 342; Klaten,
273, 278, 306, 3090; Madiun, 273,
278-279, 307^ 310; Salatiga, 244,
307; Surakarta, 248, 2670, 271, 273-
274, 270-278, 282, 304, 307-309,
313, 316-326, 330, 332; Yogyakarta,
*73, *78, 307, 3**-3*4
SS, 8, 98-99, 236, 240, 248, 275, 278-
*79, 311
ST, 3*3, 33i, 334-337; Nogosari, 334-
337
STOVIA, 29, 33, 35, 58n, 81, 118
sabillilahism, 274, 278
Salamoen, 327-329
Salim, Hadji Agoes, 107, 115, 2i6n, 219-
220, 222-231, 235-238, 243, 249,
255, 260-261, 301, 342
Samanhoedi, Hadji, 25, 39, 40, 42-43,
49, 51, 55-57, 70-71, 73, 78-79, 82,
106, 130, 139, 141-142, 180
sama rata sama rasa, 88-90, 196, 239,
255, 261, 300-301
Samin, Mohammad, 75, 1050, io8n
Samsoeri, Hadji, 267n, 309, 321, 330
Sandjojo, 268-269, 279-280, 309, 317
Sanoesi, Mohammad, 237-238, 263
Santoso, Raden, 140-141, 187-188
santn, 135, 329, 337
Sapoe Djagad, 269n, 279
Sardjono, 23m, 239, 248, 313, 316
Sarekat Abangan, 197-203, 340
Sarekat Hidjo, 312, 314
Sarekat Pegawai Pelaboean dan Laoet,
*47n, 3i5
Sarekat Postel, no, 236, 311, 315, 318,
3*o, 33i
Sarekat Prijaji, 33-34, 340
Sarotomo, 44-46, 49, 55-56, 81-82, 87
Sasrawidjaja, Raden, 198, 19911
Sastrodihardjo, Raden Gatoet, 144, 154,
160, i98n, 199, 272n, 273^ 309n
Sastropanitro, 205-206, 214, 268-269,
*79, *81
Sastrosidjono, 327
Sastrosoedirdjo, 322
Sastrosoegondo, Mas Ngabehi, 252, 257
Sastrowidjono, Raden, 95, 309, 317, 321,
3*6, 330, 338
Satan, 260, 265, 273, 285-286, 290-293,
295-296
satria, 61-62, 66, 74, 78, 81, 84, 87, 89-
90, 104, 117-118, 119, 124-126,
i39n, 167, 182, 186, 212, 226, 254,
*63, *73, 300, 302, 304-305; thief,
78-79, 87-88, 183, 226; true, 64, 78,
81, 84-86, 88-90, 125-126, 182, 186,
305
Sawahan, 334
Second Class Native School, 28, 81, 127,
i36n, 138, i88n, 252, 16911, 275
Secretariat Locale Arbeiders/Vakbonden
Merah Indonesia, 323
Secretariat of Red Indonesian Labor
Groups, 315, 319
Sekaten, 275-276, 325, 333
Semaoen (Semaun), 88, 91, 96, 98-105,
108, 114-115, 122, 141, 2i6n, 217-
220, 222, 225-231, 236, 238-242,
*45"*46, 2.51, 284, 287, 289, 300,
304, 3i3, 340, 34*
Semarang, 8-9, 23-24, 31, 34, 49, 51-
52, 67, 70, 81, 85, 87, 98-99, 103,
105, 115, 117-118, 119-120, i39n,
140, 144, 166, 170-173, 180-181,
185, 214-215, 219, 220, 230, 234,
236, 241-244, 248, 268, 275, 277-
281, 299-300, 306, 308, 315
sembah, 53, 62, 66, 100
Senopati, 181-184, 3�3, 3�9
Serat Kalatida, 198
Setia Oesaha, 51-54, 74
Siang-hwee, 34, 36
Sie Dhian Ho, 38, 46, 316
Sinar Djawa, 32, 49, 51, 53, 56, 60-61,
100-101, 105
Sinar Hindia, 105, 115, 225, 242, 247^
248, 255, 274, 300, 320
Sirat, Hadji, 187, 214
Sirat, Mas Pengoeloe Hadji Abdoellah, 56
Sismadi Sastrosiswojo, 138, 144, 181,
189-190, 213, 250, 253-255, 260,
Index 363
269, 272-273, 280, 282-283, 3O7,
323-324, 332, 33311, 338
Siswomintardjo, 317, 324, 331-332,
333n,338
Si Tetap, 99
Siti Jenar, Seh, 198
Sjahboedin Latif, 228, 238, zym
Sjarief, 135, 13611, 21311, 254, 256, 260,
268-269, 2-77, 182, 320, 331, 338
slametan, 68, 208-209, 326, 332
slander, 227, 295-296. See also fitnah
Sneevliet, H. J. F. M., 85, 98-101, 122,
2-46, 34�, 342-
Snouck Hurgronje, C., 126, 219
Soeara Ra'jat, 245, 247-248, 313
Soedarman, 140, 144, 154, 187, 192
Soedibio, Prawoto, io8n, 236, 26$n
Soedjak, Hadji, 213, 260
Soedjono, Raden, 56
Soegito, 318, 320, 331
Soehario, 105, 141
Soekarno (Sukarno), xi, 263, 341-342
Soekindar, 238n, 239
Soekirno, i05n, io8n, 115, 225n, 238n,
300
Soemantri, 242n, 246, 274
Soemarisah, Woro, 317
Soemodihardjo, m-112, 187, 228
Soemoharjono, m
Soemoloekito, Raden Mas, 154, 158
Soemono, 279, 307n, 331
Soendoro, 320, 331
Soepojo, 327
Soerabajaasch Handelsblad, Het, 98, 162,
192
Soerat Hardjomartojo, 235n, 236-237,
269, 272-273, 277
Soeriokoesoemo, Soejatiman (Soetatmo),
63, 96, no, 139
Soerjodiningrat, Raden Mas Ario, 55
Soerjodipoetro, 75, io5n
Soerjopranoto (Surjopranoto, Suryopranoto), 75, 91, i05n, io8n, no115, II7, 12.2,
145, 187, 192-193,
195, 199-2.05, 213, 215, 2i6n, 218,
220-230, 236, 238n, 255, 265, 272,
3�r, 342
Soerjosasmojo, 186, 2i3n, 236, 238, 251,
254-255, 256n
Soerjosoeparto (Soerjosoeparta), Raden
Mas, 7n, 5on, 80. See also Prang
Wedana, Pangeran Adipati Ario Prabu
Soerkati, Moehamad, 237
Soeroso, 238
Soetadi, 138, 143, 145, 23on, 234
Soetarto, 331, 334
Soetopo, 234
Soewardi Soerjaningrat, 52, 57-59, 62-
64, 70, 81-82, 84-87, 102, no, 118,
119, 144, 173, 185, 207, 212-216,
235, 251, 255, 272-273, 283-284,
300-301, 305, 340
Soewarno, 268-271, 276-277, 279-280,
307, 3i3? 317, 3Z5, 331, 333? 33#
Sontohartono, Mas, i36n, 252
Sosrodiningrat, Raden Adipati, 38, 55, 80,
130
Sosrokardono, Raden Pandji, 54, 74-76,
96, 100, i05n, 107-108, 113-115,
i39n, 140-141, 220, 300, 329
Sosrokoernio, Raden, 54, 56, 70, 81-82,
87, 106, 130, 140
Sosrosoedewo, 131
soviet, 93, 245, 294
Sri Wedari, 32, 131, 141-142, 184, 319
State Railway. See SS
strike, xi, xiv-xv, 10-18, 47, 88, 91, 100,
103, 107, 109, 111-113, 117, 140-
141, 146, 151, 156-165, 168-177,
187, 193, 195-197, 201-206, 208-
209, 220-224, 227, 233-237, 240-
243, 249-250, 253, 255, 265-266,
268-270, 272, 275, 294, 300, 315-
317, 319, 323-324, 336-337, 339-
342-
sugar factory, 10, 48, 53, no, 112, 187,
194-196, 201-202, 205-206, 214,
221-222; workers, 109, in, 145,
i87n, 192, 194-195, 204-205, 208-
209, 213, 221-222, 224, 323
sugar plantation, 8, 10-12, 15-16, 36,
47, i05n, in, 146, 161-164, 192,
194, 198, 204, 207, 209, 222-223,
3�6n, 31711, 322, 333-334
Sugar Syndicate, 50, 68, 205, 214, 219,
221-224, z43, 311-312
Sumatra, 33, 77-79, "5
sunan, 1-3, 5-7, 25, 31, 51, 55, 80, 106,
118, 121, 127, I36n, 148, 153, 168,
175-181, 183-185, 189, 191-194,
204, 209-210, 268, 276, 318, 330, 333
Sun Yat-sen, 36, 318
Surabaya, 8, 24-25, 31, 37, 40, 45-46,
48-52, 67, 72, 80, 99, 103, I05n,
106-107, 114-115, 131, 137, 141,
144, 223, 225-226, 229, 231, 234,
241, 262, 308, 315, 319
Surakarta, xiv-xv, 1-3, 5-6, 8-12, 23-
28, 31-32, 30-39, 41-52, 65, 68, 70,
79-82, 90-91, 117-120, 127-132,
136, 138-144, 147, 151, 169-172,
175-180, 187, 191, 194-195, 204-
206, 209-210, 212-215, 218, 242,
244, 250-253, 256-257, 266-278,
364 Index
Surakarta (cont.)
280-281, 296, 299-300, 303-307,
318-319, 336, 338
susuhunan. See sunan
THHK, 38, 318
TKNM, 107, 117, 130-133, 136, 140,
142-143, 180, 252, 260
tabligh, 112, 129, 135-137, 145, 149,
213, 234, 252-253, 320, 328, 330
Tajib, Hadji Moehammad, 154, 168-170,
188
Talma, D., 97, 219
Taman Pewarta, 38, 46
Tan Malaka, 231, 234-235, 244-246,
284, 294, 332, 340
Tasikmadu, 12, 195, 204
Tedjomartojo, 220, 228-230, 235n, 272,
283, 322
Teeuwen, J. J. E., i38n, 170
Tegalgondo, 146, 153, 157-159, 160-
161, 163-165, 168, 175-176, 192,
204, 208, 214
theosophist, 115, 120, 122, 126, 170,
302, 342
Tijdschrift, Het, 119, 121
Tirtoadhisoerjo (Tirtoadhisuryo), Raden
Mas, 33-35, 38, 40, 42-45, 48, 57,
60, 80-82, 340, 342
Tirtoadiwinoto, Raden Mas, 32
Tirtodanoedjo, Raden, 32, 53-54, 105,
140
Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo (Tjipto Mangunkusumo, Cipto Mangunkusumo),
xvi, 52.-53, 58-59, 63-64, 78-79, 82,
85, 88-96, 117-127, 137-139, 141-
145, 158, i6in, 165-170, 172-186,
188-193, 199, 203, 207, 209-216,
226, 250-251, 267-268, 273, 275,
279, 281, 284, 341-342
Tjitrosoebono, 230
Tjitrosoedarmo, 188, 205, 208, 214
Tjokroaminoto (Tjokroaminoto,
Cokroaminoto), Raden Mas Oemar
Said, 42n, 48-49, 51-54, 57, 59-64,
69-79, 81, 84, 91, 95-96, 100-108,
113 - 116, 122, 130-132, 185, 200,
202, 218-220, 225-228, 230, 236-
240, 243, 251, 254, 256n, 260-268,
272, 285, 301, 340, 342
Tjokrosoedarmo, Mas, 48, 51-52, 54, 75,
io5
Tjong Hoa Hwe Koan. See THHK
tobacco plantation, 10-12, 15-16, 146,
x53, 157-169, 19*,.198, 203-204,
2�7, 275, 317, 337 '
Toenggal Boedi, 140, 144-145, 187, 192
Toli Toli, 113-114
Tondokoesoemo, Mas, 54
Topee, G. L., 85, 172
trade unions, xi-xii, xiv, 88, 98-100, 103,
107, 109-110, 112-117, 177, 187,
217-218, 220, 222, 229-230, 234-
236, 240-245, 249, 270-271, 274,
300, 309, 311, 313, 315, 317-320,
323-324, 326, 330-333, 338, 340;
batik workers, 318, 323, 331;
chauffeurs, 109, 315, 318, 323, 331;
coachmen 109, 315, 331, 336; machine
shop workers, 315, 318; pawnshop
workers, 331; peasants, 323; police,
187, 192; printers, 315, 318, 323; railworkers, 98, 109; shoemakers, 109,
331; sugar factory workers, 109, 187.
See also PFB; PPPB; SBB; SBG; ST;
Typografenbond; VSTP
tricks, 133-134, 136, 183-184, 258-
259, 265, 290
Troelstra, M. J., 93, 97
Troenopawiro, 162-164, 251
Typografenbond, 109, 187
Uhlenbeck, G. W., i37n, 205, 210
ummat Islam, 130, 222
VIPBOW, 109, 240, 242
VOC, 1-2, 176
VSTP, 91, 98-99, 109, 113, 115, 218,
220, 227-228, 236, 240-242, 244,
266, 268-270, 275, 311, 315, 318,
320, 322-324, 326, 331, 336-337
Vakcentrale. See PPKB
Vogel, 122, 144, 157, 169, 171-172,
186, 200, 212
Volkslectuur, 53, 182, 219, 275, 281
Volksraad, 92, 94-97, 103-T04, 1050,
IT4, 115n, 1 x7, 12.6, 137-139, I42--
143, 166, 168-170, 175-176, 178-
179, 181, 183, 209-210, 216, 219,
233, 294, 311
Vorstenlanden, 1-2, 6, 8-10, 12, 14, 17-
19, 21-24, 37, 39, 161, 176-177,
179-180, 185, 206, 210, 249, 270-
27x, 273, 302, 306, 313
Vorstenlanden Agricultural Association,
205, 207
Wahidin Soedirohoesodo (Sudirohusodo),
32-, 35, 38
wargo pangarso, 43~44, 53, X2.7
wargo roemekso, 43, 53, 218, 237
war of voice, 82, 84, 299
wayang, 44, 61-62, 64, 77, 123-126,
128, 167, 189-190, 197, 207
wayang orang, 184, 3 18-319
wedana polisi, 57, 278-280
Index 365
Welfare Commission, 82-84
Wignjadisastra, A., 57, 58n, 63, i05n,
io8n
Wijk, G. F. van, 19, 42n
Winanta, 248, 313, 316
Winter, C. F., 7
Wirokoesoemo, Raden Ngabehi, 142
Wiromardjojo, 267
Wiromartono, 271, 307, 3o8n, 321, 330,
338
Wirosoeharto, 307, 317, 321, 331, 333,
338
Woerjaningrat, Raden Mas, 7n, 55, 80,
138, 276, 342
Wolterbeek Muller, D. G., 235n, 281
Wongsosoediro, 159-160
Wonogiri, 2-3, 12, 81, 268
Wonosari, 188, 195, 204, 208, 214, 3o6n,
317n
Wono Tamtomo, 300
Yogyakarta, 1, 3n, 5, 8-12, 23, 28, 31-
32, 35, 37-39, 45? 5G 5G 72.? 110-
m, 115, 129-130, 136, i38n, 162-
163, 204-205, 213-215, 219-221,
225, 230, 234-236, 241-242, 250-
253, 262, 264, 267-268, 270-271,
275, 277, 279-280, 301-302, 306-
307, 312-313
'
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Shiraishi, Takashi, 1950-
An age in motion : popular radicalism in Java, 1912-1926 / Takashi
Shiraishi.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-8014-2188-8 (alk. paper)
1. Java (Indonesia)-History. 2. Indonesia-History-1798-1942. 3.
Radicalism-Indonesia-Java-History-20th century. I. Title.
DS646.27.S55 1990
959.8'2-dc20 89-37476

{continued from front flap)

Relying mainly on pergerakan publications
and Dutch colonial documents, Shiraishi an�
alyzes the sources and evolution of the move�
ment in national and local arenas. On the na�
tional level, he discusses the Sarekat Islam
(Association of Islam) and traces the forma�
tion of political parties. Shiraishi then ex�
plores local transformations of the pergera�
kan in Surakarta, Central Java, focusing on
the rise and decline of several political parties
and associations, including the Surakarta Sar�
ekat Islam, the Insulinde and the National In�
dies Party-Sarekat Hindia, the Indonesian
Communist Party, and the Sarekat Ra'jat. In
addition he discusses the words and deeds of
three major pergerakan leaders-Marco Kartodikromo, Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, and
Hadji Mohammad Misbach-and demon�
strates how their actions were read in the
local Surakartan context. Throughout, he
demonstrates how modern political expres�
sions contributed to the emerging nationalist
discourse used by these different figures. The
result is an illuminating picture of what hap�
pened in Java when its thinkers and political
actors generated their first "modern" argu�
ments. Shiraishi's insights deepen our under�
standing of what political life was like in In�
donesia in the first quarter of this century,
and in so doing broaden our conceptions of
contemporary Indonesian politics, showing
especially how the categories and classifica�
tions of the last sixty years actually evolved.
An Age in Motion will be of interest to
Southeast Asianists, historians, political sci�
entists, and anyone interested in questions of
nationalism and the rise of modern politics in
the Third World.
Takashi Shiraishi is Assistant Professor of
Southeast Asian History at Cornell University.
For information on books of related interest, or for a
catalog, please write: Promotion Department, Cornell
University Press, 124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, New York
14850.
Of related interest
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"Based almost entirely on primary sources, this is one of the most thor�
ough accounts yet written of the rise of Vietnamese communism. Khanh
sees communism in Vietnam as a fusion of nationalism and Leninism,
one indigenous and the other imported. The book contains a remarkable
amount of research and will be useful to historians, general readers, and
to policymakers seeking to understand [America's] Vietnam tragedy."
-Foreign Affairs
"Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1945 represents an important turn�
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the best book on the Communist party in a major Western language.
An outstanding analysis of the first phase of the longest revolutionary
struggle in modern history. '-Gabriel Kolko, Journal of Contemporary
Asia
Cloth ISBN 0-8014-1369-9 Paper ISBN 0-8014-9397-8 384 pages Illustrations
Opium to Java
Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise
in Colonial Indonesia, 1860-1910
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Opium smoking was a widespread social custom in nineteenth-century
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Ihese monopoly franchises were regulated by the government and oper�
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James Rush explains the workings of the opium farm system during its
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ITHACA AND LONDON
isbn D-flom-Biafl-a