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HIERARCHY OF COURTS RULE
De Jesus va. CA
Facts
Petitioner and his stepmother were charged with violation of Sec. 28 (h) of the Social Security
Law for failure to remit the SSS loan amortizations of private respondent. Petitioner filed a
motion to quash the Information that the SSS and not the MTC has jurisdiction over the case,
among others. Trial court denied the motion and petitioner challenged before the CA by way of
petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, the Order of the trial court denying his motion to
quash.
CA dismissed the petition the case involves an order of MTC whose decisions are not directly
reviewable by CA.
Issue
W/N MTC decisions are not directly reviewable by the CA.
Held
We discern a procedural misconception by the Court of Appeals of its jurisdiction over matters
brought to it by way of petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus from Municipal Trial
Courts. Obviously, it is error to hold that decisions of Municipal Trial Courts are not directly
reviewable by the Court of Appeals, and that such petition should have been filed with the
Regional Trial Court being "the proper and competent tribunal."
Under Sec. 9 of B.P. 129, the Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to issue writs
of mandamus, prohibition,certiorari, habeas corpus  and quo warranto, whether or not in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction is concurrent with that of Supreme Court 3 and with
the Regional Trial Courts, for writs enforceable within their respective regions.  The allegations of Santiago in its petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
While We are not unaware of the practice of the Court of Appeals of remanding to the proper
Regional Trial Court for appropriate disposition petitions of this nature, yet, this is done only
when there is no cogent reason advanced why the appellate court should hear the case. Plainly,
therefore, respondent Court of Appeals could still have transmitted the petition to the Regional
Trial Court of General Santos City not because the former has no jurisdiction but more of
convenience and propriety as the latter court exercises administrative supervision over the
Municipal Trial Court as the next higher tribunal in the judicial hierarchy, instead of the Court of
Appeals. Indeed, such established practice is not without basis.
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
Davao Lights vs. CA
Facts
Petitioner filed a verified complaint for recovery of a sum of money and damages against
Queensland Hotel, etc. and Teodorico Adarna. The complaint contained an ex parte application
for a writ of attachment. The trial court judge issued an order granting the ex parte application
and the attachment bond.
The writ of attachment is then issued. The summons and copies of the complaint, writ of
attachment and attachment bond were served on defendants and pursuant to the writ, the
sheriff seized properties of the defendants.
Defendants filed a motion to discharge the attachment for lack of jurisdiction to issue the same
because at the time the order of attachment was promulgated and the attachment writ issued
had not yet acquired jurisdiction over the cause and over the persons of the defendants.
Issue
W/N the writ of preliminary attachment may issue ex parte against a defendant before
acquisition of jurisdiction of the latter’s person by service of summons or his voluntary
submission to the Court’s authority.
Held
The writs of attachment may properly issue ex parte provided that the Court is satisfied with the
relevant requisites therefor have been fulfilled by the applicant, although it may, in its
discretion, require prior hearing on the application with notice to the defendant; but that levy on
property pursuant to the writ thus issued may not be validly effected unless preceded, or
contemporaneously accompanied, by service on the defendant of summons, a copy of the
complaint (and of the appointment of guardian ad litem, if any), the application for attachment
(if not incorporated in but submitted separately from the complaint), the order of attachment,
and the plaintiff’s attachment bond.
Santiago vs. Vasquez
Facts:
Santiago had been charged with violations of EO 324 for having approved the legalization of
aliens who arrived in the Phil and libel, among others, as filed by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (as authorized by the Ombudsman) in the RTC. Santiago then sought to enjoin the
RTC and the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the criminal cases against thru certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction directly in the SC.
Issue: Whether the recourse of Santiago is proper.
Held: No.
injunction are matters which can be ventilated and substantiated in the proceedings before
and/or during the trial of these cases in the lower courts which would be the proper stages and
for the adjudication thereof.
In the matter of petition for habeas corpus.
Enrile vs. Salazar G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
Facts:
Enrile was arrested by the NBI for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, without bail on the strength of a warrant issued by an RTC. Thus Enrile, thru counsel
filed a petition for habeas corpus in the SC.
Issue: WON the filing of the petition for the writ of habeas corpus is the proper recourse of
Enrile.
Held: No.
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the
petitioner’s right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction
to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent.
The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be
admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the evidence
against him.

Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court
have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if
appropriate relief was also available there.
People vs. Cuaresma G.R. No. L-67787 April 18, 1989
Facts:
Cuaresma was charged with oral defamation in a city court by virtue of an information filed by
an Asst. Fiscal. She moved to quash the same but was denied and such order of denial required
the Fiscal to file a verified complaint by the private offended party. This was complied with.
Cuaresma then moved for quashal alleging that the action against her had already prescribed.
This was granted. Hence, the People filed an application directly to the SC for a writ of certiorari
against the City Court.
Issue: Whether the filing of the application for a writ of certiorari directly to the SC is proper.
Held: No. The application for the writ of certiorari sought against a City Court was brought
directly to this Court although there is no discernible special and important reason for not
presenting it to the Regional Trial Court.
There is a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs.  section 8 of said Rule are complied with; and upon failure of the defendant to comply with any
A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”) courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation
of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is established policy.
A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
out in the petition.
Malano vs. Gloria G.R. No. 106692 September 1, 1994
Facts:
Malano’s position under the DOST was aboliched due to the reorganization in such office. He
made an appeal with the DOST/RAB to place her to any comparable position. He was placed in a
position lower than his previous, but he accepted this. Later on, he claimed from DOST the
payment of back salaries and the payment of salary comparable with his previous position,
invoking in his favour the decision on a later jurisprudence. Upon denial, he sent to CSC a letter
to order his employer to pay what he demands, which was also denied. Thus, he filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus in the SC.
Issue: WON the recourse of Malano is proper.
Held: No.
Mandamus is not available for him. And even assuming that such is available, the court finds no
special or cogent reason to justify acceptance of this petition as an exception to this Court’s
policy concerning the hierarchy of courts in relation to cases where it has concurrent jurisdiction
with the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.  Yes, properties levied and seized by virtue of a writ of attachment and later by a writ of
The court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition,mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with
Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable
in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this court, and by the Regional Trial
Court, with the Court of Appeals, although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129
on August 14, 1981, the latter’s competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted by
those “in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.” This concurrence of jurisdiction is not; however, to be
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taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of
courts.
Peck vs. Hon Concepcion G.R. No. L-49140 June 26, 1944
Facts:
Mrs. Montenegro moved for the restitution of her premises. The municipal court granted this
and ordered Peck to pay a monthly rental of 55 Pesos within the first 10 days of every month
while the case for restitution is pending. During the pendency of the appeal to the CFI, Peck
failed to pay such rental within the first 10 days, and thus, Mrs. Montenegro moved for the
immediate execution of the judgment of the municipal court for restitution. The CFI granted
this. Peck moved for reconsideration but was refused since according to the CFI, the writ of
execution was mandatory.
Issue: WON the CFI was correct in granting the writ of execution.
Held: Yes.
In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases under Rule 72, the judgment of the municipal court
is immediately executory unless the conditions precedent for the stay of execution specified in
of said conditions, it is mandatory upon the court to issue the writ of execution.
The court has no discretion to give or not to give this effect to such failure of payment.
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Since in the instant case there is a contract between the parties for the payment of the rent of
P55 in advance within the first ten days of each month, and since the petitioner as defendant
below failed to pay or deposit the rent for the month of January 1944 on or before the 10th day
of said month, the respondent judge had no alternative but to grant the petition for execution
prayed for by his correspondent Mrs. Montenegro.
Uy vs. CA G.R. No. 83897 November 9, 1990
Facts:
A writ of preliminary attachment was implemented by sheriff Cabang for the satisfaction of the
debt of Sy Yuk Tat from Uy. However, there were third party claimants over the property
attached. Thus, these third party claimants filed a writ of preliminary injunction in a different
CFI branch against Uy and Sheriff Cabang alleging that the properties attached by the sheriff
belong to them. Since according to the CFI it would take a while before such writ of prelim
injunction can be issued, the judge ordered the parties to maintain the status quo of the subject
properties. Hence, Uy and Cabang filed a motion to dissolve the status quo order on the ground
that the court had no jurisdiction to interfere with properties under custodio legis on orders of a
court of co-equal jurisdiction. Subsequently, third party claimants filed a motion for prelim
attachment which was granted. 
Issue:
WON properties levied and seized by virtue of a writ of attachment and later by a writ of
execution, were under custodia legis and therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of another co-
equal court where a third party claimant claimed ownership of the same properties.
Held: 
execution were under custodia legis and therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of another co-
equal court where a third party claimant claimed ownership of the same properties.
However, this rule is confined to cases where the property belongs to the defendant or one in
which the defendant has proprietary interests. But when the Sheriff, acting beyond the bounds
of his office seizes a stranger’s property, the rule does not apply and interference with his
custody is not interference with another court’s order of attachment.
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Issue: WON the injunction was proper.

Bengzon vs. CA G.R. No. 82568 May 31, 1988 Held:

Facts: No. As Cereno appears to be the duly elected mayor of the aforesaid town, the law mandates
Boie Takeda, a Phil corporation engaged in the manufacture of drugs, etc. had been ordered that he assume office on February 2, 1988. The respondent judge committed a grave abuse of
through an admin case (BFAD, etc) to recall the marketing plus cancellation of the registration discretion, and acted in excess of his jurisdiction in ordering petitioner to desist and refrain from
of a certain drug(Danzen) manufactured by them which was found to be ineffective. Thus, Boie assuming office. 
Takeda prayed for the issuance in their favour of a writ of prelim injunction to restrain the Sec
of Health from enforcing the Regulation against them. The CA issued a TRO in their favour The respondent judge is not justified in protecting private respondent Asis alleged right to the
pending the hearing of the application for prelim injunction. contested office when it has not yet been clearly established against petitioner whose right is
actual and existing. An injunction “is not to protect contingent or future rights nor is it a remedy
to enforce an abstract right.”
Issue: WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ.

Held: No. 

A writ of preliminary injunction, as an ancillary or preventive remedy may only be resorted to by

a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interests, and for no other purpose,
during the pendency of the principal action.

The writ was issued to protect and preserve the right or license of the private respondent Boie-
Takeda to market its product “Danzen” in the Philippines, which it has been doing since 1970 or
for the past 17 years. Hence the object of the writ is to preserve the status quo, or the last
actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy which, as
correctly noted by the Court of Appeals, “is the status before the withdrawal order” was issued.
The status quo before the ban or withdrawal order was issued, was that Boie-Takeda’s product,
“Danzen” tablets, was registered and being sold in the Philippines under proper license from the
Bureau of Food and Drugs. That status quo is what the writ of preliminary injunction seeks to
preserve pending a final determination of the merits of Boie-Takeda’s petition for prelim
injunction.

Searth Commodities vs. CA G.R. No. 64220 March 31, 1992

Facts:
Upon failure of Searth to pay their loan from DBP, its mortgages were foreclosed and were
advertised to be sold by DBP. Thus, Searth prayed for the annulment the of real estate
mortgage and the foreclosure sale plus a writ of injunction to enjoin the sale of their properties.
An order restraining the bidding was issued but such order was dissolved. 

Issue: WON the issuance of a writ of prelim injunction is proper in this case.

Held: No.

The object of the writ is to preserve the status quo, which is the last actual peaceable
uncontested status that preceded the pending controversy.

The last actual peaceable uncontested status that preceded the controversy is that DBP is the
owner of the properties in dispute, the petitioners having failed to redeem them and DBP having
consolidated its title thereto. As owner of, these properties, DBP has every right to dispose of
them. The issuance of the writ would no doubt upset, not preserve, the status quo.

Cereno vs. Dictado G.R. No. L-49140 June 26, 1944

Facts:
Cereno was the duly elected mayor of Vinzons, Cam Norte; he also took his oath of office. Asis
filed an election protest seeking a judicial recount of the votes. The judge then issued an order
that Cereno desist and refrain from continuing in acting as municipal mayor until further orders
of the court.