[G.R. No. 117472.
February 7, 1997] compensate for a wrong done to a private party or his family, not to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEO
ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On June 25, 1996, we rendered our decision in the instant case
affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of
raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been committed
sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in
effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme
penalty of death.
On July 9, 1996, the accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's
grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation
of rape against the accused. We find no substantial arguments on the
said motion that can disturb our verdict.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel,
Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death
Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the
Philippines (FLAG).
On August 23, 1996, we received the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-
appellant. The motion raises the following grounds for the reversal of
the death sentence:
"[1] Accused-appellant should not have been prosecuted since the
pardon by the offended party and her mother before the filing of the
complaint acted as a bar to his criminal prosecution.
[2] The lack of a definite allegation of the date of the commission of
the offense in the Complaint and throughout trial prevented the
accused-appellant from preparing an adequate defense.
[3] The guilt of the accused was not proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
[4] The Honorable Court erred in finding that the accused-appellant
was the father or stepfather of the complainant and in affirming the
sentence of death against him on this basis.
[5] The trial court denied the accused-appellant of due process and
manifested bias in the conduct of the trial.
[6] The accused-appellant was denied his constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel and to due process, due to the
incompetence of counsel.
[7] R.A. [No.] 7659, reimposing the death penalty is
unconstitutional per se:
a. For crimes where no death results from the offense, the death
penalty is a severe and excessive penalty in violation of Article III,
Sec. 19 ( I ) of the 1987 Constitution.
b. The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
Article III, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution."
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3)
main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial
proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-
appellant's former counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
III
Although its origins seem lost in obscurity, the imposition of death as
punishment for violation of law or custom, religious or secular, is an
ancient practice. We do know that our forefathers killed to avenge
themselves and their kin and that initially, the criminal law was used to
punish in the name of the state.
The dawning of civilization brought with it both the increasing
sensitization throughout the later generations against past barbarity and
the institutionalization of state power under the rule of law. Today
every man or woman is both an individual person with inherent human
rights recognized and protected by the state and a citizen with the duty
to serve the common weal and defend and preserve society.
One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure
society against threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the
legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that define and
punish illegal acts that may be committed by its own subjects, the
executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and
sentences the criminals in accordance with these laws.
Although penologists, throughout history, have not stopped debating
on the causes of criminal behavior and the purposes of criminal
punishment, our criminal laws have been perceived as relatively stable
and functional since the enforcement of the Revised Penal Code on
January 1, 1932, this notwithstanding occasional opposition to the
death penalty provisions therein. The Revised Penal Code, as it was
originally promulgated, provided for the death penalty in specified
crimes under specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital
punishment had entered our legal system through the old Penal Code,
which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a
constitutional question of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel,
unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the
constitutional proscription against cruel and unusual punishments. We
unchangingly answered this question in the negative in the cases
of Harden v. Director of Prison,8 People v. Limaco,9 People v.
Camano,10 People v. Puda11 and People v. Marcos,12 In Harden, we
ruled:
"The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive.
In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court
said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within
the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies
there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than
the mere extinguishment of life.'"13
Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that our courts are
not the fora for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the
death sentence where the law itself provides therefor in specific and
well-defined criminal acts. Thus we had ruled in the 1951 case
of Limaco that:
"x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the
supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective.
However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as
long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it
is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless
of their private opinions,"14
and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of People v. Veneracion.15
Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of
treason, correspondence with the enemy during times of war, qualified
piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide
or with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons resulting
in insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in death. The
list of capital offenses lengthened as the legislature responded to the
emergencies of the times. In 1941, Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 616
added espionage to the list. In the 1950s, at the height of the Huk
rebellion, the government enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1700,
otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, which carried the death
penalty for leaders of the rebellion. From 1971 to 1972, more capital
offenses were created by more laws, among them, the Anti-Hijacking
Law, the Dangerous Drugs Act, and the Anti-Carnapping Law. During
martial law, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 was enacted
penalizing with death, among others, crimes involving homicide
committed with an unlicensed firearm.
In the aftermath of the 1986 revolution that dismantled the Marcos
regime and led to the nullification of the 1973 Constitution, a
Constitutional Commission was convened following appointments
thereto by Corazon Aquino who was catapulted to power by the
people.
Tasked with formulating a charter that echoes the new found freedom
of a rejuvenated people, the Constitutional Commissioners grouped
themselves into working committees among which is the Bill of Rights
Committee with Jose B. Laurel, Jr. As Chairman and Father Joaquin
G. Bernas, S.J., as Vice-Chairman.
On July 17, 1986, Father Bernas presented the committee draft of the
proposed bill of rights to the rest of the commission. What is now
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution was first
denominated as Section 22 and was originally worded as follows:
"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment, or the death penalty inflicted. Death penalty
already imposed shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua."
Father Bernas explained that the foregoing provision was the result of
a consensus among the members of the Bill of Rights Committee that
the death penalty should be abolished. Having agreed to abolish the
death penalty, they proceeded to deliberate on how the abolition was to
be done -- whether the abolition should be done by the Constitution or
by the legislature -- and the majority voted for a constitutional
abolition of the death penalty. Father Bernas explained:
"x x x [T]here was a division in the Committee not on whether the
death penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the
abolition should be done by the Constitution -- in which case it cannot
be restored by the legislature -- or left to the legislature. The majority
voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty. And the
reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the convict and his
family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never carried
out. There is no evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly
criminals, hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope that
other lives might be saved. Assuming mastery over the life of another
man is just too presumptuous for any man. The fact that the death
penalty as an institution has been there from time immemorial should
not deter us from reviewing it. Human life is more valuable than an
institution intended precisely to serve human life. So, basically, this is
the summary of the reasons which were presented in support of the
constitutional abolition of the death penalty".16
The original wording of Article III, Section 19 (1), however, did not
survive the debate that it instigated. Commissioner Napoleon G. Rama
first pointed out that "never in our history has there been a higher
incidence of crime" and that "criminality was at its zenith during the
last decade".17 Ultimately, the dissent defined itself to an unwillingness
to absolutely excise the death penalty from our legal system and leave
society helpless in the face of a future upsurge of crimes or other
similar emergencies. As Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr.
suggested, "although we abolish the death penalty in the Constitution,
we should afford some amount of flexibility to future
legislation,"18 and his concern was amplified by the interpellatory
remarks of Commissioner Lugum L. Commissioner and now
Associate Justice Florenz Regalado, Commissioner Crispino M. de
Castro, Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla, Commissioner Christian
Monsod, Commissioner Francisco A. Rodrigo, and Commissioner
Ricardo Romulo. Commissioner Padilla put it succinctly in the
following exchange with Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani:
"BISHOP BACANI. x x x At present, they explicitly make it clear that
the church has never condemned the right of the state to inflict capital
punishment.
MR. PADILLA. x x x So it is granted that the state is not deprived of
the right even from a moral standpoint of imposing or prescribing
capital punishment.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes. What I am saying is that from the Catholic
point of view, that right of the state is not forbidden.
MR. PADILLA. In fact x x x we have to accept that the state has the
delegated authority from the Creator to impose the death penalty under
certain circumstances.
BISHOP BACANI. The state has the delegation from God for it to do
what is needed for the sake of the common good, but the issue at stake
is whether or not under the present circumstances that will be for the
common good.
MR. PADILLA. But the delegated power of the state cannot be denied.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes, the state can be delegated by God at a
particular stage in history, but it is not clear whether or not that
delegation is forever under all circumstances
MR. PADILLA. So this matter should be left to the legislature to
determine, under certain specified conditions or circumstances,
whether the retention of the death penalty or its abolition would be for
the common good. I do not believe this Commission can a priori, and
as was remarked within a few days or even a month, determine a
positive provision in the Constitution that would prohibit even the
legislature to prescribe the death penalty for the most heinous crimes,
the most grievous offenses attended by many qualifying and
aggravating circumstances."19
What followed, thus, were proposed amendments to the beleaguered
provision. The move to add the phrase, "unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the national assembly provides for the death
penalty," came from Commissioners Monsod, Jose E. Suarez and de
los Reyes. Commissioner Rodrigo, however, expressed reservations
even as regards the proposed amendment. He said:
"x x x [T]he issue here is whether or not we should provide this matter
in the Constitution or leave it to the discretion of our legislature.
Arguments pro and con have been given x x x. But my stand is, we
should leave this to the discretion of the legislature.
The proposed amendment is halfhearted. It is awkward because we
will, in effect, repeal by our Constitution a piece of legislation and
after repealing this piece of legislation, tell the legislature that we have
repealed the law and that the legislature can go ahead and enact it
again. I think this is not worthy of a constitutional body like ours. If
we will leave the matter of the death penalty to the legislature, let us
leave it completely to the discretion of the legislature, but let us not
have this half-baked provision. We have many provisions in the
Revised Penal Code imposing the death penalty. We will now revoke
or repeal these pieces of legislation by means of the Constitution, but
at the same time say that it is up to the legislature to impose this again.
x x x The temper and condition of the times change x x x and so we, I
think we should leave this matter to the legislature to enact statutes
depending on the changing needs of the times. Let us entrust this
completely to the legislature composed of representatives elected by
the people.
I do not say that we are not competent. But we have to admit the fact
that we are not elected by the people and if we are going to entrust this
to the legislature, let us not be half-baked nor half-hearted about it. Let
us entrust it to the legislature 100 percent."20cräläwvirtualibräry
Nonetheless, the proposed amendment was approved with twenty-
three (23) commissioners voting in favor of the amendment and twelve
(12) voting against it, followed by more revisions, hence the present
wording of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution in the
following tenor:
"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed,
unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua."
The implications of the foregoing provision on the effectivity of the
death penalty provisions in the Revised Penal Code and certain special
criminal laws and the state of the scale of penalties thereunder, were
tremendous.
The immediate problem pertained to the applicable penalty for what
used to be capital crimes. In People v. Gavarra,21 we stated that "in
view of the abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for murder
is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua"22 thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period.
The constitutional abolition of the death penalty, it seemed, limited the
penalty for murder to only the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum
and the medium, which we then, in People v. Masangkay,23 People v.
Atencio24 and People v. Intino25 divided into three new periods, to wit,
the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the
upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium;
and reclusion perpetua as the maximum, in keeping with the three-
grade scheme under the Revised Penal Code. In People v.
Munoz,26 however, we reconsidered these aforecited cases and after
extended discussion, we concluded that the doctrine announced therein
did not reflect the intention of the framers. The crux of the issue was
whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the
death penalty, for if it did, then, the aforementioned new three-grade
penalty should replace the old one where the death penalty constituted
the maximum period. But if no total abolition can be read from said
constitutional provision and the death penalty is only suspended, it
cannot as yet be negated by the institution of a new three-grade penalty
premised on the total inexistence of the death penalty in our statute
books. We thus ruled in Munoz:
"The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution
abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder
to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These
should now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the
three-grade scheme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree
feel that Article III, Section 19 (1) merely prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty and has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua,
also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be
maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is
really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the
death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall
not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed,
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather
awkward, is still plain enough".27
Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19
(1) of the 1987 Constitution than the form in which the legislature took
the initiative in re-imposing the death penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution,
to enact legislation re-imposing the death penalty for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to this constitutional
mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-step process consisting of:
first, the decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death penalty
or not; and second, the vote to pass on the third reading the bill re-
imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes.
On February 15, 1993, after a fierce and fiery exchange of arguments
for and against capital punishment, the Members of the Senate voted
on the policy issue of death penalty. The vote was explained, thus:
"SUSPENSION OF THE RULES
Upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Body
suspended the Rules of the Senate.
Thereafter, upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection,
the Chair directed that a nominal voting be conducted on the policy
issue of death penalty.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Asked by Senator Tolentino on how the Members of the Senate would
vote on this policy question, Senator Romulo stated that a vote of Yes
would mean a vote in favor of death as a penalty to be reincorporated
in the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code, and a
vote of No would be a vote against the reincorporation of death
penalty in the scale of penalties in the Revised Penal Code.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR ALVAREZ
xxx
The Chair explained that it was agreed upon that the Body would first
decide the question whether or not death penalty should be reimposed,
and thereafter, a seven-man committee would be formed to draft the
compromise bill in accordance with the result of the voting. If the
Body decides in favor of the death penalty, the Chair said that the
committee would specify the crimes on which death penalty would be
imposed. It affirmed that a vote of Yes in the nominal voting would
mean a vote in favor of death penalty on at least one crime, and that
certain refinements on how the penalty would be imposed would be
left to the discretion of the seven-man committee.
xxx
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TAADA
In reply to Senator Taada's query, the Chair affirmed that even if a
senator would vote 'yes' on the basic policy issue, he could still vote
'no' on the imposition of the death penalty on a particular crime.
REMARKS OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Senator Tolentino observed that the Body would be voting on the basic
policy issue of whether or not the death penalty would be included in
the scale of penalties found in Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, so
that if it is voted down, the Body would discontinue discussing Senate
Bill No. 891 pursuant to the Rules, but if approved, a special
committee, as agreed upon in the caucus, is going to be appointed and
whatever course it will take will depend upon the mandate given to it
by the Body later on.
The Chair affirmed Senator Tolentino's observations.
REMARKS OF SENATOR ROCO
Senator Roco stated that the Body would vote whether or not death as
a penalty will be reincorporated in the scale of penalties provided by
the Revised Penal Code. However, he pointed out that if the Body
decides in favor of death penalty, the Body would still have to address
two issues: 1) Is the crime for which the death penalty is supposed to
be imposed heinous pursuant to the constitutional mandate? 2) And, if
so, is there a compelling reason to impose the death penalty for it? The
death penalty, he stressed, cannot be imposed simply because the
crime is heinous."28
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and
no abstention, the Chair declared that the Senate has voted to re-
incorporate death as a penalty in the scale of penalties as provided in
the Revised Penal Code. A nine-person committee was subsequently
created to draft the compromise bill pursuant to said vote. The
mandate of the committee was to retain the death penalty, while the
main debate in the committee would be the determination of the
crimes to be considered heinous.
On March 17, 1993, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Chairman of the
Special Committee on the Death Penalty, delivered his Sponsorship
Speech. He began with an explanation as to why the Senate Bill No.
891 re-imposes the death penalty by amending the Revised Penal Code
and other special penal laws and includes provisions that do not define
or punish crimes but serve purposes allied to the reimposition of the
death penalty. Senator Tolentino stated:
x x x [W]hen the Senate approved the policy of reimposing the death
penalty on heinous crimes and delegated to the Special Committee the
work of drafting a bill, a compromise bill that would be the subject for
future deliberations of this Body, the Committee had to consider that
the death penalty was imposed originally in the Revised Penal Code.
So, when the Constitution was approved in order to do away with the
death penalty, unless Congress should, for compelling reasons
reimpose that penalty on heinous crimes, it was obvious that it was the
Revised Penal Code that was affected by that provision of the
Constitution. The death penalty, as provided in the Revised Penal
Code, would be considered as having been repealed -- all provisions
on the death penalty would be considered as having been repealed by
the Constitution, until Congress should, for compelling reasons,
reimpose such penalty on heinous crimes. Therefore, it was not only
one article but many articles of the Revised Penal Code that were
actually affected by the Constitution.
And it is in consideration of this consequence of the constitutional
provision that our Special Committee had to consider the Revised
Penal Code itself in making this compromise bill or text of the bill.
That is why, in the proposed draft now under consideration which we
are sponsoring, the specific provisions of the Revised Penal Code are
actually either reenacted or amended or both. Because by the effect of
the Constitution, some provisions were totally repealed, and they had
to be reenacted so that the provisions could be retained. And some of
them had to be amended because the Committee thought that
amendments were proper."29
In response to a query by Senator Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as to
whether or not it would have been better if the Senate were to enact a
special law which merely defined and imposed the death penalty for
heinous crimes, Senator Tolentino explicated, thus:
"x x x [T]hat may be a way presenting the bill. But we must bear in
mind that the death penalty is imposed in the Revised Penal Code.
Therefore, when the Constitution abolished the death penalty, it
actually was amending the Revised Penal Code to such an extent that
the Constitution provides that where the death penalty has already
been imposed but not yet carried out, then the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua, that is the penalty in the Revised Penal Code.
So we thought that it would be best to just amend the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, restoring the death penalty for some crimes that
may be considered as heinous. That is why the bill is in this form
amending the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Of course, if some people want to present a special bill... the whole
trouble is, when a special bill is presented and we want to punish in the
special bill the case of murder, for instance, we will have to reproduce
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on murder in order to define
the crime for which the death penalty shall be imposed. Or if we want
to impose the death penalty in the case of kidnapping which is
punished in the Revised Penal Code, we will do the same -- merely
reproduce. Why will we do that? So we just followed the simpler
method of keeping the definition of the crime as the same and merely
adding some aggravating circumstances and reimposing the death
penalty in these offenses originally punished in the Revised Penal
Code."30
From March 17, 1993, when the death penalty bill was presented for
discussion until August 16, 1993, the Members of the Senate debated
on its provisions.
The stiffest opposition thereto was bannered by Senator Lina who kept
prodding the sponsors of the bill to state the compelling reason for
each and every crime for which the supreme penalty of death was
sought. Zeroing in on the statement in the preamble of the death
penalty bill that the same is warranted in the face of "the alarming
upsurge of [heinous] crimes", Senator Lina demanded for solid
statistics showing that in the case of each and every crime in the death
penalty bill, there was a significantly higher incidence of each crime
after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2, 1987 when the
1987 Constitution was ratified by the majority of the Filipino people,
than before such ratification.31 Inasmuch as the re-impositionists could
not satisfy the abolitionists with sufficient statistical data for the latter
to accept the alarming upsurge of heinous crimes as a compelling
reason justifying the reimposition of the death penalty, Senator Lina
concluded that there were, in fact, no compelling reasons therefor. In
the alternative, Senator Lina argued that the compelling reason
required by the constitution was that "the State has done everything in
its command so that it can be justified to use an inhuman punishment
called death penalty".32 The problem, Senator Lina emphasized, was
that even the re-impositionists admit that there were still numerous
reforms in the criminal justice system that may and must be put in
place, and so clearly, the recourse to the enactment of a death penalty
bill was not in the nature of a last resort, hence, unconstitutional in the
absence of compelling reasons. As an initial reaction to Senator Lina's
contentions, Senator Tolentino explained that the statement in the
preamble is a general one and refers to all the crimes covered by the
bill and not to specific crimes. He added that one crime may not have
the same degree of increase in incidence as the other crimes and that
the public demand to impose the death penalty is enough compelling
reason.33
Equally fit to the task was Senator Wigberto Taada to whom the battle
lines were clearly drawn. He put to issue two things: first, the
definition of "heinous crimes" as provided for in the death penalty bill;
and second, the statement of compelling reasons for each and every
capital crime. His interpellation of Senator Tolentino clearly showed
his objections to the bill:
"Senator Taada. x x x But what would make crimes heinous, Mr.
President? Are crimes heinous by their nature or elements as they are
described in the bill or are crimes heinous because they are punished
by death, as bribery and malversation are proposed to be punished in
the bill?
Senator Tolentino. They are heinous by their nature, Mr. President, but
that is not supposed to be the exclusive criterion. The nature of the
offense is the most important element in considering it heinous but, at
the same time, we should consider the relation of the offense to society
in order to have a complete idea of the heinous nature of these
offenses.
In the case of malversation or bribery, for instance, these offenses by
themselves connected with the effect upon society and the government
have made them fall under the classification of heinous crimes. The
compelling reason for imposing the death penalty is when the offenses
of malversation and bribery becomes so grave and so serious as
indicated in the substitute bill itself, then there is a compelling reason
for the death penalty.
Senator Taada. With respect to the compelling reasons, Mr. President,
does the Gentleman believe that these compelling reasons, which
would call for the reimposition of the death penalty, should be
separately, distinctly and clearly stated for each crime so that it will be
very clear to one and all that not only are these crimes heinous but also
one can see the compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death
penalty therefor?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that matter was actually considered
by the Committee. But the decision of the Committee was to avoid
stating the compelling reason for each and every offense that is
included in the substitute measure. That is why in the preamble,
general statements were made to show these compelling reasons. And
that, we believe, included in the bill, when converted into law, would
be sufficient notice as to what were considered compelling reasons by
the Congress, in providing the death penalty for these different
offenses.
If a matter like this is questioned before the Supreme Court, I would
suppose that with the preamble already in general terms, the Supreme
Court would feel that it was the sense of Congress that this preamble
would be applicable to each and every offense described or punishable
in the measure.
So we felt that it was not necessary to repeat these compelling reasons
for each and every offense.
Senator Taada. Mr. President, I am thinking about the constitutional
limitations upon the power of Congress to enact criminal legislation,
especially the provisions on the Bill of Rights, particularly the one
which says that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law.
Can we not say that under this provision, it is required that the
compelling reasons be so stated in the bill so that the bill, when it
becomes a law, will clearly define the acts and the omissions punished
as crimes?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, I believe that in itself, as substantive
law, this is sufficient. The question of whether there is due process will
more or less be a matter of procedure in the compliance with the
requirements of the Constitution with respect to due process itself
which is a separate matter from the substantive law as to the definition
and penalty for crimes.
Senator Taada. Under the Constitution, Mr. President, it appears that
the reimposition of the death penalty is subject to three conditions and
these are:
1. Congress should so provide such reimposition of the death penalty;
2. There are compelling reasons; and
3. These involve heinous crimes.
Under these provision of the Constitution, paragraph 1, Section 13,
does the distinguished Gentleman not feel that Congress is bound to
state clearly the compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death
penalty for each crime, as well as the elements that make each of the
crimes heinous included in the bill?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that is a matter of opinion already. I
believe that whether we state the compelling reasons or not, whether
we state why a certain offense is heinous, is not very important. If the
question is raised in the Supreme Court, it is not what we say in the
bill that will be controlling but what the Supreme Court will fell as a
sufficient compelling reason or as to the heinous nature whether the
crime is heinous or not. The accused can certainly raise the matter of
constitutionality but it will not go into the matter of due process. It will
go into the very power of Congress to enact a bill imposing the death
penalty. So that would be entirely separate from the matter of due
process." 34
Senator Francisco Tatad, on his part, pointed out that the death penalty
bill violated our international commitment in support of the worldwide
abolition of capital punishment, the Philippines being a signatory to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Second
Optional Protocol. Senator Ernesto Herrera clarified, however, that in
the United Nations, subject matters are submitted to the different
committees which vote on them for consideration in the plenary
session. He stressed that unless approved in the plenary session, a
declaration would have no binding effect on signatory countries. In
this respect, the Philippines cannot be deemed irrevocably bound by
said covenant and protocol considering that these agreements have
reached only the committee level.35
After the protracted debate, the Members of the Senate voted on
Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading. With seventeen (17) affirmative
votes, four (4) negative votes, and one abstention, the death penalty
bill was approved on third reading on August 16, 1993.
The Senate's vote to pass Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading on
August 16, 1993 was a vindication of, the House of Representatives.
The House had, in the Eight Congress, earlier approved on third
reading House Bill No. 295 on the restoration of the death penalty for
certain heinous crimes. The House was in effect rebuffed by the Senate
when the Senate killed House Bill No. 295 along with other bills
coming from the House. House Bill No. 295 was resurrected during
the Ninth Congress in the form of House Bill No. 62 which was
introduced by twenty one (21) Members of the House of
Representatives on October 27, 1992. House Bill No. 62 was a merger
of House Bill Nos. 125, 187, 411, 764, 506, 781, 955, 1565, 1586,
2206, 3238, 3576 and 3632 authored by various Members of the
Lower House.
In his Sponsorship Speech, Representative Manuel R. Sanchez of
Rizal ably essayed the constitutional vesting in Congress of the power
to re-impose the death penalty for compelling reasons invoking
heinous crimes as well as the nature of this constitutional pre-requisite
to the exercise of such power.
"Mr. Speaker, in Article III, Section 19(1) of Constitution reads, a I
quote:
'Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress shall thereafter provide for it...'
The phrase 'unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
the Congress shall thereafter provide for it was introduced as an
amendment by then Comm. Christian Monsod.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment,
the death penalty was not completely abolished by the 1987
Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the death penalty and gave
Congress the discretion to review it at the propitious time.
Arguing for the inclusion of said amendment in the fine provision,
Comm. Ricardo Romulo said, and I quote:
"'The people should have the final say on the subject, because, at some
future time, the people might want to restore death penalty through
initiative and referendum.
Commissioner Monsod further argued, and I quote:
We cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it is
entirely possible in the future that circumstances may arise which we
should not preclude today.
xxx xxx xxx
I believe that [there] are enough compelling reasons that merit the
reimposition of the capital punishment. The violent manner and the
viciousness in which crimes are now committed with alarming
regularity, show very clearly a patent disregard of the law and a
mockery of public peace and order.
In the public gallery section today are the relatives of the victims of
heinous crimes the Hultmans, the Maguans, the Vizcondes, the
Castanoses, and many more, and they are all crying for justice. We
ought to listen to them because their lives, their hopes, their dreams,
their future have fallen asunder by the cruel and vicious criminality of
a few who put their selfish interest above that of society.
Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly
violent manner in which the same was committed or by the reason of
its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the
law, public peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose
essential and inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and
outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a
people.
Of late, we are witness to such kind of barbaric crimes.
The Vizconde massacre that took the lives of a mother and her two
lovely daughters, will stand in the people's memory for many long
years as the epitome of viciousness and atrocity that are repugnant to
civilized society.
The senseless murder of Eldon Maguan, and up-and-coming young
business executive, was and still is an outrage that shocks the moral
self of our people.
The mind-boggling death of Maureen Hultmann, a comely 16 year-old
high school student who dreamt of becoming a commercial model
someday, at the hands of a crazed man was so repulsive, so brutal that
it offends the sensibilities of Christians and non-Christians alike
The cold-blooded double murder of Cochise Bernabe and Beebom
Castanos, the lovely and promising couple from the University of the
Philippines, is eternally lodged in the recesses of our minds and still
makes our stomach turn in utter disgust.
xxx xxx xxx
The seriousness of the situation is such that if no radical action is taken
by this body in restoring death penalty as a positive response to the
overwhelming clamor of the people, then, as Professor Esteban
Bautista of the Philippine Law Center said, and I quote:
'When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or
unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they
deserve, there are sown the seeds of anarchy of self-help, of vigilante
justice and lynch law. The people will take the law upon their hands
and exact vengeance in the nature of personal vendetta.'
It is for this reason, Mr. Speaker, that I stand here and support House
Bill No. 62.
As duly elected Representatives of our people, collectively, we ought
to listen to our constituents and heed their plea a plea for life, liberty
and pursuit of their happiness under a regime of justice and
democracy, and without threat that their loves ones will be kidnapped,
raped or butchered.
But if such a misfortune befalls them, there is the law they could rely
on for justice. A law that will exact retribution for the victims. A law
that will deter future animalistic behavior of the criminal who take
their selfish interest over and above that of society. A law that will
deal a deathblow upon all heinous crimes.
Mr. Speaker, my distinguished colleagues, for the preservation of all
that we hold dear and sacred, let us restore the death penalty." 36
A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and
in the House of Representatives reveals that, while both Chambers
were not wanting of oppositors to the death penalty, the Lower House
seemed less quarrelsome about the form of the death penalty bill as a
special law specifying certain heinous crimes without regard to the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code and more unified in the
perception of what crimes are heinous and that the fact of their very
heinousness involves the compulsion and the imperative to suppress, if
not completely eradicate, their occurrence. Be it the foregoing general
statement of Representative Sanchez or the following details of the
nature of the heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by
Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental, there was
clearly, among the hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower
House, no doubt as to their cause:
"My friends, this bill provides for the imposition of the death penalty
not only for the importation, manufacture and sale of dangerous drugs,
but also for other heinous crimes such as reason; parricide; murder;
kidnapping; robbery; rape as defined by the Revised Penal Code with
or without additionally defined circumstances; plunder, as defined in
R.A. 7080; piracy, as defined under Section 2 of PD 532; carnapping,
as defined in Section 2 of RA 6539, when the owner, driver or
occupant is killed; hijacking, as defined in xxx RA 6235; and arson
resulting in the death of any occupants.
All these crimes have a common denominator which qualifies them to
the level of heinous crimes. A heinous crime is one which, by reason
of its inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity or
perversity, is repugnant and outrageous to the common standards
of decency and morality in a just and civilized society.
For instance, the crime of treason is defined as a breach of allegiance
to a government, committed by a person who owes allegiance to it
(U.S. v. Abad 1 Phil. 437). By the 'allegiance' is meant the obligation
of fidelity and obedience which individuals owe to the government
under which they live or to their sovereign in return for the protection
which they receive (52 Am Jur 797).
In kidnapping, the though alone of one's loved one being held against
his or her own will in some unidentified xxx house by a group of
scoundrels who are strangers is enough terrify and send shivers of fear
through the spine of any person, even scoundrels themselves.
In robbery accompanied by rape, intentional mutilation or arson, what
is being punished by death is the fact that the perpetrator, at the time of
the commission of the crime, thinks nothing of the other crime he
commits and sees it merely as a form of self-amusement. When a
homicide is committed by reason of the robbery, the culprits are
perceived as willing to take human life in exchange for money or other
personal property.
In the crime of rape, not only do we speak of the pain and agony of the
parents over the personal shock and suffering of their child but the
stigma of the traumatic and degrading incident which has shattered the
victim's life and permanently destroyed her reputation, not to mention
the ordeal of having to undergo the shameful experience of police
interrogation and court hearings.
Piracy, which is merely a higher form of robbery, is punished for the
universal hostility of the perpetrators against their victims who are
passengers and complement of the vessel, and because of the fact that,
in the high seas, no one may be expected to be able to come to the
rescue of the helpless victims. For the same reason, Mr. Speaker, the
crime of air piracy is punished due to the evil motive of the hijackers
in making unreasonable demands upon the sovereignty of an entire
nation or nations, coupled with the attendant circumstance of
subjecting the passengers to terrorism." 37
The debate on House Bill No. 62 lasted from October 27, 1992 to
February 11, 1993. On February 11, 1993, the Members of the House
of Representatives overwhelmingly approved the death penalty bill on
second reading.
On February 23, 1993, after explaining their votes, the Members of the
House of Representatives cast their vote on House Bill No. 62 when it
was up for consideration on third reading. 38 The results were 123
votes in favor, 26 votes against, and 2 abstentions
After the approval on third reading of House Bill No. 62 on February
23, 1993 and of Senate Bill No. 891 on August 16, 1993, the
Bicameral Conference Committee convened to incorporate and
consolidate them.
On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, entitled, "An
Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes,
Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended,
Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes," took effect.39
Between December 31, 1993, when R.A. No. 7659 took effect, and
the present time, criminal offenders have been prosecuted under
said law, and one of them, herein accused-appellant, has been,
pursuant to said law, meted out the supreme penalty of death for
raping his ten-year old daughter. Upon his conviction, his case was
elevated to us on automatic review. On June 25, 1996, we affirmed
his conviction and the death sentence.
Now, accused-appellant comes to us in the heels of this court's
affirmation of his death sentence and raises for the first time the issue
of the constitutionality of R.A. 7659. His thesis is two-fold: (1) that the
death penalty law is unconstitutional per se for having been enacted in
the absence of compelling reasons therefor; and (2) that the death
penalty for rape is a cruel, excessive and inhuman punishment in
violation of the constitutional proscription against punishment of such
nature.
We reject accused-appellant's proposition.
Three justices interposed their dissent hereto, agreeing with accused-
appellant's view that Congress enacted R.A. No. 7659 without
complying with the twin requirements of compelling reasons and
heinous crimes.
At this juncture, the detailed events leading to the enactment of R.A.
No. 7659 as unfurled in the beginning of this disquisition, necessarily
provide the context for the following analysis.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in
Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty "for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes". This power is not subsumed in the
plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear
showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the
death penalty entails (1) that Congress define or describe what is
meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by
death, only crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the
definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case,
death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly
proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance
with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and (3)
that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly
motivated by "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we
find the definition or description of heinous crimes. Said clause
provides that
"x x x the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for
being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of
their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society."
Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People v.
Alicando, 40 traced the etymological root of the word "heinous" to the
Early Spartans' word, "haineus", meaning, hateful and abominable,
which, in turn, was from the Greek prefix "haton", denoting acts so
hatefully or shockingly evil.
We find the foregoing definition or description to be a sufficient
criterion of what is to be considered a heinous crime. This criterion is
deliberately undetailed as to the circumstances of the victim, the
accused, place, time, the manner of commission of crime, its
proximate consequences and effects on the victim as well as on
society, to afford the sentencing authority sufficient leeway to exercise
his discretion in imposing the appropriate penalty in cases where R.A.
No. 7659 imposes not a mandatory penalty of death but the more
flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
During the debates on the proposed death penalty bill, Senators Lina
and Taada grilled the sponsors of the bill as regards what they
perceived as a mere enumeration of capital crimes without a
specification of the elements that make them heinous. They were
oblivious to the fact that there were two types of crimes in the death
penalty bill: first, there were crimes penalized by reclusion perpetua to
death; and second, there were crimes penalized by mandatory capital
punishment upon the attendance of certain specified qualifying
circumstances.
Under R.A. No. 7659, the following crimes are penalized by reclusion
perpetua to death:
(1) Treason (Sec. 2);
(2) Qualified piracy (Sec. 3);
(3) Parricide (Sec. 5);
(4) Murder (Sec. 6);
(5) Infanticide (Sec. 7);
(6) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention if attended by any of the
following four circumstances: (a) the victim was detained for more
than three days; (b) it was committed simulating public authority; (c)
serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill
him were made; and (d) if the victim is a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer (Sec. 8);
(7) Robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation (Sec. 9);
(8) Destructive arson if what is burned is (a) one or more buildings or
edifice; (b) a building where people usually gather; (c) a train, ship or
airplane for public use; (d) a building or factory in the service of
public utilities; (e) a building for the purpose of concealing or
destroying evidence Or a crime; (f) an arsenal, fireworks factory, or
government museum; and (g) a storehouse or factory of explosive
materials located in an inhabited place; or regardless of what is burned,
if the arson is perpetrated by two or more persons (Sec. 10);
(9) Rape attended by any of the following circumstances: (a) the rape
is committed with a deadly weapon; (b) the rape is committed by two
or more persons; and (c) the rape is attempted or frustrated and
committed with homicide (Sec. 11);
(10) Plunder involving at least P50 million (Sec. 12);
(11) Importation of prohibited drugs (Sec. 13);
(12) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of
prohibited drugs (id.);
(13) Maintenance of den, dive or resort for users of prohibited drugs
(id.);
(14) Manufacture of prohibited drugs (id.);
(15) Possession or use of prohibited drugs in certain specified amounts
(id.);
(16) Cultivation of plants which are sources of prohibited drugs (id.)
(17) Importation of regulated drugs (Sec. 14);
(18) Manufacture of regulated drugs (id.);
(19) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, transportation, and
distribution of regulated drugs (id.);
(20) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs
(Sec. 15);
(21) Possession or use of regulated drugs in specified amounts (Sec.
16);
(22) Misappropriation, misapplication or failure to account dangerous
drugs confiscated by the arresting officer (Sec. 17);
(23) Planting evidence of dangerous drugs in person or immediate
vicinity of another to implicate the latter (Sec. 19); and
(24) Carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
motor vehicle is killed or raped (Sec. 20).
All the foregoing crimes are not capital crimes per se, the uniform
penalty for all of them being not mandatory death but the flexible
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In other words, it is premature
to demand for a specification of the heinous elements in each of
foregoing crimes because they are not anyway mandatorily penalized
with death. The elements that call for the imposition of the supreme
penalty of death in these crimes, would only be relevant when the trial
court, given the prerogative to impose reclusion perpetua, instead
actually imposes the death penalty because it has, in appreciating the
evidence proffered before it, found the attendance of certain
circumstances in the manner by which the crime was committed, or in
the person of the accused on his own or in relation to the victim, or in
any other matter of significance to the commission of the crime or its
effects on the victim or on society, which circumstances characterize
the criminal acts as grievous, odious, or hateful, or inherently or
manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or perverse as to be repugnant
and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and
morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.
On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7659, the mandatory penalty of
death is imposed in the following crimes:
(1) Qualified bribery
"If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains
from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of any
offer, promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the
offense which was not prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he
shall suffer the penalty of death." (Sec. 4)
(2) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the
death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured or subjected to
dehumanizing acts
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of ransom from the victim or any other
person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were
present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or
is raped, or is subject to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty [of death] shall be imposed." (Sec. 8)
(3) Destructive arson resulting in death
"If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized
under this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall
be imposed." (Sec. 10)
(4) Rape with the victim becoming insane, rape with homicide and
qualified
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become
insane, the penalty shall be death.
xxx xxx xxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of
the parent or the victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military
authorities.
3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any
of the children or other relatives within the third degree of
consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old
5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement
agency.
7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
suffered permanent physical mutilation." (Sec. 11 )
(5) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of
prohibited drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited
drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause
of the death of victim thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein
provided shall be imposed." (Sec. 13)
(6) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of prohibited drugs
where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary, the maximum of the penalty [of death] shall be imposed in
every case where a prohibited drug is administered, delivered or sold
to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place.
Should a prohibited drug be the proximate case of the death of a
person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the maintainer
notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary." (Sec. 13)
(7) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation of regulated drugs where the victim is a minor or the
victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated
drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause
of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty [of death]
herein provided shall be imposed." (Sec. 14)
(8) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs
where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the
contrary, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be
imposed in every case where a regulated drug is administered,
delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such
place.
Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of death of a person
using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty
herein provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding
the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 15)
(9) Drug offenses if convicted are government officials, employees or
officers including members of police agencies and armed forces
"The maximum penalties [of death] provided for in Section 3, 4 (1),
5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11,12 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 14(1),
15A (1), 16, and 19 of Article III [of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972] shall be imposed, if those found guilty or any of the same
offenses are government officials, employees or officers including
members of police agencies and the armed forces." (Sec. 19)
(10) Planting of dangerous drugs as evidence in drug offenses with the
mandatory death penalty if convicted are government officials,
employees or officers
"Any such above government official, employee or officer who is
found guilty of 'planting' any dangerous drugs punished in Section s 3,
4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15, and 16 of
Article III (of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) in the person or in
the immediate vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the latter,
shall suffer the same penalty as therein provided." (Sec. 19)
(11) In all the crimes in RA. No. 7659 in their qualified form
"When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the
offender of his public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its
maximum [of death] regardless of mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed if the offense was
committed by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated
crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more
persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another
for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime." (Sec. 23)
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of
heinousness must be squarely applied.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are,
by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken
or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to
completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human
being. The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life,
and this means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or her
individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his or her own
physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual,
psychological, material and social preferences and needs. Seen in this
light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for
ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped,
tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting
in death, and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death
of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape,
parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention where
the victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical
injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or
the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional
mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver
or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are
penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their
very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the
significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme
of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state
finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and
underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical
rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population,
the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle
the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality
that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and psyche
of the populace. Terribly lacking the money to provide even the most
basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or
misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the
very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the
people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the
effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive
arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government
officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be
allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of
heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified
crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to the other
crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they
are admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily penalized
by death. The proper time to determine their heinousness in
contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to
pass on a death sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court meting out
the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to say,
however, that the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal
Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of
the crime for the trial court to validly impose the death penalty in the
crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which are punished with the flexible
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
In the first place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or repeal the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code relating to aggravating
circumstances. Secondly, R.A. No. 7659, while it specifies
circumstances that generally qualify a crime provided therein to be
punished by the maximum penalty of death, neither amends nor
repeals the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, construing R.A. No. 7659 in parimateria with the Revised Penal
Code, death may be imposed when (1) aggravating circumstances
attend the commission of the crime as to make operative the provision
of the Revised Penal Code regarding the imposition of the maximum
penalty; and (2) other circumstances attend the commission of the
crime which indubitably characterize the same as heinous in
contemplation of R.A. No. 7659 that justify the imposition of the
death, albeit the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.
Without difficulty, we understand the rationale for the guided
discretion granted in the trial court to cognize circumstances that
characterize the commission of the crime as heinous. Certainly there is
an infinity of circumstances that may attend the commission of a crime
to the same extent that there is no telling the evil that man is capable
of. The legislature cannot and need not foresee and inscribe in law
each and every loathsome act man is capable of. It is sufficient thus
that R.A. 7659 provides the test and yardstick for the determination of
the legal situation warranting the imposition of the supreme penalty of
death. Needless to say, we are not unaware of the ever existing danger
of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in meting out the
death sentence. Precisely to reduce to nil the possibility of executing
an innocent man or one criminal but not heinously criminal, R.A. 7659
is replete with both procedural and substantive safeguards that ensure
only the correct application of the mandate of R.A. No. 7659.
In the course of the congressional debates on the constitutional
requirement that the death penalty be re-imposed for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, we note that the main objection to
the death penalty bill revolved around the persistent demand of the
abolitionists for a statement of the reason in each and every heinous
crime and statistical proof the such compelling reason actually exists.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and
compulsion are inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with each
other. Because the subject crimes are either so revolting and debasing
as to violate the most minimum of the human standards of decency or
its effects, repercussions, implications and consequences so
destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the context of
our socio-political and economic agenda as a developing nation, these
crimes must be frustrated, curtailed and altogether eradicated. There
can be no ifs or buts in the face of evil, and we cannot afford to wait
until we rub elbows with it before grasping it by the ears and thrashing
it to its demission.
The abolitionists in congress insisted that all criminal reforms first be
pursued and implemented before the death penalty be re-imposed in
case such reforms prove unsuccessful. They claimed that the only
compelling reason contemplated of by the constitution is that nothing
else but the death penalty is left for the government to resort to that
could check the chaos and the destruction that is being caused by
unbridled criminality. Three of our colleagues, are of the opinion that
the compelling reason required by the constitution is that there
occurred a dramatic and significant change in the socio-cultural milieu
after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2, 1987 such as
an unprecedented rise in the incidence of criminality. Such are,
however, interpretations only of the phrase "compelling reasons" but
not of the conjunctive phrase "compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes". The imposition of the requirement that there be a rise in the
incidence of criminality because of the suspension of the death
penalty, moreover, is an unfair and misplaced demand, for what it
amounts to, in fact, is a requirement that the death penalty first proves
itself to be a truly deterrent factor in criminal behavior. If there was a
dramatically higher incidence of criminality during the time that the
death penalty was suspended, that would have proven that the death
penalty was indeed a deterrent during the years before its suspension.
Suffice it to say that the constitution in the first place did not require
that the death penalty be first proven to be a deterrent; what it requires
is that there be compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that
congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-
impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a
requirement that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive
manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be
perceived and statistically proven following the suspension of the
death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death
penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal
reforms have failed to abate criminality in society. It is immaterial and
irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming
upsurge of such crimes", for the same was never intended by said law
to be the yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is
that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of
law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for
heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty
for said crimes."
We now proceed to answer accused-appellant's other ground for
attacking the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, i.e., that the death
penalty imposed in rape is violative of the constitutional proscription
against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.)
Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia.41 To state, however, that the
U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled that the death
penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading
and inaccurate.
The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the
arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was
imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense
theory in Furman centered not so much on the nature of the death
penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the
black accused who is meted out the death penalty by a white jury that
is given the unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to
impose the death penalty. In fact, the long road of the American
abolitionist movement leading to the landmark case of Furman was
trekked by American civil rights advocates zealously fighting against
racial discrimination. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Furman:
"We cannot say from facts disclosed in these records that these
defendants were sentenced to death because they were black. Yet our
task is not restricted to an effort to divine what motives impelled these
death penalties. Rather, we deal with a system of law and of justice
that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the
determination whether defendants committing these crimes should die
x x x.
xxx
In a Nation committed to equal protection of the laws there is no
permissible 'caste' aspect of law enforcement. Yet we know that the
discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables
the penalty to be selectively applied, feeding prejudices against the
accused if he is poor and despised x x x.
xxx
Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their
operation. They are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is
an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the
laws that is implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments."
Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel
and unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all
discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the
discretion which these statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing
juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or
standards intended to lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the
intervention of personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on
the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.
Consequently, in the aftermath of Furman, when most of the states re-
enacted their death penalty statutes now bearing the procedural checks
that were required by the U.S. Supreme Court, said court affirmed the
constitutionality of the new death penalty statutes in the cases of
Gregg v. Georgia,42 Jurek v. Texas,43 and Profitt v. Florida.44
Next, accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly
because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life. In
support of his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling
of the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia. 45
In Coker, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x It is now settled that the death penalty is not invariably cruel
and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment; it is not inherently barbaric or an unacceptable mode of
punishment for crime; neither is it always disproportionate to the crime
for which it is imposed. It is also established that imposing capital
punishment, at least for murder, in accordance with the procedures
provided under the Georgia statutes saves the sentence from the
infirmities which led the Court to invalidate the prior Georgia capital
punishment statute in Furman v. Georgia x x x.
xxx
In Gregg [v. Georgia] x x x the Court's judgment was that the death
penalty for deliberate murder was neither the purposeless imposition
of severe punishment nor a punishment grossly disproportionate to the
crime. But the Court reserved the question of the constitutionality of
the death penalty when imposed for other crimes. x x x
That question, with respect to rape of an adult woman, is now before
us.
xxx
x x x [T]he public judgment with respect to rape, as reflected in the
statutes providing the punishment for that crime, has been dramatically
different. In reviving death penalty laws to satisfy Furman's mandate,
none of the States that had not previously authorized death for rape
chose to include rape among capital felonies. Of the 16 States in which
rape had been a capital offense, only three provided the death penalty
for rape of an adult woman in their revised statutes -- Georgia, North
Carolina. and Louisiana. In the latter two States, the death penalty was
mandatory for those found guilty, and those laws were invalidated by
Woodson and Roberts. When Louisiana and North Carolina,
respondent to those decisions, again revised their capital punishment
laws, they reenacted the death penalty for murder but not for rape;
none of the seven other legislatures that to our knowledge have
amended or replaced their death penalty statutes since July 2, 1976,
including four States (in addition to Louisiana and North Carolina) that
had authorized the death sentence for rape prior to 1972 and had
reacted to Furman with mandatory statutes, included rape among the
crimes for which death was an authorized punishment.
xxx
It should be noted that Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee also
authorized the death penalty in some rape cases, but only where the
victim was a child, and the rapist an adult, the Tennessee statute has
since been invalidated because the death sentence was mandatory. x x
x The upshot is that Georgia is the sole jurisdiction in the United
States at the present time that authorizes a sentence of death when the
rape victim is an adult woman, and only two other jurisdictions
provide capital punishment when the victim is a child
The current judgment with respect to the death penalty for rape is not
wholly unanimous among state legislatures, but it obviously weighs
very heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable
penalty for raping an adult woman.
x x x [T]he legislative rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly
confirms our own judgment, which is that death is indeed a
disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman.
We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is highly
reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt
for the personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim and for
the latter's privilege of choosing those with whom intimate
relationships are to be established. Short of homicide, it is the 'ultimate
violation of self.' It is also a violent crime because it normally involves
force, or the threat of force or intimidation, to over come the will and
the capacity of the victim to resist. Rape is very often accompanied by
physical injury to the female and can also inflict mental and
psychological damage. Because it undermines the community's sense
of security, there is public injury as well.
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of
moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it
does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified
taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another
crime, rape by definition does not include the death of or even the
serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no
more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer;
for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it is
not over and normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding
conviction that the death penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and
irrevocability' x x x is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such,
does not take human life."
The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds:
first, that the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as
a proper punishment for the crime of rape through the willful omission
by the state legislatures to include rape in their new death penalty
statutes in the aftermath of Furman; and second, that rape, while
concededly a dastardly contemptuous violation of a woman's spiritual
integrity, physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not
involve the taking of life.
Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing
on the Philippine experience and in the context of our own culture.
Anent the second ground, we disagree with the court's predicate that
the gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not,
is the attendance of the circumstance of death on the part of the victim.
Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of
retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth". We have
already demonstrated earlier in our discussion of heinous crimes that
the forfeiture of life simply because life was taken, never was a
defining essence of the death penalty in the context of our legal history
and cultural experience; rather, the death penalty is imposed in
heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed
unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a
person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the
national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through
organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and
honest citizenry, and because they have so caused irreparable and
substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a
repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of
individuals and the survival of government, they must be
permanently prevented from doing so. At any rate, this court has no
doubts as to the innate heinousness of the crime of rape, as we have
held in the case of People v. Cristobal: 46
"Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another
person. It does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the
respect, freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every
person has a right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for
life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency
and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself."
We are not unaware that for all the legal posturings we have so
essayed here, at the heart of the issue of capital punishment is the
wistful, sentimental life-and-death question to which all of us, without
thinking, would answer, "life, of course, over death". But dealing with
the fundamental question of death provides a context for struggling
with even more basic questions, for to grapple with the meaning of
death is, in an indirect way, to ask the meaning of life. Otherwise put,
to ask what the rights are of the dying is to ask what the rights are of
the living.
"Capital punishment ought not to be abolished solely because it is
substantially repulsive, if infinitely less repulsive than the acts which
invoke it. Yet the mounting zeal for its abolition seems to arise from a
sentimentalized hyperfastidiousness that seeks to expunge from the
society all that appears harsh and suppressive. If we are to preserve the
humane society we will have to retain sufficient strength of character
and will to do the unpleasant in order that tranquillity and civility may
rule comprehensively. It seems very likely that capital punishment is a
x x x necessary, if limited factor in that maintenance of social
tranquillity and ought to be retained on this ground. To do otherwise is
to indulge in the luxury of permitting a sense of false delicacy to reign
over the necessity of social survival." 47
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion for
Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are
hereby DENIED48 for LACK OF MERIT.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-38969-70 February 9, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELICIANO MUÑOZ, alias "Tony", et al., accused, MARVIN
MILLORA, TOMAS TAYABA, alias "Tamy Tayaba" and JOSE
MISLANG, defendants-appellants.
CRUZ, J.:
Of the four persons convicted in this case, one has not appealed and
thus impliedly accepted his sentence. The others have questioned their
conviction and insist that they are innocent. The prosecution did not
think so, and neither does the Solicitor General now. The brief for the
appellee would affirm the finding of guilt and in fact even increase the
penalty.
The prosecution presented a bizarre case of arbitrary condemnation
and instant punishment meted out by what appear to be the members
of a private army. Eleven persons, most of them bodyguards of the
town mayor, went out in a jeep at the behest of one of them who
had complained of having been victimized by cattle rustlers.
Having found their supposed quarry, they proceeded to execute each
one of them in cold blood without further ado and without mercy. One
was shot in the mouth and died instantly as his son and daughter
looked on in horror. The second was forced to lie down on the ground
and then shot twice, also in the head, before his terrified wife and son.
The third, who was only sixteen years old, was kicked in the head until
he bled before he too had his brains blown out. To all appearances, the
unfortunate victims were only innocent farmers and not the dangerous
criminals they were pronounced to be.
Bizarre but true, as the trial court agreed.
Of the eleven persons who were charged with murder in three separate
informations, the four who stood trial were found guilty. 1 The other
seven have yet to be identified and tried. The sentence of Feliciano
Muñoz, who did not appeal, has long become final and executory and
is now being served. 2 We deal here only with the appeals of the other
convicts, namely, Marvin Millora, Tomas Tayaba, and Jose Mislang,
who all ask for a reversal.
The killings occurred in the morning of June 30, 1972, in Balite Sur,
San Carlos City, Pangasinan. 3
As established by the prosecution, Feliciano Muñoz, Marvin Millora,
Tomas Tayaba, Jose Mislang, and the other seven unidentified men
went to the house of Mauro Bulatao and asked for the address of his
son Arsenic. All four of them went inside while the rest surrounded the
house. All eleven men were armed. Mauro, who was then bathing his
horse, was called by the accused. As he approached and while under
his house, he was met by Millora who simply shot him at arm's length
with a "long firearm," hitting him in the mouth and killing him as he
fell. At that precise time, Muñoz, Tayaba and Mislang were standing
by Millora, evidently giving him armed support. None of them made
any move to restrain or dissuade him. 4
After killing Mauro, the four accused dragged out of the house his
sixteen year old son, Aquilino, and knocked him down. Muñoz kicked
him several times in the head as he lay on the ground while the others
looked on in silent approval or at least without objection. They then
took the bleeding man with them to look for their third target,
Alejandro Bulatao. 5
In Alejandro's house, the group forced his wife, Juana to go with them
and direct them to her husband. They found him tending to their cows
with his son Pedro. Muñoz ordered Alejandro and his wife to lie down
and then, even as Pedro pleaded for his father's life, shot Alejandro
twice in the head, killing him instantly. Millora, Tayaba and Mislang,
along with their companions, merely stood by as the brutal act was
committed. Juana watched her husband's death in terror and the 12-
year old boy made a desperate run for his life as one of the accused
fired at him and missed. 6
The second victim having been murdered as the first, the accused then
vented their violence on Aquilino, whom Muñoz again brutally kicked
as the others looked on. Aquilino was entirely defenseless. Finally,
Muñoz ended the boy's agony and shot him to death, hitting him in the
head and body. Muñoz and Minora then picked up all the empty shells
and fled with the rest of their companions, leaving the terrified Juana
with the two grisly corpses. 7
The above events were narrated at the trial by Melecia
Bulatao, Mauro's daughter and Aquilino's sister; Jose Bulatao, Mauro's
son and Aquilino's brother; Juana Bulatao, 10 Alejandro's wife; and
Pedro Bulatao, 11 their son. Their testimony was corroborated by Dr.
Juanita de Vera, 12 who performed the autopsy on the three victims.
Melecia and Jose testified on the killing of their father by Marvin
Minora as the other accused stood by and the mauling of their brother
Aquilino before he was dragged away by the group. The trial court
especially noted the straightforward account given by Jose, who
positively identified Minora as the killer and described the
participation of the others, including the savage kicking of his brother
by Muñoz. 13 Melecia earlier pointed to Mislang as the one who had
shot her father but changed her mind later on cross-examination and
named Millora as the actual killer. She explained her turn-about by
confessing that she had earlier agreed to exonerate Minora in exchange
for the sum of P3,000.00 promised by his father although she actually
did not receive the money. 14 For her part, Juana related how she was
threatened with death unless she accompanied the accused to where
her husband was. She narrated in detail how Alejandro was killed
before her very eyes and how Aquilino was later kicked and then also
shot to death, also by Muñoz, while the other accused stood by. 15 Her
testimony was corroborated by Pedro, her son, whom the accused had
also thought of killing because he was "talkative" and indeed was shot
at when he successfully escaped after his father's murder. 16
The defense makes much of the fact that it was only months after the
killings that it occurred to these witnesses to denounce the accused and
suggests that this delay should impugn their credibility. As correctly
pointed out by the trial judge, however, these witnesses were naturally
deterred from doing so for fear that they would meet the same fate that
befell their relatives. These were humble barrio folk whose timidity
did not allow them to report their grievances beyond the barrio
officials they knew, more so since the higher authorities appeared to be
indifferent and gave no attention, much less encouragement, to their
complaints.
It is true that there were several inconsistencies in the testimony of
these witnesses as painstakingly pointed out by the appellants, 17 but
these are minor flaws that do not detract from the essential truthfulness
of their accounts of the ruthless killings. 18
The brutality of the murders and the veracity of the testimony of the
said witnesses are emphasized by the medical reports 19 of the injuries
sustained by the victims, as follows:
Mauro Bulatao:
1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper lip
left side around 1 cm. in diameter and with the exit at the middle of the
back of the head around 1-1/2 cm. in diameter.
2. Gunshot wound at the lower lip left side of the mouth.
Alejandro Bulatao:
1. Lacerated gunshot wound at the left eye with the whole eye
practically lacerated.
2. Lacerated gunshot wound of the right eye and the forehead
practically opened with the brain tissue outside.
Aquiline Bulatao:
1. Thru and thru gunshot wound with point of entrance at the upper
right jaw bone around 1- 1/2 cm. in diameter and with the exit at the
middle of the back of the head around 2 cm. in diameter.
2. Gunshot wound at the upper left shoulder out the middle of the left
clavicle around 1- 1/2 inches in diameter.
The three appellants invoked individual defenses which the trial court
correctly rejected as false and unbelievable. All claimed the Bulataos
were killed as a result of an exchange of gunfire with a rather hazy
group and each claimed he was not involved in the shoot-out.
Testifying for Millora on the alleged encounter between the Bulataos
and their adversaries, Victoriano Bacani said that the latter included
Tayaba, Mislang and five others who fled from the scene in a
jeep. 20 Graciano Muñoz, corroborating Bacani, said he himself saw
seven men in a jeep coming from the sound of the gunfire after he had
paid Mauro P400.00 to redeem his stolen carabao. 21 Another witness
for Millora, Orlando de los Santos, testified to having seen the
encounter between the Bulataos and the other group and declared that
the former were armed with carbines and Garand rifles. 22
The trial court rejected Bacani's testimony because he appeared
hesitant and suspicious on the stand and did not give the impression
that he was telling the truth. 23 Moreover, it took him all of one year to
report the alleged shooting encounter, which he also did not mention
that same afternoon when he visited Mauro's family to condole with
them. 24 It is also not believable that the group would flee because they
had no more bullets when their supposed three adversaries were
already dead in the field. The alleged redemption made by Muñoz was
described by the trial court as preposterous, especially since no shred
of evidence had been presented to show that Mauro was a cattle
rustler, let alone his 16 year old son. 25 As for De los Santos, no
firearms were discovered beside the dead bodies of the Bulataos,
including Mauro, who was found not in the supposed battleground but
under his house, as testified to by Dr. De Vera. 26
Millora's own defense was that he was in Dagupan City at the time of
the killings, having gone there in the evening of June 29, 1972. He
claimed he had stayed there overnight with a female companion after
drinking beer with Atty. Antonio Resngit returning to San Carlos City
only between 8 and 9 o'clock the following morning or June 30,
1972. 27 The lawyer corroborated him, 28 but he cannot be more
credible than Mauro's own children, Jose and Melecia, who positively
identified Millora as the person who actually shot their father in the
face and killed him instantly. Such a traumatic experience could not
have been forgotten by these witnesses who saw their father murdered
without warning or mercy nor could their memory of the heartless
killer have been easily wiped out from their minds.
It is stressed that Juana Bulatao and her son Pedro also categorically
declared that Millora was with the group that she took to the field
where her husband and Aquilino were killed by Muñoz. 29
Tayaba and Mislang offered a common defense, also of alibi. Both
claimed that Mislang having complained of cattle rustlers, a group of
policemen, including Tayaba, stayed in the former's house the whole
night of June 29, 1972, leaving only at 8 o'clock the following
morning of June 30, 1972, after Mislang had served them
breakfast. 30 Significantly, however, barrio Bacnar where Mislang's
house was located, is only two kilometers from Balite
Sur. 31 Moreover, the trial court doubted the testimony given by Sgt.
Lomibao, who corroborated them and spoke of having heard the
gunfire narrated by Millora's witnesses. The decision noted that
Lomibao was mysteriously absent when the police chief and Dr. de
Vera went to the scene of the crime at 9 o'clock that morning to
investigate the killings. In fact, it expressed the suspicion that Lomibao
and Patrolman Liwanag, who also testified for the accused, might have
been among the seven unidentified persons who were with Muñoz and
the three appellants herein when the Bulataos were murdered. 32
All told, we affirm the findings of the trial judge, who had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses at the trial and assess their
credibility. As we said in a previous case:
We see no reason to reverse the factual findings of the trial judge, who
had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and to
assess their credibility. The written record will not show that nuance of
tone or voice, the meaningful contrast between the hesitant pause and
the prompt reply, and the expression or color or tilt of face that will
affirm the truth or expose the fabrication. All these subtle factors could
be considered by the trial judge in weighing the conflicting
declarations before him, and we do not find that he has erred. 33
We agree that the three appellants, together with Muñoz and their
seven other companions, participated in the killings of the three
Bulataos in the manner described by the witnesses for the prosecution.
The defenses of the herein appellants should be, as they properly were,
rejected as undeserving of belief in the light of the more convincing
and telling evidence submitted by the government.
However, we do not accept the different degrees of participation
assigned by the court a quo to each of the appellants in each of the
three offenses imputed to them. In Criminal Case No. 0176,
Millora was found guilty as principal and Muñoz and the other
two herein appellants only as accomplices, and in Criminal Case
Nos. 0177 and 0178, Muñoz was found guilty as principal and the
herein appellants only as accomplices. 34 In support of this finding,
the trial court said that there was no evidence of conspiracy to
justify holding each of the accused equally liable for the three
murders.
We hold that there was. Indeed, it is clear that from the very start,
when the eleven men went out to look for the suspected cattle
rustlers, there was already an agreement among them to ferret out
and punish the Bulataos whom they had condemned beforehand.
They knew whom they were looking for. They knew where to look for
them. They sought each of them with drawn and ready weapons. When
they reached Mauro Bulatao's house, four of them went inside while
the rest deployed themselves in strategic positions. When Millora shot
Mauro, the appellants and the others stood by with guns at the ready.
Nobody moved to dissuade or stop him. Together they dragged
Aquilino from the house and the rest watched while Muñoz kicked
him in the head while helpless on the ground. Together, they took him
with them and then forced Juana Bulatao to lead them to her husband.
The rest stood by with their weapons as Muñoz shot Alejandro in the
head. No one interceded to stop him from also killing Aquilino. There
is no question that the group moved in concert, pursuing a common
design previously agreed upon, that made each of them part of a
conspiracy. 35 As such, each of them is liable in equal degree with the
others for each of the three killings. Each member of the conspiracy to
commit the crime of murder is guilty as a co-principal, regardless of
who actually pulled the trigger that killed the three victims. It is settled
that in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. 36
Each of the three killings constituted the crime of murder, qualified
by alevosia. There was treachery because every one of the three
victims was completely helpless and defenseless when shot and killed
by the accused with no risk to themselves. Mauro was completely
taken by surprise when he was shot in the face. Alejandro was lying
down when he was shot in the head. Aquilino was seated when he was
shot in the head and shoulders. None of the three victims had a chance
to resist.
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, but this was
modified by Article III, Section 19(l) of the 1987 Constitution
providing as follows:
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless,
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be
reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Conformably, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the
death penalty whenever it was called for under the said article but
instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua as mandated by the
above provision. The maximum period of the penalty was thus in
effect lowered to the medium, the same period applied, as before,
where the offense was not attended by any modifying circumstance,
with the minimum period, i. e., reclusion temporal maximum, being
still applicable in all other cases. The three-grade scheme of the
original penalty, including death, was thus maintained except that the
maximum period was not imposed because of the constitutional
prohibition.
The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended
discussion, come to the conclusion that the doctrine announced therein
does not reflect the intention of the framers as embodied in Article III,
Section 19(l) of the Constitution. This conclusion is not unanimous, to
be sure. Indeed, there is much to be said of the opposite view, which
was in fact shared by many of those now voting for its reversal. The
majority of the Court, however, is of the belief that the original
interpretation should be restored as the more acceptable reading of the
constitutional provision in question.
The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution
abolished the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder
to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These
should now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the
three-grade scheme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree
feel that Article III, Section 19(l) merely prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty and has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua,
also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be
maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there is
really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the
death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall
not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed,
shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather
awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of legal
hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is
neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the
records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation. 41
At that, the Court finds that such resort, even if made, would not be of
much assistance either in the case at bar. Accepting arguendo that it
was the intention of the framers to abolish the death penalty, we are
still not convinced from the debates in the Constitutional Commission
that there was also a requirement to adjust the two remaining periods
by dividing them into three shorter periods. This is not a necessary
consequence of the provision as worded. The following exchange cited
by those in favor of Masangkay is at best thought-provoking but not
decisive of the question:
FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from
those statutes-only the death penalty. The statute is not abolished, but
the penalty is abolished.
MR. MAAMBONG: That is what I am worried about, because the
statutes, especially in the General Criminal Law, which is the Revised
Penal Code, do not necessarily punish directly with death. Sometimes
it has a range of reclusion temporal to death or reclusion perpetua to
death. And what would be the effect on the judges, for example, if the
range is reclusion temporal to death and he can no longer impose the
death penalty? He will have difficulty in computing the degrees.
Could the committee enlighten us on how the judge will look at the
specific situation.
FR. BERNAS: I grant that the judges will have difficulty, but I
suppose that the judges will be equal to their tasks. The only thing is, if
there is a range, the range cannot go as far as death (Record,
CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, 749).
FR. BERNAS: Certainly, the penalties lower than death remain.
MR. REGALADO: That would be reclusion perpetua. But the range
of the penalty for murder consists of three periods. The maximum
period of reclusion temporal under the present status is the minimum
period for the penalty for murder. The medium period is reclusion
perpetua. The maximum period is death. If we now remove the death
penalty, we will, therefore, have a range of penalty of 17 years, 4
months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal up to reclusion
perpetua. You cannot divide reclusion perpetua into two. While it has
a duration of 30 years, it is an indivisible penalty. Where do we get the
medium period now until such time that Congress gets around to
accommodate this amendment?
FR. BERNAS: As I said, this is a matter which lawyers can argue with
judges about. All we are saying is, the judges cannot impose the death
penalty (Record, CONCOM July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p. 750).
So there we have it — "this is a matter which lawyers can argue with
judges about." Assuming that Commissioner Bernas's answer reflected
the consensus of the body, we are still not persuaded that it was the
intention of the framers to lower not only the maximum period but also
the other periods of the original penalty. That is not necessarily
inferable from his statement that "the judges will be equal to their
task," especially so since he also said and we think with more
definiteness-that "all we are saying is that the judges cannot impose
the death penalty" (Emphasis supplied). We understand this to mean
that they were not saying more.
The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to
abolish the death penalty or merely to prevent its imposition. Whatever
the intention was, what we should determine is whether or not they
also meant to require a corresponding modification in the other periods
as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty.
It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at
all expressed in Article III, Section 19(l) of the Constitution or
indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication. It
would have been so easy, assuming such intention, to state it
categorically and plainly, leaving no doubt as to its meaning. One
searches in vain for such a statement, express or even implied. The
writer of this opinion makes the personal observation that this might
be still another instance where the framers meant one thing and said
another-or strangely, considering their loquacity elsewhere — did not
say enough.
The original ruling as applied in the Gavarra, Masangkay, Atencio
and Intino cases represented the unanimous thinking of the Court as it
was then constituted. All but two members 42 at that time still sit on the
Court today. If we have seen fit to take a second look at the doctrine
on which we were all agreed before, it is not because of a change in
the composition of this body. It is virtually the same Court that is
changing its mind after reflecting on the question again in the light of
new perspectives. And well it might, and can, for the tenets it lays
down are not immutable. The decisions of this Court are not petrified
rules grown rigid once pronounced but vital, growing things subject to
change as all life is. While we are told that the trodden path is best,
this should not prevent us from opening a fresh trial or exploring the
other side or testing a new idea in a spirit of continuing inquiry.
Coming back to the case at bar, we find that there being no generic
aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of
the offenses, the applicable sentence is the medium period of the
penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code which,
conformably to the new doctrine here adopted and announced, is
still reclusion perpetua. This is the penalty we impose on all the
accused-appellants for each of the three murders they have committed
in conspiracy with the others. The award of civil indemnity for the
heirs of each of the victims is affirmed but the amount thereof is
hereby increased to P30,000.00 in line with the present policy.
It remains to observe that the crimes inflicted upon the humble farmers
would have remained unpunished were it not for the vigilance of
certain responsible officials, especially the police and the prosecuting
officer, who took up the cudgels for the victims' families. The courage
and conscientiousness they displayed are still the most potent weapons
against those who, in their arrogance, believe that they can flout the
law and frustrate justice because they have the protection of powerful
patrons.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is MODIFIED and all the
accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty as principals in Criminal
Case Nos. 0176, 0177 and 0178. Each of them is sentenced to suffer
three (3) penalties of reclusion perpetua, and to pay solidarily to the
heirs of their victims civil indemnity in the sum of P30,000.00 for each
of the deceased, or a total indemnity of P90,000.00, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
In People v. Gavarra 37 Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court
that "in view of the abolition of the death penalty under Section 19,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed
for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua" thereby eliminating death as the original maximum period.
Later, without categorically saying so, the Court, through Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera in People v. Masangkay 38 and through
Justice Andres R. Narvasa in People v. Atencio 39 divided the modified
penalty into three new periods, the limits of which were specified by
Justice Edgardo L. Paras in People v. Intino, 40 as follows: the lower
half of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half
of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion
perpetua as the maximum.

Accordingly, with the hope that "as judges, (we) will be equal to (our)
tasks," whatever that means, we hereby reverse the current doctrine
providing for three new periods for the penalty for murder as reduced
by the Constitution. Instead, we return to our original interpretation
and hold that Article III, Section 19(l) does not change the periods of
the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty
and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and
minimum penalties remains unchanged.

The Court relies that this interpretation may lead to certain inequities
that would not have arisen under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code before its modification. Thus, a person originally subject to the
death penalty and another who committed the murder without the
attendance of any modifying circumstance will now be both
punishable with the same medium period although the former is
concededly more guilty than the latter. True enough. But that is the
will not of this Court but of the Constitution. That is a question of
wisdom, not construction. Of some relevance perhaps is the parable in
the Bible of the workman who was paid the stipulated daily wage of
one penny although he had worked longer than others hired later in the
day also paid the same amount. When he complained because he felt
unjustly treated by the householder, the latter replied: "Friend, I do you
no wrong. Did you not agree with me for a penny?'

The problem in any event is addressed not to this Court but to the
Congress. Penalties are prescribed by statute and are essentially and
exclusively legislative. As judges, we can only interpret and apply
them and have no authority to modify them or revise their range as
determined exclusively by the legislature. We should not encroach on
this prerogative of the lawmaking body.

G.R. No. 166401             October 30, 2006
[Formerly G.R. Nos. 158660-67]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO BON, appellant.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Two critical issues emerge in this case. The first relates to whether the
Court should affirm the conviction of appellant Alfredo Bon
(appellant) for six counts of rape and two counts of attempted rape, the
victims being his then-minor nieces. On that score, we affirm. As a
consequence though, we are ultimately impelled to confront a
question much broader in both scope and import. While the Court
had previously declined to acknowledge the constitutional
abolition of the death penalty through the 1987 Constitution, 1 we
now find it necessary to determine whether the enactment of Republic
Act No. 9346 resulted in the statutory interdiction of the death penalty.
The second issue arises as we are compelled to review the maximum
term of reclusion temporal in the sentence imposed on appellant by the
Court of Appeals for the two counts of attempted rape. The sentence
was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the enactment of
Republic Act No. 9346 which ended the imposition of the death
penalty in the Philippines. The proximate concern as to appellant is
whether his penalty for attempted qualified rape, which under the
penal law should be two degrees lower than that of consummated
qualified rape, should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua.
First, the antecedent facts.
I.
Eight (8) Informations2 were filed within the period from 21 August
2000 to 23 February 2001 by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Gumaca, Quezon against appellant, charging him with the rape of
AAA3 and BBB,4 the daughters of his older brother. Appellant was
accused of raping AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6899-G, 6902-G, 6906-
G, and 6908-G; while he was accused of raping BBB in Criminal Case
Nos. 6689-G, 6903-G, 6905-G, and 6907-G.5 All these cases were
consolidated for trial. The rapes were alleged to have been committed
in several instances over a span of six (6) years.
Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant, their uncle, and both
identified him as the man who had raped them. During trial, their
respective birth certificates and the medical certificates executed by
the doctor who physically examined them were entered as
documentary evidence.
AAA testified that she was only six (6) years old when she was first
molested in 1994 in the house appellant had shared with her
grandmother.6 She recounted that the incident took place when she and
appellant were alone in the house. Appellant touched her thighs and
vagina, removed her clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina.
Appellant threatened that she and her parents would be killed should
she disclose the incident to anyone. She thereafter stopped sleeping in
the house of her grandmother. It was only three (3) years after, in
1997, that she slept in the said house, yet again she was sexually
abused by appellant. She was then nine (9) years old.7
AAA recounted that at age eleven (11) in 1999, she was raped by
appellant for the third time, again at the house of her
grandmother.8 The following year, when she was twelve (12), she was
abused for the fourth time by appellant. This time, she was raped in an
outdoor clearing9 after having been invited there by appellant to get
some vegetables. While at the clearing, appellant forced her to lie
down on a grassy spot and tried to insert his penis in her vagina. As
she cried in pain, appellant allegedly stopped.10
It was only on 12 June 2000 that she decided to reveal to her mother,
CCC,11 the brutish acts appellant had done to her.12 Her mother thus
filed a complaint against her uncle. AAA identified appellant in open
court and presented as documentary evidence her birth certificate to
prove that she was born on 3 September 1988.13
BBB, on the other hand, testified that she was first raped by appellant
in 1997 when she was ten (10) years old, also at the house appellant
shared with her grandmother. While alone in the house, appellant
poked a knife at her, removed her clothes and inserted his penis in her
vagina. Despite the pain she felt, she could not resist appellant as he
was holding a knife. She did not report the rape to her parents out of
fear of appellant's threat that he would kill her.14 BBB further testified
that in 1998 and 1999, she was raped again by appellant on several
occasions, the rapes occurring under threat of a bladed weapon, and
regardless of the time of day.15
BBB stated that she was last raped by appellant on 15 January
2000.16 On that night, she was sleeping beside her sister AAA in the
house of her grandmother when she felt appellant touching her body.
She pushed him away but appellant pulled her three (3) meters away
from AAA towards the door. As appellant was holding a knife, BBB
could not make any noise to alert her sister. Appellant ordered her to
remove her clothes and forced her to lie down. After he took off his
clothes, appellant placed himself on top of BBB and stayed there for
three (3) minutes "moving up and down." Thereafter, she put on her
clothes and returned to where her sister was. She added that although it
was dark, she knew it was appellant who had molested her as she was
familiar with his smell. Since then, she never slept in her
grandmother's house again.17
It was on 14 June 2000 that BBB disclosed her harrowing experience
to her mother. Prior to that, however, she had already revealed the
sexual abuses she had underwent to her sister AAA. Upon learning of
the same, her mother brought her to the police station and her
statement was taken. Thereafter, she was brought to the hospital to be
examined. Furthermore, BBB explained that she only reported the
abuses done to her on 14 June 2000 or five (5) months after the last
rape because she was afraid of appellant's threat of killing her and her
family.18
The third witness for the prosecution was the mother, CCC. She
testified that she only knew of the abuses done on her daughters on 15
June 2000. Five months earlier, CCC became concerned after
observing that BBB, on the pretext of preparing clothes for a game,
was packing more than enough clothes. She asked her other daughter,
DDD, to dig into the matter and the latter told her that BBB was
planning to leave their house. Upon learning this, she sent somebody
to retrieve BBB. However, it was only five months after that incident
that BBB confided to her mother that she was raped by appellant. CCC
lost no time in reporting the matter to the authorities and had BBB and
AAA examined in the hospital. After examination, it was confirmed
that BBB was indeed sexually molested.19
CCC initially did not tell her husband about what had happened to
their daughters because she was afraid that her husband might kill
appellant. It was only after appellant was arrested that she disclosed
such fact to her husband. After the arrest of appellant, his relatives
became angry at CCC, and her mother-in-law avoided talking to her
since then.20
The physician who examined BBB and AAA also testified for the
prosecution. Dr. Purita T. Tullas (Dr. Tullas), medical officer of
Gumaca District Hospital, testified that she was the one who examined
BBB and AAA, and thereafter, issued medical certificates for each
child. These medical certificates were presented in court.21
The medical certificate of BBB revealed that at the time of
examination, there were no external sign of physical injury found on
her body. However, Dr. Tullas found that the labia
majora and minora of BBB was slightly gaping, her vaginal orifice
was admitting two fingers without resistance and there were hymenal
lacerations at "three (3) o'clock" and "eight (8) o'clock" which might
have happened a long time before her examination. Dr. Tullas
concluded that there might have been sexual penetration caused by a
male sex organ for several times.22
AAA's medical certificate stated that at the time of examination, there
were no external physical injuries apparent on her body. AAA's labia
majora and minora were well coaptated and the hymen was still intact.
On direct examination, Dr. Tullas said that it could happen that the
hymen would still be intact despite sexual penetration with a person
having an elastic hymen. On the other hand, when asked on cross-
examination, she stated that there was also the possibility that no
foreign body touched the labia of the pudendum of AAA.23
Only appellant testified for his defense, offering denial and alibi as his
defense. He averred in court that from 1994 to 2000, he lived in the
house of his parents which was about "thirty (30) arm stretches" away
from the house of BBB and AAA. He denied having raped BBB on 15
January 2000 because on said date he was at the house of his sister,
two (2) kilometers away from the house of his parents where the rape
occurred, from 11:30 in the morning and stayed there until early
morning of the following day.24
He offered a general denial of the other charges against him by BBB
and AAA. He claimed that he seldom saw the two minors. He further
asserted that prior to the institution of the criminal case against him he
had a smooth relationship with his nieces and the only reason the case
was filed against him was that CCC, his sister-in-law and the mother
of his nieces, harbored ill-feelings towards his deceased father, who
would call CCC "lazy" within earshot of other family members.25
The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape. 26 The
RTC pronounced appellant's defense of denial and alibi as
unconvincing, citing jurisprudence declaring denial and alibi as
intrinsically weak defenses. The RTC concluded that appellant failed
to controvert the clear, candid and straightforward testimonies of his
nieces. It further considered the qualifying circumstances of minority
of the victims and the relationship of the victims and appellant, the
latter being the former's relative by consanguinity within the third
degree.
As the penalty imposed consisted of eight (8) death sentences, the
records of the case were automatically elevated to this Court for
review. However, in the aftermath of the pronouncement of the Court
in People v. Mateo27 the present case was transferred to the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.
On 29 December 2004, the Court of Appeals agreed with the rulings of
the RTC in regard to six (6) of the eight (8) death sentences imposed
on appellant.28 The appellate court ratiocinated, thus:
We have painstakingly gone over the record of these cases and find no
cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court except in at
least two (2) cases. The prosecution's case which was anchored mainly
on the testimonies of private complainants [BBB] and [AAA], deserve
full faith and credit for being clear, precise and straightforward. Like
the trial court, We find no reason to disbelieve the private
complainants. It was established with certitude that the accused on
several occasions sexually assaulted his nieces. The perpetration of the
crimes and its authorship were proved by the victims' candid and
unwavering testimonies both of whom had the misfortune of sharing
the same fate in the hands of their own uncle. The sincerity of [AAA]
was made more evident when she cried on the witness stand in obvious
distress over what their uncle had done to her and her sister.29
The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case
Nos. 6906 and 6908 to attempted rape. In these two (2) cases, it was
alleged that appellant had raped AAA in 1999 and on 11 June 2000,
respectively. According to the appellate court, it could not find
evidence beyond reasonable doubt in those two (2) cases that appellant
had accomplished the slightest penetration of AAA's vagina to make
him liable for consummated rape. It stressed that there was not even
moral certainty that appellant's penis ever touched the labia of the
pudendum, quoting portions of the transcript of the stenographic notes
where AAA was asked if appellant was then successful in inserting his
penis into her vagina and she answered in the negative. 30 Accordingly,
the Court of Appeals reduced the penalties attached to the two (2)
counts of rape from death for consummated qualified rape to an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, for attempted rape.
Appellant, in his Supplemental Brief31 before this Court, assails the
findings of the Court of Appeals. He cites inconsistencies in the
testimony of BBB as to what really transpired on 15 January 2000.
Particularly, appellant observes that BBB testified on 6 June 2001 as to
her rape on 15 January 2000. BBB, her sister and appellant had been
sleeping side by side. However, when BBB again testified on 3 July
2002, this time she stated that on that night, as she and her sister AAA
were sleeping in their room at their parents' house (and not at her
grandmother's), the accused passed through a window, entered their
room and raped her again.32 Appellant also latches on the
inconsistencies in BBB's testimony as to the length of the duration of
her rape on that day. In BBB's testimony on 6 June 2001, she said that
appellant was atop her for three (3) minutes while in the 3 July 2002
hearing, BBB stated that the rape lasted for only half a minute.
It must be observed though that BBB was at a tender age when she
was raped in 2001. Moreover, these inconsistencies, which the RTC
and the Court of Appeals did not consider material, were elicited while
BBB was testifying in open court. Our observations in People v.
Perez33 on the appreciation of alleged inconsistencies in the testimony
of rape victims who happen to be minors are instructive, thus:
We note that these alleged inconsistencies refer, at best, only to trivial,
minor, and insignificant details. They bear no materiality to the
commission of the crime of rape of which accused-appellant was
convicted.[34] As pointed out by the Solicitor General in the Appellee's
Brief, the seeming inconsistencies were brought about by confusion
and merely represent minor lapses during the rape victim's direct
examination and cannot possibly affect her credibility. Minor lapses
are to be expected when a person is recounting details of a traumatic
experience too painful to recall. The rape victim was testifying in open
court, in the presence of strangers, on an extremely intimate matter,
which, more often than not, is talked about in hushed tones. Under
such circumstances, it is not surprising that her narration was less than
letter-perfect.[35] "Moreover, the inconsistency may be attributed to the
well-known fact that a courtroom atmosphere can affect the accuracy
of testimony and the manner in which a witness answers
questions."[36]37
Further, the public prosecutor offered a convincing explanation on
why BBB was confused on some points of her two testimonies.
Particularly in the Memorandum for the People38 filed with the RTC,
the public prosecutor creditably explained the inconsistencies, thus:
[BBB]'s testimony on July 3, 2002 might be contradictory to her first
testimony on June 6, 2001, with respect to the last rape on January 15,
2000, as regards the place of commission—house of her parents or
house of accused; and the length of time he stayed on her top – 3
minutes or half-minute. But she remained consistent in her declaration
that on January 15, 2000, her uncle inserted his penis into her vagina,
and he was moving while on her top then she felt something came out
from him. He was able to rape her because he threatened her with a
knife or bladed weapon. Further, the first she took the witness stand on
June 6, 2001, she was made to recall the last rape, the first rape and
many acts of sexual abuses [sic] against her. She was even confused
about her age when she was first raped by her uncle. After she testified
on November 14, 2001, for the separate charges of rapes in 1997, 1998
and 1999, she was able to recall more clearly the last rape on January
15, 2000, which happened in her own house. These noted
discrepancies as to the exact place of commission – accused's house or
victim's house – is not an essential element of the crime of rape and
both houses are situated in Brgy. Villa Padua Ilaya, Gumaca, Quezon,
which is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. x x
x 39
In addition, we share the lower court's disbelief of appellant's proffered
defenses of denial and alibi. These two defenses are inherently the
weakest as they are negative defenses. Mere denials of involvement in
a crime cannot take precedence over the positive testimony of the
offended party. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the defendant
to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed;
he must likewise demonstrate that it is physically impossible for him
to have been at the scene of the crime at the time.40
In the case at bar, appellant's alibi that he was at his sister's house
barely two (2) kilometers away when the rape took place on 15
January 2000 cannot be given credence by this Court. If we are to
thread this line of reasoning, appellant could have easily left his sister's
house in the middle of the night, raped BBB, and then returned to his
sister's house without much difficulty and without anybody noticing
his absence.
Well-settled is the rule that a categorical and positive identification of
an accused, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and
denial.41 The defenses of denial and alibi deserve scant consideration
when the prosecution has strong, clear and convincing evidence
identifying appellant as the perpetrator.42 In this case, both BBB and
AAA, minors and relatives of appellant, positively identified him as
their rapist in open court. The lower courts found no issue detracting
from the credibility of such identification.
It is to be noted that there is an attempt to commit rape when the
offender commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not
perform all acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.47 In Criminal Case No. 6906-G, the records show that there
was no penetration or any indication that the penis of appellant
touched the labia of the pudendum of AAA. This was evident in
AAA's testimony at the hearing on 17 October 2001, to wit:
Q – Do you remember of any unusual incident that happened to you
when you were eleven years old?
A – Yes, Mam. [sic]

It is worthy to note that the alibi presented by appellant is limited to Q – What was that?
the 15 January 2000 rape of BBB. He offers nothing to counteract the
accusations against him involving the seven (7) other specific acts of
rape other than the averment that he did not know anything about the A – He also touched my vagina and my other private parts and he
allegations propounded on him, an infinitesimal defense considering inserted also his penis (into) my vagina. [sic]
the evidence against him.
Q – Was he able to insert his penis into your vagina?
Appellant does claim that the present case was merely instituted
because of the grudge of CCC towards his deceased father. It is A – No, Mam. [sic]
outrageous to even suggest that a mother will subject her daughters to
the humiliating experience of coming before the court and narrating Q – Why?
their harrowing experience just because she was tagged by her father-
in-law as lazy. In addition, CCC's father-in-law had died several years
before the criminal charges against appellant were ever instituted. If A – It was painful, Mam. [sic]
CCC truly wanted to retaliate and damage the reputation of her father-
in-law, she could have done so when the latter was still alive. No xxxx
member of a rape victim's family would dare encourage the victim to
publicly expose the dishonor of the family, more specifically if such
Q – How many times did he try to insert his penis into your vagina?
accusation is against a member of the family, unless the crime was in
fact committed.43
A – Many times, Mam.48 [sic]
Besides, no sane woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and subject AAA also testified in the same vein in Criminal Case No. 6908-G.
herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not in truth, been a victim of
rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. Q – I am now through with Criminal Case No. 6906-G. In Criminal
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, Case No. 6908-G, also for Rape. When was the last time that this
since when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been sexual abuse was committed by your Uncle?
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has been
committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and
A – June 11, Mam. [sic]
sincerity.44 The weight of such testimonies may be countered by
physical evidence to the contrary, or indubitable proof that the accused
could not have committed the rape, but in the absence of such Q – What year?
countervailing proof, these testimonies shall be accorded utmost value.
A – June 11, 2000, Mam. [sic]
The twin aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were
properly appreciated in this case. The minority of the victims and their xxxx
relationship with appellant were aptly established in the lower court
proceedings. Not only did the prosecution allege in the Informations
the ages of the victims when they were raped but the prosecution also Q – What did your Uncle do to you on June 11, 2000?
presented the birth certificates of BBB and AAA in court as
documentary evidence to prove that they were both minors when A – He also removed my clothes, Mam. [sic]
appellant raped them. Appellant, in open court, also admitted that that
he was the uncle of both victims being the brother of the victims' Q – And after removing your clothes, what did he do to you?
father, and thus, a relative of the victims within the third degree of
consanguinity.
A – He was trying to insert his penis into my vagina, Mam. [sic]
Furthermore, the delay in reporting the repulsive acts of appellant to
BBB and AAA is understandably justified, considering that appellant xxxx
repeatedly threatened to kill them and their family should they disclose
the incidents to anyone. It has been held time and again that delay in Q – And what did you feel when he was trying to insert his penis in
revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated your vagina?
charge.45 Such intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim's
perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime A – Painful, Mam. [sic]
and not by any hard and fast rule. It is enough that the intimidation
produces a fear that if the victim does not yield to the perverse
impulses of the accused, something would happen to her at the Q – And what did you do when you feel painful?
moment, or even thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she
would report the incident.46 A – I cried, Mam. [sic]

At the same time, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the two Q – When you cried, what did your Uncle do, if any?
counts of rape in Criminal Case Nos. 6906-G and 6908-G were not
proven beyond reasonable doubt, but only the two separate incidents A – He did not pursue what he was doing, Mam. [sic]
of attempted rape.
xxxx
Q – And your Uncle was not able to penetrate his penis to your
vagina?
A – No, Mam.49 [sic]
In downgrading the offense committed and consequently decreasing
the penalty, the CA declared:
It is carnal knowledge, not pain, that is the element to consummate
rape. Indeed pain may be deduced from the sexual act but accused
cannot be convicted of rape by presuming carnal knowledge out of
pain. It is well-settled that complete penetration of the penis into the
vagina is not necessary to convict for consummated rape since the
slightest penetration of one into the other will suffice. However, in
People v. Campuhan, the term "slightest penetration" was clarified to
mean that there must be sufficient and convincing proof of the penis
indeed touching at the very least the labias of the female organ. Mere
epidermal contact between the penis and the external layer of the
victim's vagina (the stroking and the grazing of the male organ upon
the female organ or the mons pubis) categorizes the crime as attempted
rape or acts of lasciviousness. There must be positive proof of even the
slightest penetration, more accurately, the touching of the labias by the
penis, before rape could be deemed consummated. We, therefore, take
exception to the finding of the trial court that when the accused was
trying to insert his penis into the child's vagina, the act proved painful
to [AAA,] which made the accused stop from further executing the act.
From the testimony of private complainant, [AAA] in the afore-
numbered cases, the prosecution failed to demonstrate beyond any
shadow of doubt that accused-appellant's penis reached the labia of the
pudendum of AAA's vagina. There is no basis then to apply the rule
that the introduction of the penis into the aperture of the female organ
(thereby touching the labia of the pudendum) already consummates the
case of rape. x x x 50
It should be added that under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code,
there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In the crime of
rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony.
Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have
commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the
victim but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance, the penetration, however slight, is not completed.51
The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it
has been established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty
of six (6) counts of rape and two (2) counts of attempted rape.
However, in light of Rep. Act No. 9346, the appropriate penalties for
both crimes should be amended.
II.
We shall not dwell at length on the proper penalty imposable on
appellant for the six (6) counts of rape. The sentence of death imposed
by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals can no longer be
affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, titled "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines." Section 2 of the law
mandates that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed. Correspondingly, the Court can no longer
uphold the death sentences imposed by lower courts, but must, if the
guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when appropriate. Since
the passage of Rep. Act No. 9346, the Court has had occasion to
effectuate such reduction in recent cases such as People v.
Tubongbanua52 and People v. Cabalquinto.53
III.
The question of what should be the appropriate penalty for the two (2)
counts of attempted rape proves to be the more challenging but
interesting question facing the Court.
The Court of Appeals had sentenced appellant, for the attempted rape
of AAA, to "an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal as maximum," for each count of attempted rape.
There is no doubt as to the validity of this sentence at the time it was
meted prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346. Article 51 of the
Revised Penal Code establishes the penalty to be imposed upon the
principals of an attempted felony:
ART. 51. xxx — A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed
by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the
principals in an attempt to commit a felony.54
What is the penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law"
for attempted rape? Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, which
incorporates the amendments introduced by Rep. Act No. 8353,
prescribes:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common
law spouse of the parent of the victim. x x x55
The prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly
proven to have been under eighteen years of age and to have been
raped by her uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code. The determination of the penalty two degrees lower than the
death penalty entails the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the
Revised Penal Code:
Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties.—For the purpose of graduating
the penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57,
inclusive, of this Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as
principals of any frustrated or attempted felony, or as accomplices or
accessories, the following rules shall be observed:
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible,
the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following
that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in
Article 71 of this Code.56
xxxx
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code (Article 71) warrants special
attention, crucial as it is to our disposition of this question. The
provision reads:
Art. 71. Graduated scales. — In the case in which the law prescribes a
penalty lower or higher by one or more degrees than another given
penalty, the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in
graduating such penalty.
The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in
which is comprised the given penalty:
The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the
following graduated scales:
SCALE NO. 1
1. Death
2. Reclusion perpetua
3. Reclusion temporal
4. Prision mayor
5. Prision correctional
6. Arresto mayor
7. Destierro
8. Arresto menor
9. Public censure
10. Fine57
xxxx
Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees
lower than death is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum
penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on appellant for attempted
rape. Reclusion temporal is a penalty comprised of three divisible
periods, a minimum, a medium and a maximum.
At the same time, the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribes that "the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said
Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." The purpose
of the prescription of minimum and maximum periods under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is to effect the privilege granted under the
same law, for prisoners who have served the minimum penalty to be
eligible for parole per the discretion of the Board of Indiscriminate
Sentence.58 Thus, convicts sentenced to suffer death penalty or life-
imprisonment are ineligible under that law, as are persons sentenced
to reclusion perpetua, an indivisible penalty without minimum or
maximum periods.59
Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty
for attempted rape, with a maximum penalty within the range
of reclusion temporal, and a minimum penalty within the range of the
penalty next lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act No. 9346 had not
been enacted, the Court would have affirmed such sentence without
complication. However, the enactment of the law has given rise to the
problem concerning the imposable penalty. Appellant was sentenced
to a maximum term within reclusion temporal since that is the penalty
two degrees lower than death. With the elimination of death as a
penalty, does it follow that appellant should now be sentenced to a
penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the highest
remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so
followed, appellant would be sentenced to prision mayor in lieu
of reclusion temporal.
IV.
Obviously, our ruling on the appropriate penalty on appellant for
attempted rape will affect not only appellant, but several classes of
convicts as well. Before we proceed with the discussion, the Court
finds it necessary to make the following qualification.
Prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346, the death penalty was
imposable under two different frames of reference. This was especially
made clear with the 1993 amendments to the Revised Penal Code
through Rep. Act No. 7659, or the Death Penalty Law. Under the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death penalty was provided for
in two ways, namely: as the maximum penalty for "reclusion
perpetua to death," and death itself as an automatic and exclusive
penalty. Death as the automatic penalty was mandated for the crimes
of qualified bribery "if it is the public officer who asks or demands
such gift or present;"60 kidnapping or detention "for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person;"61 destructive
arson wherein "death results;"62 and rape qualified by any of the
several circumstances enumerated under the law.
On the other hand, the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death" was
imposable on several crimes, including murder,63 qualified
piracy,64 and treason.65 The imposition of the death penalty for crimes
punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death" depended on the
appreciation of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances generally
outlined in Articles 13 and 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Reference to
those two provisions was unnecessary if the penalty imposed was
death, as opposed to "reclusion perpetua to death."
There is no need for now to discuss the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346
on the penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies which were
punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death" if consummated, or on
accomplices and accessories to such felonies. Such situations do not
relate to the case of appellant, who was convicted of two (2) counts of
attempted rape, which, if consummated, of course would have carried
prior to the enactment of Rep. Act 9346 the penalty of death, and not
"reclusion perpetua to death."
The Court also recognizes that the graduation of penalties reckoned
from "reclusion perpetua to death" differs from that based on the
exclusive penalty of death. For example, it has been held that the
penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to death"
is prision mayor.66 In contrast, the Court has likewise held that for
qualified rape in the attempted stage, "the penalty x x x two (2)
degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death for the offense
charged x x x is reclusion temporal."67 In People v. Tolentino,68 we
ruled that the accused, who had been sentenced to die for the rape of
his nine (9)-year old stepdaughter, was guilty only of attempted rape.
In explaining that "reclusion temporal" was the proper penalty, the
Court, through then Chief Justice Davide, explained:
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an
attempted felony is the "penalty lower by two degrees than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony." In this case, the
penalty for the rape if it had been consummated would have been
death, pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R.A. No. 7659, since [RT69] was eight years old and TOLENTINO
was the common-law spouse of [RT's] mother. The last paragraph
thereof provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim.
xxxx
The penalty in this case should have been reclusion temporal, which is
the penalty lower by two degrees than death. However, with the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, TOLENTINO may be
sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment penalty whose minimum
shall be within the range of prision mayor and whose maximum shall
be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period
pursuant to Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.70
This dichotomy results from the application of Article 61 of the
Revised Penal Code. Both reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible
penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the
penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible
penalties … the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately
following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective
graduated scale." Hence, in passing sentence on those convicted of
attempted felonies which warranted the penalty of "reclusion perpetua
to death" if consummated, the Court has consistently held that penalty
two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor.
In contrast, if the penalty for the consummated crime is the single
indivisible penalty of death, as was prescribed for several crimes under
Rep. Act No. 7659, Article 61(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides
that "the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the
penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following that
indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in
Article 71". Thus, the proper penalty two degrees lower than death
is reclusion temporal.
It is also for this reason that the controversy we are now addressing did
not similarly arise after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, which
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty subject to its subsequent
readoption at the choice of Congress. Generally, the highest penalty
imposed under the Revised Penal Code was "reclusion perpetua to
death," a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties. As a result,
the Court had no occasion, after the passage of the 1987 Constitution,
to consider the effect of the charter on penalties downgraded from a
single indivisible penalty. It was under Rep. Act No. 7659, passed in
1993, that some commonly occurring crimes, such as qualified rape
and kidnapping for ransom, were penalized with the single indivisible
penalty of death.
The discussion for purposes of this decision will only center on crimes,
such as qualified rape as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, for which the imposable penalty was death alone. Thus, our
ruling will bear no direct effect on the sentencing of accomplices and
accessories or persons guilty of the attempted or frustrated stage of
felonies for which the imposable penalty was "reclusion perpetua to
death."
Hence, it should be understood that any reference forthwith to the
penalty of death does not refer to the penalty of "reclusion
perpetua to death."
V.
If there was a clear intent in Rep. Act No. 9346 to downgrade the
penalties for convicts whose sentences had been graduated beginning
from death pursuant to Article 71, the Court would not hesitate to
enforce such downgrading based on clear statutory intent. However,
nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly refers to those penalties
imposed on frustrated or attempted felonies, or on accessories and
accomplices.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 bears examination:
Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited.
Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred
Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act
Designating Death by Lethal Injection, is hereby repealed. Republic
Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659),
otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws,
executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty
are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
If the penalties for attempted rape of a minor,71 among others, were
deemed to have been amended by virtue of Rep. Act No. 9346, such
amendment can be justified under the ambit of the repealing clause,
which reads, "all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as
they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly." While this clause may, given its breadth, initially
impress as the nature of a general repealing clause, it is in actuality an
express repealing clause. Section 1 specifically repeals all laws,
executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty,
and not merely such enactments which are inconsistent with Rep. Act
No. 9346.
Section 1 arguably presents more problems in that regard with its
utilization of the particular phrase "insofar as they impose the death
penalty." We can entertain two schools of thought in construing this
provision, both of them rooted in literalist interpretations. First, it can
be claimed that the present application of the penalties for attempted
rape of a minor (among many examples) does not "impose the death
penalty," since none of the convicts concerned would face execution
through the application of the penalty for attempted rape. Hence, the
statutory provisions enforced in determining the penalty for attempted
rape, or other crimes not punishable by death, are not amended by
Rep. Act No. 9346.
On the other hand, the operation of the provisions imposing the
penalty for attempted rape of a minor necessarily calls for the
application, if not its literal imposition, of death as a penalty, in the
context of applying the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71 of
the Revised Penal Code. If we were to construe "impose" as to mean
"apply," then it could be argued that Article 71 was indeed amended
by Rep. Act No. 9346. After all, the application of Article 71 to crimes
such as attempted rape of a minor call for the actual operation of the
death penalty not only in theory, but as a means of determining the
proper graduated penalty.
On face value, the attractive worth of the firstly offered line of
thinking is enhanced by its innate conservatism, limiting as it would
the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346. It also can be understood if
confronted with the option of employing either a liberal or a
conservative construction, there is a natural tendency to employ the
conservative mode. Further, the reasoning is seemingly consistent with
that employed by the Court in People v. Muñoz,72 a decision which
will be thoroughly analyzed in the course of this discussion.
If the true intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the extent of the
"imposition" of the death penalty to actual executions, this could have
been accomplished with more clarity. For example, had Section 1 read
instead "insofar as they sentence an accused to death," there would
have been no room for doubt that only those statutory provisions
calling for actual executions would have been repealed or amended.
The inability of Congress to shape the repealing clause in so specific a
fashion does leave open the question whether Congress did actually
intend to limit the operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 to actual executions
only.
But let us for now test that premise by assuming for the nonce that the
legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the prohibition of
the law to the physical imposition of the death penalty, without
extending any effect to the graduated scale of penalties under Article
71 of the Revised Penal Code.
VI.
There are troubling results if we were to uphold, based on
legislative intent, the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that
limits its effects only to matters relating to the physical imposition
of the death penalty.
Illustrations are necessary. The easy demonstration of iniquitous
results is in the case of accomplices. Under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, kidnapping for ransom was punishable by
death. Let us say X and Y were tried for the crime. X was charged as a
principal for having directly participated in the kidnapping. Y was
charged as an accomplice for having allowed X to use his house to
detain the victim, even though Y was abroad at the time of the crime
and otherwise had no other participation therein. Both X and Y were
convicted by final judgment. Since X could no longer be meted the
death penalty, he is sentenced instead to reclusion perpetua.
Ordinarily, Y as an accomplice should receive the penalty next lower
in degree, or reclusion temporal. Yet following the "conservative"
interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346, the graduation of penalties
remains unaffected with the enactment of the new law. Thus, under
Article 71, which would still take into account the death penalty within
the graduated scale, Y, as an accomplice, would be sentenced
to reclusion perpetua, the same penalty as the principal.
It might be countered that part of the legislative intent of Rep. Act No.
9346, by retaining the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71,
was to equalize the penalties of principals and accomplices for crimes
previously punishable by death. We do not doubt that the legislature
has the theoretical capability to amend the penal law in such fashion.
Yet given the drastic effects of equalizing the penalties for principals
and accomplices, a step that runs contrary to entrenched thought in
criminal law, one could reasonably assume that a legislature truly
oriented to enact such change would have been candid enough to have
explicitly stated such intent in the law itself. Of course, nothing in
Rep. Act No. 9346, either in the caption or in the provisions, explicates
the intention to equalize the penalties for principals and accomplices in
any crime at all.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that it would, at bare minimum, seem
strange that the penalties for principals and accomplices are equalized
in some crimes, and not in others. Let us return to our previous
example of X and Y, but this time, assume that they were charged for
simple kidnapping, with no qualifying circumstance that would have
resulted in the imposition of the death penalty. Since the crime is not
punishable by death, Rep. Act No. 9346 would have no effect in the
imposition of the penalty for simple kidnapping. Accordingly, X
would have been sentenced to reclusion perpetua as the principal,
while Y would have been sentenced to reclusion temporal as an
accomplice.
Since simple kidnapping is a comparatively lighter crime than
kidnapping for ransom, the lesser penalties are justified. Since Y was
merely an accomplice to the crime of simple kidnapping, the
imposition on him of a lighter penalty than X is in accord with the
Revised Penal Code and established juridical and legal thought. Less
justifiable would be the notion that in kidnapping for ransom, the
principal and the accomplice would receive the same penalty, while in
simple kidnapping, the principal suffers a higher penalty than the
accomplice. Frankly, there is no rational explanation for such a
disparity, and no legal justification other than the recognition that
Congress has the power to will it so.
Admittedly, the impact of Rep. Act No. 9346 is less dramatic in
relation to frustrated and attempted felonies which were punishable by
death if consummated. The consummated felony previously
punishable by death would now be punishable by reclusion perpetua.
At the same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would, under
the foregoing premise in this section, be penalized one degree lower
from death, or also reclusion perpetua. It does not seem right, of
course, that the same penalty of reclusion perpetua would be imposed
on both the consummated and frustrated felony. However, the anomaly
would be mainly in theory, as we recognize that those felonies
previously punishable by death are improbable of commission in their
frustrated stage, unlike several felonies punishable by "reclusion
perpetua to death,"73 such as murder, which may be frustrated.
Still, it cannot be denied that these felonies previously punishable by
death are capable of commission in their attempted stages and that the
Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for attempted felonies is
"a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony." The Court has thus consistently
imposed reclusion temporal, the penalty two degrees lower than death,
as the maximum term for attempted felonies which, if consummated,
would have warranted the death penalty. 74 If it were to be insisted that
Rep. Act No. 9346 did not affect at all the penalties for attempted
felonies, then those found guilty of the subject attempted felonies
would still be sentenced to reclusion temporal, even though the
"penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony" would now be prision mayor.
It should be pointed out that the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346
that would sanction a penalty for some attempted felonies that is only
one degree lower than the consummated crime would, again, be
disharmonious and inconsistent with the Revised Penal Code and
established thought in criminal law. Conceding again that the
legislature has the discretion to designate the criminal penalties it sees
fit, a regime that foists a differential theoretical basis for the
punishment of different attempted felonies resulting in discriminatory
penalties is not only irrational but also, to say the least, highly suspect.
Considering that physical liberties are at stake, it would be a most
cruel joke if such discriminatory effects ensued not from deliberate
legislative will, but from oversight.
VII.
The implementation of Rep. Act No. 9346 in a way that leaves extant
the penalties for accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted
felonies, clearly results in illogical, iniquitous and inconsistent effects.
In contrast, no similar flaws ensue should we construe Rep. Act No.
9346 instead as not having barred the application of the death penalty
even as a means of depreciating penalties other than death. In
particular, the operative amendment that would assure the integrity of
penalties for accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted
felonies lies in Article 71, which ranks "death" at the top of the scale
for graduated penalties.
Simply put, the negation of the word "death" as previously inscribed in
Article 71 will have the effect of appropriately downgrading the proper
penalties attaching to accomplices, accessories, frustrated and
attempted felonies to the level consistent with the rest of our penal
laws. Returning to our previous examples, Y, the convicted
accomplice in kidnapping for ransom, would now bear the penalty
of reclusion temporal, the penalty one degree lower than that the
principal X would bear (reclusion perpetua). Such sentence would be
consistent with Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code, as well as
Article 71, as amended, to remove the reference to "death." Moreover,
the prospect of the accomplice receiving the same sentence as the
principal, an anomalous notion within our penal laws, would be
eliminated. Thus, the same standard would prevail in sentencing
principals and accomplices to the crime of kidnapping in ransom, as
that prescribed to the crime of simple kidnapping.
The harmonization that would result if Rep. Act No. 9346 were
construed as having eliminated the reference to "death" in Article 71
would run across the board in our penal laws. Consistent with Article
51 of the Revised Penal Code, those convicted of attempted qualified
rape would receive the penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed
by law, now Rep. Act No. 9346, for qualified rape.
There are principles in statutory construction that will sanction, even
mandate, this "expansive" interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346. The
maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus
interpretandi embodies the principle that a statute should be so
construed not only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize
with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete,
coherent and intelligible system—a uniform system of
jurisprudence.75 "Interpreting and harmonizing laws with laws is the
best method of interpretation. x x x x This manner of construction
would provide a complete, consistent and intelligible system to secure
the rights of all persons affected by different legislative and quasi-
legislative acts."76 There can be no harmony between Rep. Act No.
9346 and the Revised Penal Code unless the later statute is construed
as having downgraded those penalties attached to death by reason of
the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that manner will a clear
and consistent rule emerge as to the application of penalties for
frustrated and attempted felonies, and for accessories and accomplices.
It is also a well-known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal or
criminal laws are strictly construed against the state and liberally in
favor of the accused.77 If the language of the law were ambiguous, the
court will lean more strongly in favor of the defendant than it would if
the statute were remedial, as a means of effecting substantial
justice.78 The law is tender in favor of the rights of an individual. 79 It is
this philosophy of caution before the State may deprive a person of life
or liberty that animates one of the most fundamental principles in our
Bill of Rights, that every person is presumed innocent until proven
guilty.
Resort to the aforementioned principles in statutory construction
would not have been necessary had Rep. Act No. 9346 ineluctably
stated that the repeal of all laws imposing the death penalty did not
engender the corresponding modification of penalties other than death,
dependent as these are on "death" as a measure under the graduated
scale of penalties under Article 71. Admittedly, if this were indeed the
intent of Congress, and such intent were unequivocally expressed in
Rep. Act No. 9346, the resulting inequities and inconsistencies we had
earlier pointed out would have remained. If that were to be the case,
we would have acknowledged, perhaps tacitly, that such inequities and
inconsistencies fell part of the legislative intent. It does not speak well
of a Congress to be deliberately inconsistent with, or ignorant of its
own prior enactments. Yet ultimately, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346
is not expressive of such rash or injudicious notions, as it is susceptible
to a reading that would harmonize its effects with the precepts and
practices that pervade our general penal laws, and in a manner that
does not defy the clear will of Congress.
VIII.
One who would like to advocate that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not
correspondingly amend any of the penalties other than death in our
penal laws would most certainly invoke our ruling in People v.
Muñoz,80 decided in 1989. Therein, a divided Court ruled in that the
constitutional bar on the imposition of the death penalty did not enact
"a corresponding modification in the other periods [in penalties]",
there being no expression of "such a requirement… in Article III,
Section 19(1) of the Constitution or indicat[ion] therein by at least
clear and unmistakable implication."81 In so concluding, the Court
made the oft-cited pronouncement that there was nothing in the 1987
Constitution "which expressly declares the abolition of the death
penalty."82
It is time to re-examine Muñoz and its continued viability in light of
Rep. Act No. 9346. More precisely, would Muñoz as precedent deter
the Court from ruling that Rep. Act No. 9346 consequently
downgraded penalties other than death?
It can be recalled that the accused in Muñoz were found guilty of
murder, which under the Revised Penal Code, carried the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The subject
murders therein were not attended by any modifying circumstance, and
thus penalized in the penalty's medium term. Jurisprudence previous
to Muñoz held that the proper penalty in such instances should be "the
higher half of reclusion temporal maximum," with reclusion
temporal maximum, divided into two halves for that
purpose. Muñoz rejected this formulation, holding instead that the
penalty should be reclusion perpetua. Towards this conclusion, the
Court made the above-cited conclusions relating to the constitutional
abolition of the death penalty, and the charter's effects on the other
periods. Six justices dissented from that ruling, and as recently as
1997, a member of the Court felt strongly enough to publish a view
urging the reexamination of Muñoz.83
It would be disingenuous to consider Muñoz as directly settling the
question now befacing us, as the legal premises behind Muñoz are
different from those in this case. Most pertinently, Muñoz inquired into
the effects of the Constitution on the proper penalty for murder; while
herein, we are ascertaining the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 on the
proper penalty for attempted qualified rape. Muñoz may have
pronounced that the Constitution did not abolish the death
penalty, but that issue no longer falls into consideration herein, the
correct query now being whether Congress has banned the death
penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346. Otherwise
framed, Muñoz does not preclude the Court from concluding that
with the express prohibition of the imposition of the death penalty
Congress has unequivocally banned the same.
Muñoz made hay over the peculiar formulation of Section 19(1),
Article III, which provided that "[n]either shall death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it." Muñoz and its progenies, have
interpreted that provision as prohibiting the actual imposition of the
death penalty, as opposed to enacting an amendatory law that
eliminates all references and applications of the death penalty in our
statutes. It can also be understood and appreciated that at the
time Muñoz was decided, it would have been polemical to foster an
unequivocal pronouncement that Section 19(1), Article III abolished
the death penalty, since the very provision itself acknowledged that
Congress may nonetheless subsequently provide for the penalty "for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes," as Congress very well
did just four (4) years after Muñoz. No such language exists in Rep.
Act No. 9346. Of course, the legislature has the inherent and
constitutional power to enact laws prescribing penalties for crimes, and
the Constitution will not prohibit Congress from reenacting the death
penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." Yet it was
that express stipulation in the Constitution that dissuaded the Court
from recognizing the constitutional abolition of the death penalty; and
there is no similar statutory expression in Rep. Act No. 9346, which
could be construed as evocative of intent similar to that of the
Constitution.
The doctrine in Muñoz that the constitutional prohibition on the
imposition of the death penalty did not enact a corresponding
modification of other penalties is similarly irrelevant to this case,
which calls for an examination as to whether such corresponding
modifications of other penalties arose as a consequence of Rep. Act
No. 9346, and not the Constitution.
For purposes of legal hermeneutics, the critical question is whether
Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to delete the word "death" as expressly
provided for in the graduated scale of penalties under Article
71. Muñoz did not engage in an analogous inquiry in relation to
Article 71 and the Constitution, for what was relevant therein was not
the general graduated scale of penalties, but the range of the penalties
for murder. Herein, at bare minimum, no provision in Rep. Act No.
9346 provides a context within which the concept of "death penalty"
bears retentive legal effect, especially in relation to Article 71. Unlike
the Constitution, Rep. Act No. 9346 does expressly stipulate the
amendment of all extant laws insofar as they called for the imposition
of the penalty of death.
The impression left by Muñoz was that the use of the word
"imposition" in the Constitution evinced the framer's intent to retain
the operation of penalties under the Revised Penal Code. In the same
vein, one might try to construe the use of "imposition" in Rep. Act No.
9346 as a means employed by Congress to ensure that the "death
penalty", as applied in Article 71, remain extant. If the use of
"imposition" was implemented as a means of retaining "death" under
Article 71, it would have been a most curious, roundabout means
indeed. The Court can tolerate to a certain degree the deliberate
vagueness sometimes employed in legislation, yet constitutional due
process demands a higher degree of clarity when infringements on life
or liberty are intended. We have ruled, on due process grounds, as
arbitrary and oppressive a tax assessed on a standard characterized as
"nothing but blather in search of meaning."84 In the matter of statutes
that deprive a person of physical liberty, the demand for a clear
standard in sentencing is even more exacting.
Yet in truth, there is no material difference between "imposition" and
"application," for both terms embody the operation in law of the death
penalty. Since Article 71 denominates "death" as an element in the
graduated scale of penalties, there is no question that the operation of
Article 71 involves the actual application of the death penalty as a
means of determining the extent which a person's liberty is to be
deprived. Since Rep. Act No. 9346 unequivocally bars the application
of the death penalty, as well as expressly repeals all such statutory
provisions requiring the application of the death penalty, such effect
necessarily extends to its relevance to the graduated scale of penalties
under Article 71.
We cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to
retain the operative effects of the death penalty in the graduation of the
other penalties in our penal laws. Munoz cannot enjoin us to adopt
such conclusion. Rep. Act No. 9346 is not swaddled in the same
restraints appreciated by Muñoz on Section 19(1), Article III. The very
Congress empowered by the Constitution to reinstate the imposition of
the death penalty once thought it best to do so, through Rep. Act No.
7650. Within the same realm of constitutional discretion, Congress has
reversed itself. It must be asserted that today, the legal status of the
suppression of the death penalty in the Philippines has never been
more secure than at any time in our political history as a nation.
Following Muñoz, the sovereign people, through the 1987
Constitution, might not have willed the abolition of the death penalty
and instead placed it under a suspensive condition. As such, we
affirmed the characterization of the death penalty during the
interregnum between the 1987 Constitution and its reimposition
through law as being "in a state of hibernation." 85 No longer. It
reawakened — then it died; because the sovereign people, through
Rep. Act No. 9346, banned the death penalty. Only by an Act of
Congress can it be reborn. Before that day, the consideration of death
as a penalty is bereft of legal effect, whether as a means of depriving
life, or as a means of depriving liberty.
Despite our present pronouncement on the ban against of the death
penalty, we do not acknowledge that Muñoz lacked legal justification
when it was decided; that its application as precedent prior to Rep. Act
No. 9346 was erroneous; or that previous sentences imposed on
convicts on the basis of Muñoz were wrong. Muñoz properly stood as
the governing precedent in the matter of sentences that passed finality
prior to Rep. Act No. 9346; and the consistent reliance by the courts
on its doctrines entrenched its footing in criminal law jurisprudence.
IX.
Rep. Act No. 7659, in the course of reintroducing the death penalty in
the Philippines, also effectively classified the crimes listed therein as
"heinous," within constitutional contemplation. Such reclassification
under Rep. Act No. 7659 was accompanied by certain legal effects
other than the imposition of the death penalty, such as the increase in
imposable fines attached to certain heinous crimes.86 The
categorization of certain crimes as "heinous", constituting as it does
official recognition that some crimes are more odious than others, has
also influenced this Court in adjudging the proper pecuniary
indemnities awarded to the victims of these crimes. Hence, a general
inclination persists in levying a greater amount of damages on accused
found guilty of heinous crimes.
It should be understood that the debarring of the death penalty through
Rep. Act No. 9346 did not correspondingly declassify those crimes
previously catalogued as "heinous". The amendatory effects of Rep.
Act No. 9346 extend only to the application of the death penalty but
not to the definition or classification of crimes. True, the penalties for
heinous crimes have been downgraded under the aegis of the new law.
Still, what remains extant is the recognition by law that such crimes,
by their abhorrent nature, constitute a special category by themselves.
Accordingly, Rep. Act No. 9346 does not serve as basis for the
reduction of civil indemnity and other damages that adhere to heinous
crimes.
X.
we downgrade the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no
eligibility for parole, pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346. For each of the
two (2) counts of attempted rape, we downgrade by one degree lower
the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals. We hold that there being
no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty of prision
mayor should be imposed in it medium period. Consequently, we
impose the new penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as maximum.

Having pronounced the statutory disallowance of the death penalty
through Rep. Act No. 9346 and the corresponding modification of
penalties other than death through that statute, we now proceed to
discuss the effects of these rulings.
As to sentences not yet handed down, or affirmed with finality, the
application is immediate. Henceforth, "death," as utilized in Article 71
of the Revised Penal Code, shall no longer form part of the equation in
the graduation of penalties. For example, in the case of appellant, the
determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not
from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than
reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no
longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but
instead, prision mayor.
There should be little complication if the crime committed was
punishable by the free-standing penalty of "death," as utilized in Rep.
Act No. 7659, as opposed to the ranged penalty of "reclusion
perpetua to death," as often used in the Revised Penal Code and other
penal laws. The facts of the present case do not concern the latter
penalty, hence our reluctance to avail of an extended discussion
thereof. However, we did earlier observe that both "reclusion
perpetua" and death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime
is composed of two indivisible penalties x x x x the penalty next lower
in degree shall be that immediately following the lesser of the
penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale." Hence, as we
earlier noted, our previous rulings that the penalty two degrees lower
than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor.
Then there is the matter of whether retroactive effect should be
extended to this new ruling, favorable as it is to persons previously
convicted of crimes which, if consummated or participated in as a
principal, would have warranted the solitary penalty of death. We see
no choice but to extend the retroactive benefit. Article 22 of the
Revised Penal Code states that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal[87] x x x x although at the time of the publication of
such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same." Given that we have ruled that Rep. Act No. 9346
downgraded the penalties for such crimes, the benefit of Article 22 has
to apply, except as to those persons defined as "habitual criminal[s]."
Indeed, Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly recognized that its enactment
would have retroactive beneficial effects, referring as it did to "persons
x x x whose sentences were reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of
this Act."88
Lastly, as to damages, the Court awards AAA P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each count of attempted rape, it being the
prevailing rate of indemnity as pronounced in the recent case
of People v. Miranda.89
Separately, the Court applies prevailing jurisprudence90 in awarding to
BBB and AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of
consummated rape.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Court
sentences appellant Alfredo J. Bon to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with no possibility of parole for each of the six (6) counts of
consummated rape committed against AAA in Criminal Case Nos.
6699, 6902, and against BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689, 6903, 6905,
and 6907. Appellant is further ORDERED to indemnify AAA and
BBB for the crime of consummated rape, in the amounts
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of them.
For the two (2) counts of attempted rape of AAA in Criminal Cases
No. 6906 and 6908, appellant is hereby SENTENCED to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
of prision mayor as maximum for each count of attempted rape. In
addition, appellant is ORDERED to indemnify AAA for each of the
two (2) counts of attempted rape in the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

It cannot be discounted that by operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 and

Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, there may be convicts presently
serving their original sentences whose actual served terms exceed their
reduced sentences. It should be understood that this decision does
not make operative the release of such convicts, especially as there
may be other reasons that exist for their continued
detention. There are remedies under law that could be employed to
obtain the release of such prisoners, if warranted. Offices such as the
Public Attorney's Office and non-governmental organizations that
frequently assist detainees possess the capacity and acumen to help
implement the release of such prisoners who are so entitled by reason
of this ruling.

XI.

We close by returning to the matter of appellant Alfredo Bon. By

reason of Rep. Act No. 9346, he is spared the death sentence, and
entitled to the corresponding reduction of his penalty as a consequence
of the downgrading of his offense from two (2) counts consummated
rape to two (2) counts of attempted rape. For the six (6) counts of rape,

G.R. No. 169641               September 10, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICHARD O. SARCIA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On automatic review is the decision1 dated July 14, 2005 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00717 which affirmed, with
modifications, an earlier decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Ligao City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4134, finding herein
accused-appellant Richard O. Sarcia alias "Nogi" guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape3 committed against AAA,4 and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay
the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, and the cost of the suit. However, the CA modified the
penalties imposed by the RTC by imposing the death penalty,
increasing the award of civil indemnity to ₱75,000.00, and awarding
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, aside from the ₱50,000.00 for
moral damages.
The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in 1996 against
AAA, a five (5) year old girl. After almost four (4) years, AAA’s
father filed a complaint5 for acts of lasciviousness against herein
accused-appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon review of the evidence, the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay upgraded the
charge to rape.6 The Information7 dated September 5, 2000 reads:
That sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doña Tomasa, Municipality of
Guinobatan, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
lewd and unchaste design, and by means of force, threats and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have sexual intercourse with [AAA], who was then 6 years of age,
against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with the
assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.8 Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the victim AAA; her
minor cousin; her father; and Dr. Joana Manatlao, the Municipal
Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. The defense presented the
accused-appellant himself, who vehemently denied committing the
crimes imputed to him and Manuel Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the
Municipal Trial Court at Guinobatan, Albay.
On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision 9 finding the
accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape and imposed the penalty
mentioned above.
The record of this case was forwarded to this Court in view of the
Notice of Appeal filed by the accused- appellant.10
Accused-appellant filed his Appellant’s Brief11 on July 15, 2004, while
the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its
Appellee’s Brief12 on December 15, 2004.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo, 13 modifying the
pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this Court in
cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial court is death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the Resolution dated
September 19, 1995 in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court," the case
was transferred, for appropriate action and disposition, to the CA
where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717.
As stated at the beginning hereof, the CA, in its decision of July 14,
2005, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 000717, affirmed with modification
the judgment of conviction pronounced by the trial court. We quote the
fallo of the CA decision:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. The
accused, Richard Sarcia y Olivera, is ordered to suffer the penalty of
DEATH, and to pay the victim, [AAA], the amount of (1) ₱75,000.00
as civil indemnity; (2) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and (3)
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for
review, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty Cases),
which took effect on October 15, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
On September 30, 2005, the case was elevated to this Court for further
review.14
In our Resolution15 of November 15, 2005, we required the parties to
simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs. Accused-
appellant filed his Supplemental Brief16 on April 7, 2006. Having
failed to submit one, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was
deemed to have waived the filing of its supplemental brief.
In his Brief filed before the CA, accused-appellant raised the following
assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF [AAA], [her cousin] and
[her father].
II
THE LOWER COURT GLARINGLY ERRED IN REJECTING THE
DEFENSE OF ALIBI INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED WHICH
IS MORE CREDIBLE.
III
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
THE ACCUSED RICHARD SARCIA.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the OSG in the
Appellee's Brief, as follows:
On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her
[cousin and two other playmates], was playing in the yard of Saling
Crisologo near a mango tree.
Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him to the
backyard of Saling Crisologo’s house. She agreed. Unknown to
appellant, [AAA’s cousin] followed them.
Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAA’s] shorts and
underwear. He also removed his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he
ordered [AAA] to lie down on her back. Then, he lay on top of her and
inserted his penis into [AAA’s] private organ. Appellant made an up-
and-down movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi"). [AAA] felt severe pain
inside her private part and said "aray." She also felt an intense pain
inside her stomach.
[AAA’s cousin], who positioned herself around five (5) meters away
from them, witnessed appellant’s dastardly act. Horrified, [AAA’s
cousin] instinctively rushed to the house of [AAA’s] mother, her aunt
Emily, and told the latter what she had seen. [AAA’s] mother
answered that they (referring to {AAA and her cousin} were still very
young to be talking about such matters.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and ordered
[AAA] to put on her clothes. Appellant then left.
Perplexed, [AAA’s cousin] immediately returned to the backyard of
Saling Crisologo where she found [AAA] crying. Appellant, however,
was gone. [AAA’s cousin] approached [AAA] and asked her what
appellant had done to her. When [AAA] did not answer, [her cousin]
did not ask her any further question and just accompanied her home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what appellant had done to
her because she feared that her mother might slap her. Later, when her
mother washed her body, she felt a grating sensation in her private
part. Thereafter, [AAA] called for [her cousin]. [AAA’s cousin] came
to their house and told [AAA’s] mother again that appellant had earlier
made an up-and-down movement on top of [AAA]. [AAA’s mother],
however did not say anything. At that time, [AAA’s] father was
working in Manila.
Dr. Joana Manatloa is the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan,
Albay. She testified that: (1) it was the rural health officer, Dr.
Reantaso, who conducted a physical examination on [AAA]; (2) Dr.
Reantaso prepared and signed a medico-legal certificate containing the
result of [AAA]’s examination; (3) Dr. Reantaso, however, had
already resigned as rural health officer of Guinobatan, Albay; (4) as a
medical doctor, she can interpret, the findings in said medico-legal
certificate issued to [AAA]; (5) [AAA]’s medical findings are as
follows: "negative for introital vulvar laceration nor scars, perforated
hymen, complete, pinkish vaginal mucosa, vaginal admits little finger
with resistance; (6) the finding "negative for introital bulvar laceration
nor scars" means, in layman’s language, that there was no showing of
any scar or wound, and (7) there is a complete perforation of the
hymen which means that it could have been subjected to a certain
trauma or pressure such as strenuous exercise or the entry of an object
like a medical instrument or penis.17
On the other hand, the trial court summarized the version of the
defense as follows:
Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single, student and a resident of Doña
Tomasa, Guinobatan, Albay denied he raped [AAA]. While he knows
[AAA’s] parents, because sometimes they go to their house looking
for his father to borrow money, he does not know [AAA] herself. His
father retired as a fireman from Crispa in 1991 while his mother
worked as an agriculturist in the Municipality of Teresa, Antipolo,
Rizal. As an agriculturist of the Department of Agriculture, his mother
would bring seedlings and attend seminars in Batangas and Baguio.
They were residing in Cainta, Rizal when sometime in 1992 they
transferred residence to Guinobatan, Albay. His father is from
barangay Masarawag while his mother is from barangay Doña Tomasa
both of Guinobatan, Albay. After their transfer in Guinobatan, his
mother continued to be an agriculturist while his father tended to his 1-
hectare coconut land. Richard testified he was between fourteen (14)
and fifteen (15) years old in 1992 when they transferred to
Guinobatan. Between 1992 and 1994 he was out of school. But from
1994 to 1998 he took his high school at Masarawag High School. His
daily routine was at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon after school
before proceeding home he would usually play basketball at the
basketball court near the church in Doña Tomasa about 1 kilometer
away from their house. When her mother suffered a stroke in 1999 he
and his father took turns taking care of his mother. Richard denied
molesting other girls ... and was most surprised when he was accused
of raping [AAA]. He knows Saling Crisologo and the latter’s place
which is more than half kilometer to their house. Richard claimed
Salvacion Bobier, grandmother of Mae Christine Camu, whose death
on May 7, 2000 was imputed to him and for which a case for Murder
under Criminal Case No. 4087 was filed against him with the docile
cooperation of [AAA’s] parents who are related to Salvacion,
concocted and instigated [AAA’s] rape charge against him to make the
case for Murder against him stronger and life for him miserable. He
was incarcerated on May 10, 2000 for the Murder charge and two (2)
months later while he already in detention, the rape case supposedly
committed in 1996 was filed against him in the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Guinobatan, Albay. He was to learn about it from his sister,
Marivic, on a Sunday afternoon sometime on July 20, 2000 when his
sister visited him in jail. He naturally got angry when he heard of this
rape charge because he did not do such thing and recalled telling his
sister they can go to a doctor and have the child examine to prove he
did not rape her. Subsequently, from his sister again he was to learn
that the rape case was ordered dismissed.
On cross-examination, Richard admitted [AAA’s] mother, is also
related to his father, [AAA mother’s] father, being a second cousin of
his father. Richard is convinced it is not the lending of money by his
father to the AAA’s family as the motive for the latter to file the rape
case against him but the instigation of Salvacion Bobier.
Manuel A. Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), Guinobatan, Albay, testified on the records of Criminal Case
No. 7078 filed in MTC Guinobatan, Albay against Richard Sarcia for
Rape in relation to RA 7610 relative to the alleged withdrawal of said
rape case but the accused through counsel failed to formally offer the
marked exhibits relative to said case.18
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting him,
as the prosecution was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. He assailed the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, AAA,
her cousin and her father on the following grounds: (1) the testimonies
of AAA and her cousin were inconsistent with each other; (2) the
victim was confused as to the date and time of the commission of the
offense; (3) there was a four-year delay in filing the criminal case, and
the only reason why they filed the said case was "to help Salvacion
Bobier get a conviction of this same accused in a murder case filed by
said Salvacion Bobier for the death of her granddaughter Mae
Christine Camu on May 7, 2000." Accused-appellant stressed that the
same Salvacion Bobier helped AAA’s father in filing the said case for
rape. Accused-appellant also claimed that the prosecution failed to
prove that he employed force, threats or intimidation to achieve his
end. Finally, accused-appellant harped on the finding in the medical
certificate issued by Dr. Reantaso and interpreted by Dr. Joana
Manatlao, stating "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scar
which means that there was no showing of any scar or wound."
In his Appellee's Brief accused-appellant pointed out the
inconsistencies between AAA’s and her cousin’s testimonies as
follows: (1) the cousin testified that she played with AAA at the time
of the incident, while AAA testified that she was doing nothing before
accused-appellant invited her to the back of the house of a certain
Saling; (2) the cousin testified that when she saw accused-appellant
doing the push-and-pull motion while on top of AAA, the latter
shouted in a loud voice contrary to AAA’s testimony that when
accused-appellant was inside her and started the up-and-down motion,
she said "aray"; (3) when the cousin returned to AAA after telling the
latter’s mother what accused-appellant had done to AAA, she found
AAA crying. AAA however testified that, after putting on her clothes,
she invited the cousin to their house; and (4) the cousin testified that
other children were playing at the time of the incident, but AAA
testified that there were only four of them who were playing at that
time.
As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses,
which refer only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect
the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is consistency
in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of
the accused. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the
credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not
rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities,
unusual, for there is no person with perfect faculties or senses. 19 The
alleged inconsistencies in this case are too inconsequential to overturn
the findings of the court a quo. It is important that the two prosecution
witnesses were one in saying that it was accused-appellant who
sexually abused AAA. Their positive, candid and straightforward
narrations of how AAA was sexually abused by accused-appellant
evidently deserve full faith and credence. When the rape incident
happened, AAA was only five (5) years old; and when she and her
cousin testified, they were barely 9 and 11 years old, respectively. This
Court has had occasion to rule that the alleged inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the witnesses can be explained by their age and their
inexperience with court proceedings, and that even the most candid of
witnesses commit mistakes and make confused and inconsistent
statements. This is especially true of young witnesses, who could be
overwhelmed by the atmosphere of the courtroom. Hence, there is
more reason to accord them ample space for inaccuracy.20
Accused-appellant capitalizes on AAA’s inability to recall the exact
date when the incident in 1996 was committed. Failure to recall the
exact date of the crime, however, is not an indication of false
testimony, for even discrepancies regarding exact dates of rapes are
inconsequential and immaterial and cannot discredit the credibility of
the victim as a witness.21 In People v. Purazo,22 We ruled:
We have ruled, time and again that the date is not an essential element
of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal
knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of commission in
rape cases need not be accurately stated. As early as 1908, we already
held that where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an
essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on
proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime
was not committed at the precise time or place alleged, or if the proof
fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the
complaint, provided it appears that the specific crime charged was in
fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or
information within the period of the statute of limitations and at a
place within the jurisdiction of the court.
Also in People v. Salalima,23 the Court held:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does
not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. The reason is
obvious. The precise date or time when the victim was raped is not an
element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal
knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense
was committed at any time as near to the actual date when the offense
was committed an information is sufficient. In previous cases, we
ruled that allegations that rapes were committed "before and until
October 15, 1994," "sometime in the year 1991 and the days
thereafter," "sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior
and/or subsequent thereto" and "on or about and sometime in the year
1988" constitute sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In this case, AAA’s declaration that the rape incident took place on
December 15, 1996 was explained by the trial court, and we quote:
The rape took place in 1996. As earlier noted by the Court the date
December 15, 1996 mentioned by [AAA] may have been arbitrarily
chosen by the latter due to the intense cross-examination she was
subjected but the Court believes it could have been in any month and
date in the year 1996 as in fact neither the information nor [AAA’s]
sworn statement mention the month and date but only the year.24
Likewise, witnesses’ credibility is not affected by the delay in the
filing of the case against accused-appellant. Neither does the delay
bolster accused-appellant’s claim that the only reason why this case
was filed against him was "to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction
of this same accused-appellant in the case of murder filed by Salvacion
Bobier for the death of her granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on
May 7, 2000."
The rape victim’s delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not
destroy the truth of the charge nor is it an indication of deceit. It is
common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear of her aggressor
and the lack of courage to face the public stigma of having been
sexually abused. In People v. Coloma25 we even considered an 8-year
delay in reporting the long history of rape by the victim’s father as
understandable and not enough to render incredible the complaint of a
13-year-old daughter. Thus, in the absence of other circumstances that
show that the charge was a mere concoction and impelled by some ill
motive, delay in the filing of the complainant is not sufficient to defeat
the charge. Here, the failure of AAA’s parents to immediately file this
case was sufficiently justified by the complainant’s father in the
latter’s testimony, thus:
Q But, did you not say, please correct me if I am wrong, you got angry
when your wife told you that something happened to Hazel way back
in 1996?
A Yes, sir.
Q Yet, despite your anger you were telling us that you waited until
June to file this case?
A After I heard about the incident, I and my wife had a talk for which
reason that during that time we had no money yet to use in filing the
case, so we waited. When we were able to save enough amounts, we
filed the case.26
Accused-appellant also contends that he could not be liable for rape
because there is no proof that he employed force, threats or
intimidation in having carnal knowledge of AAA. Where the girl is
below 12 years old, as in this case, the only subject of inquiry is
whether "carnal knowledge" took place. Proof of force, intimidation or
consent is unnecessary, since none of these is an element of statutory
rape. There is a conclusive presumption of absence of free consent
when the rape victim is below the age of twelve.27
Accused-appellant harps on the medical report, particularly the
conclusion quoted as follows: "negative for introital bulvar laceration
nor scars, which means, in layman language, that there was no
showing of any scar or wound." The Court has consistently ruled that
the presence of lacerations in the victim’s sexual organ is not
necessary to prove the crime of rape and its absence does not negate
the fact of rape. A medical report is not indispensable in a prosecution
for rape.28 What is important is that AAA’s testimony meets the test of
credibility, and that is sufficient to convict the accused.
Accused-appellant’s defense of denial was properly rejected. Time and
time again, we have ruled that denial like alibi is the weakest of all
defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove.
Furthermore, it cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal
identification of appellant by the offended party and other witnesses.
Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent any showing
of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter,
prevails over the appellants’ defense of denial and alibi.29 The shallow
hypothesis put forward by accused-appellant that he was accused of
raping AAA due to the instigation of Salvacion Bobier hardly
convinces this Court. On this score, the trial court aptly reached the
following conclusion:
…True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted AAA’s family file the
instant case against the accused, but the Court believes [AAA’s]
parents finally decided to file the rape case because after they have
come to realize after what happened to Mae Christine Camu that what
previously [AAA and her cousin] told her mother and which the latter
had continually ignored is after all true.
AAA was barely 9 years of age when she testified. It has been stressed
often enough that the testimony of rape victims who are young and
immature deserve full credence. It is improbable for a girl of
complainant’s age to fabricate a charge so humiliating to herself and
her family had she not been truly subjected to the painful experience of
sexual abuse. At any rate, a girl of tender years, innocent and guileless,
cannot be expected to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to
any man if it were not true.30 Parents would not sacrifice their own
daughter, a child of tender years at that, and subject her to the rigors
and humiliation of public trial for rape, if they were not motivated by
an honest desire to have their daughter’s transgressor punished
accordingly.31 Hence, the logical conclusion is that no such improper
motive exists and that her testimony is worthy of full faith and
credence.
The guilt of accused-appellant having been established beyond
reasonable doubt, we discuss now the proper penalty to be imposed on
him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659,32 was the governing law at the time the accused-appellant
committed the rape in question. Under the said law, the penalty of
death shall be imposed when the victim of rape is a child below seven
years of age. In this case, as the age of AAA, who was five (5) years
old at the time the rape was committed, was alleged in the information
and proven during trial by the presentation of her birth certificate,
which showed her date of birth as January 16, 1991, the death penalty
should be imposed.
However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed
by the CA. We cannot agree with the CA’s conclusion that the
accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the time of the
commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2)33 of the Revised
Penal Code. When accused appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he
admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that in 1996, he was
18 years of age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could
have taken place "in any month and date in the year 1996." Since the
prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time when the
rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was
committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing
the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to
the latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has appreciated this
circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the accused
regarding his age.34
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a
minor under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by
law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. However, for
purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the
penalty to be reckoned with.35 Thus, the proper imposable penalty for
the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in awarding damages
provided in the Civil Code, in case a crime is committed. Specifically,
Article 2204 of the Civil Code provides that "in crimes, the damages to
be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to
the aggravating or mitigating circumstances." The issue now is
whether the award of damages should be reduced in view of the
presence here of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of
the accused at the time of the commission of the offense.
A review of the nature and purpose of the damages imposed on the
convicted offender is in order. Article 107 of the Revised Penal Code
defines the term "indemnification," which is included in the civil
liability prescribed by Article 104 of the same Code, as follows:
Art. 107. Indemnification-What is included. – Indemnification for
consequential damages shall include not only those caused the injured
party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third person by
reason of the crime.
Relative to civil indemnity, People v. Victor36 ratiocinated as follows:
The lower court, however, erred in categorizing the award of
₱50,000.00 to the offended party as being in the nature of moral
damages. We have heretofore explained in People v. Gementiza
that the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil liability ex
delicto for the offended party, in the amount authorized by the
prevailing judicial policy and aside from other proven actual
damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in
civil law. It is not to be considered as moral damages thereunder, the
latter being based on different jural foundations and assessed by the
court in the exercise of sound discretion.
One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape
continue unabated and the legislative response has been in the form of
higher penalties. The Court believes that, on like considerations, the
jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the same
direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is
committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under
which the death penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the
indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not less
than ₱75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law, and the financial fluctuations over time,
but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the
incidence of heinous crimes against chastity. (Emphasis Supplied)
The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages are
likewise compensatory in nature. In San Andres v. Court of
Appeals,37 we held:
x x x Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in
the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for
actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
(Emphasis Supplied)
In another case, this Court also explained:
What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence
as compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or
mental anguish resulting from a wrong (25 C.J.S. 815).38 (Emphasis
Supplied)
Thus, according to law and jurisprudence, civil indemnity is in the
nature of actual and compensatory damages for the injury caused to
the offended party and that suffered by her family, and moral damages
are likewise compensatory in nature. The fact of minority of the
offender at the time of the commission of the offense has no bearing
on the gravity and extent of injury caused to the victim and her family,
particularly considering the circumstances attending this case. Here,
the accused-appelant could have been eighteen at the time of the
commission of the rape. He was accorded the benefit of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority because of a lack of proof
regarding his actual age and the date of the rape rather than a moral or
evidentiary certainty of his minority.
In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, which warrants the lowering of the public
penalty by one degree, there is no justifiable ground to depart from the
jurisprudential trend in the award of damages in the case of qualified
rape, considering the compensatory nature of the award of civil
indemnity and moral damages. This was the same stance this Court
took in People v. Candelario,39 a case decided on July 28, 1999, which
did not reduce the award of damages. At that time, the damages
amounted to ₱75,000.00 for civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 for moral
damages, even if the public penalty imposed on the accused was
lowered by one degree, because of the presence of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority.
The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling
in People v. Salome40 and People v. Quiachon41 is the penalty provided
by law or imposable for the offense because of its heinousness, not the
public penalty actually imposed on the offender.
Regarding the civil indemnity and moral damages, People v. Salome
explained the basis for increasing the amount of said civil damages as
follows:
The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the Court
of Appeals to Sally in accordance with the ruling in People v.
Sambrano which states:
"As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any
of the attending qualifying circumstances that require the imposition of
the death penalty, the civil indemnity for the victim shall ₱75,000.00
… Also, in rape cases, moral damages are awarded without the need
proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim
has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. However,
the trial court’s award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages should also be
increased to ₱75,000 pursuant to current jurisprudence on qualified
rape."
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a heinous
offense is still death and the offense is still heinous. Consequently, the
civil indemnity for the victim is still ₱75,000.00.
People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:
With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following
prevailing jurisprudence, correctly awarded the following amounts;
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime is
qualified by circumstances warranting the imposition of the death
penalty; ₱75,000.00.00 as moral damages because the victim is
assumed to have suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an
award of moral damages even without proof thereof, x x x
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant
because of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of
₱75,000.00 is still proper because, following the ratiocination in
People v. Victor, the said award is not dependent on the actual
imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended
the commission of the offense. The Court declared that the award of
₱75,000.00 shows "not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time but
also the expression of the displeasure of the court of the incidence of
heinous crimes against chastity."
The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is
the heinous character of the crime committed, which would have
warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether
the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code
provides that exemplary or corrective damages are imposed in addition
to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Exemplary damages are not recoverable as a matter of right. The
requirements of an award of exemplary damagees are: (1) they may be
imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and
only after the claimant’s right to them has been established; (2) they
cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending
upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the
claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a
wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.42 Since the
compensatory damages, such as the civil indemnity and moral
damages, are increased when qualified rape is committed, the
exemplary damages should likewise be increased in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence.43
In sum, the increased amount of ₱75,000.00 each as civil indemnity
and moral damages should be maintained. It is also proper and
appropriate that the award of exemplary damages be likewise
increased to the amount of ₱30,000.00 based on the latest
jurisprudence on the award of damages on qualified rape. Thus, the
CA correctly awarded ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity. However the
award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages is increased to
₱75,000.0044 and that of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages is likewise
increased to ₱30,000.00.45
Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the New Bilibid
Prison pending the outcome of his appeal before this Court, Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006
took effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA decision were
promulgated on January 17, 2003 and July 14, 2005, respectively. The
promulgation of the sentence of conviction of accused-appellant
handed down by the RTC was not suspended as he was about 25 years
of age at that time, in accordance with Article 192 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code 46 and
Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict
with the Law.47 Accused-appellant is now approximately 31 years of
age. He was previously detained at the Albay Provincial Jail at Legaspi
City and transferred to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City on
October 13, 2003.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentence. – Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence
at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age
of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for
which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise
benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the Act
to those who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time
of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below the age of 18
years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason,
the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower
court is still under review. Hence, it is necessary to examine which
provisions of R.A. No. 9344 shall apply to accused-appellant, who was
below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of
sentence of a child in conflict with the law, even if he/she is already 18
years of age or more at the time he/she is found guilty of the offense
charged. It reads:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is
under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with
the law under suspended sentence, without need of application:
Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied
even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or more at the time
of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juvenile in
Conflict with the Law.
The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature of
the offense committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D.
No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.48 The said P.D. and Supreme
Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would
not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she
has been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344,
the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that
when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. 49 Since
R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been
convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a
lesser offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply
the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law
who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the
automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law
can be gleaned from the Senate deliberations 50 on Senate Bill No. 1402
(Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the
pertinent portion of which is quoted below:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is
charged, accused with, or may have committed a serious offense, and
may have acted with discernment, then the child could be
recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC),
or by my proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go
through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and
restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary
consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the
child’s restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics
supplied)1avvphi1
Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension
of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the
law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said
suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age
of 21, thus:
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. – If the
court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon
the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child
in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the
condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in
conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of
judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of
age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether
to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution
of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified
period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years. (emphasis ours)
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment
of the RTC had been promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A.
No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of
sentence is now moot and academic.51 However, accused-appellant
shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No.
9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as
follows:
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps
and Other Training Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may,
after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination
with the DSWD.
The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not
affected by the appropriate disposition measures and shall be enforced
in accordance with law.52
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-
appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua;53 and (2) accused-appellant
is ordered to pay the victim the amount of ₱75,000.00 and ₱30,000.00
as moral damages and exemplary damages, respectively. The award of
civil indemnity in the amount of ₱75,000.00 is maintained. However,
the case shall be REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate
disposition in accordance with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183563               December 14, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HENRY ARPON y JUNTILLA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Assailed before Us is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated
February 8, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00560, which affirmed
with modification the Decision2 dated September 9, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City, Branch 7, in Criminal
Case Nos. 2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53, finding the accused-appellant
Henry Arpon y Juntilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of one (1)
count of statutory rape and seven (7) counts of rape against the private
complainant AAA.3
On December 29, 1999, the accused-appellant was charged 4 with eight
(8) counts of rape in separate informations, the accusatory portions of
which state:
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46
That sometime in the year 1995 in the municipality of [XXX],
Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA], the
offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, succeed in having carnal knowledge of the
said [AAA], who was then only eight (8) years old, without her
consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.5
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force
and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA],
without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.6
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-48
That sometime in the month July 1999 in the municipality of [XXX],
Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force
and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA],
without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.7
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-49
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force
and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA],
without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.8
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-50
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force
and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA],
without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.9
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-51
That sometime in the month of July, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force
and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA],
without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.10
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-52
That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force
and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA],
without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.11
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-47
That sometime in the month of August, 1999 in the municipality of
[XXX], Province of Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, who is the uncle of [AAA],
the twelve-year-old offended party, actuated by lust, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with the use of force
and violence succeed in having carnal knowledge of the said [AAA],
without her consent and against her will.
Contrary to law with the aggravating circumstance that the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree.12 (Emphases ours.)
During the arraignment of the accused-appellant on November 28,
2000, he entered a plea of not guilty. 13 On March 13, 2001, the pre-
trial conference of the cases was conducted and the parties stipulated
on the identity of the accused-appellant in all the cases, the minority of
the victim and the fact that the accused appellant is the uncle of the
victim.14
The pre-trial order containing the foregoing stipulations was signed by
the accused and his counsel. The cases were then heard on
consolidated trial.
The prosecution presented the lone testimony of AAA to prove the
charges against the accused-appellant. AAA testified that she was born
on November 1, 1987.15 In one afternoon when she was only eight
years old, she stated that the accused-appellant raped her inside their
house. She could not remember, though, the exact month and date of
the incident. The accused-appellant stripped off her shorts, panties and
shirt and went on top of her. He had his clothes on and only pulled
down his zipper. He then pulled out his organ, put it in her vagina and
did the pumping motion. AAA felt pain but she did not know if his
organ penetrated her vagina. When he pulled out his organ, she did not
see any blood. She did so only when she urinated.16
AAA also testified that the accused-appellant raped her again in July
1999 for five times on different nights. The accused-appellant was
then drinking alcohol with BBB, the stepfather of AAA, in the house
of AAA’s neighbor. He came to AAA’s house, took off her panty and
went on top of her. She could not see what he was wearing as it was
nighttime. He made her hold his penis then he left. When asked again
how the accused-appellant raped her for five nights in July of the said
year, AAA narrated that he pulled down her panty, went on top of her
and pumped. She felt pain as he put his penis into her vagina. Every
time she urinated, thereafter, she felt pain. AAA said that she
recognized the accused-appellant as her assailant since it was a
moonlit night and their window was only covered by cloth. He entered
through the kitchen as the door therein was detached.17
AAA further related that the accused-appellant raped her again twice
in August 1999 at nighttime. He kissed her and then he took off his
shirt, went on top of her and pumped. She felt pain in her vagina and
in her chest because he was heavy. She did not know if his penis
penetrated her vagina. She related that the accused-appellant was her
uncle as he was the brother of her mother. AAA said that she did not
tell anybody about the rapes because the accused-appellant threatened
to kill her mother if she did. She only filed a complaint when he
proceeded to also rape her younger sister, DDD.18
After the testimony of AAA, the prosecution formally offered its
documentary evidence, consisting of: (1) Exhibit A - the Medico-Legal
Report,19 which contained the results of the medical examination
conducted on AAA by Dr. Rommel Capungcol and Dr. Melissa Adel
Gagala on October 26, 1999; and (2) Exhibit B - the Social Case Study
Report20 pertaining to AAA’s case, which was issued by the Municipal
Social Welfare and Development Office of the Province of Leyte.
The Medico-Legal Report stated the following findings:
P. E. Findings: Surg. Findings:
- (-) Physical injuries.
OB- NOTES:
- Patient came in with history of rape since 8 year old for so many
times. last act was March 1999.
O: Pelvic Exam:
Ext. Genetalia – grossly normal.
Introitus: Old, healed incomplete laceration at 3 & 9 o’clock position
Speculum Exam: not done due to resistance.
Internal Exam:
Vaginal smear for presence of spermatozoa: = NEGATIVE21
Upon the other hand, the defense called the accused-appellant to the
witness stand to deny the informations filed against him and to refute
the testimony of AAA. He testified that when the first incident of rape
allegedly happened in 1995, he was only 13 years old as he was born
on February 23, 1982. In 1995, he worked in Sagkahan, Tacloban City
as a houseboy for a certain Gloria Salazar and he stayed there up to
1996. He stated that he was working in Tacloban City when the
alleged rapes happened in the municipality of XXX. When he would
go home from Tacloban, he would stay at the house of a certain Fred
Antoni. He did not go to the house of AAA as the latter’s parents were
his enemies. He said that he had a quarrel with AAA’s parents because
he did not work with them in the ricefields. He further recounted that
in July 1999, he was also living in Tacloban City and worked there as
a dishwasher at a restaurant. He worked there from 1998 up to
September 1999. The accused-appellant likewise stated that in August
1999, he was still working at the same restaurant in Tacloban City.
While working there, he did not go home to XXX as he was busy with
work. He denied that he would have drinking sprees with AAA’s
stepfather, BBB, because they were enemies.22
On cross-examination, the accused-appellant admitted that the mother
of AAA was his sister and they were close to each other. He said that
his parents were still alive in 1995 up to October 1999 and the latter
then resided at Calaasan, Alangalang, Leyte. He indicated that his
parents’ house was about two kilometers away from the house of
AAA. While he was working at the restaurant in Tacloban City, he
would visit his parents once every month, mainly on Sundays.23
The Judgment of the RTC
On September 9, 2002, the RTC of Tacloban City, Branch 7, rendered
a Decision convicting the accused-appellant as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, pursuant to Art. 266-A and
266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended, and further amended by
R.A. 8353 (Rape Law of 1997) and R.A. 7659 (Death Penalty Law)
the Court found accused HENRY ARPON, GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of ONE COUNT OF STATUTORY
RAPE and SEVEN COUNTS OF RAPE charged under the
informations and sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty
of DEATH, and to indemnify the victim, [AAA] the amount
of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos for each count of Rape and pay
moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos
and pay the cost.24 (Emphases in the original.)
The court a quo found more credible the testimony of AAA. The fact
that AAA was in tears when she testified convinced the trial court of
the truthfulness of her rape charges against the accused-appellant. If
there were inconsistencies in AAA’s testimony, the trial court deemed
the same understandable considering that AAA was pitted against a
learned opposing counsel. The delay in the reporting of the rape
incidents was not also an indication that the charges were fabricated.
Moreover, the trial court ruled that the findings of the medico-legal
officer confirmed that she was indeed raped. The accused-appellant’s
defense of alibi was likewise disregarded by the trial court, declaring
that it was not physically impossible for him to be present in XXX at
any time of the day after working hours while he was working in
Tacloban City. The trial court stated that the accused-appellant was
positively identified by AAA as the person who sexually abused her
and she held no grudge against him. The trial court imposed the
penalty of death as it found that AAA was less than 18 years old at the
time of the commission of the rape incidents and the accused-appellant
was her uncle, a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree.
The trial court also appreciated against the accused-appellant the
aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence and nighttime.
The accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration 25 of the RTC
Decision, asserting that the trial court failed to consider his minority as
a privileged mitigating circumstance. As stated in his direct
examination, the accused-appellant claimed that he was born on
February 23, 1982, such that he was only 13 and 17 years old when the
incidents of rape allegedly occurred in 1995 and 1999, respectively. In
a Resolution26 dated November 6, 2002, the trial court denied the
accused-appellant’s motion, holding that the latter failed to
substantiate with clear and convincing evidence his allegation of
minority.
The cases were elevated to the Court on automatic review and were
docketed as G.R. Nos. 165201-08.27 The parties then filed their
respective briefs.28 On February 7, 2006, we resolved29 to transfer the
cases to the Court of Appeals pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Mateo.30 The cases were docketed in the appellate court as CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 00560.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
On February 8, 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed
decision, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 9, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City in Criminal Case Nos.
2001-01-46 to 2001-01-53 is AFFIRMED with modification
awarding exemplary damages to [AAA] in the amount of
Twenty[-]Five Thousand (₱25,000.00) Pesos for each count of rape
and clarification that the separate award of Fifty Thousand
(₱50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages likewise pertains to each count
of rape. The death penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua in
accord with Rep. Act No. 9346.31
The Court of Appeals adjudged that the inconsistencies pointed out by
the accused-appellant in the testimony of AAA were not sufficient to
discredit her. The appellate court held that the exact age of AAA when
the incidents of rape occurred no longer mattered, as she was still a
minor at the time. More significant was her "straightforward,
categorical and candid testimony" that she was raped eight times by
the accused-appellant. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the
ruling of the RTC that AAA’s charges of rape conformed with the
physical evidence and the accused-appellant’s uncorroborated defense
of alibi could not stand against the positive identification made by
AAA.
As regards the attendant circumstances, the Court of Appeals ruled
that the relationship of the accused-appellant to AAA was both alleged
in the informations and admitted by the accused-appellant. The
appellate court, however, differed in appreciating against the accused-
appellant the qualifying circumstance of AAA’s minority. The lone
testimony of AAA on the said circumstance was held to be an
insufficient proof therefor. The aggravating circumstance of nighttime
was also ruled to be inapplicable as it was not shown that the same was
purposely sought by the accused-appellant or that it facilitated the
commission of the crimes of rape. In view of the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of relationship, the Court of Appeals awarded
exemplary damages in favor of AAA.
The accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal32 of the above decision
and the same was given due course by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution33 dated May 27, 2008.
On November 17, 2008, the Court resolved to accept the appeal and
required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they
so desire, within 30 days from notice. 34 Thereafter, in a Manifestation
and Motion35 filed on December 24, 2008, the plaintiff-appellee,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, prayed that it be excused
from filing a supplemental brief. On February 3, 2009, the accused-
appellant submitted a Supplemental Brief.36
The Issues
In the accused-appellant’s brief, the following issues were invoked:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE
THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT
AND CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT
TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH.37
The accused-appellant insists that it was error on the part of the RTC
to give weight to the incredible testimony of AAA. He alleges that
AAA could not state with consistency the exact date when she was
first supposedly raped, as well as her age at that time. The accused-
appellant also avers that AAA could not remember the dates of the
other incidents of rape charged, all of which were allegedly described
in a uniform manner. Contrary to the judgment of the Court of
Appeals, the accused-appellant posits that the above inconsistencies
cannot merely be discounted as insignificant. He further insists that the
qualifying circumstances of AAA’s minority and her relationship to
the accused-appellant were not duly proven by the prosecution. The
accused-appellant, thus, prays for a judgment of acquittal.
The Ruling of the Court
After a careful examination of the records of this case, the Court
resolves to deny the appeal, but with a modification of the penalties
and the amount of indemnities awarded.
To recall, the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the accused-
appellant guilty of one (1) count of statutory rape and seven (7) counts
of qualified rape.
Under the information in Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46, the first
incident of rape was alleged to have occurred in 1995 when AAA was
only eight years old. However, the accused-appellant points out that
the prosecution failed to substantiate the said fact as AAA’s testimony
thereon was too inconsistent and incredible to be worthy of any belief.
He explains that AAA initially claimed that she was raped for the first
time when she was eight years old. Nonetheless, during her testimony
regarding the incidents of rape that occurred in July 1999, she said that
the accused did the same thing that he did to her when she was only
seven years old. On her redirect examination, AAA then stated that she
was first raped in 1998 when she was eleven (11) years old.
Presently, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime
of rape by sexual intercourse as follows:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise
unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present.
In particular, "Article 266-A(1)(d) spells out the definition of the crime
of statutory rape, the elements of which are: (1) that the offender had
carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a woman is under
twelve (12) years of age or is demented."38
The above provision came into existence by virtue of Republic Act
No. 8353,39 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on
October 22, 1997.40 Prior to this date, the crime of rape was penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,41 which provides:
ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
In People v. Macafe,42 we explained the concept of statutory rape
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in this wise:
Rape under paragraph 3 of [Article 335] is termed statutory rape as it
departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law
punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below
twelve years old. Hence, force and intimidation are immaterial;
the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether
carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does
not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years;
the child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to
discern evil from good.43 (Emphasis ours.)
Manifestly, the elements of statutory rape in the above-mentioned
provisions of law are essentially the same. Thus, whether the first
incident of rape charged in this case did occur in 1995, i.e., before the
amendment of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, or in 1998, after
the effectivity of the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, the prosecution has the
burden to establish the fact of carnal knowledge and the age of AAA at
the time of the commission of the rape.
Contrary to the posturing of the accused-appellant, "the date of the
commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime of rape,
for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a
woman."44 "Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are
irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal."45
As regards the first incident of rape, the RTC credited with veracity
the substance of AAA’s testimony. On this matter, we reiterate our
ruling in People v. Condes46 that:
Time and again, the Court has held that when the decision hinges on
the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the trial
court's observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are
often accorded finality. The trial judge has the advantage of observing
the witness' deportment and manner of testifying. Her "furtive glance,
blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone,
calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath" are all useful
aids for an accurate determination of a witness' honesty and sincerity.
The trial judge, therefore, can better determine if witnesses are telling
the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies.
Unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be
respected for it had the opportunity to observe the conduct and
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and detect if they were
lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said
findings are sustained by the [Court of Appeals].47
In the instant case, we have thoroughly scrutinized the testimony of
AAA and we found no cogent reason to disturb the finding of the RTC
that the accused-appellant indeed committed the first incident of rape
charged. AAA positively identified the accused-appellant as the
perpetrator of the dastardly crimes. With tears in her eyes, she clearly
and straightforwardly narrated the said incident of rape as follows:
[PROSECUTOR EDGAR SABARRE]
Q: Do you recall of any unusual incident that happened when you were
still 8 years old?
[AAA]
A: There was but I cannot anymore remember the exact month and
date.
Q: Just tell what happened to you when you were still 8 years old?
A: I was raped by Tiyo Henry.
Q: How did he rape you?
A: He stripped me of my panty, shorts and shirts.
Q: Do you remember what place did he rape you?
A: Yes, sir in our house. Q: Was it in the daytime or night time?

Q: Who were the persons present then at that time? A: Night time.

A: My younger brother and I. Q: Was it in different nights or on the same night?

Q: About your mother and step father where were they? A: Different nights.

A: In the ricefield. Q: Who were present then at that time when he raped you five times?

PROS. SABARRE: A: My Kuya and other siblings.

May we make it of record that the witness is crying. Q: You have companions why were you raped?

COURT: A: Because they were sleeping.

Have it on record. Q: How did he rape you on that July night for five times, will you
please narrate to the court?
PROS. SABARRE:
A: Because they have been drinking, he came to our house, pulled out
Q: Do you still recall was it in the morning, in the afternoon or my panty and went on top of me.
evening?
Q: With whom was he drinking?
A: In the afternoon.
A: With my step father.
xxxx
Q: Where did they drink?
Q: After your clothes and [panty] were taken off by accused what did
he do to you next if any? A: In our neighbor.

A: He went on top of me.
Q: Was he still with his clothes on or already naked?
A: He has still clothes on, he did not take off his pants, he only pulled
down the zipper.
Q: When he took off your shorts and panty what was the accused
wearing at that time?
A: I do not know because I could not see since it was night time.
Q: When he was on top of [you] was he still wearing something?

Q: And when he pulled down the zipper and went on top of you what A: No, sir.
did he do next if any?
Q: What did he do with his penis?
A: He was pumping on me.
A: He made me hold it.
Q: Did he pull out his organ?
Q: Then after he made you hold it what did he do with it?
A: Yes, sir.
A: He left.
Q: And where did he place his organ?
xxxx
A: In my vagina.
ATTY. SABARRE:
Q: When he kept on pumping what did you feel?
Q: You said you were raped on that July evening for five nights how
A: Pain.48 did he rape you?

The above testimony of AAA was also corroborated by the Medico- A: (witness did not answer)
Legal Report of Dr. Capungcol and Dr. Gagala, who found "old,
healed, incomplete" hymenal lacerations on the private part of AAA. PROS. SABARRE:
"[W]hen the testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical
findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that there has been carnal
knowledge."49 Make it of record that the witness is crying again.

Anent the five incidents of rape that were alleged to have been Q: Why are you crying?
committed in July 1999, the Court disagrees with the ruling of the trial
court that all five counts were proven with moral certainty. The A: I am angry and hurt.
testimony of AAA on the said incidents is as follows:
PROS. SABARRE:
Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in July
1999? Your honor please may I be allowed to suspend the proceeding
considering that the witness is psychologically incapable of further
A: Five times. proceeding.
xxxx
Q: I have asked you how did the accused rape you will you please
narrate the whole incident to this honorable court?
A: The same that he did when I was 8 years old, he went on top of me.
Q: What was the same thing you are talking about?
A: He pulled down my panty and went on top of me and pump.
Q: When he pump what did you feel?
A: Pain.
COURT:
Why did you feel pain?
A: He placed his penis inside my vagina, everytime I urinate I feel
pain.
ATTY. SABARRE;
How did you recognize that it was Henry Arpon when it was night
time?
A: It was a moonlight night and our window was only covered by
cloth as cover.50
From the above testimony, AAA merely described a single incident of
rape. She made no reference whatsoever to the other four instances of
rape that were likewise supposedly committed in the month of July
1999.
The same is also true for the two (2) counts of rape allegedly
committed in August 1999. AAA narrated only one incident of rape in
this manner:
Q: How many times did [the accused-appellant] rape you in the month
of August 1999?
A: Two times.
Q: Was it during day time or night time?
A: Nighttime.
Q: How did he rape you again that August 1999?
A: He kissed me.
Q: After kissing you what did he do next?
A: He took off his shirts.
Q: After he took off his shirts what happened?
A: He went on top of me and pump.
Q: When he made a pumping motion on top of you what did you feel?
A: My vagina was painful and also my chest because he was heavy.
Q: Why did you feel pain in your vagina?
A: Because he was raping me.
Q: Did his penis penetrate your vagina?
A: I do not know.
Q: If this Henry Arpon is present now in court could you recognize
him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where is he?
A: That man (witness pointing a detention prisoner when asked his
name answered Henry Arpon).51
"It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a separate and
distinct crime that the law requires to be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. The prosecution's evidence must pass the exacting test of moral
certainty that the law demands to satisfy the burden of overcoming the
appellant's presumption of innocence."52 Thus, including the first
incident of rape, the testimony of AAA was only able to establish three
instances when the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her.
The allegation of the accused-appellant that the testimony of AAA
described the incidents of rape in a uniform manner does not convince
this Court. To our mind, AAA’s narration of the sexual abuses
committed by the accused-appellant contained an adequate recital of
the evidentiary facts constituting the crime of rape, i.e., that he placed
his organ in her private part.53 "Etched in our jurisprudence is the
doctrine that a victim of a savage crime cannot be expected to
mechanically retain and then give an accurate account of every lurid
detail of a frightening experience — a verity born[e] out of human
nature and experience."54
We uphold the ruling of the RTC that the accused-appellant’s defense
of alibi deserves scant consideration. "Alibi is an inherently weak
defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit
approbation, the accused must adduce clear and convincing evidence
that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime
was committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime when it was committed." 55 "[S]ince alibi
is a weak defense for being easily fabricated, it cannot prevail over and
is worthless in the face of the positive identification by a credible
witness that an accused perpetrated the crime."56
In the instant case, we quote with approval the findings of fact of the
trial court that:
The distance of [XXX] to Tacloban City is just a few kilometers and
can be negotiated by passenger bus in less than one (1) hour, hence, it
is not impossible for the accused to be present in [XXX] at any time of
the day after working hours while working in Tacloban. Besides, the
accused has his day off every Sunday, which according to him he
spent in [XXX], Leyte.
The accused was positively identified by the victim as the person who
sexually molested her beginning that afternoon of 1995, and
subsequently thereafter in the coming years up to August 1999. She
can not be mistaken on the identity of the accused, because the first
sexual molestation happened during the daytime, besides, she is
familiar with him being her uncle, the brother of her mother.57
Furthermore, the Court rejects the contention of the accused-appellant
that AAA may have been prompted to falsely testify against him
(accused-appellant) in view of the latter’s quarrel with AAA’s parents
when he refused to work with them in the rice fields.58 Aside from
being uncorroborated, we find the same specious and implausible.
"Where the charges against the appellant involve a heinous offense, a
minor disagreement, even if true, does not amount to a sufficient
justification for dragging a young girl's honor to a merciless public
scrutiny that a rape trial brings in its wake."591avvphi1
As to the accused-appellant’s objection that there was no proof of the
age of the victim, we affirm the trial court’s finding that the
prosecution sufficiently established the age of AAA when the
incidents of rape were committed. The testimony of AAA that she was
born on November 1, 1987,60 the voluntary stipulation of the accused,
with assistance of counsel, regarding the minority of the victim during
pre-trial and his testimony regarding his recollection of the age of the
victim,61 his own niece, all militate against accused-appellant’s theory.
In People v. Pruna,62 the Court established the guidelines in
appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance, as follows:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an
original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such
party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic
documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which
show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have
been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear
and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either
by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought
to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought
to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is
sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or
the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the
victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that
it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the
offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial
evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. (Emphases
ours.)
Notably, in its Decision, the trial court observed that at the time she
took the witness stand (when she was 14 years old), the victim, as to
her body and facial features, was indeed a minor.63
That the carnal knowledge in this case was committed through force,
threat or intimidation need no longer be belabored upon. "[I]n rape
committed by close kin, such as the victim’s father, step-father, uncle,
or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that
actual force or intimidation be employed. Moral influence or
ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation."64
Penalties
On the penalties imposable in the instant case, the former Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes the crime of rape
with reclusion perpetua. The sixth paragraph thereof also provides
that:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common law-spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphases ours.)
Similarly, the present Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
relevantly recites:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding
article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphases ours.)
The Court finds that the circumstances of minority and relationship
qualify the three (3) counts of rape committed by the accused-
appellant. "As a special qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape,
the concurrence of the victim’s minority and her relationship to the
accused must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable
doubt."65 In the instant case, the informations alleged that AAA was
less than eighteen (18) years of age when the incidents of rape
occurred and the accused-appellant is her uncle, a relative by
consanguinity within the third civil degree. The said circumstances
were also admitted by the accused-appellant during the pre-trial
conference of the case and again admitted by him during his
testimony.66
In People v. Pepito,67 the Court explained that "[t]he purpose of
entering into a stipulation or admission of facts is to expedite trial and
to relieve the parties and the court, as well, of the costs of proving
facts which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be
ascertained by reasonable inquiry. These admissions during the pre-
trial conference are worthy of credit. Being mandatory in nature, the
admissions made by appellant therein must be given weight."
Consequently, for the first incident of rape, regardless of whether the
same occurred in 1995 or in 1998, the imposition of the death penalty
is warranted. For the second and third counts of rape, the imposable
penalty is also death.
Nonetheless, a reduction of the above penalty is in order.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals failed to consider in favor of the
accused-appellant the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
Although this matter was not among the issues raised before the Court,
we still take cognizance of the same in accordance with the settled rule
that "[i]n a criminal case, an appeal throws open the entire case wide
open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though
unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment."68
Pertinently, the first paragraph of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9344,
otherwise known as the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,"
provides for the rule on how to determine the age of a child in conflict
with the law,69 viz:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. — The child in conflict with the law
shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the
rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she is proven to be
eighteen (18) years of age or older. The age of a child may be
determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or
any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age
may be based on information from the child himself/herself,
testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and
other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it
shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Furthermore, in Sierra v. People,70 we clarified that, in the past, the
Court deemed sufficient the testimonial evidence regarding the
minority and age of the accused provided the following conditions
concur, namely: "(1) the absence of any other satisfactory evidence
such as the birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or similar documents
that would prove the date of birth of the accused; (2) the presence of
testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and minority of
the accused at the time of the complained incident without any
objection on the part of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary
evidence showing that the accused's and/or his relatives' testimonies
are untrue."71
In the instant case, the accused-appellant testified that he was born on
February 23, 1982 and that he was only 13 years old when the first
incident of rape allegedly happened in 1995.72 Other than his
testimony, no other evidence was presented to prove the date of his
birth. However, the records of this case show neither any objection to
the said testimony on the part of the prosecution, nor any contrary
evidence to dispute the same. Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals
should have appreciated the accused-appellant’s minority in
ascertaining the appropriate penalty.
Although the acts of rape in this case were committed before Republic
Act No. 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, the said law is still
applicable given that Section 68 thereof expressly states:
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving
Sentences. — Persons who have been convicted and are serving
sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below
the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the
offense for which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall
likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. They shall
be entitled to appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and
their sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be
immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act or other
applicable law.
People v. Sarcia73 further stressed that "[w]ith more reason, the Act
should apply to [a] case wherein the conviction by the lower court is
still under review."
Thus, in the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 9344 is explicit in providing that:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen
(15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense
shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be
subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of the Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age
shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws. (Emphases ours.)
As held in Sierra, the above provision effectively modified the
minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility in paragraphs 2 and 3
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,74 "i.e., from ‘under nine years
of age’ and ‘above nine years of age and under fifteen’ (who acted
without discernment) - to ‘fifteen years old or under’ and ‘above
fifteen but below 18’ (who acted without discernment) in determining
exemption from criminal liability."75
Accordingly, for the first count of rape, which in the information in
Criminal Case No. 2000-01-46 was allegedly committed in 1995, the
testimony of the accused-appellant sufficiently established that he was
only 13 years old at that time. In view of the failure of the prosecution
to prove the exact date and year of the first incident of rape, i.e.,
whether the same occurred in 1995 or in 1998 as previously discussed,
any doubt therein "should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being
more beneficial to the latter."76 The Court, thus, exempts the accused-
appellant from criminal liability for the first count of rape pursuant to
the first paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344. The
accused-appellant, nevertheless, remains civilly liable therefor.
For the second and third counts of rape that were committed in the
year 1999, the accused-appellant was already 17 years old. We
likewise find that in the said instances, the accused-appellant acted
with discernment. In Madali v. People,77 the Court had the occasion to
reiterate that "[d]iscernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully
appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be
known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the
facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case." In this
case, the fact that the accused-appellant acted with discernment was
satisfactorily established by the testimony of AAA, which we had
already found to be credible. Verily, AAA testified that she at first did
not tell anybody about the sexual assault she suffered at the hands of
the accused-appellant because the latter told her that he would kill her
mother if she did so. That the accused-appellant had to threaten AAA
in an effort to conceal his dastardly acts only proved that he knew full
well that what he did was wrong and that he was aware of the
consequences thereof.
Accordant with the second paragraph of Article 68 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and in conformity with our ruling in Sarcia,
when the offender is a minor under eighteen (18) years of age, "the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but
always in the proper period. However, for purposes of determining the
proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with."
Thus, for the second and third counts of rape, the proper penalty
imposable upon the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua for each
count.
Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the accused-
appellant the circumstance of his minority, the latter would have been
entitled to a suspension of sentence for the second and third counts of
rape under Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, which reads:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. — Once the child who is
under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall
determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with
the law under suspended sentence, without need of application.
Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be supplied
even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the
time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various
circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on
Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.1awphi1
Be that as it may, the suspension of sentence may no longer be applied
in the instant case given that the accused-appellant is now about 29
years of age and Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344 puts a limit to
the application of a suspended sentence, namely, when the child
reaches a maximum age of 21. The said provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. — If
the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed
upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the
child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the
conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in
conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of
judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of
age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether
to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution
of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified
period or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years. (Emphasis ours.)
Nonetheless, the disposition set forth under Section 51 of Republic Act
No. 9344 is warranted in the instant case, to wit:
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps
and Other Training Facilities. — A child in conflict with the law may
after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the [Bureau of Corrections],
in coordination with the [Department of Social Welfare and
Development].
Additionally, the civil liability of the accused-appellant for the second
and third incidents of rape shall not be affected by the above
disposition and the same shall be enforced in accordance with law and
the pronouncements in the prevailing jurisprudence.
Civil Liability
The Court recently ruled in People v. Masagca, Jr.78 that "[c]ivil
indemnity is mandatory when rape is found to have been committed.
Based on prevailing jurisprudence, we affirm the award of ₱75,000.00
to the rape victim as civil indemnity for each count." We also
explained in Sarcia that "[t]he litmus test x x x in the determination of
the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime committed,
which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty,
regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced
to reclusion perpetua."79 The trial court’s award of civil indemnity of
₱50,000.00 for each count of rape is therefore increased to ₱75,000.00
for each of the three (3) counts of rape committed in the instant case.
Anent the award of moral damages, the same is justified "without need
of proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the
victim has suffered moral injuries [from the experience she
underwent]."80 We also increase the trial court’s award of ₱50,000.00
to ₱75,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape herein
established in keeping with the recent case law.81
Lastly, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ award of exemplary damages.
As held in People v. Llanas, Jr.,82 "[t]he award of exemplary damages
is also proper not only to deter outrageous conduct, but also in view of
the aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship
surrounding the commission of the offense, both of which were
alleged in the information and proved during the trial." The appellate
court’s award of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages is raised to
₱30,000.00 for each of the three (3) counts of rape in keeping with the
current jurisprudence on the matter.83
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the appeal is DENIED. The
Decision dated February 8, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 00560 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(1) For the first count of rape herein established, the accused-appellant
Henry Arpon y Juntilla is hereby EXEMPTED from criminal liability.
(2) For the second and third counts of rape, the accused-appellant is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of
QUALIFIED RAPE and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count.
(3) As to the civil liability, the accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay
AAA for each of the three (3) counts of rape ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the
legal rate of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision.
(4) The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for its
appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No.
9344.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172707               October 1, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
vs.
HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO, EDWIN
DUKILMAN Y SUBOH, TONY ABAO Y SULA, RAUL UDAL Y
KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN
MACALINBOL Y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS Y AMPIL,
NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN Y RAFON
A.K.A LARINA PERPENIAN AND JOHN DOES, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court for Automatic Review is the Decision1 dated 28 June
2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00863,
which affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109 dated 16 October 1998,
finding accused-appellants Halil Gambao y Esmail, Eddie Karim y
Uso, Edwin Dukilman y Suboh, Tony Abao y Sula, Raul Udal y
Kagui, Teng Mandao y Haron, Theng Dilangalen y Nanding, Jaman
Macalinbol y Katol, Monette Ronas y Ampil, Nora Evad y Mulok and
Thian Perpenian y Rafon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
kidnapping for ransom as defined and penalized under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7659.
The accused-appellants, along with an unidentified person, were
charged under the criminal information3 which reads:
Criminal Case No. 98-0928
For Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA 7659
That on August 12, 1998 at around 7:30 o’clock in the evening at No.
118 FB Harrison Pasay City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named-accused conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together,
did then and there by force and intimidation, and the use of high
powered firearms, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry
away and deprive Lucia Chan y Lee of her liberty against her will for
the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was
made as a condition for her release amounting to FOUR HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (₱400,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of
Lucia L. Chan in the said amount and such other amounts as may be
awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code.
The antecedent facts were culled from the records of the case:4
Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. She usually
expected fish deliveries, which were shipped by her suppliers from the
provinces. Sometime in the afternoon of 11 August 1998, two persons,
one of whom was identified as Theng Dilangalen (Dilangalen), went to
Chan’s residence at FB Harrison St., Pasay City to inquire about a
certain passport alleged to have been mistakenly placed inside a box of
fish to be delivered to her. Unable to locate said passport, the two left.
The next morning, Dilangalen, together with another companion
identified as Tony Abao (Abao), returned looking for Chan but were
told that she was out. When the two returned in the afternoon, Chan
informed them that the fish delivery had yet to arrive. Chan offered
instead to accompany them to the airport to retrieve the box of fish
allegedly containing the passport. Dilangalen and Abao declined and
told Chan that they would be back later that evening.5
Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains at
large, returned to Chan’s residence that evening. Chan’s houseboy
ushered them in and Chan met them by the stairs. 6 Thereat, the
unidentified companion of Dilangalen pointed his gun at Chan’s son,
Levy Chan (Levy), and the house companions.7 As the unidentified
man forcibly dragged Chan, her son Levy tried to stop the man by
grabbing his mother’s feet. Seeing this, Dilangalen pointed his gun at
Levy’s head forcing the latter to release his grip on Chan’s feet.8 Levy
thereafter proceeded to the Pasay Police Headquarters to report the
incident.9
Chan was forced to board a "Tamaraw FX" van.10 After travelling for
about two hours, the group stopped at a certain house. Accused-
appellant Edwin Dukilman (Dukilman) warned Chan not to shout as he
had his gun pointed at her mouth. Chan was ordered to go with two
women,11 later identified in court by Chan as appellants Monette
Ronas (Ronas) and Nora Evad (Evad). 12 Chan was brought inside a
house and was made to lie down on a bed, guarded by Ronas, Evad,
Dukilman and Jaman Macalinbol (Macalinbol).13 Ronas and Evad
threatened Chan that she would be killed unless she paid 20 Million
Pesos.14
On 13 August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and was asked to
board the "Tamaraw FX" van. After travelling for about ten minutes,
the van stopped and the group alighted. Chan was brought to a room
on the second floor of the house. Inside the room were three persons
whom Chan identified in court as Macalinbol, Raul Udal (Udal) and
Halil Gambao (Gambao).15 Another woman, later identified as Thian
Perpenian (Perpenian), arrived.16 At about 9:00 o’clock in the evening,
a man who was later identified as Teng Mandao (Mandao), entered the
room with a handgun and asked Chan "Bakit kayo nagsumbong sa
pulis?"17 Another man, whom Chan identified in court as Eddie Karim
(Karim), ordered Mandao out of the room. Karim informed Chan that
he was sent by their boss to ask her how much money she has. 18 Chan
was instructed to talk to her son through a cell phone and she gave
instructions to her son to get the ₱75, 000.00 she kept in her
cabinet.19 The group then talked to Chan’s son and negotiated the
ransom amount in exchange for his mother’s release. It was agreed
upon that Levy was to deliver ₱400,000.00 at the "Chowking"
Restaurant at Buendia Avenue.20
Inspectors Narciso Ouano, Jr. (Inspector Ouano) and Cesar Mancao
(Inspector Mancao), who were assigned at the Pasay City area to
conduct the investigation regarding the kidnapping, were informed that
the abductors called and demanded for ransom in exchange for Chan’s
release.21 During their surveillance the following day, Inspectors
Ouano and Mancao observed a Red Transport taxicab entering the
route which led to the victim’s residence. The inspectors observed that
the occupants of the taxicab kept on looking at the second floor of the
house. The inspectors and their team tailed the taxicab until Pansol,
Calamba, Laguna, where it entered the Elizabeth Resort and stopped in
front of Cottage 1. Convinced that the woman the team saw in the
cottage was the victim, they sought clearance from Philippine Anti
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to conduct a rescue
operation.22
On 14 August 1998, P/Insp. Vicente Arnado (Inspector Arnado)
received information that the abductors acceded to a ₱400,000.00
ransom money to be delivered at "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia
Avenue at around 2:00 am. Upon learning of the information, the team
immediately and strategically positioned themselves around the
vicinity of the restaurant. At about 2:00 am, a light blue "Tamaraw
FX" van with 4 people on board arrived. The four took the ransom
money and headed towards the South Luzon Expressway. The
surveillance team successfully intercepted the van and arrested the 4
men, later identified in court as Karim, Abao, Gambao and Dukilman.
The team was also able to recover the ₱400,000.00 ransom.23
At about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of the same day, the police team
assaulted Cottage No. 1, resulting in the safe rescue of Chan and the
apprehension of seven of her abductors, later identified in court as
Dilangalen, Udal, Macalinbol, Mandao, Perpenian, Evad and Ronas.24
During the 7 October 1998 hearing, after the victim and her son
testified, Karim manifested his desire to change his earlier plea of "not
guilty" to "guilty." The presiding judge then explained the
consequences of a change of plea, stating: "It would mean the moment
you withdraw your previous pleas of not guilty and enter a plea of
guilty, the court of course, after receiving evidence, as in fact it has
received the testimonies of [the] two witnesses, will [outrightly]
sentence you to the penalty provided by law after the prosecution shall
have finished the presentation of its evidence. Now that I have
explained to you the consequences of your entering a plea of guilty,
are you still desirous of entering a plea of ‘guilty’?" Eddie Karim
answered, "Yes."25 On hearing this clarification, the other appellants
likewise manifested, through their counsel who had earlier conferred
with them and explained to each of them the consequences of a change
of plea, their desire to change the pleas they entered. The trial court
separately asked each of the appellants namely: Gambao, Abao, Udal,
Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad if they understood
the consequence of changing their pleas. All of them answered in the
affirmative.26 Similarly, Dukilman manifested his desire to change his
plea and assured the trial court that he understood the consequences of
such change of plea.27 Thereupon, the trial court ordered their re-
arraignment. After they pleaded guilty,28 the trial court directed the
prosecution to present evidence, which it did.
On 16 October 1998, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Gambao,
Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol,
Ronas, Evad and Perpenian of Kidnapping for Ransom. Hence, they
appealed to the CA.
In a Decision dated 28 June 2005, the appellate court affirmed with
modifications the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of
the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-
appellants HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO,
EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL
UDAL y KAGUI, TENG MANDAO y HARON, THENG
DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL,
MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom defined and
penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
RA 7659 and imposing upon each of them the supreme penalty of
death is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that each of them is
ordered to pay jointly and severally the victim in the amount of
₱50,000.00 by way of moral damages.
It appearing that accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON
was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, she
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.29
Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative
Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the appellate court certified the case to this
Court and accordingly ordered the elevation of the records.
In a Resolution30 dated 20 June 2006, we required the parties to file
their respective supplemental briefs. The issues raised by the accused-
appellants in their respective briefs, supplemental briefs and
manifestations will be discussed collectively.
Insufficiency of Evidence
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas, Evad would have this Court
believe that the witness, Chan, was not able to positively identify them
because of her failing eyesight due to old age.
This argument is bereft of merit. We note that both the trial court and
the CA found Chan’s testimony credible and straightforward. During
her testimony, she positively identified the accused-appellants. If she
had not met them before, she could not have positively identified them
in open court. In fact, the participation of these accused-appellants was
further established through the testimonies of the other prosecution
witnesses.
Time and again, this Court has maintained that the question of
credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine. For
this reason, its observations and conclusions are accorded great respect
on appeal. They are conclusive and binding unless shown to be tainted
with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered.31 In
People v. Tañedo,32 this Court had occasion to reiterate the ruling that
findings of fact of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of
witnesses command great respect since it had the opportunity to
observe their demeanor while they testified in court.33 It can be
observed that the briefs submitted by the accused-appellants are
replete with generalities and wanting in relevant particulars. It is for
this reason that we are giving full credence to the findings of the trial
court regarding the credibility of witness Chan.
Perpenian likewise argued that the evidence for her conviction is
insufficient. We also find her argument bereft of merit.
The testimony of Inspector Ouano, establishing Perpenian as one of
the seven people apprehended when they conducted the rescue
operation at around 5:00 o’clock in the morning of 14 August
1998,34 and the positive identification of Perpenian by Chan
constituted adequate evidence working against her defense of denial.
Further, it should be noted that the only defense the accused-appellants
proffered was denial. It is established jurisprudence that denial cannot
prevail over the witnesses’ positive identification of the accused-
appellants, more so where the defense did not present convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for them to have been
present at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime.35
The foregoing considered, the positive identification by Chan, the
relevant testimonies of witnesses and the absence of evidence other
than mere denial proffered by the defense lead this Court to give due
weight to the findings of the lower courts.
Improvident Plea
As provided for by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by RA 7659, the penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death. A review
of the records36 shows that on 7 October 1998, the accused-appellants
withdrew their plea of "not guilty" and were re-arraigned. They
subsequently entered pleas of "guilty" to the crime of kidnapping for
ransom, a capital offense. This Court, in People v. Oden, 37 laid down
the duties of the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense. The trial court is mandated:
(1)
to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt,
(2)
to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability, and
(3)
to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his
behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.38
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more
care where the possible punishment is in its severest form, namely
death, for the reason that the execution of such a sentence is
irreversible. The primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of
guilt on the part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since
he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeiting his
life and liberty without having fully understood the meaning,
significance and consequence of his plea.39 Moreover, the requirement
of taking further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in
determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.40
Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines whether the
plea of guilt was based on a free and informed judgement. The inquiry
must focus on the voluntariness of the plea and the full comprehension
of the consequences of the plea. This Court finds no cogent reason for
deviating from the guidelines provided by jurisprudence41 and thus,
adopts the same:
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge
must conduct a "searching inquiry," we have held that the following
guidelines should be observed:
Ascertain from the accused himself
(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the
custodial and preliminary investigations; and
(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the
accused has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by
actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or
simply because of the judge’s intimidating robes.
Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had
conferred with, and completely explained to, the accused the meaning
and consequences of a plea of guilty.
Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as
his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which
may serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and
informed plea of guilty.
Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the
penalty under the law and the certainty that he will serve such
sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of
a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises of the
authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or
express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused
does not labor under these mistaken impressions because a plea of
guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of the crime
proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that
increase punishment.
Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and
fully explain to him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his
indictment. Failure of the court to do so would constitute a violation of
his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.
All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and
understood by the latter.
The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading
guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to narrate the
tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.
It is evident from the records42 that the aforesaid rules have not been
fully complied with. The questions propounded by the trial court judge
failed to ensure that accused-appellants fully understood the
consequences of their plea. In fact, it is readily apparent from the
records43 that Karim had the mistaken assumption that his plea of guilt
would mitigate the imposable penalty and that both the judge and his
counsel failed to explain to him that such plea of guilt will not mitigate
the penalty pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Karim
was not warned by the trial court judge that in cases where the penalty
is single and indivisible, like death, the penalty is not affected by either
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The trial court judge’s
seemingly annoyed statement that a conditional plea is not allowed, as
provided below, is inadequate:
Atty. Ferrer:
Your Honor please, may we be allowed to say something before the
trial. For accused Eddie Karim we manifest and petition this court that
he be allowed to be re-arraigned Your Honor please, considering that
he will plead guilty as charged but the imposable penalty is lowered,
Your Honor.
Court:
You cannot make a conditional plea of guilty, that is what the law
says. You plead guilty, no condition attached. Conditional plea is not
allowed.
Atty. Ferrer:
Considering, Your Honor, accused Eddie Karim is already repenting
Court:
Nevertheless. Read the law. If you entered a plea of guilty there should
be no condition attached. We cannot make that condition and dictate to
the court the penalty. 44
Although the pleas rendered, save for Perpenian’s, were improvidently
made, this Court will still not set aside the condemnatory judgment.
Despite the trial court judge’s shortcomings, we still agree with his
ruling on accused-appellants’ culpability.
As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt
are set aside and the cases are remanded for further proceedings if such
plea is the sole basis of judgement. If the trial court, however, relied on
sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, as it did in this
case, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated
not merely on the guilty plea but on evidence proving the commission
of the offense charged.45 The manner by which the plea of guilty is
made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance where the
conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the
commission of the crime by the accused.46
Contrary to accused-appellants’ assertions, they were convicted by the
trial court, not on the basis of their plea of guilty, but on the strength of
the evidence adduced by the prosecution, which was properly
appreciated by the trial court.47 The prosecution was able to prove the
guilt of the accused-appellants and their degrees of culpability beyond
reasonable doubt.
Degree of Culpability
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas and Evad argue in their
respective briefs that conspiracy, insofar as they were concerned, was
not convincingly established. Dukilman hinges his argument on the
fact that he was not one of those arrested during the rescue operation
based on the testimony of Inspector Ouano.48 On the other hand, Ronas
and Evad base their argument on the fact that they had no participation
whatsoever in the negotiation for the ransom money.
We hold otherwise. Although Dukilman was not one of those
apprehended at the cottage during the rescue operation, the testimony
of Police Inspector Arnado sufficiently established that he was one of
the four people apprehended when the police intercepted the
"Tamaraw FX" at the Nichols Tollgate.49 Likewise, the testimony of
Police Inspector Ouano sufficiently established that Ronas and Evad
were two of those who were arrested during the rescue
operation.50 This Court has held before that to be a conspirator, one
need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even
take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be
performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy.51 Once
conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them
becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are
principals.52 Moreover, Chan positively identified the accused-
appellants and placed all of them at the crime scenes.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and
decide to commit it. It has been a long standing opinion of this Court
that proof of the conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence, as the
same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before,
during or after the commission of the crime indicating a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission of the
offense.53 The testimonies, when taken together, reveal the common
purpose of the accused-appellants and how they were all united in its
execution from beginning to end. There were testimonies proving that
(1) before the incident, two of the accused-appellants kept coming
back to the victim’s house; (2) during the kidnapping, accused-
appellants changed shifts in guarding the victim; and (3) the accused
appellants were those present when the ransom money was recovered
and when the rescue operation was conducted.
Seeing that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao,
Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad was
established beyond reasonable doubt based on the proffered evidence
of the prosecution, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
In Perpenian’s Supplemental Brief,54 she directs this Court’s attention
to the manifestation made by the prosecution regarding their
disinterest in prosecuting, insofar as she was concerned. 55 However,
pursuant to the ruling of this Court in Crespo v. Judge Mogul,56 once
the information is filed, any disposition of the case or dismissal or
acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive
jurisdiction, competence and discretion of the courts; more so in this
case, where no Motion to Dismiss was filed by the prosecution.
The trial court took note of the fact that Perpenian gave inconsistent
answers and lied several times under oath during the trial. 57 Perpenian
lied about substantial details such as her real name, age, address and
the fact that she saw Chan at the Elizabeth Resort. When asked why
she lied several times, Perpenian claimed she was scared to be
included or identified with the other accused-appellants. The lying and
the fear of being identified with people whom she knew had done
wrong are indicative of discernment. She knew, therefore, that there
was an ongoing crime being committed at the resort while she was
there. It is apparent that she was fully aware of the consequences of the
unlawful act.
As reflected in the records, 58 the prosecution was not able to proffer
sufficient evidence to hold her responsible as a principal. Seeing that
the only evidence the prosecution had was the testimony59 of Chan to
the effect that on 13 August 1998 Perpenian entered the room where
the victim was detained and conversed with Evad and Ronas regarding
stories unrelated to the kidnapping, this Court opines that Perpenian
should not be held liable as a co-principal, but rather only as an
accomplice to the crime.
Jurisprudence60 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance
with Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, in order that a person may
be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that there be community of
design; that is knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he
cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the
intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the
crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between
the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person
charged as accomplice.
The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to exonerate her
criminal liability.1âwphi1 Assuming arguendo that she just came to
the resort thinking it was a swimming party, it was inevitable that she
acquired knowledge of the criminal design of the principals when she
saw Chan being guarded in the room. A rational person would have
suspected something was wrong and would have reported such
incident to the police. Perpenian, however, chose to keep quiet; and to
add to that, she even spent the night at the cottage. It has been held
before that being present and giving moral support when a crime is
being committed will make a person responsible as an accomplice in
the crime committed.61 It should be noted that the accused-appellant’s
presence and company were not indispensable and essential to the
perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom; hence, she is only liable as
an accomplice.62 Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in People
v. Clemente, et al.,63 where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the
participation of the offender will be considered as that of an
accomplice rather than that of a principal.
Having admitted their involvement in the crime of kidnapping for
ransom and considering the evidence presented by the prosecution,
linking accused-appellants’ participation in the crime, no doubt can be
entertained as to their guilt. The CA convicted the accused-appellants
of kidnapping for ransom and imposed upon them the supreme penalty
of death, applying the provisions of Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code. Likewise, this Court finds accused-appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principals to the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
However, pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,64 we modify the penalty imposed
by the trial court and reduce the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua, without
eligibility for parole.
Modification should also be made as to the criminal liability of
Perpenian. Pursuant to the passing of R.A. No. 9344, 65 a determination
of whether she acted with or without discernment is necessary.
Considering that Perpenian acted with discernment when she was 17
years old at the time of the commission of the offense, her minority
should be appreciated not as an exempting circumstance, but as a
privileged mitigating circumstance pursuant to Article 68 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344,66 the suspension of sentence of a
child in conflict with the law shall still be applied even if he/she is
already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer
benefit from the aforesaid provision, because under Article 40 of R.A.
No. 9344,67 the suspension of sentence can be availed of only until the
child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one
(21) years. This leaves the Court with no choice but to pronounce
judgement. Perpenian is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an
accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Since this Court
has ruled that death as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code
shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties
pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,68 the penalty imposed by law on
accomplices in the commission of consummated kidnapping for
ransom is Reclusion Temporal, the penalty one degree lower than what
the principals would bear (Reclusion Perpetua).69 Applying Article 68
of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should then be
adjusted to the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law for
accomplices. This Court, therefore, holds that as to Perpenian, the
penalty of Prision Mayor, the penalty lower than that prescribed by
law (Reclusion Temporal), should be imposed. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty, which is one
degree lower than the maximum imposable penalty, shall be within the
range of Prision Correccional; and the maximum penalty shall be
within the minimum period of Prision Mayor, absent any aggravating
circumstance and there being one mitigating circumstance. Hence, the
Court imposes the indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one
(1) day of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one
(1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.
As regards Perpenian’s possible confinement in an agricultural camp
or other training facility in accordance with Section 51 of R.A. 9344,
this Court held in People v. Jacinto70 that the age of the child in
conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment is
not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense
when he/she was still of tender age. This Court, however, finds such
arrangement no longer necessary in view of the fact that Perpenian’s
actual served term has already exceeded the imposable penalty for her
offense. For such reason, she may be immediately released from
detention.
We note that in the Order71 dated 9 October 1998, the trial court
admitted the documentary evidence offered by the counsel for the
defense proving that the real name of Thian Perpenian is Larina
Perpenian.
In view of the death of Mandao during the pendency of this case, he is
relieved of all personal and pecuniary penalties attendant to the crime,
his death72 having occurred before rendition of final judgement.73
There is prevailing jurisprudence,74 on civil liabilities arising from the
commission of kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from
the victim or any other person under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code. The persons convicted were held liable for ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
We take this opportunity to increase the amounts of indemnity and
damages, where, as in this case, the penalty for the crime committed is
death which, however, cannot be imposed because of the provisions of
R.A. No. 9346:75
1. ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. ₱100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have
suffered and thus needs no proof; and
3. ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public
good.
These amounts shall be the minimum indemnity and damages where
death is the penalty warranted by the facts but is not imposable under
present law.
The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros 76 is instructive on
the apportionment of civil liabilities among all the accused-appellants.
The entire amount of the civil liabilities should be apportioned among
all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime according to
the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual
participation. Hence, each principal accused-appellant should shoulder
a greater share in the total amount of indemnity and damages than
Perpenian who was adjudged as only an accomplice.
Taking into account the difference in the degrees of their participation,
all of them shall be liable for the total amount of ₱300,000.00 divided
among the principals who shall be liable for ₱288,000.00 (or
₱32,000.00 each) and Perpenian who shall be liable for ₱12,000.00.
This is broken down into ₱10,666.67 civil indemnity, ₱10,666.67
moral damages and ₱10,666.67 exemplary damages for each principal;
and ₱4,000.00 civil indemnity, ₱4,000.00 moral damages and
₱4,000.00 exemplary damages for the lone accomplice.
WHEREFORE, the 28 June 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR–H.C. No. 00863 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO y
ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH,
TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, THENG
DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL,
MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK are
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole. Accused-appellant
THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as
maximum. Accused-appellants are ordered to indemnify the victim in
the amounts of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages apportioned in the
following manner: the principals to the crime shall jointly and
severally pay the victim the total amount of ₱288,000.00 while the
accomplice shall pay the victim ₱12,000.00, subject to Article 110 of
the Revised Penal Code on several and subsidiary liability.
The Court orders the Correctional Institute for Women to immediately
release THIAN PERPENIAN A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN due to
her having fully served the penalty imposed on her, unless her further
detention is warranted for any other lawful causes.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation
to the Director of the Correctional Institute for Women by personal
service. The Director of the Correctional Institute for Women shall
submit to this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of a copy of the
decision, the action he has taken thereon.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 200157
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
JOERY DELIOLA Y BARRIDO, A.K.A. "JAKE DELIOLA",
Accused-Appellant
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
On appeal is the 29 June 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC NO. 00435, affirming the 22 December 2005
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Silay City, Negros
Occidental, in Criminal Case Nos. 5214-69 and 5215-69, which found
accused-appellant Joery Deliola y Barrido guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of Statutory Rape, and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in both cases.
Accused-appellant was charged with two (2) counts of Statutory Rape.
The accusatory portions of the Informations narrate:
Criminal Case No. 5214-69
That sometime in the month of June, 2002, in the Municipality of
Manapla, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, 15
years old, with the use of a bladed weapon, through force, threat and
intimidation, with the attendant qualifying aggravating circumstances
of relationship and minority, the accused being the uncle of herein
victim who was less than eighteen (18) years of age, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
one [MMM],3 a minor, 11 years old, against her will, to the damage
and prejudice.4
Criminal Case No. 5215-69
That on or about the 1st day of July, 2002, in the Municipality of
Manapla, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, 15
years old, with the use of a bladed weapon, through force, threat and
intimidation, with the attendant qualifying aggravating circumstances
of relationship and minority, the accused being the uncle of herein
victim who was less than eighteen (18) years of age, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
one [MMM], a minor, 11 years old, against her will, to the damage and
prejudice. 5
On arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of NOT
GUILTY. 6 At the joint pre-trial 7 of the cases, the following
stipulation of facts were admitted: (1) that the court has jurisdiction
over the case (2) the identity of accused-appellant as the accused in the
two criminal cases; (3) that accusedappellant is the uncle of MMM; (4)
that MMM, was 11 years old when the incidents giving rise to the
present criminal actions were allegedly committed; (5) that at the time
of the incidents on June and 1 July 2002, accused-appellant and
Ml\1M were neighbors; (6) that MMM was then a grade school pupil;
and (7) that accused-appellant was not attending school at the time of
the submitted incidents giving rise to these criminal actions. Trial on
the merits ensued afterwards.
The Facts
The facts culled from the records and as summarized by the Court of
Appeals, are as follows:
When the crime was committed, MMM was 11 years old, 8 while the
accused-appellant, MMM's uncle,9 was 15 years old.  The prosecution
submits that sometime in the first week of June 2002, at about three
o'clock in the afternoon, MMM went to the nipa plantation to defecate
but before she was able to do so, accused-appellant, armed with a
knife, suddenly appeared. He approached MMM, poked a knife at her
neck, ordered her to bend over, and took off her shorts and underwear.
Fearing for her life, MMM obeyed the orders of accused-appellant.
MMM tried to resist but accused-appellant was still able to force his
penis inside MMM' s vagina. MMM felt pain and cried. After
satisfying his lust, accused-appellant put on his briefs and shorts then
left. When she got home, MMM immediately took a bath and noticed
bloodstain on her underwear. Afraid of accusedappellant's threats of
killing her, MMM kept mum and did not disclose to anyone the
tragedy that happened to her that day. 11
On or about the 1st day of July 2002, MMM was at the nipa plantation
again when accused-appellant suddenly arrived. He poked MMM's
back with a knife and threatened to stab her unless she followed
accusedappellant' s orders. MMM was fearful and was left with no
choice but to submit to accused-appellant's commands. She was
directed to bend over and to lower down her shorts and underwear.
While MMM was bending over and half naked, accused-appellant held
the victim's waist and inserted his penis into MMM's private part.
MMM could not do anything but cry. Before leaving, he again
threatened to kill MMM if she would reveal what happened between
them. 12
MMM still remained silent about her ordeal. However, about two.
weeks after the second rape, MMM' s grandmother noticed that there
was something unusual in the way MMM was walking. This prompted
her to confront MMM. 13 Upon learning of what happened to MMM,
the victim's aunt, brought the former to the Municipal Health Office of
Manapla, Negros Occidental for examination, 14 and thereafter to the
police authorities, before whom the victim executed her sworn
statement. 15
Dr. Edbert Jayme (Dr. Jayme), the Municipal Health Officer who
conducted a physical and internal examination upon MMM, testified
as an expert witness for the prosecution. Dr. Jayme's internal findings
showed that the victim had positive hyperemia of the vulva or
congestion, redness, and swelling around the area, which may have
been caused by a blunt object such as the finger of the human being or
an erect penis. The victim was also found to have a positive
incomplete hymenal laceration at 3:00 and 7:00 positions, which was
similarly caused by a blunt object such as the finger of the human
being or an erect penis. 16 According to Dr. Jayme, the lacerations may
have been inflicted within two weeks prior to the examination since
the lacerations were fresh. 17 Dr. Jayme also found that the victim's
vagina could admit two (2) fingers with ease, which is unusual for an
11-year old. 18 A Medical Certificate 19 dated 12 July 2002 was issued
by the Municipal Health Center of Manapla.
As lone witness for the defense, accused-appellant denied raping the
victim and claimed that he was fishing with his grandfather during the
times MMM was raped. 20 He testified that he is MMM's uncle and
that he was only fifteen years old when the alleged crime occurred.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On 22 December 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision finding accused-
appellant guilty of two counts of Statutory Rape. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal Cases Nos.
5214-69 and 5215-69, this Court finds accused, JOERY DELIOLA Y
BARRIDO, AK.A. "JAKE DELIOLA", Guilty of the crimes of Rape,
as defined in A1iicle 266-A in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph 5,
subparagraph 1, of Republic Act No. 8353, as his guilts had been
established by the prosecution beyond any reasonable doubt.
Taking into consideration the privilege mitigating circumstance of
minority, this Court, in Criminal Case No. 5214-69, sentences accused,
Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, the same to be served by him at the National
Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City, Province of Rizal, Philippines.
Accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, is, further,
ordered by this Court to pay minor, [MMM], the sum of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as Moral Damages, and the sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), all in Philippine Currency,
as Exemplary Damages.
In Criminal Case No. 5215-69, this Court likewise sentences accused,
Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, the same to be served by him at the National
Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City, Province of Rizal, Philippines.
Accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, is, likewise,
ordered by this Court to pay minor, [MMM], the sum of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as Moral Damages, and the sum of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), all in Philippine Currency,
as Exemplary Damages.
Accused, Joery Deliola y Barrido, a.k.a. Jake Deliola, is remanded to
the custody of the Jail Warden of the Provincial Jail of Negros
Occidental, until he is finally committed to the National Penitentiary at
Muntinlupa City, Rizal.
In the service of the sentences imposed on him by this Court, accused
named shall be given full credit for the entire period of his detention
pending trial. 21
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision dated 29 June 2011,
affirmed the judgment of conviction of the RTC. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision insofar as the finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt of accused-appellant Joery B. Deliola of the
two crimes of rape in Criminal Cases No. 5214-69 and 5215-69 is
AFFIRMED. However, as accused-appellant Joery Deliola y Barrido
is a child in conflict with the law, the pronouncement of his sentence is
hereby SUSPENDED and the case is REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court,6th Judicial Region, Branch 69, Silay City, Negros
Occidental, for appropriate disposition in accordance with Section 38
of Republic Act No. 9344. Accused-appellant is CONDEMNED to
pay the victim MMM: 1) In Criminal Case No. 5214-69, the amounts
of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 for moral damages, and
₱30,000.00 for exemplary damages; and 2) In Criminal Case No.
5215-69, the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000 for
moral damages and P30,000.00 for exemplary damages. 22
Accused-appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal. In a
Resolution23 dated 27 February 2012, we required the parties to submit
their respective supplemental briefs. However, both parties
manifested24 that they are dispensing with the filing of supplemental
briefs and, instead, adopting their respective briefs as supplemental
briefs in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the
trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. His defenses of denial
and alibi are bereft of merit.
Statutory Rape
Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Cod, as amended by
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353.25 define and punish Statutory Rape as
follows:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed.- Rape is committed-
1) by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman x x x:
xxxx
d) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present.
Art. 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding
article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim;
xxxx
Statutory rape is committed when the prosecution proves that: (l) the
offended party is under 12 years of age and (2) the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim, regardless of whether there was force, threat
or intimidation; whether the offended party was deprived of reason or
consciousness; or whether it was done through fraudulent machination
or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is
proven and that there was sexual intercourse.26
The two elements were proven in the present case. The age of MMM
was uncontested. In her Birth Certificate,27 presented and admitted in
open court, 28 it was indicated that she was born on 5 March 1991 and,
thus, only eleven years old when the crime was committed. The only
controversy left qefore us is whether or not accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of the victim.
Credibility of Witness
Accused-appellant tried to dispute MMM' s credibility by pointing out
several inconsistencies in her testimony. He argued that the victim
testified that on the alleged second incident of rape, on 1 July 2002,
she felt no pain and her vagina did not bleed. Accused-appellant
maintains that such statement is inconsistent with MMM's
grandmother's claim that MMM was walking with great difficulty and
pain. Accused-appellant likewise argues that given the tender age of
the victim, she could have felt pain, if not suffered bleeding, even on
the second incident of rape.
We disagree. It is carnal knowledge, not pain nor bleeding, which is
essential to consummate rape. 29 It is also possible for physiological
manifestations of rape, such as pain, to appear only after the incident.
More importantly, the testimony of MMM's grandmother was just an
observation on the victim's manner of walking. It is baseless and
unreasonable to put the victim's and the grandmother's testimonies side
by side and claim them to be inconsistent. Moreover, as consistently
held by this Court, discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimony
of a witness referring to minor details, and not in actuality touching
upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair her credibility. If at
all, they serve as proof that the witness is not coached or rehearsed. 30
Accused-appellant also points out that Dr. Jayme's findings are not
conclusive and that the non-intact hymen of the victim could be
congenita This argument is bereft of merit. The prime consideration in
the prosecution of rape is the victim's testimony, not necessarily the
medical findings. Assuming arguendo that the non-intact hymen of the
victim is congenital, this Court has consistently held that the absence
of laceration in the hymen does not negate rape. 31 Apart from the
findings of Dr. Jayme, MMM was steadfast in testifying that accused-
appellant raped her twice. When a rape victim's testimony is
straightforward and consistent despite grueling examination, it
deserves full faith and confidence. 32 The victim's testimony alone, if
credible, is sufficient to convict.33
Accused-appellant likewise argues that the victim's claim that she was
penetrated from behind is contrary to human experience. We are not
persuaded.1âwphi1 As correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, the
animal in man may come out when he commits rape such that it is not
unlikely that in the process of his immersion and transformation into
another character, he would prefer to mate in the way lower creatures
do. 34
Accused-appellant further questions the fact that the v1ctnn did not
attempt to escape from her captor or even shout or call for help, and
that she did not report the alleged rape to anyone after its occurrence.
However, as held in the case of People v. Rosales: 35
At any rate, it is an oft-repeated principle that not every witness to or
victim of a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably
to the usual expectations of everyone. People may react differently to
the same situation. One person's spontaneous, or unthinking or even
instinctive, response to a horrible and repulsive stimulus may be
aggression, while another's may be cold indifference. Yet, it can never
be successfully argued that the latter are any less sexual victims than
the former. 36
Given the nature of the crime of rape, the credible, natural, and
convincing testimony of the victim alone may be sufficient to convict
the accused, more so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-
legal findings of the examining physician. 37
MMM's testimony, positively identifying accused-appellant as the
person who raped her is believable. We uphold the ruling of the trial
court on the credibility of MMM and the truthfulness of her
testimonies, to wit:
[MMM], though a minor, thirteen (13) years old at the time she took
the stand, demonstrated to this Court her capacity of observation,
recollection, and communication. She showed that she can perceive,
and perceiving, can make known her perception to this Court as she
clearly and capably related the details of her sad and horrible
experiences at the hands of the accused. She withstood a thorough and
exhaustive examination. There is no doubt that she is a competent
witness. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 349 SCRA 451, G.R. No.
116372 January 18, 2001; People vs. Rama, 350 SCRA 266, G.R. No.
136304, January 25, 2001). [MMM] gave a clear, straightforward,
spontaneous, frank and consistent narrative. It was a positive and
credible account she presented before this Court. There was not a
motive ascribed or, in the very least, suggested by the defense that
might have raised doubt on her credibility and on the credibility of the
statements she made before this Court.38
We find no reason to disturb the trial court's appreciation of MMM's
testimony. Deeply entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the
trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their
deportment and demeanor on the witness stand, a vantage point denied
appellate courts; and when his findings have been affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this
Court.39
Furthermore, testimonies of child victims are given full weight and
credit, for when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped,
she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and
sincerity.40 No young woman would admit that she was raped, make
public the offense and allow the examination of her private parts
undergo the troubles and humiliation of a public trial and endure the
ordeal of testifying to all gory details, if she had not in fact been
raped.41
Denial and Alibi as Inherently Weak Defenses
In contrast to MMM's direct, positive and categorical testimony and
identification of her assailant, accused-appellant's bare denial and alibi
could not prevail. This Court has consistently held that: "denial is an
intrinsically weak defense which must be supported by strong
evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. No jurisprudence in
criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all
defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove and for
which reason it is generally rejected. For the alibi to prosper, it is
imperative that the accused establishes two elements: (1) he was not at
the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was
physically impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its
commission.42 "Accused-appellant failed to establish these elements.
His claim that at the time of the alleged crime, he was at sea fishing
with his grandfather was uncorroborated. For some reason, he did not
even present his grandfather Clemente Gabayeron to testify in court.
As opposed to MMM' s convincing recital of facts, accused-appellant's
denial and alibi will not stand.
Time of commission
not an essential element
to establish rape
Lastly, accused-appellant argues that the Information43 stating that the
first crime of rape was committed "sometime in the month of June
2002" is not sufficiently explicit and certain as to inform him of the
date on which the criminal act was alleged to have been committed.
Accused-appellant is mistaken. This Court has repeatedly held that it is
not incumbent upon the victim to establish the date when she was
raped for purposes of convicting the perpetrator. 44 The date of
commission is not an essential element of the crime of rape; what is
material is its occurrence. Thus, there is no need to prove the exact
date of comm1ss1on; an approximation thereof will suffice.45
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that accused-
appellant's belated objection to the Information cannot prosper, to wit:
Moreover, accused-appellant's counsel took active part in the trial by
cross-examining the prosecution witnesses on the particular dates and
circumstances of the two offenses of rape as alleged in the
informations without prior objection to the validity or propriety of the
informations. It is now too late in the day for the accused-appellant to
claim that any of the Informations was defective. Objections relating
to the form of the complaint or information cannot be made for the
first time on appeal. If the appellant had found the Information
insufficient, he should have moved before arraignment either for a bill
of particulars, for him to be properly informed of the exact date of the
alleged rape, or for the quashal of the Information, on the ground that
it did not conform with the prescribed form. 46
Penalty and Damages
To determine the appropriate penalty, we refer to the pertinent law on
the matter. According to R.A. No. 9344,47 as amended:48
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - x x x
A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of the
fifteenth anniversary of his/her birthdate.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age
shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an
intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in
which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not
include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws.
To reiterate, the law says that a minor is fifteen (15) years of age on
the day of the fifteenth anniversary of his/her birth date. In A.M. No.
02-l-18- SC49 dated November 24, 2009, the Supreme Court likewise
defined the age of criminal responsibility as the age when a child,
fifteen (15) years and one (1) day old or above but below eighteen (18)
years of age, commits an offense with discernment.
Accused-appellant testified that he was born on 14 April
1987, 50 making him 15 years and 2 months old when the crime was
committed. We are now left with the question of whether or not
accused-appellant acted with discernment. In People v. Jacinto, 51 we
explained that discernment is the mental capacity of a minor to fully
grasp the consequences of his act, known and determined by taking
into account all the facts and circumstances presented by the records in
each case.
That the accused-appellant acted with discernment when he raped the
victim is demonstrated by the following surrounding circumstances:
(1) the victim was a helpless minor; (2) accused-appellant secured the
consummation of the offense with a weapon; (3) he satisfied his lust
by penetrating the victim from behind; and (4) he threatened the victim
not to report what happened. Taking all these facts into consideration,
accusedappellant clearly knew that what he did was wrong.
Considering that the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship were alleged and proven during trial, 52 accused-appellant
shall be criminally liable for the crime of Qualified Statutory Rape.
However, given that accused-appellant was only 15 years old and 2
months when the crime was committed, the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority should be appreciated; thus, the penalty next
lower in degree than that prescribed by law shall be imposed. 53 In
accordance with the controlling jurisprudence on the matter,54 for
purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the
penalty to be reckoned with. Thus, we affirm the ruling of the lower
courts and impose upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Although it is acknowleged that accused-appellant was qualified for
suspension of sentence when he committed the crime, Section 40 of
R.A. 934455 provides that the same extends only until the child in
conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)
years old. Nevertheless, in extending the application of RA No. 9344
to give meaning to the legislative intent of the said law, we ruled
in People v. Jacinto, 56 as cited in People v. Ancajas,57 that the
promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should
extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21)
years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a
child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration,
rehabilitation and reintegration in order that he/she may be given the
chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the
community. 58 Thus, accused-appellant is ordered to serve his
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities, in accordance with
Section 51 59 of R.A. 9344.
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,60 we modify the award of
damages of the lower courts.1âwphi1 Accused-appellant is hereby
ordered to indemnify MMM, the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity for each count of rape, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages for
each count of rape, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages for each
count of rape. The damages awarded shall earn interest at the legal rate
of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid. 61
WHEREFORE, the 29 June 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC NO. 00435 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.· Appellant JOERY DELIOLA Y BARRIDO,
A.K.A. "JAKE DELIOLA," is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of Qualified Statutory Rape and is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape.
Appellant is ORDERED to indemnify MMM the amounts of
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of rape, ₱75,000.00 as
moral damages for each count of rape, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary
damages for each count of rape. All monetary awards for damages
shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Silay
City, Branch 69 for its appropriate action in accordance with Section
51 of Republic Act No. 9344.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 108172-73 May 25, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CONRADO LUCAS Y BRIONES, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a sworn statement 1 taken on 16 February 1991, Chanda Lucas y
Austria, then seventeen years old, charged her natural father, accused
Jose Conrado Lucas, of attempted rape committed against her on 12
February 1991. She revealed therein that she was first raped by him
when she was only nine years old, or, as disclosed in a handwritten
note at the left-hand margin of her sworn statement, "noong Nov. 26,
1982 . . . at naulit ng maraming beses."
On 19 February 1991, Chanda, assisted by her mother, Ofelia Austria-
Lucas, filed two separate sworn criminal complaints for rape 2 and for
attempted rape 3 against her father with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. The complaints, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-91-
18465 and Q-91-18466, were subsequently assigned to Branch 104 of
the said court.
The accusatory portion of the complaint for rape in Criminal Case
No. Q-91-18465 reads:
That on or about the 26th day of November 1982 and sometime
thereafter in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs
and by means of violence and intimidation did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the
undersigned CHANDA LUCAS Y AUSTRIA, who was then nine (9)
years old, now 17 yrs. of age, against her will, to her damage and
prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under the
provisions of the New Civil Code.
while that for attempted rape in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 reads:
That on or about the 12th day of February 1991, in Quezon City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation,
commence the commission of the crime of rape directly by overt acts
by then and there taking advantage of complainant's tender age and
innocence, by then and there putting his hand inside the panty of
the undersigned and mashing her vagina while his other hand was
pressing her nipples and at the same time kissing her on the lips, face
and neck, thereafter accused placed himself on top of her but said
accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the said offense of rape by reason of the fact that the brother
and sister of the undersigned was awakened and shouted upon the
accused, a cause other than the spontaneous desistance of the said
accused, that the aforesaid act of the said accused was done against
the will of the undersigned, to her damage and prejudice in such
amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the New
Civil Code.
The cases were jointly tried after the accused had pleaded not guilty
upon his arraignment. 4 The prosecution presented as witnesses the
complainant herself; her sister, Cynthia; and Dr. Emmanuel Aranas.
The defense presented only the accused.
Complainant Chanda Lucas, who was born on 2 June 1973, 5 testified
that their0 house at 23-X Daropa Road, Baesa, Quezon City, has only
one bedroom. On 26 November 1983, she was sleeping in the bedroom
with her brother and sisters. Their mother did not sleep in their house
at that time. At about 2:00 to 3:00 a.m., she awoke and realized that
her father was removing her panty and shorts. He cautioned her to
keep quiet. Then, her father, who was already naked, went on top of
her and placed his sexual organ inside her vagina. She was hurt but did
not resist because her father threatened to kill her. Only her older sister
Cynthia witnessed the incident. Chanda reported the incident to her
mother and her aunt but the former did nothing. When her aunt said
that her father should be jailed, her mother did not agree. 6
The 26 November 1983 incident was only the first of many atrocities.
Since then, her father had been repeatedly molesting her, especially
when her mother was not around. The last assault on her womanhood
occurred on 12 February 1991 when she was already seventeen years
old. Before he had sex with her at 3:00 a.m. on 12 February 1991, he
first moved her brothers and sisters, who were sleeping in the same
room with her, to another place. She did not resist because he had
a balisong with him and told her that he can take her life anytime.
After the sexual assault, he stood up holding his balisong 7 and again
said that she has only one life and that he can take it anytime.
On the morning of 16 February 1992, in the company of her mother
and uncle, she reported the incident to the police in their area. The
police investigator questioned her and her sworn statement (Exhibit
"D") was taken. In the afternoon of that day, she submitted to a
medical examination at Camp Crame and a medical certificate was
issued. 8
Cynthia Lucas Viado, the elder sister of Chanda, testified that she
witnessed the incident of 26 November 1983. She was then thirteen
years old while Chanda was only nine years old. She saw his father on
top of Chanda, then she closed her eyes and covered her face with a
blanket. She reported the incident and the fact that she saw blood on
the underwear of Chanda to her aunt Neneng and her mother; the
former was very angry upon learning of the incident but the latter did
not believe her; at that time, her mother loved her father dearly. 9 On
cross- examination, Cynthia declared that her father intended to
sexually abuse her on 26 November 1983 but because she resisted, her
father instead raped Chanda. She was not able to help Chanda because
she was afraid of her father. Their brother and another sister were not
aware of the incident and they did not wake them up because they
were ashamed of their neighbors. 10
Dr. Emmanuel Aranas testified that he examined the complainant on
16 February 1991 at the Crime Laboratory Services at Camp Crame
pursuant to a letter-request 11 from Capt. Jaime Q. Peralta of the
Central Police district, Quezon City. His examination of her genitalia
disclosed healed lacerations, but he could not determine when the
lacerations were inflicted or sustained. He concluded that the
complainant has had several sexual experiences and was no longer a
virgin. 12 He issued a written report of his findings. 13 On cross-
examination, he declared that he found no sperm on the organ of the
complainant and that there were no signs of recent trauma or physical
injuries on her. 14
On the witness stand, the accused testified that he and Chanda's
mother, Ofelia Austria, are not married; however, since 1969, they had
been living together as husband and wife until 1972, when he was
detained for alleged gunrunning and when Ofelia and the children
moved to Cotabato. They were reunited in 1977. He denied having
raped his second daughter, Chanda, and alleged that the brothers and
sisters of Ofelia, particularly Leonardo Austria, were all angry at him
and instigated the filing of the fabricated charges against him. He
further declared that Ofelia was angry at him because he intervened in
guiding the life of Chanda. He could not recall anymore where he was
on 26 November 1983. However, on 12 February 1991, he and Ofelia
quarreled about Chanda's frequent late arrivals from school and,
because of the quarrel, he "physically harmed" both of them. 15
On 28 October 1992, the trial court promulgated its decision 16 in the
two cases finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
crimes of rape. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
In Crim. Case No. Q-91-18465, the prosecution was able to establish
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
as charged in the information, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA plus all the accessory penalties
provided by law.
In Crim. Case No. Q-91-18466, the prosecution was able to establish
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
as charged in the information, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, plus all the accessory penalties
provided by law.
Accused is ordered to pay the victim the sum of P30,000.00 as actual
and moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. 17
On 4 November 1992, the accused filed a notice of appeal. 18 In his
brief submitted to this Court, he alleges that the trial court erred:
I
. . . IN GIVING UNMERITED VERACITY TO THE INCREDIBLE,
UNPERSUASIVE AND UNRELIABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN DISREGARDING
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE.
II
. . . IN CONVICTING HIM OF THE CRIME OF RAPE
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. Q-91-18466 INASMUCH AS THE
SAME IS MORE SERIOUS THAN THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
III
. . . IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
OF RAPE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO Q-91-18465 DESPITE THE
FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 19
As to the first assigned error, the accused asserts that the conduct of
his daughters, Chanda and Cynthia, after the alleged first sexual abuse
casts doubt on their credibility. It is hard to believe that if Chanda were
indeed raped by him when she was only nine years old and repeatedly
thereafter, she would report the abuses only when she was seventeen
years old. Several remedies were available to her and she had relatives
who could extend their help. 20
He also contends that the testimony of Cynthia is not convincing; it
was contrary to human experience and conduct for her to simply close
her eyes and cover her face with a blanket upon witnessing the rape of
her younger sister by their own father instead of helping Chanda. If
she was afraid of her father at that time, she could have convinced
Chanda to temporarily leave their house and seek shelter with her
relatives. It was also unnatural for her to abandon Chanda when, as she
claims, she fully knew the bestial tendencies of her father. 21 As to his
wife, Ofelia, he attributes to her an ulterior motive when she consented
to the filing of the charges against him. Except for the souring of their
relationship which ended in their separation, he finds no possible
explanation why Ofelia believed Chanda's report on the 12 February
1991 incident when she, Ofelia, refused to heed Chanda and Cynthia's
report concerning the 26 November 1983 incident.
Anent the second assigned error, he contends that he could not be
validly convicted of rape in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 under a
complaint for attempted rape only. He cites the rule that when the
offense proved is more serious than that charged, the accused can only
be convicted of the offense charged.
The appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, prays that
the judgment of conviction in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465 be
affirmed in toto. However, it submits that the accused can be convicted
only of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466. The
appellee argues that the trial court correctly gave credence to the
testimony of Chanda as it is "positive, straightforward and clearly
revelatory only of the truth of the facts she experienced, without any
dubious motive shown why she would bear false witness against
appellant." 22 The reaction which the accused expected of Chanda after
the first rape and which she did not so manifest does not necessarily
lead to a conclusion that she fabricated her story. As Chanda's father,
he exercised absolute authority and moral influence over her.
Moreover, at the tender age of nine, she was totally helpless and
defenseless. And regarding the imputed motive of Chanda's mother,
the same is too trivial to prompt her to falsely charged him with a
grave crime.
The first and third assigned errors raise a question of fact which hinges
on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. The second involves a
question of law.
In rape cases, this Court has been guided by three well-entrenched
principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is
difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of
rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense. 23
Conclusions as to the credibility of witnesses in rape cases lie heavily
on the sound judgment of the trial court. Accordingly, in the
appreciation of the evidence, the appellate court accords due deference
to the trial court's views on who should be given credence since the
latter is in a better position to decide the question of the credibility of
witnesses, having seen and heard these witnesses and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The trial court's
findings concerning the credibility of witnesses carry great weight and
respect and will be sustained by the appellate court unless the trial
court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which would have affected the
result of the case. 24
After a careful examination of the records and the evidence, we are
unable to find any cogent reason to disturb the finding of the trial court
that the accused raped his daughter, Chanda, on 26 November 1983
and 12 February 1991.
As regards the first charge, there is, however, a variance between the
evidence presented and the allegations of the complaint. The complaint
in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465 charges the accused with the crime
of rape committed on 26 November 1982. Both Chanda and Cynthia,
however, testified that the incident took place on 26 November
1983. 25 The accused offered no objection to such evidence.
Consequently, the variance was not fatal to the prosecution.
In United States vs. Arcos, 26 this Court ruled:
Where time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential
element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the
commission of the crime, even if it appear that the crime was
not committed at the precise time or placed alleged, or if the proof
fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the
complaint, providing it appears that the specific crime charged was in
fact committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or
information within the period of the statute of limitations, and at a
place within the jurisdiction of the court. (U.S. vs. Smith, and
cases cited, 2 Phil. Rep., 20).
The unobjected testimony of another date of the commission of the
crime charged in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465 could even be the
basis for an amendment of the complaint to make it conform to the
evidence. 27
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court also provides:
Sec. 14. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be
amended, in substance and form, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to
all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when
the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
Chanda was less than twelve years old when she was raped by the
accused on 26 November 1983. Since she was born on 2 June 1973,
she was then exactly ten years, five months, and twenty-four days old.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
and
3. When the woman is under twelve (12) years of age, even though
neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding
paragraphs shall be present.
xxx xxx xxx
The third paragraph is known as statutory rape or the unlawful carnal
knowledge of a woman below 12 years of age. 28 Otherwise stated,
carnal knowledge alone is sufficient for conviction as the presence of
any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article
335 is not required. 29
As found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, the
accused had carnal knowledge of his daughter Chanda — then below
twelve years old — on 26 November 1983. We are not persuaded by
the arguments of the accused that if indeed she were raped on that date
and several times thereafter, she should not have kept her silence until
she was seventeen years old since she had all the available remedies
for redress as well as relatives who could help her. The equanimity or
the wisdom of more mature persons cannot be expected from a young
and immature girl like Chanda. We have said before that the workings
of a human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable
and that people react differently to various situations. 30
In addition to her tender age and immaturity, Chanda was, to say the
least, a victim of unfavorable circumstances not of her own making.
These prevented her from exposing earlier the evil deeds of her father.
All that she could proudly claim was a beautiful name — Chanda. She
had no decent home. Her father and her mother were not married and
were untrammeled by the bonds of lawful wedlock. When she was
born, her father was under detention for gunrunning and it was only
when she was four years old (1977) when he rejoined his "family."
Since then, all the members of the family slept in one room. Chanda
had no choice of another home, for it does not appear that another was
available to the family or that she was prepared to leave it because she
had the means to face life alone or that a kind soul had offered her
shelter. She was a victim of poverty and a virtual captive in the only
"home" her natural parents could provide, for she was entirely
dependent upon them.
Verily, she was completely under the moral ascendancy and control of
her father and the fear alone of a harsher life outside such a "home"
and of what her father would do if she would expose his evil deeds,
made her suffer in silence for a long time the excruciating pains his
assaults inflicted upon her. Then too, although she told her mother
about the abuse committed by her father on 26 November 1983, 31 her
mother only got angry but did not do anything. Chanda must have felt
despair at such indifference.
Her delay in reporting the sexual assaults to the authorities is thus
understandable and does not affect her credibility. We do not believe
that she would fabricate a story of defloration against her own father,
make public her painful and humiliating experiences which are better
kept in secret or forgotten, allow her private parts to be examined, and
eventually bring to shame her own family and jeopardize her chances
of marriage unless she was not telling the truth and was motivated by
nothing but the desire to obtain justice for the grievous wrongs
committed against her. 32
There was a consummated rape on 12 February 1991. According to
Chanda's testimony, at 3:00 a.m. that day, the accused, who had
a balisong with him, laid down beside her, threatened her that she had
only one life which he can take away any time; removed her shorts and
panty and then moved on top of her and inserted "his organ to her
organ." Thereafter, he stood up holding his balisong and reiterated his
earlier threat. 33
Considering, however, that the complaint for this incident subject of
Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 charges the accused with the crime
of attempted rape, then, as correctly pointed out by the accused in his
second assigned error and concurred in by the Office of the Solicitor
General, he cannot be convicted of consummated rape.
Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides that "[w]hen there
is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included
in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that
which is proved." The offense charged in Criminal Case No. Q-91-
18466 (attempted rape) is necessarily included in the offense that was
proved (consummated rape). Accordingly, the accused should be
convicted of attempted rape only. The penalty for attempted rape
is prision mayor, which is two degrees lower than that provided by
law for rape. 34 The accused is entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, and for attempted rape he may be
sentenced to a penalty whose minimum should be within the range
of prision correccional and whose maximum should be within the
range range of prision mayor, taking into account the modifying
circumstances. The alternative circumstance of relationship provided
for in Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code should be appreciated
against the accused considering that the offended party, Chanda, is his
descendant. In crimes against chastity, such as rape, relationship is
aggravating. 35
of prision correccional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum.
There should also be awards for damages in each of the two cases.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of 28 October 1992 of Branch
104 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Criminal Case
No. Q-91-18465 and Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 is hereby
AFFIRMED, subject to the modifications indicated above. As
modified:
(1) In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465, accused JOSE CONRADO
LUCAS y BRIONES is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Thirty-four (34) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the offended party the sum
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and
(2) In Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466, said accused is hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ATTEMPTED
RAPE only and is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from Four (4) years, TWO (2) months and One (1) day
of prision correccional maximum as minimum to Ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum and to pay
the offended party the sum of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Costs against the accused-appellant.

Prior to R.A. No. 7659, 36 the presence of modifying circumstances SO ORDERED

would not affect the penalty of reclusion perpetua prescribed for the
crime of rape because such a penalty was then indivisible and under
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, when the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed. However, pursuant to Section 21 of R.A. No.
7659, which amended Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, reclusion
perpetua has now a defined duration, i.e., from twenty (20) years and
one (1) day to forty (40) years. There is, however, no corresponding
amendment to Article 76 of the same Code for the purpose of
converting reclusion perpetua into a divisible penalty with three
specific
period — minimum, medium, and maximum — and including it in the
table provided therein showing the duration and the time included in
each of the periods.

It may thus be said that although the law has now fixed the duration
of reclusion perpetua, it did not make explicit its intention to convert it
into a divisible penalty. In any event, Article 65 of the Code which
provides:

Art. 65. Rules in cases in which the penalty is not composed of three

periods. — In cases in which the penalty prescribed by law is not
composed of three periods, the courts shall apply the rules contained
in the foregoing articles, dividing into three equal portions of time
included in the penalty prescribed, and forming one period of each of
the three portions.

may be applied. Accordingly, the time included in the penalty

of reclusion perpetua (twenty [20] years and one [1] days to forty [40]
years) can be divided into three equal portions, with each composing a
period. The periods of reclusion perpetua would then be as follows:

minimum — 20 years and 1 day to 26 years and 8 months

medium — 26 years, 8 months and 1 day to 33 years and 4 months

maximum — 34 years, 4 months and 1 day to 40 years

Taking into account the presence of the aggravating circumstance of

relationship in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18465, the accused may
finally be sentenced to thirty-four (34) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of reclusion perpetua.

Considering again such aggravating circumstance, the accused may be

sentenced in Criminal Case No. Q-91-18466 to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day

.R. No. 199527
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru Private Complainant
BRIAN VICTOR BRITCHFORD, Petitioner
vs.
SALVADOR ALAPAN, Respondent
DECISION
MARITRES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution,
dated 22 November 2011, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 118333, which dismissed the petition seeking the imposition of
subsidiary imprisonment for nonpayment of fine in eight (8) cases of
violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22).
THE FACTS
In an Information, dated 26 May 2006, respondent Salvador
Alapan (respondent) and his wife Myrna Alapan (Myrna) were
charged with eight (8) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Upon
arraignment on 1 September 2006, they pleaded not guilty to the
charges.
In August 2005, the Spouses Alapan borrowed ₱400,000.00 from
petitioner Brian Victor Britchford (petitioner) with a promise that they
would pay the said amount within three (3) months. To secure the
indebtedness, respondent issued eight (8) postdated checks.
When the checks matured, petitioner deposited then at the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), Olongapo City branch. One week thereafter,
PNB informed petitioner that the checks were dishonored for the
reason that the account against which the checks were drawn was
closed. Petitioner immediately informed respondent of the dishonor of
the checks.
On their part, the Spouses Alapan averred that their account was
closed only on the last week of October 2005 because they suffered
business reverses. They nonetheless stated that they were willing to
settle their monetary obligation.
The MTC Ruling
In a decision,1 dated 4 February 2009, the Municipal Trial Court, San
Felipe, Zambales (MTC), convicted respondent of eight (8) counts of
violation of B.P. Big. 22. It imposed a penalty of fine instead of
imprisonment considering that respondent's act of issuing the bounced
checks was not tainted with bad faith and that he was a first-time
offender. On the other hand, the MTC acquitted Myrna because she
did not participate in the issuance of the dishonored checks.
The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the evidence of the prosecution to
have established the guilt of Accused Salvador Alapan of the eight (8)
counts of Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and imposes upon the aforenamed
accused to pay a fine of ₱30,000.00 for each case or total of
₱240,000.00 and to indemnify the offended party, Mr. Brian Victor
Britchford the sum of FOUR HUNDRED ELEVEN THOUSAND
(₱411,000.00) Philippine Currency, representing the face value of the
dishonored checks, with legal interest per annum commencing from
March 8, 2006, when demand was made, until fully paid, and to pay
attorney's fees of ₱15,000.00 and to pay the costs.2
After the MTC judgment became final and executory, a writ of
execution was issued. The writ, however, was returned unsatisfied.
Petitioner thus filed a Motion to Impose Subsidiary Penalty3 for
respondent's failure to pay the fine imposed by the MTC.
In its Order,4 dated 24 September 2010, the MTC denied the motion on
the ground that subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency was not
imposed in the judgment of convicion.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 69, Iba, Zambales (RTC).
The RTC Ruling
In a decision,5 dated 25 January 2011, the RTC dismissed the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction. It held that respondent could not be made to
undergo subsidiary imprisonment because the judgment of conviction
did not provide for such penalty in case of non-payment of fine. The
RTC further opined that the MTC decision which already attained
finality could no longer be altered or modified. It disposed the case in
this wise:
IN VIEW THEREOF, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.6
Undeterred, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Resolution, dated 22 November 2011, the CA dismissed the
petition. It ruled that the petition was filed without the intervention of
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which was contrary to
Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code.
The dispositive portion reads:
In view of the foregoing and finding the Manifestation (in lieu of
Comment) filed by the OSG to be well-founded, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED pursuant to Section 3, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Court.7
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
I. WHETHER PETITIONER MAY ASSAIL THE PENALTY
IMPOSED IN THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION;
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT MAY UNDERGO SUBSIDIARY
IMPRISONMENT FOR FAILURE TO PAY THE FINE.
Petitioner argues that Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the
Administrative Code is applicable only in cases wherein the
government or any of its branches or instrumentalities is directly
involved; that the said law does not cover matters wherein it is the
interest of the private complainant that is directly affected; and that
Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 expressly states that there is no
legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) provisions on subsidiary imprisonment should only a fine
be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine.8
In his comment, respondent counters, citing Gonzales v. Chavez, 9 that
it is mandatory upon the OSG to represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring
the services of a lawyer; that it is only the State, through its appellate
counsel, the OSG, which has the sole right and authority to institute
criminal proceedings before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court;10 that the imposition or the non-imposition of subsidiary penalty
is a matter that involves the interest of the State, thus, the private
offended party is without legal personality to bring an appeal on the
criminal aspect of the case; and that the imposition of subsidiary
imprisonment must be clearly stated in the judgment.11
In his reply, petitioner avers that Administrative Circular No. 13-2001
categorically implies that subsidiary imprisonment could be resorted to
even if the penalty provided by the trial court is limited only to fine;
and that the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment would emphasize
the gravity of the offense committed by respondent and would serve as
a deterrent to others not to emulate this malicious act.12
OUR RULING
Petitioner lacks legal standing to question the trial court's order.
In the appeal of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, the authority to represent the People is vested solely in
the Solicitor General. This power is expressly provided in Section 35,
Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 of the Revised Administrative
Code.13 Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People
of the Philippines in all criminal cases.14
Jurisprudence has already settled that the interest of the private
complainant is limited only to the civil liability arising from the
crime.1âwphi1 Thus, in Bautista v. Cuneta-Pangilinan, 15 the Court
ruled:
Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which
the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant
or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising
therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is
an acquittal, an appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken,
whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the solicitor
general. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the People
of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not undertake such appeal.16
In this case, respondent was convicted of eight (8) counts of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 for which he was imposed the penalty of fine instead of
imprisonment pursuant to Administrative Circulars No. 12-2000 and
13- 2001. Thus, the penalty of fine and the imposition of subsidiary
imprisonment in case of nonpayment thereof pertain to the criminal
aspect of the case. On the other hand, the indemnification for the face
value of the dishonored checks refers to the civil aspect of the case.
Consequently petitioner could not appeal the imposition of fine as
penalty which was not even questioned by the People through the
OSG. "While a private prosecutor may be allowed to intervene in
criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, his participation is subordinate to the interest of the
People, hence, he cannot be permitted to adopt a position contrary to
that of the Solicitor General. To do so would be tantamount to giving
the private prosecutor the direction and control of the criminal
proceeding, contrary to the provisions of law."17 Hence, the CA
properly dismissed the petition for review.
Subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency must be expressly
stated in the judgment of conviction.
Another reason which militates against petitioner's position is the lack
of provision pertaining to subsidiary imprisonment in the judgment of
conviction. People v. Fajardo, 18 in relation to Republic Act. No. 5465
which amended Article 39 of the RPC, discusses the rationale behind
the necessity for expressly imposing subsidiary imprisonment in the
judgment of conviction, viz:
The first paragraph of article 39 of the Revised Penal Code reads as
follows:
ART. 39. Subsidiary penalty. - If the convict has no property with
which to meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding
article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate
of one day for each eight pesos, subject to the following rules: ...
Article 78 of Chapter V of the same Code, in its pertinent part, which
deals with the execution and service of penalties, provides:
ART. 78. When and how a penalty is to be executed. - No penalty shall
executed except by virtue of a final judgment.
A penalty shall not be executed in any other form than that prescribed
by law, nor with any other circumstances or incidents than those
expressly authorized thereby.
It is a fundamental principle consecration in section 3 of the Jones
Law, the Act of Congress of the United States of America approved on
August 29, 1916, which was still in force when the order appealed
from was made, that no person may be deprived of liberty without due
process of law. This constitutional provision was in a sense
incorporated in article 78 of the Revised Penal Code prescribing that
no penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment. As
the fact show that there is no judgment sentencing the accused to
suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvent to pay the fine
imposed upon him, because the said subsidiary imprisonment is not
stated in the judgment finding him guilty, it is clear that the court
could not legally compel him to serve said subsidiary imprisonment. A
contrary holding would be a violation of the laws aforementioned.
That subsidiary imprisonment is a penalty, there can be no doubt, for,
according to article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, it is imposed upon
the accused and served by him in lieu of the fine which he fails to pay
on account of insolvency. There is not a single provision in the Code
from which it may be logically inferred that an accused may
automatically be made to serve subsidiary imprisonment in a case
where he has been sentenced merely to pay a fine and has been found
to be insolvent. Such would be contrary to the legal provisions above-
cited and to the doctrine laid down in United States vs. Miranda (2
Phil., 606, 610), in which it was said: "That judgment of the lower
court fails to impose subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency for
indemnification to the owner of the banca, but only imposes subsidiary
punishment as to the costs. In this respect the judgment is erroneous
and should be modified."
We, therefore, conclude that an accused who has been sentenced by
final judgment to pay a fine only and is found to be insolvent and
could not pay the fine for this reason, cannot be compelled to serve the
subsidiary imprisonment provided for in article 39 of the Revised
Penal Code. [emphasis supplied]19
Indeed, Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 provides that "should
only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there
is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code
provisions on subsidiary imprisonment." However, the Circular does
not sanction indiscriminate imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for
the same must still comply with the law.
Here, the judgment of conviction did not provide subsidiary
imprisonment in case of failure to pay the penalty of fine. Thus,
subsidiary imprisonment may not be imposed without violating the
RPC and the constitutional provision on due process.
The final and executory decision of the MTC can no longer be
modified.
Finally, the time-honored doctrine of immutability of judgment
precludes modification of a final and executory judgment:
A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable. This quality of immutability precludes the modification of
a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true whether the
modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest
court in the land. The orderly administration of justice requires that, at
the risk of occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions of a court must
reach a point of finality set by the law. The noble purpose is to write
finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our
justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations.
Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be
maintained by those who exercise the power of adjudication. Any act,
which violates such principle, must immediately be struck down.
Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not
confined in its operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily
known as courts, but extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers
had been conferred.
The only exceptions to the rule on the immutability of final judgments
are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tune
entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void
Judgments.20
There is no doubt that the MTC decision has long attained finality and
that none of the aforementioned exceptions finds application in this
case. Hence, the MTC decision stands and any other question
involving the said decision must now be put to rest.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 22 November 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 118333
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 6-A-92 June 21, 1993

TO: THE COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, AND

REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS

SUBJECT: THE CORRECT APPLICATION OF THE PENALTIES

OF RECLUSION PERPETUA AND LIFE IMPRISONMENT

Administrative Circular No. 6-92, dated October 12, 1992, is hereby

amended to read as follows:

The Court has observed that several trial judges, in their judgments of
conviction for such serious offenses as Murder, Robbery with
Homicide and Rape with Homicide under the Revised Penal Code and
Violation of Section 4, Art. II, RA 6425, as amended by P.D. 1675
(Dangerous Drugs Act), fail to appreciate and observe the substantial
difference between Reclusion Perpetua under the Revised Penal Code
and Life Imprisonment when imposed as a penalty by special law.

For the guidance of all concerned, the admonition by the Court on the
subject in People vs. Penillos, January 30, 1992 (205 SCRA 546), is
reproduced hereunder:

As noted from the dispositive portion of the challenged decision, the

trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Evidently, it considered the latter as the English
translation of the former, which is not the case. Both are different and
distinct penalties. In the recent case of People vs. Baguio, (April 30,
1991, 196 SCRA 459), this Court held:

The Code (Revised Penal Code) does not prescribe the penalty of life
imprisonment for any of the felonies therein defined, that penalty
being invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized not by the
Revised Penal Code but by special law. Reclusion Perpetua entails
imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict
becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it accessory penalties,
namely: perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not the same as life
imprisonment which, for one thing, does not carry with it any
accessory penalty, and for another, does not appear to have any
definite extent or duration.

As early as 1948, in People vs. Mobe, reiterated in PP vs. Pilones and

in the concurring opinion of Justice Ramon Aquino in People vs.
Sumadic, this Court already made it clear that reclusion perpetua is
not the same as imprisonment for life or life imprisonment. Every
Judge should take note of the distinction and this Court expects that,
henceforth, no trial judge should mistake one for the other. (Emphasis
supplied)

Strict compliance with this Administrative Circular is hereby enjoined.

Section 21. Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall

be from twenty years and one day to forty years.

Reclusion temporal. - The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be from

twelve years and one day to twenty years.

Prision mayor and temporary disqualification. - The duration of the

penalties of prision mayor and temporary disqualification shall be
from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of
disqualification is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, it
shall be that of the principal penalty.

Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. - The duration of the

penalties of prision correccional, suspension, and destierro shall be
from six months and one day to six years, except when the suspension
is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be
that of the principal penalty.

Arresto mayor. - The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall be

from one month and one day to six months.

Arresto menor. - The duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall be

from one day to thirty days.

Bond to keep the peace. - The bond to keep the peace shall be required
to cover such period of time as the court may determine."