INTRO TO LAW PAGE 37 CASE(1)

VOL. 13, MARCH 31, 1965

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Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. City of Cebu
A N N O T A T I ON

LEGISLATIVE INTENT
(Statutory Construction)
Generally.—It is the cardinal rule of statutory construction that the Court must ascertain
the legislative intent for the purpose of giving effect to any statute (Macondray & Co. vs.
Eustaquio, 64 Phil. 446; Daza vs. Villaroman, 69 Phil. 12; People vs. Concepcion, 44 Phil.
126). Legislative intent is thus the vital part, the heart, the soul and essence of the law and
the guiding star in the interpretation thereof (50 Am. Jur. 200).
What is Legislative Intent?—For construction purposes legislative intent does not mean
the collection of the subjective wishes, hopes and prejudices of each and every member of
the legislature, but rather the “objective footprints left on the trial of legislative enactment”
(2 Sutherland Statutory Construction 322 [3rd Ed.]). It can only be discovered by tracing
the history of the statute’s enactment, the evil which the legislature aimed to prevent or
cure thereby. To look to the intent of each legislator when he voted for the statute is to
disregard the realities of legislative procedure. (Id.)

Thus, in interpreting a legal provision on adoption, an interpretation which gives effect to

the law and is, in keeping with the modern trend of adoption statute should be followed
(Prasnik vs. Republic, 98 Phil. 666).

Once the legislative intent is discovered the judiciary has no other choice but to apply it. If
it is already apparent from the law in question then there is no need of construction thereof.

The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is part of the law itself, and is to be
followed and applied, where ascertainable in construing conflicting provisions. (Hemmani
vs. The Export Control Committee, 100 Phil. 973; Altabani vs. Masbate Consolidated
Mining Co., 69 Phil. 696).
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The fundamental purpose which may have been in the mind of the legislature in enacting
the law should be considered. The Court has no other choice (Regalado vs. Yulo, 61 Phil.
173; Philippine Sugar Central Agency vs. Collector of Customs, 51 Phil. 131).

The Court should give effect to the general legislative intent if it can be discovered within
the four corners of the law. When the object intended to be accomplished by the statute is
once clearly ascertained, general words may be restrained to it and those of narrower import
may be expanded to embrace it to effectuate the intent (Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil.
322).

If the statute needs interpretation or construction, the influence most dominant in that
process is the purpose and intent of the legislature (De Jesus vs. City of Manila, 29 Phil.
73; Ty Sue vs. Hord, 12 Phil 485).

Principles in determining Legislative Intent—

1.It is a fundamental principle that such a construction is, if possible, that which will give
effect to all provisions of the statute (In Re Allen, 2 Phil. 630).
2.The courts will correct the statute when an obvious mistake had been made and give
effect to the law the real meaning intended by the legislature if such meaning is apparent
upon the face of the whole enactment (Lamb vs. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456).
3.Courts should not go outside of the field of interpretation to inquire into the motive or
motives of the legislature in enacting a particular statute (Luzon Stevedoring Co. vs. Luzon
Marine Department Union, 101 Phil. 257).
4.The mandatory nature of the provision of the law may be determined not only from the
language of the statute but also from the apparent legislative intent behind the enactment
(Guiao vs. Figueroa, 94 Phil. 1018).
5.The tenancy act is intended to improve the lot of tenants and should be construed to
promote its purpose in
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457 Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. City of Cebu

accordance with the general intent of the lawmakers (Sibulo vs. Altar, 83 Phil. 513; See
also Javellana vs. Mirasol, 40 Phil. 761).
6.If the language of the law is too plain and ambiguous there is no need to entertain
inquiries for the purpose of ascertaining legislative intent (Velasco vs. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720;
Marin vs. Nacianceno, 19 Phil. 238). The spirit of the law must prevail over the letter
thereof (McMicking vs. Lichauco, 27 Phil. 386; Garcia vs. Ambler, 4 Phil. 81; Torres vs.
Limjap, 56 Phil. 141).
7.If the literal interpretation of the words of the statute would lead to absurdity, said letters
may be disregarded to find out the spirit and the reason for its enactment (Rufino Lopez &
Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 850). The rule is that drafters of the law
could not have intended to create absurd or impossible situations (Pritchard vs. Republic,
46 O.G. 1st Supp. 26).
8.If the language of the law admits more than one construction, one that which gives effect
to the evident purpose and object sought to be attained by the enactment of the statute must
be followed (U.S. vs. Navarro, 19 Phil. 134).
9.Where the language of the law is susceptible to two or more constructions, one which
will render the statute ineffective or insufficient and the other which will intend to give
effect to the evident intent of the legislature, the latter construction must be followed (U.S.
vs. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85).
10.The whole statute involved must be examined looking into the intendment of the law.
A meaning that does not appear, nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the
statute cannot be placed therein (Chang Yung Fa vs. Gianzon, 97 Phil. 913).
11.The preamble of the law itself may be looked into as a clear intention of the legislature
(Go Chioco vs. Martinez, 45 Phil. 256).

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12.If the language admits of more than one interpretation that interpretation which tends to
give effect to the object of the law should be adopted (U.S. vs. Navarro, 19 Phil. 134).
13.The history of the times and state of the things existing when the act was framed or
adopted must be followed (De los Santos vs. Mallari, 87 Phil. 289). Conditions of the things
at the time of the enactment of the law should be considered to determine the legislative
intent (Gomez Garcia vs. Hipolito, 2 Phil. 732; U.S. vs. De Guzman, 30 Phil. 416; Santiago
vs. Yatco, CA-G.R. No. 30752-R, Aug. 30, 1962, 59 O.G. 3459).
14.Legislative debates being expressions and views of individual members are not safe
guides for determining the meaning and purpose of the legislature in enacting a statute
(Manila, Jockey Club, Inc. vs. Games & Amusements Board, 107 Phil. 151). Motives,
opinions and even reasons expressed by individual members of Congress cannot be
properly taken into consideration in ascertaining legislative intent (People vs. Manantan, 5
SCRA 684; Resins, Inc. vs. Auditor General, 25 SCRA 254; Casco Philippine Chemical
Co. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347; Sung Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 102 Phil.
477; 54 O.G. 615; Mayon Motors, Inc. vs. Acting Comm. of Int. Revenue, 1 SCRA 918).
15.Where the legislative policy is so strong as shown not only by the provisions of the law
under examination but also by the amendatory acts thereto, a construction to carry out the
evident policy of the law must be made (Tinio vs. Frances, G.R. No. L-7747, November,
1955).
16.Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each
other in order to arrive at the effect contemplated by the legislature. (Chartered Bank vs.
Imperial, 48 Phil. 931). The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole
text of the law and every part of the act is to be taken into view (Lopez vs. El Hogar
Filipino, 47 Phil. 249).

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Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. City of Cebu

17.It is presumed that the legislature reenacted the law on the tax with full knowledge of
the regulation therein enforced and that it approved them because they carry out the
legislative purpose (Interprovincial Auto Bus Co. vs. Collector, 98 Phil. 290).
18.Whether or not a statute is impliedly repealed is a question of legislative intent to be
ascertained by an examination of both statutes and in the light of the purpose and object of
both (U.S. vs. Tantoco, 34 Phil. 722; National Power Corp. vs. Arca, 25 SCRA 931).
19.Whether there is a plain and irreconcilable repugnancy between two laws the later
expression of the legislative will must be given effect (Garcia Valdez vs. Tuazon, 40 Phil.
943; Aldecoa vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 30 Phil. 228).
20.There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions in a statute may
in all circumstances be distinguished from those which are mandatory. However, in the
determination of the question, as of every other question of statutory construction, the
prime object is to ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative intent must be obtained
from all the surrounding circumstances, and the determination does not depend on the form
of the statute. Consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its object, and
the consequences which would result from construing it one way or the other, and the
statute must be construed in connection with other related statutes.
The main objective of the framers of our constitution in providing for the establishment,
first of an electoral commission, and then of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of
Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election
contests affecting members of the lawmaking body (Tañada, et al. vs. Cuenco, et al., 100
Phil. 1101 [uprep.])

21.Where the provision of a statute which has been consistently construed by the courts in
a certain manner is incorporated in another statute, the conclusion is that the

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framer of the latter has reproduced the former with the intent of adopting, also, its settled
interpretation by the judicial department (Montelibano, et al. vs. Ferrer, 97 Phil. 228).
If the intention of the framers of the constitution was that the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus carries or implies the suspension of the right to bail, they would
have very easily provided that all persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
securities, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong and
except when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended (Nava, et al. vs.
Gatmaitan, et al., 90 Phil. 172; Hernandez vs. Monteza, Ibid.; City Fiscal of Manila vs.
Abaya, Ibid.)

22.The rule of ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling
where the plain purpose and intent of the lawmaking body would thereby be hindered and
defeated (Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Social Security Commission, 1 SCRA
10).
23.Whether or not in a given case the statute is to be construed is to be determined by the
subject matter of the prohibition, as well as the language of the statute and the intention of
the legislature (U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil 128; U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488; U.S. vs.
Siy Cong Bieng, 30 Phil. 577).
24.The rule that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of others is only an aid to the
ascertainment of the meaning of the law and must yield whenever the contrary intention on
the part of the lawmakers is present (Springer vs. Gov’t of the P.I., 277 U.S. 189).
25.In determining the intention of the legislature, the court is permitted to look to prior
laws on the same subject and to investigate the antecedent or legislative history of the
statute involved (Director of Lands vs. Abaya, 63 Phil. 599).
26.While statutes prescribing punishments or penal-

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461 Serrano vs. Miave

ties are not to be extended further than their terms, reasonably justify, this principle is
subordinate to the rule of reasonable, sensible construction of statutes in view of the
legislative purpose and intent and not to defeat that intent as indicated by the language used
(Republic vs. Padilla, 71 Phil. 261).—JUDGE JORGE COQUIA.
Notes.—To the same effect is Everett Steamship Corp. vs. Municipality of Medina, 16
SCRA 978.

It is a well-known principle that the power to tax and license as a means of raising revenues
is not inherent in a municipal corporation. In order that it may be exercised the power must
be expressly conferred in plain terms or it must arise by necessary implication from the
powers expressly granted. A grant of power of this nature is, as a rule, strictly construed
against its exercise and in favor of the public especially where the purpose is to raise
revenue. (McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Vol. III, sec. 1987, p. 2193.) Hence, the
power when granted is to be construed in strictissimi juris.
As to power of municipal corporations to enforce sales tax, see C. N. Hodges vs. Municipal
Board of Iloilo City, 19 SCRA 28.

LEGISLATIVE INTENT , 13 SCRA 455, March 31, 1965