10. Cabalan Pastulan Negrito Labor Assoc.

vs NLRC 241 SCRA 643

Facts:

The neo-colonial in the Philippines would hold the Negrito or a... member of indigenous cultural
communities to the same social bondage. But our Constitution and our laws were precisely formulated
under a sense of obligation to the marginalized and the underprivileged.

Fernando Sanchez, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of back wages and other benefits
on January 3, 1991 with Regional Office No. III of the Department of Labor and Employment in Olongapo
City.

Cabalan Pastulan Negrito Labor Association (CAPANELA, for brevity) and its president, Jose Alviz, Sr., as
respondents, alleged that the former was employed by CAPANELA as a foreman with a monthly salary of
P3,245.70 from March, 1977 until he was illegally dismissed March 27, 1990 (instead of January 1,
1990)... pray for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full back wages... and
moral and exemplary damages.

A decision was rendered on June 24, 1991 in favor of herein private respondent, declaring his dismissal
illegal, and ordering herein petitioners to pay the backwages. Complainant was reinstated. Private
respondent subsequently filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution on July 15, 1991.

This was opposed by CAPANELA who insisted on the dismissal of the appeal.

A partial writ of execution [16] was issued by Labor Arbiter Saludares on August 15, 1991 ordering the
physical or payroll reinstatement of private respondent.

As stated at the outset, the NLRC dismissed the appeal on February 28, 1992 for failure of petitioners to
post the supersedeas bond required by law,... (1) the dismissal of private respondent was legal, and (2)
the appeal was perfected despite failure to file a supersedeas bond.

CAPANELA is an association composed of Negritos who worked inside the American naval base in Subic
Bay (hereinafter referred to as the Base).
CAPANELA, through its officers, saw to it that its members reported for work, recorded their attendance,
and distributed the workers' salaries paid by the Base at the end of a specific pay period, without gaining
any amount from such undertakings. Petitioner Alviz, Sr., for his... part and as president of CAPANELA,
was himself only an employee at the Base. In other words, neither CAPANELA nor its president was the
employer of private respondent Sanchez; rather, it was the United States Government acting through
the military base authorities. [18]

Issues:

(1) WON the dismissal of private respondent was legal

Ruling:

Private respondent maintains that there existed an employer-employee relationship, as allegedly

supported by the evidence on record, and that petitioners CAPANELA and Alviz, Sr. exercised control as
employer over the means and methods by which the work was accomplished.

CAPANELA, through its officers, could only impose disciplinary sanctions upon its members for
infractions of its own rules and regulations, to the extent of ousting a member from the association not
equivalent to the illegal dismissal from employment contemplated in our labor laws. Petitioners, not
being the employer negotiation was between CAPANELA and the U.S. Navy, with the former supplying
the labor and the U.S. government paying the wages.

Since CAPANELA merely provided the labor force, it cannot be deduced therefrom that CAPANELA
should also compensate the laborers. CAPANELA had no control of the premises as it was the U.S. naval
authorities who had the power to issue passes or deny their issuance. Evidence to prove that payment
of wages was merely done through CAPANELA, but the source of payment was actually the U.S.
government paying workers according to the volume of work accomplished on rates agreed upon
between CAPANELA and the U.S. government

Principles:

Essential elements of an employer-employee relationship as: (a) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the power of control with
regard to the means and methods by which the... work is to be accomplished,... permissible job
contracting... contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his
own account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method,... ontractor has
substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and other
materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business

11. (Camarines Sur Electric Coop vs. Aquino 566 SCRA 263)

FACTS:

Aquino started a computer gaming business and leased a building for the same purpose. She was
suspected of illegal wiretapping and was investigated for it. Consequently, the electric service to her
business was disconnected. Thus, R filed a Complaint for Damages due to unrealized profits. Upon P’s
motion, the case was dismissed for lack of cause of action.

On January 5, 2009, R filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Notice of Hearing) and mailed a copy to
P’s counsel on the same date. In the said Motion with Notice of Hearing, the date of hearing was January
9, 2009. P filed an opposition thereto alleging that the motion should be denied for noncompliance with
the 3-day rule. P further alleges that since the motion is defective, the appeal period was not tolled and
hence filed out of time.

RTC denied the MR. CA decided that there was a coa but did not render judgment on the timeliness of
the appeal. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

WON Aquino’s Motion is valid for complying with the 3-day rule and thus rendering the appeal valid.

RULING:

NO, the Motion is invalid.

Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 4. Hearing of Motion. – Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the
rights of the adverse party, every motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. Every written motion
required to be heard and the notice of hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its
receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good
cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

A motion which failes to comply with Secion 4 is a mere scrap of paper. It also does not suspend the
running of the period to appeal. R mailed a copy of her motion for reconsideration (with notice of
hearing) to its (petitioner’s) counsel only on January 5, 2004, although the motion was already
scheduled for hearing on January 9, 2004. Respondent should have foreseen that the registered mail,
which originated from Naga City, would not be able to reach the law office of petitioner’s counsel in
Manila at least 3 days before said date. As expected, the mail did not reach petitioner’s counsel on time.
In fact, he received it only on the day of the hearing itself. Thus, respondent’s motion for
reconsideration was fatally flawed for failure to comply with the 3-day rule.

Based on the foregoing, respondent’s defective motion for reconsideration did not stop the running of
her period to appeal. Thus, the appeal in the CA should have been dismissed outright as the decision of
the RTC had by then already become final and executory.

12. San Lorenzo Village Assoc. Inc vs CA 288 SCRA 115

FACTS

Almeda owned land and bldg. in Pasay Road, San Lorenzo Village, Makati – TCT 4738.

TCT contained restriction on ownership – imposed in 1958: a.) Automatic membership in SLVAI; b.)Lot
may not be subdivided; c.) To be used for residential purposes only; d.) Only 1 storey bldg. may be
erected; and e.) There must be an easement.

Land was sold to ADEC in 1990. ADEC wanted to cancel the annotations. Co. assailed restrictions in the
TCT as Pasay Road is already filled with commercial establishments/ industrial buidlings.

ADEC wanted to build a taller building and DID NOT WANT TO BECOME SLVA member. ADEC filed
petition for TRO and prohibition against SLVAI and prayed to cancel the annotations.

SLVAI filed motion to dismiss on grounds of LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION and lack of ADEC’s personality to
sue. Court denied SLVAI’s motion. CA also denied certiorari. Hence this petition for certiorari filed by
SLVAI to SC.
ISSUE/S

WON Almeda Devt and Equipment Corporation (ADEC) has a cause of action.

HELD/RATIO

YES, ADEC has a cause of action.

A complaint states a cause of action where it contains the three (3) essential elements of a cause of
action, namely: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3)
the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.

If these elements are absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action.

The averments in the complaint are allegations well within the hypothetical-admission principle.

Here, the averments in the complaint like the title of ADECs vendor, the execution of the sale by said
vendor to ADEC, the latters status as the vendors successor-in-interest, and the altered physical
environment along Pasay Road, are allegations well within the hypothetical-admission principle. These
averments satisfy the three (3) elements of a cause of action. In other words, the complaint did state a
cause of action.

SC DECISION: Petition by SLVAI Dismissed. CA Decision Affirmed.

13. (Paranaque Kings Enterprises Inc. vs CA 268 SCRA 727)

Facts:

Defendant Catalina Santos is the owner of 8 parcels of land located in Parañaque. Frederick
Chua leased the property of defendant and assigned all rights and interest and participation in the
leased property to Lee Ching Bing by deed of assignment. Lee Ching Bing also assigned all his rights and
interest in the leased property to Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. All of these contracts/deeds were
registered.
Paragraph 9 of the assigned leased (sic) contract provides among others that:

9. That in case the properties subject of the lease agreement are sold or encumbered, Lessors shall
impose as a condition that the buyer or mortgagee thereof shall recognize and be bound by all the terms
and conditions of this lease agreement and shall respect this Contract of Lease as if they are the
LESSORS thereof and in case of sale, LESSEE shall have the first option or priority to buy the properties
subject of the lease;

Defendant Santos sold the eight parcels of land subject of the lease to Defendant David Raymundo, for a
consideration of P5Million, in contravention of the contract of lease, for the first option or priority to
buy was not offered by defendant Santos to the plaintiff. Santos, realizing the error, she had it
reconveyed to her for the same consideration of P5Million and subsequently the property was offered
for sale to plaintiff for the sum of P15Million, however the period of 10 days to make good of the offer
expired. Another deed of sale was executed by Santos in favor of Raymundo for consideration of
P9Million. Hence, the petitioner filed a complaint before the RTC.

RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. It ratiocinated that Santos complied with
the lease agreement by offering the properties for sale to the plaintiff and there was a definite refusal
on the part of the plaintiff to accept the offer.

CA affirmed in toto the ruling of RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not there is valid cause of action.

Ruling:

Yes.

The principal legal question, as stated earlier, is whether the complaint filed by herein petitioner in the
lower court states a valid cause of action. Since such question assumes the facts alleged in the complaint
as true, it follows that the determination thereof is one of law, and not of facts. There is a question of
law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of
alleged facts.
A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right, and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the
plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.