Tenorio, Kim Clarence C.

BSED-ENG3A

Existentialism is a blanket word for philosophers who see the essence of the
human condition as a major philosophical issue and believe that the only way to solve it
is through ontology. This broad meaning will be explained by looking at seven main
concepts addressed by existentialist thinkers. Existentialist thinkers are mostly from the
continental United States. Simone de Beauvoir was the most youthful understudy ever
to pass the requesting agrégation at the prestigious École Normale Supérieure. In this
way a star Normalienne, she was an essayist, rationalist, women's activist, deep rooted
accomplice of Jean-Paul Sartre, infamous for her anti-bourgeois way of living and her
free sexual connections which included among others a energetic undertaking with the
American author Nelson Algren. Much ink has been spilled debating whether de
Beauvoir’s work constitutes a body of free philosophical work, or may be a reformulation
of Sartre’s work. The wrangle about rests of course upon the elemental
misinterpretation that needs a body of work to exist and develop freely of (or
uninfluenced by) its mental environment. Such ‘objectivity’ isn't as it were outlandish but
too undesirable: such a body of work would be ultimately unimportant since it would be
non-communicable. So the address of de Beauvoir’s ‘independence’ can be rejected
here as unimportant to the philosophical queries of existentialism.

In 1943 Being and Nothingness, the foundation of the Existentialist development

in France was distributed. There Sartre gave an account of flexibility as ontological
constitutive of the subject. One cannot but be free: usually the bit of the Sartrean
conception of flexibility. In 1945 Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Recognition is
distributed. There, as well as in an exposition from the same year titled ‘The war has
taken place’, Merleau-Ponty intensely criticizes the Sartrean stand, scrutinizing it as a
reformulation of essential Stolid fundamentals. One cannot accept opportunity in
segregation from the flexibility of others. Activity is participatory: “…my flexibility is
joined with that of others by way of the world” (Merleau-Ponty in Stewart 1995:315).
Besides activity takes put inside a certain authentic setting. For Merleau-Ponty the
subjective free-will is continuously in a argumentative relationship with its verifiable
setting. In 1947 Simone de Beauvoir’s Morals of Equivocalness is distributed. In Morals
of Uncertainty de Beauvoir offers a picture of the human subject as always swaying
between facticity and greatness. Though the human is continuously as of now confined
by the brute realities of his presence, all things considered it continuously tries to
overcome its circumstance, to select its flexibility and in this way to make itself. This
pressure must be considered positive, and not prohibitive of activity. It is precisely since
the ontology of the human could be a battleground of contradictory developments (a see
consistent with de Beauvoir’s Hegelianism) that the subject must create an morals
which can be persistent with its ontological center. The term for this pressure is
uncertainty. Equivocalness isn't a quality of the human as substance, but a
characterisation of human presence. We are equivocal creatures predetermined to toss
ourselves into the longer term whereas at the same time it is our exceptionally possess
presence that tosses us back into facticity.

De Beauvoir, not at all like Sartre, was a academic peruser of Hegel. Her position
on existential morals is in this way more intensely impacted by Hegel’s see within the
Phenomenology of Soul concerning the minute of acknowledgment (Hegel 1977:111).
There Hegel portrays the development in which self-consciousness produces itself by
setting another would be self-consciousness, not as a quiet protest (Gegen-stand) but
as itself self-consciousness. The Hegelian movement remains one of the foremost
intriguing minutes within the history of logic since it is for the primary time that the
structure of the self does not take put from inside the self (as happens with Descartes,
for whom the as it were truth is the truth of my presence; or Leibniz, for whom the
monads are ‘windowless’; or Fichte, for whom the ‘I’ is completely self-constitutive) but
from the exterior. It is, Hegel tells us, as it were since somebody else recognizes me as
a subject that I can be constituted as such exterior the minute of an acknowledgment.
As in Nietzsche,

morals allude to a way of life (a βίος), as restricted to ethical quality which concerns
affirmed or condemned conduct. In this way there are no formulas for morals. Drawn
from Hegel’s minute of acknowledgment, de Beauvoir recognizes that the plausibility of
human prospering is based firstly upon the acknowledgment of the presence of the
other (“Man can discover a defense of his claim presence as it were within the presence
of the other men” (Beauvoir 1976:72) and furthermore on the acknowledgment that my
claim thriving (or my ability to posture ventures, within the dialect of existentialists)
passes through the plausibility of a common thriving. “Only the flexibility of others keeps
each one of us from solidifying within the craziness of facticity,” (Beauvoir 1976:71) de
Beauvoir composes; or once more “To will oneself free is additionally to will others free”
(Beauvoir 1976:73). The Morals of Uncertainty closes by pronouncing the need of
accepting one’s flexibility and the attestation that it is as it were through activity that
flexibility makes one work existentially accurate.

In 1949 Le Deuxième Sexe is distributed in France. In English in 1953 it showed

up as The Moment Sex in an condensed interpretation. The book instantly got to be a
best vender and afterward a establishing content of Moment Wave Woman's rights (the
women's activist development from the early 60’s to the 70’s propelled by the respectful
rights development and centering at the hypothetical examination of the concepts of
balance, imbalance, the part of family, equity and so forward). More than anything, The
Moment Sex constitutes a think about in connected existentialism where the unique
concept ‘Woman’ gives way to the examination of the lives of regular people battling
against persecution and mortification. When de Beauvoir says that there's no such thing
as a ‘Woman’ we ought to listen the reverberate of the Kierkegaardian attestation of the
single person against the deliberations of Hegelian reasoning, or additionally Sartre’s
request on the need of the prioritization of the individual lives of self-creating individuals.