The Secular Is Sacred

THE SECULAR IS SACRED
ARCHIVES INTERNATIONALES D'HISTOIRE DES IDEES
INTERNATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS
69
ARDIS B. COLLINS

Platonism and Thomism in Marsilio Ficino's
J>latonic Jrheolo~
Directors: P. Dibon (Paris) and R. Popkin (Washington Univ., St. Louis)

Editorial Board: J. Aubin (Paris); J. Collins (St. Louis Univ.); P. Costabel (Paris);
A. Crombie (Oxford); I. Dambska (Cracow); H. de la Fontaine-Verwey (Amsterdam);
H. Gadamer (Heidelberg); H. Gouhier (Paris); T. Gregory (Rome); T. E. Jessop (Hull);
P. O. Kristeller (Columbia Univ.); Elisabeth Labrousse (Paris); A. Lossky (Los Angeles);
S. Lindroth (Upsala); C. B. Schmitt (Warburg Institute, London); J. Orcibal (Paris); I. S.
Revaht (Paris) ;J. Roger (Paris) ;H. Rowen (Rutgers Univ., N. Y.); G. Sebba (EmoryUniv.,
Atlanta); R. Shackleton (Oxford); J. Tans (Groningen); G. Tonelli (Binghamton, N.Y.)
Platonism and Thomism in Marsilio Ficino's
Platonic Theology
by
ARDIS B. COLLINS
MARTINUS NIJHOFF I THE HAGUE I 1974

Dedicated to
My Parents, Ardis B. and Margaret Collins,
and to the Memory of

Rev. I. T. Eschmann, G.P.
<0 1971 by Martinus Nijlwff, The Hague, Netherlands

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1974
All rights reserved, including the rights to translate or to
reprodw;, this book or "arts thereof in any form
ISBN-13: 978-94-010-2024-4 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-010-2022-0
DOl: 10.1007/978-94-010-2022-0
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface VII
CHAPTER ONE: THE SEARCH FOR GOD I
CHAPTER TWO: THE APPROACH TO GOD THROUGH UNITY AND

POWER 8
CHAPTER THREE: THE APPROACH TO GOD THROUGH BEING 23
CHAPTER FOUR: THE METAPHYSICAL STRUCTURE OF CREATURES,

MORTAL AND IMMORTAL 44
CHAPTER FIVE: THE SPECIAL PRESENCE OF GOD TO MAN 73
CHAPTER SIX: PHILOSOPHY SEEKS WHAT RELIGION WORSHIPS 105
APPENDIX: TEXTS FOR COMPARISON I 14

BIBLIOGRAPHY 2 I6
INDEX 220
PREFACE
This book presents a philosophical position examined philosophically.

Although it does not go beyond the confines ofFicino's perspective and
is governed by standards of historical accuracy, it makes explicit in its
explanation ofFicino's text the enduring philosophical questions which
are at issue there. True, the book examines in some detail Ficino's
relation to his Platonic and Scholastic sources, and this is an issue of
primary interest to those who study the history of culture or the his-
torical development of philosophy. However, in Ficino's thought, this
issue is also a philosophical issue. Ficino chooses Platonism as his guide
because this philosophy retains an explicit and essential orientation to
religion. When he takes Platonism as the primary instance of philoso-
phy, he is taking a stand on the nature of philosophy itself. Philosophy
necessarily points toward the divinity and hence is necessarily related
to the veneration and worship of its object. Christian theology joins
Platonic philosophy in this movement toward God, developing more
completely the implications of its fundamental insights. And the
"splendor of Christian theology" is Thomas Aquinas. 1 Therefore, to
examine the relationship between Platonism and Thomism in Ficino's
thought is to examine Ficino's position on the unity of philosophy and
theology.
Scholars writing about Ficino have pointed to three major influences
on his thought. The influence of Plato and the neo-Platonists, of course,
is readily recognized. Ficino saw himself as the leader of a Platonic
revival and was accepted as such by the scholars of his time. Disagree-
ment arises from the attempt to assess this influence in relation to
others and to determine its role in Ficino's own position. Giuseppe
1 Marsilio Ficino, Theologia Platonica, Book XVIII, Chapter 8, Paris (1964, 1970) ed. vol.
III, pp. 208-09, Basel (1561) ed. p. 410. References to the Theologia Platonica are hereafter
abbreviated thus: TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, pp. 208-09, B-4IO.
VIII PREFACE
Saitta and Michele Schiavone claim that the neo-Platonic influence is

the major one and that this influence inspired a philosophical position
closely related to the dialectical philosophies of the modern day. These
philosophies claim that the divine is present in the human, driving
man through various stages of development to the divinity which alone
can fulfill him. So also according to Ficino, man moves toward that
which is beyond his knowing drawn on by love or desire, and this love
is the presence of God within him. Schiavone recognizes that Ficino
often uses the language of medieval Christian theologians. He claims,
however, that this is a thinly veiled attempt by Ficino to protect him-
self against accusations of unorthodoxy.2
Kristeller insists that the Scholastic influence is present alongside the
Platonic and that it cannot be dismissed. He points out that there is a
striking similarity between Ficino's thought and that of Aquinas and
lists twenty-four texts in which Fieino mentions, always with approval,
Aquinas himself or his works, especially the Summa Contra Gentiles. s
There is reason to think that Fieino's interest in Aquinas was at least in
part stimulated by a concern for his own orthodoxy. One of Fieino's
contemporaries reports that Fieino was advised by St. Antoninus to
read the Summa Contra Gentiles before reading the Platonists and to take
the Thomistic work as a guard against any heresy he might encounter
in Platonism. But the report suggests that Ficino accepted the work
sympathetically in the role recommended. 4 Also, Kristeller finds no
reason to doubt Ficino's commitment to orthodoxy and much to sug-
gest that it was an important and explicit part of his thought. Ac-
cording to Kristeller, the Thomistic influence on Ficino is a strong one.
The tentative conclusion, however, is that the influence of Augustine,
" ... from whose works Ficino quotes entire pages," is more profound. 5
The evidence turned up by Etienne Gilson and Cornelio Fabro,
together with an older work by Walter Dress, makes it necessary to
reevaluate these views of Ficino's relation to Aquinas. By juxtaposing
long passages from the two works, Walter Dress has irrefutably tied
Ficino's Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans to Aquinas' commentary
on the same epistle. The whole organization of Ficino's work - the
2 Giuseppe Saitta, Marsilio Ficino e la filosofia dell'umanesimo, especially cbs. IV, V, IX;
Michele Schiavone, Problemi filosofici in Marsilio Ficino.
3 Paul Oskar Kristeller, "The Scholastic Background of Marsilio Ficino," in Studies in
Renaissance Thought and Letters p. 39 and note 15.
4 Zenobius Acciaiolus in the preface to his translation of the Affectionum Curatio ofTheodo-
retus in Supplementum Ficinianum v. II, p. 204.
5 Kristeller, The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, pp. 14-15; Eight Philosophers of the Italian
Renaissance, pp. 48--49.
PREFACE IX
argument, the order of ideas, the sentence structure - follows that of

Aquinas. Ficino makes some additions and deletes small parts, but
Aquinas' work is obvious in Ficino's adaptation ofit.6 Etienne Gilson
and Cornelio Fabro have found several passages in Ficino's Platonic
Theology which show the same kind of striking similarity to Aquinas'
Summa Contra Gentiles. 7
This evidence places under grave suspicion any attempt to dismiss
the similarity between Ficino's thought and that of Aquinas as a matter
of mere terminology. Words take their meaning from the context in
which they are used. Dress' book shows that in one work, at least,
Ficino shares with Aquinas not only a certain technical vocabulary, but
the whole development of thought which gives meaning to that vo-
cabulary. The passages presented by Gilson and Fabro are shorter
pieces. However, they contain complete versions of short arguments in
which Ficino and Aquinas agree not only on the general conclusion,
but also on the premisses and assumptions leading to that conclusion,
usually to the point of verbatim correspondence. This shows that at
least the proximate context for the terminology is the same in Ficino's
as it is in Aquinas' text. Kristeller was right to insist that the Thomistic
influence on Ficino cannot be dismissed.
The real task, however, remains to be done. In what manner does
Ficino understand and accept the Thomistic doctrine? What role does
it play in his philosophy? How does this role relate to the influence of
Augustine and the Platonists? To answer these questions, we must
know the full extent to which Ficino has used the writings of Aquinas
as his own. We need a complete catalogue of texts in which the Tho-
mistic influence is obvious. Such a detailed study, however, is available
only for the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. The comparisons
made by Etienne Gilson and Cornelio Fabro are not, and were not
meant to be, complete. They are useful because they point to an area
in which research might prove fruitful.
Gilson and Fabro have found Thomistic texts in Ficino's major
work, the Platonic Theology. This work is a long one intended to be
comprehensive; Ficino wrote it in his maturity and revised it eight
years after the first composition. Unlike the commentaries it is pre-
sented as Ficino's own philosophy, inspired by Plato, not as a study
primarilyidevoted to the Platonic philosophy itself. Most important of
6 Walter Dress, Die Mystik Des Marsilio Ficino, pp. 151-216.
7 Etienne Gilson, "Marsile Ficin et Ie Contra Gentiles," Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale (1957),
101-13; Cornelio Fabro, "Influenza tomistiche nella filosofia del Ficino," Studia Patavina,
1959, 393-4 13.
x PREFACE
all, Ficino devotes this work to the two major issues in his argument
with the Aristotelians at the University of Padua, the unity of philoso-
phy and religion and the immortality of the human soul. The texts
discovered by Gilson are concerned with immortality, those discovered
by Fabro with creation. Thus, Thomistic influence appears in Ficino's
discussion on issues fundamental to his philosophical position.
In the light of this, I have made a complete study of the Platonic
Theology, collecting all the passages which show a striking similarity to
passages in Aquinas' Summa Contra Gentiles. Since there is external and
internal evidence that Ficino read this summa with approval, and no
evidence that he read any other of Aquinas' major works, I have
limited my research to this one Thomistic source. In an appendix to
this study, texts from the Platonic Theology are juxtaposed to texts from
the Summa Contra Gentiles. Comparison of these texts shows that im-
portant sections ofFicino's work are completely dominated by Aquinas'
influence. On central questions like creation, the immortality ofthe soul,
and human beatitude, Ficino follows Aquinas' text argument byargu-
ment. Itis not only from Augustine's works that he quotes entire pages.
On the basis of this evidence, I have sought to determine the role
which Thomistic thought plays in carrying out Ficino's major purpose
in the Platonic Theology. I have found that my predecessors are not mis-
taken in pointing to the Platonic, Augustinian, and Thomistic strains
in Ficino's thought. But there is no reason to deny one in order to assert
the other. All three are present and are primary determinants of
Ficino's position. My study shows how they are woven together and
how each is related to a coherent view of the Platonic Theology. The
analysis of the Thomistic influence is more complete, since this influ-
ence has received less attention from Ficinian scholars. However, in
relating Platonism and Augustinianism to the main purpose ofFicino's
major work, the study contributes some new perspectives for under-
standing Ficino's relations to these sources. And because the study
concentrates on the Platonic Theology alone, it provides a more coherent
view of this work than is now available. It has been possible to follow
Ficino's own order and context in developing his theme, and this order
reveals, more clearly than selective analysis can, the way in which
Ficino works out his position and relates his sources.
The research on which this study is based was originally undertaken
for a doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of Toronto. But
a doctoral thesis requires much attention before it can be presented to
the public in published form. The task of revision has been facilitated
by a grant from Loyola University of Chicago, for which I am grateful.
CHAPTER ONE
THE SEARCH FOR GOD
He who separates the study of philosophy from holy religion errs no

less than the man who would separate the pursuit of wisdom from the
reverence of it. The philosophical quest is a search for God; in him all
things live and have their being; he is the light of all our knowing.
Hence, our seeking after knowledge is not just an attempt to know
things. It is an attempt to find God, and, finding him, to do him
reverence. This is the way Marsilio Ficino begins his major work, the
Platonic Theology, and with this he takes his position outside the Aristo-
telian schools of fifteenth century Italy.
If we understand the secular as a self-governing human endeavor,
functioning within laws derived solely from man's humanity, and ab-
stracting from any relation which man has to a reality above himself,
then the question of the secular and the sacred became explicit in the
Christian West with the development of Latin Averroism in the thir-
teenth century. During this period, philosophical discussion at the
Universities of Paris and Oxford was primarily determined by the
masters of theology, whose philosophizing was set in the context of
Christian revelation. However, as more and more attention was given
to the texts of Aristotle, many of which were newly discovered at this
time, and to those of his Arabian commentator, Averroes, a different
way of doing philosophy began to develop. The professors of philoso-
phy in the Faculty of Arts at Paris, Siger of Brabant chief among them,
defined their profession explicitly as autonomous philosophizing fol-
lowing the model of Aristotle and Averroes. Philosophy began with the
Aristotelian texts, taking from them its principles and some of its ob-
jects for discussion. In the light of these, other questions were con-
sidered and judged. Thm, philosophy had its own realm and its own
laws distinct from those of the faith, and no matter how strong and
sincere a man's belief in the teachings of the Church, his philosophical
2 THE SEARCH FOR GOD
endeavors must follow the laws of philosophy. By the fifteenth century

this way of philosophizing was firmly established in the universities of
Italy and from this vantage had a profound influence on the develop~
ment of modern science.!
In 1462, when Ficino was twenty-nine years old, Cosimo de'Medici,
the head of the ruling family in Florence, gave him a house at Careggi
near Florence and commissioned him to translate the Platonic works
from Greek into Latin. By 1469, Ficino had given to the men of the
West the first complete translation of Plato's dialogues. 2 Not unnatu~
rally, the translator became known in Europe as an expert on Plato~
nism. Around him a group of scholars gathered to study the Platonic
and neo-Platonic writings. Men of learning came to Florence to par-
ticipate in the activities of this circle. They heard readings, commenta~
ries, and lectures, they took part in discussions. If they could not come
to Florence, they wrote letters to Ficino asking him to give his own or
the Platonic position on various questions. The group at Careggi
became known as the Florentine Academy after the Platonic academies
of 01d. 3
Ficino had a very special view of what he was doing in leading this
revival of Platonism. The year after finishing the translation of the
Platonic dialogues, he began the Platonic Theology. With this work, he
officially took upon himself the role of a Platonic philosopher-theo-
logian, and in the preface he explains what this role implies. For Ficino,
to choose Platonism as the primary instance of philosophy is to take a
position on the nature of philosophy itself. According to Plato, says
Ficino, the mind is related to God as sight to the light of the sun. We
cannot know anything without the divine light as we cannot see any-
thing without the sunlight. All things exist and are revealed in a divine
milieu. Hence, no matter where we turn for knowledge, we are looking
for God. Recognizing this, Plato gave to his philosophy an orientation
toward the divine. Whether his discussions are about morals or dialec-
tic, mathematics or physics, they are eventually directed toward the
contemplation and reverence of God. This, says Ficino, is the reason
why the theologians are so much in agreement with Platonic philoso-
1 For studies of Averroism in fifteenth and sixteenth century Italy, see John Herman
Randall, The Career of Philosop", I, pp. 47-88; Bruno Nardi, Saggi sull'Aristotelismo Padovano
dal Secolo XIVal XVI; Kristeller, Renaissance Thought II, chs. IV-VI.
II Raymond Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition During the Middle Ages,
pp.22-36.
3 For Ficino's biography, see Arnaldo della Torre, Stana dell' Accademia Platonica di Firenz.e;
Raymond Marcel, Marsile Ficin; Kristeller, Eight Philosophers, pp. 37-42; Renaissance Thought
II, ch. IV.
THE SEARCH FOR GOD 3
phy. Augustine considers the Platonists to be Christians a little changed.
Because Ficino shares this view, he has written a work of Platonic
theology in which the unity of philosophy and religion is to be made
manifest.
Thus, Ficino intends to oppose the secular Aristotelianism of the
Averroists, but he is more at variance with secularism than with Aristo-
telianism. Through the Platonic philosophy, Ficino proposes a broader
scope for philosophical endeavor than is recognized by the work of the
Aristotelian philosophers. He is not primarily concerned with their
specific conclusions, but emphatically denies the validity of their limit-
ed view. All things are known through God. Hence, all knowledge,
even the knowledge of physics, is about God. Philosophy cannot go its
own way and leave theology aside, because philosophy has no way but
toward the true God revealed to man through Christian teaching.
Ficino has chosen to work within a Platonic framework because Plato
always sees things against the divine background. Platonic philosophy
knows itself to be a search for God.
But he who would know God must first know himself. This is the counsel
which Plato follows and which Ficino intends to follow after him. The
human soul in its knowledge reflects all things. It also bears the image
of the divine countenance. In it, therefore, we meet God himself and
the works of God. Ficino intends to go the old Platonic way, referring
material things to the soul's knowledge of them and the soul itself to
the revealing presence of God. According to Ficino, however, this
movement through self-knowledge is essentially a contemplation of
man's immortality. There is something in man which manifests an
everlasting destiny, and this manifestation both justifies the claim that
philosophy is inseparable from religion and points the way to the ob-
ject of worship.
Ficino's first argument for immortality indicates in a general way
how these three themes are related. Man, he says, suffers from a chronic
dissatisfaction with his life on this earth. Restless in soul, weak in body,
frustrated by the poverty of all he sees, he continually yearns for some-
thing more fulfilling than anything he can find in his earthly environ-
ment. Ifhe had no hope ofa better life, nothing would be more tragic,
more unhappy, more truncated than the life of man. This desire for a
better life is the foundation for Ficino's position on human immortality.
It is the evidence to which he appeals when he assures us that man,
who above all things is the image of God, cannot be doomed to live out
his destiny within the limits and frustrations of his earthly existence.
His destiny must answer the scope of his yearning. If this mortal ex-
istence cannot fill it, then there must be something beyond mortality
which does.
In the Platonic Theology at least, both the desire and its fulfillment are
essentially related to the thirst for knowledge. Ficino ends his first
argument for immortality with the assurance that when the soul loses
its body, it passes into a life of excellence in which its contemplation of
the light is unimpeded by the darkness and uncertainty of the earthly
prison. This description of the afterlife implies that the source of our
unhappiness is our imperfect relationship to the light. The assurance of
our immortality shows that we are destined for a more perfect contem-
plation than this world can afford, and in this vision we shall be made
whole. 4
A generation later, Pietro Pomponazzi, taking up the question of
immortality within the context of secular Aristotelianism, dismisses this
argument. According to Pomponazzi, the weakness of human intelli-
gence is everywhere manifest. Obviously, contemplation is not man's
proper activity, since very few achieve it, and even these do so with
difficulty and with severe limitations. Man's proper activity is moral
action. This kind of activity distinguishes man from brutes and yet
remains within the capabilities of every human individual. Thus, we
call a man a good man because of his virtue, and may affirm this while
denying that he is a good philosopher. The philosophical abilities which
the few achieve are present in the race to serve the good of
society. All activities possible to man must be represented in society
as a whole in order to achieve the good of the community. But only
moral action is necessary to each individual man by reason of his hu-
manity. If he cannot achieve the heights of contemplation, he should
not envy those who do or be dissatisfied with his lot, since that which
he desires is beyond his nature. 5
In the whole history of philosophy, there is not a clearer example of
the fundamental difference between Platonism and Aristotelianism
than this argument between Pomponazzi and Ficino. According to
Aristotle, the being and truth of things is the essence which defines
them in their kind and which is realized in each individual. If we
would know what man is, we must look to those characteristics which
are repeated in every human being. 6 Platonism, however, defines
Ficino, TP, I, I.
4
Pietro Pomponazzi, De Immortalitate Animae cbs. 13-14. Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
5
X 7 II77b25-II78alo.
6 cr. Aristotle, Posterior Anarytics II 19; Metaphysics r (IV) 2 loo3a34-loo¥l; Z (VII)
3 I028b34-1029a32; 6; Nicomachean Ethics 17; 10; X 6-8, especially IJ77b25-u78alo.
things in terms of an ideal. A beautiful piece of sculpture is primarily
an imperfect or incomplete manifestation of absolute and perfect
beauty. Ifmany different things are called by a common name, this is
not because each has the same definitive characteristic, but because
each aspires to the same perfect and absolute version of itself. Truth
and being do not refer to the way things are in themselves, but to the
way in which they measure up to an ideal, as in contemporary par-
lance we say that a person is truly human, or a real human being not
because he has the same general characteristics as other men but be-
cause he shows humanity in a more perfect form. In a Platonic philoso-
phy, therefore, man is defined by his aspirations. 7 Ficino, following the
spirit of this philosophy, points to man's dissatisfaction with his earthly
life, his inability to achieve a perfect vision of the light, and concludes
from this that the proper end of man must be the life to which he
aspires, not that in which he is now confined. Pomponazzi, following
the spirit of Aristotelianism, defines man in terms of what he is and
condemns his high hopes as the unrealistic desire of a man trying to be
more than human.
But Ficino's position does not show itself to its best advantage in the
first tentative argument which opens the Platonic Theology. In order to
strengthen his position, Ficino must show why man's frustrations with
his present condition and his desire for a better life must be taken
seriously. Ficino will do this by showing that man can perform no
properly human activity, no act of knowledge and no act of conscious
desire, without implicitly pursuing a transcendent end. On this issue,
Ficino is more indebted to Christian theology than to Platonism, for
he develops a position which follows the spirit and the letter of Thomas
Aquinas' Summa Contra Gentiles.
It seems strange at first to find Thomas Aquinas in the middle of all
this Platonism. Accustomed as we are to distinguishing Platonism from
Aristotelianism by its theory of knowledge, we expect to find no sympa-
thy between an avowed Platonist and a theologian who, following
Aristotle, placed the source of all knowledge in sensation. But the
position of Thomas Aquinas in Renaissance Italy is a complex one.
Dominicans were all over Italy at this time, and they carried with
them a knowledge of and respect for the thought of their great thir-
teenth-century confrere. Zenobius Acciaiolus, a Dominican and one of
Ficino's contemporaries, reports that St. Antoninus, also a Dominican,
had advised Ficino to read Aquinas' Summa Contra Gentiles before be-
7 Cf. Plato, Republic especially V 474b-48oa; VI 5o¥-VII 518c; Phaedo 63-107.
ginning his work on the Platonic writings. The purpose of this pre-
liminary reading was to protect Ficino against those elements of Plato-
nism which were contrary to Christian doctrine. According to the
report, Ficino accepted it in the role recommended. s Another Domini-
can, Vincent Bandello, wrote a letter to Lorenzo de'Medici concerning
a discussion which had occurred between Lorenzo and Fieino. Ficino
had disagreed with Aquinas' position on the priority of intellect over
will. In his letter, Bandello defends Aquinas' position. 9 Pomponazzi
tells us in the preface of his work on immortality that the treatise grew
out of a discussion with a Dominican student who was attending his
lectures. Pomponazzi had been considering Aquinas' doctrine of hu-
man immortality. He had admitted that it was probably true, since it
accorded with Christian revelation, but he doubted that it could be
justified on strictly philosophical grounds. The student had asked
Pomponazzi to give his own position on this question using natural
reason alone to establish it. Pomponazzi's book on immortality was the
result. Thus, even in a very limited sphere, we find several Dominicans
involved in the philosophical and theological discussion of Ficino's
time, influencing it with their regard for Thomistic theology. And
although both Ficino and Pomponazzi disagree with Aquinas on some
points, both accept him as an authority on Christian theology. Ficino
reveals this attitude explicitly in the Platonic Theology. When he turns
from the "ambiguities" of philosophy, and Platonic philosophy at that,
to the more "direct" route of Christian theology, it is Aquinas' expla-
nation which he presents. For Ficino, Thomas Aquinas is the "splendor
of Christian theology" .10
This acceptance of Thomas Aquinas as the leading exponent of
Christian theology is especially important for Ficino's thought. Ac-
cording to Ficino, philosophy cannot be separated from holy religion,
and Aquinas is the authority on the theology which explicitly joins
itself to that religion. Therefore, to examine the relationship between
Platonism and Thomism in Ficino's thought is to examine Ficino's
position on the unity of philosophy and theology, a unity which mani-
fests the inseparability of philosophy and religion. Ficino repeatedly
juxtaposes Platonism to Christian theology pointing to their funda-
mental agreement. Only once does he point to a difference between
8 Zenobius Acciaiolus in the preface to his translation of the Affictionum CUTatio of Theodo-
retus in Supplementum Ficinianum vol. II, p. 204-
9 For the text of Bandello's letter, see Kristeller, I.e Thomisme et la Pensee ltalienne de la
Renaissance, pp. 195-278.
10 TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, pp. 208-09, B-4IO.
them, when he takes Christian theology to be a less ambiguous and
more direct route to beatitude. This implies that Christian theology is
simply the search for God in its more advanced and explicit form.
Ficino's task in the Platonic Theology is threefold. The primary pur-
pose of the work is to oppose secular Aristotelianism by proving that
philosophy cannot be separated from religion; philosophy is a search
for God and hence is necessarily related to the worship of its object.
Ficino accomplishes this purpose by showing that the desire for God is
implicit in every act of human knowledge and every act of human will;
he confirms this conclusion by uncovering the fundamental agreement
between philosophy and theology. The second part of the task, the
consideration of human immortality, serves the first; it reveals that the
desire for God goes beyond the limits of mortal existence and cannot
be in vain, thus establishing a continuity between this life and the next.
This introduces a third task which transforms the whole enterprise.
Ficino's philosophy attempts to teach man a point of view. It tries to
lay open to him the divine dimension of his world. Its arguments and
conclusions are meant to show that man himself and the world around
him are flooded with the divine presence. The purpose of all this is to
make human life on this earth continuous with the life hereafter by
drawing man even now to his proper place with God. The contem-
plation of man's immortality is part of this journey to God. Immor-
tality is not just a question to be asked and answered. It is an attitude
to be established. To "know thyself" immortal is to "know thyself" en
route to a perfect union with God, and the movement toward that
destiny begins now. Therefore, Ficino attempts to provide a guide by
which the soul can make its way through the levels of knowing and
approach its final blessedness. Thus, he begins the work of the Platonic
Theology with an exhortation to his readers:
Oh, heavenly souls desirous of the heavenly fatherland, let us disengage
the bonds of earthly shackles, so that, borne up by Platonic wings and with
God as our guide, we may freely fly to the heavenly seat, where at last we
shall contemplate in happiness the excellence of our race)l
11 ..... solvamus obsecro, caelestes animi caelestis patriae cupidi, solvamus quamprimum
vincula compedum terrenarum, ut alis sublati platonicis ac Deo duce, in sedem aetheream
liberius pervolemus, ubi statim nostri generis excellentiam feliciter contemplabimur." (TP,
I, I, v. I, p. 38,8-79).
CHAPTER TWO
THE APPROACH TO GOD THROUGH

UNITY AND POWER
Ficino begins the Platonic Theology by distinguishing in the universe five

levels of unity and efficacious power. This is the initiation into the
Platonic point of view. It is the first attempt to explain why to "know
thyself" is to know the world and God, for the world structure is unified
by its relationship to the divinity, and the human soul has a central
position in this structure. As Ficino develops this integral view of the
universe, he begins to lay bare the principle according to which the
divine dimension of man's world can be revealed.
The lowest level in the hierarchy of the universe is that of corpore-
ality. According to the Platonists, says Ficino, corporeality is extended
matter. As extended it lacks unity and all the requirements for action.
An agent must have the power to act and to infuse its action into the
patient. Consequently, it must be powerful in itself, disposed toward
motion, united to the patient and capable of penetrating it. Because a
body is by nature extended, it has parts, bulk, and density. Because of
its bulk, it is sluggish and hard to move. Because of its density, it cannot
share the same place with another body; hence, it cannot be united to
it or penetrate it. The corporeal, therefore, cannot infuse action into
another. Neither can it bring forth action out of itself. Power is di-
minished by multitude, increased by unity. Thus, aridity, because it
unifies, increases the power of heat and cold, whereas humidity, be-
cause it disperses, decreases it. Since corporeality is spread out in parts,
it is both impotent and multiple.
The concept of multiplicity, however, does not convey fully the
complete lack of unity which Ficino attributes to corporeality. A thing
which is composed of parts may yet have unity in those parts, but a
body, because it is extended, is by nature divisible; it is defined as that
which is not one. Hence, it is divisible without end. There is nothing in
the nature of corporeality to account for unity.1
1 TP, I, 2, v. I, pp. 40--42, B-7g-80. Cf. Procius, The Elements qf Theology # 80.
THE APPROACH TO GOD THROUGH UNITY AND POWER 9
When Ficino considers the hierarchy of the universe in another place,
he explains this lack of unity in terms of mutability. Matter is not deter-
mined to any species or kind. Matter does not explain why a thing is
hot or cold, black or white, dog, cat, horse or house. Matter explains
the ability to change, and nothing more. Because it is a capacity for
many different kinds of things, it renders a thing capable of changing
from one kind to another. Matter, therefore, has nothing within itself
to hold it to one determination; its very nature is to be in potency to
many; left to itself, it would be in constant change. Thus, stability is a
kind of unity, and this unity, too, is lacking to corporeality.2
Ficino's discussion of the corporeal presupposes an inevitable link
between unity and the power to act. Because he observes that power in
things varies with the degree of unity, he concludes that the two neces-
sarily accompany each other. Corporeality is by definition divisible;
hence it is completely lacking in efficacious power. Its nature is to
undergo action, not to initiate it.
Yet corporeal things do act, and they are one and stable. If this
unity and power cannot be explained by their corporeality, there must
be something else to account for it. The way in which the actions of
corporeal things differ from each other indicates that qualities have an
influence on these actions. Although all bodies are alike in being cor-
poreal, they are not all alike in their actions; e.g. hot water warms, but
cold water cools that with which it is in contact. Qualities leave a
stamp on the actions of a body, characterizing them and distinguishing
them from others. This is because quality is a form and a form is a
principle of being; it causes a thing to be in a certain way - hot, cold,
smooth, rough, yellow, blue, red. The way a thing is determines the
way it acts. If it is something hot, it gives heat to other things. Hence,
quality is a source of action because it is a source of being. 3
Ficino has previously linked power and unity; now he finds the root
of power in being. Because form is a principle of being, it is a principle
of operating. But this implies that the form is also a principle of unity,
for the power to act has been necessarily linked to this. Hence, when
Ficino considers the hierarchy of the universe again, he attributes a
unifYing function to the form. Matter is without unity because it is
undetermined in species or kind. Left without determination it would
be completely unstable, flowing from one state to another. Quality
2 TP, III, I, v. I, p. 128, B-1 15.

3 TP, I, 2, v. I, p. 42, B-80-811 (The pages of the Basel edition are mianumbered. This
reference is to the first page numbered 81).
10 THE APPROACH TO GOD THROUGH UNITY AND POWER
unifies the body by stabilizing it, determining it to one of the many

possibilities for which it has a capacity.4 Thus, the role of quality as
determining the body to be of a certain kind, although previously
establishing it as a principle of being and hence of operation, here
establishes it as a principle of unity.
Because quality is a source of unity for the body, it must be more
unified than corporeality. Unlike corporeality, it is not by nature ex-
tended. Point and harmony, for example, have no extension, yet they
are qualities. Those qualities which do have extension do not vary in
accordance with it; a body which has been divided has the full nature
of whiteness in both parts, the same nature formerly present in the
whole, but neither part has the full quantity or extension of the whole.
Thus, quality in itself is not extended; and since division comes about
by reason of extension, quality is indivisible. 5
Quality, then, is above corporeality because it is indivisible in itself
and a source of action. As a form it has unity and power which cor-
poreality does not possess. But this is not enough. Qualities are so in-
volved in the corporeal that the unity and power proper to them are
rendered ineffective. Although a quality is unquantified and hence
indivisible in itself, it is divided by reason of the body in which it exists.
The division of a white thing results in the division of its whiteness.
Each part may be equally white, but the original unity has been broken.
A quality cannot hold a body together and make it one thing.
The influence on action is equally weak. A quality in a certain sense
is material. It comes to be and passes away with the body to which it
belongs; it cannot continue to be unless it continues to be in matter.
Thus, quality does not subsist; it is not that which exists. Color, tem-
perature, texture, harmony, these are not things, but characteristics of
things, and characteristics do not act. They have an influence on ac-
tion, but they do not perform it. This inadequacy for operation is
rooted in the relationship to being. That which acts is that which
exists, and quality exists only in something else. Besides, a quality
begins to be and passes away in the same moment. In the act of coming
to be, it ceases to be. Hence, it never takes full possession of its act of
existing. Because quality does not have the sufficiency for existing, it
does not have the sufficiency for acting. 6 If, therefore, the actions of
4 TP, III, I, v. I, p. H18, B-1 15.

5 TP, I, 2, v. I, pp. 43-44, B-8Il.
8 TP, I, 3, v. I, pp. 44-48, B-81 L lh 2 ; pp. 51-52, B-841-83; 1,4, v. I, p. 57, B-85; XI, 6,
v. II, pp. 136-37, B-259.
THE APPROACH TO GOD THROUGH UNITY AND POWER II
bodies are to be explained, there must be a higher principle which

makes up for the deficiencies of quality.
Quality is superior to corporeality because it is a form. It calls for a
higher principle because it is not a perfect form. By making a thing to
be of a certain kind, a form makes it one and efficacious. But a form can
unify the body and move it to act only if it is not involved in the ex-
tension, divisibility, and consequent impotence of corporeality. If an
infinite series is to be avoided, there must be an incorporeal form which
has unity as something of its own, not as something given to it by an-
other principle. 7 This unity is the unity of substance. A body is one
whole because all its parts and all its vacillating conditions belong to
one thing which maintains its identity throughout. 8 Throughout his
body and throughout his history a man is himself. His physical and
temporal elements are a living whole because they are his. He exists;
they exist in him. Ficino calls this unifying principle soul or life. Life,
he says, must be a certain indivisible power, since death takes place
through division and dissolution. Also, life in us reveals itself as some-
thing uniting contrary movements into an ordered whole. 9
The soul, however, must account not only for the unity and stability
of the body, but also for its power or its ability to move itself. Qualities,
as we have seen, must be in some way involved in the source of this
action, for they leave their mark on the action; for example, because
wood is hot, its act is an act of heating. But because qualities are de-
pendent in their own action, they cannot fully account for that of the
body. If, then, the soul is to supply for this deficiency, it must be free
from the dependence characteristic of quality, without, however, elimi-
nating the role of quality as the source of operation.
Since a cause produces that which is like itself, there must be a pro-
portion or likeness between the soul and the qualities through which it
causes the body to act. Qualities are completely mobile: mobile in
themselves, since they come to be and pass away in the same instant;
mobile in their operations, since these operations are constantly chang-
ing their proportion. If the soul were in no way mobile, there would be
no mark of the cause evident in the effect. Why should something
completely stable produce something completely unstable? Hence, the
soul must be in some way mobile. Yet it cannot be completely so, for
then it would be as dependent in its actions as the qualitIes it supports.
7 TP, I, 3, v. I, p. 51, B-841 ; p. 54, B-83; p. 55, B-842.
8 TP, I, 3, v. I, p. 4, B-812; I, 4, v. I, pp. 56-58, B-842....85; III, I, v. I, pp. 131-32,
B-I16; p. 132, B-I17; p. 129, B-II5.
II TP, I, 3, v. I, pp. 51-52, B-8443.
But If a thing is mutable in essence, i.e. if change belongs to it by

nature, it can have no stability whatsoever. This is the case with quali-
ties. Therefore, the soul must be mobile in its operations, but stable in
essence.!o
To say this in another way, what is such by reason of another must
be reduced to that which is such through itself. That which bestows
mobility must possess it. But if we are to avoid an infinite regress, that
which is the ultimate source of motion must possess motion by reason
of no other. Therefore, the soul is mobile through itself. It moves as does
quality, but not by reason of another; it moves by reason of itself. It has
within itself the source of its own motion. Source and receiver are the
same. There is no passing from agent to patient, but only the natural
movement of the essence. This internal power of moving we call life.
It is the soul, then, which accounts for the action of the body. The
soul gives to the body this internal power of moving which is called life.
If the soul is present to the body, then the body moves from within; the
body lives; it has a power of motion within itself, i.e. the soul. This is
the reason why a body, powerless in itself, can move itself to act. But if
it is without soul, it can only move in virtue of an external agent.!!
Thus, the rational soul is simpler than quality, being undivided in
the body. It has more stability than quality, remaining immutable in
its essence. It is more powerful than quality, having the sufficiency to
10 TP, 1,4, v. I, p. 58, B-85; III, I, v. I, pp. 131-3!l, B-II6.

11 TP, III, I, v. I, pp. 133-34, B-117-18; III,!l, v. I, p. 14!l, B-I!lI. Ficino does not
explain what role the lower forms of life have to play in the hierarchy of the universe. He
says explicitly that the soul which properly belongs to the third level of the universe is the
rational soul. The place of plants and brute animals is not considered. Ficino once compares
the relation between the rational and irrational soul to that between a body and its shadow.
(1,3, v. I, p. 55, B-842) But Ficino does not explain whether this is an irrational soul which
belongs to human nature along with the rational or one proper to brute animals. In other
discussions, Ficino distinguishes between the true self-movement of the rational soul and the
less powerful forms of self-movement in brute animals and plants. The judgment according
to which the brute animal governs his movement is one necessitated by the condition of the
body and the object presenting itself to the senses. For example, if a hungry dog becomes
aware of food, he necessarily moves towards it. The brute animal, then, does not truly move
itself. Vegetative beings have no judgment whatsoever, not even a necessitated one, from
which their motion can take its source. They are less in control of their action than brute
animals are. However, since intellectual knowledge is concerned with universals and action
with singulars, the rational soul in its judgment is open to many modes of action. The form
which determines its judgment is the universal ratio of goodness. There are an infinite num-
ber of singulars falling under this universal ratio, and the rational soul, determined only by
the universal, is free to choose anyone of them. Thus. the rational soul, in moving itself to
act, is not necessarily drawn by the external object. It has within itself a form common to all
goods, the universal essence of goodness, and in the light of this it judges the particular goods
which participate in it. The rational soul, far from being subject to the external object,
subjects the external object to itself, passing judgment upon it. Thus, it dominates and
controls its own action and is truly self-moving. (IX, 4, v. II, pp. !lQ-!lI, B-!l07-o8)
move in virtue of itself. The soul is a true form because it subsists in

itself and not in the body. Hence, it has the simplicity and efficacious
power proper to a form.
The rational soul provides for the weaknesses of qualities; but it is
not without its own inadequacies. Although it remains undivided in
dimension and stable in substance, it is mobile in its operations. Its
extrinsic operations are drawn out in time and divided in its successive
moments; it nourishes and sustains the body, not instantaneously, but
little by little. Its intrinsic operations are dispersed and disunited in
discourse; it acquires knowledge gradually; it is not at once in full
possession of its objects. In operation the soul is neither one nor stable.
It vacillates between potency and act, between the capacity for some-
thing which is not as yet possessed and the actual possession of it. But
that action which produces its effect instantaneously and that intrinsic
operation which has the whole of itself all at once, these are more
perfect. That which moves does so because it does not rest in itself, i.e.
because it is not satisfied with itself. It is moved through the desire to
attain something which will render it more perfect than it is in its
present state. Thus, it seeks something it lacks, something which it
cannot give to itself or have from itself. If this were not so, there would
be no necessity for it to change. Therefore, it attains that which it seeks
from something more perfect than itself and better endowed.
What the soul seeks and does not at once possess is understanding. It
varies between understanding and not understanding, manifesting that
it can remain itself without this act and hence does not have the act
solely from itself. It is dependent in its understanding on something
other than itself which always has what the soul can only acquire.
Above the soul, which moves itself because it is in need, is that which
remains immobile either because it is in need of nothing or because it
has already been satisfied. Above that which moves from the capacity
for knowledge to the act of knowing stands that which is always in the
act of knowing. 12
Ficino, in presenting his own position, does not explain very clearly
how that which is above the soul determines the soul to the act of
understanding. He is more explicit in explaining the thinking of the
Platonists on this question. According to the Platonists, he says, the
rational soul by a certain continual illumination knows or has a sense
of God and the angels. As a result of this awareness, the soul seeks to
12 TP, I, 5, v. I, pp. 58-60, B-85-86; 1,6, v. I, p. 67, B-8g; III, 2, v. I, p. 141, B-120.
make itself into a likeness of these in its operations. The motion through
which it pursues this end has its proper source in the soul. But it is
roused to this activity by an end outside itself,13
Up to this point Ficino has established that there is something su-
perior to the soul. But since the needs of the soul which are here invoked
as evidence can be fittingly fulfilled by God directly, why does he feel
justified in positing angels or minds on the next level above souls?
Perhaps because in his estimation the soul is an imperfect mind, the
angel a perfect one, and God who is truth itself is above mind. Although
the rational soul is a mind, i.e. a being capable of intellectual activity, it
is not the most proper kind of mind. To be a soul and to be a mind are
not exactly the same. There are things which live, and hence have
souls, but which have no intellectual activity. A soul is rational not
because it is a soul, but because it is a special kind of soul, and its intel-
lectuality does not exhaust its essence. A soul is a principle oflife and of
life functions for the body to which it belongs. Hit is also an intellectual
being, it is such only in the highest part of itself. Thus, the rational soul
has some activities which it performs only in union with the body, while
its intellectual activity is one which the body cannot share. The rational
soul, then, is an imperfect mind. Although it is proper to mind to be
separate from the body, the intellectual soul is present to a body, a
principle of life for it, and carried along with it. If, therefore, the ex-
istence of the perfect can be assumed from the imperfect, there must be
above the rational soul a mind which is pure mind and hence com-
pletely separate from bodies,14
Even a pure mind, however, is distinct from and inferior to truth, for
mind is dependent on truth for its knowledge, but truth has no need of
mind. There is truth without mind. Things which are not minds are
yet true. Therefore, although the mind is dependent on truth, truth
remains distinct from and independent of the mind and hence superior
to it. Hpure minds are to be posited above souls in the hierarchy of the
universe, God cannot belong to this level. God is not a mind; he is not
even the perfect instance in the genus of minds. I5 On the next
level above rational souls stand the angels - pure minds understanding
all their objects in one perpetual act of knowing.
But the angel, too, manifests the need for something superior to itself,
13 TP, III, I, v. I, p. 136, B-1 18. Cf. Plotinus, Enneads V-I-3; Proclus, The Elements of
Theology # 20, 175, 190, 192.
14 TP, I, 5, v. I, pp. 60--63, B-86-87.
15 TP, I, 6, v. I, pp. 69-70, B-go.
as we have seen. Above it is truth itself, on which it depends for its

knowledge. Above it, too, is unity itself, which is the cause of its being
one. The angel belongs to the level of the universe next to the soul, and
the soul is both mobile and multiple. If the angel were both immobile
and simple, it would share no characteristic with the soul. Two ex-
tremes would be proximate to each other without a middle level. Hence,
the angel must be either mobile or multiple, since it is next to the soul
in the hierarchy, but not both, since it is on a level above the soul and
superior to it. But since unity is the foundation or cause of stability, a
thing which is completely unified is also completely stable; it lacks
both multiplicity and mobility. In order to be both like the soul and
different from it, the angel must be multiple but not mobile.
Multiplicity in the angel is that proper to intellects, these being
composed of essence, being, power of understanding, and the act of
understanding, each of which is in some way different from the others.
(Ficino does not explain here how or why these differ; he will take this
up in another discussion.) But the multiple is dependent on unity, for it
is in need of being united. Unity, on the contrary, is sufficient for itself;
it has no need of multiplicity. Therefore, the angel, being multiple, is
dependent on something above itself, something which is not only com-
pletely immobile, but also completely simple. Above the angel, there
must be unity itself. This unity itself is God, who is the most powerful of
all things, for power is unity and absolute unity is absolutely power-
ful. 16
Also above the angel there must be goodness itself, since the angel
cannot account for goodness in things. As the soul properly is the
source of vital motion, and hence does not account for things lacking
life, so the mind has as its proper area the determinations of things, the
specific kinds they fall into, the way they are, the order of forms, and
does not account for what lies beyond this realm. But beyond form
there is prime matter, that primitive capacity for determination which
is open to various possibilities without calling for anyone of them. It
has no form in virtue of itself and hence remains outside the area ofthe
mind's efficacy. Yet it is good because it has a tendency to something
good, i.e. it has the capacity for being formed. Mind, then, does not
account for goodness. Hence, all things strive for the good, but all do
not strive after mind, this being unattainable for some, and there is no
frustrated tendency in nature. Moreover, those things which have
16 TP, I, 6, v. I, pp. 67-68, B-89; III, I, v. I, p. 129, B-1 15.

mind are not satisfied with this alone but seek beyond it for the good.
Finally, intelligence itself is sought because it is a good. Consequently,
above pure minds there must be goodness itself to account for goodness
in things.17
Thus, we ascend from the level of the angels to unity itself, truth
itself, goodness itself, and these are one and the same. If we observe
unity, truth, and goodness in things, we find that they are the same.
Unity is simplicity, i.e. lack of composition. Truth is purity; for a thing
to be true is for it to be completely and purely itself. True wine is that
which is wine only, unmixed with any foreign element. Thus, the truth
of a thing consists in its simplicity or lack of composition; a thing is true
because it is one. It is good for the same reason. It has well-being when
it is united with itself and its principle; for a thing to be good is for it to
be itself, pure and unadulterated. Thus, unity, truth, and goodness are
the same in things. Now what is one and the same in things must be one
and the same in their cause, since an effect retains the vestiges of its
cause and is similar to it. All things participate in and seek after unity,
truth, and goodness. Hence, unity itself, truth itself, and goodness itself
must be the originating cause and final fulfillment of everything. If,
then, the cause has so produced its effect that unity, truth, and good-
ness are the same in it, this must be because they are the same in the
cause itself.
In this one cause which is unity, truth, and goodness, the hierarchy
of the universe achieves its summit. Ficino sees the universe as a hier-
archy of causes, the superior beings providing for the needs of the
inferior. If the superior has no efficacious function in relation to the
inferior, there is no reason to posit it at all. Therefore, Ficino refuses to
posit anything above unity, truth, and goodness because such a being
cannot receive anything from outside itself. Pure unity, truth, and
goodness cannot be dependent. To be dependent is to be composite,
since the effect has in its constitution not only itself, but that which it
cannot have from itself and must receive from a cause. Such a compos-
ite would be one, true, and good, but it would not be unity itself, truth
itself, and goodness itself, since it would not be purely these. Thus,
unity, truth, and goodness cannot be caused. Moreover, there can be
nothing superior to unity unless there is something more powerful than
unity. But since power consists in unity, there can be nothing more
17 TP, 1,6, v. I, pp. 71-72, B-go-gl.

powerful than unity itself, for there can be nothing more unified. Unity
is power and unity itself must be omnipotent. IS
This last argument makes explicit a principle which underlies Fici-
no's whole discussion of the hierarchy of beings. The dependence which
one level of the universe has upon another is explained primarily in
terms of unity and power. At each level there are beings more unified
and more efficacious than their inferiors and accounting for the unity
and power of the things below them. (There is one possible exception
to this. The way in which the rational soul depends upon the angel,
especially for its unity, is not clearly explained. Ficino seems to be
more concerned with the angel's superiority than with its causality.)
But unity and power are not two different principles. If the variation in
power runs parallel to the variation in unity, it is because there is a
very close relationship between the two. Ficino has referred to this
relationship several times. In the discussion of corporeality, he observes
that a thing is more powerful when it is more unified, and from this he
assumes an inevitable connection between unity and power. The insta-
bility of quality is given as the reason for its lack of power; it cannot act
unless it is strengthened by a certain indivisible power called life. But
when considering the highest level of the universe, Ficino is explicit:
unity is power.
Up to this point, Ficino has given no reason for identifying unity and
power. But this reason becomes manifest when he reviews the hier-
archy of the universe in terms of potency and act. To receive and to
undergo influences is proper to corporeality. Hence, in corporeal na-
ture there is the potency which the theologians call receptive and pas-
sive, i.e. the capacity to be determined or made to be in a certain way.
But if to receive is characteristic of the corporeal, to act and to impose
influences is characteristic of the incorporeal. Whereas passive potency
or the ability to be caused belongs to the nature of the corporeal, act or
the power to cause belongs to the nature of the incorporeal. Since a
quality is neither itself a body nor an essential characteristic of the cor-
poreal, it is incorporeal and therefore has some power to act. But being
received in the body and divided in it, it becomes corporeal, infected
with the passivity of the body, and thus a composite of act and potency.
The soul holds itself alooffrom the receptivity ofthe body, and thus it is
18 TP, II, I, v. I, pp. 73-74, B-g2. "Ille quidem est Deus, tanto rerum potentissimus
omnium, quanto est omnium simplicissimus, siquidem in simplicitate consistit unio, in
unitate potestas." (1,6, v. I, p. 68, B--8g) "Neque iniuria multitudinem angelo assignamus,
quia si sit perfecta et absolutissima unitas, erit summa et interminata potestas, siquidem vir-
tus in unitate consistit." (III, I, v. I, p. 130, B-116)
an act. But it retains in its mobility a receptivity of its own. For what-
ever moves seeks something lacking to itself which must be given to it
from without. Thus, the soul is an act because it moves something, but
it is not pure act because it also receives something.
Although the angel, unlike the soul, is immobile, it is not pure act. It
is most fitting that God, who is completely removed from matter, also
be completely removed from the receptivity characteristic of it. God
must be pure act. But if this is so, there can be no other which is such,
for act itself is one. By nature and definition pure act is unique. A plu-
rality is possible only if some foreign element is introduced to dis-
tinguish one from another. This destroys the purity of the act. Such a
composite is not absolute act, but act of a certain kind. According to
Ficino, this is what Plato means in the Philebus when he says that God is
term or limit and has nothing of the infinite, but everything else is a
composite of the limit and the infinite. The term or limit is called
act; the infinite is called potency because it is undetermined in itself,
determined and formed by act.1 9
The angel, therefore, is a composite of potency and act. Because it
does not possess within its essence the objects of its knowledge, because
it remains distinct from truth and dependent upon it, its essence is in
potency to its act of understanding and receptive of those forms by
which it understands. The angel is immobile, not because it has no
need of anything outside itself, but because that need is completely ful-
filled in the first moment ofits creation. The angel, therefore, has multi-
plicity because it is dependent for its act on something outside itself.2o
In this review of the hierarchy of the universe, the characteristics
which Ficino has previously considered as signs of disunity - division of
quality in the body, mobility in the operations of the rational soul, the
angel's dependence for understanding on God who is truth itself - are
considered as signs of impotence. To receive or undergo influences is
called potency; to do things and impose influences is called act. This
composition of receptivity and efficacious power is what constitutes
multiplicity in a thing.
But unity and power are not the only principles determining the
hierarchic structure of the universe. Although unity is the dominant
theme in the discussion of this structure, being, too, is associated with
19 Plato, Philebus 23c-3Ia. For a discussion of Ficino's use of the Philebus, see ch. 4,
PP·55-56 .
20 TP, III, I, v. I, pp. 130-31, B-1 16.
efficacious power and considered to be a necessary condition of action.

Thus, Ficino says that a thing acts according as it is, i.e. the mode of
action follows the mode of being. The form is a principle of action
because it is a principle of being. Full possession of the act of existing is
necessary for action. Immediately following the discussion of the hier-
archy, Ficino brings together its three themes - unity, power, and
being - in a series of arguments for divine omnipotence.
God is all-powerful because he is unity itself, because he is pure act,
and because he is being itself. As there is the greatest weakness in
dispersion, so there is the greatest power in unity. Pure unity, there-
fore, has power unlimited.
Act by its nature is not limited unless it belongs to a subject in which
there is some passive potency. As we have seen, to act is to do some-
thing, to impose influences, to bring something about, to be causal.
Act is efficacy. Hence, act can be limited in its causal power only by
something other than itself, i.e. the passive potency which marks a
thing not as cause but caused. Since the divine act is pure act, it has no
limits.
Pure being is infinite. All the richness of the things which are or can
be falls within the nature of being, for being is simply the reality of
what is and includes all the perfection which can be. And being can be
given to and known in an infinite variety of things. Hence, being itself
includes infinite perfection. Also, there can be no lack in being itself.
Being is the positive, the 'is'; lack is the negative, the 'is not'. To lack
anything is antithetical to the nature of being. Therefore, if being is
limited, this is not because it is being, but because its cause has a
limited power for producing it or that to which it belongs has a limited
capacity for receiving it. The divine being is neither given nor received.
God is not caused, and his being does not belong to anything in him; in
God being itself is that which exists. Hence, God has the infinity proper
to being itself and this involves unlimited power.
Finally, God produces into being that which in no way is. The effect
of his act has no reality whatsoever, not even the potency to be, except
as received from him. Such an effect is infinitely removed from act. Yet
the power of God brings it into being. To do this the divine power must
be infinite. 21
These arguments, following one upon the other in Ficino's text,
bring together two views of the world and two schools of influence.
21 TP, II, 4, v. I, pp. 82-83, B-g6.

When Ficino establishes divine omnipotence from God's nature as

unity itself and pure act, he refers back to the discussion of the hier-
archical structure of the universe. This discussion considers the world
and its ultimate cause in terms of unity and power. But the arguments
based on the infinity of pure being and the infinite gap between being
and absolute non-being point ahead to the discussion of primary and
secondary causality. This discussion considers the world and its cause
in terms of being and act. Thus, the divine dimension can be discovered
by contemplating unity in the world, as we have seen, or by contem-
plating its being, as we shall see (chapters 3-4). The arguments for divine
omnipotence bring these two views together by calling God unity itself,
pure act, being itself in the same context. If unity is identical with act
and efficacious power, so also is being; and the ultimate cause of all
things, whose power is the full and final explanation of all reality, is
both pure unity and pure being.
Ficino's first discussion of the hierarchy of the universe has a Platonic
tone. Corporeality consists of matter and quantity and is divisible to
infinity; quality is completely unstable; the soul moves itself in imi-
tation of pure minds; pure mind has all its knowledge in one act; it is
dependent in its knowing on an object superior to itself, dependent for
unity on that which is absolutely one, and dependent for desirability
on goodness itself. All these are Platonic themes, and Fieino, at one
time or another, attributes each of them to a Platonic source. 22 Even
where no such references are made the influence of Proclus is evident.
22 (I) The body consists of matter and quantity which is divisible to infinity:
TP, I, 2, V. I, p. 40, B-7g-80; p. 42, B-80; III, I, v. I, p. 128, B-1I5.
PrOChlS, The Elements of Theology # 80.
(2) Quality is totally unstable:
TP, 1,4, v. I, pp. 56-57, B-85; XI, 6, v. II, pp. 136-37, B-259.
Plato, Timaeus 49d-50b. Cf. Crarylus 439c-40d.
(3) The soul moves itself in imitation of pure minds and God:
TP, III, I, v. I, p. 136, B-1l8.
Plotinus Enneads V-I-3. C£ Proclus, The Elements of Theology # 20, 175, 190, 192.
(4) Pure mind has all its knowledge in one act:
TP, I, 6, v. I, p. 67, B-89.
Plotinus, Enneads V-I-4; V-3-16. Cf. Proclus, The Elements of Theology # 170, 190.
(5) Mind is dependent for unity and desirability on unity itself and goodness itself:
TP, 1,6, v. I, p. 68, B-8g, pp. 71-72, B-go-gI; II, v. I, p. 75, B-g3.
Plotinus, Enneads V-3-12; VI-7-20; VI-g-6.
(6) Mind is dependent in intellection on an object superior to itself:
TP, I, 6, v. I, pp. 69-70, B-go.
Plotinus, Enneads VI-7-40; VI-g-6.
Ficino calls this object truth itself, and this causes some difficulty in relation to his dis-
cussion of the one and the good above being and truth. We shall consider this difficulty in
ch·5·
Each level in the hierarchy of the universe is related to its superior as

moved to mover; thus, each level is superior in efficacious power to the
one below it. The hierarchy of the universe consists of various grades of
power, and power is identified with unity. This framework within
which Ficino's whole discussion proceeds is taken from Proclus. 23 Also,
Ficino insists that efficacious power belongs only to the incorporeal;
the corporeal is completely impotent because of its divisibility. He
argues that quality is perishable because it is divided in the body and
because it belongs to a substance by which it can be abandoned. He
places the soul between mind which is completely stable and quality
which is completely unstable, and concludes that the soul is stable in
essence, but mobile in operation. These themes are to be found in
Proclus' The Elements of Theology.24 Thus, in his first search for the
divinity, Ficino takes the Platonists as his guides.
When, however, he recasts the hierarchy of the universe in terms of
potency and act, the tone is no longer Platonic. Ficino himself calls
attention to this, for he attributes the notion of passive potency to "the
theologians" and claims that the Platonic concepts oflimit and infinite
correspond to the act-potency relationship he is considering. He admits,
therefore, that act and potency are notions taken from another school
of influence than the Platonic and that some explanation is required in
order to bring the two together. Thus, he uses the act-potency compo-
sition to explain the correspondence between unity and power which
he has assumed in the first and more Platonic discussion of the hier-
archy of the universe. And he points to the Platonic concepts of limit
and infinite in order to confirm that the Platonic and the theological
views on this issue can be harmonized. He will have more to say about
this in a later discussion. 25
Ficino does not mention Thomas Aquinas explicitly in this re-
formulation of the hierarchical structure of the universe. However, in
this discussion and a later one, he attributes the doctrine of potency
and act to the theologians, and Aquinas is, in Fieino's estimation, the
leading exponent of Christian theology.26 Moreover, while presenting
the Platonic view of the hierarchy of the universe, Ficino occasionally
hints at a doctrine of being which is characteristically Thomistic. A
thing acts according as it is, he says. Action comes from the form from
23 Proclus, The Elements of Theology # 20, 61-{i2, 86, 95.

24 Ibid., # 48, 50, 80, 106, 187, 190-92, 197. Cf. Plotinus, Enneads VI-4-1.
25 Cf. ch. 4.
26 Cf. ch. I, p. 6-7.
which being comes. The whole act of existing is necessary for action.
Even in a completely immobile being there is a composition of essence
and being. Later, when we consider the Ficinian doctrine of being in
detail, we shall see the great extent to which the thought of Thomas
Aquinas has determined it and the central role which the potency-act
relationship plays in it (chapters 3-5)' But there need be nothing tenta-
tive about the conclusion that the influence of Thomas Aquinas is
present in Ficino's arguments for divine omnipotence. The arguments
based on the infinity of being and the infinite power necessary for
creation are taken almost word for word from the texts of Aquinas. And
the argument from the infinity of pure act is very similar to one used by
Aquinas. 27
Thus, Ficino integrates the Platonic doctrine of unity and power,
developed in his first discussion of the hierarchy of the universe, with
the Thomistic doctrine of being and act, developed in the later dis-
cussion of primary and secondary causality. In the arguments for di-
vine omnipotence, he places the two side by side. Causality, is the
concept by reason of which the Platonic world view is related to the
Thomistic.
The hierarchy of the universe involves two kinds of causality. The
first is that of originating the causal act, performing it so to speak. Both
corporeality and quality must depend upon the soul for this; only in
virtue of the soul can a body perform an act. The soul itself, however,
is a self-moving or life principle, bringing forth action out of itself,
needing no other principle to initiate it. Thus, the soul's dependence on
the beings above it is of a different kind from that of the body and its
qualities on the soul. The soul needs an end for the sake of which it
initiates action, and the beings on the higher levels of the hierarchy
provide this. Their causality in relation to the soul is one of attraction.
Two things are necessary for this efficacy: the end itself must be de-
sirable; and the desirability must be made known to the soul. Pure
minds have a similar dependence on God. Unlike the soul, they pos-
sess their knowledge fully and perpetually without having to acquire it.
Nevertheless, they are dependent for it on truth itselfwhich is above them.
The rational soul has a key position in the hierarchical structure of the
universe. It is the source of all motion in the material world. Yet its own
action is directed to an end which transcends this world. Through the
soul's power, therefore, the whole material cosmos moves toward God.
27 Appendix # 3, 4, 2.
CHAPTER THREE
THE APPROACH TO GOD THROUGH BEING
Causal power according to Ficino's discussion of the hierarchical

structure of the universe, is the ability to perform an action or produce
an effect. In the context of this discussion, act means operation, just as
when we say 'to act' we mean 'to do something'. Even the power of
pure truth and pure goodness is related to operation, for it is the power
to call forth action in rational souls and pure minds. But when Ficino
considers action in terms of being, as he does in the discussion of prima-
ry and secondary causality, he adds another dimension to his concept
of causality.
Ficino introduces the discussion with a proof for the existence of
God, beginning with the contingency observable in the material world.
We see corporeal things pass from non-being to being, and from this to
non-being again. They come to be, remain for a while, and then pass
away. Thus, these things do not have to exist. Something in their
nature leaves them open to destruction. Even the heavenly bodies,
which appear indestructible, do not retain the same mode of being.
They do not always exist in the same way. Whatever kind of being
each may have, this does not belong to it of necessity; its nature
is open to other possibilities. Corporeal things, then, do not explain
their own being. Since they are open to contrary possibilities, some-
thing other than themselves must explain why they are determined to
one of these possibilities rather than another. Something else must de-
termine them to be.
If, however, this determining principle is also open to being and
non-being, it too will depend upon something other than itself for its
being. But this line of dependence cannot go on indefinitely. If every-
thing were dependent on something above itself, each thing would
come to be only on the condition that it had been itself produced by a
cause. And since in turn every cause would come to be only on the
24 THE APPROACH TO GOD THROUGH BEING
condition that it had been produced by another, nothing would ever

come to be. If nothing possessed the sufficiency to initiate the action on
its own, all things would await another, and this waiting would always
be in vain. Since things do exist, even though they do not have to exist,
there must be a principle which is necessary in virtue of itself, depend-
ing on nothing other than itself to account for its being, a principle
which is completely self-sufficient.
Such a principle must be absolutely simple and absolutely unique.
For the composite exists because its different parts are integrated into
one whole. Hence it is dependent for its being on the conciliation of
those parts and on that composer or cause which accounts for this
union. It is not self-sufficient, then, nor is it necessary. Parts can be
separated as well as integrated. What has parts has within itself by that
very fact the possibility of not being. Therefore, a self-sufficient being
cannot be composite. It must have unqualified unity.
Without composition a plurality is impossible. Things of the same
kind must be both alike and different - alike in order to be of the same
kind, different in order to be distinguished from one another. A self-
sufficient principle must have the kind of being which needs no cause.
But if there were several such principles, each would also have another
characteristic distinguishing it from the others. Each principle would
then be composite, or at least only one of them could remain simple,
and hence only one could be self-sufficient. There is, then, one God
existing necessarily and in virtue of himself alone, and from him all
things have being.!
A thing which must receive its being from something outside itself
never ceases to be dependent on its cause. Such a thing does not have
being in its nature; it is the kind of thing which can exist only if it is
caused by another. Hence, apart from its relationship to the cause it
cannot exist. Its nature is not contradictory to being; but it cannot
exist if left to itself alone. In this sense, it is more natural for the thing
not to be than to be, i.e. its own nature would leave it non-existent.
Granting that it does exist, its being is primarily from another, not
from itself. But what belongs to a thing by nature must always remain
as long as the thing itself remains. Therefore, the thing which comes
into being only because it has been caused by another persists in being
only because it is being caused by another. If in the beginning it did
not have the wherewithall to be, it never has the wherewithall to be.
1 TP, II, 7, v. I, pp. 92-93, B-JOO-OI; II, 3, v. I, p. 80, B-g5; II, 2, v. I, pp. 75-77, B-g3.
THE APPROACH TO GOD THROUGH BEING 25
As long as it has being, it must have it from a cause, and if the power of
the cause were removed, it would not exist.
But many effects continue to exist without continuing their de-
pendence on the cause which produced them. Stone can continue to be
a statue without the continuing action of the sculptor. Although stone
exists prior to the action of the sculptor, it does not exist as a statue.
It cannot be a statue just by being stone. But it can preserve itself in
this state in virtue of its own nature. Because of its solidity, it retains
the shape given to it until another is imposed upon it.
God's efficacy, however, is different from that of any other cause.
By his own power alone, God produces the whole effect. There is
nothing about it which is not caused by him, and hence there is nothing
which could contribute to its preservation if his causal influence were
removed. Therefore, everything must depend on God as a shadow
depends on a body. As long as the cause is present, so is the effect; but
if the cause is removed, the whole effect is lost with it. Thus, the effect
has no reality at all except as it is related to God's causal act. Taken in
itself and apart from this act, it is nothing. This is not because it is a
kind of nothingness which God has produced into being. Nothingness
is contradictory to being and hence cannot be. Rather, all that the thing
is comes to it from outside itself. And since it has nothing in itself by
which it could possess being in its own right, it always needs the support
of its cause. Thus, all things receive being from God through a con-
tinuing efficacy which touches all that they are. 2
Ficino's first approach to God, through the hierarchy of the universe,
reveals God as pure unity, truth, and goodness, the ultimate cause of
all action. The second approach reveals him as absolutely simple,
unique, and necessary, the ultimate cause of all being. Without him
things not only do not act, they do not exist. In this context, Ficino
attributes a special character to divine efficacy. Causation as we ob-
serve it does not completely account for the effect. A sculptor, for
example, cannot work without tools and material. He must take into
account the nature of these things in order to bring about the effect he
desires. The stone and the chisel contribute something to the effect
2 TP, II, 7, v. I, pp. 94-95, B-IOI; II, 3, v. I, p. 81, B-g5. " ... Deus per eamdem vim
servat creata per quam creavit ... " (V, 13, v. I, p. 208, B-149) "Ipsum enim quod dicimus
nihilum in eorum creatione neque materia neque effector ipsorum est ex quibus fiant, sed
terminus forsitan unde fiant. Neque etiam terminus est revera, sed dicitur." (XVIII, 2, v.
III, p. 184, B-400) " ... non in nihilo, non enim potentia ipsa essendi fundatur in nihilo.
Nam quo pacto alterum oppositum sit oppositi et contradictorii alterius fundamentum?
Esse vero et non esse contradictoria sunt." (V, 12, V. I, p. 202, B-146)
which comes from the sculptor only by way of manipulation. However,

some productions are more complete than others according as the
agent is more or less independent in his action. We often speak of an
artistic production as creative because the dominant spirit of the work
originates in the artist himself. God's causal act is conceived according
to this analogy. God is a creator of the highest order. He produces the
whole reality of the effect from his own power alone. There is nothing
in the thing which does not come from him. As the original source of
being, the divine efficacy is all-pervasive.
Having opened up this new perspective on divine causality, Ficino
considers again how God is the first cause of all action. Because God
continually preserves things in the being he has given them, he causes
not only their operative powers, but the actions which are brought
forth out of them. God does not produce a thing with operative power
and then leave that thing to its own devices. At any given moment he is
producing it. When it acts, he is producing it, and he causes it in all
that it is. He produces not only the thing itself with its power, but the
thing performing an action through that power. Thus, he acts in all the
actions of his effects. And because he is the first origin of the action, the
one whose power is most properly its source, he is more properly the
cause of it than the agent which performs it.
This is manifest in the effects of these causes. All agents in some way
give being to their effects. The efficacy of the cause is just this, that
through its action something comes to be which, prior to and inde-
pendent of this action, was not. Thus, from many different causes
comes one common effect, being. But if effects are similar to their
causes, then one effect must flow from one cause. Agents which are
diverse can concur in the production of one effect only if every act of
causing is in some way united to every other. Hence, everyone of these
actions must be ordered under one agent whose power is their ultimate
source. 3
Moreover, the order of effects manifests the order of causes. Causes
express themselves in their effects. They act in the same way that they
are and hence produce by their action something similar to them-
selves. 4 But if this is so, then to cause being itself, i.e. being considered
absolutely and without qualification, is proper to God alone. If an
effect is particular, i.e. if it belongs to some things and not to others, it
must be referred to a cause which is the cause of some but not others.
3 TP, II, 7, v. I, pp. 95-96, B-IOI-D2.
4 TP, VIII, 14, v. I, p. 323, B-198.
If, on the other hand, an effect is common to all things, it must be the mark
ofthat which is the cause of all. Since, therefore, being is common to all
things, it must be caused by that one God who is the cause of all things.
All other agents produce effects which are less widespread; they
produce being in this or that mode. 5
There are two questions, then, which can be asked about the origin
of an effect: why is it this kind of thing rather than another, and why
is there anything at all. When we ask about kinds - why is this a man
rather than a horse, why is this green rather than red or blue, hot
rather than cold, why is he kind rather cruel - things fall into groups,
one kind excluding others. But when we ask why is there anything at
all, the question applies to everything. Therefore, to explain why a
thing is a man rather than a horse takes a cause which can cause a man.
But to explain why this man is something rather than nothing takes a
cause which produces all the things which are. It also takes a cause
which produces its effect from nothing. This is the burden of Fieino's
next argument.
The most primary of all effects is being. Being comes first after
nothing; it is a condition for whatever reality a thing has. A thing
cannot be of a certain kind unless all that designates it as such has
reality. To be whatever it is requires that whatever it is exist; to be of
this kind rather than another depends upon its being something rather
than nothing.
In the first version of this argument, Ficino is trying to prove that
being is the proper effect of God. Being is the first of all effects. There-
fore, it is the proper effect of God who is the first of all causes. 6 In the
second version ofthe argument, Fieino is demonstrating that only God
can produce something from nothing. It is proper to God to give being
to all things. Other agents cause a thing to be of one kind rather than
another; they cause being insofar as it has a certain mode. God causes
a thing to be rather than not be; he causes being insofar as it is being.
Since being follows after nothing and is a condition for all the modes of
being, to produce something from nothing is proper to the cause which
causes being as being, and this is God alone. 7
Thus, being is what takes a thing out of its nothingness. If a cause is
to cause a thing to be which is not in any way whatsoever, that cause
must give being to it, and not being insofar as it is a certain mode, but
5 TP, V, 13, v. I, p. 204, B-147-48.

8 TP, II, 7, v. I, p. 96, B-I02.
7 TP, V, 13, v. I, p. 204. B-14,8.
being as being. Everything except God must be caused in this way.

Everything except God is empty in itself; it has no reality at all except
what it receives from outside itself. Everything except God must be
made to be something rather than nothing, not just this kind of thing
rather than another. Hence, every production, every coming to be,
involves creation, and every creation involves producing being as being.
But being is the proper effect of God alone because only God precedes
all other causalities and hence produces an effect from nothing. Or the
argument can be reversed; God alone can produce something from
nothing because God alone can produce being as being. Thus, it is one
and the same for Ficino to speak of God as creator and to speak of being
as his proper effect. Since every production involves being as such, on
which the reality of the mode depends, and since the production of
being as such involves creation, every cause depends upon God in its
causing.
In order to elucidate this, Ficino describes the diversifying function
of secondary causes. The divine power tends toward universal being.
Being as being is its proper effect. Secondary causes produce being in-
sofar as it is of a certain mode. This mode distinguishes the being of one
thing from that of another. Everything is something rather than
nothing, but each in its own way, a man by being a man, a tree by
being a tree. By causing being to be in a certain mode, secondary
causes introduce certain properties of being. Thus, they account for the
difference in the effects, although they do not account for the nature of
being itself. Even in this, however, they are dependent on the primary
cause. Secondary causes produce their effects only if the power of the
first cause acts through them. Just as being in a certain mode depends
on being as being, the power to cause being in a certain mode depends
on the power to cause being as being. By acting through the secondary
cause, the power of God diversifies itself. God insofar as he acts through
the secondary agent causes the thing to be of one kind rather than
another.
Ficino compares the cooperation of the primary and secondary
causes to the relationship between the sun and the colored windows
through which it shines. By introducing certain properties of being, the
secondary causes account for the difference in the effects, although they
do not account for the nature of being itself. Similarly, the windows
through which the sun shines account for the difference of color in the
effects, but not for their light. 8 This comparison is important for under-
8 TP, II, 7, v. I, p. 96, B-I02.
standing the relationship between primary and secondary causes.
When Ficino says that an effect has its being from God alone, but its
mode from God as he acts through secondary causes, he does not mean
that God gives being directly to the effect while giving the mode
through the instrumentality of another agent. Even though the patch
oflight has the being oflight from the sun alone, that it be light of this
color is given to it through the windows. In passing through the win-
dows nothing is given to light which belongs to the nature oflight itself.
But the light does pass through them to the effect and because of this
becomes colored light. So also the whole influence of the divine efficacy
comes to the effect through the secondary cause. But there is something
about the effect, i.e. being as being, which can only be explained by
the primary cause and which is in no way contributed by the secondary
one. There is also something about it, i.e. the mode of being, which
originates in the first but is also truly caused by the second in virtue of
the first. Moreover, the primary agent causes both aspects of the effect
through one and the same act. The sun produces light and its color
through the one act of giving off light. So also God produces being and
its mode through the one act of causing being as being.
There are difficulties in this explanation, however. The language and
comparisons used give the impression that being is the same in all
things and that diversity among beings is accounted for by the influence
of a secondary cause. This cause gives "certain properties" to being,
thus diversifYing the divine power which tends toward universal being.
Hence, the mode of being, which is the proper effect of the secondary
cause, seems to have a content which the nature of being itself does not
contain; and the secondary cause seems to be the source of something
which does not come from the creator whose proper effect is the nature
of being itself. Similarly, the light of the sun receives color from the
windows through which it shines, and that color is something positive
contributed by the windows and not by the sun. Yet Ficino has insisted
that God causes the whole effect; in whatever way a thing is, it is from
God. This difficulty is not avoided by saying that God causes the mode
of being insofar as he acts through the secondary cause, not if the
instrument can give some perfection to the effect which is not present in
the divine power.
Ficino attacks this difficulty when he considers God's creative know-
ledge. Here he asks how diversity can come from God who is absolutely
simple. Since being is diversified by its mode, this is to ask how the
mode of being is the effect of divine causality. Divine simplicity requires
that the whole reality of God be one and identical. Hence, divine action
is one with God himself. Those operations which are most consistent
with this kind of unity are most appropriate to God. To know and to
will are of this kind, for they begin and end in the agent. The agent
performs the action and finishes it within himsel( But in us to know or
to will is something we do, not something we are; and the action is
related to an object which is other than ourselves. This is not true of
God. God is his act of understanding and will, and God himself is the
object known and chosen. The act by which other things are known
and produced must be one with this act of knowing and willing the
divine essence. Only thus can the divine unity be preserved. 9
The problem involved in this is how to explain the diversity in the
world. If the action which produces the created universe is so absolute-
ly one, what accounts for the multiplicity and variety in that universe?
Ficino attributes a diversifying function to the secondary cause. But
this is not enough. He also argues that the proper natures (rationes) of
all things must be in God their creator. Any production which comes
about by design and not by chance must be directed to the effect by a
form or likeness of the effect within the cause itself. If the agent does
not just stumble into the production, then it produces an effect which
takes its form and character from the causal act. The effect comes to be
out of the action of the cause, and takes on the character of that which
gives it being. Thus, the cause must have within itself the form or like-
ness of the effect. This form guides the causal act and explains why the
effect is the way it is. Since chance lacks order, it cannot explain the
order of the universe. Hence, this order must be the effect of an agent
which has in itself a likeness of the effect. Since the universe is produced
by the intention of God, God must have within himself the form or
likeness of the cosmic order. In other words, if there is order in the
universe, God put it there; and ifhe put it there, he must first have had
it in himsel( But the whole order cannot be comprehended without a
knowledge of the proper natures (rationes) of the parts. Hence, the
proper natures of all things, by which each is distinct from the others,
are in God; they have their being and their being distinct from the
same source. 10
There is another reason why the distinctness of things cannot have
its ultimate explanation in the secondary cause. According to Ficino,
9 TP, II, I I, v. I, p. 108, pp. I 10-12, B-Io~8; II, 12, v. I, pp. 115-17, B-1 10; 11,9, v.
I, pp. 99-101, B-I03-04; II, 8, vC I, pp. 97--98, B-102.
10 TP, II, I I, v Itpp. 108-09, B-I07.
angels and human souls are incorporeal and hence caused by God
alone. (We shall examine his argument for this in chapter four.) The
influence of a secondary cause cannot explain why these creatures differ
from each other since no such agent enters into the production of them.
God must be the source of their distinctness. l l Thus, whatever Ficino
understands by the diversifying function of the secondary cause, the
full explanation of things even in their distinctness is found in the
creative action of God. Whatever the implications of the comparison
he uses, whatever the difficulties of ambiguous language, it is clear from
this discussion that the secondary cause adds nothing which does not
originate in the first cause.
Granting now that the likenesses of diverse things must be in the
divine knowledge, how is the divine simplicity to be preserved? As we
have seen, God's knowledge of other things falls within his knowledge
of himself. The forms of diverse things, therefore, are known in knowing
the divine essence. In contemplating his own essence, God sees himself
as the proper exemplar of all forms. When he knows to what extent
they can approach his essence and to what extent they fall short of it,
he knows them in all that is proper to them. For example, ifhe sees his
essence as capable of being imitated in the mode of life but not of
awareness, he grasps the form and idea of plants. But if he sees himself
as imitated in the mode of knowledge but not of intelligence, he grasps
the proper essence of animals. Thus, through one insight the divine
intelligence sees one single form or idea, the essence of God, absolutely
one and simple. But he sees himself not only as the divinity itself, but
also as the exemplar of all things. Being itself, which is his essence, is
known to him as communicable in many modes.
Thus, the forms or ideas remain one in essence, lest composition be
introduced into the simplicity of God. But if there is to be diversity in
the world, they must differ in some way. God himself is the exemplar
or model according to which things are created. This implies some kind
of distinction between the divine essence as the exemplar of one thing
and that same essence as the exemplar of a different thing. This dis-
tinction is one of relation brought about not by the things themselves,
but by the divine intellect comparing itself to things. Each form or
ratio is simply the divinity as able to be imitated or communicated in a
certain mode. Each is distinct because God refers himself to that mode
and contemplates himself as imitable in that way. But these relations by
11 TP, XI, 4, v. II, p. 120, B-251-52; V, 13, v. I, p. 208, B-149.

reason of which the ideas are distinguished are not real relations; they
do not exist as distinct in the thing itself, i.e. in God. Rather they differ
in ratio. Insofar as many essences or rationes are understood from one
essence, to that extent are there many ideas or relations in the divine
intelligence. 12
The ratio, as Ficino understands it, is something real. It is an intelli-
gible content in the object of knowledge forming a basis for the act of
intelligence. 13 The ratio is what we know about the object. The divine
ideas are distinct in ratio because the intelligible content of each is differ-
ent from the others. The content which is the model for one thing is not
the same as that which is the model for another. In this sense, God him-
self is the cause of the diversity. The richness of his essence provides a
model for a variety of more limited things, each in its own way the
image of God, each reflecting a different aspect of the divinity. But the
act of understanding and will by which God knows and creates these
many things is not itself multiple or diversified. God understands the
distinct natures of all his creatures in one insight by knowing his own
essence in the fullness of its imitability.
The relation between God and creatures as it is understood in this
context is simply God knowing himself. By saying that this relation is
not established by things, but by God, Fieino avoids making God's
knowledge of things dependent on something outside himself.14 When
Fieino says that such relations are not real, he is saying that God's
knowledge is not really an act terminating in an object outside himself.
Rather it is an act of knowing himself and in this one act many things
are comprehended as well. Since it is in virtue of this relation that the
exemplar forms are diversified in the divine knowledge, the distinctions
between these forms are not real, but simply many things understood in
one act.
Thus, Fieino posits the very distinctness of things in the divine es-
sence itself. When he says in the consideration of primary and seconda-
ry causality that God is the cause of the mode, he means that the very
distinctness of that mode, its character as identical with itself and set off
from other things, is present in the divine essence and flows therefrom.
He does not mean to suggest that God accounts for part of a thing's
composition and the secondary cause for another part. If this were the
case, he could not explain the difference between angels and rational
12 TP, II, g, v. I, p. 102, B--104; II, 1 I, V. I, pp. 108-0g, B--107; XI, 3, v. II, p. 108,
B--246; XI, 4, v. II, pp. I 19-20, B--25I; XVI, I, v. III, pp. 1Og-1O, B--36g-70
13 TP, V, 7, v I, P 185, B--I40; VIII, 4, v I, p 300, B-188; X, g, v II, p go, B--238.
14 Cf TP, XI, 4, v. II, p. 116, B--250.
souls, since both have their source in God alone. God explains the
whole creature, its being and its mode. The mode is in the divine know-
ledge as a way in which the divine perfection can be imitated in a
limited way. Thus, the creature both in its being and in its mode is the
effect of God.
But the proper effect of God is being, not the mode of being. If he
produces the mode, he does so by producing being as being. He causes
a thing to be of one kind rather than another by causing it to be some-
thing rather than nothing. Ficino understands the creative act in this
way when he establishes that God's knowledge of creatures is com-
pletely exhaustive. God's knowledge is as extensive as his operation,
since in him knowledge and will and action are one and the same. But
the divine action extends to every last detail of a thing. There is nothing
in a creature which God does not cause. Knowing himself as such a
cause, God knows clearly all there is to know about a creature. He sees
all that goes into it because he puts it there. If there are intermediary
causes contributing to its constitution, these too he knows in their to-
tality. For he is the origin of all that belongs to them, and hence the
ultimate source of all that they contribute to the effect. It is not neces-
sary, however, for God to know the more remote effects through the
causes which come between him and them. Since he is the first origin
of being itself and the cause of being for all things, when he sees him-
self, he sees the whole being of anything whatsoever.15 Thus, to know a
thing in its last detail is to know the whole being of a thing. There is
nothing which belongs to a thing which is not included in this. God
knows all there is to know about a creature because he knows himself
as the cause of its being. Creation, properly speaking, is a production
of being; the mode flows from God insofar as he produces being as such.
Ficino makes this more explicit in a succinct and difficult text which
refers to the priority of the divine being over the divine ideas.
For it is fitting that the divine being, which is prior to the ideas or species,
and which gives being through species to the things coming forth from itself,
should give being in species and hence different modes of being to different
species. Thus, the angelic being is limited in the angelic species; and the
angelic species, which we call essence and which is the foundation of being
such, is in a certain way infinite. 16
15 TP, 11,9, v. I, pp. 100-01, B-log-Q4.
16 "Par enim est ut esse divinum quod ideas, id est species, antecedit perque species rebus
ab ipso manantibus esse dispertit, hoc ipsum esse tradat in speciebus, ideoque diversis
speciebus modos essendi diversos. Itaque esse angelicum in angelica specie terminatur.
Species autem angelica, quam eamdem vocamus essentiam, quae esse talis estfundamentum,
quodammodo est infinita, ... " (TP, XV, 2, v. III, p. 23, B-333)
The priority of the divine being over the divine ideas stems from this -
divine ideas are the divine being itself insofar as it is communicable in
many different modes. The divine being is the foundation, so to speak,
of the divine ideas and hence prior to them. It is fitting, then, that the
effect of God's causal act be primarily and more properly being as
being; but this being is in a certain species or mode.
The discussion of primary and secondary causality opens up a new
view of God's relation to the world. In the hierarchy of the universe,
two kinds of causation are operative, originative and attractive. The
soul or life principle originates action in the corporeal; it performs the
action by which corporeal things move. The soul itself, and pure minds,
depend on God, but in a different way. God is the truth which they
contemplate and the goodness they seek. The search for God directs
their action and their action moves the corporeal world. Thus, God is
related to the lower levels of the hierarchy as the first cause of all action.
But he moves the world as an end.
In the analysis of primary and secondary causality, causation related
to action is again the central concept for understanding the relation-
ship between God and the world. But in this context, God is the source
of all action because he is the source of all being, and his causal influ-
ence is originative rather than attractive. Being is most fundamental
and most universal. It comes first after nothing and encompasses all
that is. Hence, it is the proper effect of God who is the first cause of all
things. The primacy and universality of his action is properly described
as the production of being, and as the cause of being he permeates all
reality. Nothing falls outside his influence, and hence nothing stands
prior to it to take hold of it. In the effect, all is dependence. Therefore,
God must be continually and efficaciously present to all that is real in a
thing, even its powers and operations. When a creature performs an
action, it brings forth a reality out of its own being; and it can neither
possess nor produce being except in virtue of God acting in it as the
primary cause of being as such. Thus, God is not just an end which the
creature seeks in performing the action; God himself originates the
action as the primary agent acting in the secondary one.
Ficino's first view of God's relation to the world is Platonic in spirit.
The second is Thomistic not only in spirit but in letter. We had a pre-
view of this in the arguments for divine omnipotence where the concept
of creation enters for the first time. Ficino argues that only infinite
power can bridge the gap between absolute non-being and being. Only
the omnipotent can produce into being a thing which, prior to being
caused, has not even the potency to be. Since God's power has this
kind of effect, it must be infinite. Ficino takes this argument from
Aquinas and with it he takes the Thomistic notion of creation'!? Later,
in the discussion of primary and secondary causality, he weaves around
this notion a whole vision of God's relation to the world, and here, too,
Aquinas dominates the discussion.
After a preliminary appeal to God as creating and preserving cause,
Ficino characterizes creation as the production of being as being. He
then argues that this kind of efficacy is necessary for every other, and is
proper to God alone. Every argument he uses is taken from Aquinas.
When he wishes to establish that God alone can cause being as such, he
uses Aquinas' article establishing that nothing gives being except by the
power of God.!8 When he wishes to establish that God alone can pro-
duce something from nothing, he uses Aquinas' article establishing that
the act of creation belongs to God alone.!9 Occasionally, Ficino adds an
analogy or a sentence of explanation or interpretation. Trying to ex-
plain the primacy of being, he says that being is the first to be acquired
and the last to be lost, for a man or horse cannot be such unless a man
or a horse exists. 20 He adds the analogy ofthe sun and the window in an
attempt to clarify the relationship between the primary and secondary
cause; that a man is comes from God, that he is a man comes also from
another human being. 21 All of these additions are attempts to explain
a very specific point within a Thomistic argument. Ficino does not
develop anyone of them outside the very close structure of Aquinas'
discussion. Thus, the analysis of primary and secondary causality is
primarily a presentation of the discussion in the Summa Contra Gentiles.
The additions are short comments on the text.
Even the arguments introducing this analysis are Thomistic in tone.
There is no conclusive evidence that Ficino took from Aquinas the
argument establishing the existence of a first necessary being, but
Aquinas uses the same argument. 22 Part of the discussion of God as
preserving cause is derived from the Summa Contra Gentiles. 23 Aquinas
does not emphasize in this discussion the complete emptiness of the
17 Appendix # 2-4'
18 Appendix # 11-12.
20 TP, V, 13, v. I, p. 204, B-148.
21 TP, II, 7, v. I, p. 96, B-I02.
22 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk. II, Ch. 15, Marietti (1961) ed. #927,
Doubleday (1955-57) trans. #6; I, 15, # 124, (5); 1,18, # 146, (5); 1,42, #342-43, (8-g).
cr. Appendix # 6-7.
23 Appendix # 8-g.
creature. Ficino adds this dimension himself. But nothing could be

more Thomistic, as the argument for divine omnipotence shows. Final-
ly, the argument which opens the discussion of primary and secondary
causality is to be found both in Proclus' Elements of Theology, which
Ficino has used in other parts of his work, and in Aquinas' article es-
tablishing that all things act by the power of God. 24 The correspond-
ence between Ficino's text and that of Aquinas is not obvious from its
literal structure. But Ficino's terminology is Thomistic. Also, Aquinas'
article refers to one which Ficino has certainly used. 25 Indeed, this
latter forms the whole basis of the discussion which follows. Ficino
probably followed up Aquinas' reference.
In the discussion of the divine ideas, Ficino shows more freedom
from the Thomistic text than in any other part of his doctrine of cre-
ation. He does not go against or even beyond Aquinas' thinking on this
question. But he seems to have taken it to himself in such a way that his
formulation of it is obviously his own. The overall argument follows
Aquinas, and here and there the text retains Aquinas' text almost word
for word. This literal correspondence is present at the beginning of the
discussion (I) when Ficino establishes from the divine simplicity and
perfection that the being of God is one with his knowing and willing
himself, and (2) when he argues further that the action by which other
things are known and produced must be one with this act of knowing
and willing the divine essence. 26
Ficino then takes up the principal question, how can the world's
variety come from an absolutely simple creator. Here Ficino gives a
brief version of a more detailed argument found in the Summa Contra
Gentiles. 27 Aquinas points to the perfection of God's power, whose
action is directed by knowledge and will and cannot fail in its intention.
If an effect is caused by an intellectual and voluntary agent, its form is
something intended by that agent; and if the agent is infinite in his
power and hence cannot be prevented from accomplishing what he
intends, then the form found in the effect is not the result of chance, but
of his causal act. The form of the universe, created by God, is the dis-
tinction and order of its parts. Hence, the distinction of things is not the
result of chance, but of God's intention.
Using this conclusion, Aquinas explicitly considers and rejects the
24 Proclu8, The Elements of Theology # 56; Appendix # 10. For Ficino's use of Proclus,
see ch. 2, pp. 20-21.
25 Appendix # 10-1 I.
26 Appendix # 28-30'
possibility of explaining the distinction of things by the diversity of
agents. If the agents were not related to one another in a certain order,
then the order which they produce would come to be by chance; a
unity not present in the cause would come to be in the effect. Since the
order of the universe cannot be the result of chance, its cause must have
sufficient unity to account for it. But this is possible only if there is an
order among the diverse agents, and this in turn is possible only as the
effect of one cause. Hence, the order of the universe and the distinction
of things which it implies is the effect of this one and more primary
cause. 28
At this point, Aquinas, like Ficino, identifies the cause of a thing's
distinctness with the cause of its being. 29 A thing comes to be a being
insofar as it becomes one, undivided in itself, and distinct from others.
Hence, if a thing is caused in its being, its distinction from other things
is also caused, and the cause of its being will be the cause of its distinct-
ness. Since all things have being from the first cause, no agent other
than the first and no order of agents dependent on him can be the first
cause of the distinction of things. 30
Having established that a diversity of agents cannot be the first cause
of distinction among things, Aquinas has established that the order of
secondary causes cannot be the sole or ultimate explanation of diversity
in the universe. This especially follows from the last argument since it
points to the dependence of all other causes on the first. This depend-
ence is the mark ofa secondary cause. Nevertheless, a special chapter is
devoted to the question of secondary causes. Here Aquinas says that his
previous arguments rule out any explanation of diversity which rests
solely on secondary causality. His aim at this point is to argue against
the opinion that the first cause, being one, cannot produce the multi-
plicity of the universe. If this opinion is held, the distinction of things
must be explained by the diversity of causes. The first cause is said to
cause one effect which, being inferior to and dependent on the first, has
some multiplicity within it. This in turn produces another effect more
multiple than itself and so on until the diversity of the whole universe is
fully explained. Aquinas points out that this explanation does not allow
the total diversity of things to be attributed to one cause. The reason for
positing the causal sequence is to avoid attributing great multiplicity
28 Aquinas, CG, II, 41, # II68, (2).

29 "Proprie igitur in Deo sunt omnium rationes. Neque aliunde rerum species habent ut
distinctae sint, quam unde habent ut sint." (TP, II, 1 I, v. I, p. 109, B-I07)
30 Aquinas, CG, II, 40, # 1164, (5); 41, # 1170, (4). Cf. 1,42, # 349, (18).
to an agent which has no multiplicity whatsoever. Hence, the greater

multiplicity of the subsequent effects is not to be attributed to the first
cause, but only to the cause immediately prior to the effect. Granting
this, the total diversity of the universe is the effect not of one cause, but
of the collected influence of all causes; and without one ordering princi-
ple this concurrence of causes must be fortuitous. Therefore, unless the
distinction of things and the order of the universe is the proper effect of
one cause, the first, it must be explained as a work ofchance. 31 This has
already been rejected.
Aquinas now indicates to what lengths he intends to go in positing
God as the cause of the distinction of things. A cause produces that
which is like itself and an intelligent cause produces that which is like
the knowledge guiding its action. God produces through intelligence.
Therefore the order and distinction of things, which is his proper
effect, must be present in his knowledge. God can be the cause of a
multiplicity of effects because the forms of diverse things are known
by him.32 Also, some effects, like the intellectual substances, come
into being only by creation, which is a causality possible to God
alone. To explain the distinction of these things from one another,
there must be forms of diverse things in God himself.33 Of course,
Aquinas must explain how diverse forms can be present in an absolute-
ly simple being. But he insists that they are in God himself and are not
separate forms having their own reality outside of him. Everything is
caused by God and God causes things through intelligence. Separate
forms distinct from each other must still be explained by a diversity of
forms in the divine intellect. 34
Ficino's argument does not go into as much detail as does that of
Aquinas, but it is the same argument. Both Aquinas and Ficino begin
by showing that the order of the universe cannot be caused by chance.
But Ficino's is only an argument against chance; Aquinas eliminates
chance by establishing that the order of the universe must be the effect
ofthe first cause. This conclusion belongs to Aquinas' argument against
those who explain diversity solely in terms of the diversity of causes, a
polemic which Ficino does not enter. However, Ficino agrees that the
order of the universe is the effect of God; he simply assumes it without
81 CG, II, 42, # JJ81-82, (1-2).

82 CG, 11,42, # u86, (6). cr. 1,54, #446-47, (I); 1,29, #270, (2); 31, #280, (2).
88 CG, II, 42, # I18g, (g).
34 CG, I, 51, #431, (3); #433, (5).
argument, perhaps in virtue of his previous conclusion that all things,

and hence the whole world, have their being from God, Also, Ficino
does not give a special argument to prove that the forms of diverse
things are in God himself, not outside him. Still he agrees with this
when he says that an agent is directed to its effect by a form within
itself. 35
The principal part of Ficino's argument runs parallel to one which
Aquinas gives in his article establishing that the distinction of things
cannot be explained by secondary causes. Aquinas has previously es-
tablished that the order of the universe is the effect of the first cause and
Fieino has assumed it. From this both argue that the forms of diverse
things are in the divine intellect. The same conclusion is again es-
tablished by pointing to the diversity of incorporeal substances. Thus,
although Ficino does not put the question as explicitly as Aquinas, he,
like Aquinas, denies that the distinction of things can be ultimately
explained by secondary causes. The diversity of the world and the dis-
tinction of things which establishes it are effects of the first cause; and
both Ficino and Aquinas point out that distinction and being have
the same source.
Granting now that the likenesses of diverse things must be in the
divine knowledge, how is the divine simplicity to be preserved? Fieino's
explanation of this is taken from Aquinas. By knowing to what extent
things approach the divine essence and to what extent they fall short of
it, God knows their proper natures. Within the divine essence, there
are many rationes by reason of which that simple essence is the model
or exemplar for many different things. 36 Aquinas' explanation of how
these rationes are distinct differs slightly from Ficino's.
According to Aquinas, our intellect, following the diversity of things
which are images of God, forms diverse conceptions of him and at-
tributes a multiplicity of names to him. Although God is simple, this
diversity in our knowledge is neither false nor futile since each con-
ception refers to God according to a different ratio. In other words,
each tells us something different about the one simple being of God.
The foundation for the distinction, therefore, is the relation of likeness
between God and his creatures. This relation, however, is real only in
the creature, not in God. A relation is fulfilled only in its being toward
35 "Quis non viderit, si videndo se videt facitque cuncta, sequi ut in substantia sua sub-
stantiales formae sint quae exemplaria causaeque sint omnium?" (TP, XI, 4, v. II, p. 116,
B-250 ).
36 Appendix # 23.
the other. The divine being does not need creatures in order to be
complete. Since God is a necessary being, completely self-sufficient, he
is fully himself whether or not he produces a world of creatures. Crea-
tures, however, are really related to God because their whole being is
in being dependent on him. Thus, it is more proper to say that creatures
are like God than that God is like creatures. Since the distinction of one
ratio from another is based on the relation oflikeness between God and
his effects, it is more proper to attribute the distinction to things than
to God. The rationes are not distinct in God. They are distinct only
insofar as he knows many ways in which things can be like him.37
Fieino, too, speaks of the one divine essence in which many rationes are
understood.
Fieino, however, puts the emphasis at a different point. Like Aquinas,
he speaks of a relation between God and things, by which relation the
ideas or exemplar forms are diversified. But Ficino says that this is a
relation established not by things themselves, but by the divine intel-
lect comparing itself to things. When he speaks of this relation as not
real but one of intellect, he refers to the divine intellect which through
one idea knows and brings into being many things. His concern here
is to preserve the independence of God's knowledge by denying that it
is an act directed to and dependent upon an object outside himsel£ The
"relation" which is established by God and not by things is divine
knowledge which can be "related" only to itsel£ The relation which,
according to Aquinas, is real only in creatures and not in God is the
relation of likeness. Creatures are like God because they are produced
by him. God is not like creatures since he is prior to them. Thus, despite
the difference of approach, Ficino and Aquinas understand the dis-
tinction in ratio in the same way. Although God himself is one and
absolutely simple, his perfection is so rich that it can be a modelfor all the
diverse things of the universe. The intelligible content (ratio) according
to which he is the model for one is not the same as that according to
which he is the model for another. But all this in him is integrated into
one sublime and all-perfect divine essence.
The two most important issues for understanding God's role in
causing the mode of being are (I) the distinction in ratio which dis-
tinguishes the divine ideas and (2) the identification of God's exhaus-
tive knowledge of a thing with the knowledge of its being. The first
37 Aquinas, eG, I, 35; 54, #452, (5); II, 12, #913, (2); II, #906-07. (2-3); 29.
# 1047, (2); # 1050. (5). Cf. Appendix # 26.
reveals that God is so properly the cause of the mode that the very
distinctness of that mode is present in his creative knowledge and has
its source therein. The second reveals that creation is the production of
being as being and the production of the mode is included in this.
Ficino's explanation of the first point is probably inspired by his reading
of Aquinas. His position is essentially the same as that of his master;
and it is surrounded by and founded upon arguments which follow
closely Aquinas' text. In making the second point, Ficino departs very
little from Aquinas' argument. Because God knows himself as the
origin of being, he knows the whole reality of the thing he causes. 3S
As we have seen, Ficino's discussion of primary and secondary cau-
sality raises difficulties for his doctrine of creation. In this discussion,
being could be interpreted as a common effect to which other effects,
contributed by secondary causes, are added. This would give to second-
ary causes a power which the primary cause does not possess. Aquinas
does not escape these difficulties. He, too, considers the secondary cause
as diversifying the action of the first, this second cause having as its
proper effect other perfections which determine being. Ficino's de-
scription probably originates here. 39 The same attitude is expressed in
more detail when Aquinas argues against those who would attribute to
secondary causes no function of their own in their cooperation with the
primary agent. The argument appeals to the diversity of effects. Why
do different things produce different results if the effect is the effect of
God alone? The action is all God's; the only difference is that it passes
through different things, and this cannot diversify it if these things are
not causes with him. But the action must be diversified, since its effects
vary. Heat always produces heat, never cold, and the offspring of
human beings are human like their parents. Therefore, although all
things are caused by the first agent, secondary agents are still truly
causes. 40
Thus, Aquinas sees the divine action as in need of diversification by
secondary causes, and this is done by giving to the effect "other per-
fections" which determine being. The difficulties caused by such lan-
guage are formidable. If God is the cause of all things, how can a
secondary agent give to the effect something positive which does not
originate in the divine action? Yet Aquinas establishes the authenticity
of secondary causality on its power to establish a diversity which divine
38 Appendix # 14.
39 Appendix # 12.
40 Aquinas, eG, III, 69, # 2442, (12).
causality alone could not have; and the diversifying elements are these
"other perfections" which determine being.41
When the doctrine of divine ideas is brought to bear on the dis-
cussion of primary and secondary causality, it is evident that both
Ficino and Aquinas intend to stand by their original doctrine of cre-
ation. Even the proper nature of a thing, that which makes it distinct
from all others, has its ultimate source in God, the cause of being. To
cause the being of a thing is to produce it in every detail. Aquinas,
however, is more explicit than this, as he has been more explicit in
attributing the diversity of effects to secondary causes. He asks the
question directly. How can we say that an effect is caused by a natural
agent and also by God? If the effect is accounted for by God, what role
is left for another agent to play in causing it? And if it is caused by the
natural agent, why is it necessary to say that God causes it? 42 Aquinas
does not answer these questions by attributing part of the effect to one
cause and part to another. He explicitly denies this. The whole effect is
caused both by an instrument and the principal agent. Hence, the
doctrine of secondary causality cannot be understood by attributing
being to the first agent and the mode to the second. God is not the
cause of being (esse) but of a being (ens) insofar as it is a being (ens).
Similarly, the secondary cause is the cause not of the mode or determi-
nations of being, but of a being insofar as it is of a certain kind. 43 Thus,
Aquinas says, in the Summa Theoiogiae, that the object of creation is not
being, but that which has being, the substance or thing which exists.
To be caused is to come to be; hence, what is caused is what exists,
namely the thing. This is true of creation as it is of every other kind of
causation. There is no sequence of causality from God through being
to the whole or from the secondary cause through the mode to the
whole. That which is caused in each case is the thing. 44
What is not made clear is how a thing is caused in a certain respect
by one cause and in another respect by another. What does it mean for
a whole thing to be caused insofar as it is this, say a being, or insofar as
it is that, say a certain kind of being? Aquinas has made a passing
reference to instrumental causality. The effect of instrumental causality
is produced as a whole by both causes. Written words are caused both
by the writer and his pen. The writer produces the words insofar as
41cr. CG, II, 21, #973, (5); #976, (8); #978, (10).
42CG, III, 70, #2460-63, (1-4).
43CG, II, 21, #978, (10).
44 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-45-4c and ad I. cr. 1-45-1.
they are intelligible; the pen produces them insofar as they are marks
and shapes. The writer produces marks and shapes by the act of pro-
ducing intelligible signs; the pen produces intelligible signs by the act
of producing marks and shapes. So also God produces the whole thing
insofar as it is a being, and by this act produces a being of a certain kind.
The secondary cause produces the whole thing insofar as it is of a
certain kind, and by this act produces a being.
Ficino has nothing to equal this analysis of the problems raised by
primary and secondary causality. He does not share Aquinas' concern
for the authenticity of secondary causation, although he says nothing
which is contrary to it. His primary interest is the all-pervasive presence
of God in the being and actions of all things, and this is sufficiently up-
held by the doctrine of divine ideas. We shall see later (chapters 5-6)
that Aquinas' doctrine of primary and secondary causality is essential
for justifYing Ficino's claim that the search for knowledge, in whatever
area, is always a search for God, and that philosophy cannot be sepa-
rated from religion.
At this point, it is sufficient to note that Ficino has placed side by
side two views of God - the Platonic and the Thomistic. Both present
God as pure and absolute efficacious power, the ultimate cause of all
action. Between the Platonic consideration of the hierarchy of the
universe and the Thomistic consideration of primary and secondary
causality are the arguments for divine omnipotence. These point back
to the Platonic discussion and forward to the Thomistic one, thus testi-
fying to the essential compatibility of Platonism and Thomistic theolo-
gy.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE METAPHYSICAL STRUCTURE OF

CREATURES, MORTAL AND IMMORTAL
Fieino has approached God through two kinds of dependence - de-

pendence in action and dependence in being. All things move or are
moved for the sake of the pure unity, truth, and goodness which is God.
God draws all things to himself. But he is not only the end of action; he
is also the beginning. The action not only moves toward him, it arises
out of him. He is the first origin of being, the creator from whom things
have all that they are and hence all that they do. And insofar as they
are caused not only in their action, but in their very being, there is in
them an efficacy more fundamental than that from which motion and
operation flow. In another account of the world's origin, Fieino relates
God's causal act to this intrinsic causation which corresponds to it.
According to Ficino, the Platonists give two names to God signifying
two different aspects of his relationship to his effects. In the Parmenides,
Fieino says, God is called the infinite because he receives no limit from
without. In the Philebus, he is called the term or limit because he de-
termines all things by means of forms. Suspended from God like a
shadow is a potency, in a sense a material potency, which by its very
nature is unformed or undetermined. This potency reflects God's cha-
racter as unlimited or infinite. But to the extent that God as the term
or limit looks at his shadow as in a mirror, he is reflected in the shadow
even as an image, and thus infinity itself, i.e. common matter, is de-
termined by forms.
The Platonists strengthen this position with the following argument.
If God always has the power to produce all things, then beyond God
there is always the power to become all things. For they think he cannot
always be able to produce all things unless it is always possible for all
things to come to be. This potency they call common matter, and by
this they mean a power equally receptive of all forms, open to all and
favoring none. It tends neither to being nor to non-being. If it had a
THE METAPHYSICAL STRUCTURE OF CREATURES 45
tendency to being, it would have no need of a forming principle beyond

itself. In virtue of itself alone it would come to be. If it had a tendency
to non-being, it could never come to be. To exist would contradict its
nature. Thus, it is equally open to being and non-being. Likewise it is
equally disposed to different forms as a kind of middle between them,
leaning toward no one of them of itself and determined from without
by a forming principle. Thus, all things under God consist of the infi-
nite, i.e. a receptive and formable potency, and the term or limit, i.e.
formal act'!
In this discussion, the words 'limit' and 'form' signify determination.
That which is by nature open to several contrary possibilities is limited
or tied down to one of them by a cause. To be thus caused is to receive
form; the effect takes into itself a definite character which cannot be
accounted for by its own nature. This use of the word 'limit' gives a
twofold meaning to the word 'infinite'. God is infinite because he
receives no limit from without. He is unlimited insofar as he is un-
caused. He is not determined by anything outside himself. But he does
not need to be limited, for he has all things in himself. Although he
receives nothing from without, he gives a definite character and de-
termination to all things. Out of himself alone he brings forth the posi-
tive perfections of the world. Thus, God is infinite because he has no
need. Matter is infinite because it is nothing but need. This common
potency is open to many possibilities without demanding anyone of
them. Thus, it is unlimited. But having no limit means having no
definite character, a pure capacity which is actually nothing. Infinity
is the need to receive whatever it actually is from something other than
itself.
Following the Platonic account of the world's origin, Ficino gives
another account which he attributes to the Christian theologians. This
position is meant to confirm the previous one. Every creature must be
given being by God, and if abandoned by God, it would exist no longer.
Since the creature does not exist in virtue of itself, it is not identical
with its being. What the creature is in itself is called essence. This is
what it is by nature and definition. But being does not belong to the
nature and definition of anything caused. Such a nature is consistent
with being; it can be. But it does not have to be. Hence, being is not
included in or demanded by the nature itself. Therefore, every creature
1 TP, XVII, 2, v. III, pp. 14g-50, B-386-87.

46 THE METAPHYSICAL STRUCTURE OF CREATURES
is composed of essence and being; and this composition is established by

dependence on a cause.
To cause or produce something is to make the potential actual. With-
out the influence of the agent, the effect is only a possibility. Through
the influence of the agent, that which can be actually is. Therefore, to
produce an effect is to bring act to potency. These two, act and poten-
cy, are necessarily distinguished in the creature. The essence, which
must receive being from outside itself, is the potency or capacity for
being. It can be. Being is the act received, causing that which can be to
be, thus giving to the capacity what it can in no way possess from itself.
Since being always belongs to the creature as something outside its
essence and definition, the distinction between essence and being re-
mains even when the potency is actual. Even when the creature exists,
it is the kind of thing which can exist only in virtue of something other
than itself. It has being, but not as something included in its nature and
definition. The essence, which is the creature itself, is distinct from its
being, which it possesses through its relationship to the agent. There-
fore, every creature is composed of potency and act, i.e. of essence and
being. 2
When the Platonists speak of the infinite in things, they mean es-
sence and potency, says Ficino. When they speak of term or limit, they
mean being and act. 3 Thus, the account attributed to the Platonists is
interpreted in terms of the one attributed to the Christian theologians.
In line with his original purpose, Ficino is showing the consistency
between Christian theology and Platonic philosophy. The theologians
say that all things are created by God and that all on this account have
a composite character. Ficino claims that Platonic philosophy has also
grasped this basic religious truth. By understanding all things as com-
posites of the infinite and the limit, of matter and form, they have seen
the true relationship between God and the world.
Both the Platonic and the Christian accounts establish composition
from contingency. Whatever comes to be must be possible. Therefore,
the thing which actually is has the capacity or ability to be. But a thing
which cannot be unless it is caused is also open to non-being, since it
fails to be if the cause does not produce it; it is not sufficient to bring
itself to actual being. Even when the capacity for being is fulfilled, that
capacity remains the kind which has its act from a cause and hence is
2 TP, XVII, 2, v. III, pp. Is0--5I, B-387.

3 "Essentiam quidem potentiamque ad infinitatem, esse vero et actum ad terminum
Platonici referunt." (TP, XVII, 2, v. III, p. 15I, B-387)
not identical with it. The potency-act distinction marks the thing as
necessarily dependent on a cause. According to Ficino, then, both
Platonists and Christians recognize that all things are dependent on
God and composite because of this dependence. All things have within
themselves a potency which is open to contrary possibilities. They also
possess an act which determines them to one of those possibilities rather
than another. This act is given by God.
In this explanation, two levels of causation are distinguished. The
external cause produces its effect by giving to it an act which is the
intrinsic cause of its being. What God does from without, the act does
from within. Through its efficacy, that which does not have to be actu-
ally is. Here, then, act is again identified with efficacy or causation. But
causation does not mean to bring forth action, but to put into being.
And the cause is not only the extrinsic act which brings forth the effect,
but a principle belonging to the effect itself in virtue of which it stands
in being.
What is this act which is intrinsic to the thing it causes and yet dis-
tinct from it? What kind of relationship is there between the potency
which has been fulfilled and the act which fulfills it? This is where the
difference between the Platonic language and that of the Christian
theologians causes difficulty. Ficino explains the relationship between
essence and being in the discussion of human immortality. In this dis-
cussion, he distinguishes the act-potency relationship between form and
matter from the act-potency relationship between being and essence.
Arguing for the immortality of the human soul, Ficino appeals to the
immortality of the essence. Essence and being are not the same, he says.
Essence is that which is expressed in the definition. In other words,
essence is what a thing is as itself. Being is the act of the essence and its
presence in the nature ofthings. Now an essence has a certain immor-
tality. The definition of a star or a man is true for all time and in all
places, no matter what the condition of stars and men may be, even if
they do not exist. An essence according to itself is not subject to time
and place, for immortality belongs to the nature of every form.
Some forms, however, are determined to be in a body, and are,
therefore, subject to the corporeal conditions of time and place. The
form is immortal according to itself, but not according to being, since it
cannot be unless it is in matter. Other forms, however, have their being
in themselves. Now that which is received is taken in according to the
capacity of that which receives it. If the essence in itself is immortal,
then it receives being in an immortal mode. Hence, forms which do not
have their being in matter are immortal according to essence and ac-
cording to being. The rational soul is such a form. 4
An essence according to itself is not subject to time and place, for
immortality belongs to the nature of every form. Form is the primary
factor in the essence. It determines what a thing is; it even determines
whether or not it is in matter. If the form calls for matter, then matter
belongs to the essence. Thus, every essence is a form; some are forms
which belong to matter. But every essence, pure form or form-matter
composite, is distinct from being.
Ifform determines what a thing is and answers to its definition, what
is being as distinct from the essence? Essence is a capacity to receive
being. But it is not just the unqualified possibility of being. It is the
possibility of being something specific, a man, a horse, a star. It has a
certain positive content and this content has enough reality to establish
the truth of a proposition. The definition of a star or a man is true in
all times and places, regardless of the condition of existing stars and
men. Thus, the definition expresses something which can be, and which
is unaffected by the state of the actually existing things corresponding
to it. This shows that the essence is not the same as being. Its content
can remain eternally true even though the things in which this content
exists are radically changed by generation and corruption. Being places
this content in actuality. In virtue of being, the essence not only can
exist, it does exist. The essence in turn determines being in its mode. It
receives being according to its capacity. The essence of a man has
human being, the essence of a star has the being of a star. The capacity
determines the act by being able to receive only a certain specific way
of being, as a scholar can learn only what falls within his capability. If,
then, the essence is a pure form, complete without matter, its being will
be as immortal as definitions are. If, however, the essence is a form
which must belong to matter, its being will be subject to space-time
conditions, and will exist only in a certain space at a certain time.
Other arguments for the immortality of the human soul make a simi-
lar appeal to the relationship between form and being. The movement
toward being and away from it, generation and corruption, comes
about by reason of the reception and loss ofform. It is form rather than
matter which causes a thing to be what it is. A work of sculpture is not a
representation of a man or a horse by reason of the metal from which it
is made. The metal can be formed into any number of things. Rather
4 TP, V, 7, v. I, pp. 185-87, B-140.

the form or likeness imposed upon the metal by the sculptor sets it
apart as the statue of a horse or man. The same is true of natural things.
Plato is not a man, nor the fig tree a tree because of the matter which
can be either, and any number of other things as well. Plato is a man
because the body is one of a certain composition and harmony and
because it has a soul. Thus, it is from the form that all things have their
proper being, nature, and species; the form makes them what they
must be if they are to exist at all. In losing this, they relinquish their
very being, just as in acquiring this they come to the possession ofit. To
clarify this, Ficino uses the example of fire, whose form, for the sake of
the discussion, he takes to be heat. If the coldness of earth or of water
enters into the matter of fire, driving out the form of heat and replacing
it, that matter ceases to be fire, or rather fire ceases to be. Assuming
that heat is the substantial form offire, i.e. that it makes fire to be fire,
in ceasing to be hot, fire loses its being. It no longer exists. Because the
form establishes the proper being of a thing, causing the thing to be
what it is as itself and as that which exists, when the form is lost, the
thing no longer exists, because it is no longer itself. 5
Being, then, belongs to a thing because of its form; but it belongs to
the form in virtue of itself as rotundity belongs to the circle. A circle by
its very nature is round. No condition outside the circle itself is neces-
sary to establish its rotundity. Wood, on the other hand, is round not
because it is wood, but because an artisan has imposed upon it a circu-
lar figure, and rotundity necessarily belongs to such a figure. If the
wood ceases to be round, this is because it ceases to be circular. But it is
not on this account completely destroyed, since rotundity is not neces-
sary for wood to be wood. As the existence of wood does not establish
its rotundity, for all wood is not round, so its lack of rotundity does not
bring about its non-existence. Rotundity belongs to it by reason of some
condition outside itself. But if the circular figure ceases to be round, it
ceases to be itself; it no longer exists. So also heat belongs to fire, and
light to the sun in virtue of themselves. Iffire is fire, then it must be hot,
and if the sun is the sun, it must be aglow. In the same way being
belongs to the form because it is a form. As a circle has rotundity for no
other reason than because it is a circle, so the form has being for no
other reason than because it is a form. A circle must be round; this is
what is means to be a circle. So also the form must have being; this is
what it means to be a form. A form is by definition that which exists. 6
5 TP, V, 8, v. I, pp. 187-88, B-14Q-41.
6 TP, V, g, v.~I, P':lgl, B-142.
What, then, is the principle by reason of which the form relinquishes

its being? How does corruption take place if the form necessarily has
being? Some forms are brought forth from the potency of matter. They
belong to matter before they come to the possession of being, and they
come to be by reason of their presence in matter. Consider the vase
which has been wrought from gold. Within the gold itself, the vase is
present potentially. The agent need only bring from the gold a shape
already latent within it. So also there are forms which lie hidden in the
potentiality of matter and which are brought out of it into being. Such
forms come to be out of and in virtue of the capacity of matter to
become them. Since, therefore, they attain being by reason of their
adherence to matter according to potency, they also retain it by reason
of their adherence to matter according to act. They come to be because
they are present potentially in matter. This is the condition of their
being. Hence, they can only preserve their being as long as they
continue to fulfill that condition by their adherence to matter. 7
But the form has being by reason of itself. As the circle itself is enough
to demand rotundity, so the form should be enough to demand being.
If the forms which come forth from matter are truly forms, why should
there be a condition of their being? Because being belongs to the form
according to its nature. This is what it means for the form to have being
through itself. That which exists, exists in its own mode. Some forms
according to their nature are forms of matter. This is what it means for
them to be themselves. For those forms, adherence to matter is prior to
being and the condition of being. Such forms by themselves are not
proper subjects of being. They are not complete enough to be that
which exists. Their being must be in matter. Since, then, being flows
from the form according to its nature, forms which are the forms of
matter exist not by their own being, but by the being of the form-
matter composite. If the composite ceases to have being, so also do the
parts which exist in virtue of the being of the composite.
Now one of the members of the composite is most unstable. Matter is
open to many forms, just as metal can receive many different shapes.
This multiple possibility is obvious in the changes we observe around
us. A tree is burned and ashes remain. Something about the tree makes
7 TP, XV, 2, v. III, pp. 26-28, B-334-35. Cf. Plato, Timaeus 28c, 37c, 50d-52a. Also,
Proclus, The Elements qf Theology # 159. Although Ficino's text, in the section referred to
above, presents a discussion attributed to the Pythagoreans, its essential elements are pre-
sented in other texts as Ficino's own. The value of the text is in the example of the vase, the
gold, and the light of the sun. This example helps to clarify Ficino's explanation. Cf. TP, V,
9, v. I, p. 194, B-143.
it capable of becoming what is not a tree. The capacity makes it possi-

ble for the tree to be burned to ashes, and the actual burning makes this
aspect of the tree manifest. It is the continual determinability of matter
which is the principle of corruption. This makes possible the divorce of
the two elements in the composite, the loss of being which was proper
to the composite, and the destruction of the form which existed by
reason of that being. Thus, when cold invades the domain of heat,
chasing it away and replacing it, fire, which is a composite of heat and
matter, loses its being. Because the form of heat existed by reason of
that same being of the whole, it, too, ceases to be. Matter alone remains,
but under the formation of another form, that of cold, and by reason of
another being, that of earth or water. So it is with all those forms
which, having no being of their own, exist in virtue of the being of the
composite. 8
The rational soul, however, is different from these forms. Matter has
no capacity for intelligence. Action follows being in such a way that the
subject of the action is the subject of being and the mode of that action
is the same as the mode of being. Because, properly speaking, it is the
man who exists, it is the man who thinks, not just his mind. For mind
exists only because it belongs to an existing man. Hence, the mode of
thinking is a human one as is the mode of being. But the rational soul
has an action in which matter cannot be involved; it knows things in
separation from matter and material conditions. Whereas a material
thing is composite, changing, impenetrable even by those things which
are its like in essence, the soul has knowledge which is immutable,
reduces things to their simple parts in knowing them, and unifies them
under one universal idea. But if the soul acts in separation from matter,
it must be separate from it. Thus, it exists in itself and is independent of
the body.9 It cannot come forth out of the potency of matter. It is not
like the shape of the vase, which is brought out of the inherent capacity
of the metal. Rather it is like the light of the sun reflected by the metal
and imposed on it from without. By working on the gold itself, an
agent can bring from within it the shape of a vase. This shape is already
there. All it needs is to be brought forth actually. But the light of the
sun is not there. No matter how clever the agent, light could not be
8 TP, V, 9, v. I, p. 192, B-I42; XV, 2, v. III, p. 25, B-334; V, 8, v. I, pp. 188-89, B-I4I.
9 TP, VIII, 14, v. I, p. 323, B-1 98. "Ut quemadmodum quod sine materia noscit est sine
ipsa, ita quod absque materiae conditionibus comprehendit ab ipsius passionibus procul
existat." (X, 5, v. II, p. 74, B-231) "Itaque rationalis anima nullo modo pendet ex corpore
in essendo, sicut neque in movendo et operando." (IX, I, v. II, p. 9, B-203) cr. XV, 2, v.
III, pp. 27-28, B-335; V, 14, v. I, p. 212, B-151; VI, 7, v. I, p. 244, B-165.
brought out of gold. Light must be given to it from without, from the
sun. So also the rational soul comes to the body not out of the potency
of matter, but from without, from the divine agent,l0
The rational soul, then, is not the kind of form which can only be
itself if it belongs to matter. It is complete enough to act without
matter, and this indicates that it is complete enough to exist without it.
I [ it also informs matter, its adherence to matter does not take prece-
dence over its being. As the light of the sun remains properly the sun's
own light, even when it enlightens the objects of this world, so the being
of the soul remains properly the soul's own being, even when the body,
too, exists in virtue of it. The rational soul is the proper subject of being ;
it is that which exists. Being belongs to the soul in its own right and is
proper to it.ll
What principle of corruption is there, then, by which the soul could
pass away? What capacity would allow it to release its hold on being?
The capacity for non-being is rooted in the capacity for being. That
which is possible is neither necessary nor impossible. For the impossible
cannot be, the necessary must be, but the possible can be. In the possi-
ble there is an indifference to being and non-being. There is no reason
why it cannot be, but there is no reason why it must be either. This
indifference remains, even after a determination has been made. Al-
though the thing actually is one thing rather than another, it is still the
kind of thing which need not be such. Herein lies the seed of its cor-
ruption. A thing loses its actual determination by reason of its ability
10 TP, XV, 2, v. III, pp. 26-28, B-334-35.

11 "Anima vero propter tertiae illius essentiae proprietatem mera quaedam forma est, non
composita ex materia et forma, neque recubans in materia. Ideo in seipsa permanens, quic-
quid in se est nihil est aliud praeter formam. Ipsa igitur sua essentia non formatur per aliud
quicquam, sed sui ipsius est forma, id est ipsamet et forma est." (TP, V, 8, v. I, p. 189,
B-141) "Sed animae essentia, quoniam est forma soluta, esse sortitur per semetipsam et in ea
ipsum esse est primus et proprius actus essentiae, nec ullum vinculum est per quod esse cum
essentia connectatur, quo soluto, accidat dissolutio .... semper est absolute." (TP, V, 9, v.
I, p. 194, B-143) " ... anima nihil aliud est apud Platonicos nisi forma simplex per se sub-
sistens, in essentia quidem sua perfecta et integra, ... " (TP, V, 12, V. I, p. 199, B-145) Cf.
Proclus, The Elements of Theology # 49, 187. "Forma corporis, qualis rationalis est anima,
neque a se habet esse, quoniam fit ab alio, neque pro seipsa tantum esse suum servat, quia
ipsum communicat corpori, esse tamen habet in se, quia suum esse in eiusdem fundatur
essentia suaeque essentiae actus est proprius, sicuti solis anima secundum Platonicos in se
lucet et illuminat solem, ita tamen ut lumen proprium non amittat." (TP, XV, 2, v. III,
p. 25, B-334) Cf. Plotinus, Enneads V-3--g, 12; VI-4-7, 10. "Animae esse vivere est, quan-
doquidem animae essentia est vita, per quam formaliter vivit corpus. Esse quoque animantis
nihil aliud est quam vivere. Non tamen alius est vivere ipsum animae corpori copulatae,
aliud ipsius compositi vivere. Immo sicut per unam eamdemque vitam, id est animae essen-
tiam vivit utrumque, sed anima per suam, corpus per alienam, ita ut plerique iudicant, per
unum dumtaxat vivere utraque sunt dicunturque viventia, per suum anima, corpus per
alienum." (TP, XV, 5, v. III, pp. 35-36, B-338).
to be otherwise. Thus, that which allows a thing to pass away is the
very capacity by reason of which it comes to be. Those forms which
come to be from the potency of matter are brought to destruction
through that same potency.1 2
The origin of the rational soul, however, does not lie in matter, which
has no capacity to be a rational being. Nor does the soul come to be
from the integration of parts, as is the case with tables, chairs, houses,
and the like. Yet there must be some potency from which it is brought
forth into act, for every creature is in potency to its being. Although it
does not have its source in matter, which is a capacity for forms, it must
be rooted in the potency of the essence, which is a capacity for being.
Does it not pass away in virtue of this same capacity; is it not resolved
into itself in potency? 13
As corporeal matter cannot be without corporeal act, so spiritual
matter, i.e. the essence, cannot be without spiritual act. The capacity
to be formed is not present apart from some actual determination. A
thing actually determined can be otherwise determined. Corporeal
matter consists in this. But the pure ability to be formed, absolved from
all actual formation, is nothing. So also with regard to spiritual matter.
The soul's ability to be, apart from all actual existence is nothing.
When the soul comes to be, it comes to be from nothing.1 4 Now only
God can cause a thing to be which absolutely was not, for he alone is
the cause of being itself, and this follows immediately after nothing.
The soul's capacity for being is simply the power of God to create it.
Hence, its capacity for non-being is simply the power of God either to
destroy it or to withdraw from it that causal influx by which he con-
tinually produces it in being. I5 But God always gives to things what-
ever is proper to them, since he has himself ordained that they should
be as they are and he is immutable. Consequently, if he has created a
form which has being proper to itself and contains within itself no
reason for not being, then he cannot withdraw being from it. In giving
such a nature to the rational soul, he has himself decreed that it exist
necessarily and without condition. 16
There are two ways in which a thing can be indifferent to being and
non-being, and these correspond to the two aspects of causation which
12 TP, V, 12, V. I, pp. 200-01, B-146.

13 TP, V, 13, v. I, pp. 203-04, B-147; V, 12, v. I, pp. 201-02, B-146.
14 TP, V, 12, v. I, pp. 201-02, B-146; V, II, V. I, p. 198, B-145.
15 TP, V, 13, v. I, pp. 203-09, B-147-49; V, 12, v. I, p. 202, B-146-47.
16 TP, V, 12, v. I, pp. 202--03, B-I47; II, 12, v. I, p. 116, B-1 10; V, 9, v. I, p. 192,
B-1 42-43.
Ficino distinguishes in the discussion of primary and secondary cau-

sality. Matter can be or not be something specific, a lion for example. I7
Its "mere possibility" stems from its capacity for different forms which
are contrary to each other and hence cannot be possessed simultane-
ously. Matter is a capacity for different essential modes of being. A
material thing does not have to be the thing it is; it can be a different
thing altogether. This is the kind of indifference to being and non-
being which the rational soul does not have. The only mode for which
it has a capacity is its own mode. It is either that or nothing. But it does
not have to exist. There would be no contradiction in its not being
anything at all. Hence, we can ask why is it something rather than
nothing. There must be a cause outside the soul itself to explain this.
But if it exists, it exists as a rational soul and cannot be anything else,
not on the essential level at least. Therefore, we cannot ask why is it the
kind of thing it is rather than another kind of thing. The only way we
can question the mode of being is by questioning being itself. Analo-
gous to this is the relation between fire and heat. We can ask why there
is a fire in the grate rather than not and the question makes sense. But it
makes no sense to ask why fire is hot rather than cold. If fire is by
nature hot, then we can question the presence of heat only by question-
ing the presence of fire itself. With regard to the rational soul, we can
ask why there is anything at all, and this is to ask why there is a rational
soul. But it makes no sense to ask why it has this mode rather than
another, since it has no capacity for anything else.
Thus, when Ficino elaborates his own position, the relationship be-
tween matter and form and the relationship between essence and being
are not the same. Both are relationships between potency and act, but
one is on the level of the mode - matter does not have to have the mode
it has and is determined to it by the form - and the other is on the level
of being as being - essence does not have to exist at all and is deter-
mined to it by being, an act other than itself. But what happens, then,
to Ficino's claim that the relation between matter and form, described
by the Platonists, is really the relation between essence and being, de-
scribed by the Christian theologians? Ficino has presented three ac-
counts of the act-potency composition in creatures. In the first account,
attributed to Plato and the Platonists, the composition is one of the
infinite or matter and the limit or form. Matter is the undetermined;
form is that which determines it. In the argument presented to
17 Ficino uses 'lion' as an example of a determination in relation to which matter is
"merely possible". (TP, V, 1~, V. I, pp. ~Oo-OI, B-1.¥»
strengthen this position, the composition is one of possible and actual

being. Possible being is undetermined because it demands neither being
nor non-being. Actual being determines it to be. In the account at-
tributed to the Christian theologians, the composition is one of essence
and being. The essence is the undetermined because a creature does
not account for its own being, but must receive it from the creator.
Ficino says that all three of these accounts refer to the same compo-
sition. It is true that all three refer to a composition of the undeter-
mined with that which determines it, i.e. a composition of potency and
act. But the similarity ends there.
In the Philebus, Plato considers the value of the life of reason or in-
telligence in relation to the life of pleasure. He introduces the dis-
cussion of the infinite and the limit to show that reason is more akin to
the absolute value than pleasure is. By the infinite or the unlimited is
meant that which can be increased or decreased without end. It re-
quires no definite quantity or proportion. Such are hot and cold, dry
and wet, high and low, and anything else which admits of the terms
'more', 'less', 'strongly', 'slightly', and the like. This character of un-
limitedness allows these things to run to the excessive, as in a fever,
extreme heat or cold, etc. But when a definite measure or limit is
introduced into them, a certain balance, proportion, or harmony is the
result. Pleasure has the character of the unlimited; it derives from itself
no definite measure. But the order of the universe shows that it comes
to be and is controlled by a power which is not irrational or blind; the
cause orders and regulates the universe according to reason. Hence,
although the cause of the infinite, the limit, and the composite is differ-
ent from all three, reason, which is associated with the limit, is more
akin to the cause than pleasure is.1 8
Plato does not apply the name 'limit' or 'term' to the cause. He says
that the cause is different from all its effects - the limit, the infinite, and
the mixed. But limit is more akin to it than the others. Neither does
Plato apply the name 'infinite' to the cause. In the Parmenides, he says
that all things other than the one are composites of unity, which gives
them limit, and unlimitedness, which they have from their own nature.
But he does not say that the one is the infinite. It is Proclus who argues
that if limit is characteristic of all things which are caused, then the
cause of all things must be pure limit with no mixture of the infinite;
and if the infinite as well as the limit enters into all things, then the
18 Plato, Philebus 23c-3Ia.

cause of all must be infinite with no mixture of limit. Ficino applies

both names - pure limit and pure infinity - to the same cause as ex-
pressing two different aspects of its nature. 19
Fieino relates this discussion of the infinite and the limit to the doc-
trine of matter and form which Plato presents in the Timaeus. Accord-
ing to the Timaeus, matter is a receptacle of forms; these forms are
imitations of the intelligible and unchanging patterns and are imposed
on the receptacle by the cause of the universe. The forms of the Timaeus
and the limit of the Philebus are both effects of a universal cause. Per-
haps this is why Ficino thinks that God is called term or limit because
he is a giver offorms. 2o
But the determination described in the Timaeus is not a giving of
being to essence, but a giving of essence to matter. The forms ofthings
in the sensible world are images of unchangeable, intelligible patterns.
In the Republic unchangeable, intelligible forms are such things as jus-
tice itself and beauty itself. These are identified with being because
each is always itself and purely itself. Thus, the form causes a thing to
be by causing it to be what it is, e.g. just, beautiful, etc. 21 This falls in
the area of essence; it does not refer to an act or determination to which
the essence itselfis in potency. And there is no evidence that the forms
which Plato discusses in the Timaeus are inconsistent with those dis-
cussed in the Republic. Ficino chooses to emphasize those aspects of the
Platonic account which resemble the account attributed to the Chris-
tian theologians, i.e. through the action of God things which can be
actually come to be. But he does not bring into his discussion the
aspects in which the two accounts significantly differ. The position
attributed to the Christian theologians is more akin to the Platonic
argument from possible being than to Plato's discussion of matter and
form. The distinctive character of Ficino's position is not developed in
this text. 22
Composition is the mark of dependence. This is the principle which
governs the movement through the hierarchy of the universe. And
composition is explained in terms of potency and act. But dependence
in this case is dependence in action. Now a new approach has been
19 Plato, Parmenides IS8b-160b; Proclus, The Elements of Theology # go.

20 Timaeus 48e-Sla. At the end of this text, Ficino says that Avicebron's Fons Vitae is in
agreement with the position he has attributed to Plato. Cf. Ibn Gabirol, Fons Vitae V, 41,
pp. 330--3 1 •
21 Republic V 476e-48oa.
22 For a further discussion of the way Ficino uses the Platonic notions of infinite and limit,
see ch. S, note 32.
introduced, pointing to a more fundamental dependence and a more

fundamental composition. All things under God are composites of po-
tency and act because all things depend on God for their being. A
thing is not only in potency to its action, it is in potency to its being.
Plato, the Platonists, and the Christian theologians attest to this. We
must now clarify the exact nature of the potency-act relationship es-
pecially on the level of being.
The first characteristic of potency is indetermination. Creatures are
merely possible; they can exist but do not have to exist. Since actual
existence is not in their nature, they must be determined to it by some-
thing outside themselves. From this the second characteristic is derived.
Potency is a receptivity. According to the Christian theologians, Ficino
says, all things have being from God. The argument proceeds immedi-
ately from this to the potency-act relationship. Potency marks a thing
as having been caused, i.e. as receiving its act from something other
than itself. Thus, Ficino argues that a thing cannot be in potency to
itself because it cannot receive itself. When relating potency and act to
action, Ficino is more explicit:
If to receive and be acted upon is proper to the corporeal, but to give and
to act is proper to the incorporeal, then in the corporeal nature there is the
potency which the theologians call passive and receptive and in the incor-
poreal nature there is act, i.e. the power of acting. 23
Potency, then, is receptivity, and act is efficacy. Act and efficacy here
primarily indicate the power to produce or to give something. But if a
cause is to produce an effect, it must give to the effect an intrinsic
principle in virtue of which the effect itself is whatever the cause has
made it to be. Unless the act is within the effect itself, the effect remains
a mere possibility. Act on the part of the agent must bring forth an act
in the patient. This intrinsic act is the ground for saying "The effect is"
rather than "The agent is producing it". Thus, being is the act of the
essence not because it is an agent producing it, but because it belongs
to the essence, is present within it in a most intimate way, and by this
presence causes it to be. 24
Ficino often refers to act as proper to a certain potency or to potency
23 "Porro, si corporis proprium est suscipere atque pati, naturae autem incorporalis prop-
rium dare et agere, in natura corporali dicitur esse potentia, potentia scilicet, ut aiunt theo-
logi, susceptiva atque passiva; in natura incorporali actus, id est efficacia ad agendum."
(TP, III, I, v. I, p. 130, B-1 16)
24 " ••. nihil magis intrinsecum essentiae est quam esse, ... " (TP, VI, 9, v. I, p. 247,
B-1 66)
as the proper subject of a certain act. The proper subject of being is

that which has being as its own. Some realities exist because they be-
long to an existing thing. The being by which they exist is not their
own, but that of the subject which possesses them. Properly speaking,
that which exists is this subject, called essence or substance - the horse,
the man, the stone, rather than the characteristics or properties of these
things. Forms are proper subjects of being if they are complete enough
to be that which exists. Those which by nature belong to matter are not
things which exist, but rather the forms of things which exist. Being
properly belongs to the formed matter rather than to the form alone. 25
Ficino uses the phrase 'proper act' when distinguishing essence from
power. Both are potencies. But they are not the same potency, since
they do not have the same proper act. 26 The proper act of a potency,
then, is the essential element in determining what it is. To be a capacity
for this act is its nature. The intellect is the capacity for knowing; its
proper act is the actual knowing. The essence is the capacity to exist;
its proper act is the actual existing. Proper act is simply the 'is' which
completes the 'can be' in its own line. That of which the one is the
capacity and the other the actuality is the same. To say, therefore, that
being is the proper act of the essence is to say that it fulfills the capacity
which is the essence itself causing it to be itself in act.
In relation to its proper act, a potency is one-directional. Fire, for
example, is the proper subject of heat, but has no capacity for cold.
Fire as fire is hot, and if it is cold, it cannot be fire. So also form, which
is the proper subject of being, has no tendency toward non-being. Ifit
is a form which belongs to matter, it can be destroyed. But destruction
is the by-product of the multi-directional capacity of matter; matter is
a potency ordered to form, but not to anyone form. Even pure forms do
not have to exist. But this is not because they have a tendency to non-
being. If they do not exist, they are not forms. Just as cold is possible,
while fire has no capacity for it, so the non-existence of pure forms is
possible, but not as a capacity or tendency belonging to the form itself.
The proper subject of an act cannot have a capacity for any other act,
since its very nature is defined by the act to which it is ordered. Any
other act would be contrary to itself.
Although being is the proper act of the essence, causing it to be itself
in act, Ficino says that the distinction between essence and being is
25 TP, XV, 2, v. III, p. 25, B-334.

26 TP, V, 13, v. I, p. 207, B-I49.
preserved in the actually existing thing. 27 The relationship between

the existing essence and the being by which it exists is like the relation-
ship between a power and its operation. As the intellect knows, so the
essence exists. Knowing is an activity which the intellect performs.
Ficino would have us consider being in the same dynamic way. Hence,
he uses the infinitive form 'to be', which he retains when speaking of
being in its modes. The being of the living thing is to live, the being of
light is to shine. 28 Often he interprets this 'to be' as the 'act of being'
(actus essendi, actus existendi). 29 Just as the intellect acts the act of under-
standing, so the essence acts the act of being. The distinction between
the essence in act and its being is like the distinction between a thing
and its action. The action is not the thing itself, but what it does. The
runner is not identical with his running. Running is an act he performs,
and by performing it he becomes a runner. So also, being is not identi-
cal with the essence. Being is the act it exercises in actually being itself.
When Ficino explains how all things are known through being, he says
that a being (ens) in potency is known through a being in act, and a
being in act is known through the act of existing. 30 The term 'ens' signi-
fies the composite of essence and being, not being itself, but that which
exists. 31 Thus, a being in act is distinguished (I) from a being in poten-
cy, and hence from itself considered purely as potential, and (2) from
the act of existing. Being (esse) is not the thing in act, i.e. the thing
which is, but the act which causes it to be a thing in act.
Up to this point, Ficino has considered the relationship between be-
ing and essence as one in which being is the intrinsic act or cause of the
essence. But sometimes he reverses this approach and considers it as
27 " ••• sed in ipsa productione proprie actus potentiae adhibetur. Atque haec ipsa duo in
creatura necessario distinguuntur, alioquin esse ipsum creaturae, quia in seipso subsisteret,
esset penitus infinitum." (TP, XVII, 2, v. III, pp. 150-51, B-387)
28 "Esse quidem lucis illius quid est aliud quam lucere? .... Animae esse vivere est,
quandoquidem animae essentia est vita, per quam formaliter vivit corpus." (TP, XV, 5, v.
III, pp. 35-36, B-338) Also, V, I I, v. I, p. 199, B-I45.
29 " ••• ens actu per actum noscitur existendi. Talis actus esse ipsum existit." (TP, XII,
7, v. II, p. 190, B-282) "Duo namque existendi actus duo sunt esse, non unum." (TP, XV,
II, v. III, p. 60, B-348) "In anima vero actus ipsius est ipsum Silum esse; essentia vero et
substantia eius est illa ipsa potentia quae essendi actui subest. Non enim est in formis absolu-
tis ferme alia compositio quam ex essentia atque esse aut similis. Essentia locum materiae et
potentiae tenet; esse vero locum formae et actus." (TP, V, I I, V. I, p. 197, B-I44) "Actus
quidem existendi ibi est, in ipsa scilicet forma integra et perfecta, siquidem per formae
integritatem est unumquodque." (TP, V, 12, v. I, p. 199, B-I45) "Vocatur [Deus] tamen a
Peripateticis esse, quantum ipse est purus et absolutus actus, per quem omnes essentiae actum
essendi suscipiunt." (TP, XII, 3, v. II, p. 163, B-270)
30 TP, XII, 7, v. II, p. 190, B-282.
31 "Verumautemet ens et intelligibile idem. Quicquid autem in hoc ipso genere ex essen-
tia atque esse componitur, tamquam ens verumque potiusquam tamquam esse veritasve se
habet, ... " (TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, p. 210, B-4I I) Also, TP, XI, 6, v. II, pp. 134-35, B-258.
one in which essence is a principle of being. Essence is a source of being

in the same way that the intellect is a source of the act of knowing.
Being is what the essence does, the act it exercises, as knowing is the act
exercised by the knowing power. Being flows from the essence because
essence is the subject of the act; essence is that which acts the act of
existing. In this capacity, essence is also called substance or that which
exists. In turn, that which exists is what a thing is in its essence, for
essence is what a thing must be in order to be itself and without which
it would no longer exist. If this changes, that which exists is no longer
the same. 32 The substance or essence, therfore, has a certain content.
It exists according to the kind of capacity it is - as a man, a stone, a
horse. That which exists gives a mode to its being precisely because it is
the subject of that act and hence exercises it according to its capacity.33
Similarly, the act of running is qualified by the physical condition of
the man who runs and the act of knowing by the wisdom of the knower.
Thus, Ficino says that being is given through essence as to be wise is
given through through wisdom.34 The act of being is an act of being
wise because it is the act of one who has wisdom. So, too, the essence of
the soul is life, its being is to live. 3s Life is what the soul is as itself. To
live is the act it exercises in being itself. Generally speaking, essence is
what a thing is; being is its act of being what it is. Thus does being flow
from the essence. 36
The interplay of two causalities is not difficult to understand in ordi-
nary cases because potency is reducible to act. Potency is act taken in a
new aspect. A man is well educated. This is an actuality. Because he is
well educated, he is able to learn in areas closed to others. By relating
the actuality to a new act, we see it as a capacity. But essence is a
32 TP, VII, 9, v. I, pp. 278-79, B-179. "Essentia quidem manifeste significat rationem rei
cuiusque formalem, innuit quoque esse tamquam actum essentiae proprium." (TP, XVII,
2, v. III, p. 151, B-387)
33 TP, V, 13, v. I, p. 206, B-14B; V, 7, v. I, pp. 185--87, B-140. "Sed ad divina iterum
revertamur. Deum quidem esse negat nemo. Esse vero ipsum Dei non certa quadam specie
determinatur essendi, per quam fiat esse tale vel tale, ne compositus sit Deus ex communi
natura essendi et ex aliqua addita differentia, id est essendi proprietate. Igitur esse ipsum
absolutum est nullis limitibus circumscriptum, quod existit penitus infinitum, radix immensa
omnium eorum contentrix et procreatrix, quae tale habent esse vel tale. A simplici enim
fonte omnis compositio manat. Igitur angeli esse habent, sed quisque illorum tale esse vel
tale, id est cum hac aut illa proprietate in alia atque alia specie angelorum. Quapropter esse
angeli non est infinitum sicut esse divinum. Non enim continet amplius totius essendi inte-
gram plenitudinem neque omne esse existit, sed una quadam rerum specie ciauditur, per
quam ad unicum essendi modum determinatur." (TP, XV, 2, v. III, p. 23, B-333)
34 TP, VI, 6, v. I, p. 243, B-J64.
35 TP, V, I I, v. I, p. 199, B-145. "Animae esse vivere est, quandoquidem animae essentia
est vita, per quam formaliter vivit corpus." (TP, XV, 5, v. III, pp. 35-36, B-338)
36 TP, VI, 12, v. I, pp. 255-56, B-1 70.
potency which is not reducible to act. Being is its most fundamental

act, and in its potency essence is other than being. From whence, then,
does it derive the content by which it determines being to a certain
mode? For it is not empty. It is a capacity marked out for a specific act.
The being of a man has a human mode because the essence is a capa-
city for that mode. Thus, when Ficino distinguishes being and essence
in an argument for human immortality, he attributes to the essence
that content which is the ground of the definition. Being makes the
content actual; but the essence has it in potency. If potency is not
nothing, it has some kind of reality. Yet the potency of the essence is
not act. Granted that the essence receives actuality from its being,
where does it get its reality as potency?
There is no question that the essence receives whatever reality it has
from God. About this Ficino is explicit. Whether material or spiritual,
potency has no reality without act, and hence essence, even in its
potency, is nothing without being. The potency of the essence has no
reality at all except in the actually existing thing. But all things are
created by God, and a creature owes its whole reality to the creator.
Apart from God's creative act, it purely and simply is not, not even in
potency; its possibility lies only in God's power to create it.37
Creation, however, is properly described as the production of being,
and being is the act of the essence; the potency of the essence dis-
tinguishes it from being. Does God give this potency to the creature by
giving it being, in which case the only reality in a creature is that
derived from its act of being? Or does God create a whole in which
there are two realities, the potency of the essence and its act of being,
neither derived from the other?
On the side of the second alternative is the account which describes
the potency-act composition in creatures first according to the Plato-
nists and then according to the Christian theologians. The capacity to
be all things, which the Platonists call matter, is suspended from God
like a shadow, and, by reason of its own lack oflimit or determination,
reflects the infinity of God. God looks upon the shadow and is reflected
therein, thus giving matter his image. This is the formation or deter-
mination of matter. Matter seems to cooperate in the act as a recepta-
cle already present and ready to receive it. This is not a chronological
priority, perhaps, but at least matter as potency seems to have some
reality ofits own which does not come from God by reason of the deter-
37 TP, 11,4, v. I, p. 83, B-g6; V, 13, v. I, pp. 205-06, B-148; V, 12, v. I, pp. 201-02,
B-146; V, II, V. I, p. Ig8, B-I45.
mination which establishes it in act. Since Ficino thinks that form and
matter in the Platonic doctrine correspond to being and essence in the
Christian doctrine, this could mean that Ficino sees the essence as
taking its actuality from being, but not its potency.3S
Also attributed to the Platonists is the opinion that matter, which is a
potency, does not fall into the realm of being, since it has being only in
virtue of something other than itself, namely the form. But it is one and
good even apart from what it receives from the form. It is good in its
tendency toward the good. It is one in its determinability, since di-
versity comes from the form which determines it to be one thing differ-
ent from another. This implies that a potency can have some real
characteristics which do not belong to it in virtue of its being. 39
The consideration of the Christian position gives the same im-
pression, although less explicitly. The production of an effect is defined
as the imposition of act on potency. One of the reasons given for this is
that potency cannot receive itself; it must receive that which is other
than itself, i.e. act.40 Applied to essence and being, this means that the
essence receives only its act, not its potency, when it receives being.
This cannot be construed to mean that the creature receives from God
only its being and not its potency to be. Ficino has eliminated this
possibility by a clear statement in another place, as we have seen. But
it could mean that the essence has its reality as potency from God but
not in virtue of its being.
It is impossible, however, to draw any clear-cut conclusions from
this text alone. The account of the Platonic position suffers from the
attempt to give the Platonists the benefit of the Christian doctrine of
creation. Ficino interprets the Platonic terms so freely that it is difficult
to discern what can be taken strictly and with its full implications. The
account of the Christian position aims to establish that a creature,
since it does not have to be, is other than its being, and since it receives
being, is in potency to it. The potency-act relationship marks the crea-
ture as dependent on God for its being. But we hesitate to conclude any
more than this from the discussion. If the argument that a potency
cannot receive itself implies anything more in this context, it is that the
essence receives from God its act, but not its potency. Ficino has clearly
denied this. Since we cannot push the text this far, we cannot legiti-
mately push it farther to implications even less clearly intended.
38 TP, XVII, 2, v. III, p. 149-50, B-386-87.

39 TP, XII, 3, v. II, p. 163, B-270.
40 TP, XVII, 2, v. III, pp. 150-51, B-387.
On the other side of this issue are the discussion of primary and
secondary causality, the explanation of how God can produce diverse
effects, and the arguments for divine omnipotence. The whole dis-
cussion of primary and secondary causality rests on the universality and
primacy of being. Being is common to all things, and it comes first
after nothing. There is nothing beyond being and nothing prior to it.
Hence, it is the proper effect of God who is the first cause of all things.
And only God can cause being as such because only God can produce
something from nothing. Being, then, is the intrinsic principle which
establishes a thing out of nothingness. Being does as an intrinsic princi-
ple what God does as a transcendent cause; it accounts for the whole
reality of the creature. Thus, God has an exhaustive knowledge of his
creatures because he knows himself as the cause of their being.
The discussion of divine infinity confirms this interpretation of Fici-
no's position, for Ficino establishes the infinity of God from the infinite
excellence proper to pure being and pure act. We know that pure being
is infinite by the way being manifests itself in the finite. There are an
infinite variety of ways in which being can be possessed. Why do we
say this? Ficino does not explain, but we can try to explain for him.
Each of the things we know has reality and excellence insofar as it has
being. Wherever we look, we confront being in a new form. Being is truly
here, there, wherever 'is' applies; and nothing falls outside that 'is'. This
proliferation reveals that being transcends each of the modes in which we
grasp it. Its function in each case is to posit all the perfection the thing has
and never does this exhaust it. We can turn and turn and turn to different
things, we can take all these together, and still we can conceive of new
worlds and new histories, and all of these too will be in a new way. There
is no end to what being can be. Being is all that can be; it can lack
nothing. Hence, if there is one in whom being is pure and left to seek its
own level, this one will be all in all; it will be actually all the perfection
which can be. Other things, the things we know, are not such. Each of
them, and indeed all together, in some way are not. Their limits cannot
come from being, for being appears again in some quite different place.
What, then, holds the being of this one thing to a limited mode which
being itself does not require? Not being itself, but the subject to which
it belongs or the cause from which it flows. Either that which has being
has limited capacity or that which produces it has limited power. God
himself has no cause, and in him can be no composition. The subject
which has being cannot be other than being itsel£ Hence, God is pure
being and infinite. The same can be said in terms of act and potency.
Pure act, like pure being, can have no limit. To be subjected to a limit
is a passivity, a potency, which is the opposite of act. Finite act is an
impure act because it is mixed with what is other than itself, i.e. poten-
cy. Since God cannot be composite and potency cannot be pure, for it
has no reality at all without act, God is pure act and infinite. 41
The proliferation of being can be interpreted in a different way.
Take being as a common nature, having one content throughout all the
things which are and differing by reason of some positive characteristic
not included within being itself. Ficino sometimes speaks in this way.42
This would explain why being is present in so many different things.
But if this interpretation is used, the argument for divine infinity has no
effect. An infinity of existing or possibly existing things would indicate
not infinite excellence, but the mere multiplication of instances of one
limited perfection. Moreover, in the very text in which he uses the terms
'common nature' and 'added difference', Ficino asserts that undeter-
mined being is richer and fuller than that which is confined to a certain
mode. Being with an added difference lacks the fullness ofbeing. 43 The
determination of being, then, is negative, not positive. Determination
holds being back from the infinite perfection which is proper to it.
Being itself encompasses all reality. It lacks nothing. There can be
nothing, then, which falls outside of being, although all things other
than God fall short of the full perfection of being itself. But if this is so,
the potency which in creatures puts a limit on being and is distinct
from it, is either nothing at all (which is absurd, since nothing would
have no effect) or it falls within the realm of being. And if pure act is
another name for pure being, if it signifies the all-encompassing excel-
lence of God, then potency is not the opposite of act. If it were, God
would lack something. The opposite of act is nothing. Therefore, the
potency of the essence cannot have even from God a reality other than
that derived from the act of being, since God himself is nothing else but
being or act.
Being is limited to a certain mode either by the subject which re-
ceives it or the cause which produces it. The role of the subject with
limited capacity appears most clearly when something already existing
changes from one thing to another or from one mode of being to an-
other. The difficulty in the relationship between essence and being is
that it falls on a more fundamental level. On this level we question the
41 TP, II, 4, v. I, pp. 82-83, B--g6; XV, 2, v. III, p. 23, B-333.

42 TP, XV, 2, v. III, p. 23, B-333; XII, 7, v. II, p. 190, B-282.
43 TP, XV, 2, v. III, p. 23, B-333.
mode only by questioning being itself. We ask why is there something
rather than nothing. This throws the essence into question, but only as
implicit in the more fundamental question of being. Why is there some-
thing rather than nothing? On the level of the thing itself, the answer is
being, and being brings the essence with it.
Ultimately, this problem must be referred back to the other way in
which being is determined, i.e. by the cause which produces it. God
determines being to a certain mode by knowing the extent to which the
effect falls short of his own essence. For to know absolute being is to
know not only the way in which creatures are like God, since they too
are beings, but also the way in which they are unlike him, since they
lack the full perfection of being itself. Thus, the discussion of the divine
ideas retains the position taken in the discussion of divine infinity. To
determine being is to hold it back from its full perfection. Let us con-
sider again that text in which Ficino assigns priority to the divine being
over the divine ideas:
For it is fitting that the divine being, which is prior to the ideas or species,
and which gives being through species to the things coming forth from itself,
should give being in species and hence different modes of being to different
species. Thus, the angelic being is limited in the angelic species; and the
angelic species, which we call essence and which is the foundation of being
such, is in a certain way infinite. 44
In this text, Ficino uses the word 'species' in two different ways -
first, to refer to the divine ideas which are the foundation in the agent
for the diversity of his effects, and second as the essence which is the
intrinsic cause of the mode of being. The latter consideration of the
creature and its intrinsic elements is said to follow from the previous
consideration of God as causing being through the ideas. Therefore,
the essence, which causes the mode intrinsically, corresponds to the
divine idea through which the agent gives different modes of being.
Now Ficino has said that the divine being is prior to the divine ideas.
Thus, God's action is primarily a production of being; this includes the
production of the mode and the essence which intrinsically establishes
that mode. God causes the whole creature insofar as he produces being
which is being of a certain kind.
What, then, is the ontological status of the potency? Whether we
consider God as the cause of being or as the cause of the mode, his cre-
44 TP, XV, 2, v. III, p. 23, B-333 (For text, see ch. 3, note 16).
ative act is the production of being as being. By producing being God

causes the whole reality of the effect. Being, then, is more fundamental
than the essence. Being comes first after nothing, and the essence fol-
lows on this. Ficino is saying this, whether or not he accounts for the
ontological status of the potency. We can only conclude that potency
takes whatever reality it has from being.
Plato, the Platonists, and the Christian theologians recognize the
dependence of all things on God, and by reason of this dependence
assign to all things a fundamental composition. The principle of re-
ceptivity is potency. A thing has reality not from itself but from a cause.
The principle of determination is act. A thing which does not have to
be nevertheless is in virtue of an intrinsic efficacy given by the cause.
The relationship between matter and form, between possible and actu-
al being, between essence and being have in common this relationship
between the determinable and the determining. But there are distinc-
tive aspects of these relationships which Fieino develops in other dis-
cussions. The distinction between matter and form falls within the area
of essence, i.e. what a thing is. A thing is a tree; the form accounts for
this. A tree is the kind of thing which can be burned to ashes; matter
accounts for this. The distinction between possible and actual being
can signify a relationship which goes beyond essence, the relationship
between what a thing is and its existence. But the relation between
what a thing is and its existence is not the same as the relationship
between essence and being, although occasionally Ficino refers to this
aspect alone. 45 The relation between essence and being is not conceived
as actualized possibility, according to the analogy of formed matter,
and as though essence and existence together made up a thing. It is
conceived as essence existing, according to the analogy of actor and
action. This makes more understandable the interplay of causality be-
tween essence and being.
Consider a man and his act of knowing. The one who performs the
action is not just a man who can become a knower; he is a knower. As
the subject of the action, this is what he is, and he is such in virtue of
the act of knowing which he performs. Yet the act remains distinct from
the subject. The knower is not the act of knowing itself, but the one
who performs it. Therefore, the action, although distinct from the sub-
ject, puts the subject into being; it causes a knower to be. What the
man is as a knower, the content and ground of his definition, is caused
45 TP, V, 7, v. I, pp. 185-87, B-140'

in him by the act he exercises. Yet in a sense the knower himself causes
the act, he performs it and by performing it determines it to the level of
his learning. In this case, of course, the man is a man before he is a
knower, and his capacity for knowledge is determined by what he actu-
ally is prior to the action which fulfills it. In the relationship between
essence and being, there is no prior actuality other than God himself
who puts the thing into being. But the act of being causes the essence in a
way similar to the efficacy of the act of knowing in relation to the knower.
Being is the act a thing exercises in being itself, and what the thing is,
the content and ground of its definition, is caused by this act. Yet the
thing exercises the act of being according to its capacity and thus de-
termines being to a certain mode. It has this capacity rather than an-
other because God gives it being in this mode rather than another.
Being has absolute priority; whatever reality a thing has, even its
reality as potency, belongs to it in virtue of being.
The distinctive aspects ofFicino's position on essence and being arise
from his reading of Aquinas. We have already seen how the discussions
of divine infinity, primary and secondary causality, and the divine ideas
are dominated by the spirit and the letter of Aquinas' text. These are
the discussions which assign absolute priority to being, the pure being
of God first, and the being of creatures following from it. Aquinas is
more thorough than Ficino on this issue. He denies explicitly that being
is a common nature to which other perfections are added, although he,
too, at times uses the language of common nature and added determi-
nations. 46 He affirms clearly that a thing has all its perfection from
being or act, that potency is a kind of being and hence is given by a
causal act properly described as the production ofbeing. 47 But Ficino's
46 Aquinas, CG, I, 22, # 206, (5); # 207, (6); # 209, (8); 24, # 223, (2); 26, # 24 1, (5);
#247, (II); 28, #260, (2); #262, (4); 11,52, # 1275, (3); 111,66, #2412, (6).
47 CG, 1,28, # 260, (2); II, 16, # 933, (2); # 936, (5); # 938-43, (7-12). The primary
concern in II, 16 is to prove that matter does not escape the causality of God. Matter, in this
discussion, is not limited to the matter of bodies, but is identified with receptivity. In II, 17,
# 947, (2), Aquinas refers to II, 16 as proving that there is no potency prior to and receptive
of the divine action. Thus, he thinks that in proving that there is no prior matter, he has
proven that there is no prior potency. Cf. 1,16, # 132, (6); 65, # 531, (3); II, 7, # 888, (3).
A created thing is possible prior to its actual being in virtue of the power of the agent to
produce it and its own compatibility with actual being. The power of the agent, of course,
is not a passive but an active potency. But Aquinas also denies that the thing's compatibility
with being is a passive potentiality, at least he denies that this is a real potency (nulla potentia
existente), and he contrasts it to the passive potency in virtue of which things come to be
through motion. (CG, II, 37, # 1132, [5])
What does Aquinas mean when he denies that compatibility with being is a real potency
(potentia existente)? Without some kind of reality it would be absolutely nothing. Yet it is said
to be compatible with being in virtue of some content. In other discussions, Aquinas relates
the compatibility with being to the power of the first cause. Although God is an omnipotent
position is clear enough. The creative act is the production of being as

being and creation causes the total reality of the creature. God is being
itself and pure act, and no perfection is lacking to him. Ficino repeats
these views on his own as well as in close dependence on Aquinas'
text. 48 No reality is attributed to the potency but that given by God in
the production of being. No reality can fall beyond being or act.
The arguments for the immortality of the soul are significant because
they distinguish between the matter-form relationship and the relation-
ship between essence and being. These arguments tell us that essence
by reason ofform is the proper subject of being, in potency to this act
with no tendency toward its opposite. The possibility of its non-ex-
istence is in its capacity for contrary forms, which it has by reason of
matter, or, if it is a pure form, in its cause, which does not have to cause
it. The mode of being follows the capacity of the essence. If the essence
is a form which comes to be from the potency of matter, its being is
terminable in conformity with the tendency of its proper subject toward
other forms. If the essence is a pure form, which comes to be from no
other potency than God's power to create it, then its being is ever-
lasting in conformity with the tendency of its proper subject toward
being and not toward non-being. This analysis of the relationship be-
tween essence and being has been taken from Aquinas with the argu-
ments for human immortality. Of the arguments relevant to the doc-
trine of being, only one does not appear in the Summa Contra Gentiles. 49
Throughout the discussion, Ficino retains the essential structure of
cause, he is incapable of some things. The object of his will is his own being, which is being
itself. All else is willed and produced insofar as it has a likeness to this. Hence, God can will
only what is consistent with being as being. Whatever involves being and non-being simul-
taneously, i.e. whatever involves contradiction, cannot be caused by him. Compatibility
with being puts a thing within the power of the first agent and this makes it possible. (CG, I,
84, # 708, [3]; II, 25, # 1019, [I I]; # 1020, [12]) Thus, compatibility with being is a real
possibility insofar as it is in the reality of the first cause. But prior to actual being, it has no
reality outside that cause. This is what Aquinas means when he contrasts it to the potency in
virtue of which things come to be through motion.
48 TP, II, 4, v. I, p. 83, B-g6; XV, 2, v, III, p. 23, B-333; II, 7, v. I, pp. 94-95, B-IOI.
49 Appendix # 40, 42, 43. For a comparison of Ficino and Aquinas on the immateriality
and existential independence of the rational soul, see Appendix # 39-40, 43, 54-6 I, 63-65.
Also:
(I) Fieino, TP, X, 5, v. II, p. 74, B-231; Aquinas, CG, II, 75, # 1553, (10); 50, # 1261,
(3)·
(2) Ficino, TP, IX, I, v. III, p. 9, B-203; XV, 2, v. III, pp. 26-28, B-335; Aquinas, CG,
II, 51, # 1268, (I).
(3) Ficino, TP, V, 8, v. I, p. 189, B-141; V, 9, v. I, p. 194, B-143; V, 12, v. I, p. 199,
B-145; XV, 2, v. III, pp. 26-28, B-334-35; XV, 5, v. III, pp. 150-51, B-338; Aquinas, CG,
I1,54, # 1293, (7); # 1294 (8); IV, 81, #4156, (II).
For the one argument which Fieino does not take from Aquinas, see TP, V, 7, v. I, pp. 185-
87, B- 1 40 •
Aquinas' reasoning, although he expands the discussion with illustra-

tive examples, broader explanations, and by posing other questions
related to the issue. The most significant difference between Ficino's
version of the arguments and the originals is that Ficino's discussion of
immortality takes up the question of the potency more thoroughly.
Ficino asks how a form can ever lose its being if being belongs to the
form by nature. In answering this question, he distinguishes clearly
between matter, which is in potency to forms, and essence, which is in
potency to being. He introduces the same issue again when considering
the correspondence between the potency by which things come to be
and that by which they pass away. Material things come to be and pass
away in virtue of matter which tends toward contrary forms. Pure
forms, whose potency is that of the essence for being, come to be from
the creator alone. Thus, the potency of the essence is a more funda-
mental potency than that of matter. It is related directly to the first
cause; matter is related to him through secondary causes which propel
it from one form to another.
The additions which Ficino makes to Aquinas' discussion do not
indicate any departure from Aquinas' position. On the contrary, they
bring into the arguments themselves premisses which are essential to
the reasoning and which Aquinas takes for granted because he has dis-
cussed them elsewhere. In a few succinct and scattered texts, Aquinas
indicates the role matter plays in destruction. He says that the forms of
matter are dependent in being on matter but he does not explain this
further. From this dependence, he concludes that the being in virtue of
which such forms exist is proper not to the form alone, but to the
composite. 50 The composite, not the form alone, is that which
exists. 51 Hence, the being of these forms is to be in matter. 52 Because
matter is in potency to other forms as well, the union of the composite
can be destroyed, the matter actualized by another form, and the
first form destroyed in virtue of this. 53
Aquinas devotes a special chapter to distinguishing the matter-form
relationship from the relationship between substance and being. 54 His
first approach is to show that the elements of the two relationships are
not the same, i.e. that matter is not the substance even though both are
potencies, and form is not being even though both are acts. Matter is
50 Aquinas, CG, 11,51, # 1269, (2).
51 CG, II, 54, # 1289, (3); # 1292 (6).
52 CG, 11,43, # 1197, (5).
53 CG, II, 30, # 1064, (2); I, 18, # 143, (4).
54 CG, II, 54.
not substance because matter is not that which exists. Matter exists only
if it is formed. In material things, what exists is neither the form nor the
matter, but the formed matter, the composite. But substance is the
proper subject of being. For a substance to be a substance is for it to be
that which exists. Hence, matter and substance are not the same.
Also, the form is not being, but is related to being as light to the act
of illuminating (lucere) and whiteness to being white (album esse). The
form is signified by a noun, while being is signified by a verb, a word of
acting. The form causes a thing to be what it is, while being is the act it
exercises in being what it is. Aquinas' comparisons show the appropri-
ateness between noun and verb which is characteristic of the relation-
ship between a subject and its proper act. To illumine or to glow is what
light does in being light, to be white is the act exercised by whiteness in
being itself. The form is a principle of being insofar as it is a cause of
that whose proper act is being.
Aquinas compares this to transparency in air and the light which
illumines it. Because air is transparent it is the proper subject of il-
lumination. Transparency is not the light itself; it does not give illumi-
nation to the air. But it makes the air the kind of thing which can
receive light into itself. Hence, if we ask why air is something illumined,
the answer could be twofold, i.e. because of the sun which gives light to
it or because of the transparency of air itself which makes it able to be
illumined by this light. So also with the substantial form and its being.
If we ask why a thing is an existing thing, the answer can be both
because it has been given being by an external cause and because it is
the kind of thing which can be something existing.
This discussion is important not only because it distinguishes the
potency of matter from the potency of substance, but also because it
indicates the dynamic character of being. The relationship between
what exists and being is that between a thing, signified by a noun or
name, and the act it exercises in being itself, signified by a verb. Here
and throughout the work Aquinas expresses being by the infinitive
form 'to be' (esse) and retains it when translating being into its various
modes. The being of the living thing is to live; the being of light is to
shine. 55 He compares the relationship between essence and being to
that between power and action. As active power is something acting or
producing (agens), so essence is something being (ens).56 The essence
55 CG, 11,57, # 1339. (14).

56 CG, II, g. # g01, (4).
is related to being (esse) as the intellect is related to the act of knowing
(intelligere).57
Ficino explains being in exactly the same way, as we have seen. To
what extent is this the result of Aquinas' influence? Ficino has not used
the chapter in which Aquinas distinguishes the relationship between
matter and form from the relationship between substance and being,
at least in any way which is easily recognizable. But this chapter is part
of Aquinas' discussion of immortality in intellectual substances, and
Ficino has used eight of Aquinas' arguments for immortality. 58 Also,
Aquinas applies his understanding of the relation between form and
being in an argument establishing that the soul is the proper form of
the body. The argument occurs in Ficino's text in an abbreviated ver-
sion. 59 This is significant because the formula "to live is the being of the
living thing", which Ficino uses several times in other places, is part of
this argument. Although the formula is not included in Ficino's version,
Ficino read it here and took it as his own. Finally, the term 'act of
being' (actus essendi, actus existendi) is Ficino's interpretation of what
Aquinas means by 'to be'. Twice when he uses this expression he is
presenting an argument he has taken from the Summa Contra Gentiles. In
one argument, he substitutes the term 'act of being' for Aquinas' 'to be'.
Aquinas says, "But in intellectual substances, as has been shown, act is
to be, but substance is potency." Ficino's version of this is, "But in the
soul act is to be. But its essence and substance is that very potency
which is the subject of the act of being." 60 Although the term 'act of
being' does not appear in the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas does use it
in the Summa Theologiae. 61 IfFicino did not know the latter work direct-
ly, he may have known it through his associates. It is a striking coinci-
dence that Ficino should interpret esse as Aquinas himself interprets it,
and do so when using texts from Aquinas' work in which the inter-
pretive phrase does not appear.
Besides the evidence that Ficino read texts in which Aquinas indi-
cates the dynamic character of being, there is the striking similarity
between Ficino and Aquinas on this issue. Ficino uses the same analogy
(power and operation) and the same examples (to live, to shine). This,
together with the dominant role Aquinas plays in all the major dis-
cussions involving the doctrine of being - divine infinity, primary and
57 CG, 1,45, # 384, (3).
58 Appendix # 40-43, 62, 68.
69 Appendix # 49.
60 Appendix # 42.
61 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 1-3-4 ad 2.
secondary causality, the divine ideas, the arguments for the immortality
of the human soul, and the discussion of man's last end (see chapter 5) -
leaves little doubt that when Ficino hints at the dynamic character of
being, he is inspired by Aquinas.
The absolute priority of being, its dynamic character, the role ofthe
essence as the proper subject of being and as determining being by the
limitation of its capacity - these are the distinctive aspects of Ficino's
position on essence and being. And Ficino derives them all from his
reading of Aquinas. When Ficino juxtaposes the Platonic and Christian
approaches to the composite character of creatures, he suppresses these
more advanced aspects of his view. At this point, he is anxious to show
what Plato, the Platonists, and the Christian theologians have in com-
mon. Philosophy, represented by Plato and the Platonists, and Chris-
tian theology, probably represented by Aquinas, agree in recognizing
that all things depend on God and as a result are composites of potency
and act. Composition is the mark of dependence not only in action but
in being. Ficino claims that when the Platonists speak of the infinite in
things, they mean essence and potency, and when they speak ofterm or
limit, they mean being and act. But this is not the case. The relation-
ship between the infinite and the limit, between matter and form, be-
tween actual and possible being, between essence and being are not
exactly the same, not at least when they are considered in their full
context. It is difficult to determine whether Ficino really thought they
were. Perhaps he merely wishes to point out that both philosophy and
theology recognize the fundamental dependence of all things on God by
attributing to them two principles - the determinable and the deter-
mining, the receptive and the received, potency and act. Perhaps he
wishes to point out only that the Platonic positions lean toward the
more developed view which Christian theology has attained. In an-
other discussion, which we shall take up in the next chapter, Ficino does
not hesitate to admit that theology is the more direct route to the
truth. 62
82 TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, pp. 208-09, B-4IO. cr. ch. 5, p. 94.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE SPECIAL PRESENCE OF GOD TO MAN
Ficino has taken two routes to God: through the levels of action and
unity to omnipotent unity itself; and through being to the infinite
creator who is pure being and pure act. The first approach is Platonic
in tone, the second Thomistic. The principal characteristic of the way
Ficino and Aquinas understand being is the emphasis on its dynamism
and its primacy. Being is an act and act is a doing and a causing. Thus,
both authors express being by the infinitive form of the verb - to be, to
live, to glow, to be wise. Both compare the relationship between a thing
and its being to that between a thing and its operation. Ficino even
signifies being by the terms 'act of being' and 'act of existing'. Ficino
and Aquinas think of being as similar to an activity, a doing.
But more explicit than this is their understanding of being as effi-
cacious. Act is the source of causing. To be in potency is to be receptive,
i.e. to undergo influences or to be dependent upon a cause. To be in act
is to have the power to give act, i.e. to impose influences or to bring
something into being. Thus, pure act or pure being is omnipotent. He
does what it takes infinite power to do; he causes the totality of the
effect, bringing it into being from nothing. Pure being or pure act is
pure efficacious power.
The proper effect of him who is pure efficacious power is that which
is itself efficacious, being as being or act. Being comes first after nothing;
it intrinsically accounts for the whole reality of a thing causing all that
it is. And being is the principle of all subsequent causality. All other
causalities depend upon the creative causing which is proper to pure
being. Other causes act in virtue of the prior act of the creator; he acts
in all their causing. Within the created thing itself, all operation has its
source in being. A thing acts according as it is; that which acts is that
which is, and it acts in the same mode that it is. 1 According to Ficino,
1 "Operatio cuiusque rei esse ipsum rei semper sequitur, ita ut illius sit operatio cuius [etJ
esse et modus operandi idem sit qui et essendi ... " (TP, VIII, 14, v. I, p. 323, B-lgS) Also,
1,2, v. I, p. 42, B-8o-llIl. cr. Aquinas, CG, II, 50, # 1262, (4).
74 THE SPECIAL PRESENCE OF GOD TO MAN
quality lacks the sufficiency for acting because it does not have full
possession of the act of existing. 2 Even the causality through which the
form determines its being to a certain mode is dependent upon the
causality through which being is given to it by the creator; the very
priority of the form over being is dependent upon the efficacy of being,
for without this the form is nothing. Because God is the cause of being,
he is the cause of the diverse modes of being, and hence has ideas or
forms within himself. God produces and knows the modes in the pro-
duction and knowledge of being.
According to Ficino, unity, like being, is identical with efficacious
power. The levels of the universe are distinguished according to the
varying degrees of unity and the sufficiency for acting, the more unified
being the more powerful. In his description of the highest level, Ficino
makes the identification explicit; unity is power. When he reviews the
hierarchy in terms of potency and act, the identification is related to
the lower levels. Act is efficacious power; potency is that which receives
the influence of that power. A thing is multiple or lacks unity insofar as
it is a composite of potency and act; it is a composite of potency and act
to the extent that it depends on something else for its efficacy. Cor-
poreality and quality are dependent in what they are and what they do
on the forms above them. The body is of a certain kind and acts in a
certain way in virtue of the qualities which belong to it. The body with
its qualities is determined to be a living thing, i.e. a substance which is
self-moving, by the rational soul. The rational soul and the pure mind
are dependent in knowing on truth itself which is their object. God,
who is the first principle and dependent on nothing, is pure act or pure
efficacious power.
Thus, Ficino identifies both unity and being with act or efficacy.
God is omnipotent because he is unity itself, because he is pure act,
because he is pure efficacy, and because he is being itself. Unity as such,
like being, is causal. In the discussion of the hierarchy of the universe,
causality is understood primarily in terms of operation. A thing is more
powerful to the extent that it is more independent in its action. But
there are indications that this efficacy is to be understood in terms of
being as well. The body is dependent in being as well as action on the
qualities which determine it, for to cause a thing to be of a certain kind
is to cause it to be. Quality lacks the sufficiency for acting because it
lacks the sufficiency for existing. These are traces of an attitude which
2 TP, 1,3, v. I, pp. 47-413, B-82-81 2 ; pp. 51-52, B-841-83; 1,4, v. I, p. 57, B-85; XI, 6,
v. II, pp. 136-37, B-259; III, I, v. I, p. 129, B-1 15.
THE SPECIAL PRESENCE OF GOD TO MAN 75
is more explicit in Ficino's doctrine of creation, namely that operation
depends on being. The power in virtue of which a thing acts depends
upon the power in virtue of which it has being. Both unity and being
are identified with that primary efficacy by reason of which a thing is
in act and hence has causal power. Thus, self-sufficiency in action and
in being requires absolute simplicity.3 Corruption is explained in terms
of division, and generation in terms of unification. 4 A thing is, and
hence is powerful, because of its unity and because of its being.
All the aspects of the Ficinian doctrine of act come together in the
discussion of the soul's presence to the body. The soul is a principle of
being for the whole body and for each of its parts. We know this because
the whole and the parts change species when the soul is no longer pre-
sent; that which was living, in the whole of itself and in each part, is no
longer living, in the whole or in its parts. But "nothing is more intrinsic
to essence than being", and a thing is related to unity in the same way
that it is related to being. Since the soul gives being to the whole body
and to each of its parts, for both whole and parts are living, it must be
united to or present in the whole body and each of its parts. Being flows
from essence, operation from power. The soul gives being and oper-
ation to each member of the body; therefore, it also gives essence and
power to each one, for it gives being and operation to the body insofar
as it is united to it. Therefore, the soul is united not only to the whole
body, but to each of its parts. 5
Running through this argument is an identification of essence with
the soul itself or at least with its presence in the body. To give essence
to the body is for the soul to be united to it, i.e. to give itself to the body
or to be present in it. The soul causes the body to be, to be what it is, to
have the power to act, and to act. It does this in virtue of its presence in
or union with the body. Thus, the principle of being is the principle of
essence, power, and action, and the efficacy of this principle is es-
tablished through an intimate presence which is more intrinsic than
any other. Nothing is more intrinsic to essence than being.
This presence is also a principle of unity. The first time unity is
introduced into the argument, it refers to the soul's union with the
body. A thing is related to being in the same way that it is related to
unity. If the soul gives being to the body, then it is united to the body.
3 TP, II, 7, v. I, pp. 92-93, B-IOO-oI; II, 3, v. I, p. 80, B-g5; 11,2, v. I, pp. 75-77, B-93.
4 TP, I, 3, v. I, pp. 51-52, B-84L83; XII, 3, v. II, pp. 163-64, B-27°-7I. Cf. Proclus,
The Elements of Theology # 13, 61-62, 72, 95, 127; Plotinus, Enneads V-3-15; VI-9-1, 2.
5 TP, VI, 9, v. I, p. 247, B-166.
But later in the discussion, Ficino explains the unity of the body itself
by the soul's presence to the whole and to each ofthe parts. The bodily
members are one thing because one and the same form, the soul, is
present in the whole and in each of the parts. Thus, the soul gives being,
essence, power, action, and unity to the body by being in it, i.e. by
presence.
Dominating this discussion is Ficino's understanding of being as an
intimate presence. The soul's role as a principle of being for the body
manifests its intimate union with the body. To understand being in this
way follows the spirit ofFicino's whole doctrine of being. An essence is an
essence only because it exists. 6 Its proper act is being; this is the act by
which it is itself. This, too, is the act which establishes it out of nothing-
ness. Being, because of its primary efficacy, permeates all that a thing
is. Nothing, then, is more intimate to a thing than being.
If the soul as a principle of being for the body is an intimate, uni-
fying presence, how close must he be who is the ultimate source of being
and unity for all reality. Ficino has discovered the divine presence in
the metaphysical structure of the universe. He now turns back to ex-
amine the knowledge and desire which impel men to make such a
discovery. The examination is a reflective one, man contemplating his
own God-oriented activity, and it develops the theme of divine presence
as this applies in a special way to man. We shall find that the special
presence of God to man is bound up with his presence in the meta-
physical structure of the universe.
Following his master, Plato, Ficino compares God's role in know-
ledge to that of the sun in the act of seeing. Two elements are involved
in the act of seeing, the eye which sees and the color which is seen. On
the part of each there is the thing itself, its power and its act. The sun is
the source of all these. To the eyes it gives generation, the power of
sight, and the act of seeing. For without light we can see nothing. To
color it gives generation, the power by which it can move the eyes to
see, and the act through which it does so. And this for the same reason,
i.e. because without light nothing is seen. There is, then, a threefold act
involved in sight, namely the motion by which color moves the eye, the
act of sight itself, and the light through which each is joined to the
other. So also in understanding. From God the intellect receives es-
sence, the power to know, the very act of knowing. The object receives
essence, intelligibility, and the act through which it moves the mind.
Here, too, there is a threefold act. The act by which the intelligible
6 TP, XII, 7, v. II, pp. 194--95, B--283-84.
moves the mind Plato calls truth. The act of knowing he calls science.
The act which binds them, the light in virtue of which they come
together, is God himself. Thus, John the Evangelist says that the divine
mind is the way, the truth, and the life. He is the life of the mind
knowing, the truth of the thing to be known, and the way through
which things flow into the mind and the mind is accessible to things.
Through him alone can God be reached, as the Evangelist says in an-
other place. For we know nothing else in things than truth. Through
the essence (ratio) of truth, true things move the intellect, so that truth
itself moves the intellect through truth toward truth. The analogy
applies in the area of desire as well as to the area of knowledge. What
we know in things is their truth and what we desire in them is their
goodness. There is, therefore, something common in virtue of which all
things are intelligible and desirable. As the common light of the sun
reveals visible objects to the eyes, so the common light of truth reveals
true things to the mind and the common light of goodness reveals good
things to the will. Thus, God, who is truth itself and goodness itself,
unites the knower and the known, the lover and the object he desires. 7
Ficino's whole discussion oftruth fits into the framework of the analo-
gy of the sun. As the common light of the sun reveals visible objects to
the eyes, so the common light of truth reveals true things to the mind.
But the sun's influence is twofold and so is God's. The sun is the source
of generation for the eyes and for the visible; through generation both
organs and objects of sight come to be. So God gives essence to the
knower and the known; this is to say that he causes them to be, for es-
sence is essence only because it exists. Hence, truth is explained first in
terms of being. Truth is that by which all things are, to whatever degree
they are. S Thus, the first principle is called truth because he is for all
things the cause ofbeing. 9 Truth is essence insofar as essence causes a
thing to be what it is, thus determining the mode or degree of being. A
thing is true when it is wholly and completely itself, unmixed with any
foreign element. The truth of a thing is the essence in its purity, sepa-
rated from all that is contingent to it. Truth in the ultimate cause has
the absolute purity of complete unity.1 o For a thing to be true, then, is
for it to be, and in that mode which establishes it as itself.
7 TP, XII, I, v. II, pp. 155-56, B-267. cr. Plato, Republic VI 506d-09b;John XIV, 6.
8 TP, XII, 7, v. II, pp. 194-95, B-283-84.
9 TP, II, 3, v. I, p. 82, B-g5-96.
10 TP, II, I, V. I, p. 73, B-g2; XI, 6, v. II, p.137, B-26I. " ... videndo respicit verum,
cui propria puritas est, ... " (II, 1 I, V. I, p. 1 I I,
B-Io8) "Veritas autem singularum rerum
in ipsa firma illarum ratione consistit." (XIV, 3, v. II, p. 258, B-3IO)
Truth also implies a relationship to knowing. The being of things is

their truth because their being involves an act of knowledge. The act of
creation which brings them forth in their mode of being is an act of
understanding. Things are true because God knows them. And they
bear the mark of this knowledge, this divine idea or exemplar, which
guides the creative act. If the truth of things is their being, established
in its mode by the essence, this is because the mode of being expresses
agreement between things and the divine knowledge through which
they are created. l l Thus, God is present to all things as the source of
their being and the exemplar according to which their being is true.
But truth is not only that in virtue of which a thing is; it is also that
in virtue of which it is known or knowing. Since the true and perfect
mode of knowledge follows the mode of being, the truth of human
knowledge is to know the truth of things, and this is to know them not
only in themselves, but also in conformity to their cause. If we are to
know things as they are, we must know them as the effects of the divine
ideas bearing the mark of their cause. The evaluative character of
human knowledge reveals that we do know and judge things through
their causes. We find in all men, even the young and uneducated, an
instinct for evaluation. They judge some things to be better than others,
some to be preferred to others. These judgments manifest that we know
more about things than they can tell us about themselves. To place
things in an order of preference, to judge them as more or less desirable,
more or less good, is to compare them to a norm or standard and to
arrange them according to the way they measure up to it. To say that
one law is more just than another is to compare both to perfect justice.
Thus, value judgments imply that we know a perfect and complete
version of what things are incompletely and imperfectly. Such know-
ledge cannot be derived from things themselves, since things reveal only
their own mode. Such knowledge cannot come from the mind, since
the mind measures and evaluates even its own acts. Our ability to make
value judgments must arise from a knowledge of him who is the meas-
ure of all reality, God the creator. For the fundamental reality of
things is being. Being is the intrinsic power in virtue of which all that
they are stands forth out of nothingness. And being relates to God not
only as the effect of an agent, but also as the imperfect and incomplete
11 "Similiter ideo res intelligimus vere, quoniam ita ut revera sunt intelligimus. Contra
vero ita revera sunt ideo, quoniam eas ita Deus intelligit." (TP, XVIII, I, v. III, p. 179,
B-398) "Veritas rei creatae in hoc versatur ut ideae suae respondeat undique ... " (XII, I, V.
II, p. 152, B-266)
manifestation of what God is absolutely and perfectly. A thing's level of
perfection is determined by the extent to which it approximates the
perfection of being itself. And this is exactly what God knows in the
divine ideas; he knows himself, perfect and absolute being, as imitable
in a certain finite mode of being. Therefore, when the human mind
judges a thing's level of perfection, it must have knowledge ofthe divine
ideas as well as of the thing it evaluates. Since this knowledge cannot be
given by the thing or constructed by the mind, representations of the
divine self-knowledge must be present in the mind revealing to it both
God himself and the things of which he is the cause.
Ficino identifies the evaluative character of human knowledge with
a certain universality. In one and the same series of arguments, he
speaks first of the rules by which we judge the agreement between
things and the divine exemplar, and then of the universal and intel-
ligible species of things. Hence, the generality of our ideas seems to be
justified by the unity of things under a common ideal. Although the
divine ideas apply to things in all their singularity, it seems that they
also bring them together under common norms, and ultimately under
the one norm which is absolute being, as we shall see.
The rules of judgment inhere in the mind prior to any inventions or
fabrications made by it. They are inborn or innate to it, belonging to it
because it is what it is. Hence, their function in knowledge bears all the
marks of natural instinct. Men irresistably give their approval to some
things, such as the light of wisdom and the contemplation of truth,
even when they cannot explain why they do so. The act of understand-
ing, like all other vital operations, comes forth from an intrinsic princi-
ple of action. As the nutritive part of the soul alters, generates and
nourishes the body by reason of an internal seed, so also the mind,
through innate rules, judges all things. The soul comes forth equipped
with the forms of its knowledge. They are infused into it by the creator.
In making its judgment, it simply brings forth in act those forms which
are always latent within it.1 2
In the apprehension of the ideas, we know God in which they are and
things of which they are the exemplar. But God himself is primarily the
object of knowledge, for the ideas are present to things, but not in
them. God, who is the truth itself, becomes as it were the form of the
12 TP, XI, 3, v. II, pp. 97-101, B-241-43; pp. 106-10, B-246-47; XI, 4, v. II, pp. 122-
25, B-252-53; XI, 5, v. II, pp. 127-28, B-255; XI, 6, v. II, pp. 141-42, B-261; XII, 1, v. II,
pp. 152-53, B-266; XII, 4, v. II, pp. 166-69, B-272; XII, 7, v. II, pp. 188-89, B-281; VIII,
4, v. I, p. 307, B-191; XVIII, 1, v. III, p. 179, B-398. cr. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio II,
6-12 (PL 32, 1248-60).
mind,13 Thus, Ficino distinguishes between two kinds of divine pres-

ence. The divine ideas are present to created things as the source of
their being. But they are not in things, since the ideas reveal what the
thing lacks of absolute and perfect being. To know the divine idea,
therefore, is to know God as the direct object of knowledge.
This is not to say that in our ordinary knowledge we know God as
he is in himself. The norms according to which the mind judges both
itself and other things do not reveal the full richness of the divinity. But
neither do they reveal primarily the effects of God, from which a know-
ledge of the cause is derived. Rather they reveal the relationship be-
tween the cause and the effect, from which an evaluative knowledge of
the effect is derived. According to Ficino, the divine idea is God him-
self as related to a specific effect or as imitable in a certain finite mode.
And the formulae in the mind are intrinsic representations not of the
created thing itself, but of the idea according to which it has been
caused. They primarily represent God in his relationship to his effects
and hence transcend the limits of the effects themselves. Thus, when
Ficino describes the inadequacy of our ordinary knowledge of God, he
does not contrast knowing God as he is in himself to knowing him
through his effects. In our ordinary knowledge of God, he says, we
know the way in which God is referred to others and others to him; we
know the relationship between God and his effects, not just the effects. 14
Even in its ordinary knowledge, however, the mind can come closer
to God. Through the innate ideas, we know God as revealed in his
relationship to the limited and diverse essences of created things; and
we know him in virtue of formulae or representations which are in the
mind and proper to it. But just as the eyes without seeing the sun itself
can come to see one light shining on all the diverse objects which it
makes visible, so the mind without comprehending the full richness and
unity of God can come to know the common light of truth and being
revealing all things to its understanding. IS Fidno establishes this by an
appeal to the Augustinian doctrine of common truth supplemented by
the Thomistic doctrine of being which he has made his own. If many
souls grasp one and the same truth, this is because either the knower or
the known is one. Either there is one intellect for all these souls, or there
is one truth contemplated by them all. The first, Ficino will not ac-
13 TP, XII, I, v. II, pp. 156-57, B-267-68; p. 153, B-266; XII, 2, v. II, p. 159, B-268-
69; XII, 3, v. II, pp. 160--61, B-269.
14 TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, p. 20g, B-4IQ-I I.
U; TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, pp. 206-07, B-409; TP, XII, 3, v. II, pp. 160-62, B-26g-70'
cept. 16 He holds, with Augustine, that all intellects are plunged into
the same font of truth, as if to contemplate the work of the artificer in
that one idea (ratio) through which he has produced it. In confirmation
of this, Ficino appeals to the knowledge of being, the most manifest and
most common of all our knowledge. All knowledge is a knowledge of
being. In all the singular modes of being, being itselfis understood, just
as the genus animal is understood in all the various species of animals.
Let it be called man or white, what we assert is being in the species of
man or white.
Being is not only present in all our knowledge, it brings to light all
else. It is known through itself, all else in virtue of it. Thus, that which
is not (non-ens) is known through that which is (ens), and that which is
in potency (ens in potentia) through that which is in act (ens in actu).
Blindness is understandable only as a lack of sight; a potency is known
only as a capacity for some act. But that which is in act is known
through the very act in virtue of which it is a being in act. And this is
being itself or the act of existing (actus existendi) .17 Ens differs from esse
as a true thing differs from truth. A being (ens) and a true thing (verum)
are composites of essence and being (esse). In these the act of being is
contracted or confined to a certain mode by the essence. Thus, a being
is not pure being itself, but a certain kind of being, and the true is not
truth itself, but a certain kind of truth. As a thing is true by reason of
truth, so a thing is a being by reason of being, and through this act is it
intelligible. IS
But Ficino goes one step further. If a being (ens) is known through
being (esse) which is in act, all existing things are known in virtue of
God who is the act and origin of them all. If the act of being accounts
for the intelligibility of a thing, then God who gives it this act of being,
God who makes it to be, is the original mover when the mind is moved
by being. He moves the movable prior to all others, with more force,
16 See Ficino's arguments against Averroes in Bk. XV, especially cbs. I, I I, 13, 14.
17 TP, XII, 7, v. II, pp. 188-g0, B-28I-82. Cf. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio II, 7-12
(PL 32, I24g-60); De Diversis Quaestionibus I, XLVI, 2 (PL 40, 30-31); De T,initale IX,
VI-VII, 9-12 (PL 42, 965-67); Soliloquies I, I, 3 (PL 32, 869); I, VIII, 15 (PL 32, 877); I,
XV, 27 (PL 32, 883-84).
18 "Aurelius Augustinus, divino vir ingenio, ... iactis a Platone superioribus fundamen-
tis, argumentationes huiusmodi construit. Aliud est verum, aliud veritas, quemadmodum
aliud castus aliud castitas, praestantiusque est vero veritas, siquidem omne verum veritate
est verum." (TP, XI, 6, v. II, pp. 134-35, B-258) Cf. Augustine, Soliloquies I, XV, 27 (PL
32,883-84); I, I, 3 (PL 32, 869); I, VIII, 15 (PL 32,877). "Verum autem et ens et intelli-
gibile idem. Quicquid autem in hoc ipso genere ex essentia atque esse componitur, tamquam
ens verumque potiusquam tamquam esse veritasve se habet, ... " (TP, XVIII, 8, v. III,
p. 210, B-4II)
and for a longer time. Indeed, all other things which move the mind
do so through his action.1 9
God is the ultimate source of all action because action flows from
being which is his proper effect. And because he originates the action,
he is more properly the cause of the effect than the secondary cause
through which his influence flows. All this was established when Ficino
was considering more explicitly and with more general application the
role of God in the actions of his creatures. Here he applies the general
doctrine to a specific case. If an object moves the mind, it does so in
virtue of the divine act. The reason given for this is that things are
known through the act of being. God moves the mind because he is the
origin of that act. And whereas the divine action was previously said to
be more properly the cause of the effect than the following causes, here
it is said to be prior to all others, more forceful, and more enduring.
Indeed, the mind is not moved if it is not ultimately moved by him, for
all else is in debt to him for its action. In either case Ficino is insisting that
the effect must be primarily attributed to God. Thus, every action by
which an object moves the mind comes ultimately from him, by way
of that being or truth which he gives to all things.
When Plato says that from the good itself knowledge or science is
infused into the intellect and truth into the intelligibles, Ficino under-
stands him to mean that the beneficial and vivifying act of all things,
i.e. God, surrounds and permeates all his works. But God is the act of
all things not because he joins with them to form a new composite, but
because he is the primary mover in all their actions. The formula,
intrinsic to the mind and representing the divine idea which is its ob-
ject, moves the mind as a secondary cause; its efficacy depends upon
that of God who is the primary act.20 Therefore, God who is absolute
19 "Si per esse, quod cuiuslibet entis actus est, quodlibet ens agnoscitur, sequitur ut per
esse, quod cunctorum existentium actus origoque est, existentia cuncta noscantur ... Deus
autem actus est omnium auctor existentium, perque actionis excessum prius, vehementius,
diutius movet mentem, quam reliqua quae offeruntur, immo eius virtute reliqua mentem
movent." (TP, XII, 7, v. II, pp. 190-91, B-282)
20 "Hunc esse Platonis nostri sensum arbitror, quando scribit et intellectui scientiam et
intelligibilibus veritatem ab ipso bono infundi, quod videlicet beneficus ille et vivificus actus
omnium, qui Deus est, ambit opera sua semper ac se inserit universis." (TP, XII, 4, v. II,
p. 166, B-27I) Cf. Plato, Republic VI 506d-09b. "Ubi ad ipsum intelligendi actum Deus se
habet tamquam agens primum atque commune, formula tamquam agens proprium atque
secundum, simulacrum tamquam incitamentum, mens tenet materiae locum." (XII, 4, v.
II, p. 166, B-272) "Non fit autem ex animo ac Deo tertia quaedam natura a tertio aliquo
componente utrumque invicem et ad tertium actum dirigente utrumque, sicuti fit in natura-
lium rerum compositione, sed quia in animo contemplante Deus et primus motor est, et
formator ultimus, ideo totus actus est Deus, quo quidem actu et ipse semper est Deus, et
animus fit saltern quandoque divinus." (XII, 4, v. II, p. 172, B-274)
being itself, i.e. pure act and the author of all existing things, is the
first thing offered to the mind. He it is who penetrates, shines through,
and brings to light all things. However, although the form or idea of
God is always present within us, although all else is known in and
through this, we do not avert to it, just as the eye is not aware of seeing
the light of the sun continually and all else in and through this light. 21
Without saying so very explicitly, Ficino distinguishes between
several different ways in which God as absolute being is present in
human knowledge. The first and most important distinction is between
being as origin and being as measure or norm. In the argument for the
existence of God, our direct knowledge is of creatures. From their
instability, we derive the conclusion that there is a first cause who
produces all things in their being. From this are established other at-
tributes of the cause - simplicity, uniqueness, omnipotence, perfection.
Ultimately the whole argumentation rests on what creatures can tell us
about themselves within the confines of their own essences. Being itself
is that which stands behind what we know revealed only indirectly
through his effects.
But there is another kind of knowledge which this does not explain.
Our value judgments manifest a knowledge not only of the way things
are, but also of the measure according to which their level of perfection
can be assigned. Now the measure of all things is God, for he is perfect
and absolute being while they are beings in a limited mode. Therefore,
evaluative knowledge involves a knowledge of God which goes beyond
the limits of the creature and its finite mode. Through innate repre-
sentations of his creative knowledge, God places himself before the
mind as that which is known, not as that which stands behind the
known.
In the first stages, this knowledge is diversified, things being ar-
ranged according to various principles. But in the later stages, we come
to know all things in the common light of truth and being, and this is to
know all things as the effects of him who is the author of this light. 22
This is a more advanced kind of knowledge than that which remains
within the diversity of the innate ideas. Therefore, it must share in the
transcendence of the knowledge given through the ideas while sur-
passing it in unity. When Ficino says that all things are known in virtue
of being, he is arguing for the conclusion that all our knowledge has one
and the same source, being itself or God. But he is not describing the
21 TP, XII, 7, v. II, p. 191, B-282.
22 TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, pp. 206-07, B-409.
knowledge we have of the common light of being. When we know this,

what we know is the light itself, not a conclusion about the light de-
rived from a description of the way we know creatures. As we con-
template the norms by which we judge things, we come to see them
contained within a unity. We get a slight glimpse of the one intention
or ratio which is the origin and measure of all, i.e. absolute being.
Therefore, in this final stage of ordinary human knowledge, man
knows all things as the effects of God not only because he knows them
as coming forth from God's creative act, but also because he knows
them as an approximation of God's absolute perfection.
Thus, Ficino interprets the Platonic and Augustinian themes of di-
vine presence in terms of the Thomistic doctrine of creation and the
notion of being on which it is based. This relating of Thomistic theolo-
gy to Platonic questions underscores the Platonic aspects of Aquinas'
thought, for Aquinas is as much a Platonist as he is an Aristotelian.
Aristotle explains things in terms of first causes by relating them to their
origin; the first cause is the cause of motion, and motion carries things
into existence and out again. Although the unmoved mover moves as
an end, it is primarily a cause explaining how things come to be; it is
not the measure of things in any direct way. Things are measured by
their own essences. 23 Aquinas brings together God's role as origin with
his role as the measure of all things. By expanding the notion of efficient
causation into an all-pervasive power, he establishes a continuity be-
tween the first cause and its effects that is more than mere origin.
Things are explained in terms of their likeness and unlikeness to God.
They have being and hence are like God. They lack the fullness of
being itself and hence are unlike him. The act of being establishes the
likeness; the essence establishes the unlikeness. Thus, the whole reality
of a thing is a reference to God, not only because he produces it in its
being, which is its most fundamental reality, but also because in its
being it is incompletely and imperfectly what he is absolutely and per-
fectly. This is the reason why a thing cannot be adequately known
unless it is known in relation to God. Aquinas does not explain value
judgments in terms of innate ideas or divine illumination, but he says
quite clearly that God is the measure of all things. 24 Hence, Fieino
finds no difficulty in relating the Augustinian doctrine of divine il-
lumination to Aquinas' explanation of the divine ideas.
23 Aristotle, Metaphysics A (XII) 6--10; Nicomachaen Ethics I 7; 10; X 6-8, especially

1177b25-1178alo.
24 Aquinas, eG, I, 28, especially # 266, (8).
Ficino relates this Augustinian-Thomistic explanation of divine il-

lumination to the distinction which the neo-Platonists make between
the highest principle who is the one and the good above being and the
second god who is the first being. When the Platonists call the highest
God being itself (esse ipsum), he says, they do not mean being which is
essence, but being which is the principle of this. He is being above any
being which is conceived in the proper nature of being (ratio essendi)
and which is included within a concept. For the highest god is proper-
ly called by the name of unity and goodness, the next god by the name
of being (ens). This second divinity is brought forth from absolute unity
into a threefold multiplicity - essence, life, and mind. As the Plato-
nists see it, the mind is formed by the good itself through that unified
touch which is the apex of the mind. By the next god, who is being (ens)
itself, it is formed through the intellect, its power of knowing. For
us, Ficino says, it is enough to say that the soul is formed by the
divinity.25
All our knowledge is, in the last analysis, a knowledge of God. To
establish this has been the aim of the whole discussion. But the kind of
knowledge which is in question is the natural understanding which the
intellect has of things. Any object at all which moves the mind does so
in virtue of its being and ultimately in virtue of God who is the source
of being. God, who is absolute being itself, is the first thing which offers
itself to the mind. Only when he introduces the Platonic view does
Ficino distinguish two ways in which the mind can be formed by God.
The name 'being (ens) itself' applies to the second divinity, which forms
the mind in its power of knowing. But to know through the intellect is a
lower order of knowledge for the mind. Superior to this is the unified
experience of the divinity which is the mind at the peak of its activity.
The god which forms the mind in this higher order of knowing is
properly called unity and goodness. When the name 'being' is applied
to him, it does not have the same meaning as when attributed to the
source of ordinary knowledge. The highest god is being itself (the term
esse rather than ens is used), but above being as conceived in the proper
notion of being and included within a concept.
In another place, Ficino presents the neo-Platonic position in more
detail and explains why it is more proper to call the highest God the
one and the good above being. According to the Platonists, our intel-
25 TP, XII, 7, v. II, p. 191, B-292. Cf. Plotinus, Enneads V-3-17; VI-7-23, 35-36, 42;
VI-9-4, 5· Also, V-3- I 2; VI -7-17, 34, 38; VI--9- 10, 1I. Proclus, The Elements of TheologJ
# 39, 101-02, 138.
lect is naturally inclined to the knowledge of forms which are either

separate from matter or have been separated from it by the intellect
itself. Because these forms are the moving and forming principles in
knowledge, they are properly called intelligible. They are called intel-
lectual according to cause. The less common or universal of these forms
are placed by the Platonists in the more common ones, and all these are
in the first being (ens), which is the most common and most perfect of
all beings. Like the forms it contains, this first being (ens) is intellectual
according to cause, intelligible according to form. Thus, the intelligible
is identified with being (ens), and this is because being is the natural
and adequate object of the intellect. The first being (ens) has a certain
proportion to intellects and can be comprehended by them. Indeed, it
is the object to which they are naturally inclined. But the first principle,
which is called unity and goodness, cannot be so grasped, its light being
far above all things. To this the mind is united by a unified touch. For
this reason the Platonists place the one and the good, the first principle
of all things, above being (ens) and the intelligible.
There are other reasons for this. Minds seek the good for its own sake,
simply because it is good. They seek the intelligible, i.e. being (ens)
itself, not just for the sake of understanding, but for the sake of doing
this well. The good, then, is above the intelligible. Ficino adds to this
an argument on his own authority. The intelligible is related to the
intellect, the good to the will. Hence, they cannot be the same. More-
over, being (ens) itself is perceived by the intellect according to the
mode of the intellect, but the good attracts the soul to itself and trans-
forms the soul into itself. That which attracts the will is more excellent
than that which attracts the intellect. 26 Thus, the one and the good is
other than being (ens) and the intelligible and above it. While the
forms are in the intelligible according to form and in it differ with an
absolute and formal difference, in the good they are present according
to cause, distinct only in ratio, by reason of the various relations which
the divinity has to the things of which it is the source. 27
26 Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-I6-lc.
27 TP, XI, 4, v. II, pp. 112-14, B-248-49. Cf. Proclus, The ElementsqfTheology # 176-77;
Plotinus, Enneads VI-4-2, 4, 8; VI-5-7; VI-7-I3, 20 to 21, 25; VI-g-2, 5. The difference
between the way the forms are present in the first being and the way they are present in the
one and the good above being is not explained by Ficino in Platonic terms. In the highest
god, he says, these forms are distinct by a distinction in ratio, i.e. according to the various
relations which the one divinity has to its effects. Here we recognize Fieino's own doctrine of
the divine ideas, a doctrine derived from his reading of Thomas Aquinas. The formal differ-
ence which distinguishes the forms in the second god is in the divinity itself and establishes a
certain multiplicity therein. We draw this conclusion from the contrast Ficino sets up
between the distinction in ratio in a god who is absolutely one and the formal difference in a
In this text, Fieino uses the incomprehensibility of God as an argu-

ment aimed at placing him above being. The being about which he
speaks is that to which the intellect is naturally ordained, that which
falls within the natural capacity of its power. This is the object which
contains within itself all the more specific objects which the intellect
grasps. They are present here precisely as the intellect attains them,
distinguished within the whole by a formal difference. The other two
arguments establishing the good as other than being (ens) and above it
reveal the same attitude toward being. Its inferiority is established
from its role as the natural object of the intellect. This is what being
(ens) primarily signifies.
Ficino does not accept the neo-Platonic position that there is a
second god under the first principle, and that this second god is the
proper object of human knowing. 28 But he does think that God, who is
the first principle, forms the mind through the common light of being.
By knowing all things in this light, the mind recognizes a certain unity
among them; all are understood in terms of being, which is to say that
all are understood in their relation to that one cause who is the cause
of being. In the knowledge of the different essences of things, God is
known in a multiplicity. When these are known in the common light of
being, God is known in a unity which has a multiplicity within it. The
various relations between God and created things are still understood
in all their diversity, but the mind also recognizes a common and uni-
fYing element permeating this diversity. Thus, when Ficino describes
the way the Platonists explain this stage of knowing, he points to their
one god who is the first being, but in whom the forms of things differ ac-
cording to a real difference. This second god, who is under the first
principle, is a unity with a multiplicity within it.
In the preceding discussion, Ficino hints at a distinction between two
kinds of human knowing corresponding to the two gods described by
the Platonists. Taking up the Platonic theme again in another place, he
gives a fuller account of the difference between these two ways of
knowing the divine. The Platonists, he says, describe the inadequacies
of the intellect by comparing it to sight. Sight can never take in the full
god who is a well-integrated manifold. In the Platonic The%gy, at least, nothing else is said
about formal difference. But what is said reminds us of the formal distinction discussed by
John Duns Scotus; Scotus insists, however, that formal distinction is consistent with the
absolute simplicity of God. (Ordinatio I, d 2, P 2, q 1-4, ns 403-08; Balie II, pp. 356-58.
Also, Ord. I, d 8, PI, q 4, ns 191-94, 219"-llI; Balie IV, pp. 260-62, 274-76)
28 "Sed haec ipsi [Platonici] viderint, nobis autem sufficit animam divinitate formari."
(TP, XII, 7. v. II. p. 191. B-282)
splendor of the sun. Such brightness is beyond the measure of intensity

to which the sight is proportioned. Rather we see the light of the sun as
it is reflected in the colored objects around us, and even in these cir-
cumstances vision is not perfect. We often see things obscurely and in a
way other than they are. Ifwe concentrate our vision on one object, we
do not see another clearly. Similarly, the human intellect cannot
comprehend the full richness of the divine light because the divine
infinity cannot be contained within the finite capacity of the mind.
Even when the mind looks to the divine light as determined in created
things, it does not always know clearly, especially if it is distracted by
its presence in and care for the body. But in its highest beatitude the
mind is carried beyond its ordinary inadequacies. In this state all its
multability is stabilized, all its multiplicity integrated, so that it is
brought to a unity beyond itself, joined to God by a relationship above
intelligence, and sees God not in virtue of its own power, but in virtue
of God himself present to it. This union with God is established through
the transforming power of the love of God which takes complete pos-
session of the mind and makes it divine.
Ficino admits that this Platonic description of our knowledge of God
is not easy to understand, and he tries to make it clearer by giving his
own explanation of it. When the separated mind is first turned into
itself, it knows things through a light that is proper to itself, i.e. it
knows them through formulae or representations which are in the
mind. But then the mind turn') to the common light; in virtue of this it
knows all things as the effects of him who is the author of this light.
(Here Ficino seems to be referring back to his previous discussion of
the common truth which brings to light all else. This truth is being, for
in virtue of being all else is known. Thus, God who is the author of be-
ing is the author of the common light by which we know, and to know
things in the light of being is to know them as the effects of God.) But to
know in virtue of the common light is not to know the origin of this
light. Nothing outside God himself can hold the full splendor which is
intrinsic to the divinity. Although the light is full and complete in God,
it comes forth into the mind as something limited. Still the mind has a
natural desire for the divine light and a natural desire cannot be frus-
trated. Through knowledge the mind follows the light with difficulty.
But through love it keeps to the right direction in spite of its blindness.
Thus, the mind is transformed not trough its own power but through
the attracting power of the divinity. God draws the mind to itself by
enkindling in it a love for him. Through this love the mind is joined to
him, penetrated throughout by his infinite goodness which brings to it
complete and infinite joy.1I9
The previous discussion of the mind's ordinary knowledge of God
has shown that the Platonists consider the names 'one' and 'good' to be
more proper to God than 'being', at least as 'being' is understood in
the knowledge of created things. In the text we are now considering,
Ficino explains the inadequacy of the name 'being' without explaining
why the names 'one' and 'good' are to be preferred. Arguments in
support of this preference are given elsewhere, as we have seen. 30 But
none of these arguments appeal to the role of unity and goodness in the
mind's beatific knowledge of God. Yet whenever Ficino presents the
Platonic position on the divine names his purpose is to distinguish the
mind's ordinary knowledge of God, a knowledge of him in relation to
his effects, from that knowledge of him which comes through direct
union and which carries the mind beyond itself. In one place, he says
explicitly that it is the incomprehensibility of God which puts him
beyond the name 'being' (ens), a name signifying the proper object of
the mind.31 What is the connection between the mind's knowledge of
God through union and calling God the one and the good above being?
On the basis of the text we have been considering here, which describes
beatific union in terms of unity and goodness, we can suggest a possible
explanation for this connection. The explanation is not presented by
Ficino himself, but it is in sympathy with his text and is implicit in its
principles.
The mind's most perfect knowledge of God is a totally integrated act
of the whole mind. The whole mind is flooded with the divine, and
through this all its mutability is stabilized and all its multiplicity uni-
fied. In beatific knowing, then, the mind is raised by God to a unity
above itself. Thus, when God communicates himself most perfectly to
the mind, the result is unity. Unity seems to be the proper effect of God
and the name 'unity' most properly applied to him.
The name 'good' also has a special significance in the discussion of
the mind's union with God. The knowledge of God which the mind has
through its natural powers, a knowledge described in other texts as a
knowledge of being, does not reveal God as he is in himself; the mind
knows in the light of the divinity without knowing the divinity itself.
29 TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, pp. 200-07, B-409-IO. Plato, Republic VII 51¥-16c, 532a-32d;
Plotinus, Enneads V-3-17; VI-7-22, 31, 34-36; VI-1)-4, 9 to II.
ao Of. pp. 85-86.
81 Of. note 27.
go THE SPECIAL PRESENCE OF GOD TO MAN
But through its love or natural desire for God, the mind moves toward
a union with him in which the divine light itself is revealed to its gaze.
It is the goodness or attractiveness of God which guides the mind to
himself and fills it with joy when the union is accomplished. Thus, the
revelation of God which is made through goodness carries the mind
beyond the limits of its ordinary knowledge of him through being. It
seems, therefore, that God is more perfectly known as good than as
being.
Ficino gives his most complete defense of the Platonic preference for
calling God the one and the good when he asks why, if God is the source
of all our knowing, we are not always explicitly aware of him. The
themes of this discussion are very much the same as those in the other
texts we have considered in relation to this question. At first, we know
things in their specific natures without distinguishing the divine light
in virtue of which they are known. We know God only as he is mani-
fested within the limited nature of a created thing. Through contem-
plation we come to distinguish the light which makes things intelligible
from the known object itself. But we do not as yet know the source of
this light. This is similar to the situation which would exist if the sun
were hidden so that we could not see the source of the light in the air
which makes colored objects visible, even though we could distinguish
this light from the colored objects themselves.
After an introductory consideration of these themes, Ficino refers to
the seventh book of Plato's Republic as containing Plato's discussion of
the same issues. Following this reference, Ficino distinguishes the stages
of a theologian's knowledge. The theologian gradually withdraws his
mind from the fallacies of the sensible and turns to the species, i.e. the
formulae implanted in the mind from its origin, through which the
mind has been formed by the ideas. By this means the mind contem-
plates the ideas themselves and considers the species of natural things.
In being formed by the ideas, the mind is formed by God who is the
origin of the ideas, and in the contemplation of the ideas the mind
touches God. After a long period of contemplation, the mind begins to
be wise in a way that is above the level of human knowing. At this
point, it is no longer ignorant that it knows in virtue of God, that its
knowledge is a knowledge of God, that it knows God.
The principal reason for considering this part of Fieino's interpre-
tation of the Platonic text is to provide a context for the discussion
which is to follow. Ficino is attributing to Plato a distinction between a
knowledge directed exclusively to things themselves and a knowledge
which is conscious of the common light, the ideas, in virtue of which

they are known and which has its source in God. At the end of the
discussion, Ficino refers to a wisdom above human knowing, a de-
scription previously applied to the knowledge of God in himselfthrough
union with him. After this hint at the distinction between knowing God
through his effects and knowing him through God himself, Ficino
introduces the question of the divine names.
According to Plato, Ficino says, it is fitting that God should be called
goodness itself. Goodness diffuses itself, draws things to itself and per-
fects them. All of these are especially true of God who diffuses himself by
producing things, draws them all back to himself, and perfects them by
forming and reforming them. Thus, God is fittingly called goodness
itself. It is indeed more proper to call him by this name than to give him
the name 'mind' or 'essence'. Mind properly signifies a power capable
of truth and eager for goodness, while God is truth and goodness itself.
God is not ignorant of himself; and he is the cause of minds. For these
reasons he often receives the name 'mind'. But he is not properly so
called. The same is true of the name 'essence', which refers to the sub-
ject of being (esse), and even of the name 'being' (esse), which refers to
the act of essence. If 'being' refers to such an act, it refers to an act
mixed with potency, an impure and finite act. Such a name cannot
properly apply to God. But because God is the pure and absolute act
through which all essences receive the act of being, he is called being
itself (esse ipsum) by the Peripetetics.
Plotinus and Proc1us give other reasons for placing God above being.
The first principle of all things should extend itself to all, so that every-
thing in some way participates in the first, and in virtue of this partici-
pation turns back to it, is preserved and perfected by it. Although entity
seems to be common to all things, it does not extend to matter. Matter
has being only through the form. Yet matter is good because it tends
toward goodness. It is also one, and precisely because it is unformed.
For division, difference, multiplicity have their source either in the
variety of forms or in dimension and number. All of these are formal
principles. Thus, unity is affirmed of matter because form, and the
being which flows from it, is denied of it. Because unity and goodness
are more universal than being (ens), they are more fittingly applied to
the first principle of all things.
The Platonists take their second argument from the non-identity of
opposites. Being (ens) itself cannot be the same as unity, since their
opposites are not the same. To deny that a thing has unity is to affirm
that it is multiple. But this is not to say that it is nothing, which is

exactly what we do say when we deny that a thing has being. Since
unity and being are not the same, either both are first principles or one
is above the other. There cannot be two first principles. Nor can being
be above unity. For if unity participates in being, which it must ifit is
inferior to it, then unity will be composed of itself and something other
than itself. This is a contradiction.
Finally, unity rather than being is more fittingly attributed to the
first principle because unity signifies no composition, while being (ens)
includes both essence and its act of being (esse). The Platonists will not
admit that the act of being can be taken apart from the essence, lest the
proper act be separated from its proper potency.
In comparison to goodness, too, the Platonists see being as an inap-
propriate name for the first principle. All things desire and seek the
good. This can be said without qualification. But being (esse) is desira-
ble only if it is well-being (esse bene). The desire for being (esse) is a
qualified one, and being is sought for the sake of the good. Since, then,
the good is the ultimate end of all things, the final object of all striving,
and since things seek their origin and return to it, the good must be not
only the last end, but also the first principle of all things. In this is
implied not only that the name 'good' is fittingly applied to God, but
that it is more fitting to him than 'being' (esse), since being is sought for
the sake of the good. According to the Platonists, then, God is the one
and the good above being (ens).
After presenting the various arguments of Plato and his followers,
Ficino goes on to consider the knowledge which the blessed have of God.
These are united directly to the good, but not by an intellectual power.
Such a power implies multiplicity and hence is unfitting to grasp unity
itself. Such a power is inferior to the intelligible, i.e. universal being
(ens), on which it depends. It cannot approach that which excels even
the intelligible. The one and the good is grasped in a certain unified
touch above intelligence, a mystical intuition as it were. God unites the
soul to himself not by the bond of intelligence, which is accomplished
through an image, but by a real union of the substance itself.32
32 TP, XII, 3, v. II, pp. 160--6S, B--26g-71. Of. Plotinus, Enneads V-3-9 to 17; V-S-9;
VI-S-I; VI-7-3, 20 to 23, 33 to 41; VI-g-I to S, 10, I I; ProcIus, The Elements of Theology
# 13, 25, 28, 39, 57, 61-62, 72, 78,80,86,89,92,95, 102, 115,121,127, 138. Plato, Plotinus,
and ProcIus assert that the first principle is above being. Plotinus and ProcIus give as the
reason for this the multiplicity or composition which is proper to being. But this composition
is not explained as one of essence with being. (Plato, Republic VI So6d-ogc; Plotinus, En-
The arguments given here for preferring 'one' and 'good' over 'being'
as names of God do not appeal to the distinction between our natural
knowledge of God and our knowledge of him through union. They
consider being to signify something limited, while God is infinite, or
they appeal to unity or goodness as more universal or more ultimately
causal in created things and hence as more properly applied to the first
cause of those things. However, the presentation of these arguments is
neads V-g-Ig; VI-7-gg; VI-7-g8; VI-9-2; Proclus, The Elements of Theology # 102, 115,
Ig8.)
Proclus says that being is a composite of the infinite and the limit, infinite referring to its
unlimited power, limit to its indivisible and unitary character. But the way in which Proclus
discusses the function of the limit in this composition is somewhat ambiguous. At times, the
limit seems to be the source of the infinity; Proclus says that what makes a thing indivisible
and unitary also makes it infinite, and things are more or less powerful as they are more or
less unitary. Thus, the corporeal which is divisible to infinity is completely impotent; it is not
an agent, but that which is subject to the action of others. Proclus distinguishes between two
kinds of power or potency - perfecting or efficacious power which belongs to the actual and
which brings about new actuality through its action, and receptive power which receives its
actuality or fulfillment from something else. The power which is proper to being and which
is called the infinite is efficacious power, which Ficino would call act. The power which is
proper to the corporeal is receptive and this is infinite in its divisibility. The various degrees
of efficacious power or infinity are established through mixture with receptivity or multi-
plicity. This is what limits infinity and keeps it from being pure efficacious power, which
Ficino would call pure act. The infinity or power which is proper to being is not pure power
because it is mixed with the limit. The ambiguity of Proclus' discussion is most pronounced
at this point. The limit is interpreted here as that which is other than the infinite and which
keeps it from being completely powerful. It seems to be akin to the receptivity and multi-
plicity proper to the impotent. But originally being was said to have limit because of its
unity, and unity is above being and more powerful than being. (The Elements of Theology
# 78, 80, 86, 89, 92, 95, 102, 115, Ig8)
If we relate Proclus' use of the terms 'infinite' and 'limit' to Ficino's use of them, the
confusion increases. The Platonists, says Ficino, think that all things which are caused are
composed of a receptive principle, in virtue of which they can be but do not have to be, and
an actualizing or determining principle, in virtue of which they are. But according to
Ficino, the term 'infinite' applies to the receptive principle, i.e. the potency, and the term
'limit' refers to the determining principle, i.e. act. (Cf. ch. 4, pp. 44-46) In Proclus' dis-
cussion the term 'infinite' is identified with efficacious power; since this power is the source
of actuality, it is more akin to the determining than the receptive principle.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, Ficino probably has Proclus' discussion in mind when
he interprets the Platonic doctrine of manifold being in terms of essence and the act of being.
According to Proclus, beings are composites of an efficacious principle, closely associated
with unity, and a receptive principle, closely associated with divisibility and multiplicity.
The hierarchy of beings is explained in these terms and Ficino accepts this explanation as his
own. (Cf. ch. 2, especially pp. 20-21). In the discusssion cited previously (ch. 4, pp. 44-
46), he identifies the Platonic receptive principle with essence and the Platonic deter-
mining principle with being, calling the first 'potency' and the second 'act'. Now Ficino
attributes to the Platonists the argument that being, because it belongs to essence, is mixed
with potency, is impure and finite act, and hence cannot apply to God. The Platonists, he
says, will not allow the act of being to be taken apart from essence; it properly belongs to
essence as act to its proper potency. Proclus argues that being cannot be pure efficacy or
power because its efficacious principle (the infinite) is mixed with something other than
itself which restricts it (the limit). He assumes, therefore, that such mixture is proper to being.
It seems that Ficino again interprets the Platonic receptive principle as essence and potency
and the Platonic efficacious principle as being or act.
immediately preceded and followed by a consideration of the distinc-

tion between natural and beatific knowledge of the divine. The closing
statement describes beatific knowledge as union with the one and the
good and distinguishes it from the knowledge of universal being (ens),
an inferior kind of knowing. Thus, when Fieino argues that it is more
proper to call God the one and the good than to call him being, he is
thinking of being as the natural and proper object of the human mind.
This is explicit in other discussions of this question, as we have seen. 33
It is consistent with arguments which consider being as something finite.
But Ficino is not satisfied to consider the mind's beatific knowledge
of God in Platonic terms only. At the end of the discussion of the Pla-
tonic position, he appeals to the authority of St. Matthew. To this he
adds:
The mention of the Holy Evangelist seems to remind us that, having set
aside philosophical ambiguities, we may seek beatitude by a shorter route
by following the lead of Christian theologians, and especially Thomas
Aquinas, the splendor of Christian theology.34
Fieino's discussion of beatitude as he understands it from Christian

theology must be considered in the light of this introductory statement.
Ficino has expressed a preference for this way of considering beatific
knowledge over that beset by philosophical ambiguities, and the phi-
losophical position which has been under discussion is that of the
Platonists.
The inadequacy of the mind's ordinary knowledge of God is here
described under the authority of Christian theology in much the same
way that it is described just prior to this under the authority of the
Platonists and in an earlier text under the authority of Augustine.
When Ficino discusses the knowledge which the blessed have of the
divinity, the role of being as the source of knowledge again becomes
quite clear. Fieino has insisted that, although all our knowledge is a
knowledge of God, we do not always know God directly and as he is in
himself. Here he establishes this once again. The created mind, con-
templating God in its own essence, which differs from its being, or in a
light proper to that essence and determined in it, cannot understand
the divine substance as it is in itself. The divine substance is infinite,
38 cr. pp. 85-87.
84 "Sed ecce iam beata Evangelii sancti commemoratio nos admonere videtur, ut philo-
sophicis dimissis ambagibus breviori tramite beatitudinem ea quaeramus via, qua Christiani
ducunt theologi ac Thomas Aquinas in primis, Christianae splendor Theologiae." (TP,
XVIII, 8, v. III, pp. 208-09, B-410)
while the mind grasps it as represented in the finite. In this finite mani-
festation of God, we know only that God is, what he is not rather than
what he is, and in what way he is referred to others and others to him.
As the sight is darkened when it gazes on the sun, whose light reveals
all else to it, so the intellect, unaided by any but its natural equipment,
attains God only as a great Unknown. 35
At this point Ficino refers to Plato and to Dionysius as in agreement
with the position he has just presented. Thus, this part of the discussion
of Christian theology is understood to be consistent with the Platonic
position on the same issue. Aquinas presents the same position and
appeals to the same text from the work of Dionysius, and he does so in
the chapter immediately preceding the one which Ficino uses in the
discussion to follow. 36 Either there is a direct Thomistic influence here
or Ficino considers his description to be in the spirit of Aquinas'
thought, as indeed it is. At this point at least Ficino sees no discrepancy
between the Platonic and the Thomistic positions on the mind's know-
ledge of God.
Thomistic theology does not accept the mind's inadequate know-
ledge of God as final. Despite his limits, man desires to know God fully,
and this desire is not a flight of fancy, but a necessity of nature. The
natural tendency of knowledge is toward a definitive understanding of
things, an understanding which reveals the true identity of the object,
an understanding which knows the object as it is in itself. In every act
of knowledge, the mind is seeking this final truth. Therefore, the human
mind in all its knowledge about God is seeking to know God as he is in
himself, a knowledge which only the infinity of God himself can reveal.
Man cannot know God at all without expressing in that knowledge the
desire to know him fully. And man cannot know anything without
implicitly pursuing the knowledge of God, for knowledge is directed
toward being and being refers to God. Since God is being itself and the
cause of being in creatures, he is perfect intelligibility, absolute truth,
and the completion of human knowledge in its own line.
According to the teaching of Christian theology, therefore, the mind's
inability to grasp the divinity itself does not indicate a complete dis-
junction between the mind and God. God is beyond the natural capaci-
ty of the mind not because of a complete otherness, but because of the
excellence of his intelligibility. To return to an image which Ficino has
35 TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, p. 209, B-41D-11. cr. Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, De

Mystica Theoiogia, cap. I, sect. 3.
36 Aquinas, CG, III, 49, # 2270, (9). cr. Appendix # 73.
used in another consideration of this question, God is to the mind as the

sun is to the eye. The sun is not completely different from the object of
sight. The eye's capacity for awareness is properly ordered to light and
the illumined. Because the light of the sun is so perfect as light, so con-
centrated and so intense, the eye cannot see it. But the light of the sun
is still light and the cause of the light which the eye sees. Similarly,
God is perfection in the order of the knowable. The mind is properly
ordered to the knowledge of beings and the true. God is being itself and
truth itself. He is the cause of being and truth in the things we know,
and hence the cause of their intelligibility. He is beyond the mind's
capacity because he is so completely knowable.
Man is a marvellous ambiguity. His very nature thrusts him far
beyond the human. His desire for God is unavoidable; it is a necessity
of nature. Yet he cannot by his own power achieve the object, since the
object is beyond his nature. But natural desire cannot be frustrated
without involving the creator in a colossal absurdity. To cancel man's
natural desire is to cancel man himself, God's creature and image.
Therefore, Ficino, following Aquinas, concludes that man is destined
for a perfect union with God in which God will carry the human soul
beyond its limitations revealing himself not through an image or repre-
sentation, but through direct presence.
But is it not equally absurd for one substance to enter another and
thus become the principle of its knowledge? This is like saying that
Plato knows Socrates because Socrates himself has entered the mind of
Plato. But this is not absurd if God is the substance which enters the
mind. The perfection of the intellect is the true, and the true, the intel-
ligible, and being (ens) are the same. Hence, that which is a composite
of essence and being (esse) is not truth itself just as it is not being (esse)
itsel£ Rather it is a being (ens) and a true thing. Such composites can-
not be the forms of other things in the same genus, since in them the
form is restricted to its matter. Thus, no created mind can be the form
of another mind. Only God is such a form, for he alone is being itself
and truth itself.
The terms 'form' and 'matter' are not used here in their proper sense.
Ficino indicates this when he qualifies 'matter' with quasi, and again
when he says that God is a form not as part of a composite, but as a
principle of action. Ficino has established quite clearly that there are
created things which are pure forms independent of matter. Yet he
refers explicitly to these very forms when he says that no created mind
can be the form of another mind since every created mind is a compos-
ite ofform and matter. In this discussion, the form is that which makes
the true to be true and a being to be a being. It is the truth of a true
thing, the being itself (esse) of a being (ens). Thus, God alone is pure
form, unrestricted by matter, because he alone is truth itself and being
itself. 37
This discussion of beatific knowledge has been taken from Aquinas'
Summa Contra Gentiles. 3s Many of its elements run parallel to the previ-
ous discussion attributed to the Platonists. In the discussion attributed
to Plato, in the explanation of the Platonic position which Ficino
presents as his own, and in the discussion attributed to the Christian
theologians, the mind's inability to know God in himselfis explained by
its finiteness. Because the mind is finite, its capacity for knowledge is
finite and its object is finite. It knows the infinite God only as he is
manifested in the limited. But Ficino attributes both to Plato and to
Christian theology the conviction that the mind is carried beyond itself
by the action of God; it is brought into union with God by God him-
self, and in virtue of his presence it knows God as he is in himself.
Since man cannot comprehend the object he seeks, there must be
some other guiding principle which keeps him to the right direction in
spite of his blindness. This principle is his love of God. But how can
man love what is so litde known to him? How can his love focus on the
full wonder of God, if he knows nothing of it? The love which propels
man toward his end is a light infused by God himself, a light mani-
festing itself in the mind's thirst for truth and the will's zeal for good-
ness. The love which carries man beyond the limits of his knowledge is
that same natural desire which gives evidence of his transcendent end. 39
Moreover, when Ficino moves from the Platonic approach to God
through unity and power to the Thomistic approach through being, a
decisive change takes place in his thought. In the first approach, God
moves the world as an object of desire, an end attracting to himself
those lower beings whose function it is to originate or infuse motion
into the corporeal realm. In the second approach, God moves the world
37 This is not the first time Ficino has used these terms in this way. The soul, he has said,
cannot be resolved into itself in potency because spiritual matter, like corporeal matter,
cannot be without its proper act. Hence, the essence of the soul cannot be without its being.
(TP, V, II, v. I, pp. 197-98, B-14S)
38 Appendix # 73-77,79.
89 "Idque inde provenire censendum quod naturalis tum intelligentiae perspicacia tum
voluntatis ardor radius quidam est ab ipsa divina luce proxime per ipsius lumen infusus in
eamdemque resilit natural iter, neque moveri cessat, priusquam in suum se solem denique
restituerit." (TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, p. 210, B-41 I) "Mens enim amando lucem non tam sese
accendit et transfert, quam a luce blande alliciente, vehementer percutiente, penitus pene-
trante et accenditur, et transfertur, et lucet." (TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, p. 206, B-409)
as an originating cause. He is the one who infuses motion or causal

action into the universe because he must act in all the actions of his
creatures. The latter approach is decidedly Thomistic and Ficino intro-
duces it again from time to time when discussing God's presence in the
human soul. Considering now the love or desire which guides the soul
to God, Ficino relates the originative aspect of God's influence to an
effect which seems to arise most appropriately from his attractive
power. According to Plotinus, it is as an object of desire that the divine
moves the soul toward itself. Even Aquinas does not remind us here
that God himself puts the desire for himself into the soul of man. But
Ficino insists on it. He expands Aquinas' argument to include it. God
does not just attract the soul; he infuses into it that natural keenness of
the mind and ardor of the will which make him not only appealing but
absolutely necessary to it. And Ficino himself, not Aquinas, attributes
to this desire a guiding function. Ficino understands the desire or love
for God, the ardor of the will, to be a kind of light which guides the
mind when its knowledge is no longer adequate for the search. By
infusing this principle of momentum into the soul, God originates the
soul's movement toward himself. According to Aquinas, God infuses
into the soul a special principle, grace, which guides man back to God.
Aquinas, like Ficino, identifies this principle with love, love for God,
but the principle is not identified with natural desire. 4o
The most difficult issue in the comparison of the Platonic and Tho-
mistic positions on beatific knowledge is the question of the divine
names. There are two radically different ways in which the human
mind knows the divinity. The mind is naturally ordered to being and
the intelligible. To these it has a certain proportion. They fall within its
natural capacity. Within this order, it comes to full comprehension
when it contemplates all things in the common light of being and
understands their diversity within that one intention or ratio according
to which they have been produced. This is to know God in his relation-
ship to creatures and as he is revealed through a finite manifestation of
himsel£ According to the neo-Platonists, this knowledge has as its ob-
ject a god who is properly named 'first being' (ens) and 'first intelligi-
ble'. He holds within himself the forms of all things, these forms re-
taining their diversity within his all-encompassing unity. The function
of the first being in the Platonic account corresponds to that of the
common light of being in the accounts attributed to Augustine and
40 Aquinas, CG, III, lSD-51.

Aquinas. But according to the Platonic account, the first principle,
which is called the one and the good, is above the intelligible. He is
beyond the scope of the mind in its natural capacity. The mind cannot
know the highest god unless it is raised above itself to a mystical union
with him. The function ofthe one and the good in the Platonic account
corresponds to that of being itself and truth itself in the Thomistic
account. Although Ficino does not accept the two gods posited by the
neo-Platonists, he does accept the distinction between two ways in
which one and the same God is present to human cognition. He points
to the two gods of the neo-Platonists in order to show once more that in
crucial issues Platonism and Christian theology are at one. But they are
not at one, and Ficino cannot take care of the difference merely by
denying that there are two different gods for each way of knowing. Can
the God of mystical union be properly called being and truth or not?
This involves not only the names of God but the essential focus of
Ficino's metaphysics.
According to the Thomistic view, there is a proportion between the
mind and God even though God is beyond the natural capacity of the
mind. God is not completely alien to the mind's capacity for knowledge.
The mind is ordered to the intelligible which is finite while God is
infinitely intelligible. He is infinite perfection in this order. Hence,
there is a certain continuity between him and the objects to which the
mind is properly ordered. The names which are most appropriate to
God as he reveals himself most perfectly to the mind are those which
express both the continuity and otherness between him and finite intel-
ligible objects. He is not a being (ens) or a true thing (verum); he is
being itself and truth itself by which all things are and are true.
What does Ficino understand the Platonists to mean when they deny
that there is a proportion between the mind and the god who is the one
and the good? The disproportion is not so complete as to make a union
between the mind and this god impossible. Some continuity between
the world of our ordinary knowledge and the god who is above being is
implicitly affirmed in the Platonic discussion. Properly speaking, being
is something limited and created, just as mind, properly speaking, is an
intelligence of an inferior kind. Presumably, unity and goodness do not
have such a limited signification, for their applicability to God is more
proper than that of being. But what is it about umty and goodness that
makes them different? Their universality and priority, to judge from
the arguments. That which belongs to everything and is most basic to
everything has a certain continuity with the principle who is the first
and universal cause of things. It IS his special mark, so to speak. This is

Ficino's attitude in all discussions of the divine names. In the Platonic
account, unity and goodness have priority over being and truth. But
when Ficino discusses these issues in his own name, he says that being
as such is infinite perfection and that being in creatures is the most
common and most primary of all effects. In its universality and abso-
lute primacy being manifests the relationship between the creature and
the principle which is the first efficient cause and final end of all
thingS. 41 But if this is so, then unity and goodness cannot be more
universal and more ultimate than being, and the names 'one' and
'good' are not more properly applied to the first principle than the
name 'being itself'.
The universality and primacy of unity and goodness justifies calling
God the one and the good above being only if unity and goodness are
not the same as being. In presenting the neo-Platonic position, Ficino
gives arguments to establish this non-identity. He argues that matter
has unity and goodness without having being. The argument takes
being as ens, but its conclusion is based on the role of the form as the
source of the act of being (esse). Goodness is the unqualified object of
desire; being (esse) is sought only for the sake of the good. Also, the good
and being (ens) are objects of different powers. Yet Ficino says in an-
other place that the object of the will is being (ens) under the ratio of the
good; the object of the intellect is being under the ratio of the true. 42 In
his discussion of the soul's presence to the body, he says explicitly that a
thing is related to unity in the same way that it is related to being. His
discussion of the hierarchic structure of the world rests on the identifi-
cation of unity and efficacious power or act. But he identifies being, too,
with power and act, for he establishes the infinite power of God not
only from unity, but also from the infinity of a,bsolute being (esse). The
doctrine of the one and the good above being is ascribed to Plato and
the Platonists. But according to Ficino, Plato is his inspiration in his
arguments concerning the one God who is unity itself, truth itself, and
goodness itself.43 These arguments accept unity, truth, and goodness as
41 TP, II, I, v. I, pp. 73-74, B--g2.
42 "Ad haec, sicut obiectwn intellectus est ens ipsum sub ratione veri, ita voluntatis
obiectwn ens ipswn sub ratione boni." (TP, X, 8, v. II, p. 86, 8-236) Ct: Aquinas, Summa
Theologiae 1-5-1; 16-3.
48 "Quamobrem ipsa unitas, veritas, bonitas, quam invenimus super angelum, ex mente
Platonia omnium est principium, Deus unus verusque et bonus." (TP, II, I, v. I, p. 75,
B--g3) "Deus igitur mundi unius ordinator est unus. Unus, inquam, prima Platonicorum
ratione, quia est unitas. Est etiam unus secunda eorumdem ratione, quia est veritas ...•
Iterum est unus Deus tertia ratione Platonicorum, quia summa est bonitas." (TP, 11,2, v. I,
P·78,~)
the same in created things and in God; they accept the names 'unity',
'truth', and 'goodness' as having equal daim to the status of a divine
name. And truth is identified with being in this discussion. 44
In the light of this disparity between the doctrine which Ficino
presents as his own and that which he attributes to the Platonists, we
must ask to what extent Ficino sympathizes with the Platonic position
on the divine names. The arguments which establish that unity and
goodness are not the same as being are never attributed to Plato him-
self. They are given as the arguments of Plotinus and Produs, or as
those of "the Platonists". Ficino, on several occasions, has been willing
to stop short offull agreement with Plotinus and Produs and with "the
Platonists".45 However, we must admit that Ficino sees some kind of
otherness between goodness and being. One of the arguments used in
support of this is his own contribution to the discus'!lion. Good is the
object of the will, being (ens) the object of the intellect. Hence, being
and goodness are not the same. But he says in another place, as we have
seen, that the object of the intellect is being (ens) itself under the ratio of
the true; the object of the will is this same being itself under the ratio of
the good. 46 Ficino has explained the sameness and otherness of the
divine ideas by a distinction in ratio. The same kind of distinction seems
to be implied here. But Ficino does not attempt a full explanation, in
these terms or any others. It is possible that Ficino does not fully ac-
cept the neo-Platonic position he presents. It is also possible that he
accepts an otherness in a sense which does not eliminate the identity
he has already affirmed.
According to Ficino, being as such is infinite perfection. Being in the
44 TP, II, I, v. I, pp. 73-74, :8-92; II, 3, v. I, p. 82, :8-95--96.

45 "Sed haec ipsi [Platoniei] viderint, nobis autem suffieit animam divinitate formari."
(TP, XII, 7, v. II, p. 191, B-282) "Sed cur animae quoque elementorum earumque currus
ad caelestem habitationem non annituntur? Quoniam, ut platonicorum potiusquam mea
opinione respondeam, offieium illis a Deo assignatum est, ut ibi sint semper." (TP, XVIII,
8, v. III, pp. 20croI, B-407) "Quamquam Plotinus et Proculus aliique nonnulli Platonico-
rum animam fieri arbitrantur ab angelo, tamen Dionysium Areopagitam, Origenem et
AureIium Augustinum, Platonicos excellentissimos, sequor lihentius, qui animam putant a
Deo unico procreari." (TP, V, 13, v. I, p. 203, B-I47) We are aware that the issue of the
one and the good above being is discussed at great length in Fieino's commentary on Plato's
Parmenities, and that many of the arguments assigned to the neo-Platonists or "the Platonists"
in the Platonic Theology are assigned to Plato himself in the commentary. (In Parm. II p. 1138;
XLIII p. 1158) But to make any conclusion as to the significance of this commentary, a
lengthy and detailed investigation is necessary, an investigation establishing, among other
things, to what extent Ficino as a commentator merely serves the text with as much sympa-
thetic interpretation as possible, and to what extent he intends to use it as a vehicle for
presenting his own thought. As we have seen, Fieino is capable of presenting sympathetically
the doctrines of others while withholding his full agreement from them.
46 Cf. note 42.
creature follows immediately after nothing; it is the most universal and

most primary effect proper to the most primary cause. Unity, truth or
being, and goodness are the same in created things and in God. This is
what Ficino says in his own name and this clearly goes against any
understanding of being as subsequent to unity and goodness or as
something which is in itself limited. Since the priority of unity and
goodness over being and truth is asserted only under the name of the
Platonists, we cannot reasonably conclude that Ficino's sympathies are
more with this view than with that which he presents as his own.
There is one text in which Fieino grapples directly with the issue of
the priority of unity over being. He is attempting to establish the ulti-
mate indivisibility of the object of knowledge. Who, he asks, can divide
unity, simplicity, purity? Who can divide absolute being itself? To
divide a thing is to resolve it into parts prior to the whole. But these are
composed of no preceding parts. Man can be resolved into animal and
rational, and animal into body and the power of sensing. Body can be
further resolved into substance and quantity, substance into being (esse)
and the sufficiency of subsisting. But I know not, says Ficino, into what
parts being (esse) itself can be resolved. Perhaps into unity and multi-
tude as Plotinus and Proc1us think. But unity certainly has no parts
into which it can be resolved. 47
Here each object of knowledge is resolved into its constituent parts,
parts which are prior to the whole insofar as the whole results from
their union. HPlotinus and Proclus are right in saying that being (esse)
itself can be resolved into unity and multitude, then unity is other than
being and prior to it. But Ficino's aim in the discussion is to reach a
completely indivisible principle of knowledge. For this purpose he need
not decide whether or not being is ultimate in this regard. And he does
not make such a decision. However, his attitude seems to be that he
himself cannot see how being can be composite, but if someone insists
on the neo-Platonic position, the conclusion still holds. This is con-
firmf'd by the first part of the text in which he affirms the absolute
simplicity and indivisibility of being without hesitation This would
also be consistent WIth the attitude toward being and unity which we
have observed in the presentation of his own doctrine.
Fieino agrees WIth the Platonic position to this extent: the common
light of being does not manifest God as he is in himself; the act of being
which is proper to a created, finite thing cannot reveal the infinite ex-
47 TP, VIII, 4, v. I, pp. 30g-1O, B-I92-93.

cellence of the divinity. But, according to Ficino, being as such IS not

proper to a created thing; being as such is infinite and is God himself.
Thus, Ficino does not accept the full implications of the Platonic po-
sition; he does not accept that being as such is caused being. He con-
siders the Thomistic account a more direct route to understanding the
nature of beatific knowing. In this account, God as revealed in beatific
union is called being itself and truth itself. These names imply a certain
proportion between the mind and God without which no knowledge of
God as he is in himself would be possible.
Ficino does not deny that unity and goodness are just as properly
applied to God as being and truth. Moreover, the name 'goodness'
expresses the attraction by which God moves the mind beyond itself
into union with him. This brings in the role oflove in the mind's seeking
after the divinity, and Ficino understands love to have a guiding func-
tion in this pursuit. Perhaps this is why the Platonic explanation of our
union with God appeals to him. But there is no clear evidence that he
accepts the priority of unity and goodness over being. And there is
considerable evidence against it. Perhaps again Ficino does not intend
to claim that Platonism and Christian theology are presenting exactly
the same interpretation of divine presence. If Thomistic theology affords
a more direct route to a proper understanding of God's relation to man,
yet Platonism contains the seeds of this truth. Philosophy moves in the
same direction as theology, although theology may find its way with
less difficulty.
According to the Thomistic explanation, nothing proper to the soul
can reveal God as he is in himself, since the soul is finite and God is
infinite. But since the soul has a natural desire for such a revelation, and
since a natural desire cannot be frustrated, the soul must be destined
for a union with God by which God will reveal himself directly to it.
The only form which is sufficient to show forth the fullness of the di-
vinity is God himself. Hence, in beatific union God enters the soul not
through an image or representation, but according to substance. God
himself is in the soul and through this direct presence is he known. Such
a union of substances is possible because God is being itself or truth
itself. The intellect is ordered to being and truth; hence, being and
truth establish the union between knower and known. If the union is
not complete, this is because being and truth are not complete, but are
the being and truth of a being and a true thing. But God is pure being
and pure truth. Hence, he can reveal himself to the soul through a
direct and perfect union with it.
The theme which runs through this explanation of beatific knowledge

is that being makes union with the mind possible. Let us relate this to
what Ficino has said previously about being as presence. The soul is
intimately united to the body because it is the principle of being, es-
sence, power, and operation for the body. This follows from two princi-
pIes: that being is more intrinsic to essence than anything else and that
a thing is related to being in the same way that it is related to unity. The
intimate presence of the soul to the body is described as a union be-
tween soul and body, and this presence or union is established through
being. So also the presence of the known to the knower is a union, and
this, too, is established through being. Finally, in beatific knowledge,
God is present to the knower through a union of the divine substance
itself with the human soul, and this is possible because God is being
itself. Thus, being is a principle of presence or union.
As we have seen, the union of the soul with the body, its presence to
the whole body and to each of its members, establishes a unity in the
body itself so that all its members are one thing. In beatific union, God
permeates the whole soul and through this presence brings it to a unity
beyond itself. The primacy and universality of being establishes a cer-
tain unity in the diversity of created things. This unity in diversity
manifests the presence of one God who is being itself giving being to all
things. When we know in the light of being, then, our knowledge re-
sembles God's knowledge of things in that one ratio according to which
he has created them. Thus, unity is established through the all-per-
vasive presence of one principle, and this presence is explained in terms
of being and its efficacy. Ficino has identified both unity and being
with act or efficacious power. He explains the divine presence as the
presence of being itself and pure act in the being and actions of his
effects. It is only fitting that unity should be the result of this presence.
CHAPTER SIX
PHILOSOPHY SEEKS WHAT RELIGION WORSHIPS
The preface to the Platonic Theology introduces the work as a search for
God which uses the Platonic philosophy as a guide. Ficino chooses this
guide in order to make manifest the inseparability of philosophy and
religion and the special place which man holds in God's revelation of
himself. Platonism recognizes that every intellectual enterprise, even
physics and mathematics, is en route to the divine. It seeks to make its
way through the levels of knowing to the point at which it touches God
himself, and it does this, not in order to know a fact, but in order to
contemplate and venerate a wondrous reality. But if he would know
God, man must know himself, for the way to God inevitably leads to
this place where God is revealed in a special way. Ficino gives this as a
reason for focusing his Platonic theology on the immortality of the soul.
In some way, the essential orientation of philosophy toward God be-
comes manifest in man's everlasting destiny.
Ficino opens the work with an argument for human immortality
which sets the tone of the whole enterprise. The argument begins with
a dramatic description of man's plight. What does this life offer him?
Restlessness, dissatisfaction, the continual frustration of his longing for
fulfillment. His body is weak, his mind hindered by the darkness of the
earthly prison. Can he hope for nothing more than this? If not, then his
situation is worse than that of any other animal on earth. Why? Other
animals are doomed to live out their destiny in this place. Why should
the same destiny be more tragic for man? Because man shows by his
chronic dissatisfaction and restlessness that something in himself tran-
scends the limits of what life on this earth can afford. His desire points
beyond mortal existence. If this desire is doomed to frustration, then
man is indeed a tragic figure. Since such an absurdity cannot come
from the hand of God, man must be destined for a life which overcomes
the darkness and frustrations of mortal existence.
106 PHILOSOPHY SEEKS WHAT RELIGION WORSHIPS
Considering this argument now, after examining the discussion of

divine presence and human beatitude, we see how persistent Ficino has
been in following up his original insight. The Platonic Theology begins
and ends with this theme - man's desire for something beyond the
limits of his life on this earth taken as evidence that fulfillment awaits
him in a life which breaks through these limits. Between the two de-
velopments of the theme, Ficino establishes a necessary connection be-
tween the desire and its fulfillment by showing that the desire springs
from human nature itself and is implicit in all those acts, acts of know-
ing and acts of will, which manifest the nature of man. This justification
rests on an analysis of being, first as a principle of reality and second as
the proper object of human knowledge and desire.
Ficino's metaphysics is founded on the concept of causation or effica-
cy. This is what the word 'act' means. But causation is not merely one
event following another according to a regular pattern. To be a cause
is to be the power in virtue of which something stands in reality. The
cause explains the effect, it answers the question 'Why?', because the
effect takes its being out of the cause. Thus, causation involves influ-
ence, a flowing of originating power into the effect, a coming forth of
the effect from the depths of that power. This is why causation, being
and presence are so intimately and inevitably linked in Ficino's thought.
Nothing can get closer to a thing than its own reality; nothing is more
intimate than being. Hence, the power which is the source of being
enters the innermost regions of its effect. The more complete the de-
pendence of the effect on its cause, the more intimate and pervasive is
the presence of the efficacious power in and throughout the effect.
Although we may come to understand causation first as the relation
between one thing and another, causation as Ficino understands it is
derived from the efficacy which is being itself. To cause is to put a
thing into being and thus to touch its innermost reality. Being is the
originating power by which a thing holds itself in reality and by which
it gives reality to another. 'Act' at first means to produce something, to
impose influence, to put into being. But more fundamentally it means
the power to be. This is the significance of the principle that being is act
and that absolute being is absolute perfection in itself and absolute
power in relation to possible effects.
In the service of this concept of causation, Thomistic metaphysics
finds a most suitable place. Indeed, it is difficult to determine whether
Ficino adopted Aquinas' thought because it was most appropriate to
his own basic metaphysical principle or learned the principle itselffrom
PHILOSOPHY SEEKS WHAT RELIGION WORSHIPS 107
his reading of Aquinas. Aquinas understands being in the context of

creation. To create is to produce a thing from nothing. This means
that the agent is so completely the cause of the effect that nothing in
the effect falls beyond its influence. Creation is perfection in the order
of causing. The intrinsic principle by which a thing stands forth out of
nothing is the act of being, an efficacious power belonging to the thing
itself. Out of this power or act, all that the thing is exists. Therefore, to
create is to cause the effect in its being or to give to it that innermost
power which permeates all that it is and puts it in being. Only God can
be a creator. Only one being can be pure and absolute being or act or
efficacy, the perfection of causal power. Only one can be the originator
of a perfect productive act and an all-pervasive, intrinsic causal princi-
ple. This one is infinite; he is God.
On this basic metaphysical position stands Ficino's whole doctrine of
divine presence. Presence and union are explained in terms of being
- the presence of the soul to the body, the presence of God in all his
creatures, his special presence in the soul of man. Nothing can be more
intimate to a thing than its being; being is the power out of which its
whole self stands; being is its innermost region. Since being is the proper
effect of God, God is most intimately present to his creatures. As the
origin of their being, he pervades and surrounds them. He touches even
the actions which flow up from their own originating power.
As creator God is not only the first origin of all things, but also their
measure and ideal. Following Aquinas, Ficino distinguishes the way in
which being is possessed by God from the way in which it belongs to his
effects. A contingent thing is by nature and definition the kind of thing
which depends upon a cause. Its essence, therefore, is a receptive princi-
ple, a potency or capacity for being. The act which fulfills this capacity
must be distinct from the essence itself, since actual existence belongs to
the thing not by nature but in virtue of its relation to a cause. God,
however, originates being, and hence must possess it in virtue of him-
self alone. He does not receive being, but is being itself.
Since being as being is causal, since its proper function is to posit
perfection, accounting for whatever is rather than is not, pure being is
absolute, complete and infinite perfection. It is actually and all in one
all the perfection which can be. This is God. Other things, the things
we know, are not such. Each of them in some way is not. Its limits,
however, do not come from being, for that which it lacks is also being.
Limitation is established by the potency which can receive being only
within the confines of its limited essence.
A capacity or potency, however, is nothing at all unless it is a capaci-

ty in an actually existing thing. Being comes first after nothing; there is
no reality whatsoever without existence. Hence, all that a thing is, it is
in virtue of its being, and this is the principle which relates it to its
cause. As the first origin of being, God causes the effect in every aspect.
Even the receptive principle to which being is given and whose capaci-
ty limits being to a finite mode is produced by God in the production of
being. Ultimately, the being of creatures receives its limits from the
divine cause, who, by knowing himself, knows and produces both the
perfections and the limits of his effects. Being itself reveals what
creatures are and what they fau to be. Both the act of existing and the
essence refer to God, the first establishing the likeness, the second the
unlikeness between creatures and the creator. Thus, the fundamental
reality of things is their relation to God, and this is true not only be-
cause in him they have their origin, but also because in him they have
their ideal. The fundamental reality of things is being in a finite mode,
being determined by a limitation which is not proper to being itself.
Thus, God who is being itself, infinite and perfect, is the absolute
version of what things are imperfectly and incompletely.
Because being points to God and because being permeates all that is,
it is impossible for man to turn anywhere without turning toward God.
Being attracts the human will under the aspect of goodness or perfec-
tion. Everything we seek, we seek as a good, and goodness itself is God
who is being itself and absolute perfection. Being is present in all our
knowledge and brings to light all else. Our knowledge of different
things is a knowledge of being in different modes. In all our knowing,
being is the light which reveals everything else. All that a thing is has
reality from its act of being; so all that we know about it has intelligibi-
lity from this act. But behind even this, and shining through it, is God,
who is being itself continuously and efficaciously present in and through
the being of creatures whose source he is. That aspect of things which
reveals them to the human intellect, that aspect which makes them
accessible to human knowledge is that aspect in which their whole
reality is a reference to God. The human mind is by nature directed
toward being and through this toward God.
We must distinguish, however, between direction and achievement.
A human being is a finite thing with finite powers. Since man must
receive existence from a cause, his nature is not being itself, but a
capacity for being which limits being to a finite mode. His natural
powers, therefore, cannot encompass the infinity of God. The human
mind knows God only through a finite manifestation. By this means, it

can know that God exists, arguing from the contingency of things to the
necessity of God. It can distinguish God from creatures, denying of him
the limits and imperfections proper to beings which depend upon a
cause. It can know the relation between creatures and God, knowing
God as the cause or origin of creatures. But it cannot know God as he is
in himself. It does, nevertheless, desire this knowledge, for in this alone
does it fulfill its natural inclination. Knowledge is complete only when
it grasps the object in its true identity. If man has any knowledge of
God, he expresses in that knowledge the desire to know him completely
and definitively. And all knowledge leads to God, since all knowledge
is directed toward being and being refers to God and is filled with his
presence. God is being itself and truth itself, beyond the natural limits
of the mind and yet the completion of the mind in its own line, for God
is intelligibihty par excellence, so perfectly knowable that he can join
with the mind through direct and substantial union.
The inclination and inadequacy of human nature are brought to-
gether in desire. Desire is that ambiguous situation in which the object
is both present and absent. The desire implies some sense of the object,
for we cannot want something if we are totally unaware of it. Yet this
sense of the object does not yield possession and satisfaction, but rather
reveals that something is missing. Thus, desire reveals the object only
enough to create dissatisfaction with the present state of affairs. Man is
by nature one who knows God, for all his knowledge is a knowledge of
being and this is implicitly a knowledge of God. But this knowledge is
only enough to reveal that there is more. Thus, man is by nature one
who seeks God, but cannot find him.
It is no wonder, then, that man is frustrated, unhappy, and dissatis-
fied with his lot. His very nature thrusts him far beyond the human.
His desire for God is intense and unavoidable; it is a necessity of nature.
Yet he cannot by his own power achieve the object, since the object is
beyond his nature. But natural desire cannot be frustrated without
involving the creator in contradiction and absurdity. Therefore, Ficino,
following Aquinas, concludes that man is destined for a perfect union
with God in which God will carry the human soul beyond its limi-
tations revealing himself not through an image or representation, but
through direct presence. Thus, man's dissatisfaction with his present
condition and his desire for a more perfect contemplation manifests his
immortality and justifies the claim that philosophy cannot be separated
from religion. All human knowledge is a search for God and hence is
necessarily related to the worship of its object.
But if Ficino is to complete his project, he must provide not only

evidence for a conclusion, but also a guide to the object which the con-
clusion asserts. Since man cannot comprehend the object he seeks, there
must be some other guiding principle which keeps him to the right
direction in spite of his blindness. At this point, Ficino, following Plo-
tinus, introduces the love theme. A love or longing for God leads man
to his goal without comprehension to guide him, for man's love tran-
scends the limits of his knowledge. Ficino interprets this in Thomistic
terms. The love which carries man beyond the limits of his knowledge
is that same natural desire which gives evidence of his immortality and
makes philosophy inseparable from religion.
Since natural desire is directed toward being, man moves toward
God by seeking to understand all things in the light of being. This
understanding begins with a reflection on the universal and evaluative
character of our knowledge, a character which reveals that we know
not only things themselves, but also the norm in relation to which the
many share in one exemplar and are measured in value. The measure
according to which a thing can be so judged is the dIvine idea which
governs its production as a certain finite approximation of being itself.
Ficino concludes, therefore, that there are in the human mind innate
representations of the divine ideas. These representations inform the
mind in such a way as to make its knowledge an act revealing the
relation between God and creatures.
Just as the divine being has a certain priority over the divine ideas,
so knowledge in the common light of being surpasses knowledge in the
light of various norms and principles. The divine being is the one ratio
or intention which governs the creation of all the diverse things of the
universe. Hence, our knowledge reaches the peak of its natural capacity
when it knows and judges all things according to that one norm which
include:. all others in its all-encompassing unity.
Man makes his way to God under the impetus and guidance of a
blinded love springing from the depths of his being. This is the vision
which dominates the Platonic Theology. This is the vision which fulfills
the purpose outlined in the preface. The doctrine of being which Ficino
develops under the influence of Thomistic theology gives to this vision
a philosophical justification for assuming that the desire will be fulfilled.
Knowledge is directed toward being and being refers to God as its ori-
gin and measure. Implicit in every act of human knowledge is the desire
for God, for he alone can complete its natural inclination. Thus, man's
proper activity reveals a desire for God which belongs to the very
PHILOSOPHY SEEKS WHAT RELIGION WORSHIPS I II
nature of man. Man is defined as the desire to transcend himself. This

is the reason why it is absurd to think that the desire could be frus-
trated.
Important as this justification is, however, Ficino's vision remains
Platonic. Ficino claims that love or desire guides man to God even
though the human mind cannot comprehend the object it seeks. This
aspect of his position he does not take from Aquinas. It is inspired by
neo-Platonism. And it is the central issue for the purpose proposed in
the preface of the Platonic Theology. Aquinas points to the desire for an
adequate knowledge of God as evidence for a conclusion - that man is
destined to know God as he is in himself. Ficino presents the desire not
just as evidence for a conclusion, but as a light which shows us the way
to the divinity we do not comprehend. Man can find God if he but
know himself. His own desire to transcend himself reveals his own im-
mortality and the way to God for whom he is destined. Thus, Ficino
writes a work of Platonic theology on the immortality of the soul. Hid-
den away in every man's search for truth and goodness is the desire for
God. All intellectual endeavors are at bottom attempts to find God, no
matter what the more explicit object may be. He who would separate
philosophy from holy religion separates the pursuit of wisdom from the
honor and reverence of it, for philosophy seeks what religion worships.
Thus, Thomistic metaphysics serves the purpose of the Platonic The-
ology by giving a metaphysical foundation to the neo-Platonic vision
which dominates it. But Fieino tries to give not only a philosophical
justification for the claim that philosophy cannot be separate from re-
ligion or out of harmony with theology, but also a practical example of
the unity of philosophy and theology. His own work is an attempt to
show that Platonic philosophy and Thomistic theology are congruent
in their grasp of basic truths about God's relation to the world. Ac-
cording to Aquinas, all creatures have in their basic constitution two
principles - essence, a receptive potency, and being, the act of this
potency. This composite character marks things as dependent on God
for their reality. Ficino relates to this the Platonic claims that all things
under the first principle are composites of the infinite and the limit, of
matter and form, of possible and actual being. In Platonic philosophy
itself, these compositions do not have exactly the same meaning and
none ofthe three signifies the relationship between essence and being as
it is explained by Aquinas. But when Fieino juxtaposes them and points
to their harmony, he suppresses the differences and points only to what
they have in common.
He follows a similar procedure when he presents Platonic and Tho-

mistic accounts of the beatific union between man and God. In the
Platonic account, he describes this union as a union with the one and
the good above being. This is contrasted to our ordinary knowledge
which has as its object the second god, the first being (ens). Being (esse)
properly means the act of being which is limited to a certain mode by
the finite capacity of the essence to which it belongs. In the Thomistic
account, beatific union is described as a union with being itself and
truth itself; it is contrasted to our ordinary knowledge of beings and
true things. Being (esse) properly means the act of existing, which ac-
cording to itself is infinite in perfection and power, and can only be
limited by something other than being, i.e. potency. It is obvious that
these two accounts are not exactly the same. Ficino himself mentions
this. He does not accept two gods, a first being who is different from
and subordinate to the one and the good above being. He introduces
the Thomistic account as a more direct route to the truth leaving
behind the ambiguities of the philosophers. What he does not say, but
must have known, is that his interpretation of the Platonic position on
the divine names is more Thomistic than Platonic. The Platonists do
not relate essence and being in such a way as to make essence the
limiting principle. What Ficino shows by juxtaposing the Platonic and
Thomistic accounts is that both Platonic philosophy and Thomistic
theology distinguish between knowing the divine in a finite light, i.e.
the common light of being, and knowing the origin of the light by a
mystical union with the First.
Ficino also presents two views of the world in terms of efficacious
power, one influenced by Proclus with its emphasis on unity, and one
influenced by Aquinas with its emphasis on being. But Ficino makes no
attempt to show that these are fundamentally the same. He moves
through the hierarchy of the universe in virtue of the dependence which
each level has on the higher one for unity and the power to act. On the
highest level he identifies unity and efficacious power. But the efficacy
of the First Unity, Truth, and Goodness is teleological; it moves as an
end. Following this comes a discussion of primary and secondary cau-
sality in which dependence in action rests on dependence in being, and
the primary cause is the originating cause of being and through this of
action. Ficino relates these two discussions implicitly by juxtaposing
arguments for divine omnipotence identifying unity in one and being
in another with absolute efficacious power.
It is difficult to determine how much Ficino wishes to claim when he
points to the likeness between Platonism and Thomism. He has on

occasion called attention to their differences and expressed his prefer-
ence for the theological explanation. The most plausible view is that he
intends to bring out the fundamental insights which Platonism shares
with Christian theology, but recognizes that Platonism grasps these
truths only vaguely and implicitly. In this way, he shows that philoso-
phy follows the same direction as Christian theology, and Christian
theology is explicitly joined to religion.
In all his searching after knowledge, man pursues perfect union with
all-perfect being, a pursuit guided by a love relentlessly drawing him
on beyond the limits of his comprehension. Thus, the pursuit of wisdom
is the search for God; philosophy cannot be philosophy without seeking
him who is the object of religious veneration. Being is the object of
secular knowledge; but being is holy since God dwells within it. The
secular is sacred.
APPENDIX
This appendix places texts from Ficino's Theologia Platonica in juxta-

position with those texts from Aquinas' Summa Contra Gentiles to which
they show a marked similarity. The purpose of the collection is to show
the specific areas in which the Thomistic influence on Ficino is oper-
ative, thus providing a foundation for the analysis of this influence
presented in the main body of the book. Only those texts relevant to
this book are included.
The texts are arranged according to the order in which they appear
in the Theologia Platonica and each has been given a number for easy
reference. Since all the Ficinian texts do not show the same degree of
dependence on Aquinas, some of these numbers are accompanied by a
single or double asterik (*). A number without an asterisk indicates
that the texts are alike even in their word structure leaving little or no
doubt that Ficino has taken his thought from the Summa Contra Gentiles.
A single asterisk (*) indicates a close similarity in thought content, e.g.
in the structure of an argument, without the similarity in literal struc-
ture which indicates almost verbatim copying. Although this similarity
in thought content is good evidence that the Thomistic influence is
present, it does not show with equal force that the source of that influ-
ence is the particular text we have presented. Ficino may have taken
Aquinas' thought from another text, or indirectly from the general
discussion of Thomistic theology to which he had access. A number
accompanied by a double asterisk (**) indicates that the similarity
between the Ficinian and Thomistic texts is not marked enough to
justify any conclusion about the presence of Thomistic influence. These
texts have been included primarily to show the consistency between
Ficino and Aquinas on certain questions which are important for a
comparative study of their thought.
The texts included in this appendix are taken from the editions in use
APPENDIX: TEXTS FOR COMPARISON 1I5
throughout the work and follow the spelling and punctuation of these
editions. Changes have been made only in the case of obvious mis-
prints. All citations of the Theologia Platonica refer first to the Paris
( 1964, 1970) edition which is the only corrected edition of this work.
The citations also include references to volume one of the Basel (1561)
edition of Ficino's works. These references are preceded by the initial
'B'. Citations of the Theologia Platonica are abbreviated thus: TP, I, 2,
v. I, p. 42, (B p. 80) referring to the Theologia Platonica, Book I, Chapter
2, in the Paris edition volume I, page 42, in the Basel edition page 80.
Citations of Thomas Aquinas' Summa Contra Gentiles refer to the Marietti
(1961) edition. The paragraph numbers from the English translation of
this work (New York: Doubleday, 1955-1957) are placed in parenthe-
ses following the citation. Citations of the Summa Contra Gentiles are
abbreviated thus: CG, I, 43, # 357, (6) referring to the Summa Contra
Gentiles, Book I, Chapter 43, in the Marietti edition paragraph number
357, in the English translation paragraph number 6.
116 APPENDIX: TEXTS FOR COMPARISON
**1. Marsilio Ficino, TP, I, 2, v. I, p. 42, (B p. 80).

Quod hinc etiam intueri licet quod sicut primum in natura, qui
Deus est, agit in omnia, nihil patitur, ita ultimum, quod est
materia corporalis, pati oportet ab omnibus, agere vero per se
in aliud minime, cum nihil sit infra ipsam, quod ab ipsa patia-
tur. Ac si in summa infinitaque unitate infinita est agendi virtus,
in multitudine infinita nulla est virtus agendi, sed infinita pa-
tiendi natura.
**2. Ficino, TP, II, 4, v. I, p. 82, (B p. 96).

Actus natura sua terminum non includit. Nam subiici termino
passio est, quae actui est opposita. Actus ergo non patitur ter-
minum, nisi quantum subiecto cuidam, ubi aliquid passivae
potentiae est, innititur. Actus vero divinus in seipso subsistit.
3. Ficino, TP, II, 4, v. I, p. 83, (B p. 96).

Esse ipsum prout absolute consideratur est immensum, quia et
infinitis rebus et innumerabilibus modis communicari potest et
cogitari. Igitur si alicuius esse sit finitum, oportet illud esse finiri,
vel per ipsius causam, vel [per] subiectum. Neutrum contingit
Deo. In ipso autem infinito esse ita est infinita virtus, sicut in
esse finito, finita.

Omne [autem] agens tanto estvalidius quanta remotioremab actu
potentiam patiendi producit in actum; maiore siquidem virtute
opus est ad aquam calefaciendam quam ad aerem. Sed illud
quod omnino non est infinite dis tat ab actu, nee ullam ad esse
ipsius actum suscipiendum habet potentiam, de quo planius in
sequentibus disseremus.
APPENDIX: TEXTS FOR COMPARISON 117
Thomas Aquinas, CG, I, 43, # 357, (6).
Quae quidem spiritualis magnitudo quantum ad duo attenditur: scili-
cet quantum ad potentiam; et quantum ad propriae naturae bonita-
tern sive completionem. Dicitur enim aliquid magis vel minus album
secundum modum quo in eo sua albedo completur. Pensatur etiam
magnitudo virtutis ex magnitudine actionis vel factorum. Harum au-
tern magnitudinem una aliam consequitur: nam ex hoc ipso quo ali-
quid actu est, activum est; secundum igitur modum quo in actu suo
completur, est modus magnitudinis suae virtutis. Et sic relinquitur res
spirituales magnas dici secundum modum suae completionis: nam et
Augustinus dicit quod "in his quae non mole magna sunt," idem "est
esse maius quod melius."
Aquinas, CG, I, 43, # 360, (5).

Omnis actus alteri inhaerens terminationem recipit ex eo in quo est:
quia quod est in altero, est in eo per modum recipientis. Actus igitur
in nullo existens nullo terminatur: puta, si albedo esset per se existens,
perfectio albedinis in ea non terminaretur, quominus haberet quicquid
de perfectione albedinis haberi potest. Deus autem est actus nullo modo
in alio existens: quia nec est forma in materia, ut probatum est; nec
esse suum inhaeret alicui formae vel naturae, cum ipse sit suum esse,
ut supra ostensum est. Relinquitur igitur ipsum esse infinitum.
Aquinas, CG, I, 43, # 363, (8).

Ipsum esse absolute consideratum infinitum est: nam ab infinitis et in-
finitis modis participari possibile est. Si igitur alicuius esse sit finitum,
oportet quod limitetur esse illud per aliquid aliud quod sit aliqualiter
causa illius esse. Sed esse divini non potest esse aliqua causa: quia ipse
est necesse per seipsum. Igitur esse suum est infinitum, et ipse infinitus.
Aquinas, CG, 1,43, # 368, (13-14).

a) Haec autem ratio est secundum ponentes aeternitatem mundi.
Qua non posita, adhuc magis confirmatur opinio de infinitate divinae
virtutis. Nam unumquodque agens tanto est virtuosius in agendo quan-
to potentiam magis remotam ab actu in actum reducit: sicut maiori
virtute opus est ad calefaciendum aquam quam aerem. Sed id quod
omnino non est, infinite distat ab actu, nec est aliquo modo in potentia.
Igitur, si mundus factus est postquam omnino prius non erat, oportet
factoris virtutem esse infinitam.
Sive igitur Deus aliquid creat nuper ex nihilo, sive continue

materiam primam corporum atque essentiam mentium animo-
rumque ex nullo antiquiore subiecto edit et servat, semper ab
actu primo, id est divino, pendentem, proculdubio immensam
possidet agendi virtutem.
*5. Ficino, TP, II, 7, v. I, p. 92, (B p. 100).

Praeterea, quoniam Deus non miscetur alieui, nullius proprius
dux, sed communis existit. Si est communis, commune sibi com-
petit munus. Esse ipsum rebus omnibus est commune. Esse igi-
tur ubicumque sit, pendet ex Deo.
*6. Ficino, TP, II, 7, v. I, pp. 92-93, (B p. 100).

Insuper inferiora mundi corpora de non esse migrant in esse, et
de esse transeunt in non esse. Superiora de alio esse mutantur in
aliud, seu de alio essendi modo mutantur in alium. Propterea
haec omnia aeque se habent per naturam suam ad esse atque
non esse. Si nihil aliud sit super huiusmodi corpora, vel non
accepissent esse umquam, vel si quando accepissent, iamdudum
esse omnia desivissent. Non accepissent, quoniam si aeque se
habent per naturam suam ad esse atque non esse, sepisa ad esse
nequaquam determinant. lam pridem desivissent, quia cum
b) Haec autem ratio, etiam secundum eos qui ponunt aeternitatem
mundi, valet ad probandum infinitatem divinae virtutis. Confitentur
enim Deum esse causam mundanae substantiae, quamvis earn sempi-
ternam arbitrentur, dicentes hoc modo Deum aeternum sempiterni
mundi causam existere sicut pes ab aeterno fuisset causa vestigii si ab
aeterno fuisset impressus in pulvere. Hac autem positione facta, secun-
dum rationem praedictam nihilominus sequitur Dei virtu tern esse infi-
nitam. Nam sive ex tempore, secundum nos, sive ab aeterno, secundum
eos, produxerit, nihil esse potest in re quod ipse non produxerit: cum
sit universale essendi principium. Et sic, nulla praesupposita materia
vel potentia, produxit. Oportet autem proportionem virtu tis activae
accipere secundum proportionem potentiae passivae: nam, quanto po-
tentia passiva maior praeexistit vel praeintelligitur, tanto maiori virtu-
te activa in actum completur. Relinquitur igitur, cum virtus finita
producat aliquem effectum praesupposita potentia materiae, quod Dei
virtus, quae nullam potentiam praesupponit, non sit finita, sed infinita:
et ita essentia infinita.
Aquinas, CG, II, 15, #9 2 5, (4).

Secundum ordinem effectuum oportet esse ordinem causarum: eo quod
effectus causis suis proportionati sunt. Unde oportet quod, sicut effec-
tus proprii reducuntur in causas proprias, ita id quod commune est in
effectibus propriis, reducatur in aliquam causam communem: sicut
supra particulares causas generationis huius vel illius est sol universalis
causa generationis; et rex est universalis causa regiminis in regno, su-
pra praepositos regni et etiam urbium singularium. Omnibus autem
commune est esse. Oportet igitur quod supra omnes causas sit aliqua
causa cuius sit dare esse. Prima autem causa Deus est, ut supra osten-
sum est. Oportet igitur omnia quae sunt a Deo esse.
Aquinas, CG, II, 15, #927, (6).

Omne quod est possibiIe esse et non esse, habet causam aliquam: quia
in se consideratum ad utrumlibet se habet; et sic oportet esse aliquod
aliud quod ipsum ad unum determinet. Unde, cum in infinitum proce-
di non possit, oportet quod sit aliquid necessarium quod sit causa om-
nium possibiIium esse et non esse. Necessarium autem quoddam est
habens causam suae necessitatis: in quo etiam in infinitum procedi non
potest; et sic est devenire ad aliquid quod est per se 'necesse-esse'.
Hoc autem non potest esse nisi unum, ut in primo libro ostensum est.
Et hoc est Deus. Oportet igitur omne aliud ab ipso reduci in ips urn
sicut in causam essendi.
flu ant natura sua, si non ab alio stabiliore detinerentur, iamdu-

dum in nihilum defluxissent. Praeest ergo mobilibus mundi cor-
poribus substantia incorporalis et stabilis. Haec si aeque se habet
ad esse atque non esse, ut corpora, rursus indiget alio terminan-
teo Tandem [ergo] una quaedam substantia sit oportet, quae sit
necessario per seipsam, ret] haec simplex erit omnino. Quippe
si componeretur ex partibus, non per se esset quidem, sed per
partium conspirationem atque per illum qui diversas inter se
partes conciliavisset. Immo aeque dissolutioni partium subiecta
foret ac fuit subiecta connexioni, ideoque non esset ex necessita-
te, cum per dissolutionem posset etiam quandoque non esse.
Talis est utique Deus, substantia simplex, necessario per se sub-
sistens.
**7. Ficino, TP, II, 7, v. I, p. 93, (B pp. 100-101).

Si summa essendi necessitas Deus est, et quod est summum in
quolibet genere unum est dumtaxat, nulla res praeter Deum erit
talis essendi necessitas. Nempe si talem quoque esse vis angelum,
ita ut duae sint sum mae necessitates, Deus et angelus, dec1arare
cogeris qua in re angelus differt a Deo. Non enim in ipsa essendi
necessitate, nam in hac unum abs te ponuntur esse. Igitur erit
aliquid aliud praeter ipsam necessitatem in angelo, per quod a
Deo differre queat. Quapropter non erit angelus summa neces-
sitas, quando est non necessitas pura et sola, sed mixta. Quic-
quid autem est in aliquo genere summum puram debet habere
generis illius naturam, rebus aliis non immixtam, ne minuatur
per mixtionem.
Cogeris etiamrespondere, unde habeat angelusillam necessitati
additam proprietatem. Utrum a sui ipsius necessitate an aliun-
de? Si primum detur, eamdem proprietatem habebit Deus a
simi Ii sui ipsius necessitate provenientem. Ergo per illam a Deo
angelus non distinguitur. Si concedatur aiterum, sequitur ut
aliunde propria angeli ipsius natura nascatur quam ab angelo,
quia proprietatem per quam distinguitur extrinsecus adipisci-
tur. Quod [autem] aliunde pendet, non est necessario per seip-
sum. Non est igitur angelus aut aliud quodvis essendi necessitas,
sed solus Deus. Si nihil aliud praeter Deum existit necessario per
seipsum, a Deo cuncta accipiunt esse.
APPENDIX; TEXTS FOR COMPARISON 121
Aquinas, CG, I, 42, # 342-343, (8-g).

Si sunt duo quorum utrumque est 'necesse-esse', oportet quod conve-
niant in intentione necessitatis essendi. Oportet igitur quod distinguan-
tur per aliquid quod additur uni tantum, vel utrique. Et sic oportet vel
alterum vel utrumque esse compositum. Nullum autem compositum
est 'necesse-esse', per seipsum, sicut supra ostensum est. Impossibile est
igitur esse plura quorum utrumque sit 'necesse-esse'. Et sic nec plures
deos.
Illud in quo differunt, ex quo ponuntur convenire in necessitate es-

sendi, aut requiritur ad complementum necessitatis essendi aliquo mo-
do, aut non. Si non requiritur, ergo est aliquid accidentale; quia omne
quod advenit rei nihil faciens ad esse ipsius, est accidens. Ergo hoc ac-
cidens habet causam.
a) Aut ergo essentiam eius quod est 'necesse-esse', aut aliquid aliud.
Si essentiam eius, cum ipsa necessitas essendi sit essentia eius, ut ex
supra dictis patet, necessitas essendi erit causa illius accidentis. Sed ne-
cessitas essendi invenitur in utroque. Ergo utrumque habebit illud ac-
cidens. Et sic non distinguentur secundum illud.
b) Si autem causa illius accidentis sit aliquid aliud, nisi ergo illud
aliud esset, hoc accidens non esset. Et nisi hoc accidens esset, distinctio
praedicta non esset. Ergo, nisi esset illud aliud, ista duo quae ponuntur

Sicuti se habet ars ad naturam, sic et natura ad Deum. Artium
opera eatenus permanent incorrupta, quatenus vi naturae ser-
vantur ut statu a constat diu per naturalem lapidis aut aeris
soliditatem. Similiter naturalia quaeque eatenus manent, qua-
tenus Dei servantur influxu. Et sicut natura operibus suis infert
motum, sic Deus naturae praestat esse. Tamdiu opera naturae
moventur, quamdiu natura movet. Tamdiu igitur existit natura,
quamdiu Deus servat earn in existendo.
9. Ficino, TP, II, 7, v. I, pp. 94-95, (B p. 101).

Praeterea, universum hoc opus Dei, vel fuit semper, vel aliquan-
do incepit esse. Si fuit semper, primum momentum assignari
non potest in quo prae caeteris esse a Deo acceperit. Ergo aut in
nullo accepit, quod est falsum, aut quolibet momenta accipit
inde, hoc autem nihil aliud est quam ab eo continue conservari.
Si vero esse incepit aliquando, multo magis Deo eget tamquam
conservatore, siquidem egeret etiam si poneretur aeternum.
Omnino autem quod alicui secundum naturam suam convenit,
prius convenit quam quod advenit aliunde. Sed operi secundum
se [quidem] convenit non esse, postquam non accedente causa
non fuisset. Per causam vero convenit esse. Prius igitur illi ut non
sit convenit, quam ut sit. Quapropter prius illi competit ut a
causa servetur, quam ut a seipso. Et quia quod naturale est
numquam amittitur, semper tale est, ut submota causae virtute
non perseveret in esse, postquam tale fuit ab initio naturaliter,
ut non prodiret in esse seorsum a causae actione. Causam vero
proprie Deum vocamus, qui solus rem quamlibet efficit totam,
neque cogitur aut alterius auxilio indigere, aut aliunde mate-
riam mutuari, sed cogitur res quaelibet inde tota pendere sem-
per, ut a corpore umbra. Quippe quando causa effectum efficit
ipsa totum atque effectus, si ad substantiam causae comparetur,
imaginarium quiddam est et vanum potius quam substantiale,
tunc sane effectus tamquam per se vanus continuo causae subsi-
dio indiget, et causa quae fecit totum, conservat totum. Mundus
autem si comparetur ad Deum, finitus videlicet ad infinitum,
APPENDIX: TEXTS FOR COMPARISON 12 3
'necesse-esse', non essent duo sed unum. Ergo esse proprium utriusque
est dependens ab altero. Et sic neutrum est 'necesse-esse' per seip-
sum.
Aquinas, CG, III, 65, # 2402, (6).

Sicut opus artis praesupponit opus naturae, ita opus naturae praesup-
ponit opus Dei creantis: nam materia artificialium est a natura, natu-
ralium vero per creationem a Deo. Artificialia autem conservantur in
esse virtute naturalium: sicut domus per soliditatem lapidum. Omnia
igitur naturalia non conservantur in esse nisi virtute Dei.
Aquinas, CG, III, 65, # 2404, (8).

Circa rerum originem duplex est positio: una Fidei, quod res de novo
fuerint a Deo productae in esse; et positio quorundam Philosophorum,
quod res a Deo ab aeterno effluxerint. Secundum autem utramque
positionem oportet dicere quod res conserventur in esse a Deo. Nam si
res a Deo productae sunt in esse postquam non fuerant, oportet quod
esse rerum divinam voluntatem consequatur, et similiter non esse: quia
permisit res non esse quando voluit, et fecit res esse cum voluit. Tandiu
igitur sunt quandiu eas esse vult. Sua igitur voluntas conservatrix est
rerum. - Si autem res ab aeterno a Deo effluxerunt, non est dare tem-
pus aut instans in quo primo a Deo effluxerint. Aut igitur nunquam a
Deo productae sunt: aut semper a Deo esse earum procedit quandiu
sunt. Sua igitur operatione res in esse conservat.
APPENDIX: TEXTS FOR COMPARISON
vanior est magisque umbratilis quam si finiti corporis umbra

finita comparetur ad corpus.
Denique summa causa rerum sic rebus penitus dominatur, si
res non semel modo ab illa manaverint, sed et assidue pendeant,
sicut imagines a corporibus fiunt ac servantur in speculo.
**10. Ficino, TP, II, 7, v. I, p. 95, (B p. 101).

Quoniam [ergo] Deus agit servatque omnia, ideo in omnibus
operatur, id est causae rerum sequentes Deum nihil agunt abs-
que virtute actioneque divina. Si Deus angelo esse actumque
largitur et servat, largitur etiam agendi virtutem, largitur et
actionem atque conservat. Ita quicquid angelus naturaliter
operatur, Dei operatur virtute, tamquam instrumentum virtute
agit opificis.
Ergo Deus agit non angelum solum, verumetiam ipsum angeli

opus, et multo magis quam angelus opus efficit angeli, cum ipse
sit prima actionis origo. Si opus hoc quod est factum ab angelo,
agitet ipsum aliquid, per eamdem agit Dei virtutem, per quam
et ipsum factum fuit ab angelo. Quamobrem Dei virtute fit,
quicquid ubique fit, a quocumque fiat, praesertim cum omnia
quae aliquid agunt, esse quodammodo suo operi praebeant.
I I. Ficino, TP, II, 7, v. I, pp. 95-96, (B pp. 101-102).

Quamobrem Dei virtute fit, quicquid ubique fit, a quocumque
fiat, praesertim cum omnia quae aliquid agunt, esse quodam-
modo suo operi praebeant. Esse, inquam, hoc aut illud, tale vel
tale. Ita cuncta quae sub Deo sunt agentia, ad unum commu-
nem scilicet essendi concurrunt effectum. Agentia vero plurima
et diversa in unum opus, quod est esse, non conspirant, nisi
quia ipsa sunt unum. Neque unum sunt, nisi quia sub uno sunt
atque ad unum. Unius itaque Dei agentis primi virtute agentia
reliqua operantur.
Aquinas, CG, III, 67, # 24 1 7, (3).

Manifestum est quod omnis actio quae non potest permanere cessante
impressione alicuius agentis, est ab illo agente: sicut manifestatio colo-
rum non posset esse cess ante actione solis qua aerem illuminat, unde
non est dubium quin sol sit causa manifestationis colorum. Et similiter
patet de motu violento, qui cessat cessante violentia impellentis. Sicut
autem Deus non solum dedit esse rebus cum primo esse incoeperunt,
sed quandiu sunt, esse in eis causat, res in esse conservans, ut ostensum
est; ita non solum cum primo res conditae sunt, eis virtutes operativas
dedit, sed semper eas in rebus causat. U nde, cessante influentia divina,
omnis operatio cessaret. Omnis igitur rei operatio in ipsum reducitur
sicut in causam.
Aquinas, CG, III, 67, # 24 1 9, (5).

In omnibus causis agentibus ordinatis semper oportet quod causae se-
quentes agant in virtute causae primae: sicut in rebus naturalibus cor-
pora inferiora agunt in virtute corporum caelestium; et in rebus volun-
tariis omnes artifices inferiores operantur secundum imperium supremi
architectoris. In ordine autem causarum agentium Deus est prima cau-
sa, ut in Primo ostensum est. Ergo omnes causae inferiores agentes
agunt in virtute ipsius. Causa autem action is magis est illud cuius vir-
tute agitur quam etiam illud quod agit: sicut principale agens magis
quam instrumentum. Deus igitur principalius est causa cuiuslibet ac-
tionis quam etiam secundae causae agentes.
Aquinas, CG, III, 66, # 240 9, (3).

Quando aliqua agentia diversa sub uno agente ordinantur, necesse est
quod effectus qui ab eis communiter fit, sit eorum secundum quod
uniuntur in participando motum et virtu tern illius agentis: non enim
plura faciunt unum nisi inquantum unum sunt; sicut patet quod om-
nes qui sunt in exercitu operantur ad victoriam causandam, quam cau-
sant secundum quod sunt sub ordinatione ducis, cuius proprius effectus
victoria est. Ostensum est autem in Primo quod primum agens est
Deus. Cum igitur esse sit communis effectus omnium agentium, nam

Nonne secundum ordinem effectuum ordinem causarum dispo-
nimus? Primum omnium effectuum est esse, reliqui siquidem
effectus nihil aliud sunt quam quaedam ipsius esse determina-
tiones et proprietates. Prius enim est unumquodque secundum
naturam. Deinde est hoc aut illud, tale vel tale. Adde quod et
ultimum quod amittitur est esse. Prius enim amittitur esse tale
quam simpliciter esse. Quare esse ipsum proprius est ilIius agen-
tis effectus quod est principium finisque omnium. Atque ad id
caetera agentia si quid conducunt, primi agentis virtute condu-
cunt. Et ipsa, tamquam inferiora angustiorisque imperii nihil
agunt aliud nisi quod universalem illam Dei vim actionemque
ubique ad esse universale tendentem distinguunt passim adiu-
vante Deo, et affectiones quasdam esse ipsius inducunt potius
quam essendi naturam.
**13. Ficino, TP, II, 9, v. I, pp. 99-100, (B p. 103).

Propria igitur intelligentia Dei est, ut seipsum intelligat, prae-
sertim quia si ab externo quodam obiecto intelligentia Dei per-
ficeretur, ab eodem perficeretur essentia Dei, quae eadem est
cum ilIa, fieretque Deus ab alio. Quis dixerit divinam mentem
externa sequi ut intelligat, cum externa divinam mentem sequi
cogantur ut sint? Quis proprium divinae mentis obiectum po-
suerit extra Deum, cum nulla virtus obiectum suum excedere
valeat, Deus autem excedat omnia in immensum?
*14. Ficino, TP, II, 9, v. I, pp. 100-101, (B pp. 103-104).

Ergo minimas res omnes Deus intelligit, eo maxime quod quis-
quis rerum minimarum causas omnes cognoscit res intelligit
minimas. Deus autem nullas ignorat, cognoscit quippe seipsum.
omne agens facit esse actu; oportet quod hunc effectum producunt
inquantum ordinantur sub primo agente, et agunt in virtute ipsius.
Aquinas, CG, III, 67, # 2415, (I).

Ex hoc autem apparet quod Deus causa est omnibus operantibus ut
operentur. Omne enim operans est aliquo modo causa essendi, vel se-
cundum esse substantiale, vel accidentale. Nihil autem est causa essendi
nisi inquantum agit in virtute Dei, ut ostensum est. Omne igitur
operans operatur per virtutem Dei.
Aquinas, CG, III, 66, # 2412, (6).

Secundum ordinem causarum est ordo effectuum. Prim urn autem in
omnibus effectibus est esse: nam omnia alia sunt quaedam determina-
tiones ipsius. Igitur esse est proprius effectus primi agentis, et omnia
alia agunt ipsum inquantum agunt in virtute primi agentis. Secunda
autem agentia, quae sunt quasi particulantes et determinantes actio-
nem primi agentis, agunt sicut proprios effectus alias perfectiones, quae
determinant esse.
Aquinas, CG, I, 48, #410, (8).

Operatio intellectualis speciem et nobilitatem habet secundum id quod
est per se et primo intellectum: cum hoc sit eius obiectum. Si igitur
Deus aliud a se intelligeret quasi per se et primo intellectum, eius ope-
ratio intellectualis speciem et nobilitatem haberet secundum id quod
est aliud ab ipso. Hoc autem est impossibile: cum sua operatio sit eius
essentia, ut ostensum est. Sic igitur impossibile est quod intellectum a
Deo primo et per se sit aliud ab ipso.
Aquinas, CG, I, 50, #419, (2).

Ad huius autem ostensionem, Deum esse causam omnis entis suppona-
tur: quod et ex supra dictis aliquatenus patet, et infra plenius ostende-
tur. Sic igitur nihil in aliqua re esse potest quod non sit ab eo causa tum
Ipse est omnium causa. Ergo primam et summam causarum et

rerum omnium causam noscens, noscit omnes.
Noscit, inquam, distincte atque clarissime. Nam dum se videt,
qui angeli causa est, videt clarissime angelum. Dum angelum
intuetur, per eum si opUS sit, illius opera ut per causam prop-
riam intuetur; per illa rursus opera illorum planissime. Ita re-
rum infirmarum tenet causam summam, causas medias atque
proximas, ideoque illas clare dinoscit. Quamquam non opus est
ut extra se Deus in causis sequentibus ultimos intueatur eifectus,
cum ipse sit prima ips ius esse origo; et causa essendi sequentibus
omnibus. Idcirco dum se inspicit, totum esse rerum quarumlibet
inspicit. Totum, inquam, esse plane atque distincte.
*15. Ficino, TP, II, 9, v. I, p. 101, (B p. 104).

Adde quod virtus superior debet nosse quicquid inferior [novit],
et aliquid ultra; quod in animis nostris apparet. Quae enim
singuli quinque sensus accipiunt singulatim, phantasia summa-
tim discernit, et aliquid excellentius; quod phantasia videt in
pluribus imaginibus, intellectus in una videt et clarius; videt
singula quae et phantasia, videt insuper rerum rationes univer-
sales quas illa nescit. Ita Deus unica virtute cognoscit quicquid
nos tribus, id est sensibus, phantasia et intellectu cognoscimus.
Ergo et universalia intuetur et singula.
** 16. Ficino, TP, II, 9, v. I, p. 101, (B p. 104).

Intuetur, inquam, omnes essendi modos, qui originem videt
essendi et totam comprehend it ipsius esse naturam. [Quod] si
ita est, inspicit utique singula, quae per varios essendi modos
invicem distinguuntur.

Si Deus potentiam suam perfecte cognoscit, novit distincte om-
nia ad quae potentiam habet. Nam potentiae quantitas secun-
dum eorum quae potest quantitatem consideratur. Virtus au-
tern Dei, cum sit infinita, ad innumerabilia se extendit. Innu-
merabilia igitur Deus cognoscit.
vel mediate vel immediate. Cognita autem causa, cognoscitur eius ef-
fectus. Quicquid igitur est in quacumque re potest cognosci cognito
Deo et omnibus causis mediis quae sunt inter Deum et res. Sed Deus
seipsum cognoscit et omnes causas medias quae sunt inter ipsum et rem
quamlibet. Quod enim seipsum perfecte cognoscat, iam ostensum est.
Seipso autem cognito, cognoscit quod ab ipso immediate est. Quo cog-
nito, cognoscit iterum quod ab illo immediate est: et sic de omnibus
causis mediis usque ad ultimum effectum. Ergo Deus cognoscit quic-
quid est in reo Hoc autem est habere propriam et completam cognitio-
nem de re, cognoscere scilicet omnia quae in re sunt, communia et
propria. Deus ergo propriam de rebus cognitionem habet, secundum
quod sunt ab invicem distinctae.
Aquinas, Ge, I, 65, # 534, (6).

In omnibus virtutibus ordinatis hoc communiter invenitur quod virtus
superior ad plura se extendit et tamen est unica, virtus vero inferior se
extendit ad pauciora, et multiplicatur tamen respectu illorum: sicut
patet in imaginatione et sensu; nam una vis imaginationis se extendit
ad omnia quae quinque vires sensuum cognoscunt et ad plura. Sed vis
cognoscitiva in Deo est superior quam in homine. Quicquid ergo homo
diversis viribus cognoscit, intellectu scilicet, imaginatione et sensu, hoc
Deus uno suo simplici intellectu considerat. Est igitur singularium cog-
noscitivus, quae nos sensu et imaginatione apprehendimus.
Aquinas, Ge, I, 50, #4 2 4, (7).

Quicumque cognoscit perfecte aliquam naturam universaIem, cognos-
cit modum quo natura illa haberi potest: sicut qui cognoscit albedi-
nem, scit quod recipit magis et minus. Sed ex diverso modo essendi
constituuntur diversi gradus entium. Si igitur Deus cognoscendo se
cognoscit naturam universalem entis; non autem imperfecte, quia ab
eo omnis imperfectio longe est, ut supra probatum est: oportet quod
cognoscat omnes gradus entium. Et sic de rebus aliis a se habebit
propriam cognitionem.
Aquinas, eG, I, 69, # 577, (3).

Deus suam virtutem perfecte cognoscit, ut ex supra dictis patet. Virtus
autem non potest cognosci perfecte nisi cognoscantur omnia in quae
potest: cum secundum ea quantitas virtutis quodammodo attendatur.
Sua autem virtus, cum sit infinita, ut ostensum est supra, ad infinita se
extendit. Est igitur Deus infinitorum cognitor.
*18. Ficino, TP, II, I I, v. I, pp. 105-106, (B pp. 105-106).

Deus cum omnia faciat, si per formas huiusmodi operatur, mul-
to magis multiplex compositusque erit, quam quaevis alia causa,
sive illae formae in eo essentiales sint, sive accidentales. Oportet
tamen illum esse omnium simplicissimum. Proinde neque essen-
tiales esse possunt, nulla enim essentia usquam minus una in se
esset quam divina.
Neque rursum accidentales, nam quo pacto potest Deus cap ere
qualitates? Non aliunde, cum pati aliquid ab aliquo nequeat.
Non a seipso, quippe si a se illas accipit, quantum eas dat, vicem
gerit efficientis, quantum capit, gerit subiecti vicem. Conditio-
nem vero subiecti subire non potest agens primum purusque
actus, cui su biecta sunt omnia.
19. Fieino, TP, II, I I, v. I, p. 106, (B p. 106).

Item, substantia non dependet ab accidente, quamvis accidens
dependeat a substantia. Quod non pendet ex alio, seorsum ab
alio quandoque existere valet. Igitur potest substantia quaedam
seorsum ab accidentium conditionibus limitibusque existere.
Quicquid libertatis bonique esse potest usquam, id totum per
summi principis bonique potentiam esse potest. Quamobrem
Deus iam actu illa ipsa substantia est, quae potest esse, immo
quae est ab accidentibus libera. Conducit ad idem quod effectus
modo quodam praestantiore in superioribus causis quam in
seipsis esse reperientur, atque idcirco in causa summa modo ali-
quo praestantissimo. Cum vero effectus Dei in seipsis substantiae
sint, nullo modo in Deo tanquam accidentia esse debent. Non
tamen Hlic multae substantiae sunt. Itaque sunt iIlic una quae-
Aquinas, CG, I, 51-52, #430, (2).

Non autem haec multitudo sic intelligi potest quasi multa intellecta
habeant esse distinctum in Deo. Ista enim intellecta aut essent idem
quod essentia divina: et sic in essentia Dei poneretur aliqua multitudo,
quod supra multipliciter est remotum. Aut essent superaddita essentiae
divinae: et sic esset in Deo aliquod accidens, quod supra impossibile
esse ostendimus.
Aquinas, CG, I, 23, # 21 5, (3).

Omne quod inest alicui accidentaliter, habet causam quare insit: cum
sit praeter essentiam eius cui inest. Si igitur aliquid accidentaliter sit in
Deo, oportet quod hoc sit per aliquam causam. Aut ergo causa acciden-
tis est ipsa divina substantia, aut aliquid aliud. Si aliquid aliud, oportet
quod illud agat in divinam substantiam: nihil enim inducit aliquam
formam, vel substantialem vel accidentalem, in aliquo recipiente, nisi
aliquo modo agendo in ipsum; eo quod agere nihil aliud est quam fa-
cere aliquid actu, quod quidem est per formam. Ergo Deus patietur et
movebitur ab alio agente. Quod est contra praedeterminata.
Si autem ipsa divina substantia est causa accidentis quod sibi inest;
impossibile est autem quod sit causa illius secundum quod est recipiens
ipsum, quia sic idem secundum idem faceret seipsum in actu; ergo
oportet, si in Deo est aliquod accidens, quod secundum aliud et aliud
recipiat et causet accidens illud, sicut corporalia recipiunt propria ac-
cidentia per naturam materiae et causant per formam. Sic igitur Deus
erit compositus. Cuius contrarium superius probatum est.
Aquinas, CG, I, 23, # 21 9, (7).

Item. Substantia non dependet ab accidente: quamvis accidens depen-
de at a substantia. Quod autem non dependet ab aliquo, potest aliquan-
do inveniri sine ilIo. Ergo potest aliqua substantia inveniri sine acci-
dente. Hoc autem praecipue videtur simplicissimae substantiae con-
venire, qualis est substantia divina. Divinae igitur substantiae omnino
accidens non inest.
dam, id est ipsamet Dei substantia, quandoquidem oportet in

Deo cuncta modo quam perfectissimo inveniri, atque uniri ilIi
sibique invicem perfectissime. Nequeunt autem modo sublimio-
re in Deo esse, atque sublimius uniri tum Deo tum sibi ipsis,
quam si in Deo sint ipse Deus. Non sunt igitur in Deo rerum
formae secundum modum naturae distinctae, per quas naturali
quadam necessitate non aliter ducatur ad operandum quam
ignis ad comburendum.
*20. Ficino, TP, II, II, v. I, pp. 106-107, (B p. 106).

Natura cuiusque est una quaedam forma virtusque ad unum
quoddam opus certo modo determinata, toto suo impetu faciens
quicquid facit, et faciens necessario.
Natura siquidem ignis calida unum quoddam, caloris videlicet,

opus praecipue atque eodem semper calefacit tenore et, quan-
tum in se est, omnes caloris gradus exercet ubique. Igitur quod
uno gradu ab ea calefiat materia haec, et duobus gradibus ilIa,
non ex agentis ordinatione procedit sed ex ordine graduum qui
in praeparationibus materiarum reperiuntur. Itaque ignis toti
operi non dominatur. Non enim auctor est ordinis graduum qui
sunt in opere. Ac si calores duos generaret extra subiecta, quia
se toto ageret utrosque, essent aequales utrique; immo et nunc
in subiectis omnino similibus similes omnino aequalesque gene-
rat. Potest utique natura vel per diversa media, vel ex diversis
materiis diversa facere. Sublata vero mediorum materiarumque
diversitate, vel unicum vel simillimum operatur, neque potest,
quando adest materia, non operari. Deus autem solus materiam
primamcorporum et essentias mentium animorumque quam plu-
rimas absque medio subiectoque procreat, quae quidem inter se
longe diversae sunt, multisque perfectionis gradibus inter se dis-
cretae. MeritoDeus [autem] , quia primum agens est, usque adeo
universo ipsius operi dominatur ut ipsemet et formas et forma-
rum ordinem graduumque distinctionem efficere valeat. Nullum
vero agens effectus et pauciores et minus varios faceret quam
Aquinas, CG, II, 23, #990, (2).

Omnis enim agentis per necessitatem naturae virtus determinatur ad
unum effectum. Et inde est quod omnia naturalia semper eveniunt
eodem modo, nisi sit impedimentum: non autem voluntaria. Divina
autem virtus non ordinatur ad unum effectum tantum, ut supra osten-
sum est. Deus igitur non aglt per necessitatem naturae, sed per volun-
tatem.
Aquinas, CG, II, 22, #982, (2).

Si enim solius Dei creare est, ab ipso immediate producta esse oportet
quaecumque a sua causa produci non possunt nisi per modum creatio-
nis. Huiusmodi autem sunt omnes substantiae separatae, quae non sunt
compositae ex materia et forma, quas esse nunc supponatur; et simili-
ter omnis materia corporalis. Haec igitur, tam diversa existentia, prae-
dictae virtutis immediatus effectus sunt. Nulla autem virtus producens
immediate plures effectus non ex materia, est determinata ad unum
effectum. Dico autem "immediate": quia, si per media produceret,
posset provenire diversitas ex parte mediarum causarum. Dico etiam
"non ex materia": quia idem agens et eadem actione causat diversos
effectus secundum materiae diversitatem, sicut calor ignis, qui indurat
lutum et dissolvit ceram. Dei igitur virtus non est determinata ad unum
effectum.
Deus, immo unicum prorsus ageret Deus, si per solum merae

naturae modum operaretur, cum divina natura sit omnium
simplicissima. Non ergo naturali instinctu impellitur ad agen-
dum.
*21. Ficino, TP, II, 1I, v. I, pp. 107-108, (B p. 106).

Natura nuda bonum hoc respicit aut illud; natura intellectualis
universale bonum. Causa igitur quae per nudam agit naturam,
ita comparatur ad causam quae per naturam agit intellectua-
lem, sicut particularis causa ad universalem, et minister ad ar-
chitectum. Mundi itaque architectus per naturam intellectua-
lem, quantum intellectualis est, operatur.
**22. Ficino, TP, II, 1I, V. I, p. 108, (B pp. 106-107).

IlIa prae caeteris operatio Deo congruit per quam Deus neque
ex suo statu neque ex sua simplicitate labatur. Talis in primis est
operatio mentis. Operatio [enim] naturalis ab agente quidem
incipit, sed desinit in id quod patitur, sicut calefactio ab igne in
lignum. Intellectualis autem utrumque terminum retinet in
agente. Per hanc enim Deus dum se speculando versatur secum,
undique versat externa atque, ut Parmenides pythagoreus in-
quit, rerum orbem mobilem rotat dum se servat immobilem.
23. Fieino, TP, II, 1I, V. I, p. 108, (B p. 107).

Oportet praeterea Deum esse penitus uniformem, quia super
omnium formas existit; immo et omniformem, quia formator est
omnium. Quod uniformis simul et omniformis esse queat, sola
intelleetualis natura facit. Per hane [enim] forma Dei seipsam
intuendo se concipit tanquam propriam formarum omnium ra-
tionem. Videt enim in se quicquid est cuique proprium, dum
cernit quo gradu divinam formam quodlibet imitari queat,
quove defieere, ut ecee dum intelligit formam suam per modum
vitae, non autem cognitionis, ut ita loquar, imitabilem, concipit
formam ideamque plantarum, dum vero imitabilem per mo-
dum cognitionis quidem, sed non intelligentiae, propriam ani-
malis ideam, atque caeteras eodem pacto.
Aquinas, CG, II, 23, #998, (10).

Voluntas habet pro obiecto bonum secundum rationem boni: natura
autem non attingit ad communem boni rationem, sed ad hoc bonum
quod est sua perfectio. Cum igitur, omne agens agat secundum quod
ad bonum intendit, quia finis movet agentem; oportet quod agens per
voluntatem ad agens per necessitatem naturae comparetur sicut agens
universale ad agens particulare. Agens autem particulare se habet ad
agens universale sicut eo posterius, et sicut eius instrumentum. Ergo
oportet quod priIIJlJ.m agens sit voluntarium, et non per necessitatem
naturae agens.
Aquinas, CG, II, 23, # 993, (5).

Secundum Philosophum, in IX Metaph., duplex est actio: una quae
manet in agente et est perfectio ips ius, ut videre: alia quae transit in
exteriora et est perfectio facti, sicut comburere in igne. Divina autem
actio non potest esse de genere illarum actionum quae non sunt in
agente: cum sua actio sit sua substantia, ut supra ostensum est. Oportet
igitur quod sit de genere illarum actionum quae sunt in agente et sunt
quasi perfectio ipsius. Huiusmodi autem non sunt nisi actiones cognos-
centis et appetentis, Deus igitur cognoscendo et volendo operatur. Non
igitur per necessitatem naturae, sed per arbitrium voluntatis.
Aquinas, CG, I, 54, #45 1, (4).

Divina autem essentia in se nobilitates omnium entium comprehendit,
non quidem per modum compositionis, sed per modum perfectionis, ut
supra ostensum est. Forma autem omnis, tam propria quam communis,
secundum id quod aliquid ponit, est perfectio quaedam: non autem
imperfectionem includit nisi secundum quod deficit a vero esse. Intel-
lectus igitur divinus id quod est proprium unicuique in essentia sua
comprehendere patest, intelligenda in quo eius essentiam imitetur, et in
quo ab eius perfectione deficit unumquodque: utpote, intelligendo es-
sentiam suam ut imitabilem per modum vitae et non cognitionis, acci-
pit propriam formam plantae; si vero ut imitabilem per modum cogni-
tionis et non intellectus, propriam formam animalis; et sic de aliis. Sic
igitur patet quod essentia divina, inquantum est absolute perfecta,
*24. Ficino, TP, II, I I, v. I, pp. 108-109, (B p. 107).

[Et] Profecto in omnibus quae non casu, sed vel natura vel
proposito fiunt, necesse est effectionis finem esse effecti operis
formam.
Causa vero agens actionem ad formam non ob aliud quicquam

dirigit quam per formam in ipsa manentem. Neque ad certas
dirigit formas aliter quam vel per certas formas, vel per certas
formarum rationes in seipsa conceptas. Cum igitur mirabilis
ordo mundi casu ordinis experte cons tare non possit, necesse est
in opificis ipsius intelligentia formam esse, ad cuius similitudi-
nem sit effectus. Et quoniam Dei proposito universi ordo potis-
simus est, principalis penes illum idea est idea ordinis universi.
Ratio vero ordinis atque totius haberi non potest, nisi rationes
propriae partium omnium ex quibus totum constituitur ha-
beantur, quemadmodum architectus aedificii speciem non po-
test concipere, nisi proprias partium eius conceperit rationes.
Proprie igitur in Deo sunt omnium rationes.
**25. Ficino, TP, II, I I, v. I, p. 109, (B p. 107).

Neque aliunde rerum species habent ut distinctae sint, quam
unde habent ut sint.
potest accipi ut propria ratio singulorum. Unde per eam Deus prop~
riam cognitionem de omnibus habere potest.
Aquinas, CG, II, 39, # 1156, (6).

Cuiuslibet rei procedentis ab agente per intellectum et voluntatem,
forma est ab agente intenta. Ipsa autem universitas creaturarum Deum
habet auctorem, qui est agens per voluntatem et intellectum, ut ex
praemissis patet. Nec in virtute sua defectus aliquis esse potest, ut sic
deficiat a sua intentione: cum sua virtus sit infinita, ut supra ostensum
est. Oportet igitur quod forma universi sit a Deo intenta et volita. Non
est igitur a casu: casu enim esse dicimus quae praeter intentionem
agentis sunt. Forma autem universi consistit in distinctione et ordine
partium eius. Non est igitur distinctio rerum a casu.
Aquinas, CG, II, 42, # I186, (6).

Si distinctio partium universi et ordo earum est proprius effectus causae
primae, quasi ultima forma et optimum in universo, oportet rerum
distinctionem et ~rdinem esse in intellectu causae primae: in rebus
enim quae per intellectum aguntur, forma quae in rebus factis produ~
citur, provenit a forma simili quae est in intellectu; sicut domus quae
est in materia, a domo quae est in intellectu. Forma autem distinctionis
et ordinis non potest esse in intellectu agente nisi sint ibi formae dis-
tinctorum et ordinatorum. Sunt igitur in intellectu divino formae di-
versarum rerum distinctarum et ordinatarum: nec hoc simplicitati ip-
sius repugnat, ut supra ostensum est. Si igitur ex formis quae sunt in
intellectu proveniant res extra animam, in his quae per intellectum
aguntur, poterunt a prima causa immediate causari plura et divers a,
non obstante divina simplicitate, propter quam Quidam in praedic-
tam positionem inciderunt.
Aquinas, CG, II, 39, # I 158, (8).

Hanc autem veritatem Sacra Scriptura profitetur: ut patet Gen. I, ubi,
cum primo dicatur, I "In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram,"
subiungit, 4 "Distinxit Deus lucem a tenebris," et sic de aliis: ut non
solum rerum creatio, sed etiam rerum distinctio a Deo esse ostendatur,
non a casu, sed quasi bonum et optimum universi. Unde subditur: 31
"Vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona."
**26. Ficino, TP, II, II, v. I, p. 109, (B p. 107).

Neque divina simplicitas ob idearum multitudinem minus est
simplex, cum per formam unam unoque intuitu omnes contuea-
tur. Neque dicitur idea divina essentia, prout simpliciter est es-
sentia, sed quantum huius speciei vel illius est exemplar. Quo-
circa quatenus rationes ex una essentia plures intelliguntur,
eatenus plures dicuntur idea, respectusque huiusmodi quibus
multiplicantur ideae, non a rebus ipsis efficiuntur, immo ab in-
tellectu divino suam ad res essentiam comparante. Neque sunt,
ut ita dicam, reales respectus huiusmodi, quales illi quibus per-
sonae distingui dicuntur, sed potius intellecti. Sub una [autem]
idea multa et cognoscuntur et fiunt.
27. Ficino, TP, II, II, v. I, p. 110, (B p. 107).

Causa prima omnia per se, ut in sequentibus ostendemus, ad
finem optimum per vias rectissimas modo congruentissimo diri-
git. Hoc facere nequit, nisi per intellectum anticipet finem, dis-
cernat vias, metiatur proportionem, quae inter vias est ac finem,
per voluntatem rursus finem approbet ac viam talem prae cae-
teris eligat.
28. Ficino, TP, II, II, v. I, pp. lID-II I, (B pp. 107-108).

Quod comitatur quicquid est, id enti, quantum ens est, conve-
nit. Quod tale est, in eo quod primum ens est, reperiatur opor-
tet. At quicquid est hoc habet ut et absens bonum appetat, et in
praesenti bono libentissime conquiescat. Profecto natura, sen-
sus, intellectus absens bonum appetit, praesens amplectitur.
Tatum hoc natura sensus expers per inclinationem quamdam
facit, sensus per appetitum, intellectus per voluntatem. Ergo
cum Deus sit, ut peripatetico more loquar, ens primum, quis
divinum intellectum negabit praesens bonum suum, quod est
omne bonum, per voluntatem libenter amplecti? Sicut [enim]
in sua veritate videt omnia vera, quae ipsa illuminante fiunt
vera, ita in sua bonitate vult bona omnia, quae et ipsius propa-
Aquinas, CG, I, 54, #45 2 , (5).
Quia vero propria ratio unius distinguitur a propria ratione alterius;
distinctio autem est pluralitatis principium: oportet in intellectu divino
distinctionem quandam et pluralitatem rationum intellectarum consi-
derare, secundum quod id quod est in intellectu divino est propria ra-
tio diversorum. Unde, cum hoc sit secundum quod Deus intelligit
proprium respectum assimilationis quam habet unaquaeque creatura
ad ipsum, relinquitur quod rationes rerum in intellectu divino non sint
plures vel distinctae nisi secundum quod Deus cognoscit res pluribus et
diversis modis esse assimilabiles sibi.
Aquinas, CG, II, 23, # 994, (6).

Deum agere propter finem ex hoc manifestum esse potest quod univer-
sum non est a casu, sed ad aliquod bonum ordinatur: ut per Philo-
sophum patet, in XI Metaphysicae. Primum autem agens propter finem
oportet esse agens per intellectum et voluntatem: ea enim quae intel-
lectu carent, agunt propter finem sicut in finem ab alio directa. Quod
quidem in artificialibus patet: nam sagittae motus est ad determina-
tum signum ex directione sagittantis. Simile autem esse oportet et in
naturalibus. Ad hoc enim quod aliquid directe in finem debitum ordi-
netur, requiritur cognitio ipsius finis, et eius quod est ad finem, et debi-
tae proportionis inter utrumque: quod solum intelligentis est. Cum
igitur Deus sit primum agens, non agit per necessitatem naturae, sed
intellectum et voluntatem.
Aquinas, CG, I, 72, #620, (4).

Illud quod consequitur omne ens, convenit ent! mquantum est ens.
Quod autem est huiusmodi, oportet quod in eo maxime inveniatur
quod est primum ens. Cuilibet autem enti com petit appetere suam per-
fectionem et conservationem sui esse: unicuique tamen secundum
suum modum, intellectualibus quid em per voluntatem, animalibus per
sensibilem appetitum, carentibus vero sensu per appetitum naturalem.
Aliter tamen quae habent, et quae non habent: nam ea quae non ha-
bent, appetitiva virtute sui generis desiderio tendunt ad acquirendum
quod ei deest; quae autem habent, quietantur in ipso. Hoc igitur primo
enti, quod Deus est, deesse non potest. Cum igitur ipse sit intelIigens,
inest sibi voluntas, qua placet sibi suum esse et sua bonitas.
gatione nascuntur, et ipsa perficiente fiunt bona. Mens autem

quaelibet volendo facit opera potius quam videndo. Videndo
enim replicat formas intus, volendo eas explicat extra; videndo
respieit verum, cui propria puritas est, volendo attingit bonum,
cui propria est diffusio.
29. Fieino, TP, II, I I, v. I, pp. I I I-I 12, (B p. 108).

Si agentia omnia tam secundum naturam quam secundum artem,
opera sua semper ad finem, id est ad bonum ordinant, et bonitate
sua id faciunt, accipiunt autem operandi ordinem ab agente
primo, atque illud est ipsum bonum; constat ipsum opera sua
ad finem optimum ordinare. Si enim bona particularia quia
bona sunt et quia ordinantur a summo bono, ad bonum aliquod
ordinant singula, quanta magis universale bonum ordinabit
ad bonum cuncta, videlicet ad universale bonum? Deus igitur
ad seipsum tamquam finem ducit omnia. Nullus enim actionis
divinae finis est extra Deum, quoniam finis in eodem ordine
locatur una cum eo quod agit ad finem, estque bonum quid-
dam, et causam movet agentem. Nihil autem in eodem
ordine cum Deo locatur, nisi ipse Deus. Deus alieno non
servit bono. Numquam enim particulari bone servit omne bo-
num. Deus insuper non movetur ab aliquo. Si Dei finis est ipsa
sua bonitas, Deus suo modo suam appetit et diligit bonitatem.
Cum vero et Deus sit intellectualis et bonitas eius intelligibilis,
intellectuali dilectione diligit earn. Dilectio huiusmodi in volun-
tate versatur. Deus igitur vult seipsum. Vult, inquam, se tan-
quam finem sui ipsius et omnium. Ex voluntate autem finis pro-
venit operatio circa illa quae diriguntur ad finem. Quapropter
divina voluntas, ut Plato in Timaeo inquit, creaturarum om-
nium initium est.
30. Fieino, TP, II, 12, v. I, pp. 115-116, (B p. 110).

Sola divina bonitas est absolutum divinae mentis obiectum.
Nam quaelibet vis aequari obiecto potest, excedere minime.
Nihil autem extra Deum est quod Deus excedere nequeat. Vult
autem seipsum Deus absoluta quadam voluntatis necessitate.
Ultimum namque finem suum necessario volunt omnia. Divina
bonitas Dei finis est ultimus, cuius gratia vult quicquid vult.
Aut ergo fatendum est Deum nihil yelle atque esse gustus omnis
Aquinas, CG, I, 72, # 62 5, (9).

Finis et agens ad finem semper unius ordinis inveniuntur in rebus: unde
et finis proximus, qui est proportionatus agenti, incidit in idem specie
cum agente, tam in naturalibus quam in artificialibus; nam forma artis
per quam artifex agit, est species formae quae est in materia, quae est
finis artificis; et forma ignis generantis qua agit, est eiusdem speciei
cum forma ignis geniti, quae est finis generationis.
Deo autem nihil coordinatur quasi eiusdem ordinis nISI Ipse: alias
essent plura prima, cuius contrarium supra ostensum est. Ipse est igitur
primum agens propter finem qui est ipsemet. Ipse igitur non solum est
finis appetibilis, sed appetens, ut ita dicam, se finem. Et appetitu intel-
lectuali, cum sit intelligens: qui est voluntas. Est igitur in Deo voluntas.
Aquinas, CG, I, 74, #634, (3).

Appetibile comparatur ad appetitum sieut movens ad motum, ut supra
dictum est. Et similiter se habet volitum ad voluntatem: cum voluntas
sit de genere appetitivarum potentiarum. Si igitur voluntatis divinae
sit aliud principale volitum quam ipsa Dei essentia, sequetur quod ali-
quid aliud sit superius divina voluntate, quod ipsam movet. Cuius eon-
trarium ex praedictis patet.
expertem, quod est absurdum, aut affirmandum, si quid vult,

necessario velle seipsum; praesertim cum in Deo esse ac velle sit
idem.
Volendo se, vult reliqua omnia, quae prout in Deo sunt, sunt
ipse Deus, prout ex Deo manant, sunt divini vultus imagines
atque ad divinam bonitatem referendam comprobandamque,
tamquam ad finem praecipuum, ordinantur. At vero ille divi-
nae voluntatis actus, qui prout divinam respicit bonitatem, ab-
solute necessarius est, ille, inquam, prout respicit creaturas, a
quibusdam non absolute necessarius appellatur. Nam quamvis
voluntas finem ipsum necessario velit omnino, ea tamen quae
diriguntur ad finem conditionali quadam necessitate vult, immo
etiam nonnumquam nulla necessitate vult, si quid ex illis est,
sine quo finis possideri queat. Divina aut em bonitas non indiget
creaturis.

Conducit ad haec, quod Deus volendo propriam bonitatern, non
ob aliud vult alia bona nisi tamquam ipsius imagines. Cum
autem divina bonitas immensa sit, innumerabiles ad eius exem-
plar effingi imagines possunt, innumerabiles, inquam, praeter
eas insuper quae in his saeculis effinguntur. Itaque si ex eo quod
propriam vult bonitatem, necessario esse vellet singula quae
imitari earn possunt, certe vellet infinitas creaturas existere, in-
finitis modis divinam bonitatem repraesentantes. Si autem vel-
let, utique essent.
Sed hac in re meminisse oportet, ut placet divo Thomae Aqui-

nati nostro, splendori theologiae, quanquam divinae voluntatis
actus secundum conditionem positionemve quamdam dici po-
test rem hanc aut illam necessario velIe, videlicet postquam
semel earn voluit, cum sit divina voluntas non aliter immutabi-
lis quam essentia, ipsum tamen suapte natura non habere eum
necessitatis absolutae respectum ad effectus suos, quem ad seip-
sum habet.
Aquinas, GG, I, 80, # 678, (3).

Quilibet volens de necessitate vult suum ultimum finem: sicut homo de
necessitate vult suam beatitudinem, nec potest velle miseriam. Sed
Deus vult se esse sicut ultimum finem, ut ex praedictis patet. N ecessario
igitur vult se esse, nec potest velIe se non esse.
Aquinas, GG, I, 81, # 683, (2).

Est enim aliorum ut ordinatorum ad finem suae bonitatis. Voluntas
autem non ex necessitate fertur in ea quae sunt ad finem, si finis sine his
esse possit: non enim habet necesse medicus, ex suppositione voluntatis
quam habet de sanando, ilIa medicamenta adhibere infirmo sine qui-
bus nihilominus potest infirmum sanare. Cum igitur divina bonitas sine
aliis esse possit, quinimmo nec per alia ei aliquid accrescat; nulla inest
ei necessitas ut alia velit ex hoc quod vult suam bonitatem.
Aquinas, GG, I, 81, # 685, (4).

Deus, volendo bonitatem suam, vult esse alia a se prout bonitatem eius
participant. Cum autem divina bonitas sit infinita, est infinitis modis
participabilis, et aliis modis quam ab his creaturis quae nunc sunt
participetur. Si igitur, ex hoc quod vult bonitatem suam, vellet de ne-
cessitate ea quae ipsam participant, sequeretur quod vellet esse infini-
tas creaturas, infinitis modis participantes suam bonitatem. Quod pa-
tet esse falsum: quia, si vellet, essent; cum sua voluntas sit principium
essendi rebus, ut infra ostendetur. Non igitur ex necessitate vult etiam
ea quae nunc sunt.
Aquinas, GG, I, 83, # 702, # 704, (2,4).

Ostensum enim est divinam voluntatem immutabilem esse. In quolibet
autem immutabili, si semel est aliquid, non potest postmodum non esse:
hoc enim moveri dicimus quod aliter se habet nunc et prius. Si igitur
divina voluntas est immutabilis, posito quod aliquid velit, necesse est
ex suppositione eum hoc velIe.
Praeterea. Quicquid Deus potuit, potest: virtus enim eius non mi-
nuitur, sicut nec eius essentia. Sed non potest nunc non velIe quod poni-
32. Ficino, TP, II, 12, v. I, pp. 116-117, (B p. 110).

Si Deus est perfecta entis causa atque ens proprius est effectus
Dei, eousque saltern Dei actus amplificare se potest, quousque
entis potentia potest amplificari; praesertim cum passivarn po-
tentiam ab actu superiore duci oporteat. At in huiusmodi poten-
tia entis continetur quicquid rationi entis non adversatur, que-
madmodum in potentia corporalis naturae sunt quaecumque
naturam non auferunt corporalem. Nihil autem effingi potest
quod entis rationi repugnet, nisi eius oppositum, hoc est quod
dicitur non ens. Contradictio sola rationem non entis incIudit.
Quaecumque igitur contradictionem nullam incIudunt, ut Peri-
patetici putant, in entis potentia incIuduntur atque ea omnia
potest Deus efficere. Quod inde confirmatur quod mens, excIusa
contradictione, potest per omnem, immo per immensam entis
latitudinem se porrigere.

Quorsum haec? Ut intelligas quicquid contradictionem non in-
cIudit divinae potentiae subiici atque, cum multa non sint in
natura rerum, quae tam en si essent contradictionem nullam in-
ferrent (quod patet praecipue circa numerum, magnitudinem
intervallaque stellarum), scias plurima sub divina potentia con-
tineri, quae tamen in rerum ordine numquam reperiuntur, et
cum Deus eorum quae potest quaedam faciat, quaedam non fa-
ciat, eum nulla vel naturae vel intelligentiae vel voluntatis ne-
cessitate, sed libera voluntatis electione talia operari.
34. Ficino, TP, II, 12, v. I, pp. 117-118, (B' pp. 110-1 I I).
Verum ne putet forte aliquis divinam voluntatem, si ad creata
respexerit, singulis vim inferre, meminisse oportet voluntatern
Dei malle universi bonum quam apparens alicuius particulae
commodum. N am in illo bono expressior fulget divinae bonita-
tis imago, bonumque illud in ordine quodam videtur consistere.
Exactus [autem] ordo requirit ut omnes rerum gradus in uni-
tur voluisse: quia non potest mutari sua voluntas. Ergo nunquam po-
tuit non velIe quicquid voluit. Est ergo necessarium ex suppositione
eum voluisse quicquid voluit, sicut et velIe: neutrum autem necessa-
rium absolute, sed possibile modo praedicto.
Aquinas, Ge, II, 22, # 983, (3).

Omnis virtus perfecta ad ea omnia se extendit ad quae suus per se et
proprius effectus se extendere potest: sicut aedificativa ad omnia se ex-
tendit, si perfecta sit, quae possunt rationem habere domus. Virtus
autem divina est per se causa essendi, et esse est eius proprius effectus,
ut ex dictis patet. Ergo ad omnia ilIa se extendit quae rationi entis non
repugnant: si enim in quendam tantum effectum virtus eius posset, non
esset per se causa entis inquantum huiusmodi, sed huius entis. Rationi
autem entis repugnat oppositum entis, quod est non ens. Omnia igitur
Deus potest quae in se rationem non entis non includunt. Haec autem
sunt quae contradictionem implicant. Relinquitur igitur quod quic-
quid contradictionem non implicat, Deus potest.
Aquinas, Ge, II, 23, #99 1 , (3).

Quicquid non implicat contradictionem, subest divinae potentiae, ut
osten sum est. Multa autem non sunt in rebus creatis quae tamen, si es-
sent, contradictionem non implicarent: sicut patet praecipue circa
numerum, quantitates et distantias stellarum et aliorum corporum, in
quibus si aliter se haberet ordo rerum, contradictio non implicaretur.
Multa igitur subsunt divinae virtuti quae in rerum natura non inve-
niuntur. Quicumque autem eorum quae potest facere quaedam facit
et quaedam non facit, agit per electionem voluntatis, et non per neces-
sitatem naturae. Deus igitur non agit per necessitatem naturae, sed per
voluntatem.
Aquinas, Ge I, 85, # 7 1 3-7 1 4, (3-4).

Amplius. Deus principalius vult bonum universitatis suorum effectuum
quam aliquod bonum particulare: quanta in illo completior invenitur
suae bonitatis similitudo. Completio autem universi exigit ut sint aliqua
contingentia: alias non omnes gradus entium in universo continerentur.
Vult igitur Deus aliqua esse contingentia.
Adhuc. Bonum universi in quodam ordine consideratur, ut patet in
verso contineantur, ita ut quaedam sint causae stabiles, quae-

dam mobiles, et ilIae quae mobiles sunt effectus producant in-
super magis vagos, et quodam variabili modo. Nam effectus
proximarum causarum modum potius quam remotarum imitari
videntur.
Deus autem non modo res ipsas vult esse, verumetiam essendi
modos qui ad eas per consequentiam requiruntur. Cum vero
rebus quibusdam secundum naturae suae modum conveniat ut
sint quodammodo contingentes, Deus eligit aliquid, ut theologi
quidam inquiunt, quodammodo secundum contingentiam eve-
nire. Nihil tamen ita praevaricatur, ut vel ordinem umverSI
perturbet, vel ordinatoris effugiat providentiam.
**35. Ficino, TP, III, I, v. I, pp. 130-131, (B p. 116).

Si Deus est purus actus, nequit angelus esse talis, quia quod
unum in se est, numquam fit plura, nisi per alienae naturae ad-
ditamentum. U nica est ipsius puri actus natura et definitio; in
Deo quidem est, ut patet. Quod si etiam in angelo dicatur esse,
interrogabimus, numquid in angelo sit aliquid aliud praeter ac-
tum necne? Si nihil, unus solummodo restat actus purus, siqui-
dem nihil differt actus qui tribuitur angelo ab actu Dei, cum
nihil insit utrisque praeter actum, et actus ipse sua ratione sit
unus. Sin additum est aliquid angelo praeter actum, non am-
plius est angelus purus actus, sed infectus permixtione, et actus
non absolutus, sed talis potius, aut talis. Sicut non est pura lux
quae viridis est vel rubens, sed est et lux simul et qualitas ele-
mentorum aliqua, per quam rub ens fit vel viridis. Quapropter
angelus quoque ex actu componitur et potentia.
XI Metaphysicae. Requirit autem ordo universi aliquas causas esse varia-
biles: cum corpora sint de perfectione universi, quae non movent nisi
mota. A causa autem variabili effectus contingentes sequuntur: non
enim potest esse effectus firmioris esse quam sua causa. Unde videmus,
quamvis causa remota sit necessaria, si tamen causa proxima SIt con-
tingens, effectum contingentem esse: sicut patet in his quae circa infe-
riora corpora accidunt; quae quidem contingentia sunt propter proxi-
marum causarum contingentiam, quamvis causae remotae, quae sunt
motus caelestes, sint ex necessitate. Vult igitur Deus aliqua contingen-
ter evenire.
Aquinas, CG, I, 85, # 712, (2).

Vult enim Deus omnia quae requiruntur ad rem quam vult, ut dictum
est. Sed aliquibus rebus secundum modum suae naturae competit quod
sint contingentes, non necessariae. Igitur vult aliquas res esse contin-
gentes. Efficacia autem divinae voluntatis exigit ut non solum sit quod
Deus vult esse, sed etiam ut hoc modo sit sicut Deus vult illud esse: nam
et in agentibus naturalibus, cum virtus agens est fortis, assimilat sibi
suum effectum non solum quantum ad speciem, sed etiam quantum ad
accidentia, quae sunt quidam modi ipsius rei. Igitur efficacia divinae
voluntatis contingentiam non tollit.
Aquinas, CG, II, 52, # 1274, (2).

Si enim esse est subsistens, nihil praeter ipsum esse ei adiungitur. Quia
etiam in his quorum esse non est subsistens, quod inest existenti praeter
esse eius, est quidem existenti unitum, non autem est unum cum esse
eius, nisi per accidens, inquantum est unum subiectum habens esse et
id quod est praeter esse: sicut patet quod Socrati, praeter suum esse
substantiale, inest album, quod quidem diversum est ab eius esse sub-
stantiali; non enim idem est esse Socratem et esse album, nisi per acci-
dens. Si igitur non sit esse in aliquo subiecto, non remanebit aliquis
modus quo possit ei uniri illud quod est praeter esse. Esse autem, in-
quantum est esse, non potest esse diversum: potest autem diversificari
per aliquid quod est praeter esse; sicut esse lapidis est aliud ab esse ho-
minis. Illud ergo quod est esse subsistens, non potest esse nisi unum
tantum. Ostensum est autem quod Deus est suum esse subsistens. Nihil
igitur aliud praeter ipsum potest esse suum esse. Oportet igitur in omni
substantia quae est praeter ipsum, esse aliud ipsam substantiam et esse
elUS.
36. Ficino, TP, IV, I, v. I, p. 149, (B p. 124).

Praeterea, si Deus est ipsum esse, non potest esse forma materiae,
talis enim forma non est esse ipsum, sed essendi principium. Et
quia Deus est esse, ut ita dixerim, adeo absolutum ut non sit in
essentia aliqua, multo minus est in materia.
37. Ficino, TP, IV, I, v. I, p. 149, (B p. 124).

Rursus, compositi partes in potentia quadam sunt ad ipsum to-
tius actum. In Deo autem nulla est ad ulteriorem actum poten-
tia. Non ergo ex ipso et materia fit animal unum, ut stulte pu-
tant Almariani.
*38. Ficino, TP, IV, I, v. I, p. 149, (B p. 124).

Animal quippe rationale ex seipso movetur, unde moveri potest
et non moveri, atque tum velocius moveri, tum tardius. Quod
[autem] tale est, non perseverabit in motione perpetua et aequa-
li, nisi lege alicuius superioris, quod nullo modo mutetur. Deus
igitur non est globi alicuius anima, ne ex ipso et globo animal
unum conficiatur cogaturque habere supra se ducem.
*39. Ficino, TP, V, 8, v. I, pp. 187-189, (B pp. 140-141).

Generatio et corruptio ita sibi invicem opponuntur, ut ad con-
tradictoria tend ant, et gene ratio via quaedam sit ad esse, cor-
ruptio via sit ad non esse. Unumquodque [autem] ex eo tendit
ad esse quod certam quamdam accipit formam. Ad non esse vero
ex eo quod formam suam amittere cogitur. In artibus nullum
opus tale aut tale est propter materiam, sed propter formam.
Aeneus equus aut homo non propter aeris materiam talis dici-
tur, quippe cum aes ad omnium animalium figuras suscipiendas
aeque sit praeparatum, sed propter equi aut hominis formam
quamdam similitudinemque ab artifice profectam. Haec pars
aeris eq uus dicitur, illa homo. In natura similiter, materia quidem
Aquinas, CG, I, 27, #252, (3).

Forma corporis non est ipsum esse, sed essendi principium. Deus autem
est ipsum esse. Non ergo est Deus forma corporis.
Aquinas, CG, I, 27, # 253, (4).

Ex unione formae et materiae result at aliquid compositum, quod est
totum respectu materiae et formae. Partes autem sunt in potentia re-
spectu totius. In Deo autem nulla est potentialitas. Impossibile est igi-
tur Deum esse formam unitam alicui rei.
Aquinas, CG, I, 27, # 255-256, (6-7).

Praeterea. Hoc idem potest ostendi ex aeternitate motus, sic. Si Deus
est forma alicuius mobilis, cum ipse sit primum movens, compositum
erit movens seipsum. Sed movens seipsum potest moveri et non moveri.
Utrumque igitur in ipso est. Quod autem est huiusmodi, non habet
motus indeficientiam ex seipso. Oportet igitur supra movens seipsum
ponere aliud primum movens, quod largiatur ei perpetuitatem motus.
Et sic Deus, qui est primum movens, non est forma corporis moventis
selpsum.
Est autem hic processus utilis ponentibus aeternitatem motus. Quo
non posito, eadem conclusio haberi potest ex regularitate motus caeli.
Sicut enim movens seipsum potest quiescere et moveri, ita potest velo-
cius et tardius moveri. Necessitas igitur uniformitatis motus caeli de-
pendet ex aliquo principio superiori omnino immobili, quod non est
pars corporis move ntis seipsum quasi aliqua forma eius.
Aquinas, CG, I, 26, #242, (6).

Generatio per se loquendo est via in esse, et corruptio via in non esse:
non enim generationis terminus est forma et corruptionis privatio, nisi
quia forma facit esse et privatio non esse; dato enim quod aliqua forma
non faceret esse, non diceretur generari quod talem formam acciperet.
non illud est per quod Plato est homo aut ficus est arbor. Eadem
quippe mundi prima materia hominibus, brutis, arboribus est
communis ac multa ante Platonem saecula, multa etiam post
Platonem materia illa eadem extat; Plato vero nequaquam.
Igitur non propter materiam Plato humanam habet speciem,
sed propter complexionem corporis talem atque animam, quae
formae dicuntur. Similiter de aliis iudicandum ac summatim
concludendum: quodlibet a forma habere proprium suum esse,
naturam et speciem ab aliis differentem.
Quapropter quicquid esse desinit, ipsum esse suum amittit ex eo

quod a forma propria separatur, sicut esse antea coeperat,
quando formam propriam fuerat consecutum. Ideo res ex ma-
teria formaque composita, puta ignis ex mole sua et naturali
caliditate compositus, interit, quando a sua forma seiungitur.
Potest autem frigus aquae vel terrae se materiae ignis insinuare
atque inde naturalem caliditatem, ignis formam, expellere, qua
expulsa, desinit esse ignis.
Sic ignis ille es materia et tali quadam caliditate compositus esse
amittit, quando suam amittit caliditatem, suam, inquam, sub-
stantialem formam cum eius proprietatibus, quam nunc, quo-
niam manifestum nomen non habet, caliditatem disputandi
causa nominamus. Caliditas autem ipsa, quando esse suum
amittit, cum sit forma et a forma sit esse? Quando videlicet ex
materia illa depellitur. In rebus enim compositis naturaliter esse
tribuitur toti, non partibus. Nempe esse ignis ipsius compositi
est proprie, non materiae solius, neque caloris. Nam cum calor
in ignis generatione ab agente naturali ex materiae semine
eductus fuit, ea conditione fuit per omnem materiam ignis ex-
tensus, ut inde omnino penderet neque esse proprium sibi calor
haberet, sed per ipsum commune esse totius ignis calor quoque
esse diceretur. Esse autem illud commune tunc cessat, quando
duae ilIae partes a se invicem disiunguntur. Quando esse com-
mune cessat, perit et forma quae per esse commune vigebat.
Materia vero non perit, quoniam subito aliam suscipit formam
per quam existat, ita ut dum certum amittit calorem, esse
igneum amittat; dum certam quamdam frigiditatem accipit vel
humiditatem, esse capiat terreum aut aqueum. Conclude rem
compositam, ut ignem et aquam, tunc interire, quando a sua
Aquinas, CG, II, 55, # I2g8, (2).

Omnis enim corruptio est per separationem formae a materia: simplex
quidem corruptio per separationem formae substantialis; corruptio
autem secundum quid per separationem formae accidentalis. Forma
enim manente, oportet rem esse: per formam enim substantia fit pro-
prium susceptivum eius quod est esse.
forma seiungitur; formam vero illam perdi quando a formantis

lege discedit. Sol qui genuit ignem, ignis formator existit. Is ea
lege calorem ex fomite materiae illius eduxit, ut in ea materia
iacens sub esse compositi totius contineretur. Hanc legem
transgreditur quando ex illa abit materia. Abit, quando fugatur
a frigore.
Quod ergo neque a sua forma neque a formantis lege disc edit,
quonam pacto interit, cum esse cuiusque a forma procedat et
formantis lege servetur? Anima vero propter tertiae illius essen-
tiae proprietatem mera quae dam forma est, non composita ex
materia et forma, neque recubans in materia. Ideo in seipsa
permanens, qUlcquid in se est nihil est aliud praeter formam.
Ipsa igitur sua essentia non formatur per aliud quicquam, sed
sui ipsius est forma, id est ipsamet et forma est. Nihil est autem
quod per se a sua essentia separetur, quia nihil a seipso discedit.
Omnia siquidem naturali instinctu nixuque perpetuo seipsa
servant pro viribus siblque inhaerent. Igitur anima, si numquam
a se disiungitur et ipsa sui forma est, numquam a sua forma
disiungitur. Itaque numquam desinit esse, cum esse a forma
sempel hauriatur. Sua quidem sponte a se non separaturJ ut
diximus, ...
40. Ficino, TP, V, 9, v. I, p. 191, (B p. 142).

Quod alicui per se convenit numquam separatur ab ipso. Ro-
tunditas suapte natura circulo inest atque ideo nullus umquam
sine rotunditate est circulus. Ligno autem quandoque rotundi-
tas inest, non quia lignum est (omne enim lignum [alioqui] ro-
tundum es~et), sed quia ab artifice figuram accipit circularem
quam rotunditas comitatur, ideo tunc rotunditatem capere co-
gitur. Desinit aliquando lignum esse rotundum, cum primum
esse desinit circulare, deinde restat lignum, sed non rotundum.
Figura vero circularis ita necessario rotunda est, ut si desiverit
esse rotunda, esse etiam desinat circularis. Similiter calor igni
per se convenit, humor aquae, soli lumen. Non aliter et formae
esse per se convenit, nam quicquid aliquid est in aliqua specie
id certe quod est a propria quadam forma sortitur ad talem
speciem conducente. Quoniam igitur esse proprium cuique per
formam propriam competit, sequitur ut esse communiter et
simpliciter per genus ipsum formae conveniat. Unde oportet
ipsam formam fontem did essendi et per se esse.
Ubi autem non est compositio formae et materiae, ibi non potest esse
separatio earundem. Igitur nec corruptio. Ostensum est autem quod
nulla substantia intellectualis est composita ex materia et forma. Nulla
igitur substantia intellectualis est corruptibilis.
Aquinas, CG, II, 55, # 12 99, (3).

Quod per se alicui competit, de necessitate et semper et inseparabiliter
ei inest: sicut 'rotundum' per se quidem inest circulo, per accidens
autem aeri; unde aes quidem fieri non rotundum est possibile, circu-
lum autem non esse rotundum est impossibile. Esse autem per se conse-
quitur ad formam: "per se" enim dicimus "secundum quod ipsum";
unumquodque autem habet esse secundum quod habet formam. Sub-
stantiae igitur quae non sunt ipsae formae, possunt privari esse, secun-
dum quod amittunt formam: sicut aes privatur rotunditate secundum
quod desinit esse circulare. Substantiae vero quae sunt ipsae formae,
nunquam possunt privari esse: sicut, si aliqua substantia esset circulus,
nunquam posset fieri non rotunda. Ostensum est autem supra quod
substantiae intellectuales sunt ipsae formae subsistentes. Impossibile est
igitur quod esse desinant. Sunt igitur incorruptibiles.
**41. Ficino, TP, V, 10, v. I, p. 195, (B pp. 143-144).

Quod quidem hac ratione investigabimus. Quoniam a prima
rerum causa cuncta dependent, eatenus singula in suo esse per-
manent, quatenus ad primam causam referuntur. Respiciunt
autem illam, ut aliquam ipsius similitudinem gerunt. Causa illa
actus purissimus est, ab omni materiae proprietate alienissimus.
Huic actui res inferiores non ex sua materia sed ex forma potius,
quae actus quidam existit, simile iudicantur. Quo fit ut per for-
mam suam omnia primam respiciant causam. Quare quaecum-
que ex materia et forma composita sunt, ut elementa et mixta,
non per se, neque per totam sui naturam, sed per partem illam
sui dumtaxat quae forma dicitur, causam prim am respiciunt.
42. Ficino, TP, V, 1I, v. I, pp. 196-199, (B pp. 144-145).

Sicut generatio fit per coniunctionem formae cum materia, ita
per separationem formae a materia fit corruptio. Ubi non est
harum rerum coniunctio, non accidit separatio. Talis autem
compositio non est in anima.
Sed rationem hanc latius prosequamur. In corruptione cuiusque

rei perditur ipse rei actus, sed post illum superest aliquid quod
suber at illi actui, veluti potentia aliqua susceptiva, ne fiat cor-
ruptio in nihilum, sicut non fit ex nihilo generatio. Res quidem
ex forma materiaque composita resolvitur in materiam. Forma
quoque illa, quae ex materiae fomite educta fuerat, reducitur in
materiae fomitem [misprinted "formitem"]. In anima vero ac-
tus ipsius est ipsum suum esse; essentia vero et substantia eius est
illa ipsa potentia quae essendi actui subest. Non enim est in for-
mis absolutis ferme alia compositio quam ex essentia atque esse
aut similis. Essentia locum materiae et potentiae tenet; esse vero
locum formae et actus. Si corrumpitur anima, perditur eius esse
ornnino. Sed nurnquid etiarn essentia? Nequaquarn. Nulla enim
res in nihil resolvitur, quia res quae usque adeo est simplex ut
non aliter resolvi possit quam in nihil urn, etiam talis est, ut sit a
Aquinas, CG, II, 53, # 1286, (5).
Assimilatio alicuius ad causam agentem fit per actum: "agens" enim
"agit sibi simile" inquantum est actu. Assimilatio autem cuiuslibet
substantiae creatae ad Deum est per ipsum esse, ut supra ostensum est.
Ipsum igitur esse comparatur ad omnes substantias creatas sicut actus
earum. Ex quo relinquitur quod in qualibet substantia creata sit com-
positio actus et potentiae.
Aquinas, CG, II, 55, # 12g8, (2).

Omnis enim corruptio est per separationem formae a materia: simplex
quid em eorruptio per separationem formae substantialis; corruptio au-
tern secundum quid per separationem formae aeeidentalis. Forma enim
manente, oportet rem esse: per formam enim substantia fit proprium
susceptivum eius quod est esse. Ubi autem non est eompositio formae
et materiae, ibi non potest esse separatio earundem. Igitur nec corrup-
tio. Osten sum est autem quod nulla substantia intelleetualis est compo-
sita ex materia et forma. Nulla igitur substantia intelleetualis est cor-
ruptibilis.
Aquinas, CG, II, 55, # 1300, (4).

In omni corruptione, remoto actu, manet potentia: non enim corrum-
pitur aliquid in omnino non ens, sieut nee generatur aliquid ex omnino
non ente. In substantiis autem intelleetualibus, ut ostensum est, actus
est ipsum esse, ipsa autem substantia est sicut potentia. Si igitur sub-
stantia intellectualis corrumpatur, remanebit post suam corruptionem.
Quod est omnino impossibile. Omnis igitur substantia intellectualis est
incorruptibilis.
Deo facta per creationem ex nihilo. Quae [autem] talis est soli
auctori suo sub est Deo. Dei vero influxus vitalis atque beneficus
nihil interimit. Itaque si anima destruitur, licet amittat esse,
eius tamen essentia remanet.
Quod etiam inde constat, quod quanto nobilior res est, tanto
nobiliorem habet materiam, nobiliorem et formam. Animae
sunt admodum praestantiores corporibus. Igitur sub illarum
esse tamquam sub forma et actu latet materia quaedam et po-
tentia, (si qua latet), praestantior quam sub forma et sub esse
corporis cuiuscumque. Quod autem tenet in animabus primae
materiae potentiaeque locum ipsa earum essentia est. Itaque
essentia illarum eminentior est quam materia corporum. Mate-
ria corporum incorruptibilis est. Ergo quid mirum, si esse po-
test incorruptibilis illa? Quo fit ut si quando anima esse suum
fingatur amittere, supersit necessario adhuc essentia atque sub-
stantia. Haec si superest, est certe. Si est adhuc, esse nondum est
amissum. Ita anima si corrumpi dicatur, etiam post corruptio-
nem necessario superest. Immo etiam vivit. Esse namque ani-
mae nihil aliud est quam vivere.
Sed ne quis dicat ipsum animae esse resolvi in essentiam atque
essentiam ulterius non existere, quia sit absque actu, quamvis
potentia forte supersit alicubi, meminisse oportet essentiam il-
lam non posse in materiam potentiamve materiae redigi, quia
neque ex materia constat, tamquam parte sui, neque ex mate-
riae potentia pullulat. Rursus, non posse resolvi in potentiam
causae alicuius agentis, nisi forte in Dei virtutem, qui solus ani-
mam procreavit. Non autem ob id moritur animus quod in pri-
mam vitam resolvitur. Moreretur autem si, reductus in Deum
desineret esse animus. Atqui sicut figura cerae a sigillo impressa,
quando sigillo penitus adaequatur, non destruitur, sed in spe-
ciem suam redintegratur, sic essentia animi, si quando ideae per
quam Deus eam in certa essendi specie disposuerat admovetur,
in esse pristino confirmatur. Maxime enim sequens actus robo-
ratur a primo. Nam quomodo Deus esse potest terminus in
quem corruptio tendat, cum sit efficiens terminus unde et a quo
omnis creatio generatioque deducitur? Aut quo pacto Deus qui
actus est purus, nascente anima, ad animae ipsius compositio-
nem concurrit? Ita ut quemadmodum ex materiae potentia et
Aquinas, CG, II, 55, # 1302, (6).

In quibuscumque est compositio potentiae et actus, id quod tenet lo-
cum primae potentiae, sive primi subiecti, est incorruptibile: unde
etiam in substantiis corruptibilibus materia prima est incorruptibilis.
Sed in substantiis intellectualibus id quod tenet locum primae poten-
tiae et subiecti, est ipsa earum substantia completa. Igitur substantia
ipsa est incorruptibilis. Nihil autem est corruptibile nisi per hoc quod
sua substantia corrumpitur. Igitur omnes intellectuales naturae sunt
incorruptibiles.
actu potentiae addito forma fit corporalis et in earn potentiam

denique actus formae resolvitur, sic ex Dei potentia quadam et
adiecto quodam actu fiat animus, qui tandem in Dei potentiam
quasi materiam resolvatur. Non enim gerit umquam materiae
vic em qui primus est actus.
Asseret aliquis essentiam animae neque in materiam, neque in
Deum resolvi, sed ips am se statim in se recipere, esse priore
sublato. Verum sicut materia corporalis absque actu corporali
esse nequit, ita neque spiritalis seorsum a spiritali. Quapropter
essentia, quae est materia spiritalium et ad esse spiritale quasi
actum aliquem comparatur, numquam segregatur ab esse, ab
esse, inquam, spiritali. Nisi forte quis dicat essentiam animae,
dum esse aliud exuit, aliud indui, ac tales in esse spiritali vices
hanc essentiam variare, quales in formis suis materia variat.
Absurdum id quidem dictu, tum quia essentia spiritalium sta-
bilior est quam materia corporalium, tum quia essentia animae
cum propria ipsius animae ratio sit, non esse aliud omnino et
aliud respicit pariter, sed esse solummodo animale, secundum
certam, videlicet animae, speciem. Materia quidem communis
absque hoc actu vel illo esse potest; materia vero propria absque
proprio actu, nequaquam. Quapropter essentia animae, quae in
tali specie animarum est, nunquam actum speciei alterius ani-
marum suscipiet, neque migrabit rursus essentia in eadem spe-
cie de animo hoc in illum, ne mobilis aeque sit ac materia corpo-
ralium. Immo si materia caeli eadem forma content a est sem-
per, ut placet quamplurimis, quid mirum materiam animi spi-
ritalem eodem essendi actu semper esse contentam? Ea essentia
vita est, hoc esse vivere. Semper itaque vivit.
43. Ficino, TP, V, 12, v. I, pp. 199-203, (B pp. 145-147).

Nulla res corrumpitur umquam nisi habeat in se potentiam ad
non esse. Si enim nequiret non esse, numquam esse desineret.
Anima nullam habet talem potentiam, quoniam anima nihil
aliud est apud Platonicos nisi forma simplex per se subsistens, in
essentia quidem sua perfecta et integra, ad speciem quoque ani-
malis efficiendam conducens. Actus quidem existendi ibi est, in
ipsa scilicet forma integra et perfecta, siquidem per formae inte-
gritatem est unumquodque. Igitur proprium subiectum ipsius
esse ibi est sua forma atque essentia.
Aquinas, CG, II, 55, # 13 01 , (5).

In omni quod corrumpitur, oportet quod sit potentia ad non esse. Si
quid igitur est in quo non est potentia ad non esse, hoc non potest esse
corruptibile. In substantia autem intellectuali non est potentia ad non
esse.
Ubi autem erit potentia ad non esse, quod est ipsius esse opposi-
tum? Numquid in ipso esse? At quomodo unum repugnans vim
habet ad repugnans alterum capiendum? An in ipsa essentia?
Neque hie quidem. Nam si essentia ex eo quod simplex et inte-
gra forma est proprium est ipsius esse subiectum, quomodo ha-
bet potentiam ad non esse, quod dicitur esse ipsius oppositum?
Quo enim pacta propria substantia ignis, quae proprium caloris
talis subiectum est, habet ad frigus suscipiendum potentiam ali-
quam, per quam et frigus accipiat et maneat ignis? Atqui in iis
ipsis substantiis corporalibus mortalibusque non est potentia ad
non esse, quantum sunt in specie sua completae substantiae for-
maque praeditae (secundum hoc enim existunt), sed quantum
illis subest materia prima, quae numquam sub tali aliqua forma
quiescit. Haec vero abest ab anima. Nusquam igitur potentia ad
non esse in anima reperitur. Est igitur immortalis. Sed hanc
rationem planius exponamus.
In rebus iis quae ex forma etmateria componuntur, id acciditut
materia opus ipsum quodammodo antecedat. Quis enim dubitet
quin materia prius quodammodo sit quam formetur? Accipio
materiam hanc operi faciundo quodammodo praecedentem at-
que interrogo utrum opus illud ex natura huius materiae fore
necessarium sit an impossibile, an forte possibile. Non necessa-
rium, quia sic materiae vis statim per seipsam operi necessita-
tern daret, neque praestantiore aliquo egeret formante. Nunc
vero indiget, quia quod est informe formare se nequit. Igitur
quantum ad materiam attinet, futurum opus non est necessa-
rium. Numquid impossibile? Neque hoc quidem. Sic enim esset
materia ad eo ad opus illud inepta ut numquam ad illius for-
mam atque effectum perduceretur. Si quantum ad materiam
spectat, opus agendum neque necessarium est, neque etiam im-
possibile, restat ut sit possibile. Hoc enim inter duo ilIa est
medium, possibile, inquam, esse atque non esse. Nam si ex na-
tura materiae foret possibile esse solum, foret absque dubio ne-
cessarium; sin ex natura eiusdem foret solum possibile non esse,
foret et impossibile. Quapropter cum ex natura materiae opus
ipsum possibile sit esse pariter et non esse, constat quod in ipsa
materia, quantum ad faciundum opus, est potentia ad esse pari-
ter atque non esse. Cum vero simplex materia sit ex naturis plu-
ribus non composita, eadem natura materiae est potentia ad esse
atque non esse, quoniam est indifferens ad utrumque, neque ex
Manifestum est enim ex dictis quod substantia completa est prop-

rium susceptivum ips ius esse. Proprium autem susceptivum alicuius
actus ita comparatur ut potentia ad actum illum quod nullo modo est
in potentia ad oppositum: sicut ignis ita comparatur ad calorem ut
potentia ad actum quod nullo modo est in potentia ad frigus. Unde nec
in ipsis substantiis corruptibilibus est potentia ad non esse in ipsa sub-
stantia completa nisi ratione materiae. In substantiis autem intellec-
tualibus non est materia, sed ipsae sunt substantiae completae simpli-
ces. Igitur in eis non est potentia ad non esse. Sunt igitur incorruptibi-
les.
se ad alterutrum terminatur. Superiori [ergo] agente indiget,

quod earn formando ad esse determinet. Accipit ab ilIo formam
leonis, unde fit leo, et materia ista leonis quae ante habebat
in se potentiam ad esse leonem atque non esse, iam nunc
ad esse leonem determinatur. Sed numquid adhuc restat in
materia prima eadem illa indifferens ad utrumque potentia?
Si non restaret, cessaret protinus natura materiae, neque
quicquam ex materia fieret et constaret, si statim cum fit
aliquid, materia prima natura privatur sua peritque. Ergo
cum restet, leone iam genito, potentia eadem ilIa secundum
speciem in materia non propinqua leoni secundaque, sed
prima; potentia, inquam, ad esse pariter atque non esse, id
accidit ut quemadmodum per illam potentiam esse leo quando-
que coepit, cum prius non fuisset, ita per eamdem esse quando-
que desinat, postquam fuit. Quoniam potentia ad extremum
utrumque indifferens, vel ad neutrum vertitur, vel aeque atque
vicissim vertitur ad utrumque, et sicut ad esse ex non esse con-
versa est, ita vicissim ab esse vertitur in non esse. Atque hinc
sequitur rerum corruptio corporalium.
Verum rationalis anima, cum sit forma simplex unde motus
exoritur in compositis, non potest ex aliqua materia praecedente
et subsequente forma facta fuisse, et cum sit forma in se subsis-
tens, non innixa materiae, quia et supra et infra materiam pro-
greditur iudicando, non est composita ex aliqua potentia ma-
teriae, velut animae inchoatione, et actu potentiae addito, velut
animae ipsius perfectione. Neque igitur ex materia constat, ne-
que extat. Si talis est, ex nihilo process it in lucem. Eius ergo
solus Deus est auctor, ut alias ostendimus. Atqui haec nisi
potuisset fieri, numquam profecto facta fuisset. Quapropter
praecessit animam nostram nascendi potentia. Ubinam erat
ilIa potentia? Non in anima, quae non dum erat; non in
parte animae, quae est simplex et tota simul efficitur, non per
partes; non in materia aliqua, quoniam anima a materia non
dependet; non in nihilo, non enim potentia ipsa essendi funda-
tur in nihilo. Nam quo pacto alterum oppositum sit oppositi et
contradictorii alterius fundamentum? Esse vero et non esse con-
tradictoria sunt. Restat ut ilIa potentia in solo animae auctore
fundetur Deo. Igitur potentia essendi per quam anima ad esse
producitur, ipse solus immortalis stabilisque est Deus. Potentiae
vera secundum congruentiam respondet actus. Actus ergo illi
potentiae divinae respondens est stabilis per essentiam. Talis

actus est anima. Et quemadmodum in Deo eadem potentia est
per quam et Deus potest facere animam et anima fieri, sic in
anima idem actus est, id est nixus idem, per quem et anima sub-
sistit in natura sua, et Deus earn sistit in ipsa. Quo fit, ut non
minori desiderio Deus animam in natura animae sistat quam
subsistat anima in eadem. Quae cum soli subiiciatur Deo, si
perimenda est ab aliquo, ab illo est perimenda. Ab illo vero non
potest. Quomodo enim causa alicuius effectrix et conservatrix
erit quoque corruptrix eiusdem? Aut quo pacto cuiquam
ipsum bonum perniciosum est? Aut prima vita et infinita
vita est alicui mortis origo? Dicet aliquis: Non perimit Deus
animam vim novam aliquam inferendo, sed vim ante illi
tributam auferendo, id est subtra-hendo influxum suum,
per quem anima vixerat, sicut qui intuitu imaginem suam
creat in speculo, subtrahendo vultum desinit imaginem
procreare. Sed contingere hoc ibi non potest, ut paulo ante
ostendimus.
Rursus, si Deus nunc infundit animae vitam, postea non infun-
dit, mutatio ibi provenit ab infundendo in non infundendum.
Quaero utrum anima desinat haurire vitam an Deus infundere.
Non desinit anima haurire. Quippe infusio vitae in essentiam
animae fit, quoniam vita est primus actus essentiae, cum pri-
mum acceperit esse. Animae essentia est immobilis, quoniam a
stabili Deo sine medio pendet, quia stando et quiescendo perfi-
citur, turbatur motu, attingit stabilia, regit caduca, sistit mobi-
lia, colligit dissipata, conciliat repugnantia. Nee est in ea po-
tentia illa ad esse pariter atque non esse, qualis est in corpori-
bus, quae est totius mutationis initium. Non igitur cessat ani-
mae essentia umquam vitae actum accipere. Non cessat Deus
eumdem infundere. Solis namque illis significavit Deus se vim
suam aliquando infundere cessaturum, quibus ab origine inse-
ruit proclivitatem illam ad non essendum.
Preterea, Deus, naturae institu tor, numquam rei cuiquam sub-
trahit quod rei illius est proprium. Propria animae vita est, vita,
inquam, perpetua, quia quantum rationalis est, etiam absque
disciplina et usu per solam eius naturae virtu tern quotidie in se
parit species absolutas, per quas proxime ad aeternas itur ideas.
Si naturale est animo rationali ascend ere ad ideas, naturale est
ipsi quiescere in ideis, ut sicut naturaliter illis vixit, ita naturali-
Aquinas, CG, II, 55, # 13 10, (14).

Quaecumque incipiunt esse et desinunt, per eandem potentiam habent
utrumque: eadem enim est potentia ad esse et ad non esse. Sed sub-
stantiae intelligentes non potuerunt incipere esse nisi per potentiam
primi agentis: non enim sunt ex materia, quae potuerit praefuisse, ut
ostensum est. Igitur nec est aliqua potentia ad non esse earum nisi in
primo agente, secundum quod potest non influere eis esse. Sed ex hac
sola potentia nihil potest dici corruptibile. Tum quia res dicuntur ne-
cessariae et contingentes secundum potentiam quae est in eis, et non
secundum potentiam Dei, ut supra ostensum est.
Tum etiam quia Deus, qui est institutor naturae, non subtrahit rebus
id quod est proprium naturis earum; ostensum est autem quod prop-
rium naturis intellectualibus est quod sint perpetuae; unde hoc eis a
Deo non subtrahetur. Sunt igitur substantiae intellectuales ex omni
parte incorruptibiles.
ter vivat in illis, et qui operabatur secundum naturam assidue

ad perpetua, operetur quandoque secundum naturam perpetuo
in perpetuis. Et quia idea quaeque aeterna vita est, qui secun-
dum naturam suam ide am per ideae modum potest consequi,
potest etiam per modum aeternum vitam consequi sempiter-
nam.
44. Ficino, TP, V, 13, v. I, pp. 203-204, (B p. 147).

Anima est forma ita simplex atque ita liberia, ut neque ex pluri-
bus partibus componatur, neque ex materiae visceribus eruatur.
Quando igitur fit, non potest ex rebus ullis prius existentibus
generari. Non enim ex rebus diversis procul ante positis deinde
coactis in unum conficitur, cum careat partibus. Neque ex ma-
teriae fomite prius informi, deinde formato, cum sit supra mate-
riam. Igitur fit ex nihilo. Ex nihilo autem aliquid facere Dei
solius est proprium.
45. Ficino, TP, V, 13, v. I, p. 204, (B pp. 147-148).

Nam ex ordine operum ordo causarum investigatur. Causis
enim effectus accommodetur. Quare oportet effectus proprios
in proprias causas reducamus, atque id quod commune in om-
nibus effectibus propriis reperitur in communem omnium cau-
sam referamus. Ita cum omnibus in rebus praeter proprias sin-
gularum conditiones ipsum esse commune cunctis inveniatur,
singularum conditionum et qualitatum causas singulas afferre
debemus, ipsius autem esse, quod unum omnibus est commune,
unam causam omnibusque communem. Omnibus communis
causa unus ipse est Deus. Igitur essendi revera Deus est causa.
Essendi vero hoc aut illud, hoc modo vel illo, aliae quaedam
praeter Deum sunt causae. Ita ut sis, a Deo solo habes. Ut sis
homo, etiam ab homine, ut calidus sis ab igne. Deus operibus
esse dabit, aliae causae inter se diversae diversos essendi modos,
et eos quidem virtute Dei.
Aquinas, CG, II, 87, # 17 18, (5).

Quicquid producitur in esse ab aliquo agente, acquirit ab ipso vel ali-
quid quod est principium essendi in tali specie, vel ipsum esse absolu-
tum. Anima autem non potest sic produci in esse quasi acquiratur ei
aliquid quod sit principium essendi, sicut contingit in rebus compositis
ex materia et forma, quae generantur per hoc quod acquirunt formam
in actu: non enim habet anima aliquid in seipsa quod sit sibi princi-
pium essendi, cum sit substantia simplex, ut supra ostensum est. Relin-
quitur igitur quod non producatur in esse ab aliquo agente nisi per hoc
quod consequitur ab ipso esse absolute. Ipsum autem esse est proprius
effectus primi et universalis agentis: secunda enim agentia agunt per
hoc quod imprimunt similitudines suarum formarum in rebus factis,
quae sunt formae factorum. Anima igitur non potest produci in esse
nisi a primo et universali agente, quod est Deus.
Aquinas, CG, II, 15, #9 2 5, (4).

Secundum ordinem effectuum oportet esse ordinem causarum: eo quod
effectus causis suis proportionati sunt. Unde oportet quod, sicut effec-
tus proprii reducuntur in causas proprias, ita id quod commune est in
effectibus propriis, reducatur in aliquam causam communem: sicut
supra particulares causas generationis huius vel illius est sol universalis
causa generationis; et rex est universalis causa regiminis in regno, su-
pra praepositos regni et etiam urbium singularium. Omnibus autem
commune est esse. Oportet igitur quod supra omnes causas sit aliqua
causa cuius sit dare esse. Prima autem causa Deus est, ut supra osten-
sum est. Oportet igitur omnia quae sunt a Deo esse.
Aquinas, CG, III, 66, # 241 2, (6).

Secundum ordinem causarum est ordo effectuum. Primum autem in
omnibus effectibus est esse: nam omnia alia sunt quaedam determina-
tiones ipsius. Igitur esse est proprius effectus primi agentis, et omnia
alia agunt ipsum inquantum agunt in virtute primi agentis. Secunda
autem agentia, quae sunt quasi particulantes et determinantes actio-
Esse quidem illud quod post nihilum sequitur esse dicitur abso-
lutum. Statim enim post nihil sequitur esse simpliciter. Post esse
simpliciter sequitur esse hoc aut illud, aut tale esse vel tale, puta
hominem esse vel equum, album esse vel nigrum. Non enim
potest quicquam fieri hoc et iIlud et tale, nisi sit prius quod hoc
et illud et tale fiat. Quapropter esse tale et hoc et illud, haud e
vestigio post nihilum sequitur, sed post esse ipsum simplex et
absolutum. Cum igitur Dei proprium sit esse ipsum commune
et absolutum cunctis tribuere, id vero esse ante omnes essendi
modos sequatur post nihilum, solius Dei officium erit aliquid ex
nihilo in esse perducere, ut primum quod datur omnibus, ipsum
scilicet esse, a prima sit causa, a sequentibus causis munera
secunda vel tertia.
46. Ficino, TP, V, 13, v. I, p. 205, (B p. 148).

Profecto quod naturae alicuius est particeps, non potest earn
naturam producere absolutam, quia cum id quod est tale ali-
quid secundum participationem necessario sequatur id quod est
absolute tale, immo etiam sit per illud quicquid ipsum est, si hoc
illud gigneret, certe quod est posterius rem seipso priorem atque
etiam sui ipsius causam gigneret, ubi gigneret et seipsum. Igitur
Ariston, quia non absolutus homo fuit, sed hic homo in tali
materia constitutus, humanitatem ipsam non genuit absolutam,
sed hominem hunc, Platonem scilicet, et in materia tali.
Quoniam vero quantum pertinet ad essendi naturam, quicquid

sub Deo est esse ipsius est particeps, et esse non habet simplici-
ter, sed tale esse vel tale in quadam essentia specieque determi-
natum, sequitur ut res nulla subiecta Deo ipsum esse producat,
sed talem quemdam essendi modum tali cuidam materiae tri-
buat. Quo fit, ut ad opus suum priori semper egeat fundamento.
47. Ficino, TP, V, 13, v. I, pp. !.205-206, (B p. 148).

Praeterea, tam ars quam natura quicquid agit, ex potentia
quad am producit in actum. Sculptor ex lapide ita praeparato
nem primi agentis, agunt sicut proprios effectus alias perfectiones, quae
determinant esse.
Aquinas, CG, II, 21, #97 2 , (4).

Effectus suis causis proportionaliter respondent: ut scilicet effectus in
actu causis actualibus attribuamus, et effectus in potentia causis quae
sunt in potentia; et similiter effectus particulares causis particularibus,
universalibus vero universales; ut docet Philosophus, in II Physicorum.
Esse autem est causatum primum: quod ex ratione suae communitatis
apparet. Causa igitur propria essendi est agens primum et universale,
quod Deus est. Alia vero agentia non sunt causa essendi simpliciter, sed
causa 'essendi hoc', ut hominem vel album. Esse autem simpliciter per
creationem causatur, quae nihil praesupponit: quia non potest aliquid
praeexistere quod sit extra ens simpliciter. Per alias factiones fit hoc
ens vel tale: nam ex ente praeexistente fit hoc ens vel tale. Ergo creatio
est propria Dei actio.
Aquinas, CG, II, 21, #976, (8).

Quod est secundum aliquam naturam causatum, non potest esse simpli-
citer illius naturae causa, esset enim sui ipsius causa: potest autem esse
causa illius naturae in hoc, sicut Plato est causa humanae naturae in
Socrate, non aut em simpliciter, eo quod ipse est causatus in humana
natura. Quod autem est causa alicuius in hoc, est attribuens naturam
communem alicui per quod specificatur vel individuatur. Quod non
potest esse per creationem, quae nihil praesupponit cui aliquid attri-
buatur per actionem. Impossibile est igitur aliquod ens creatum esse
causam alterius per creationem.
Aquinas, CG, III, 66, #24 1 3, (7).

Quod est per essentiam tale, est propria causa eius quod est per parti-
cipationem tale: sicut ignis est causa omnium ignitorum. Deus autem
solus est ens per essentiam suam, omnia autem alia sunt entia per parti-
cipationem: nam in solo Deo esse est sua essentia. Esse igitur cuiuslibet
existentis est proprius effectus eius, ita quod omne quod producit ali-
quid in esse, hoc facit inquantum agit in virtute Dei.
Aquinas, CG, II, 20, # 966, (5).

Creare non est nisi potentiae infinitae. Tanto enim est maioris poten-
tiae agens aliquod, quanto potentiam magis ab actu distantem in ac-
ad statuam, ut quodammodo habeat statuam in potentia, sta-

tuam actu fabricat; homo ex semine in cuius virtute homo est
generat hominem. Materia illa ex qua ars et natura aliquid
faciunt, interdum obediens multum et apta ad opus existit, in-
terdum ineptior, ita ut materiae potentia alias minus, alias ma-
gis distet ab actu operis fabricandi. Parum dis tat aeris potentia
ab ignis effectu; longe vero ab hoc aquae potentia. Facile itaque
est ex aere, difficile ex aqua ignem accendere. Unde apparet
tanto potentiorem esse oportere eum qui agit, quanta longius
intervallum est inter potentiam illam et actum, a qua in quem
opus suum est deducturus. Distantia vero inter nihil et esse est
infinita, tum quia in nihilo nulla est proportio ad eS'3e, tum quia
nulla distantia maior hac esse aut excogitari potest. Distantiam
vero proportione et fine carentem sola illa vis potest transcen-
dere, quae nullam habet ad alias vires proportionem, nee habet
finem. Virtus huiusmodi solus est Deus. Omnia enim a Dei po-
tentia exceduntur. Solus itaque Deus aliquid ex nihilo in esse
perducit.
**48. Ficino, TP, V, 13, v. I, pp. 206-207, (B pp. 148-149).

Praeterea [misprinted "Praetarea"], res omnis praeter ipsum
Deum creatura dicitur a Theologis, et ex quatuor [misprinted
"quator"] quibusdam componitur necessario. Ideo Pythagori-
ci non solum in corporibus, verumetiam in spiritibus quodam-
modo ponunt quatuor elementa, quia utraque constant ex es-
sentia, esse, virtute et actione. Nempe aliud in eis essentia est,
aliud esse. Est enim esse actus essentiae. Quod si praeter hunc
actum non esset illic essentia cui talis actus haereret, esset actus
purus et infinitus, quia non circumscriptus ab ullo. Hic autem
solus est Deus.
Rursus, esse ipsum ab omni esset participatione alterius absolu-

tum. Omne vero tale unicum est in natura. Soli igitur Deo con-
venit. Merito [autem] creatura non est ipsum esse suum, quia
ipse suus actus esse nequit, cum habeat in se potentiae passivae
nonnihil immixtum, quia subest Deo. Potentia vero opponitur
actui. Quoniam vero operatio differt ab essentia magis quam
esse ipsum (prius enim est essentia quam operetur), ideo ubi est
essentiae et ipsius esse distinctio, multo magis est distincta ope-
tum reducere potest: ut quod potest ex aqua ignem facere, quam quod
ex aere. Unde, ubi omnino potentia praeexistens subtrahitur, exceditur
omnis determinatae distantiae proportio, et sic necesse est potentiam
agentis quae aliquid instituit nulla potentia praeexistente, excedere
omnem proportionem quae posset considerari ad potentiam agentis
aliquid ex materia facientis. Nulla autem potentia corporis est infinita:
ut probatur a Philosopho in VIII Physicorum. Nullum igitur corpus po-
test aliquid creare, quod est ex nihilo ali quid facere.
Aquinas, CG, II, 52, # 12 76, (4).

Impossibile est quod sit duplex esse om nino infinitum: esse enim quod
omnino est infinitum, omnem perfectionem essendi comprehendit; et
sic, si duobus talis adesset infinitas, non inveniretur quo unum ab alter~
differret. Esse autem subsistens oportet esse infinitum: quia non term i-
natur ali quo recipiente. Impossibile est igitur esse aliquod esse subsis-
tens praeter primum.
Aquinas, CG, II, 52, # 1280, (8).

Ipsum esse competit primo agenti secundum propriam naturam: esse
enim Dei est eius substantia ut supra ostensum est. Quod autem com-
petit alicui secundum propriam naturam suam, non convenit aliis nisi
per modum participationis: sicut calor aliis corporibus ab igne. Ipsum
igitur esse competit omnibus aliis a primo agente per participationem
quandam. Quod aut em com petit alicui per participationem, non est
substantia eius. Impossibile est igitur quod substantia alterius entis
praeter agens primum sit ipsum esse.
ratio ab essentia. Operatio quidem ita est virtutis essentialis ac-

tus, sicut esse est actus essentiae. Quia vero creata essentia non
est suus actus, ideo nec est ope ratio sua, alioquin operatio talis
esset per se subsistens ab omni participantis limite penitus ab-
soluta. Quod tale est unicum diximus et infinitum existere.
Sed numquid operatio differt ab esse, sicut ab essentia differre
monstratur? Proculdubio. Duplex enim est operatio, una effiuit
extra operantem, ut calefactio, alter a manet intus, ut cognitio
et voluntas. Quae effiuit sine controversia dis tat ab esse, quod a
re ipsa non effiuit; quae manet ob id etiam discrepat, quia esse
creaturae certa quadam rerum specie clauditur. Operatio talis
per genera multa vagatur, immo vero intelligentia ipsa atque
voluntas per infinita. Illius enim obiectum est ipsum verum,
huius ipsum bonum. Verum autem et bonum saltern tam late
patent, quam ipsum quod ens vocatur. Operatio vera ab obiecto
trahit speciem. Ergo operatio talis omnibus rerum omnium spe-
ciebus induitur. Sed num differt operatio a virtute et virtus ab
essentia atque esse? Certe. Primo enim quia actus potentiae
semper opponitur; operatio, quae est actus, a virtute discrepat
et essentia, quae potentiae quaedam sunt, et virtus ab esse, quod
est actus, et ab essentia, quia potentiae per suos actus distin-
guuntur, cum propria potentia proprium respiciat actum. Es-
sentiae actus est esse, virtutis actus est operatio. Igitur tanto
inter se distant essentia atque virtus, quanta esse distat et opera-
tio.
Quorsum haec tam multa? U t intelligas operationem cuiuslibet

creaturae virtuti haerere, virtutem et esse essentiae ac nullam
creaturam per substantiam proxime operari sed per virtutem
operatricem quae est qualitas sive accidens, cum a substantia
undique distinguatur. Quotiens ergo aliquid operatur, qualita-
tes quasdam proxime generat et esse dat quale habet ipsa, id est
haerens alteri semper. Talia vero praecedente indigent funda-
mento. Quae fundamento indigent ex mhilo non creantur. Ergo
nulla creatura creat aliquid.
Aquinas, CG, II, 16, # 937, (6).

"Unumquodque agens sibi simile agit", quoquo modo. Agit autem
unumquodque agens secundum quod actu est. Illius igitur agentis erit
producere effectum causando aliquo modo formam materiae inhaeren-
tern quod est actu per formam sibi inhaerentem, et non per totam sub-
stantiam suam: unde Philosophus, in VII Metaph., probat quod res
materiales, habentes formas in materiis, generantur a materialibus
agentibus habentibus formas in materia, non a formis per se existenti-
bus. Deus autem non est ens actu per aliquid sibi inhaerens, sed per to-
tam suam substantiam, ut supra probatum est. Igitur proprius modus
suae actionis est ut producat rem subsistentem totam, non solum rem
inhaerentem, scilicet formam in materia. Per hunc autem modum agit
omne agens quod materiam in agenda non requirit. Deus igitur mate-
riam praeiacentem non requirit in sua actione.
49. Ficino, TP, VI, 7, v. I, p. 243, (B pp. 164-165).

Corpus naturale ex materia et forma componitur. Animal est
naturale corpus. Materia itaque in eo est et forma. Constat
autem ex anima atque corpore. Corpus quidem non est forma
naturalis, quia forma naturalis alicuius est forma et in aliquo
est tamquam subiecto quodam atque formato. Corpus autem
nullius forma est, neque in aliquo est subiecto, sed loco. Restat
ut anima forma sit, ob hoc potissimum quod est proprium inter-
numque operationum motionumque principium; immo etiam
essendi principium est animali. Totum hoc ad formam spectat.
Est igitur anima forma.
50. Ficino, TP, VI, 7, v. I, pp. 243-244, (B p. 165).

Est igitur anima forma. Quod si ipsa quoque esset corpus, opus
esset adhuc alia quadam forma tam animae quam corpori, per
quam ambo simul unum animal vocarentur, quam quidem for-
mam aliam proprius animam vocaremus. N am per animam,
quasi per formam, corpus quod ante potentia quadam est vi-
yens, actu fit vivens et animal actu. Anima igitur solum est
forma.
*51. Ficino, TP, VI, 8, v. I, pp. 245-246, (B pp. 165-166).

Corpus natura sua dispersum est penitus. Primo quia distantiam
partium patitur, ita ut semper in alio loco sit alia. Secundo quia
continue transmutatur. Nam si subiicitur tempori, sicut varia
momenta succedunt in tempore sic affectiones momentis singu-
lis variantur in corpore. Quae quidem varietas cum fiat in cae1is,
multo magis fit raptu cae10rum in elementis. Tertio quia con-
trariis subiicitur qualitatibus, calori et frigori et similibus. Unde
fit ut contra naturam corporis sit co ire in unum, manere simile
et sibi ipsi constare. Extensio namque ipsa quantitatis partes
corporis disiunctas man ere compellit. Motus perennis cogit mu-
tare naturam neque sua simul habere, sed aliud amittere, quae-
rere aliud. Qualitatum contrarietas impellit ut alter a fugiat al-
teram, per quam fugam corpus ipsum compositum dissipatur.
Quamvis autem per haec appareat corpus natura sua nullo
modo posse firmiter in unitate consistere, tamen corpus quod-
libet aliquo modo in suis partibus nectitur, cunctis in unam to-
tius corporis copulam conspirantibus. Est igitur in corpore ali-
quid ultra corporis naturam quod ipsum unit, sistit et continet.
Aquinas, CG, 11,65, # 1427, (2).

Viventia enim, cum sint quaedam res naturales, sunt composita ex
materia et forma. Componuntur autem ex corpore et anima, quae facit
viventia actu. Ergo oportet alterum istorum esse formam, et alterum
materiam. Corpus autem non potest esse forma: quia corpus non est in
altero sicut in materia et subiecto. Anima igitur est forma. Ergo non est
corpus: cum nullum corpus sit forma.
Aquinas, CG, II, 57, # 1339, (14)·

Quod autem ut forma propria anima corpori uniatur, sic probatur. 11-
Iud quo aliquid fit de potentia ente actu ens, est forma et actus ipsius.
Corpus autem per animam fit actu ens de potentia existente: vivere
enim est esse viventis; semen autem ante animationem est vivens solum
in potentia, per animam autem fit vivens actu. Est igitur anima forma
corporis animati.
Aquinas, CG, II, 65, # 1429, (4).

Omne corpus divisibile est. Omne autem divisibile indiget aliquo con-
tinente et uniente partes eius.
Unit, inquam, distantiam partium. Sistit fluxum perennem.

Continet invicem per suam simplicem consonantiam dissonas
corporis qualitates.
Quid hoc est? Corpusne? Si corpus est, eget similiter alia con-
nectente. Quid aliud illud? Num corpus? Si corpus, eget et alio.
Quo circa fatendum est nullam esse posse in corporibus unita-
tern, nullam constantiam nullamve concordiam, nisi illis insit
vis aliqua incorporea. Ergo si et anima corpus dicatur esse, eget
ipsa etiam aliqua copula. Vim autem huiusmodi copulantem
nos animam vel virtutem animae potiusquam illud copulatum
asseverabimus, cum videamus esse animae proprium, humores
contrarios membraque divers a in unam animalis compagem
devineire, qua abeunte diffiuunt omnia. Igitur anima neque est
corpus, sed copula corporis intima vel substantia copulatrix, ...
52. Ficino, TP, VI, 9, v. I, p. 247, (B p. 166).

Quod autem ubique in corpore sit, ex eo in praesentia patet
quod nihil magis intrinsecum essentiae est quam esse, ideoque
forma per quam esse substantiale tribuitur tum corpori toti tum
partibus, toti partibusque est intima. Et quia sicut res se habet
ad esse sic et ad unum, anima quae per se dat esse, per se
[quoque] absque medio unitur corpori universo. Quod autem
esse substantia Ie tribuat, inde patet quod ea sub lata omnia
membra mutant speciem. Quoniam vero ab essentia flu it esse, a
virtute operatio, anima quae singulis membris esse operatio-
nemque largitur, singulis quoque essentiam suam virtutemque
communicat. Ita enim esse operationemque praestat, sicut uni-
tur. Quare si illa praestat singulis, unitur et singulis.
53. Fieino, TP, VII, 9, v. I, pp. 278-279, (B p. 179).

Complexio natura quaedam est ex contrariis quodammodo
qualitatibus constituta, quae inter eas quasi medium obtinet.
Ex quo fit ut forma substantialis esse non possit, quia non in se
subsistit, sed in eo corpore quod est contrariarum illarum quali-
tatum subiectum quae, quia invicem pugnant, sese invicem non
suscipiunt, verum susceptae a materia et invicem mixtae com-
plexionem generant. Haec igitur complexio tum ex eo quod
dixi substantia non est, tum ex eo quod aliquid sibi habet con-
trarium, puta, excessum alicuius extraneae qualitatis conflatio-
nem suam dissociantis. Praeterea, suseipit magis ac minus. In-
Si igitur anima sit corpus, habebit aliquid aliud continens et illud

magis erit anima: videmus enim, anima recedente, corpus dissolvi. Et
si hoc iterum sit divisibile, oportebit vel devenire ad aliquod indivisibile
et incorporeum, quod erit anima: vel erit procedere in infinitum, quod
est impossibile. Non est igitur anima corpus.
Aquinas, CG, II, 72 , # 14.84, (3).

Sic autem anima est forma totius corporis quod etiam est forma singu-
larium partium. Si enim esset forma totius et non partium, non esset
forma substantialis talis corporis: sicut forma domus, quae est forma
totius et non singularium partium, est forma accidentalis. Quod autem
sit forma substantialis totius et partium, patet per hoc quod ab ea sorti-
tur speciem et totum et partes. U nde, ea abscedente, neque totum ne-
que partes remanent eiusdem speciei: nam oculus mortui et caro eius
non dicuntur nisi aequivoce. Si igitur anima est actus singularium
partium; actus autem est in eo cuius est actus: relinquitur quod sit se-
cundum suam essentiam in qualibet parte corporis.
Aquinas, CG, II, 63, # 1418, (3).

Complexio, cum sit quiddam constitutum ex contrariis qualitatibus
quasi medium inter eas, impossibile est quod sit forma substantialis:
nam "substantiae nihil est contrarium, nec suscipit magis et minus".
Anima autem est forma substantialis, et non accidentalis: alias per
animam non sortiretur aliquid genus vel speciem. Anima igitur non est
complexio.
tenditur enim ac remittitur natura, vis operatioque complexio-

nis. Substantia vero neque habet proprium sibi contrarium, cum
consistat in alia genere quam substantiae ipsa rerum contrarie-
tas, hoc est in genere qualitatis. Neque in natura sua aut in
magis intenditur, aut in minus remittitur, ut nunc magis, nunc
minus haec aut illa substantia sit, quod est semel substantia, hoc
est magis minusve lapis iste quam ille. Cum igitur complexio non
sit substantia, anima, si substantia sit, non est complexio.
Quod [autem] anima sit substantia, hinc etiam patet quia per
earn animal certam aliquam et substantialem sortitur speciei
generisque naturam atque cognomen. Per hanc animam hoc
quidem canis est, per illam illud equus, per aliam illud homo.
Illa quidem qualitas, quae accidens est, subiecto suo advenit
postquam illud in specie sua iam est perfectum.
54. Ficino, TP, VIII, 6, v. I, p. 313, (B p. 194).

Nullum corpus aliquid in se continet, nisi per earn quantitatis
adaequationem, per quam se toto totam rem comprehend at, par-
tern vero parte atque maiore sui parte maiorem rei contentae par-
tem, minore minorem. Intellectus non hoc pacto res ipsas capit,
nam se toto capit quicquid accipit. Eodem quippe modo capit
quo intelligit. Intelligit autem se toto quicquid intelligit.
*55. Ficino, TP, VIII, 7, v. I, pp. 314-3 15, (B pp. 194-195).

Solent corpora quando corporum aliorum formas accipiunt,
suas amittere. Quomodo enim aqua igneam caliditatem induet,
nisi frigiditatem suam exuerit? Quod si quando aliena accepta
remanet etiam propria fit imperfectior, ut quando remanet dul-
cedo in vino etiam aqua illi infusa fit dulcis, sapor in de debilior.
Mens autem rerum omnium accipit formas, dum omnes agnos-
cit et cognitas in seipsa volutat; neque illas accipiendo formam
propriam amittit aut debilitat. Quippe cum ex operatione sem-
per cuiusque formae habitus designetur atque operatio intellec-
tus intelligentia sit, sequitur ut forma intellectus sit ipsa, ut ita
dixerim, intellectualitas naturalis, quae tunc perfecta maxime
iudicatur quando operatio eius, intelligentia, perfectissima est.
Haec autem tanto est perfectior quanta plures rerum formas
attingit. Sublimior enim fit, velocior et lucidior. Quamobrem
intellectus, corporum omnium formas accipiendo, non modo
Aquinas, CG, II, 49, # 1248, (2).

Nullum enim corpus invenitur aliquid continere nisi per commensura-
tionem quantitatis: unde et, si se toto totum aliquid continet, et partem
parte continet, maiorem quid em maiore, minorem autem minore. In-
tellectus autem non comprehendit rem aliquam intellectam per ali-
quam quantitatis commensurationem: cum se toto intelligat et com-
prehendat totum et partem, maiora in quantitate et minora. Nulla
igitur substantia intelligens est corpus.
Aquinas, CG, II, 49, # 1249, (3).

Nullum corpus potest alterius corporis formam substantialem recipere
nisi per corruptionem suam formam amittat. Intellectus autem non
corrumpitur, sed magis perficitur per hoc quod recipit formas omnium
corporum: perficitur enim in intelligendo; intelligit autem secundum
quod habet in se formas mtellectorum. Nulla 19itur substantia intellec-
tualis est corpus.
non amittit aut non remittit suam, sed (quod est contra natu-
ram corporis) summopere perficit.
*56. Ficino, TP, VIII, 8, v. I, pp. 315-316, (B p. 195).

Corpus et forma per corpus extensa adeo, ut ita loquar, materia-
lia sunt ac particulari situi temporique astricta, ut universalem
vim nullam habeant. Quo enim quid corporali materiae pro-
pinquat magis eo angustius est, quo discedit longius eo fit am-
plius. Quamobrem si intellectus esset corpus vel forma diffusa
per ipsum, formae omnes ab eo susceptae, etiam si in seipsis
essent universales, in eo saltem particulares omnino materiales-
que evaderent. Nam formae in subiecto, quod est astrictum ma-
teriae passionibus, nullam vim retinet ad universale quicquam
repraesentandum. Ita intellectus quicquid cogitaret, per for-
mam materialem singularibusque conditionibus astrictam ex-
cogitaret. Cum vero operatio rei cuiusque formam rei operantis
sequatur, intellectus per talem formam operans, id est excogi-
tans, singulariter solum operaretur. Qualis autem operatio est,
tale semper est opus. Ideo intellectus singulariter cogitans sola
singularia cogitaret neque commune quicquam et universale
cognosceret. Unum quidem hominem, puta Socratem vel Pla-
tonem, in se revolveret; humanam vera naturam illis aeque
communem minime. N eque regulam in moribus et artibus ad
plura universalem statueret, neque legem conderet umquam
multos hominum actus respicientem.

Duo corporea se invicem mutuis amplexibus continere non pos-
sunt. Quod enim per quantitatem aliud continet, maius est illo
quod continetur. Non potest autem unum corpus alio quodam
uno corpore amplius esse simul atque angustius. Sic Saturni
sphaera Iovis sphaeram ambit et continet, non e converso. Alia
vero mens aliam continet et ab eadem pariter continetur. Mens
quidem mea tuam considerat, tua meam. Itaque nostrae men-
tes se invicem considerando vicissim se capiunt, capiendo intel-
ligunt, complectuntur intelligendo ...

Secundum vera sequeretur absurdum, si intellectus esset corpus,
quod videlicet ordinem corporum non transcenderet, cum cor-
APPENDIX: TEXTS FOR COMPARISON lSI
Aquinas, CG, II, 49, # 12 50 , (4).

Principium diversitatis individuorum eiusdem speciei est divisio mate-
riae secundum quantitatem: forma enim huius ignis a forma illius ignis
non differt nisi per hoc quod est in diversis partibus in quas materia di-
viditur; nec aliter quam divisione quantitatis, sine qua substantia est
indivisibilis. Quod autem recipitur in corpore, recipitur in eo secun-
dum quantitatis divisionem. Ergo forma non recipitur in corpore, nisi
ut individuata. Si igitur intellectus esset corpus, formae rerum intelligi-
biles non reciperentur in eo nisi ut individuatae. Intelligit autem inte1-
lectus res per formas earum quas penes se habet. Non ergo intellectus
intelliget universalia, sed solum particularia. Quod patet esse falsum.
Nullus igitur intellectus est corpus.
Aquinas, CG, II, 49, # 12 53, (7).

Impossibile est duo corpora se invicem continere: cum continens exce-
dat contentum. Duo autem intellectus se invicem continent et compre-
hendunt, dum unus alium intelligit. Non est igitur intellectus corpus.
Aquinas, CG, II, 49, # 12 5 1 , (5).

Nihil agit nisi secundum suam speciem: eo quod forma est principium
agendi in unoquoque. Si igitur intellectus sit corpus, actio eius ordinem
pora ferme numquam ultra suam speciem, certe numquam su-

pra suum genus aliquid operentur. Mens igitur numquam cog-
noscet incorporalia. Utrum horum praestantius arbitraris: sub-
stantiamne an actionem? Substantia certe, quae ipsius actionis
est causa. Cavendum itaque ne operationem aliquando sub-
stantia sublimiorem confiteamur. Esset autem mentis operatio
sublimior quam substantia, si substantia quidem eius certum
corpus esset solummodo, intelligentia vero eius et corpora quae-
que et incorporea comprehenderet. Quapropter non est corpus,
quandoquidem ultra corpora quaelibet apprehendit etiam in-
corporea.
59. Fieino, TP, VIII, II, v. I, p. 320, (B p. 197).

Numquam corpus formam novam accipit nisi per motum. Nam
per alterationem, ut aiunt Physici, forma inducitur in materiam.
Mens autem neque per motum aceipit formas neque aceipiendo
movetur. Quae quanta magis ab omni perturbationum et nego-
tiorum motu quietem agit, tanto magis proficit speculando. Ubi
etiam apparet eius aeternitas, quia suapte natura solam specu-
lationem veritatis affectat atque ideo statum, sine quo non per-
ficitur speculatio. Proficit autem corpus motu, quod per motum
natum est. Quod ergo stando proficit ex statu dependet, ideoque
stabilem habet substantiam atque perpetuam.
60. Ficino, TP, VIII, 12, v. I, pp. 320-321, (B p. 197).

Formae contrariorum elementorum dum sunt in materia, con-
trariae inter se sunt, quia pellunt se invicem et interimunt. In
mente non sunt contrariae, quia ibi non modo non pellunt se
invicem sed et iuvant. Simul quidem nostra mens habet contra-
riorum elementorum formas, quando simul elementa conside-
rat. Simul quoque comprehendit bona et mala, utilia et inutilia,
pulchra atque deformia, lucem et tenebras, vocem atque silen-
tium, dulce et amarum et reliqua, atque ex cognitione alterius
contrarii sincerius iudicat alterum. Non igitur est corporea ne-
que etiam proprie corruptibilis. Quippe quod corrumpitur, ut
plurimum, corrumpitur a contrario. Quid autem esse potest
menti contrarium, quae tantam habet super contraria potesta-
tem ut ab ipsis auferat contrarietatem et sua pace conciliet ini-
mica? Neque rursus corruptibilis est, quod a suis conservatoribus
disiungatur. Nam si aliena et contraria alienis contrariisque
corporum non excedet. Non igitur intelligeret nisi corpora. Hoc autem
patet esse falsum: intelligimus enim m ulta quae non sunt corpora. In-
tellectus igitur non est corpus.
Aquinas, CG, II, 50, # 1266, (8).

Materia non recipit aliquam formam de novo nisi per motum vel mu-
tationem. Intellectus autem non movetur per hoc quod recipit formas,
sed magis perficitur et quiescens intelligit, impeditur autem in intelli-
gendo per motum. Non igitur recipiuntur formae in intellectu sicut in
materia vel in re materiali. Unde patet quod substantiae intelligentes
immateriales sunt, sicut et incorporeae.
Aquinas, CG, II, 50, # 1265, (7).

Formae contrariorum, secundum esse quod habent in materia, sunt
contrariae: unde et se invicem expellunt. Secundum autem quod sunt
in intellectu, non sunt contrariae: sed unum contrariorum est ratio in-
telligibilis alterius, quia unum per aliud cognoscitur. Non igitur habent
esse materiale in intellectu. Ergo intellectus non est compositus ex ma-
teria et forma.
conciliat, multo magis se suis tum causis tum servatoribus ad-

movet.
*61. Ficino, TP, VIII, 13, v. I, pp. 321-322, (B pp. 197-198).

Corporis cuiusque forma, quando vere ab alia corpore capitur,
tale reddit omnino illud quod suscipit ips am quale est corpus
aliud a quo forma tribuitur, veluti quando flamma ignis a ligno
suscipitur, lignum facit calidum atque igneum .... Mens au-
tem corporum accipit omnium formas, quando de corporibus
iudicat. Num accipit vere? Vere profecto. Nempe ut accipit, ita
iudicat. Vere iudicat, vere igitur accipit. Accipit, inquam a,
seipsa, ut Platonici opinantur, quando corporum simulacris ex-
citata, formas quae in mentis abditis latent promit in lucem.
Accedit quod ubi perfectior forma est, ibi est [et] verior. Quanto
vero perfectior si forma corporum in mente, quam in ipsis cor-
poribus, et alias declaravimus declarabimusque. Et hinc patet
quod humana natura in Platone vel Socrate solius Platonis est
et solius Socratis propria. Humana autem natura illa, quae
mente concipitur, quando sub una hominis definitione homi-
num conditiones considerat, ad singulos homines habet vim,
siquidem omnes complectitur.
Praeterea, si veritas rei cuiusque in pura integritate consistit vel
integra puritate, atque forma in materia vim suam integram
non retinet propter passionis admixtionem et extraneis acciden-
tibus circumfunditur, verior res quaeque invenitur in mente,
ubi rei ipsius idea naturaliter insita notionem rei parit, necessa-
ria quidem includentem omnia, supervacua vero penitus exclu-
dentem. Mens igitur usque adeo vere corporum capit formas ut
verius etiam eas habeat quam materia corporum. Igitur si ipsa
sit aliquid corporale, talis reddetur omnino, qualia corpora.
Fiet ergo aqua cum aquam intelliget, cum ignem intelliget, ig-
nis. Et quia simul intelligit calorem atque frigus, fiet contraria
simul. Nunc autem rormas aceipit omnium, neque e suo statu
deiicitur, immo perfieitur capiendo. Hine apparet intellectum
non esse corporeum.
*62. Ficino, TP, VIII, 13, v. I, pp. 322-323, (B p. 198).

Apparet etiam non esse mortalem. HIe siquidem eo modo quo
est accipit quicquid accipit. Esse suum intellectuale est dum-
taxat. Non ergo accipit quicquam aliter quam intelligendo. Per
Aquinas, CG, II, 50, # 1263, (5).

Formae rerum sensibilium perfectius esse habent in intellectu quam in
rebus sensibilibus: sunt enim simpliciores et ad plura se extendentes;
per unam enim formam 'hominis' intelligibilem, omnes homines intel-
lectus cognoscit. Forma autem perfecte in materia existens facit esse
actu tale, scilicet vel ignem, vel coloratum: si autem non faciat aliquid
esse tale, est imperfecte in illo, sicut forma coloris in aere ut in deferen-
te, et sicut virtus primi agentis in instrumento.
Si igitur intellectus sit ex materia et forma compositus, formae rerum

intellectarum facient intellectum esse actu talis naturae quale est quod
intelligitur. Et sic sequitur error Empedoc1is, qui dicebat quod "ignem
igne cognoscit anima, et terra terram", et sic de allis. Quod patet esse
inconveniens. Non est igitur intelligens substantia composita ex materia
et forma.
Aquinas, CG, II, 55, # 130 5, (9).

Omne quod corrumpitur, corrumpitur per hoc quod aliquid patitur:
nam et ipsum corrumpi est quoddam patio Nulla autem substantia in-
tellectualis potest pati tali passione quae ducat ad corruptionem. Nam
huiusmodi susceptionem non modo non deficit sed et proficit.

Nihil ergo suscipit aliunde, quod ipsum mutet et perdat et,
quod maius est, tantum in omnibus formis suscipiendis lucratur
ut lucrari etiam videatur in malis.

Operatio cuiusque rei esse ipsum rei semper sequitur, ita ut il-
lius sit operatio cuius [et] esse et modus operandi idem sit qui
et essendi et opus ad quod terminatur operatio sit simile operan-
ti. In rebus ex materia et forma corporali compositis esse non
est materiae proprium aut formae, sed totius compositi ex utro-
rumque coniunctione confectio Igitur et compositi ipsius proprie
operatio est. Quare et modo composito operatur et opus produ-
cit compositum. Hoc in elementis, plantis, animalibus intuemur,
quae quidem opera composita, sicut ipsa sunt, generant. Si in-
tellectus corpus aliquod esset ex materia et forma compositum,
cum eius operatio intelligentia sit, haec ipsa intelligentia semper
ad aliquid compositum terminaretur; unde numquam aliud
praeter res compositas intelligeret. Nunc vero nostra mens usque
adeo naturalem excellit compositionem ut corpora composita in
materiam resolvat et formam et cogitet utrumque seorsum.
*64. Ficino, TP, VIII, 15, V. I, pp. 324-325, (B p. 199).

Nullius corporis actio in ipsam actionem proprie desinit, sed in
exteriorem transit materiam. N am si in actionem desineret, ac-
tio illa in operante restaret ubi in seipsum operaretur, puta,
ignis seipsum calefaceret. Quod non potest a corpore fieri quia,
si corpus non agit ex se, etiam non agit in se. Rursus, si quicquid
corpus agit movendo agit, certe, cum movere se nequeat, in
seipsum agere nequit. Videmus autem mentis operationem,
ipsam scilicet intelligentiam, in seipsam desinere, neque
quicquam per se extrinsecus facere, nisi forte quandoque
moveat voluntatem, quae motis brachiis opus aliquod extra
producat, quale fuerat cogitatum. Sensum autem dicimus
quodammodo extra se £luere, quia aliunde movetur, pro-
spicit aliena, externi finis gratia operatur, neque sui
ipsius est conscius. Mens contra movetur libere, se suaque
inspicit, sui gratia operatur. Ideo essentia apud Plato-
pati recipere quoddam est. Quod autem recipitur in substantia intel-

lectuali, oportet quod recipiatur in ea per modum ipsius, scilicet intel-
ligibiliter. Quod vero sic in substantia intellectuali recipitur, est perfi-
ciens substantiam intellectual em, et non corrumpens earn: intelligibile
enim est perfectio intelligentis. Substantia igitur intelligens est incor-
ruptibilis.
Aquinas, CG, II, 50, # 1262, (4).

Actio cuiuslibet ex materia et forma compositi non est tan tum formae,
nee tan tum materiae, sed compositi: eius enim est agere cuius est esse;
esse autem est compositi per formam; unde et compositum per formam
agit. Si igitur substantia intelligens sit compos ita ex materia et forma,
intelligere erit ipsius compositi. Actus autem terminatur ad aliquid si-
mile agenti: unde et compositum generans non generat formam, sed
compositum. Si igitur intelligere sit actio compositi, non intelligetur
nee forma nec materia, sed tantum compositum. Hoc autem patet esse
falsum. Non est igitur substantia intelligens compos ita ex materia et
forma.
Aquinas, CG, II, 49, # 12 55, (9).

Actio corporis ad actionem non terminatur, nec motus ad motum: ut
in Physicis est probatum.
Actio autem substantiae intelligentis ad actionem terminatur: intel-

lectus enim, sicut intelligit rem, ita intelligit se intelligere, et sic in infi-
nitum. Substantia igitur intelligens non est corpus.
nem status dicitur quia, si sine vita sit, torpet; vita motus, quia
iam exit in actum; mens reflexio, quia sine hac vita in externum
opus efRueret. Sed mens sistit vitalem essentiae motum in
semetipso, reflectit ipsum in essentiam quadam sui ipsius
animadversione. Trahit quoque caetera omnia ad seipsam,
prout res, potius ut ipsa mens est quam ut res extra existunt,
considerat. Vocatur etiam reflexio infinita, quia in opera-
tionem suam non modo semel mens hominis terminatur,
verumetiam innumerabiliter, cum se aliquid intelligere
animadvertit et quod animadvertat agnoscit et cum aliquid
yelle se vult, et vult quod velit se yelle atque eadem ratione
deinceps, ubi vel operatio alia in infinitum terminatur ad
aliam, vel eadem in se replicatur innumere.
65. Ficino, TP, VIII, 16, v. I, pp. 328-330, (B pp. 200-201).

Constat apud Physicos formam corporalem, praesertim elemen-
talem, esse usque ad eo terminatam ut nullo modo vim aliquam
infinitam indefessamque possit habere. Mens autem absque ter-
mino pervagatur, neque fatigatur umquam. Principio in seipsa
quasi est sine termino, ....
Quinetiam corpora dividit in partes plurimas partiumque parti-

culas. Numeros auget supra numeros absque fine. Figurarum
modos mutuasque illarum proportiones atque etiam numero-
rum comparationes innumerabiles invenit. Lineam supra cae-
lum ultra terminum undique protendit. Tempus in praeteritum
absque principio, in futurum absque fine producit. Neque so-
lum ultra omne tempus aliud antiquius cogitat et prolixius,
verumetiam ultra omnem locum alium semper cogitat amplio-
rem .....
Apparet rursus ex eo quod universales rerum rationes capito
Sub quolibet autem universali seu specie sive genere innumera-
bilia continentur. Innumerabiles sub humana specie homines
successione perpetua itemque sub aliis infinita individua colligit
in unam speciem, species multas in genus unum, multa genera
in unam essentiam, essentiam unam in divinam unitatem, veri-
tatem et bonitatem. Vicissim ab hac una gradatim descendit in
multitudinem infinitam. Mira profecto virtus, quae infinita reddit
unum, unum reddit infinita. Huic ferme non proprius in natura
gradus est ullus, quatenus sursum deorsumque penetrat omnes.
Aquinas, CG, II, 49, # 1252, (6).

Si substantia intelligens est corpus, aut est finitum, aut infinitum. Cor-
pus autem esse infinitum actu est impossibile, ut in Physicis probatur.
Est igitur finitum corpus, si corpus esse ponatur. Hoc autem est impos-
sibile. In nullo enim corpore finito potest esse potentia infinita, ut
supra probatum est. Potentia autem intellectus est quodammodo infi-
nita in intelligendo: in infinitum enim intelligit species numerorum
augendo, et similiter species figurarum et proportionum; cognoscit
etiam universale, quod est virtute infinitum secundum suum ambitum,
continet enim individua quae sunt potentia infinita. Intellectus igitur
non est corpus.
66. Ficino, TP, IX, 4, v. II, pp. 19-20, (B p. 207).

Itaque iudicium intellectus de rebus agendis non est natura sua
ad aliquid unum determinatum. Est igitur liberum. Iudicii si-
quidem libertate [ideo] carent aliqua, quia nullum habent iudi-
cium, ut plantae, aliqua quia, licet habeant, habent tamen a
natura ad unum aliquid determinatum, ut bruta. Naturali
enim existimatione iudicat ovis lupum sibi perniciosum ac fugit,
neque potest non fugere, impellente natura. Naturali instinctu
feruntur hirundines ad nidum conficiendum, apes ad alvearia,
ad telas araneae.
Ideo omnes eiusdem speciei animantes eodem modo sua fabri-

cant semper, neque discunt aliquando, neque variant umquam,
quia species naturalis qua ducuntur ab initio inest atque eadem
permanet. Homines autem et discunt, et opera sua variant sem-
per: unam tamen et ab initio naturam habent. Non igitur na-
tura trahuntur ad agendum, sed ipsi suo consilio alias aliter
seipsos agunt.
Unde enim contingere id putamus, quod arbores bestiaeque in

suis quibusdam motibus, artibus, electionibusque numquam
aberrant; homo vero saepissime. Non quidem ex eo quod intel-
lectus insit illis perfectior, quibus nec intellectus quidem inest
ulIus, sed quia ab intellectu divino numquam errante trahuntur.
Homo vero a suo, qui errare potest, ducitur, qui etiam si quando
ab actionibus propriis otium agit ad tempus, tunc ipse quoque a
Deo ducitur, neque errat: quod ex vaticiniis et miraculis dec1a-
ratur. Ac si semper duceretur sicut alia, tanto minus erraret
quam ilIa quanto perfectius est instrumentum. Rursus, si alia
seipsa ducerent sicut homo, tanto magis errarent quanto minus
perfectam sortita sunt speciem. Cum igitur homo iudicium de
rebus agendis non habeat a natura ad unum determinatum, est
necessario liber.
Aquinas, CG, II, 48, # 1246, (6).

Iudicii libertate carent aliqua vel propter hoc quod nullum habent
judicium, sicut quae cognitione carent, ut lapides et plantae: vel quia
habent iudicium a natura determinatum ad unum, sicut irrationalia
animalia; naturali enim existimatione iudicat ovis lupum sibi nocivum,
et ex hoc iudicio fugit ipsum; similiter autem in aliis.
Aquinas, CG, III, 8S, # 2601, 260 3, (S, 7).

Praeterea. Ea quae naturaliter fiunt, determinatis mediis perducuntur
ad finem, unde semper eodem modo contingunt: natura enim determi-
nata est ad unum. Electiones autem humanae diversis viis tendunt in
finem, tam in moralibus quam in artificialibus. Non igitur electiones
humanae sunt naturaliter.
Item. Ea quae sunt eiusdem speciei, non diversificantur in operatio-

nibus naturalibus quae naturam speciei consequuntur: unde omnis hi-
rundo similiter facit nidum, et omnis homo similiter intelligit prima
principia, quae sunt naturaliter nota.IElectio autem est operatio conse-
quens speciem humanam. Si igitur hdmo naturaliter eligeret,!oporteret
quod omnes homines eodem modo eligerent. Quod patet esse falsum,
tam in moralibus quam in artificialibus.
Aquinas, CG, III, 8S, # 2602, (6).

Ea quae naturaliter fiunt, ut plurimum recte fiunt: natura enim non
deficit nisi in paucioribus. Si igitur homo naturaliter eligeret, ut in plu-
ribus electiones essent rectae. Quod patet esse falsum. Non igitur homo
naturaliter eligit. Quod oporteret si ex impulsu corporum caelestium
eligeret.
Quod autem iudicet libere, ex eo coniicimus quod seipsum ducit

ad iudicandum. Quod seipsum ducat, ex eo quod in iudicium
suum se reflectit. Quod se refiectat, ex eo quod se iudicare cog-
noscit iudiciumque definit. Quam quidem libertatem intellectus
ipsius virtute sortitur. Intellectus enim non hoc modo aut illud
apprehendit bonum, sed ipsum commune bonum. Quoniam
vero intellectus per apprehensam a se formam movet volunta-
tern atque in omnibus motor et mobile proportione invicem
congruunt, voluntas rationalis non est a natura determinata,
nisi ad ipsum commune bonum. Sub ipso [autem] communi bo-
no bona singula continentur. Quicquid igitur voluntati off'ertur
ut bonum potest in illud inclinari voluntas, nulla inclinatione
naturali in contrarium prohibente. Quod quidem significatur
per ea quae supra diximus, quod multa eligit contra naturae
corporalis usum et voluptatem.
*67. Ficino, TP, IX, 4, v. II, p. 20, (B p. 207).

Denique naturalia speciei cuiusque officia probant vana esse non
posse, officium autem hominis esse consilium. Frustra tamen il-
lic ad opposita consultari, ubi nequeat alterutrum, prout con-
iectura designat, eligi atque tractari.
68. Ficino, TP, XI, I, v. II, pp. 92-93, (B pp. 239-240).

Ipsum intelligibile propria est intellectus perfectio, unde intel-
lectus in actu et intelligibile in actu sunt unum. Intellectus si-
quidem quamdiu potentia est intellecturus nondum cum re po-
tentia intelligenda coniungitur, sed quando actu intelligens est
cum re actu iam intellecta. Coniungitur autem cum ea, ut vo-
lunt Peripatetici, quoniam rei illius forma inhaeret menti. Quo-
rum vero una forma est ipsa sunt unum. Unum ergo fit ex
mente intelligente ac re intellecta, quandoquidem rei huius for-
ma, ut talis est, format mentem. Quod ergo convenit intelligibi-
Ii, quantum intelligibile est, convenit intellectui, quantum intel-
lectus, quia perfectio et quod perficitur unius sunt generis et
semper invicem proportione mutua vinciuntur. Intelligibile ve-
ro quantum tale est necessarium et perpetuum. Quippe in spe-
culando nullius existimamus corruptibilia, quia nos scire non
Aquinas, CG, 11,48, # 1246, (6).
Quaecumque igitur habent iudicium de agendis non determinatum a
natura ad unum, necesse est liberi arbitrii esse. Huiusmodi autem sunt
omnia intellectualia. Intellectus enim apprehendit non solum hoc vel
illud bonum, sed ipsum bonum commune. U nde, cum intellectus per
formam apprehensam move at voluntatem; in omnibus autem movens
et motum oporteat esse proportionata; voluntas substantiae intellec-
tualis non erit determinata a natura nisi ad bonum commune. Quic-
quid igitur offeretur sibi sub ratione boni, poterit voluntas inclinari in
illud, nulla determinatione naturali in contrarium prohibente. Omnia
igitur intellectualia liberam voluntatem habent ex iudicio intellectus
venientem. Quod est liberum arbitrium habere, quod definitur esse
"liberum de ratione iudicium".
Aquinas, CG, III, 85, # 2606, (IO).

Nulla virtus datur alicui rei frustra. Homo autem habet virtutem iudi-
candi et consiliandi de omnibus quae per ipsum operabilia sunt, sive in
usu exteriorum rerum, sive in admittendo vel repellendo intrinsecas
passiones. Quod quidem frustra esset, si electio nostra causaretur a cor-
poribus caelestibus, non existens in nostra potestate. Non igitur corpora
caelestia sunt causa nostrae electionis.
Aquinas, CG, II, 55, # 1307, (II).

Intelligibile est propria perfectio intellectus: unde "intellectus in actu
et intelligibile in actu sunt unum". Quod igitur convenit intelligibili in-
quantum est intelligibile, oportet convenire intellectui inquantum
huiusmodi: quia perfectio et perfectibile sunt unius generis. Intelligibi-
Ie autem, inquantum est intelligibile, est necessarium et incorruptibile:
necessaria enim perfecte sunt intellectu cognoscibilia; contingentia ve-
ro, inquantum huiusmodi, non nisi deficienter; habetur enim de eis non
scientia, sed 'opinio';
arbitramur quicquam, nisi certam rei rationem et necessariam

teneamus, et quae necessaria sunt, ea perfecte intellectu com-
prehenduntur; contingentia vero quantum huiusmodi, imper-
fecte. Quando enim contingentia intellectus affirmat, saepe
fallitur. Si falIi non vult, ambigit. Uterque actus imperfectus
est, et falli, et ambigere. Merito [ergo] quando contingentia
cogitat, dubitare solet, ne interim permutentur, et aliter de illis
atque aliter momentis aliis sit iudicandum. Momentis namque
singulis permutantur. Puta, dum dicimus Platonem sedere, potest
enim interim surrexisse. Definitiones autem rerum universales
perpetuae sunt, uthomo est animal rationale. Proprietates quoque
specie rum, quae proprie definiuntur sunt sempiternae, ut omne
rationale potest ratiocinari. Semper enim definitiones proprieta-
tesque tales aeque sunt verae etiam si nullus in terris homo spiret.
Has intellectus perspicue cernit tenetque firmiter et asserit sine
errore vel dubio. Et si qua contingentia intelligit, maxime sub his
rationibus universalibus comprehendit, ubi corruptibilia cogitat
non ut talia, sed ut aeterna. Intellectus ergo perpetuus est, qui
rationibus sempiternis unitur solisque perficitur. Si intellectus eas
capit et quod capit proportionem aliquam habet cum eo quod
capitur, congruentiam certe cum his rationibus intellectus habe-
bit. Hae neque principium habent neque finem. At si mens ha-
bet utrumque, nullam cum his habebit proportionem, quoniam
ab eis omnino per conditiones oppositas distinguetur. Quaprop-
ter mens aut fuit semper et erit ut ipsae, aut si esse coepit quan-
doque, non tamen desinet umquam.
69. Ficino, TP, XV, I, v. III, pp. 10-11, (B p. 328).

Si mens forma corporis esset, eodem pacto quaeque susciperet
quo et materia suscipit corporalis. Quod enim est corporis for-
ma, nihil absque sua materia suscipit. Materia vero quicquid
suscipit, dividuo suscipit modo, unde formae rerum in ea divi-
sae, temporales, particulares evadunt. Tales quoque caperet in-
tellectus. Numquam igitur per suas formas universalem natu-
ram aliquam comprehenderet.
*70. Ficino, TP, XV, I, v. III, p. II, (B p. 328).

Materia formas, quas possidet, non agnoscit. Ita mens, si iuncta
materiae per eius consortium eodem pacto caperet quo materia,
nihil prorsus agnosceret.
unde et corruptibilium intellectus scientiam habet secundum quod

sunt incorruptibilia, inquantum scilicet sunt universalia. Oportet igitur
intellectum esse incorruptibilem.
Aquinas, CG, II, 59, # 1356, (4).

Si esset forma alicuius corporis materialis, "esset eiusdem generis re-
ceptio" huius intellectus, et receptio materiae primae. Id enim quod
est alicuius corporis forma, non recipit aliquid absque sua materia. Ma-
teria autem prima recipit formas individuales: immo per hoc indivi-
duantur quod sunt in materia. Intellectus igitur possibilis reciperet for-
mas ut sunt individuales. Et sic non cognosceret universalia. Quod pa-
tet esse falsum.
Aquinas, CG, II, 59, # 1357, (5)·

Materia prima non est cognoscitiva formarum quas recipit. Si ergo
eadem esset receptio intellectus possibilis et materiae primae, nec inte!-
lectus possibilis cognosceret formas receptas. Quod est falsum.
71. Fieino, TP, XV, I, v. III, p. I I, (B p. 328).

Impossibile est in corpore infinitam ulla ratione esse virtutem.
Mentis autem virtus est quodammodo infinita.
*72. Fieino, TP, XV, 9, v. III, p. 51, (B p. 345).

Quotiens natura una duas habens dissimiles vires agendi in ac-
tum unius nimis intenditur, ab alterius actu ferme desistit. Ideo
convivae acute audire lyram simul et epulas gustare vix pos-
sunt. Quod si intentissima degustatio non impediret auditum,
has vires duas non unius substantiae, sed duarum esse affirma-
remus substantiarum. Actus autem alendi et sentiendi intentissi-
mi humanam intelligentiam impediunt, atque haec iUos. Quod
significat intellectum esse ipsius eiusdem nostrae animae vim,
cuius est nutriendi virtus et sentiendi.
**73. Ficino, TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, p. 209, (B pp. 410-41 I).

Creata mens quaelibet, respiciendo vel in suam essentiam, quae
ibi differt ab esse et in certa speeie est a Deo infinite distante, vel
in lumen sibimet proprium vel in quodvis lumen in ea determi-
natum, substantiam divinam intelligere nequit, quae cum in-
finita sit, certe quid ipsa sit per finitum aliquid repraesentari
non potest. Solum vero per ea quae diximus, mentes et Deum
esse cognoscunt, et quid non sit potiusquam quid sit, et qua ra-
tione vel ipse ad alia, vel alia referantur ad ipsum.
Id Plato in Parmenide probat. Idem Dionysius Areopagitalin
Mystica Theologia comprobat, concludens mentes in summo na-
turalis cognitionis gradu coniungi Deo velut ignoto, quasi ocu-
lum sub solis lumine caligantem.
Aquinas, CG, II, 59, # 1358, (6).
Impossibile est in corpore esse virtutem infinitam: ut probatur ab
Aristotele in VIII Physicorum. Intellectus autem possibilis est quodam-
modo virtutis infinitae: iudicamus enim per ipsum res infinitas secun-
dum numerum, inquantum per ipsum cognoscimus universalia, sub
quibus comprehenduntur particularia infinita in potentia. Non est igi-
tur intellectus possibilis virtus in corpore.
Aquinas, CG, II, 58, # 1351, (10).

Diversae vires quae non radicantur in uno principio, non impediunt se
invicem in agendo, nisi forte earum actiones essent contrariae: quod in
proposito non contingit. Videmus autem quod diversae actiones ani-
mae impediunt se: cum enim una est intensa, ahera remittitur. Opor-
tet igitur quod istae actiones, et vires quae sunt earum proxima princi-
pia, reducantur in unum principium. Hoc autem principium non po-
test esse corpus: tum quia aliqua actio est in qua non communicat
corpus, scilicet intelligere; tum quia, si principium harum virium et
actionum esset corpus inquantum huiusmodi, invenirentur in omnibus
corporibus, quod patet esse falsum. Et sic relinquitur quod sit princi-
pium earum forma aliqua una, per quam hoc corpus est tale corpus.
Quae est anima. Relinquitur igitur quod omnes actiones animae quae
sunt in nobis, ab anima una procedunt. Et sic non sunt in nobis plures
animae.
Aquinas, CG, III, 49, # 2270 , (9).

Cognoscit tamen substantia separata per suam substantiam de Deo
quia est; et quod est omnium causa; et eminentem omnibus; et remo-
tum ab omnibus, non solum quae sunt, sed etiam quae mente creata
concipi possunt. Ad quam etiam cognitionem de Deo nos utcumque
pertingere possumus: per eff'ectus enim de Deo cognoscimus quia est et
quod causa aliorum est, aliis supereminens, et ab omnibus remotus. Et
hoc est ultimum et perfectissimum nostrae cognitionis in hac vita, ut
Dionysius dicit, in libro de Mystica Theologia, cum Deo quasi "ignoto
coniungimur": quod quidem contingit dum de eo "quid non sit" cog-
noscimus, quid vero sit penitus manet ignotum.
Ig8 APPENDIX: TEXTS FOR COMPARISON
74. Ficino, TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, p. 20g, (B p. 411).

In eiusmodi vero cognitione naturale desiderium non impletur.
Quicquid enim in specie quadam est imperfectum, speciei ip-
sius optat perfectionem. Talis autem cognitio in ipsa cognitionis
specie imperfecta censetur. Solemus enim in nullo cognitionis
modo quiescere, priusquam quid sit res ipsa secundum substan-
tiam cognoverimus.
75. Ficino, TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, p. 210, (B p. 411).

Proinde quo quid naturali est fini propinquius eo vehementius
adventat ad finem. Quod in elementorum motibus est mani-
festum. Segregatae vero mentes per naturalem cognitionem pro-
pinquiores Deo evadunt quam coniunctae. Igitur cum nostrae
naturalis cognitionis suae terminis contentae non sint, certe
multo minus illae.
Quoniam vero naturalis speciei cuiuslibet appetitus ab univer-

sali natura directus omnino inanis esse non debet, oportet men-
tes omnes posse divinam videre substantiam, sine qua nihil per-
fecte vident. At cum videre illam in specie aliqua creata non
possint, opus tamen sit forma per quam videant, (forma, in-
quam, divinae substantiae propria, qua illam non imaginarie,
sed proprie cemant), necesse est eas divinae substantiae adeo
copulari ut ipsam iam inspiciant per seipsam. Simile quiddam
apparet in visu, qui colores quidem per ipsorum imagines sub
lumine cemit, lumen vero per aliud praecipue quam per lumen
videre non potest.
*76. Ficino, TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, pp. 210-211, (B p. 411).

Sed ne quis absurdum putet Deum intellectui coniungere ve1ut
formam, meminisse oportet perfectionem mentis consistere circa
verum. Verum autem et ens et intelligibile idem. Quicquid au-
Aquinas, CG, III, 50, #2276, (2).
Omne enim quod est imperfectum in aliqua specie, desiderat consequi
perfectionem speciei illius: qui enim habet opinionem de re aliqua,
quae est imperfecta illius rei notitia, ex hoc ipso incitatur ad desideran-
dum illius rei scientiam. Praedicta autem cognitio quam substantiae
separatae habent de Deo, non cognoscentes ipsius substantiam, est im-
perfecta cognitionis species: non enim arbitramur nos aliquid cognos-
cere si substantiam eius non cognoscamus; unde et praecipuum in cog-
nitione alicuius rei est scire de ea 'quid est'. Ex hac igitur cognitione
quam habent substantiae separatae de Deo, non quiescit naturale desi-
derium, sed incitatur magis ad divinam substantiam videndam.
Aquinas, CG, III, 50, # 2281, (7).

Quanto aliquid est fini propinquius, tanto maiori desiderio tendit ad
finem: unde videmus quod motus naturalis corporum in fine intendi-
tur. Intellectus autem substantiarum separatarum propinquiores sunt
divinae cognitioni quam noster intellectus. Intensius igitur desiderant
Dei cognitionem quam nos. Nos autem, quantumcumque sciamus
Deum esse, et alia quae supra dicta sunt, non quiescimus desiderio, sed
adhuc desideramus eum per essentiam suam cognoscere. Multo igitur
magis substantiae separatae hoc naturaliter desiderant. Non igitur in
cognitione Dei praedicta earum desiderium quietatur.
Aquinas, CG, III, 51, # 2284-2285, (1-2).

Cum autem impossibile sit naturale desiderium esse inane, quod qui-
dem esset si non esset possibile pervenire ad divinam substantiam intel-
ligendam, quod naturaliter omnes mentes desiderant; necesse est dicere
quod possibile sit substantiam Dei videri per intellectum, et a subs tan-
tiis intellectualibus separatis, et ab animabus nostris.
Modus autem huius visionis satis iam ex dictis qualis esse debeat, ap-
pareto Ostensum enim est supra quod divina substantia non potest vi-
deri per intellectum aliqua specie creata. Unde oportet, si Dei essentia
videatur, quod per ipsammet essentiam divinam intellectus ipsam vi-
deat: ut sit in tali visione divina essentia et quod videtur, et quo videtur.
Aquinas, CG, III, 51, # 2 28 7, (4).

Ad huius igitur intelligentiam veritatis, considerandum est quod sub-
stantia quae est per seipsam subsistens, est vel forma tantum, vel com-
positum ex materia et forma. Illud igitur quod ex materia et forma com-
tern in hoc ipso genere ex essentia atque esse componitur, tam-

quam em verumque potiusquam tamquam esse veritasve se ha-
bet, neque potest aliorum in eodem genere esse forma, cum iam
forma in se sua ad suam quasi materiam sit contracta.
Itaque nulla creata mens mentium reliquarum forma fieri po-

test, immo solus Deus ad genus mentium ubique se habet ut
forma, qui solus est ipsum esse et simplicissima veritas; ut forma,
inquam, non tamquam pars compositi, sed operandi principium,
quo mens potius ut Deus iam quam ut mens operetur, sicut igni-
tum aurum ut ignis agit potiusquam ut aurum, quale Apoca-
lypsis Ioannis iubet emendum.
77. Ficino, TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, p. 211, (B 41 I).

Ad hoc autem ut mens divinam induat substantiam, quasi for-
mam, non propria virtute ducitur, sed divina trahitur actione.
Siquidem natura inferior proprietatem formamque superioris
absque superioris ipsius actione eonsequi nequit, quod in ele-
mentis est manifestum, in quibus aer non aliter quam agente
igne ignis evadit.
*78. Fieino, TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, p. 21 I, (B pp. 411-412).

Praeterea nihil potest ad excellentiorem actionem aliquando
perduei, nisi prius in eo virtus corroboretur. Quod si ad eon-
suetam aetionis speeiem, sed tamen aliquando vehementiorem
est perducendum, satis utique erit, si modo solita virtus augea-
positum est, non potest alterius esse forma: quia forma in eo est iam
contracta ad illam materiam, ut alterius rei forma esse non possit. Illud
autem quod sic est subsistens ut tamen solum sit forma, potest alterius
esse forma, dummodo esse suum sit tale quod ab aliquo alia participari
possit, sicut in Secunda ostendimus de anima humana. Si vera esse suum
ab altero participari non posset, nullius rei forma esse posset: sic enim
per suum esse determinatur in seipso, sicut quae sunt materialia per
materiam. Hoc autem, sicut in esse substantiali vel naturali invenitur,
sic et in esse intelligibili considerandum est. Cum enim intellectus per-
fectio sit verum, illud intelligibile erit ut forma tantum in genere intel-
ligibilium quod est veritas ipsa. Quod convenit soli Deo nam cum ve-
rum sequatur ad esse, illud tantum sua veritas est quod est suum esse,
quod est proprium soli Deo, ut in Secunda ostensum est. Alia igitur
intelligibilia subsistentia sunt non ut pura forma in genere intelligibi-
lium, sed ut formam in subiecto aliquo habentes: est enim unumquod-
que eorum verum, non veritas; sicut et est ens, non autem ipsum esse.
Manifestum est igitur quod essentia divina potest comparari ad in-
tellectum creatum ut species intelligibilis qua intelligit: quod non con-
tingit de essentia alicuius alterius substantiae separatae. Nec tamen
potest esse forma alterius rei secundum esse naturale: sequeretur enim
quod, simul cum alia iuncta, constitueret unam naturam; quod esse
non potest, cum essentia divina in se perfecta sit in sui natura. Species
autem intelligibilis, unita intellectui, non constituit aliquam naturam,
sed perficit ipsum ad intelligendum: quod perfectioni divinae essentiae
non repugnat.
Aquinas, CG, III, 52, # 2291, (2).

Quod enim est superioris naturae proprium, non potest consequi natu-
ra inferior nisi per actionem superioris naturae cuius est proprium: si-
cut aqua non potest esse calida nisi per actionem ignis. Videre autem
Deum per ips am essentiam divinam est proprium naturae divinae:
operari enim per propriam formam est proprium cuiuslibet operantis.
Nulla igitur intellectualis substantia potest videre Deum per ipsam di-
vinam essentiam nisi Deo hoc faciente.
Aquinas, CG, III, 53, # 2301 , (5).

Item. Nihil potest ad altiorem operationem elevari nisi per hoc quod
eius virtus fortificatur. Contingit autem dupliciter alicuius virtutem
fortificari.
a) Uno modo, per simplicem intensionem ipsius virtutis: sicut virtus
tur, utpote si aer, qui naturaliter uno calefacit gradu, duobus

aliquando sit gradibus calefacturus, sufficiet naturalis sui caloris
aliquantum intendere qualitatem. Verumtamen si aer actionem
specie genereque superiorem sit sibi vendicaturus, videlicet si
illuminaturus fuerit, quod corporis est aetherei proprium, no-
yam ab ipso aethere formam iam sortiatur oportet.
Quorsum haec? Vt intelligamus mentem non posse ad divi-
nam substantiam per ipsammet perspiciendam attolli per solum
naturalis virtutis et luminis augmentum, cum eiusmodi opera-
tio ab ipsa naturali mentis operatione plus quam genere diiferat,
sed opus esse nova quadam virtute novoque lumine, ab altiori
principio descendente. Quod quidem et gratiae et gloriae lu-
men appellant, quo illuminata mens et multo magis accensa
divinam iam substantiam, cuius calore iam fervet, induitur ve-
lut flammam. Flammam, inquam, non qualem in crinita [stella]
siccus vapor a terra sublatus subit prope ignis sphaeram, quam-
vis id admodum simile videatur, immo flammam supercaeles-
tern, lucentem salubriter, non urentem.

Negabit forte aliquis mentem per quodvis lumen ad perspicien-
dum Deum posse perduci, quia si nulla est visus ipsius ad sonum
proportio, nimirum neque mentis neque luminis a mente sus-
cepti, ideoque finiti, ulla ad immensum Deum proportio est.
Nos autem respondebimus Deum, quamvis facultatem intellec-

tus excedat, non tamen sic alienum esse ab intellectu, sicut sonus
est alienus a visu, vel insensibile quiddam a sensu, cum Deus sit,
ut Christian is placet theologis, intelligibile primum totiusque
intellectualis virtutis et actionis principium mediumque et finis.
Est igitur quaedam inter intellectum Deumque proportio, non
quia sit ulla commensuratio, sed habitudo quaedam potius,
quasi materiae intellectualis ad intelligibilem formam et effec-
tus ad causam.
activa calidi augetur per intensionem caloris, ut possit efficere vehe-
mentiorem actionem in eadem specie.
b) Alio modo, per novae formae appositionem: sicut diaphani virtus
augetur ad hoc quod possit illuminare, per hoc quod fit lucidum actu
per formam lucis receptam in ipso de novo. Et hoc quidem virtutis aug-
mentum requiritur ad alterius speciei operationem consequendam.
c) Virtus autem intellectus creati naturalis non sufficit ad divinam
substantiam videndam, ut ex dictis patet. Oportet ergo quod augeatur
ei virtus, ad hoc quod ad talem visionem perveniat.
d) Non sufficit autem augmentum per intensionem naturalis virtu-
tis: quia talis visio non est eiusdem rationis cum visione naturali intel-
lectus creati; quod ex distantia visorum patet.
e) Oportet igitur quod fiat augmentum virtu tis intellectivae per ali-
cuius novae dispositionis adeptionem.
Aquinas, CG, III, 54, # 2304-2305, (I).

Obiicet autem Aliquis contra praedicta.
Nullum enim lumen adveniens visui potest visum elevare ad viden-
dum ea quae naturalem facultatem visus corporalis excedunt: non
enim potest visus videre nisi colorata. Divina autem substantia excedit
omnem intellectus creati capacitatem, etiam magis quam intellectus
excedat capacitatem sensus. Nullo igitur lumine superveniente intel-
lectus creatus elevari poterit ad divinam substantiam videndam.
Aquinas, CG, III, 54, # 2312, (8).

Rationes autem praedictas non difficile est solvere. Divina enim sub-
stantia non sic est extra facultatem creati intellectus quasi aliquid om-
nino extraneum ab ipso, sicut est sonus a visu, vel substantia immateria-
lis a sensu, nam divina substantia est primum intelligibile, et totius in-
tellectualis cognitionis principium: sed est extra facultatem intellectus
creati sicut excedens virtutem eius, sicut excellentia sensibilium sunt
extra facultatem sensus. Unde et Philosophus in II Metapkys., dicit
quod "intellectus noster se habet ad rerum manifestissima sicut ocu-
lus noctuae ad lucem solis". Indiget igitur confortari intellectus creatus
aliquo divino lumine ad hoc quod divinam essentiam videre possit. Per
quod prima ratio solvitur.
*80. Ficino, TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, pp. 212-213, (B p. 412).

Denique infinitas ipsa Dei haud privationem formae significat,
qualis infinitas materiae convenit, cumque sit inefficax et infor-
mis, merito cognitioni inepta censetur, sed absolutam significat
excellentiam nullo prorsus subiecto contractam. Haec autem
ceu sol natura sua id habet ut mirum in modum lucendo atque
illuminando maxime omnium movere intellectualem visum
possit atque videri, et qua virtute excedit mentem, eadem possit
eamdem supra vires proprias elevare.
*81. Ficino, TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, p. 213, (B p. 412).

Neque tamen putandum est mentem essentia divina formatam,
quamvis quid ipsa sit intelligat, ipsam tamen penitus compre-
hendere. Nam et virtus ipsius terminata est, et lumen in ea de-
terminatum, et divinam cum subit essentiam, non per omnem
divinitatis virtutem inde formatur.

Quid ergo? Numquid partem divinae substantiae cernit qui-
dem, partem vero non cernit? Non ita sane dicendum, siquidem
Deus dividi nequit. Immo vero putandum est earn aspicere
Deum, haud tamen penitus comprehendere, id est sub tot ra-
tionibus et tanta certitudine tantaque perfectione perspicere
Deum, sub quot et quanta sibimet perspectus est Deus.
Accedit ad haec quod non cuncta, quae Deus et videt et potest,

videndo Deum potest ipsa videre. Videt autem potestque Deus
infinita praeter illa, quae in natura consistunt. Quod probavi-
mus alias. Si enim Dei substantiam non comprehendit, certe ne-
que intelligentiam eius atque virtutem, neque igitur cuncta,
quae et intelligit Deus et potest, alioquin cum virtus per ea quae
potest soleat aestimari, sic quaecumque videt potestque, penitus
comprehenderet; comprehenderet pariter videndi faciendique
virtutem atque substantiam. Quid plura? Quo altior intellectus
eo et plura vel numero vel ratione intelligere debet. Ex quo
consentaneum est divinam mentem seipsam undique contuen-
Aquinas, CG, III, 54, # 2316, (12).

Neque autem divinae substantiae visionem impedire potest quod Deus
dicitur esse infinitus, ut quinta ratio proponebat. Non enim dicitur in-
finitus pfivative, sicut quantitas. Huiusmodi enim infinitum rationabi-
liter ets ignotum: quia est quasi materia carens forma, quae est cogni-
tionis principium. Sed dicitur infinitus negative, quasi forma per se
subsistens non limitata per materiam recipientem. Unde quod sic infi-
nitum est, maxime cognoscibile est secundum se.
Aquinas, CG, III, 55, # 2321 , (4)·

Dmne agens in tantum perfecte agit in quantum perfecte participat
formam quae est operationis principium. Forma autem intelligibilis
qua divina substantia videtur, est ipsa divina essentia: quae etsi fiat
forma intelligibilis intellectus creati, non tamen intellectus creatus ca-
pit ipsam secundum totum posse eius. Non igitur ita perfecte ipsam
videt sicut ipsa visibilis est. Non ergo comprehenditur ab intellectu
creato.
Aquinas, CG, III, 55, # 2323, (6).

Non autem sic dicitur quod divina substantia ab intellectu creato vide-
tur, non tamen comprehenditur, quasi aliquid eius videatur et aliquid
non videatur: cum divina substantia sit simplex omnino. Sed quia non
ita perfecte ab intellectu creato videtur sicut visibilis est: per quem
modum dicitur opinans conclusionem demonstrativam cognoscere sed
non comprehendere, quia non perfecte ips am cognoscit, scilicet per
modum scientiae, licet nulla pars eius sit quam non cognoscat.
Aquinas, CG, III, 56, # 2326-2327, (3-4).

Item. Quanto aliquis intellectus est alitior, tanto plura cognoscit, vel
secundum rerum multitudinem, vel saltern secundum earundem rerum
plures rationes. Intellectus autem divinus excedit omnem intellectum
creatum. Plura igitur cognoscit quam aliquis intellectus creatus. Non
autem cognoscit aliquid nisi per hoc quod suam essentiam videt, ut in
Primo ostensum est. Plura igitur sunt cognoscibilia per essentiam divi-
nam quam aliquis intellectus creatus per ips am videre possit.
Adhuc. Quantitas virtu tis attenditur secundum ea in quae potest.
Idem igitur est cognoscere omnia in quae potest aliqua virtus, et ipsam
virtu tern comprehendere. Divinam autem virtutem, cum sit infinita,
non potest aliquis creatus intellectus comprehendere, sicut nec essen-
tern tum plura tum pluribus rationibus videre, quam videat

quilibet intellectus.
83. Ficino, TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, pp. 213-214, (B pp. 412-413).

Nemo vero diffidere debet mentes humanas, propterea quod in
ipso mentium genere infimae sint, ad ipsam divinae substan-
tiae contemplationem posse perduci. Quandoquidem neque ip-
sae angelicae mentes illuc virtute quadam perveniunt naturali,
sed divina potius et, ut ita dicam, supernaturali trahuntur. Opus
autem quod supernaturali virtute peragitur, propter naturarum
diversitatem impediri non potest, quippe cum immensae poten-
tiae Dei nihil alicubi reluctetur. Tam facile divina potestas to-
tam movet machinam, quam facile minimam mundi partem.
Tam facile curat aegrotantem graviter, quam facile leviter aegro-
tantem. Quamobrem qua facuItate infusa divinitus mentes al-
tissimae, eadem et infimae ad sublimia rapiuntur.
84. Fieino, TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, p. 214, (B p. 413).

Praeterea suprema mentium creatarum immenso quodam a
Deo spatio distat; infima vera ob hac, cum utraque finita sit,
finito discrepat intervallo. Intervalli vero huius ad illud nulla
esse proportio iudicatur. Quod si finitum additum infinito nul-
lam, ut apparet, aff'ert varietatem, quidnam prohibet ipsam
Dei virtutem, quae spatium ad angelum usque subito percurrit
immensum, mox inde pusillum inter angelum animamque
complecti, ut simul tam anima quam angelus rapiatur?

Denique si mentium generi, qua ratione mentes sunt, naturalis
est instinctus ad summum intelligibile pervidendum, quod in
tiam eius, ut probatum est. Neque igitur intellectus creatus potest cog-
noscere omnia in quae divina virtus potest. Omnia autem in quae divi-
na virtus potest, sunt per essentiam divinam cognoscibilia: omnia enim
cognoscit Dem, et non nisi per essentiam suam. Non igitur intellectus
creatus, videns divinam substantiam, videt omnia quae in Dei sub-
stantia videri possunt.
Aquinas, CG, III, 57, # 2332, (2).

Ostensum enim est quod lumen illud non potest esse alicui creaturae
connaturale, sed omnem creatam naturam excedit secundum virtutem.
Quod autem fit virtute supernaturali, non impeditur propter naturae
diversitatem, cum divina virtus sit infinita: unde in sanatione infirmi
quae fit miraculose, non differt utrum aliquis multum vel parum infir-
metur. Diversus ergo gradus naturae intellectualis non impedit quin
infimum in tali natura ad illam visionem perduci possit praedicto lu-
mIne.
Aquinas, CG, III, 57, # 2333, (3)·

Distantia intellectus secundum ordinem naturae supremi ad Deum est
infinita in perfectione et bonitate. Eius autem distantia ad intellectum
infimum est finita: finiti enim ad finitum non potest esse infinita distan-
tia. Distantia igitur quae est inter infimum intellectum creatum et su-
premum, est quasi nihil in comparatione ad illam distantiam quae est
inter supremum intellectum creatum et Deum. Quod autem est quasi
nihil, non potest variationem sensibilem facere: sicut distantia quae est
inter centrum terrae et visum, est quasi nihil in comparatione ad dis-
tantiam quae est inter visum nostrum et octavam sphaeram, ad quam
tota terra comparata obtinet locum puncti; et propter hoc nulla sensi-
bilis variatio fit per hoc quod astrologi in suis demonstrationibus utun-
tur visu nostro quasi centro terrae. Nihil ergo differt quicumque intel-
lectus sit qui ad Dei visionem per lumen praedictum elevetur, utrum
summus, vel infimus, vel medius.
Aquinas, CG, III, 57, # 2334, (4)·

Supra probatum est quod omnis intellectus naturaliter desiderat divi-
nae substantiae visionem. Naturale autem desiderium non potest esse
omni intelligibili quaerendo quaerunt et appetunt appetendo,

sequitur ut tam naturalis sit instinctus eiusmodi mentibus infi-
mis quam supremis, atque tam hae quandoque quam illae ter-
minum consequi possint naturaliter exoptatum.

Possunt autem aliae mentes aliis darius pleniusque divinam
substantiam contueri, quatenus lumen ipsum, quo ad id quasi
materiae perspicuae praeparantur, sub diversis perfectionis gra-
dibus inde suscipiunt, sive pro naturae sive pro dispositionis ac-
quisitae diversitate aliter atque aliter praeparentur. Maxima
vero nostris mentibus varietas ex diversis amoris gradibus profi-
ciscitur, quibus quidem gradibus diversi et visionis et multo
magis gaudii gradus non iniuria congruunt. Forte vero, licet
singulae cuncta creata videant, ut probabimus, aliae tamen plu-
ra quam aliae ex his quae non creantur attingunt, et quae vi-
dent pluribus rationibus assequuntur, omnes tamen vera ratione
perspiciunt. Et cum gaudium velut terminus amori respondeat,
quae amaverunt ardentius, hae coniunctius, ut solet amor,
haerentes interius transferuntur in bonum, sic ipso amoris habi-
tu conferente, suaviusque fruuntur.

Proinde si mentium finis est ad divinam substantiam pervenire,
necessario illic tamquam in fine omne mentium desiderium
prorsus impletur. Non impleretur autem, nisi ordinem illic uni-
versi creatum undique comprehenderent. Siquidem eiusmodi
est consuetum studium intellectus, ut particularia in universalia
ad communissimum usque resolvat atque ipsum ens sub absolu-
ta ratione describat perque omnes eius gradus distinctissime di-
vidat, quasi ad id praecipue natus sit ut universi forma quan-
doque formetur.
88. Ficino, TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, pp. 215-216, (B p. 413).

Quidnam prohibet intellectum, dum fontem conspicit universi,
universum effluens inde perspicere? Praesertim cum non sicuti
sensus ex summo sensibili ad sentienda minora impeditur ad
tempus, sic intellectus ex intelligibili summo impediatur ad reli-
qua, sed potius mirifice roboretur.
inane. Quilibet igitur intellectus creatus potest pervenire ad divinae

substantiae visionem, non impediente inferioritate naturae.
Aquinas, CG, III, 58, # 2337, (I).

Quia vero modus operationis consequitur formam quae est operationis
principium; visionis autem qua intellectus creatus divinam substan-
tiam videt, principium quoddam est lumen praedictum, ut ex dictis
patet: necesse est quod secundum modum huius luminis sit modus divi-
nae visionis. Possibile est autem huius luminis diversos esse participa-
tionis gradus, ita quod unus eo perfectius illustretur quam alius. Pos-
sibile igitur est quod unus Deum videntium eum perfectius alia videat,
quamvis uterque videat eius substantiam.
Aquinas, CG, III, 59, # 2346, (I).

Quia vero visio divinae substantiae est ultimus finis cuiuslibet intellec-
tualis substantiae, ut patet ex dictis; omnis autem res cum pervenerit
ad ultimum finem, quiescit appetitus eius naturalis: oportet quod ap-
petitus naturalis substantiae intellectualis divinam substantiam viden-
tis omnino quiescat. Est autem appetitus naturalis intellectus ut cog-
noscat omnium rerum genera et species et virtutes, et totum ordinem
universi: quod demonstrat humanum studium circa singula praedicto-
rum. Quilibet igitur divinam substantiam videntium cognoscet omnia
supradicta.
Aquinas, CG, III, 59, # 2347, (2).

In hoc intellectus et sensus differt, ut patet in III de Anima, quod sensus
ab excellentibus sensibilibus corrumpitur vel debilitatur, ut postmo-
dum minora sensibilia percipere non possit: intellectus autem, quia
non eorrumpitur nee impeditur a suo obieeto, sed solum perfieitur,
postquam intellexit maius intelligibile, non minus poterit alia intelligi-
bilia intelligere, sed magis. Summum autem in genere intelligibilium

Praeterea intelligibile genus amplius est genere naturali. Multa
enim ultra ilIa quae natura facit intelligi possunt. Igitur quae-
cumque ad esse naturale complendum necessario requiruntur,
insuper et multo plura ad complendum esse intelligibile exigun-
tur. At vero esse intelligibile tunc demum absolutum est, cum
intellectus summum attingerit finem, quemadmodum ipsa natu-
ralis esse perfectio in ipsa rerum cunctarum constitutione con-
sis tit. Quamobrem Deus quaecumque ad perfectionem universi
produxit, in intellectu sibi iuncto producit.
90. Ficino, TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, p. 216, (B pp. 413-414).

Rursus quamvis alius perfectius alio Deum videat, singuli ta-
men ita vident ut capacitas naturalis impleatur ad votum. Haec
autem in qualibet mente ad omnia universi genera speciesque
extenditur, adde insuper et ad singula passim subdita speciebus.
Nec enim insuper exoptamus. Itaque mentes in Deo etiam sin-
gula distincte discernunt.

Cum mentes illic unica Dei forma rerum creatarum vide ant
formas, consentaneum est ut omnes una vide ant visione, quae
quidem si perfectissima est, statu possidetur potiusquam suc-
cessione quaeratur. Probabile enim est mentes quietis potius-
quam motionis avidas, ubi finem consecutae fuerint, firmiter
conquiescere, praesertim quia si omnes universi species ibi
cognoscunt, sub quibusdam vero generibus species procedunt
innumerae ceu sub numero figuraque et proportione, conse-
quens esse videtur ut species quodammodo vide ant infinitas. At
vero cum infinita pertransire non liceat, non praetereundo di-
numerant, sed manendo conspiciunt.
est divina substantia. Intellectus igitur qui per lumen divinum elevatur
ad videndam Dei substantiam, multo magis eodem lumine perficitur
ad omnia alia intelligenda quae sunt in rerum natura.
Aquinas, CG, III, 59, # 2348, (3).

Esse intelligibile non est minoris ambitus quam esse naturale, sed forte
maioris: intellectus enim natus est omnia quae sunt in rerum natura
intelligere, et quaedam intelligit quae non habent esse naturale, sicut
negationes et privationes. Quaecumque igitur requiruntur ad perfec-
tionem esse naturalis, requiruntur ad perfectionem esse intelligibilis,
vel etiam plura. Perfectio autem esse intelligibilis est cum intellectus ad
suum ultimum finem pervenerit: sicut perfectio esse naturalis in ipsa
rerum institutione consistit. Omnia igitur quae Deus ad perfectionem
universi produxit, intellectui se videnti manifestat.
Aquinas, CG, III, 59, # 2349, (4).

Quamvis videntium Deum unus alio perfectius eum videat, ut osten-
sum est, quilibet tamen ita perfecte eum videt quod impletur tota ca-
pacitas naturalis: quinimmo ipsa visio omnem capacitatem naturalem
excedit, ut ostensum est. Oportet igitur quod quilibet videns divinam
substantiam in ipsa substantia divina cognoscat omnia ad quae se ex-
tendit sua capacitas naturalis. Capacitas autem naturalis cuiuslibet
intellectus se extendit ad cognoscenda omnia genera et species et ordi-
nem rerum. Haec igitur quilibet Deum videntium in divina substantia
cognoscet.
Aquinas, CG, 111,60, # 2355-2 356, (3-4).

Adhuc. Unaquaeque res, cum pervenerit ad suum ultimum finem,
quiescit: cum omnis motus sit ad acquirendum finem. Ultimus autem
finis intellectus est visio divinae substantiae, ut supra ostensum est. In-
tellectus igitur divinam substantiam videns non movetur de uno inte1-
ligibili in aliud. Omnia igitur quae per hanc visionem cognoscit, simul
actu considerat.
Amplius. In divina substantia intellectus omnes rerum species cog-
noseit, ut ex die tis patet. Quorundam autem generum sunt species infi-
nitae: sicut numerorum, figurarum et proportionum. Intellectus igitur
in divina substantia videt infinita. Non autem omnia ea videre posset
nisi simul videret: quia infinita non est transire. Oportet igitur quod
omnia quae intellectus in divina substantia videt, simul videat.
92. Ficino, TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, p. 217, (B p. ,1-14).

Rursus si perpetua intelligentia ipsius intelligentis vita quaedam
est, atque ibi intelligentia ob stabilitatem suam particeps evadit
aeternitatis, sequitur ut beata mens in aeternam vitam iure
translata dicatur.

Merito quidem, nempe mens humana inter aeterna et tempo-
ralia media collocatur. Sicut igitur operatio eius, qua coniungi-
tur temporaneis, temporanea evadere consuevit, sic et ilIa qua
aeternis aeterna.
94. Ficino, TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, pp. 217-218, (B p. 414).

Denique quonam pacto visio ipsa illic mobilis sit non video, ubi
et videndi virtus tempus tum ab initio tum vel maxime iam su-
pereminet, et obiectum quod videtur, ac forma qua videtur,
status ipse est ipsaque aeternitas. Hine sequitur animas Deo se-
mel haerentes inde discessuras esse numquam, si modo motum
iam transcenderunt atque naturale desiderium impleverunt.
Quod quidem cum et in substantia stabili sit fundatum et ad
stabile obiectum naturaliter dirigatur, nimirum non aliam
quam stabilem denique possessionem appetit tamquam finem.
Quid mirum si sempiterna mens, quod non propter aliud, sed
propter se desiderat, desiderat ut semper habendum?

Praeterea ubi naturalia sub se nulla ignorat, eerte qualis sua illa
possessio sit non nescit. Quocirca si defutura est, defuturam
praevidet ac vivit infoelix., cum possessione tam cara aliquando,
immo brevi se existimet carituram.
Aquinas, CG, III, 61, # 2359, (2).
In hoc enim aeternitas a tempore differt, quod tempus in quadam suc-
cessione habet esse, aeternitatis vero esse est totum simul. lam autem
ostensum est quod in praedicta visione non est aliqua successio, sed om-
nia quae per illam videntur, simul et uno intuitu videntur. Ina ergo
visio in quadam aeternitatis participatione perficitur. Est autem illa
visio quaedam vita: actio enim intellectus est vita quaedam. Fit ergo
per illam visionem intellectus creatus vitae aeternae particeps.
Aquinas, CG, III, 61, #2362, (5).

Anima intellectiva est creata "in confinio aeternitatis et temporis", ut
in libra de Causis dicitur, et ex praemissis potest esse manifestum: quia
est ultima in ordine intellectuum, et tamen eius substantia est elevata
supra materiam corporalem, non dependens ab ipsa. Sed actio eius se-
cundum quam coniungitur inferioribus, quae sunt in tempore, est tem-
poralis. Ergo actio eius secundum quam coniungitur superioribus, quae
sunt supra tempus, aeternitatem participat. Talis autem est maxime
visio qua divinam substantiam videt. Ergo per huiusmodi visionem fit
in participatione aeternitatis: et, eadem ratione, quicumque alius in-
tellectus creatus Deum videt.
Aquinas, CG, III, 61, #2361 , (4).

Si aliqua actio sit in tempore, hoc erit vel propter principium actionis,
quod est in tempore, sicut actiones rerum naturalium sunt temporales:
vel propter operationis terminum, sicut substantiarum spiritualium,
quae sunt supra tempus, quas exercent in res tempori subditas. Visio
autem praedicta non est in tempore ex parte eius quod videtur: cum
hoc sit substantia aeterna. Neque ex parte eius quo videtur: quod etiam
est substantia aeterna. Neque etiam ex parte videntis, quod est intellec-
tus, cuius esse non subiacet tempori: cum sit incorruptibile, ut supra
probatum est. Est igitur visio illa secundum aeternitatis participatio-
nem, utpote omnino transcendens tempus.
Aquinas, CG, III, 62, # 236 7, (4).

Omne illud quod cum amore possidetur, si sciatur quod quandoque
amittatur, tristitiam infert. Visio autem praedicta, quae beatos facit,
cum sit maxime delectabilis et maxime desiderata, maxime a possiden-
tibus eam amatur. Impossibile ergo esset eos non tristari si scirent se
quandoque eam amissuros. Si autem non esset perpetua, hoc scirent:
96. Ficino, TP, XVIII, 8, v. III, p. 218, (B pp. 414-415).

Adde quod quicquid naturaliter cuidam adhaeret fini, non ali-
ter quam vi quadam illata inde divellitur. Cum igitur Deo
mens tamquam fini coniungatur naturaliter prae caeteris exop-
tato, coniunctionisque huiusmodi efficiens causa ipse sit Deus,
nullaque vis maior ex adverso queat accedere, quae violenter
quandoque seiungat quod Deus sponte coniunxit, proculdubio
mens a nullo umquam inde recedere compelletur. Quo autem
pacto vel a certa veritate per fallaciam vel a puro totoque bono
per voluntatem sese avertat, cogitari non potest.
Profecto nequementis substantia permu tatur neque intelligendi
perspicacia sub lumine deficit continue confirmante, neque lu-
men subtrahitur umquam, quod ab aeternitate infunditur in
aeternum, neque voluntas vel ob alterius stimulum a totius pos-
sessione recedit, vel ob taedium satietatemve ab eo umquam
obiecto se segregat, quod cum penitus comprehendi non possit,
nimirum et semper occurrit ut novum et cum admiratione sum-
ma, ideoque cum desiderio continue possidetur. Denique si
quanta quid summo Dei statui propinquius est, tanto fit immo-
bilius, mentes substantia iam divina formatas necesse est immo-
biles prorsus evadere.
iam enim ostensum est quod, videndo divinam substantiam, etiam alia
cognoscunt quae naturaliter sunt; unde multo magis cognoscunt qualis
illa visio sit, utrum perpetua vel quandoque desitura. Non ergo talis
visio adesset eis sine tristitia. Et ita non esset vera felicitas, quae ab omni
malo immunem reddere debet, ut supra ostensum est.
Aquinas, CG, III, 62, # 2368, (5).

Quod movetur naturaliter ad aliquid sicut ad finem sui motus, non
removetur ab eo nisi per violentiam, sicut grave cum proiicitur sursum.
Constat autem ex praedictis quod omnis substantia intellectualis natu-
rali desiderio tendit ad illam visionem. Non ergo ab illa deficiet nisi per
violentiam. Nihil autem tollitur per violentiam alicuius nisi virtus au-
ferentis sit maior virtute causantis. Visionis autem divinae causa est
Deus, ut supra probatum est. Ergo, cum nulla virtus divinam virtutem
excedat, impossibile est quod illa visio per violentiam tollatur. In per-
petuum ergo durabit.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
PRIMARY SOURCES
Aristotle. Opera. Ed. Academia Regia Borussica. Berlin: Reimer, 1836.

- . The Works if Aristotle. Translated into English under the editorship of
W. D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908-52.
Augustine, Aurelius. Confessiones, De Immortalitate Animae, De Libero Arbitrio,
De Magistro, Soliloquia. Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina, vol.
XXXII. Ed. J. P. Migne. Paris, 1841.
- . De Diversis Quaestionibus. PL, vol. XL. Paris, 1887.
- . Confessiones. Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, vol. XXXIII.
Vienna: Tempsky, 1896.
De Genesi ad Litteram. CSEL, vol. XXVIII. Vienna: Tempsky, 1894.
De Genesi ad Litteram. PL, vol. XXXIV. Paris, 1887.
De Libero Arbitrio. CSEL, vol. LXXIV. Vienna: Tempsky, 1956.
De Trinitate. PL, vol. XLII. Paris, 1886.
Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite. De Mystica Theologia. Patrologiae Cursus
Completus, Series Graeca, vol. IV. Paris, 1889.
Ficino, Marsilio. Opera Omnia. 2 vols. Basel, 1561.
- . TMologie Platonicienne de l'Immortalite des Ames. Texte critique etabli et
traduit Raymond Marcel. 3 vols. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1964, 1970.
- . Supplementum Ficinianum. Ed. P. O. Kristeller. 2 vols. Florence: Leo S.
Olschki, 1937-45.
Gabirol, Ibn (Avicebron). Fons Vitae. Beitriige zur Geschichte der Philosophie des
Mittelalters, vol. I. Ed. C. Baeumker. Munster, 1891.
John Duns Scotus. Ordinatio. Opera Omnia, vols. II, IV. Vatican, 1950,
1956 .
Pico della Mirandola. De Hominis Dignitate, Hetaplus, De Ente et Uno, e scritti
vari. Ed. E. Garin. Florence: Vallecchi, 1942.
Plato. Opera. Ed. John Burnet. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902-1906.
- . The Collected Dialogues if Plato. Ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington
Cairns. New York: Pantheon Books, 1961.
Plotinus. Enneads I-V. Opera, vols. I-II. Ed. Paul Henry and Hans Rudolf
Schwyzer. Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1951-59.
- . Enneades. Texte etabli et traduit par Emile Brehier. 6 vols. Paris: Les
Belles Lettres, 1924.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 21 7
The Enneads. Trans. Stephen MacKenna. 2nd ed. rev. by B. S. Page.
2 vols. New York: Pantheon Books, [1957].
Pomponazzi, Pietro. De Immortalitate Animae. Ed. G. Morra. Bologna: Nanni
& Fiammenghi, 1954.
- . On the Immortality of the Soul. Trans. W. H. Hay. in The Renaissance
Philosophy of Man, 280-381. Eds. Ernst Cassirer, P. O. Kristeller, John
Herman Randall. Chicago: University Press, 1948.
Proclus. The Elements of Theology. Revised text with translation, introduction
and commentary by E. R. Dodds. 2nd edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1963.
Thomas Aquinas. Liber de Veritate Catholicae Fidei contra errores Infidelium seu
Summa Contra Gentiles. Textus Leoninus. 3 vols. Rome: Marietti, 1961-
67·
- . On the Truth of the Catholic Faith or Summa Contra Gentiles. 4 vols. Trans.
Anton C. Pegis,James F. Anderson, VernonJ. Bourke, CharlesJ. O'Neil.
New York: Doubleday, 1955-57.
- . Summa Theologiae. Textus Leoninus. 4 vols. Taurini: Marietti, 1948.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Baron, Hans. "Fifteenth-Century Civilization and the Renaissance," New

Cambridge Modern History I. Ed. G. R. Potter. Cambridge: University
Press, 1957.
Burckhardt, J. The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy; An Essay. Trans.,
S. G. C. Middlemore. New York: Modern Library, [1954].
Cassirer, Ernst. Das Erkenntnisproblem. 3rd. ed. Berlin: B. Cassirer, 1922.
- . "Ficino's Place in Intellectual History," Journal of the History of Ideas,
VI, 483-50 I.
- . Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance. Leipzig-Berlin:
Teubner, 1927.
- . The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy. Trans. Mario
Domand. New York: Harper & Row, 1964.
Dannenfeldt, Karl H., ed. The Renaissance, Medieval or Modern? Boston: D. C.
Heath, 1959.
Della Torre, Arnaldo. Storia dell'Accademia Platonica di Firenze. Firenze: G.
Carnesecchi e Figli, 1902.
Di Napoli, Giovanni. L'immortalita dell'anima net Rinascimento. Torino: Studi
superiori, 1963.
Dress, Walter. Die Mystik des Marsilio Picino. Berlin-Leipzig: W. de Gruyter,
1929.
Fabro, Cornelio. "Influenza tomistiche nella filosofia del Ficino," Studia
Patavina, 1959 (6), 393-413.
Ferguson, W. K. The Renaissance in Historical Thought, Five Centuries of Inter-
pretation. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948.
Festugiere,]. La Philosophie de l'Amour de Marsile Ficin. Paris: Vrin, 1941.
Garin, Eugenio. La Cultura Filosofica del Rinascimento Italiana. Florence: San
soni, 1961.
218 BIBLIOGRAPHY
-. Der Italienische Humanismus. Bern: A. Francke, 1947.

-. Italian Humanism; Philosophy and Civic Life in the Renaissance. Trans. Peter
Munz. Oxford: Blackwell, 1965.
- . "Recenti interpretazioni de Marsilio Ficino," Giornale Critico della Filo-
sofia Italiani, XXI (1940), 299-318.
Gentile, Giovanni. Giordano Bruno e il Pensiero del Rinascimento. 2nd ed.
Florence: Vallecchi, 1925.
-. I Problemi Della Scolastica e il Pensiero Italiano. 3rd ed. rev. Florence:
Sansoni, 1963.
Gilson, Etienne. "Marsile Ficin e Ie Contra Gentiles," Archives d'Histoire Doc-
trinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age, 1957, IOI-113.
Hay, Denys. "Introduction," New Cambridge Modern History I. Ed. G. R.
Potter. Cambridge: University Press, 1957.
-. The Italian Renaissance in its Historical Background. Cambridge: University
Press, 196 I.
Heitzman, Marian. "L'agostinismo avicennizzanti e il punto di partenza
della filosofia de Marsilio Ficino," Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana,
XVI (1935),295-322; 460-480; XVII (1936), I - I I .
Horbert, Werner. Metaphysik des Marsilius Ficinus. Koblenz: Dissertation
Bonn, 1930.
Jayne, Sears. John Colet and Marsilio Ficino. London: Oxford Press, 1963.
Klibansky, Raymond. The Continuity oj the Platonic Tradition during the Middle
Ages. London: Warburg Institute, 1939.
- . "Plato's Parmenides in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance," Medieval
and Renaissance Studies, I (1941-1943), 281-330.
Kristeller, Paul Oskar. Eight Philosophers oj the Italian Renaissance. Stanford:
University Press, 1964.
- . "Humanism and Scholasticism in the Italian Renaissance," Byzantion,
XVII (1944-1945), 346-374. Reprinted in Studies in Renaissance Thought
andLetters by P. O. Kristeller. Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Litteratura, 1956.
-. 11 Pensiero Filosofico di Marsilio Ficino. Florence: Sansoni, 1953.
-. The Philosophy oj Marsilio Ficino. Trans. Virginia Conant. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1943.
-. Renaissance Thought II: Papers on Humanism and the Arts. New York:
Harper and Row, 1965.
- . "The Scholastic Background of Marsilio Ficino," Traditio, II (1945),
257-318. Reprinted in Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters.
-. Le Thomisme et la Pensee Italienne de la Renaissance. Montreal: Inst.
d'Etudes Medievales, 1967.
Marcel, Raymond. Marsile Ficin. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1958.
Nardi, Bruno. Saggi sull' Aristotelismo Padovano dal Secolo XIV at XVI. Florence:
Sansoni, 1958.
Randall, John Herman. The Career oj Philosophy I: From the Middle Ages to the
Enlightenment. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962.
Saitta, Giuseppe. Marsilio Ficino e la Filosofia dell' Umanesimo. 3rd ed. rev.
Bologna: Fiammenghi & Nanni, 1954.
Schiavone, Michele. Problemi Filosofici in Marsilio Ficino. Milan: Marzorati,
1957·
BIBLIOGRAPHY 21 9
Toffanin, Giuseppe. Storia dell' Umanesimo dal XIII al XVI Secolo. 2nd ed.
Rome: Perrella, 1940.
- . History of Humanism. Trans. Elio Gianturco. New York: Las Americas,
1954·
Trinkaus, Charles. "The Problem of Free Will in the Renaissance and the
Reformation," Journal of the History of Ideas, X (1949),51-62.
Weiss, R. "Learning and Education in Western Europe from 1470-1520,"
New Cambridge Modern History, I. Ed. G. R. Potter. Cambridge: University
Press, 1957.
INDEX
Act: power to produce something 17, 19,23; Antoninus, St. VIII, 5.

power to be 57, 106. Aristotle I, 4, 5, 84·
- Pure act: as unique 18; as infinite 19, 63, Aristotelianism 3, 4-5. See also Averroism.
~8, 73, 74,1.07; as the source ofintelIigibi- Aristotelians, the (also called the Peripete-
hty 82-83; m the Platonic account of the tics) X, 1-2, 3, 91.
One a~d the Good above Being 91. Augustine VIII, IX, X, 3, 79n, 81, 98, lOIn.
- and umty 17-22,73-76, 93n, 100, 104, 112. Averroes I, 8In.
- and potency: in the .soul's operations 13; Averroism 1-2, 3.
act and potency, ~mty and power 17-22, Avicebron (Ibn Gabirol) 56n.
74, Il2; potency IS understood through
Bandello, Vincent 6.
act 81. See also Being (and essence); Form
Beatitude. See Immortality.
(and matter).
- of b~ing: condition for action 10, 19, 22, Being: as act 20,73-74, 104, 106-07, 112;
74; mterpretation of the Thomistic term as presence 47, 57, 75-76, 104,106,107; as
'esse' 71; relation to essence or substance- perfection 63-65, 67-68.
- Pure being: as infinite 19-20, 63-65, 68,
in the !homistic context 59-60,67, in the
Platomc context 92, 93n, 102; expresses 73,74, 106, 107, 108; as origin 67, 83-84,
the dynamism of being 73; principle of 107; as measure 79, 83-84,107,108; as an
object of human knowledge - See Being
intelligibility 8 I; proper effect of God 84,
(and knowledge).
91, 108; the power to be 107; infinite in it-
self, limited by potency I 12. See also Being. and nothing 25,27-28, 33, 34,53,54,61,
63,64,66,73,76,78,91;92,101-02,107-
- proper.act: accor~ing to Ficino 57-59,76; 08.
accordmg to Aqumas 70-7 I ; according to
- being as being: the proper effect of God
the Platonic account of the One and the
Good above Being 92, 93n. 24-25, 26-29, 33-34, 35, 42-43, 73, 78-79,
81-82, 102-03, 107; comes first after
See also Power, efficacious; Causation.
Action or operation: the act of a power or nothing 35, 66, 68, 73; the act of essence
faculty 15, 75, 76; in the Platonic dis- 54! 66; the principle of operation 73; the
prmciple of intelligibility 8 I.
cussion 23, 25, 44, 93n ; in God 30, 33; - mode of: proper effect of secondary agents
analogue for the act of being 59, 66-67,
27-29; proper effect of God - See Divine
7?-71, 71-72; caused by an intrinsic prin- ideas. See also Being (and essence).
ciple 79; God's action in the mind 96-98.
and es~ence: in pure minds 15, 22; in the
- and being 9-10, 18-20,21-22,26-1-3,44,
Platomc and Christian accounts of cre-
51, 73-74, 75, 82. See also Causation
(primary and secondary). ation and creatures 44-47, 54-57, 61-62,
66, 72, III, 112; essence as definition
- and unity 9-22,44, 74. being ?S existence in time and place 47:"
- and potency 17-19, 22, 56, 74. 48; bemg as the act of essence essence as
Actus essendi, actus existendi 59, 71, 8 I.
Ange!s: pure minds dependent on truth, determining the mode of being 57-61,
umty, and goodness 15-16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 66-67, 73, 76, 77, 107-08; the absolute
priority of being 63-66,74,81; Thomistic
34,74; composites of potency and act 18;
mfluence on Ficino's discussion 67-72; in
caused by God alone 30-3 I, 32-33, 38, 39; the Platonic discussion of the One and the
a mode of being 33, 65.
INDEX 221
Good above Being 85,91-92, 93n. See also of being and of knowledge 78-80, 82-83,
Form (a principle of being). 9o-gl, 98, 110.
- possible; possible and actual 44-45, 46- Divine illumination: in general 1,2,4,5, 13;
47, 54-55, 66, 72, I II; possible and in man's natural desire for truth and
necessary 52-53; real possibility 67--68n. goodness VIII, 3-4, 7, 77, 88-g0, 95-96,
- and knowledge: common light of being 97-98, 100, 103, 105-06, 108-1 I; Ficino's
80--81, 83-84, 108; the first being (God) use of the Platonic sun analogy 76--78; the
is the first mover of the mind 8 I -83; being common light of truth and being 80-84,
itself as the object of human knowledge- 87-89, 9o-gl, 102-03, 104, 112; two ways
Platonic account 85, 87-89, 91-94, Tho- of knowing the divine 85-104.
mistic account 94-97, comparison of the - Innate ideas 78-80, 82, 83, 84, go, 110.
two accounts 98- I 04, I 12; establishes a Divine names: Platonic discussion 85-94;
necessary link between man's desire and Thomistic discussion 94-98; Ficino's po-
its fulfillment 108--09, 110-11. sition 98-104.
- and truth, unity, and goodness. See unity Dominicans 5-6.
(unity and goodness vs. being and truth). Dress, Walter VIII-IX.
See also Act (of being) ; Action (and being) ; Duns Scotus 87n.
Existence; Infinity; Presence of God;
Power, efficacious. End or purpose: man's fulfillment 5,72,97;
Body: definition of 8, 10, 102; formed by final causality 14, 16, 22, 34,44,84,92.
Ens and esse: distinguished 42,59,81, 96-97;
quality 9, 2 I .
as active and dynamic 70-71; as divine
- and soul. See Soul.
names - Platonic account 85-87, 89, 91-
Causation: definition of 19,23, 26, 73, 106; 92, 93-94, 100-01, 112, Thomistic ac-
as end and as origin 22, 25, 44, 112; first count 96-97, 99, 112, Ficino's position
cause 23--25; external and intrinsic 46--47, 101-02. See also Act (of being).
73-74; origin and measure 84; the inter- Essence: as definition 4, 45, 47-4B; as limit
relationship of different causations 106-- and measure 83,84,94; as unity 12, 21; in
08. potency to action 18; as truth 77; as a
- Creation: Thomistic influence on Ficino's divine name 91. See also Being (and es-
discussion X, 35-43, 68--69; overcomes sence).
the infinite gap between being and nothing Exemplars. See Divine ideas.
19, 20, 22; the production of being as Existence: caused by God 23-25, 57, 107;
being 26--28, 68; the production of the prior to essence 35, 53, 108; proper to
mode of being 33-42, 61--66, 68. See also essence and/or substance 42, 47-4B, 58,
Divine ideas. 59, 60, 70, 77; contradictory to non-being
- primary and secondary 20, .43, 53-54, 45; proper to form 48-49, 50, 58, 70 ;
67--68, 71-72, 74-75, 82-84, 96-98. affected by matter and change 50-51, 52,
- being and essence 58--61, 66--72. 84; a caused necessity in the human soul
See also Power, efficacious. 53-54; as a common nature 64; distin-
Chance 30, 36, 37, 38. guished from being 66--67. See also Being.
Commentaria in Parmenidem (Ficino) lOIn. Extension or quantity 8-10, I I, 20, 102.
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (Aqui-
Fabro, Cornelio VIII-X.
nas and Ficino) VIII-IX.
Florentine Academy 2.
Common nature 64,67.
Form:
Composition. See Act (and potency); Being
(and essence); Being (possible); Form - and unity g-II, 13, 75-76.
(and matter). - and efficacious power g-II, 13, 21-22.
- a principle of being: in general g-IO, 19,
Contingency 23, 46, log.
21--22,73-74; the proper subject of being
Corporeality 8-II, 17,20,22,74, 93n.
which causes the mode of being - Ficino's
Corruption: and generation 4B, 75; and
discussion 47-54,58--61, 73-74; Thomistic
matter 51,52-53, 6g. influence on Ficino's discussion 68-70. See
Cosimo de' Medici 2.
also Form (and knowledge).
Cratylus (Plato) 20n.
Creation. See Causation. - and essence 47-4B.
- and matter: in the Platonic account of
Desire. See Divine illumination. creation and creatures 44-46,54-55,61-
Dionysius, the Pseudo-Areopagite 95, lOin. 62, 66, 72, I I I ; form as the act of matter
Divine ideas: and the modes of being 29-34, but in potency to being 47--61, 68-71;
36--43, 65--68, 72, 74,86n, 101; as norms Platonists attribute goodness and unity to
222 INDEX
matter apart from form 91, 100; a Tho- Lorenzo de' Medici 6.
mistic analogy for the relation between Love VIII, 77,88,90,97-98, JlO, II I, 1I3.
truth and the true 96-97. Matter: a principle of corporeality 8-11,20;
- as limit 44-46,54-55,61-62. prime matter 15; as receptivity 18, 67n;
- and knowledge 18, 86, 87, 103. See also
Divine illumination (Innate ideas). as infinite 44-46, 56, 61-6l1, 72.
- and form. See Form (and matter).
- Exemplars. See Divine ideas.
Formal difference 86-87n. Matthew, St. 94.
Formulae. See Divine illumination (Innate Measure or norm: Platonism vs. Aristoteli-
ideas). anism 4-5, 84; God as measure 78-80, 83,
84, 107, 110.
Gilson, Etienne VIII-X. Mutability. See Stability and mutability.
God: arguments for the existence of 23-24, Necessary being. See God; Soul (as mind).
83,108-09; necessary being 24,25,35,40, Norms. See Measure.
109; simplicity of 24, 25. See also Act Nothing. See Being (and nothing).
(Pure act); Being (Pure being); Causation
(Creation); Divine ideas; Divine names; Omnipotence. See Infinity.
Infinity; Presence of God; Unity (unity Operation. See Action.
and goodness vs. being and truth). Origen lOin.
Good. See Unity (unity and goodness vs. Orthodoxy VIII, 5-6.
being and truth). Oxford, University of I.
Grace 98. Padua, University ofX.
Immortality: as beatitude X, 3-5, 6, 7, 105, Paris, University of I.
106, 109-II; arguments for 47-53; the Parmenides (Plato) 44, 55, 56n.
doctrine of being in the immortality argu- Perfection: as measure 5, 40,79,84,108; as
ments 54-55, 68-72. See also Divine illumi- being 19,63-65,67, 101-02, 102-03, 107,
nation. 112, 113; as intelligibility or truth 96, 99.
Immutability 53, 56. Phi/ebus (Plato) 18,44, 55.
Incorporeal substances. See Angels; Soul (as Philosophy:
mind). - and religion X, 1-5, 7, 105, IOg-IO, I I I.
Infinity: - and Christian theology: in general 17, 21,
- infinity, unity, and act 19-1IO, 73, 93n. 45-47, 54-57, 61-62, 66, 72; Thomistic
- infinity, being, and act: infinite power theology VII, 5-7, 20-22, 43, 72, 94-103;
19-20, 22, 34-35, 36, 67-68n, 73, 83; summary 110-13.
infinite excellence 19,63-65,67-68, 100- Place 47-48.
03, 107; divine infinity and the limits of Plato VII, IX, 2, 3, 18, 20n, 50n, 55, 66, 72,
human knowledge 88-104, 108-09, 110- 76-77, 81n, 82, 89n, 90, 91, 92, 100, 101.
II, 1I2. Platonists, the VII, VIII, IX, 3, 8, 13,44-
- the infinite and the limit: Platonic ac- 45,46,47, 52n, 66,72,85,86,87,89,91,
count of the potency-act relation between 92, 98, 99, 100, 101, lOll, 112. See also
essence and being 21, 44-47, 54-57, 61- Plotinus; Proclus.
62, 72, I I I. Plotinus 14n, 20n, lIln, 52n, 75n, 85n, 86n,
Innate ideas. See Divine illumination. 89n, 91, 92n, 98, 101, 102, 110.
Intellect. See Soul (as mind). Pomponazzi, Pietro 4, 5, 6
Intellectual substances. See Angels; Soul (as Possible being. See Being (possible).
mind). Potency: definition of 17,57,73; as infinite
Intelligible, the: the natural object of human 44-46,54-55,61-62, 93n; as real 61, 65-
knowledge 85-86, 92, 98-g9, 109. 66, 67-68n, 69, 108.
Intelligibility: and truth 76-77, 96; and See also Act (and potency).
being 81-83, 96, 108. See also Divine Power, efficacious: definition of 23, 57, 73,
illumination. 74-75, 93n, 106.
John the Evangelist 77. - and unity 8-22, 73-76, 93n, 97, 100, 104,
II 2.
Know thyself 3, 7, 8, II J. - and being: the mode of action follows the
Kristeller, Paul Oskar VIII, IX. mode of being 9, 19, lII, 73; the infinity of
being establishes infinite power Ig-lIO,
Life: earthly life and the life beyond 3-4, 5, 100; the act of being is the power to be
7, 105-06 ; a mode of being 31,59,60,71, and the source of the power to act -
73. See also Soul.
Ficino 10, 19, !l6-34, 78-79,81-83,96-97,
INDEX 223
Ficino and Aquinas 34-43, 73-76, 97-98, subject of being, independent of the body,
106-07. See also Causation (primary and and hence immortal 47-54, 68-69, 72.
secondary). - non-rational 12n, 14.
- Omnipotence. See Infinity. - as mind: definition of 14; the soul's oper-
- faculty of operation: in pure minds 15; in ations depend on truth which is above the
the rational soul 75, 76, 104; the limited soul I!]-I4, 20, 21, 22, 23, 34, 74; caused
power of the human intellect 88, 92, 96, by God alone 30-31, 32-33, 38, 39; a
108-09; analogue for the relation between necessary being 53-54. See also Divine
essence and being 59, 70-71, 71-72. illumination; Immortality.
See also Act; Causation. Space. See Place.
Power, passive. See Potency. Species 33-34,49,65,75, 79,81,90.
Presence of God: in the universe 7, 26, 34, Stability and mutability 9, 11-13, 15,88.
43, 78, I 13; in human knowledge 3, 7, 76, Substance: as unity I I, 13; as substratum 21,
82-84,88,96,97, 104, 109. 74, 102; as presence and union 92, 103,
See also Love. 104, 109. See also Being (and essence).
Proclus8n,14n,20-21,36,50n,52n,55-56, Summa Contra Gentiles VIII-X, 5,35,36,68,
75n, 85n, 86n, 91, 92-93n, 101, 102, 112. 7 I, 97, Notes and Appendix passim.
Proper subject of being. See Being (and Summa Theologiae 42, 71, 86n, won.
essence); Form (a principle of being).
Theology: and religion 3, 5-7; theological
Pythagoreans son. contempla tion 90. See also Philosophy (and
Quality 9-I3, 17, 18,20,21,22,74. Christian theology).
Quantity. See Extension. Timaeus (Plato) 20n, son, 56.
Ratio: of truth and goodness 12n, 77, 100,
Time 47-48.
Truth. See Unity (unity and goodness vs.
101; as divine ideas 30-32, 39-41, 81, 84, being and truth).
85,86,98, 104, 110.
Religion. See Philosophy (and religion); Unity:
Theology (and religion). - unity and goodness vs. being and truth:
Republic (Plato) 56, 77n, 82n, 89n, 90, 92n. unity, truth, and goodness I4-I6, 20n, 25,
Saitta, Giuseppe VIII. 34,44,74, I 12; unity and being 9-10, 17-
Schiavone, Michele VIII. 22,24,25,37,73-75, 75-76; being, truth,
and goodness 4-5, 12n, 77-78, 79-84, 88,
Secular, the I, 3, 4, 7, 113· 108-09, I I I ; the One and the Good above
Siger of Brabant I.
Being 62, 85-I04, 112.
Soul: a principle of life for the body II, I2,
See also Power, efficacious (and unity);
14, 15, 17,22,34,60,71,74,75,79. Act (and unity).
- and unity: a principle of unity and power
Unmoved mover 84.
for the body II, I7-I8, 22, 34, 74; one in
essence, diverse and dependent in opera- Will: and intellect 6, 7, 30, 36, 106; object of
tion I!]-I4, 21; a principle of unity and 77,86,97-98, 100-01, 108.
being for the body 75-76, 100, 104, 107. Wisdom I, 79,90-91, III, 1I3.
- and being: the rational soul is the proper
Zenobius Acciaiolus VIIIn, 5.

The Secular Is Sacred

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Secular Is Sacred

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

THE SECULAR IS SACRED

ARCHIVES INTERNATIONALES D'HISTOIRE DES IDEES

INTERNATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS

THE SECULAR IS SACRED

Directors: P. Dibon (Paris) and R. Popkin (Washington Univ., St. Louis)

MARTINUS NIJHOFF I THE HAGUE I 1974

and to the Memory of

<0 1971 by Martinus Nijlwff, The Hague, Netherlands

CHAPTER ONE: THE SEARCH FOR GOD I

CHAPTER TWO: THE APPROACH TO GOD THROUGH UNITY AND

CHAPTER FOUR: THE METAPHYSICAL STRUCTURE OF CREATURES,

APPENDIX: TEXTS FOR COMPARISON I 14

This book presents a philosophical position examined philosophically.

Saitta and Michele Schiavone claim that the neo-Platonic influence is

argument, the order of ideas, the sentence structure - follows that of

THE SEARCH FOR GOD

He who separates the study of philosophy from holy religion errs no

endeavors must follow the laws of philosophy. By the fifteenth century

THE APPROACH TO GOD THROUGH

Ficino begins the Platonic Theology by distinguishing in the universe five

2 TP, III, I, v. I, p. 128, B-1 15.

unifies the body by stabilizing it, determining it to one of the many

4 TP, III, I, v. I, p. H18, B-1 15.

bodies are to be explained, there must be a higher principle which

But If a thing is mutable in essence, i.e. if change belongs to it by

10 TP, 1,4, v. I, p. 58, B-85; III, I, v. I, pp. 131-3!l, B-II6.

move in virtue of itself. The soul is a true form because it subsists in

as we have seen. Above it is truth itself, on which it depends for its

16 TP, I, 6, v. I, pp. 67-68, B-89; III, I, v. I, p. 129, B-1 15.

17 TP, 1,6, v. I, pp. 71-72, B-go-gl.

efficacious power and considered to be a necessary condition of action.

21 TP, II, 4, v. I, pp. 82-83, B-g6.

When Ficino establishes divine omnipotence from God's nature as

Each level in the hierarchy of the universe is related to its superior as

23 Proclus, The Elements of Theology # 20, 61-{i2, 86, 95.

THE APPROACH TO GOD THROUGH BEING

Causal power according to Ficino's discussion of the hierarchical

condition that it had been produced by another, nothing would ever

which comes from the sculptor only by way of manipulation. However,

5 TP, V, 13, v. I, p. 204, B-147-48.

being as being. Everything except God must be caused in this way.

11 TP, XI, 4, v. II, p. 120, B-251-52; V, 13, v. I, p. 208, B-149.

creature. Ficino adds this dimension himself. But nothing could be

28 Aquinas, CG, II, 41, # II68, (2).

to an agent which has no multiplicity whatsoever. Hence, the greater

81 CG, II, 42, # JJ81-82, (1-2).

argument, perhaps in virtue of his previous conclusion that all things,

THE METAPHYSICAL STRUCTURE OF

Fieino has approached God through two kinds of dependence - de-

tendency to being, it would have no need of a forming principle beyond

1 TP, XVII, 2, v. III, pp. 14g-50, B-386-87.

is composed of essence and being; and this composition is established by

2 TP, XVII, 2, v. III, pp. Is0--5I, B-387.

4 TP, V, 7, v. I, pp. 185-87, B-140.

What, then, is the principle by reason of which the form relinquishes

it capable of becoming what is not a tree. The capacity makes it possi-

10 TP, XV, 2, v. III, pp. 26-28, B-334-35.

12 TP, V, 12, V. I, pp. 200-01, B-146.

Ficino distinguishes in the discussion of primary and secondary cau-

strengthen this position, the composition is one of possible and actual

18 Plato, Philebus 23c-3Ia.

cause of all must be infinite with no mixture of limit. Ficino applies