II.

JUDICIAL ETHICS

It is a branch of moral science which treats of the right and proper conduct to be observed by
all judges and magistrates in trying and deciding controversies brought to them for
adjudication which conduct must be demonstrative of impartiality, independence, and
freedom from improprieties.

A. SOURCES

1. NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY (BANGALORE DRAFT)
• • In November 2002, at a Roundtable Meeting of Chief Justices held at the Peace Palace in
The Hague, the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity amended and approved
the Bangalore Draft of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which is intended to be the Universal
Declaration of Judicial Standards.

• • It is founded on the following principles:

• (1) A universal recognition that a competent, independent and impartial judiciary is
essential if the courts are to fulfill their role in upholding constitutionalism and the rule of
law;
• (2) Public confidence in the judicial system and in the moral authority and integrity of the
judiciary is of utmost importance in a modern democratic society; and
• (3) It is essential that judges, individually and collectively, respect and honor judicial office
as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in the judicial system.
• • On April 27, 2004, the draft code was promulgated as the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary and given effect on June 1, 2004 (A.M. No. 03-5-01-SC)(see
annex F for the full text).
QUALITIES

1. INDEPENDENCE

Canon 1: Judicial independence is a prerequisite to the rule of law and a fundamental guarantee of fair trial. A
judge shall therefore, uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.

Judicial independence refers to the freedom of courts from extraneous influences or control.

Under the Judiciary’s unique circumstances, independence encompasses the idea that individual judges can freely
exercise their mandate to resolve justiciable disputes, while the judicial branch, as a whole, should work in the
discharge of its constitutional functions free of restraints and influence from the other branches, save only for those
imposed by the Constitution itself (Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of the Properties
Purchased by the Retired Chief/ Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012).

Independence of a judge is two-pronged:

1. Individual Judicial Independence:

• Focuses on each and particular judge and seeks to insure his or her ability to decide cases with autonomy within the
constraints of the law. A judge has this kind of independence when he can do his job without having to hear—or at
least to take it seriously if he does hear—criticisms of his personal morality and fitness for judicial office (In the Matter
of the allegations contained in the columns of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet published in Malaya dated September 18, 19, 20
and 21, 2007, A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC, August 8, 2008).

2. Institutional Judicial Independence:

Focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a branch of government and protects judges as a class (Ibid). As the
court, no branch of the government or agencies thereof could dictate upon its performance of its judicial
duties (Pineda, Judicial Ethics, 2009 ed, p. 32).
Q: Are these two aspects alternative?

A: No. A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of

independence are preserved - wherein public confidence in the competence
and integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the
legitimacy of judicial authority (In the matter of the allegations contained in
the Columns of Mr. Amado P. Macaset Published in Malaya Dated September
18,19,20 and 21, 2007 A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC, August 8, 2008).

Section 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the

basis of their assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious
understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement,
pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for
any reason.

Notes: Judges must carry out their judicial functions on the basis of their own
discernment and judgment without any undue outside influence (Funa, Legal
and Judicial Ethics: With Bar Examination Questions, 2009, p. 439).

 Judges are required to rule fairly regardless of public opinion. The pressure
of a rally demanding the issuance of warrant of arrest against the accused is
not a sufficient excuse for unjustified fixing of bail without hearing (Libarios vs.
Dabalos, A.M. No. RTJ-89-286, July 11, 1991).
Section 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from
judicial colleagues in respect of decisions which the judge is obliged to make
independently.

While there may be discussions and exchange of ideas among judges, at the
end of such discussion, the judge must decide on the basis of his own, sole,
judgment.

 A justice of the Court of Appeals who, in violation of the internal rules

(IRCA), allowed herself to be rushed into signing a decision without reading
the parties’ memorandaand without the deliberation among members of the
Division required by the IRCA, showed “weakness and lack of independence
on her part” (Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., CA-GR SP
No. 103692, A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, September 9, 2008).

 The discretion of the court to grant bail must be based on the court’s
determination as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The judge’s
admission that he granted bail to an accused upon the request of a
Congressman, despite his belief that the evidence of guilt against accused is
strong is indeed reprehensible(Tahil vs. Eisma, A.M. No. 276-MJ, 1975, June
27, 1975).
Section 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending
before another court or administrative agency.

Any attempt, whether successful or not, to influence the decision-making process of another judge,
especially one who is of lower rank and over which he exercises supervisory authority, is serious misconduct.

 Interference by members of the bench in pending suits with the end in view of influencing the course or
the result of litigation does not only subvert the independence of the judiciary but also undermines the
people’s faith in its integrity an impartiality (Sabitsana Jr. vs. Villamor, A.M. No. 90-474, October 4, 1991).

 In attending, at the request of a party to a conciliation, the barangay conciliation proceedings and
introducing himself as the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in an obvious demonstration of
support for the said party, the judge lent the prestige of his office to a party in a case (Marces vs. Arcangel,
A.M. No. RTJ-91-712, July 9, 1996).

Q: Are the rules prescribed under Section 2 and 3 absolute?

A: No. If the consultation is purely on academic or hypothetical basis and the judge does not surrender
his/her independent decision making, there is no breach of Section 2 and 3 of this Canon.

General Rule: A judge shall not interfere in the works of judges of co-equal jurisdiction (PDCP Development
Bank vs. Vestil, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1354, November 21, 1996).

Exception: However, a judge may revoke the orders of another judge in litigation subsequently assigned to
him (Washington Distillers, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120961, October 17, 1996).
Section 4. Judges shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the
public interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they
are in a special position to influence the judge.

Judge’s Family – includes:

1. Judge’s spouse;
2. Son;
3. Daughter;
4. Son-in-law;
5. Daughter-in-law;
6. Any other relative by consanguinity within the sixth civil degree; or
7. Person who is a companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge’s
household (Definitions, New Code of Judicial Conduct for Philippine Judiciary Bangalore Draft).

 Constant company with a lawyer tends to breed intimacy and camaraderie to the point that
favors in the future may be asked from the judge which he may find hard to resist (Padilla vs.
Zantua, A.M. No. MTJ-93-888, October 24, 1994).

 Where a relative of the judge is one of the parties to a case, within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, the disqualification is mandatory (Hurtado vs. Judalena, G.R. No. L-
40603, July 13, 1978).

It is a MANDATORY REQUIREMENT that the judge inhibit himself from the case when a
member of his/her family is a party to the case.
Section 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the
executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a
reasonable observer.

Freedom for Institutional Influences - Judges must be vigilant in guarding their independence against
corroding influences emanating from the other branches of the government. They must not succumb to the
undue pressures of high government officials like cabinet members, senators, congressmen, governors,
mayors and other high profile public officers. The only pressure they must respect is pressure or dictate of
the law (Pineda, Judicial Ethics, 2009 ed, p. 52).

 Judicial independence is the reason for leaving exclusively to the court the authority to deal with the
internal personal issues, even if the court employees are funded by the local government (Bagatsing vs.
Herrera, G.R. l-34952, July 25, 1975).

 While it is true that Justice Sabio could not have possibly known prior to his brother's call that his brother
intended to speak to him about the Meralco-GSIS case, the fact remains that Justice Sabio continued to
entertain a call from his brother, who also happens to be an officer of the executive branch, despite realizing
that the conversation was going to involve a pending case. Justice Sabio asks the Court if he should have
immediately slammed the phone on his brother. Certainly, such boorish behavior is not required. However,
as soon as Justice Sabio realized that his brother intended to discuss a case pending before him or in his
division, Justice Sabio should have respectfully but firmly ended the discussion. That Justice Sabio did not do
as his brother asked is of no moment. Section 5, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct maintains such a
high bar of ethical conduct that actual influence is not a prerequisite before a violation is deemed
committed. If a magistrate's actions allow even just the appearance of being influenced, it is deemed a
violation (Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA).

 A local government unit which provides vehicle for the use of the judge does not impinge on judicial
independence, in the absence of any indication of corruption or anomalous undertakings (Re: Suspension
of Clerk of Court Joboco, A.M. No. 93-10-1296-RTC, August 12, 1998).
• Section 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general
and in relation to the particular parties to a dispute which he or she has
to abdicate.
•
• It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges
should live in retirement or seclusion, however, he should be scrupulously
careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to awaken the
suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an
element in determining his judicial course (Canons of Judicial Ethics,
Administrative Order No. 162, August 1, 1946 of the Department of
Justice).
•
•  The act of a judge in meeting with litigants outside the office premises
beyond office hours violates the standard of judicial conduct (Tan vs.
Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ 04-1563, September 8, 2004).
•
Section 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in order to
maintain and enhance the institutional and operational independence of the judiciary.

 The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates judges to administer justice without delay and directs every
judge to dispose of the court’s business promptly within the period prescribed by the law and the
rules. Failure to comply with the mandate of the Constitution and Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes
serious misconduct, which is detrimental to the honor and integrity of a judicial office (Salud vs. Alumbres,
A.M. RTJ-00-1594, June 20, 2003).

Section 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public
confidence in the judiciary which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.

 Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who
discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office
undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial
system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of government (Borromeo vs. Mariano, G.R. No.
16808, Jan. 3, 1921).

 A judge should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his
obligation to promptly and properly administer justice (Dimatulac v Villon, G.R. No. 127107, October 12,
1998).

 A Judge, especially of the municipal court is the visible representation of law and justice. From him, the
people draw their will and awareness to obey the law; in him, they see the intermediary of justice between
two conflicting interests. For him to return that regard, he must be first to abide by the law, weave the
example for others to follow, and studiously avoid even the slightest infraction of the law (De la Paz vs.
Inutan, A.M. No. 201-MJ, [June 30, 1975], 159-A PHIL 793-802).

Notes: Sections 7 and 8 of Canon 1 are intended to serve as catch-all provisions for all other acts that would
guarantee the independence of the judiciary, but which may not have been covered in the specific instances
mentioned in the earlier provisions.
INTEGRITY

Canon 2: Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the

judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.

Integrity is a steadfast adherence to the strict moral or ethical code. It

is moral uprightness. It is honesty and honorableness put into
one (Pineda, Judicial Ethics, 2009 ed, p. 63).

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not

just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of
impropriety.

 This is true not only in the performance of their judicial duties but in
all their activities, including their private life. They must conduct
themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for
reproach (San Juan vs. Bagalacsa, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1395 December 22,
1997).
Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be
so in the view of a reasonable observer.

 When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of any law which he is sworn to apply, he places his
office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary itself. It is therefore paramount that a judge's personal behavior both in the
performance of his duties and his daily life, be free from any appearance of impropriety as to be beyond
reproach (Gacad vs. Clapis, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257, [July 17, 2012], 691 PHIL 126-142).

 In the judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity (Pascual vs. Bonifacio, A.M.
No. RTJ-01-1625, March 10, 2003).

 With regard to professional integrity, judges have been penalized for:

1. Demanding and/or accepting bribes (Mamba vs. Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-96-10, June 25, 2001);
2. Fraternizing with litigants and/or lawyers (Dela Cruz vs. Bersamin, A.M. No. RTJ-00-567, July 25, 2000);
3. Altering orders (Rallos vs. Gako, A.M. No. RTJ-98-1484, March 18, 2000);
4. Delay in rendering decisions (Fernandez vs. Hamoy, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1821, August 12, 2004,);
5. Sexual harassment of employee (Dawa vs. De Asa, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1144, July 22, 1998);
6. Ignorance of the law (Macalintal vs. Teh, A.M. No. RTJ-93- 1375, October 16, 1997);
7. Using intemperate language (Romero vs. Valle, A.M. No. R-192-RTJ, January 9, 1987);
8. Not wearing the judicial robe in the performance of judicial functions. (Chan vs. Majaducan, A.M. No. RTJ-
02-1697, October 15, 2003);
9. Incompetence;
10. Conducting hearings in the residence; and
11. Punching a fellow judge in the face after a disagreement.

 With respect to personal integrity, judges have been penalized for:

a. Transgressions in their private lives such as keeping and/or flaunting a mistress (In Re Judge Marcos, A.M.
No. 97-253-RTC, July 6, 2001);
b. Inebriated behavior (Lachica vs. Flordeliza, A.M. No. MTJ-9-921, March 4, 1996);
c. Frequenting casinos and cock (City of Tagbilaran vs. Hontanosas, A.M. No. MTJ- 98-1169, November 29,
2002); and
Section 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not only merely be done but must also be seen and
done.

 Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decision, but must do so in a
manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity(Rallos vs. Gako, A.
M. No. RTJ-99-1484, March 17, 2000).

 The Court cannot emphasize enough the pivotal role lower court judges play in the
promotion of the people's faith in the judiciary. Unlike the appellate court justices, they are
the so-called "front-liners" who give human face to the judicial branch at the "grassroots"
level in their interaction with litigants and those who do business with the courts (Chan vs.
Majaducon, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1697, October 15, 2003).

 The judge must not only appear to be a “good judge” but also appear as a “good
person” (Address delivered by Chief Justice Andres R Narvasa at the Judicial Career
Development Program for Judges, November 25-29, 1991).

 Public confidence in the judiciary can only be achieved when the court personnel conduct
themselves in a dignified manner befitting the public office they are holding. Judges should
avoid conduct or any demeanor that may tarnish or diminish the authority of the Supreme
Court (Tormis vs. Paredes, A.M. RTJ-13-2355, February 4, 2015).

 A judge must be like Caesar’s wife. - Because appearance is as important as reality in the
performance of judicial functions, like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure but
beyond suspicion, (Palang vs. Zosa, G.R. No. L-38229, August 30, 1974).
Section 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against
lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have
become aware.

The Supreme Court explained: “Oftentimes… leniency provides the court employees the
opportunity to commit minor transgressions of the laws and slight breaches of official
duty ultimately leading to vicious delinquencies. The respondent judge should
constantly keep a watchful eye on the conduct of his employees.

A judge has the prerogative to discipline his staff for negligence and/or mistake.
However, a judge should not make it a habit of showing fits of temper and resorting to
verbal abuse against erring employees. Thus, he should be mindful of the need to
maintain professional and harmonious relations with his personnel with a view to the
speedy and efficient administration of justice (Re: Suspension of Clerk of Court Jocobo,
Ibid.)

 Their official duties stir ripples of public suspicion and public distrust of the judicial
administrators. The slightest breach of duty by and the slightest irregularity in the
conduct of court officers and employees detract from the dignity of the courts and erode
the faith of the people in the judiciary (Buenaventura vs. Benedicto, A.C. No. 137-5,
March 27, 1971).
. IMPARTIALITY

Canon 3: Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision
itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.

Impartiality is a state of mind of the judge where there is no consciousness or sense of favor for, bias or prejudice
against any party in a case (Pineda, Judicial Ethics, 2009 ed, p. 81).

What are the two concepts of Impartiality?

a. Impartiality with respect to the decision itself; and

b. Impartiality with regards to the process in arriving at a decision.

 Allegations of partiality or bias must have a factual basis. Bare allegations or suspicions of partiality will not be
sufficient to cause the disqualification of the judge (Dimo Realty and Development vs. Dimaculangan, G.R. No.
130991, March 11, 2004).

Well-known is the judicial norm that ”judges should not only be impartial but should also appear
impartial.” Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would become meaningless if the
ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial
decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity (Rallos vs.
Judge Gako, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-99-1484, March 17, 2000).

 Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any
suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity (Rallos, et al., vs. Judge Irineo Lee, Gako, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-98-
1484, March 18, 2000).
Section 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias, or prejudice.

Justice is rendered exclusively on the basis of the law, the relevant facts, and the jurisprudence. All other human
factors such as emotions, relationships, pre-conceptions are to be excluded totally from the judge’s consideration.

To sustain a claim of bias or prejudice, the resulting opinion must be based upon an extrajudicial source – that
is, some influence other than the facts and law presented in the courtroom. In the United States, this is known as
the Extrajudicial Source Rule.

 As long as decisions made and opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings are based on the evidence
presented, the conduct observed by the magistrate, and the application of the law, such opinions – even if the latter
found to be erroneous – will not sustain a claim of personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge (Gochan vs.
Gochan, G.R. No. 1433089, February 27, 2003).

 Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a

judge’s sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to the person, and to give equal
right to the poor and rich. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion of
partiality is not enough. In this case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the circumstances cited by
the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and surmises. The complainant also failed to adduce proof
indicating the judge’s predisposition to decide the case in favor of one party (Antonio M. Lorenzana vs. Judge Ma.
Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014).

 A judge’s conduct must be clearly indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice before it can be stigmatized as biased
and partial (Cruz vs. Iturralde, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1775, April 30, 2003).

Certiorari as a remedy

 Since petitioner failed to show any strong ground of bias and partiality on the part of Judge Reyes, there can be no
irregularity or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to speak of that would merit the
filing of a certiorari case. (WILLIE ONG, doing business under the name and style EXCEL Fitness Center vs. LUCIA N.
BASCO G.R. No. 167899 August 6, 2008).
Section 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the
Judge and of the Judiciary.

 The intendment of the above provision of the Rules of Court is not difficult to find. Its rationale is
predicated in the long standing precept that no judge should handle a case in which he might be
perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and impartiality. His judgment must not be
tainted by even the slightest suspicion of improbity or preconceived interest (Urbanes, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 112884 (Resolution), August 30, 1994).

 Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing before
them so as to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or partiality. It is not expected, of course,
that judges should live in retirement or seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may be
desirable, for instance, that they continue, time and work commitments permitting, to relate to
members of the bar in worthwhile endeavors and in such fields of interest, in general, as are in
keeping with the noble aims and objectives of the legal profession. In pending or prospective
litigations before them, however, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may
tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their
objectivity, for not only must judges possess proficiency in law but that also they must act and
behave in such manner that would assure, with great comfort, litigants and their counsel of the
judges' competence, integrity and independence (In re Ong, A.M. No. SB-14-21-J, September 23,
2014).
Section 3, Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize
the occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or
deciding cases.

 The rule of disqualification of judges must yield to demands of necessity. Simply

stated, the Rule of Necessity means that a judge is not disqualified to sit in a case if
there is no other judge available to hear and decide the case. When all judges would be
disqualified, disqualification will not be permitted to destroy the only tribunal with
power in the premises. The doctrine operates on the principle that a basic judge is better
than no judge at all. Under such circumstances, it is the duty of the disqualified judge to
hear and decide the controversy, however disagreeable it may be (Parayno vs. Meneses,
G.R. No. 112684, April 26, 1994).

Guidepost for voluntary inhibition of judges

 A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in litigation. But when suggestion is
made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party with bias or
prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably capable of inciting
such a state of mind, he shall conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his
discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not
impaired (Pimentel vs. Salonga G.R. No. 27934, September 18, 1967).
Section 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before them, make any comment
that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the
process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or
issue.

This section warns judges against making any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of
the proceedings before them or “impair the manifest fairness of the process.”

Judges should avoid side remarks, hasty conclusions, loose statements, or gratuitous utterances that suggest they
are pre-judging a case (New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (Annotated), p. 35, February 2007).

 A judge has the duty to refrain from undue comments on a case. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a
judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary(Cacatian vs. Liwanag, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1418, December 10, 2003).

 A judge’s language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be
misconstrued (Fecundo vs. Berjamen, G.R. 88105, December 18, 1989).

Q: Are judges absolutely prohibited from making comments?

A: No. Not all comments are impermissible. Judges may express their open-mindedness regarding a pending issue in
cases where the judges’ comments do not necessarily favor one side over the other.

 The Supreme Court has held that judges and justices are not disqualified from participating in a case simply because
they have written legal articles on the law involved in the case (Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, G.R. 133250, May
6, 2003).
Section 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to decide the
matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially.
Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where:

a. The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceedings;
b. The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy;
c. The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in the outcome of the matter in controversy;
d. The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee, or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a former
associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
e. The judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
f. The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the 6th civil degree or to counsel within the 4th civil
degree; or
g. The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the
subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the proceedings.

Notes:

1. Bias and prejudice are not presumed- The party who claims their presence must prove them with substantial evidence;
2. Bias and prejudice must stem from extrajudicial source and not from the assailed order or decision itself, (Pineda, Judicial
Ethics, 2009 ed, p. 109);
3. In a case where the judge was a former counsel of one of the parties, he was ordered to inhibit himself (Javier vs. Comelec,
G.R. Nos. L-68379-81, September 22, 1986);
4. A judge should disqualify himself when a former associate served as counsel in the case during their association;
5. Where testimony is not material, a judge is not disqualified, (Maliwat vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 10741, May 15, 1996)
6. A judge’s decision to refuse to act on account of some disqualification is not conclusive, and his competency may be
determined on an application for mandamus to compel him to act, (Masadao vs. Elizaga, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC, October 26,
1987).
Time when petition for disqualification should be filed:

 A petition to disqualify a judge must be filed before rendition of judgment by the

judge (Government vs. Heirs of Abella, G.R. No. 25009, September 8, 1926).

Ultimate test if judge denies petition for disqualification; Remedy of the prejudiced party:

 The ultimate test is whether or not the complainant was deprived a fair and impartial
trial, (Association de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay vs. Talisay-Silay Miling Co., Inc., G.R. No. 91852,
August 15, 1995). The remedy of the prejudiced party is to seek a new trial (Pimentel vs. Salonga,
G.R. No. L-27934, September 18, 2967).

Q: Should a judge inhibit because of close personal friendships with one of the parties?

A: No. Close personal friendship is not a ground for inhibition. As long as that friendly relations with a
party-litigant does not influence his official conduct as a judge in the cases where his close friend was
a party (Macariola vs. Asuncion, A.C. No. 133-J, May 31, 1982).

 There must be convincing proof that respondent judge gave undue privileges in his court to his
close friend, or that his close friend benefited from his personal relations with the respondent judge,
or that respondent judge used his influence, if any, to favor his close friend (Santos v Judge Lacurom,
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1823, August 28, 2006).

 A judge cannot sit in any case in which he was a counsel without the written consent of all the
parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record(Lorenzo vs. Marquez, A.M. No. MTJ-
87-123 June 27, 1988).
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court contemplate two kinds of inhibition:
compulsory and voluntary.

Under the first paragraph of the cited Rule which

embodies compulsory inhibition, it is conclusively presumed that
judges cannot actively and impartially sit in the instances mentioned.

The second paragraph, which states voluntary inhibition, leaves to the

sound discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for
other just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide
(BGen. (Ret.) Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., vs. Hon. Jose R. Hernandez, as Justice
of the Sandiganbayan; 4th Division, Sandiganbayan and The People of
the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 173057-74 September 20, 2010).
Grounds for Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges under the Rules of Court:

I. Mandatory or Compulsory Disqualification (Rule 137, ROC):

i. When he or his wife or his child is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor, or otherwise;
ii. When he is related to either party within the 6th degree of consanguinity or affinity or to counsel within the 4th
degree;
iii. When he has presided in an inferior court where his ruling or decision is subject to review.

Notes: If a judge is compulsorily disqualified, he has no choice but to withdraw from the case, unless all the parties
consent thereto in writing and entered into records (Legal and Judicial Ethics 8th Edition, Agapalo, 2009, p.63).

The disqualification of the person called upon to preside over a specific case does not divest his court of jurisdiction
over the subject-matter of or the persons of the parties to the said case. At most, the disqualification strikes only at
the authority of the challenged judge to preside over the trial of the specific case and therein to exercise the
jurisdiction of the court (Geotina vs. Hon. Jose Gonzalez, G.R. No. L-26310, September 30, 1971).

Also, a judge who continues to hear a case in which he is disqualified may be held administratively liable.

II. Voluntary Inhibition

i. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself for just and valid reasons other than those
mentioned in Rule 137, ROC.
Instances which are not grounds for the disqualification of a judge

1. Mere filing of administrative case against a judge by one of the parties before him is not a ground
for disqualifying him from hearing a case (Mantaring vs. Roman, Jr., AM No. RTJ-93-964, February 28,
1996).

2. Membership in a college fraternity or in an alumni association or civic group like Rotary is not a
ground for inhibition (Bellosillo vs. Saludo, G.R. No. 126980, March 31, 2006).

3. Being neighbors is not also a ground to disqualify (Choa vs. Chiongson, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1063,
August 9, 1996).

Rationale behind the Rule on Disqualification

 The underlying principle of the rule on disqualification of judges should preside in a case in which
he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Next in importance to the duty of
rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the
fairness and integrity of the judge, and in general, litigants are entitled to have a hearing and
determination by an impartial tribunal, free from bias, prejudice and interest (Urbanes vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 117964, March 8, 2001).
Section 6: A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the
records the basis of disqualification. If based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers independently of a judge's
participation, all agree in writing that the reason for the inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial; the judge may
then participate in the proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the
record of the proceedings.

This is called as Remittal of Disqualification.

Requirements to continue hearing the case despite existence of reasons for disqualification
The decision to continue the hearing the case, despite the existence of reasons for disqualification should be:

1. Coupled with a bona fide disclosure to the parties-in-litigation; and

Subject to the express acceptance by all the parties of the cited reason as not material or substantial.

2.
Notes: Absent any of these, the judge may not continue to hear the case.

To effectively remit disqualification, a judge must disclose on record the basis of the disqualification and ask the
parties and lawyers to consider out of the presence of the judge, whether to waive the disqualification. As long as
the disqualification is not based upon personal bias or prejudice, the parties and lawyers may all agree that the judge
should not be disqualified. If all parties and the judge agree that the judge should participate, the judge may
participate, and must incorporate the agreement into the record of the proceeding.
Requisites for a valid waiver of grounds for inhibition:

1. The judge must be transparent and forthright with the grounds for inhibition;
2. The waiver should be made by the parties and their counsels; and
3. The waiver must be in writing.

This section would be applicable only in the event that the ground or grounds for inhibition is immaterial or
unsubstantial (Canon 6, Sec. 6, New Code of Judicial Conduct).

Subjective test on the voluntary inhibition of the Judge

The issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge.

The discretion given to trial judges is an acknowledgment that they are in a better position to determine the issue of
inhibition, as they are the ones who directly deal with the parties’ litigants in their courtrooms.

The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give the judge unfettered decision to decide whether he
should desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes (Kilosbayan Foundation, et al vs.
Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr., et al, G.R. No. 180543, August 18, 2010).

The mere imputation of bias and prejudgment will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to
overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and
evidence without fear or favor (Sps. Abrajano et. al. vs. Heirs of Salas, Jr., G.R. No. 158895, February 16, 2006).
 Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a schoolmate or classmate appears before the
judge as counsel for one of the parties. In one case, the Court ruled that the organizational
affiliation per se is not a ground for inhibition(Kilosbayan Foundation, et al vs. Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr.,
et al, G.R. No. 180543, August 18, 2010).

 A motion for inhibition without valid grounds to justify the same should be denied. A lawyer
should be courteous, fair, and circumspect, not petulant, combative, or bellicose in his dealings with
the courts; and finally, that the use of disrespectful, intemperate, manifestly baseless, and malicious
statements by an attorney in his pleading or motion is not only a violation of the lawyer's oath and a
transgression of the cannons of professional ethics, but also constitutes direct contempt of court for
which a lawyer may be disciplined (Aparicio vs. Andal, G.R. Nos. 86587-93)

Effect of inhibition

 After the judge had inhibited himself from a case, he loses jurisdiction over said case, (Alcantara
vs. Tamin, AM. RTJ-95-1305, April 21, 1995)., This principle also applies to disqualification.
DISQUALIFICATION VS INHIBITION
4. PROPRIETY

Canon 4: Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.

1. Propriety - This is conformity to prevailing customs and usages. In brief, it is appropriateness (id.). It is required in all
the activities of a judge. The propriety must be open and manifest to a reasonable observer (Pineda, Judicial Ethics,
2009 ed, p. 139).

 The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only
with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual.

There is no dichotomy of morality; a public official is also judged by his private morals. As we have very recently
explained, a judge’s official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence (Castillo vs
Calanog, Jr., A.M. RTJ-90-447, July 12, 1991).

 A member of the bench “is the visible representation of the law.” Thus, the law frowns upon even any
manifestation of impropriety in a magistrate’s activities (Atty. Pablo B. Magno vs. Judge Jorge Emmanuel M. Lorredo,
A.M. MTJ-17-1905, August 30, 2017).
Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

A judge occupies a position in government, which gives a tangible resemblance to an important intangible concept, viz.: justice in
society. Thus, appearance of the judge is not just a shallow concept but an embodiment of society's aspiration for justice
itself (Funa, Legal and Judicial Ethics with Bar Examination Questions, First Edition, 2009, p.461) .

 For serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the
law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules (Francisco vs. Cosico, A.M. No. CA-04-37, March 16, 2004).

Illustrations of violation of this section:

a. Including self-laudatory details in his professional calling card (OCA vs. Floro, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, March 31, 2006);
b. Announcing, through his branch Clerk of Court, his qualifications in open court before the start of the proceedings (OCA vs.
Floro, Ibid.);
c. The judge and his family were found to be using his chambers as their residence, with the provincial government paying for
the electric bills (Presado vs. Genova, A.M. No. RTJ-91-657, June 21, 1993);
d. Poking a gun at a person with whom he had a traffic altercation (Alday vs. Cruz, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1530, March 14, 2001);
e. A judge wielded a high-powered firearm in public and besieged the house of a perceived defamer of character and honor in
warlike fashion and berated the object with his ire, with his firearm aimed at the victim (Saburnido vs. Madrono, A.C. No. 4497,
September 26, 2001);
f. The respondent’s judge’s acts of meeting with litigants outside the office premises beyond office hours and sending a
member of his staff to talk with complainant constitute gross misconduct, (Tan vs. Rosete, A.M. MTJ-04-1563, September 8,
2004);
g. Respondent judge’s use of the court heading outside of judicial business (Ladignon vs. Judge Garong, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1712,
August 20, 2008); and
h. A judge who made insulting statements to a lawyer who tends to question the latter’s capability stemming from the fact that
he did not graduate from the University of the Philippines (Mane vs. Judge Belen, AM. RTJ-08-2119, June 30, 2008).
Section 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the
judicial office.

Dignified conduct is best described as conduct befitting men and women possessed of temperance
and respect for the law and for others (New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
(Annotated), p. 24, February 2007).
a
 Upon taking his oath of office as a judge, the judge, who was formerly an ordinary lawyer,
surrenders his former lifestyle to the guarded lifestyle of a judge. He steps onto a stage always
subject to public scrutiny (Vedaña vs. Judge Valencia, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1351, September 03, 1998).

 The New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides that as a subject of constant public
scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen. In particular, judges must conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration of
justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him (Campos, et al. vs. Judge
Campos, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, February 8, 2012).

 Joining Friendster per se does not violate the New Code of Judicial Conduct. However, Judge
Austria disregarded the propriety and appearance of propriety required of her when she posted
Friendster photos of herself wearing an “off-shouldered” suggestive dress and made this available
for public viewing (Antonio M. Lorenzana vs. Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, RTC, Br. 2, Batangas
City, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2, 2014).
Section 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession
who practice regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the
suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.

Essential to the avoidance of impropriety and its appearance is the maintenance of cold neutrality
and impartiality. This section requires judges to scrupulously guard against any act that may be
construed as an expression of bias in favor of a litigant (New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary (Annotated), p. 25, February 2007)

While cordial relations should be maintained at a respectable level, excessive camaraderie can be
misinterpreted as a ground to unduly influence the judge. Conversely, excessive closeness can be
exploited to portray a baseless image of influence over the judge.

 A judge is commanded at all times to be mindful of the high calling of a dispassionate and
impartial arbiter expected at all times to be a “cerebral man who deliberately holds in check the tug
and pull of purely personal preferences which he shares with his fellow mortals” (Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1660, August 25, 2005).
Drinking with lawyers
• As soon as respondent Judge had noticed the presence of lawyers who have pending
cases in his sala, he should have excused himself from engaging in a drinking spree. A
judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. Respondent Judge should have avoided fraternization with
lawyers in a drinking session or attending the party tendered by the ex-mayor. The
conduct of a judge must be free from any whiff of impropriety not only with respect to
the performance of his judicial duties but also to his behavior outside his sala and even
as a private individual. (Atty. Julieta A. Omaña vs. Judge Prudencio A. Yulde, A.M. MTJ-01-
1345, August 26, 2002)

Judge eating lunch with counsel

• For respondent judge to eat lunch with counsel is not wrong per se. The Canons,
however, provide that as much as possible he should be scrupulously careful to avoid
any suspicion that his social or business or friendly relationship is an element in
“determining his judicial course.” Knowing that Atty. Verano, Jr., is counsel of the
petitioner in an annulment case pending before him, the respondent judge should have
thought twice about joining counsel for lunch, especially in the courtroom at that.
(Pertierra vs. Judge Lerma, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1799. September 12, 2003)
Political activities of judges
• Allowed: A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions.
• Prohibited: But to avoid suspicion of political partisanship:
1. A judge shall not make political speeches;
2. A judge shall not contribute to party funds;
3. A judge shall not publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political activities
(Rule 5.10, Canon 5, Code of Judicial Conduct).

Engaging in partisan political activity improper under Civil Service Law

• Pres. Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Law) clearly states:
“Section 45. No officer or employee in the Civil Service including members of the Armed Forces, shall engage directly or
indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote nor shall be use his official
authority or influence to coerce the political activity of any other person or body. Nothing herein provided shall be
understood to prevent any officer or employee from expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or
from mentioning the names of candidates for public office whom he supports.”

Partisan political activities

• Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code defines the term "partisan political activities;" the law states:
"The term ‘election campaign’ or ‘partisan political activity’ refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat
of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office which shall include:
"(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting
votes and/or undertaking any campaign for or against a candidate;
"(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of
soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate.
"(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any
candidate for public office;
"(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any
candidate; or
"(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate."
Engaging in political activity
• Respondent started circulating handbills/letters addressed to electoral constituents in the second district of
Bulacan indicating his intention to run for a congressional seat.
For having held himself out as a congressional candidate while still a member of the Bench, Respondent took
advantage of his position to boost his candidacy, demeaned the stature of his office, and must be pronounced
guilty of gross misconduct (Vistan vs. Judge Nicolas A.M. No. MTJ-87-79 [1991])

Filing of a certificate of candidacy

• When he was appointed as a judge, he took an oath to uphold the law, yet in filing a certificate of
candidacy as a party-list representative in the May 1998 elections without giving up his judicial post, Judge
Limbona violated not only the law, but the constitutional mandate that “no officer or employee in the civil
service shall engage directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political campaign.”

The filing of a certificate of candidacy is a partisan political activity as the candidate thereby offers himself to
the electorate for an elective post (Limbona vs. Judge Limbona, A.M. No. SCC-98-4 March 22, 2011).
Section 4. Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case in which any member of their family
represents a litigant or is associated in any manner with the case.

The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where the respondent judge is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a
case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent.

A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity (Garcia vs. Judge De la Peña, A.M. No. MTJ-92-687, February 9, 1994).

The purpose is to preserve the people’s faith and confidence in the courts of justice (Funa, Legal and Judicial Ethics:
With Bar Examination Questions, 2009, p. 465).

 Even when judges do not intend to use their position to influence the outcome of cases involving family members,
it cannot be denied that a judge’s mere presence in the courtroom (Vidal vs. Dojillo, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1591, July 14,
2005) or even writing letters to an administrative body conducting an investigation pursuant to the exercise of
quasi-judicial functions (Perez vs. Costales, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1876, February 23, 2005) tend to give rise to the
suspicion that influence is being used.

When a member of the judge’s family represents a litigant, he must disqualify himself – The Code has defined who
may be considered as members of his immediate family and they are the spouse and relatives within the second
degree of consanguinity (Carual vs. Brusola A.M. No. RTJ-99-1500. October 20, 1999).
Relatives deemed covered

1. An adopted child is deemed included in the list because he/she is

considered legitimate child of the adopting parent/s;
2. Recognized illegitimate children of the judge, if there are any;
3. First and second cousins by blood, and first and second cousins-in-law;
4. Uncles, aunts, nephews and nieces; grandnephews and grandnieces. The in-
law counterparts are included.

If anyone of the above relatives of the judge, whether by blood or by

marriage, will represent a litigant in a case pending before him, the judge must
consider self-disqualification that the confidence of the people may not
erode (Pineda, Judicial Ethics, 2009 ed, pages 156-157).

Notes:

 Section 5(F) also applies to a lawyer who appears as counsel. The

restriction is shortened to the fourth (4th) civil degree. The same proximity of
degree shall apply to the in laws.

However, if the relative representing the litigant is not a counsel but one
holding a position like that of a mere attorney-in-fact, trustee or guardian,
the limit is extended up to sixth (6th) degree whether by blood or by
marriage.
Section 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but
in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the
judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

Allowed: A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions.

Prohibited: But to avoid suspicion of political partisanship:

▪ A judge shall not make political speeches,
▪ A judge shall not contribute to party funds
▪ A judge shall not publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political
activities (Rule 5.10, Canon 5, Code of Judicial Conduct).

While judges continue to enjoy their constitutional rights as citizens, their exercise of such rights must be mindful of
their equally important constitutional duty to uphold judicial independence. In the event that such constitutional
rights and constitutional duty clash, the judge must be mindful of the judicial office which he holds and his sworn duty
to uphold judicial independence (Funa, Legal and Judicial Ethics: With Bar Examination Questions, 2009, p. 466).

While judges are not expected to live a hermit-like existence or cease functioning as citizens of the Philippines, they
should remember that they do not disrobe themselves of their judicial office upon leaving their salas (New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (Annotated), p. 27, February 2007).

 The filing of a certificate of candidacy is a partisan political activity as the candidate thereby offers himself to the
electorate for an elective post (Limbona vs. Judge Limbona, A.M. No. SCC-98-4 March 22, 2011).
Illustrations of violation of this section:

a. A judge who expresses himself with expletives (In Re: Acuna, A.M. Ni. RTJ-04-1981, Ibid.);
b. A judge who engaged in partisan politics when he participated in a political rally sponsored by
one party, even though he only explained the mechanics of block voting to the audience (Macias vs.
Araulla, A.M. Ni. 1895-CFI, July 20, 1982);

c. Respondent’s writing of active and vicious editorials compromises his duties as judge in the
impartial administration of justice, for his views printed on newspapers reflect on his office as well as
on the public officers that he challenges (Galang vs. Judge Santos G.R. No. MTJ-99-1197, May 26,
1999); and

d. A judge appointed to executive position in any enterprise (Re: Inhibition of Judge Bienvenido R.
Estrada A.M. No. 98-1-32-RTC July 29, 1998).
Social Networking

To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks, judges must bear in
mind that what they communicate – regardless of whether it is a personal matter or part of his or her
judicial duties – creates and contributes to the people’s opinion not just of the judge but of the entire
Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true when the posts the judge makes are
viewable not only by his or her family and close friends, but by acquaintances and the general public.

Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in the attire she wore to
her family and close friends, but when she made this picture available for public consumption, she
placed herself in a situation where she, and the status she holds as a judge, may be the object of the
public’s criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber communications, particularly its speedy and wide-
scale character, renders this rule necessary.

We are not also unaware that the respondent’s act of posting her photos would seem harmless and
inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary member of the public. As the visible
personification of law and justice, however, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus
must accordingly comport themselves. (Lorenzana vs. Judge Austria, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, April 2,
2014)
Section 7. Judges shall inform themselves about their personal fiduciary financial
interests and shall make reasonable efforts to be informed about the financial
interests of members of their family.

This section of the New Code of Judicial Conduct should be read in conjunction with
Section 7 of the Republic Act 6713, which prohibits certain personal fiduciary and
financial conflicts.

A judge has a duty of financial transparency and duty to avoid financial conflicts of
interest. He must be always conscious of his and his family's financial dealings, when
practicable, to avoid being caught inadvertently in financial entanglements. Where a
potential financial conflict would occur, the judge becomes duty-bound to inhibit from
the case (Ibid, pp. 469-470).

Notes: (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Usman, A.M. No. SCC-08-12, October
19, 2011)
A judge clearly violates the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices for Public Officials and Employees
when he fails to file his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) without justifiable
reasons.

While every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on
moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary.

The section does not prohibit judges from having financial dealings or personal fiduciary interests.

Indeed, it is not good for judges to engage in business except only to the extent allowed by Rule 5.03
of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides:

 Subject to the provisions of the preceding rule, a judge may hold and manage investments but
should not serve as an officer, director, manager, advisor, or employee of any business except as
director of a family business of the judge (Berin and Alorro vs. Judge Barte A.M. No. MTJ-02-
1443. July 31, 2002).

 A judge should so manage investments and other financial interests as to minimize the number of
cases giving grounds for disqualification (Catbagan vs. Judge Barte, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1452. April 06,
2005).
Section 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their private
interests, or those of a member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit
others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to influence them in
the performance of judicial duties.

A judicial office carries a certain amount of prestige and influence in society. That prestige and
influence should be used to promote and enhance respect for the law and the administration of
justice, and not further the judge's and his family's personal interests.

Illustrations of violation of this Rule:

 A judge who attends the proceedings of an election protest before a Municipal Circuit Trial Court
where his brother was the election protestor purportedly in order to give moral support to his
brother (Vidal vs. Judge Dojillo, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1591, July 14, 2005).

 Another is when a respondent judge took advantage of his position as a Makati Regional Trial
Court judge by filing in the Makati Court a collection case in which he and his wife were the
complainants (Javier vs. De Guzman, A.M. No. RTJ-89-380, December 19, 1990).
Ticket-fixing – a misconduct in which judges impermissibly take advantage of their
position to avoid traffic violations (New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary (Annotated), p. 28, February 2007).

Judge cannot be appointed to executive position in any enterprise

• Circular No. 6 dated April 10, 1987 strictly enjoins all Judges, Clerks of Court and
Sheriffs not to accept the position of director or any other position in any electric
cooperative or other enterprises, or to resign immediately from such position if they are
already holding the same so as not to prejudice the expeditious and proper
administration of justice.
• In violation of this circular, Judge Estrada, who was appointed to the Judiciary on May
17, 1994, did not resign from the Board of Directors of the Rural Bank of Labrador until
May 31, 1997 (Re: Inhibition of Judge Bienvenido R. Estrada A.M. No. 98-1-32-RTC July
29, 1998).

As agent in the sale of the subject property

• By allowing himself to act as agent in the sale of the subject property, respondent
judge has increased the possibility of his disqualification to act as an impartial judge in
the event that a dispute involving the said contract of sale arises.
• Also, the possibility that the parties to the sale might plead before his court is not
remote and his business dealings with them might not only create suspicion as to his
fairness but also to his ability to render it in a manner that is free from any suspicion as
to its fairness and impartiality and also as to the judge’s integrity (Rosauro vs. Judge
Kallos A.M. No. RTJ-03-1796 February 10, 2006).
Financial and business dealings
• Judge can engage in financial and business dealings provided:
1. such will not reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality.
2. will not interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities.
3. will not increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court (Rule
5.02, Canon 5, Code of Judicial Conduct).

• A judge should so manage investments and other financial interests as to minimize the
number of cases giving grounds for disqualification (Catbagan vs. Judge Barte, A.M. No. MTJ-
02-1452. April 06, 2005).

Use of letterhead by a judge

• In other words, the respondent Judge’s transgression was not per se in the use of the
letterhead, but in not being very careful and discerning in considering the circumstances
surrounding the use of his letterhead and his title. – (Ladignon vs. Judge Garong, A.M. No.
MTJ-08-1712, August 20, 2008)
• Hence, respondent judge’s use of the court heading outside of judicial business warrants
disciplinary action for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct particularly Section 1, Canon 4.
Section 9. Confidential information acquired by judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or
disclosed by, for any other purpose not related to their judicial duties.

Judges have the duty of confidentiality when they come into possession of information in the
course of their judicial duties. Such information should only be used in arriving at a decision of a
case, and not for any other use. Hence, the judge may not use any information for other unofficial
purposes.

The judge may be liable for violation divulging valuable information of a confidential character,
acquired by his office on account of his official position to unauthorized persons or releasing sch
information in advance of its authorized release due (Sec. 3[k], R.A. 3019).

Violation of the rule may also lead to “revelation of secrets by an officer” or to “revelation of the
secrets of a private individual” punishable by Articles 229 and 230 of the Revised Penal Code,
respectively.
Illustrations of violation of this section:

a. When the appellate justice announced on television that he lost a confidential draft of an order
and publicly asked the NBI to investigate (In Re: Justice Anacleto Badoy, A.M. No. 01-12-01-SC,
January 16, 2003);

b. When a judge released a draft of her decision to a party (Centrum Agri-Business Realty Corp. vs.
Katalbas-Moscardon, G.R. No. 117964, August 11, 1995);

c. When a judge personally furnishes a party copies of orders issued without passing them through
the court docket (Co vs. Calimag, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1493, June 20, 2000); and

d. When a judge allowed his wife to have access to court records which are necessarily
confidential (Gordon vs. Lilagan, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1564, July 26, 2001).
Court Records

 Relevant documents which are submitted to, and accepted by, a court of competent jurisdiction in the
course of adjudicatory proceedings, become documents to which the presumption of public access
applies. The presumption that the public has a right to see and copy judicial records attaches to those
documents which properly come before the court in the course of an adjudicatory proceeding and which are
relevant to the adjudication (FTC vs. Standard Financial Management Corp., 830 F. 2d 404, 1987).

 Unlike court orders and decisions, however, pleadings and other documents filed by parties to a case need
not be matters of public concern or interest. They are filed for the purpose of establishing the basis upon which
the court may issue an order or a judgment affecting their rights and interests. If the information sought then is
not a matter of public concern or interest, denial of access thereto does not violate a citizen's constitutional
right to information (Hidalgo vs. Judge Reyes, G.R. No. 163155, July 21, 2006).

 The public's right of access to judicial records, including transcripts, evidence, memoranda, and court orders,
may be restricted, but only on a showing of "good cause." To determine whether good cause is shown, a judge
must balance the rights of the parties based on the particular facts of each case (Supreme Judicial Court,
Massachusetts, Suffolk. The Republican Company vs. Appeals Court & others, July 27, 2014, 441).
Section 10. Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, judges may:

a. Write, lecture, teach, and participate in activities concerning the law, the legal system, the
administration of justice or related matters;
b. Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with matters relating to the law, the
legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;
c. Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the dignity of the judicial office or
otherwise interfere with the performance of judicial duties.

Notes:

See: OCA Circular No. 100-2014, En Banc Resolution dated 01 April 2014 in A.M. NO. 13-05-05-
SC (RE: Revision of restrictions on teaching hours of Justices, Judges and personnel of the Judiciary)

Teaching shall be allowed for not more than ten (10) hours a week. On regular working days (Monday
through Friday), teaching shall not be conducted earlier than 5:30 p.m (Sec. 1, OCA Circular No. 100-
2014).
An application for permission to teach filed by a judge or justice shall require approval as follows:

a. If filed by a judge from a lower level court, it shall be subject to the approval of the executive judge
concerned;
b. If filed by an executive judge, it shall be subject to the approval of the Court Administrator;
c. If filed by an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or the Court of Tax
Appeals, it shall be subject to the approval of the presiding justice concerned;
d. If filed by the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or the Court of Tax
Appeals, it shall be subject to the approval of the Chief Justice (Sec. 3, OCA Circular No. 100-2014).

An application for permission to teach filed by a court personnel shall require approval as follows:

a. If filed by court personnel from a lower level court, it shall be subject to the approval of the
executive judge concerned;
b. If filed by court personnel from the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or the Court of Tax
Appeals, it shall be subject to the approval of the presiding justice or the executive justice concerned,
as the case may be;
c. If filed by Supreme Court personnel belonging to a chamber of an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court, it shall be subject to the approval of the Associate Justice concerned, who will notify the Chief
Justice and the Office of Administrative Services, Supreme Court, of this approval; and
d. If filed by other Supreme Court personnel, it shall be subject to the approval of the Chief
Justice (Sec. 4, OCA Circular No. 100-2014).
Failure to secure permit to teach from the Supreme Court

 Respondent judge’s failure to accomplish the Request for Permission to teach form prescribed in
Circular No. 50-97, dated July 18, 1997 is inexcusable. It is a clear violation of the judiciary rules and
regulations, indicating respondent judge’s disregard of the authority of the Supreme Court. For no
matter how insignificant or inconsequential the circular may seem to respondent judge, he should
have complied with it (Jabon vs. Judge Sibanah E. Usman, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1713 [2005]).

Section 10 states the allowable judicial activities a judge may perform. Absence of other activities
other than his judicial employment would not be healthy, mentally and emotionally. Nevertheless,
these activities must be consistent with the dignity and responsibility of the judicial office.

Notes: This section’s tolerance of judicially related activities is limited by the prohibition on judges
from being designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Sec. 12,
Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).

A judge sought the Court’s permission to accept membership in the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee on Justice, an administrative body. The Court denied his request and ruled that allowing
the judge’s membership would be a violation of the constitutional provision on the discharge by
members of the judiciary of administrative functions in quasi-judicial or administrative agencies (In
re: Designation of Judge Manzano, A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC, October 5, 1988).
Section 11. Judges shall not practice law whilst the holder of judicial office.

 Private Practice – Consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer (Ziga vs. Judge Arejola,
451 Phil. 449, June 10, 2003).

 A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law which includes preparation of pleadings,
legal papers in anticipation of litigation, and giving of legal advice (Tabao vs. Asis, A.M. No. RTJ-95-
1330, January 30, 1996).

 The basis for this rule is public policy. The rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an
attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers,
discretion and privileges of a judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and
attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own private
interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions. These
objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public interest (Carual
vs. Judge Brusola, 375 Phil. 464, October 20, 1999).
Other basis for the prohibition:
a. Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and
b. Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct

 These provisions are based on public policy for there is no question that the rights,
duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are inherently
incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of
a judge.

 It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial
duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own private interests
and assure the public of their impartiality in the performance of their functions.

 These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the
public interest (Ziga vs. Judge Arejola, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1203. June 10, 2003).
JUDGES ACTING AS NOTARY PUBLIC

It should be noted that judges assigned to municipalities and circuits may act as
notaries public provided that:

1) all notarial fees be charged to the government’s account, and

2) certification be made in the notarial documents attesting to the lack of lawyers or
notary in the municipality or circuit

RTC Judges and Justices have no authority to notarize documents anywhere and under
all circumstance (Pineda, Judicial Ethics, 2009 ed, p. 174).

 Respondent's act of representing and defending the interest of a private individual

in the disputed property constitutes private practice of law, (Carual vs. Brusola A.M.
No. RTJ-99-1500. October 20, 1999).
Section 12. Judges may form or join associations of judges or participate in other organizations
representing the interests of judges.

 Membership and active participation of judges, in judges’ organizations is a welcome activity. Since
social activities of judges with lawyers are restricted, such activities afford an opportunity to socialize
with one’s peers. It is a venue to pursue professional development in the exchange of ideas with
fellow judges (Funa, Legal and Judicial Ethics: With Bar Examination Questions, 2009, p. 479).

 It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in retirement
or seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion of their work
will permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue their
interests in or appearance at meetings of members at the bar. A judge should, however, in pending
or prospective litigation before him be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably
tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element
in determining his judicial course’” (Abundo vs. Judge Manio, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-98-1416. August 6,
1999).
Section 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, or
accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be
done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the
performance of judicial duties.

This section should be read in conjunction with Section 7(d) of R.A. 6713
which prohibits public officials from soliciting or accepting gifts. According to
this provision:

 It is the duty of judges and members of his family to refrain from soliciting
or accepting financial or material gain. It is this kind of gross and flaunting
misconduct on the part of those who are charged with the responsibility of
administering the law and rendering justice that so quickly and surely corrodes
the respect for law and the courts without which government cannot continue
and that tears apart the very bonds of our polity (Haw Tay vs. Singayao, A.M.
No. R-592-RTJ, September 17, 1987).
Section 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff of others subject to their influence,
direction or authority, to ask for, or accept any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything
done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with their duties of functions.

 This section complements the previous section and assures that what the judge cannot do directly
may not be done indirectly through the use of employees or staff members. The High Court held that
a judge allowing his bailiff’s son to store attached property at his house constitutes
misconduct (Agpalasin vs. Agcaoili, A.M. No. RTJ-95-1308, April 12, 2000).

 While sections 13 and 14 cover instances where the judge is clearly the recipient of money or
property from litigants before his court, the sections are likewise relevant to cases where the
transaction between the judge and interested parties is less obvious. In a case involving the financial
and judicial audit of the municipal trial court in Koronadal, a judge was found guilty of gross
misconduct for having violated these provisions. In that case, the judge had periodically “borrowed”
from court funds to pay for a variety of personal expenses including his children’s tuition and
medical expenses incurred for his parents’ illness. He had also used evidence submitted to the
Court – such as guns and ammunition – for his own protection (In Re: Report on the Judicial and
Financial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Koronadal City A.M. No. 02-9-233-
MTCC, April 27 2005).
Section 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may receive a token, gift,
award, or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made provided that such gift, award or benefit might
not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise
give rise to an appearance of partiality.

General Rule: Judges and members of their families cannot accept gifts, etc.

Exceptions: Subject to legal requirements like public disclosure, a judge may accept gifts provided that it might not
reasonably be perceived as intended to influence him.

Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 allows the following:

a. Gift of nominal value tendered and received as a souvenir or mark of courtesy;

b. Gift in the nature of scholarship or fellowship grant or medical treatment;
c. Travel grants or expenses for travel taking place entirely outside the Philippines (such as allowances,
transportation, food, and lodging) of more than nominal value, if such acceptance is appropriate or consistent with
the interest of the Philippines, and permitted by the head office, branch, or agency, to which the judge belongs.

Factors to Consider in Giving Token Gifts:

1. The value of the gift which should not be excessive.

2. The regularity of the occasion. The occasion should not be normally celebrated.
3. The party giving the gift. If the gift-giver happens to be a party-litigant with a pending case before the judge, the
value of the gift might be immaterial as the propriety of the gesture might be misconstrued.
Bribery: Direct and Indirect

▪ Acceptance of gifts given by reason of the office of the judge is indirect bribery (Art. 211, RPC).

▪ When he agrees to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of these official
duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, he is guilty of direct bribery (Art.
210, RPC).

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act

▪ The judge is liable criminally for directly or indirectly receiving gifts, presents or other pecuniary or material benefit
for himself or for another under conditions provided in Section 2 paragraphs b and c of the law.

Exception: Unsolicited gifts or presents of small value offered or given as a mere ordinary token of gratitude or
friendship according to local custom or usage (Sec. 14, R.A. 3019).

▪ Donations given to a judge or to his wife, descendants or ascendants by reason of his office are void (Art. 739,
NCC). Ownership does not pass to the donee. Money or property donated is recoverable by the donor, his heirs or
creditors.

▪ No loan, guarantee, or other form of financial accommodation for any business purpose may be granted, directly or
indirectly, by any government-owned or controlled bank or financial institution to the xxx Members of the Supreme
Court, xxx, during their tenure (Sec. 16, Art. XI, 1987 Constitution).
5. EQUALITY

Canon 5: Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance
of the judicial office.

This is a new canon not found in the previous two Philippine codes of Judicial Conduct. It expands the
measures to promote equality required by international human rights agreements. Those
agreements advocate a universal application of law and non-discrimination between sexes.

Section 1. Judges shall be aware of, and understand, diversity in society and differences arising
from various sources, including but not limited to race, color, sex, religion, national origin, caste,
disability, age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and economic status and other like causes.

Understanding of social diversities removes or minimizes social bias and prejudice. With
enlightenment, a judge is swayed away from deciding on the basis of race, color sex, religion,
national origin, caste, disability, age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and economic status
and other human and social differences. Judges must be able to avoid the infiltration of
preconceptions into their decisions. They should be mindful of the various international instruments
and treaties ratified by the Philippines, which affirm the equality of all human beings and establish a
norm of non-discrimination without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion (U.N. Charter,
Art. 1(3) as cited in New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (Annotated), p. 33,
February 2007)..
Section 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest
bias or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.

Notes: What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. Independent judiciary does not mean
that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are both implicit and explicit
limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values and the
explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of law. What is more, Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the Rules
of Court expressly states that no judge shall sit in any case which he has been counsel (for a party)
without the written consent of all the parties-in-interest, signed by them, and entered upon the
record (In Re: Judge Rojas, A.M. No. 98-6-185-RTC, October 30, 1998).

 When a judge accepts and occupies a high office in the administration of justice, he is responsible
for ensuring that his conduct, even in private arenas, reflects the dignity of the judicial office (Candia
vs. Tagabucha, A.M. No. 528-MTJ, September 12, 1977).

 An illustration to this section is when a judge who advises a claimant to settle her claim and
overly pressures her to accept the proposal of the employer creates the suspicion that the judge is
biased in favor of the employer (Retuya vs. Judge Equipilag, A.M. No. 1431-MTJ, July 16, 1979).
Section 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate
consideration for all persons, such as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court
staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any irrelevant
ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.

Judicial functions should be carried out in an orderly manner, free from any
extraneous disruptions. Acts of inconsiderateness disrespect and discourtesy
disrupts judicial proceedings which unduly hampers the judge’s task. In the
end, it is the administration of justice which suffers as a result of poor human
relations with the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and even judicial
colleagues.

The provision is taken from Canons 1, 9, and10 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
and Rule 3.04, Canon 3 of the 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct.
Section 4. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to his or her influence,
direction or control to differentiate between persons concerned, in a matter before the judge, on
any irrelevant ground.

Members of the court staff and persons under the direction of the judge should be instruments, as
well, in the orderly administration of justice. Inappropriate conduct of the court staff towards the
party litigants should be the accountability of the judge. His failure to properly supervise his staff
constitutes negligence on the part of the judge.

 Judges and clerks of court must therefore take proper action against the misdeeds of
employees. While the traditional value of “pakikisama” often fosters harmony and good
relationships in the workplace, it cannot be allowed to frustrate or prejudice the administration of
justice (Lacurom vs. Magbanua, A.M. No. P-02-1646, January 22, 2003).
Section 5. Judges shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting,
by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on irrelevant grounds, except such as are legally
relevant to an issue in proceedings and may be the subject of legitimate advocacy.

A judge has a duty to ensure lawyers are not biased or prejudiced. Bias and prejudice have no place
in judicial proceedings. They are immediately immaterial and irrelevant. Pursuant to this section, the
judge may reprimand the counsel for such biased or prejudiced manifestation.

Judges should conduct proceedings in court with dignity and in a manner that reflects the
importance and seriousness of proceedings. They should maintain order and proper decorum in the
court (Rule 3.03, Canon 3, 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct).

Notes:

1. A judge may not summarily suspend a lawyer for indirect contempt (Balasbas vs. Aquilizan, G.R.
No. 85286, August 24, 1992);
2. Although a judge has the power to recommend for appointment of court personnel, however, he
has no power to dismiss them. The power to dismiss a court employee is vested in the Supreme
Court (Domingo vs. Elbinias, A.M. No. 2001-CFI, August 31, 1981)); and
3. The authority of judges/or executive judges to discipline erring court personnel under their
supervision is limited to light offenses only - the suspension of a court employee charged with grave
or less grave offenses shall be referred to the Supreme Court for appropriate action (Aguire vs.
Baltazar, .M. No. P-05-1957, February 7, 2005)
6. COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE

Canon 6: Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of judicial office.

Intelligence - This is the possession of sufficient learning, ability and skill in a particular discipline
enhanced by actual and sufficient experience in the field. A competent judge is perceived as
intelligent.

Diligence - is the quality of a person characterized by his earnest willingness and capability to
promptly do or undo what is required by the nature of the obligation or duty in accordance with
existing rules. Diligence carries the elements of perseverance, industry, quickness and
carefulness, (Pineda, Judicial Ethics, 2009 ed, p. 207).

 The administration of justice is a scarred task. Upon assumption to office, a judge ceases to be an
ordinary mortal. He becomes the viable representation of the law and, more importantly, of
justice (OCA vs. Gines, A.M. No. RTJ-92-802, July 5, 1993).
Section 1. The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all other
activities.

 Though a judge has a duty to not sit where disqualified, a judge has an
equally strong duty not to recuse himself when the circumstances do not
require recusal (ABA Annotated Model of Code of Judicial Conduct [2004],
Commentary, Canon 3B (1), citing Laird vs. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 [1972], as cited in
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (Annotated), p. 40,
February 2007).).

 Judges should be attentive of their work ethic. Judges are duty bound to
comply with the service requirement to insure the maximum efficiency of the
trial courts for a speedy administration of justice (In Re: Echiverri, A.M. No.
697-CFI, October 30, 1975).
Section 2. Judges shall devote their professional activity to judicial duties, which include not only
the performance of judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the making of decisions, but
also other tasks relevant to the judicial office or the court's operations.

Notes: A very important task of the judge is efficient management of his court. Management skills,
therefore, is an important skill for the magistrate. As part of his management duties, the judge must
also be good Personnel Manager when it comes to his court staff. With an efficient management of
his court, the judge can go about in his primary judicial duties efficiently.

 A judge is expected to ensure that the records of cases assigned to his sala are intact. There is no
justification for missing records save fortuitous events. The loss of not one but eight records is
indicative of gross misconduct and inexcusable negligence unbecoming of a judge (Longboan vs.
Polig, A.M. Mo.. 704-RTJ, June 14, 1990).

 Hence, for a judge to allow an activity, and an unofficial one at that, to take precedence over the
conduct of hearings is totally unacceptable. It is a patent derogation of Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 6
and a blatant disregard of the professional yardstick that “all judicial officials and employees must
devote their official time to government service (Anonymous Complaints against Hon. Dinah
Evangeline B, Bandong, A.M. RTJ-17-2507, October 29, 2017).
Section 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their
knowledge, skills, and personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of
judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose of the training and other facilities
which should be made available, under judicial control, to judges.

 Just like lawyers, judges must ensure that they are updated with the latest rules and
jurisprudence. There is the need to be diligent in keeping abreast with developments in
law and jurisprudence (Aguilar vs. Dalano, G.R. No. 132088, June 8, 2000).

 Members of the judiciary are supposed to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the statuses and procedural rules, more so with legal principles and
rules so elementary and basic that not to know them, or to act as if one does not know
them, constitutes gross ignorance of the law (Almeron vs. Sardido, A.M. No. MTJ-99-
1238, November 6, 1997).

 Although a judge is nearing retirement, he should not relax in his study of the law and
court decisions (Abad vs. Bleza, A.M. No. 227-RTJ, October 13, 1986).

 In the absence of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or deliberate intent to do injustice,

incorrect rulings do not constitute misconduct and may not give rise to a charge of gross
ignorance of the law (Cruz vs. Iturralde, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1775, April 30, 2003).
Though good faith and absence of malice or corruption are sufficient defenses, such does not apply
where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principles are evident and basic as to be
beyond possible margin of error (Corpus vs. Ochotorena A.M. No. RTJ-04-1861, July 30, 2004).

 Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO) in favor of petitioner Albert Chang Tan in SP Case No. M-6373, since a TPO cannot be issued in
favor of a man against his wife under R.A. No. 9262, which is the Anti-violence against Women and
their Children Act of 2004. Indeed, as a family court judge, Judge Arcaya-Chus is expected to know
the correct implementation of R.A. No. 9262 (Ocampo vs. Judge Arcaya-Chua, A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-
2630-RTJ, April 23, 2010).

 Ignorance of the law is a mark of incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary,
ignorance thereof is considered as an indication of lack of integrity (Office of the Court Administrator
vs. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, et al. A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691. April 2, 2013).

 Without a standing warrant of arrest, a judge not assigned to the province, city or municipality
where the case is pending has no authority to grant bail. To do so would be gross ignorance of the
law (Prosecutor Ivy A. Tejano vs. Judge Antonio D. Marigomen, et al., A.M. RTJ-17-2492, September
26, 2017).
Section 4. Judges shall keep themselves informed about the relevant
developments of international law, including international
conventions and other instruments establishing human rights norms.

International law is an indispensable basis of judicial action. In today’s

era of international interdependence and international trade and
relations, knowledge of international law has become imperative.
Section 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly, and with reasonable promptness.

Justice delayed is justice denied. Indeed, nothing is more detrimental to the

administration of justice than an inefficient and unfair judge.

The essence of the judicial function is expressed in Section 1, Rule 124 of the Revised
Rules of Court which provides that “[j]ustice shall be impartially administered without
unnecessary delay.” This principle permeates the whole system of judicature, and
supports the legitimacy of the decrees of judicial tribunals.

Judicial Errors

Not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of law.

 If committed in good faith, such errors do not warrant administrative

sanctions. Otherwise, judges, in effect, will be expected to render infallible judgments.
However, this would apply only within certain tolerable judgments and does not apply
where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and as to be
beyond permissible margins of error (Sps. Daracan vs. Judge Natividad, A.M. No. RTJ-99-
1447, September 27, 2000).
Delay in Resolving Cases

For failure to resolve cases within the reglementary period, a judge may be held liable for gross
inefficiency and dereliction of duty. On meritorious grounds, judges may ask for additional time to
resolve cases. But such application for extension must be filed before the expiration of the
prescribed period. Delay in resolution of cases also constitutes a violation of the constitutional right
of the parties to a speedy disposition of their cases

 Where, of course, the delay cannot be attributed to the judge, such when the completion of the
transcript of stenographic notes is up to a stenographer which is not under the control of the judge,
the judge may not be held accountable (Gaspar vs. Judge Bayhon, G.R. No. RTJ-96-1338, September
5, 1997).

Rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are indispensable to prevent
needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the 90-day period is
mandatory. Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not excusable and constitutes
gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on the defaulting judge (Re:
Cases submitted for decision before Hon. Teresito A. Andoy, A.M. no. 09-9-163-MTC, May 6, 2010).

 Judge Soriano’s unreasonable delay in deciding cases and resolving incidents and motions, and his
failure to decide the remaining cases before his compulsory retirement constitutes gross inefficiency,
which cannot be tolerated (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Hon. Santiago E. Soriano, A.M. No.
MTJ-07-1683, September 11, 2013).
Section 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified, and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom
the judge deals in an official capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives,
court staff and others subject to their influence, direction and control.

 A judge has a duty to maintain order, decorum and respect in court proceedings. All judges should
always observe courtesy and civility (Fineza vs. Aruelo, A.M. No. P-01-1522, November 29, 2001).

 Judicial decorum requires a magistrate to be at all times temperate in his language (Turqeza vs.
Hernando, G.R. No. L-51626, April 30, 1980).

 Refraining from inflammatory or excessive rhetoric of from resorting to language of

vilification (Royeca vs. Animas, G.R. No. L-39584, May 3, 1976).

 Judicial decorum also requires that a judge must look respectable and be properly attired.

Respondent judge was guilty of committing acts unbecoming of judge and abuse of authority when
he shouted invectives and threw a chair at the complainant, resulting in wrist and other injuries, to
the complainant (Briones vs. Ante, Jr, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1411, April 11, 2002).

 Besides the basic equipment of possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must
exhibit that hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint which are
indispensable qualities of every judge (Rodriguez vs. Bonifacio, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510 (Resolution),
[November 6, 2000], 398 PHIL 441-480).
Section 7. Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent
discharge of judicial duties.

 Section 7 covers all other questionable or doubtful conduct of a judge. In

the final analysis, the judge must always align his conduct with the office
which he holds. It is not the public’s perception that should be adjustable but
rather the judge’s conduct which should align itself with the public’s
perception of a magistrate’s conduct. Ultimately, the judge must serve the
people by rendering justice where justice is due.

By issuing orders indefinitely postponing the hearing of election protest, the

judge manifested inefficiency in the disposition of an election protest case;
thus, overtly transgressed basic mandatory rules for expeditious resolution of
cases (De la Cruz vs. Pascua, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1461, June 26, 2001).

 Watching telenovelas surely dissipates away Judge Bandong’s precious time

in the office, which needless to say, has an adverse effect on the prompt
administration of justice (Anonymous Complaints against Hon. Dinah
Evangeline B, Bandong, A.M. RTJ-17-2507, October 29, 2017).
C. ADMINISTRATIVE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
OVER JUDGES AND JUSTICES (ALL LEVELS)

Supreme Court

Members of the Supreme Court may be removed from office on

impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust (Sec 2, Article XI, 1987
Constitution).

The SC has administrative supervision over all lower courts and

their personnel (Art. VIII, Sec. 6.) and exclusive power to
discipline judges of lower courts (Art. VIII, Sec. 11).

The Ombudsman is duty bound to refer to the SC all cases

against judges and court personnel.

Sandiganbayan
Court of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts / Municipal Trial Courts in
Cities / Municipal Trial Courts / Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Sharia District Courts

Rule:

The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a
vote of majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted
thereon (Section 11, Article VIII, Constitution).

Qualification:

(1) In principle, the Supreme Court would not assign complaints filed with it against justices and judges of the lower
courts to the IBP for investigation after the Supreme Court shall have found a probable cause in such charges. As a
matter of long standing practice, the Court has assigned complaints against Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Judges to
an Executive Judge of a Regional Trial Court, and complaints against judges of the Regional Trial Courts to a justice of
the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation, while a complaint against a member of the Court
of Appeals would probably be assigned to a member of the Supreme Court for investigation, report and
recommendation.

(2) The IBP shall refer to the Supreme Court all cases filed against judges, including complaints charging judges jointly
with practicing lawyers, whether filed directly with the IBP or transmitted to the IBP by the Office of the Solicitor
General. The Supreme Court will examine these complaints individually and on a case by case basis. The Court may
refer such a case for joint investigation to an Executive Judge of a Regional Trial Court or to a justice of the Court of
Appeals. There may, however, be instances when the case against the practicing lawyer may be separable and
conveniently referred to the IBP for investigation (SC Circular No. 3-89, Series of 1989)
D. DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS (Rule 137 of the Rules of Court in the Philippines).

COMPULSORY (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court)

No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which:

1. He, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise;
2. In which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity;
3. He is to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law;
4. In which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel;

As a general rule, a judge is prohibited from serving as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or other
fiduciary. The only exception is when the estate or trust belongs to, or the ward is a member of his immediate
family, and only if his service as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or fiduciary will not interfere with the
proper performance of his judicial duties (Rule 5.06, Canon 5, New Code of Judicial Conduct).

 The Code has defined who may be considered as members of his immediate family and they are the spouse and
relatives within the second degree of consanguinity(Carual vs. Brusola, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1500. October 20, 1999).

5. In which he has been presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the
written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record (Sec. 1, Rule 137, ROC).

 The prohibitions under the afore-quoted provisions of the Rules are clear. The disqualification is mandatory and
gives the judicial officer concerned no discretion but to inhibit himself from trying or sitting in a case. The rationale,
therefore, is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary's fairness and objectivity (Incorporators of
Mindanao Institute, Inc. vs. United Church of Christ in the Philippines, G.R. No. 171765, [March 21, 2012], 685 PHIL 21-
36).
2. VOLUNTARY (Sec. 1[2], Rule 137, Rules of Court)

May be acted upon exercise of the judge’s sound discretion, disqualifying himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reasons other than those mentioned above (Ibid).

 A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a case, but when circumstances appear that will induce doubt
as to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a
careful examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that people’s faith in the Courts of Justice is not
impaired. The better course for the judge under such circumstances is to disqualify himself (Borromeo-Herrera vs.
Borromeo, G.R. No. L-41171, July 23, 1987).

 Intimacy or friendship between a judge and an attorney of record of one of the parties to a suit is no ground for
disqualification. That one of the counsels in a case was a classmate of the trial judge is not a legal ground for the
disqualification of the said judge. To allow it would unnecessarily burden other trial judges to whom the case would be
transferred. But if the relationship between the judge and an attorney for a party is such that there would be a natural
inclination to prejudice the case, the judge should be disqualified in order to guaranty a fair trial (Query of Executive
Judge Estrada, 1987).

Objection that a judge is disqualified

The party objecting the official’s competency may, in writing, file with the official his objection, stating the grounds
therefor, and the official shall thereupon proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his
determination of the question of his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the
other papers in the case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his own
competency, until after final judgment in the case (Sec. 2, Rule 137, ROC).
DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY

1. Members of the Supreme Court

Members of the Supreme Court may be removed from office on impeachment

for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust (Sec 2,
Article XI, 1987 Constitution).

Notes: Justice Brion state in his separate concurring opinion In the Matter of
the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, February 8, 2011) that what the impeachment
provisions of the Constitution guarantee is simply the right to be removed
from office only through the impeachment process and not by any other
means; it does not preclude the imposition of disciplinary sanctions short of
removal on the impeachable official. Impeachment is the sole means of
removal, but it is certainly not the sole means of disciplining, Members of the
Supreme Court or, for that matter, public officials removable by impeachment.
2. Lower Court Judges and Justices (Rule 140)

The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during a good
behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of
their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or
order their dismissal by a vote of majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon (Sec. 11, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).

General Rule: A judge is not liable administratively, civilly, or criminally when he acts within his
power and jurisdiction.

This frees the judge from apprehension of personal consequences to himself and to preserve the
integrity and independence of the judiciary.

Exception: The judge will be held liable upon showing of serious misconduct, inefficiency, gross and
patent, or deliberate and malicious error, or bad faith.

The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond reasonable
doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is misconduct in office,
willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. (Raquiza v Castaneda, A.M. No. 1312-CFI January 31,
1978).
Misconduct

A wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment (Raquiza v Castaneda, A.M. No. 1312-CFI January 31, 1978).

Serious Misconduct

The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or
to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence (Tormis vs. Paredes, A.M. No. RTJ-13-
2366, February 4, 2015)

Ignorance of Law

Attaches when the respondent judge is found to have issued her assailed erroneous order, decision or actuation in the
performance of official duties moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive (OCA v Alaras A.M.
No. RTJ-16-2484, July 23, 2018).

Effect of withdrawal or desistance

It should be remembered that a complaint for misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance against a public officer or
employee cannot simply be withdrawn anytime; such withdrawal would not result in the automatic dismissal of the
case. The need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the government and its agencies and
instrumentalities should not be made to depend on the whims and caprices of the complainants who are, in a real
senses only witnesses therein (Mosquera vs. Lepaspi, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1504, April 12, 2000, citing Florendo vs. Enrile,
A.M. No. P-99-1286, March 4, 1999)
A. Initiation of complaint against Judges and Justices

PROCEDURE FOR FILING ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGES AND JUSTICE

Proceedings for the discipline of judges of regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan
may be instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of person who have
personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may substantiate said allegations, or upon an
anonymous complaint, supported by public records of indubitable integrity. The complaint shall be in writing and shall state
clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the
Rules of Court, or the Code of Judicial Conduct (Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC
ROC).

Q: Who are Judges and Justices covered by this rule?

A:
1. Judges of Regular and Special Courts
2. Justices of Court of Appeals
3. Sandiganbayan (ibid).

Three (3) Ways of Instituting Administrative Charges against Justices and Judges

a. Motu proprio by the Supreme Court;

b. Verified complaint with affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged or substantiating documents; or
c. Anonymous complaint with public record of indubitable integrity (ibid)

Notes: All other justices and judges from the Court of Appeals to the lowest level may be removed from office as provided by
law, but not by impeachment (Art. XI, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution).
Filing of Complaints

 Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, there are three ways by which administrative proceedings
may be instituted against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan and judges of
regular and special courts: (1) motu proprio by the Supreme Court; (2) upon verified complaint with
affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which
may substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an anonymous complaint supported by public records
of indubitable integrity (Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez, Antonio A. Henson & Angel S. Ong vs. Court of
Appeals Asso. Justices Ramon M. Bato, Jr., Isaias P. Dicdican, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J. February
19, 2013).

How to file a complaint?

The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions
constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or
the Code of Judicial Conduct (Section 1, Rule 140 of the revised Rules of Court).
Q: Is an administrative case filed against erring Justices of
Court of Appeals and Sandiganbayan, judges and lawyers in
the government service automatically treated as disbarment
cases?

A: Yes. Pursuant to Resolution No. 02-9-0-SC, Administrative

cases against erring Justices of the Court of Appeals and
Sandiganbayan, judges and lawyers in the government service is
automatically treated as disbarment cases (Pineda, Judicial
Ethics, 2009 ed, p. 359).

 This new rule shall apply to administrative cases already filed

where the respondents have not yet been required to comment
on the complaints (Resolution No. 02-9-0-SC; Heck vs. Santos,
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, February 23, 2004).

Serious administrative cases against erring justices and judges

are automatically converted as disciplinary proceedings against
them both as such officials and as members of the Bar (Pineda,
Judicial Ethics, 2009 ed, p. 360).

Q: Who has the power to discipline judges of the lower court?

How to act on the complaint?

If the complaint is sufficient in form and substance, a copy thereof shall be served upon
the respondent, and he shall be required to comment within ten (10) days from the date
of service. Otherwise, the same shall be dismissed (Section 2, Rule 140, ROC).

BY WHOM COMPLAINT INVESTIGATED

Upon the filing of the respondent’s comment, or upon the expiration of the time for
filing the same and unless other pleadings or documents are required,

the Court shall refer the matter to:

• the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report, and recommendation;
or
• assign the case for investigation, report, and recommendation to a retired member of
the Supreme Court, if the respondent is a Justice of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan, or to a Justice of the Court of Appeals, if the respondent is a Judge of a
Regional Trial Court or of a special court of equivalent rank, or to a Judge of the Regional
Trial Court if the respondent is a Judge of an inferior court (Section 3, Rule 140, ROC).
 HEARING

The investigating Justice or Judge shall set a day of the hearing and send
notice thereof to both parties (Section 4, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of
Court).

What to do during hearing?

At such hearing the parties may present oral and documentary evidence. If,
after due notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall
proceed ex parte (ibid).

Required Period to Terminate the Investigation

The Investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate the investigation within

ninety (90) days from the date of its commencement or within such extension
as the Supreme Court may grant (ibid).

REPORT

Within thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation, the
investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme Court a report
containing findings of fact and recommendation. The record containing the
Summary of the Procedure for Filing an Administrative Complaint Against Judge and Justices:

1. Complaint, in writing and duly sworn to is filed with the Supreme Court (Sec. 1, Rule 140, ROC)A;

a. If the charge is with merit, a copy will be served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer within 10
days from the date of service (Sec. 2, Ibid)
b. If not or the answer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the charges are not meritorious, it will be
dismissed which must followed by an answer within 10 days from date of service.

1. Upon filing of respondent’s comment or expiration of the period upon filing comment, the SC shall:
a. Refer the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report, and
recommendation or assign the case for investigation, report, and recommendation to a retired member of
the Supreme Court (if the respondent is a Justice of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan); or
b. Assign the case to a Justice of the Court of Appeals (if the respondent is a Judge of a Regional Trial Court
or of a special court of equivalent rank); or
c. Assign the case to a judge of the RTC (if the respondent is a judge of an inferior court) to investigate and
hear the charges (Sec. 3, Ibid).

2. After hearings, the investigating justice or judge submits a report or finding of fact, conclusions of law and
recommendations to the Supreme Court (Sec. 5, Ibid);

3. The Supreme Court takes action as the facts and the law may warrant (Sec. 6, Ibid); and

4. The proceedings shall be private and confidential but a copy of the decision or resolution of the Court
shall be attached to the record of the respondent in the Office of the Court Administrator (Sec. 12, Ibid).
General Rule: An unverified complaint cannot be given due course (Evangelista vs. Baes, A.C. No.
000, December 26, 1974).

Exception: When the charges could be fully borne by public records of indubitable
integrity (Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, RTJ-94-118, February 8, 1995).

Outright Dismissal of Administrative Complaint

If the complaint is:

(a) filed within six months before the compulsory retirement of a Justice or Judge;
(b) for an alleged cause of the action that occurred at least a year before such filing; and
(c) shown prima facie that it is intended to harass the respondent, it must forthwith be
recommended for dismissal (A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC, Resolution Prescribing Measures to Protect
Members of the Judiciary from Baseless and Unfounded Administrative Complaints, November 3,
2003.
3. Grounds

I. Administrative Liabilities

i. Serious misconduct – Implies malice or wrongful intent, not a mere error of judgment. For serious
misconduct to exist there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of
were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or were in persistent disregard of well-
known legal rules (In Re: Impeachment of Judge Horrilleno, 43 Phil. 212, March 20, 1992; Galangi vs.
Macli-ing, Adm. Matter No. 75-DJ, January 17, 1978).

a. Failure to deposit funds with the municipal treasurer or to produce them despite his promise to do
so.
b. Misappropriation of fiduciary funds (proceeds of cash bail bond) by depositing the check in his
personal account, thus converting the trust fund into his own use.
c. Extorting money from a part litigant who has a case before his court.
d. Solicitation of donation for office equipment.
e. Unlawful solicitation in violation of RA 6713.
f. Frequent unauthorized absences in office.
g. Falsification of Certificate of Service to collect salary.
h. Dictating Wednesdays as non-session days, which the judge declared as his
“mid-week pause”.
i. Indefinite postponement for several years of a criminal case pending in his sala.
j. Judge poking his gun at another in a restaurant while in a state of intoxication.
k. Pistol-whipping the complainant on the latter’s left face without any justification.
l. Using intemperate language unbecoming of a judge.
m. A judge who accepts the free use of a car for a year or utilizes free battery
charging services from the shop of a litigant (Capuno vs. Jaramillo, A.M. No. RTJ-93-
944, July 20, 1994).
n. A judge who allows litigant to pay for the freight of his personal
acquisitions (Agpalasin vs. Agcaoili, A.M. No. RTJ-95-1308, April 12, 2000).
o. Allowing his bailiff’s son to store attached property at his house (Ibid).
p. Allowing relatives to accept a business partnership offered by persons with
pending cases before his court (Dulay vs. Lelina, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1516, July 14,
2005)
q. Use of surrendered evidence, such as guns and ammunition for own protection.
r. Borrowing of court funds to pay for personal expenses.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a
rule of law or a standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative
offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the
performance of the official functions of a public officer. In grave
misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of
corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of an
established rule must be established (Re: Complaint of Leonardo A.
Velasco against Associate Justices Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr., et al. A.M.
No. OCA IPI No. 10-25-SB-J. January 15, 2013).
ii. Inefficiency – Implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. A judge would be
inexcusably negligent if he failed to observe in the performance of his duties that diligence,
prudence, and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public service (In Re:
Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134-J, January 21, 1974).

a. Unduly granting repeated motions for postponement of a case;

b. Unawareness of or unfamiliarity with the application of Indeterminate Sentence Law and the
duration and graduation of penalties;
c. Gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law;
d. Reducing to a ridiculous amount the bail bond of the accused in a murder case thus enabling him
to escape the toils of the law;
e. Imposing a penalty of subsidiary imprisonment on a party for failure to pay civil indemnity in
violation of RA 5465;
f. Issuing a warrant of arrest in a case which is clearly civil in nature;
g. Failure to dismiss a complaint which has prescribed;
h. Oppression or unwarranted display of authority;
i. Imposing the wrong penalty to the crime charged and proven;
j. Failure to comply with the basic prerequisites for the issuance of a search warrant;
k. Dismissing a criminal case based on the principle of “in pari delicto” – a civil law principle;
l. Including execution in the judgment itself;
m. Granting an Ex-Parte Motion For Execution in ejectment case without notice to adverse party; and
n. Nonfeasance of Judges – No judge or court, shall decline to render judgment by reason, of the
silence, obscurity or inefficiency of the law (Art. 9, NCC).
iii. Administrative Charges

Administrative charges, which may be filed against a judge, may be classified as:

a) Serious charges;

i. Bribery, direct or indirect;

ii. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);
iii. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
iv. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an
appropriate proceeding;
v. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
vi. Willful failure to pay a just debt;
vii. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court;
viii. Immorality;
ix. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
x. The error must be so gross and patent as to produce an inference of ignorance or bad faith or that
the judge knowingly rendered an unjust decision. The error must be so grave and so fundamental to
a point as to warrant a condemnation of the judge as patently ignorant or negligent (Bengzon vs.
Adaoag, A.M. No. MTJ-95-1045, November 28, 1995). When the legal principle involved is sufficiently
basic, lack of conservance with it constitutes gross ignorance of the law (Dipatuan vs. Judge
Mangotara, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190, April 23, 2010)
xi. Partisan political activities; and
xii. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits (Sec. 8, Rule 140, ROC).
b) Less serious charges; and

i. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case;

ii. Frequently and unjustified absences without leave or habitual tardiness;
iii. Unauthorized practice of law;
iv. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars
v. Receiving additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law;
vi. Untruthful statements in the certificate of service; and
vii. Simple misconduct (Sec. 9, Rule 140, ROC).

c) Light charges, (Sec. 7, Rule 140, ROC)

i. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct;

ii. Gambling in public;
iii. Fraternizing with lawyers and litigants with pending case/cases in his court; and
iv. Undue delay in the submission of monthly reports (Sec. 10, Rule 140, ROC).

 Administrative case cannot be immediately filed in every offense committed by a judge. Resort to
and exhaustion of these judicial remedies, as well as the entry taking of other measures against the
judge concerned, whether civil, administrative, or criminal in nature. It is only after the available
judicial remedies against the rulings or acts performed in the exercise of their judicial power have
been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken with finality, that the door to an inquiry into
their criminal, civil or administrative liability may be said to have opened or closed (Flores vs.
Abesamis, A.M. No. SC-96-1, July 10, 1997).
To hold a judge administratively liable for gross misconduct, gross ignorance of the law or
incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions and duties, it must be shown that his
acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill will, bad faith or deliberate
intent to do an injustice (Andrada vs. Hon. Judge Banzon, A.M. MTJ-08-1720, November 25, 2008).


 Absent such proof, the judge is presumed to have acted in good faith in exercising his judicial
functions (Lacadin vs. Judge Mangino, A.M. MTJ-01-1346, July 9, 2003).

Notes:

 The nature of adjudication by a judicial magistrate as a function of sovereignty invests the

magistrate with a great degree of immunity from administrative and other liabilities (Hernandez vs.
Judge Gella, et al., June 9, 2014).

 It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by authority and reason, that no civil action can be
sustained against a judicial officer for the recovery of damages by one claiming to have been
injured by the officer’s judicial action within his jurisdiction.

From the very nature of the case, the officer is called upon by law to exercise his judgment in the
matter, and the law holds his duty to the individual to be performed when he has exercised it,
however erroneous or disastrous in its consequences it may appear either to the party or to others.
A number of reasons, any one of them sufficient, have been advanced in support of this rule. Thus, it
is said of the judge: “His doing justice as between particular individuals, when they have a
controversy before him, is not the end and object which were in view when his court is created,
and he was selected to preside over or sit in it.

Courts are created on public grounds; they are to do justice as between suitors, to the end that
peace and order may prevail in the political society, and that rights may be protected and
preserved. The duty is public, and the end to be accomplished is public; the individual advantage or
loss results from the proper and thorough or improper and imperfect performance of a duty for
which his controversy is only the occasion.

The judge performs his duty to the public by doing justice between individuals, or if he fails to do
justice as between individual, he may be called to account by the State in such form and before
such tribunal as the law may have provided.

But as duty neglected is not a duty to the individual, civil redress, as for an individual injury, is not
admissible (Re: Verified complaint for disbarment of AMA LAND INC., (Represented by Joseph B.
Usita) against Court of Appeals Justices Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon. Sesinado E. Villon and Hon.
Ricardo G. Rosario, OCA IPI 12-204-CA-J, March 11, 2014).

 The filings of administrative complaints do subvert and undermine the independence of the
Judiciary and its judges. Thus, the Court does not tolerate unwarranted administrative charges
brought against sitting magistrates in respect to their judicial actions, (Hernandez vs. Judge Gella, et
al., A.M. RTJ-13-2356, June 9, 2014).
iv. Automatic Conversion of Administrative Cases against CA and Sandiganbayan Justices and Lower Courts Judges

 Administrative cases against CA and Sandiganbayan justices and lower courts judges where the charges constitute
misconduct for members of the Bar, shall also considered as disciplinary action against the justice or judge. The
respondent shall be required to comment or show cause why he should not be suspended, disbarred, or sanctioned as
a member of the Bar (Re: Automatic Conversion of some Administrative Case against Justices of the CA and
Sandiganbayan, et al., A.M. No. 02-9-02 SC, September 17, 2002).

II. Civil Liabilities

A judge who willfully or negligently renders a decision causing damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same (Art. 20, Civil Code). Also, a judge is civilly liable for damages if, in refusing or neglecting to decide a case without
just cause, a person suffered material or moral loss without prejudice to any administrative action that may be taken
against him (Art. 27, Civil Code).

III. Criminal Liabilities

i. Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment (Art. 204, RPC);

ii. Judgment Rendered Through Negligence (Art. 205, RPC);
iii. Knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order (Art. 206, RPC); and
iv. Maliciously delaying the administration of justice (Art. 207, RPC).

Notes: During the pendency of disbarment proceedings against a judge, the latter may not retire service. The
retirement of a judge or any judicial officer from the service does not preclude the finding of any administrative
liability to which he should still be answerable (Atty. Molina vs. Judge Paz, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1638, December 8, 2003).
4. IMPEACHMNENT

Articles of Impeachment against Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (December 12, 2011): The
House of Representatives voted to impeach Chief Justice Corona. They charged him with eight
(8) articles of impeachment alleging:
1. Betrayal of public trust
2. Graft and corruption
3. Culpable violation of the Constitution

Articles of Impeachment Filed by the House of Representatives:

ARTICLE I
Betrayed the public trust through his track record marked by partiality and subservience in
cases involving the Arroyo Administration from the time of his appointment as Supreme Court
justice and until his dubious appointment as a midnight chief justice to the present.

ARTICLE II
Committed culpable violation of the constitution and/or betrayed the public trust when he
failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth as required
under SEC. 17, ART. XI of the 1987 Constitution.

ARTICLE III
Committed culpable violations of the constitution and/or betrayed the public trust by failing to
meet and observe the stringent standards under ART. VIII, Section 7 (3) of the Constitution that
provides that “[a] member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence” in allowing the Supreme Court to act on mere letters filed by a
counsel which caused the issuance of flip-flopping decisions in final and executory cases; in
creating an excessive entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo through her appointment of his wife to
office; and in discussing with litigants regarding cases pending before the Supreme Court.
ARTICLE IV
Betrayed the public trust and/or committed culpable violation of the Constitution when he blatantly
disregarded the principle of separation of powers by issuing a “status quo ante” order against the House
of Representatives in the case concerning the impeachment of then Ombudsman Merceditas Navarro-
Gutierrez.

ARTICLE V
Betrayed the public trust through wanton arbitrariness and partiality in consistently disregarding the
principle of res judicata in the cases involving the 16 newly-created cities, and the promotion of Dinagat
Island into a province.

ARTICLE VI
Betrayed the public trust by arrogating unto himself, and to a committee he created, the authority and
jurisdiction to improperly investigate a justice of the Supreme Court for the purpose of exculpating him.
Such authority and jurisdiction is properly reposed by the constitution in the House of Representatives
via impeachment.

ARTICLE VII
Betrayed the public trust through his partiality in granting a temporary restraining order (TRO) in favor
of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and her husband Jose Miguel Arroyo in order to give them
an opportunity to escape prosecution and to frustrate the ends of justice, and in distorting the Supreme
Court decision on the effectivity of the TRO in view of a clear failure to comply with the conditions of the
Supreme Court’s own TRO.

ARTICLE VIII
Betrayed the public trust and/or committed graft and corruption when he failed and refused to account
for the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Special Allowance for the Judiciary (SAJ) collections.
5. SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY THE SUPREME COURT ON ERRING MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY

If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed:

a. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may be determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
b. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
c. A fine of more than P20, 000.00 but exceeding P40, 000.00.

If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
a. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months;
or
b. A fine of more than P10, 000.00 but not exceeding P20, 000.00.

If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:

a. A fine of not less than P1, 000.00 but not exceeding P10, 000.00 and/or
b. Censure;
c. Reprimand; and
d. Admonition with warning (Sec. 11, Rule 140, ROC).
Procedure for filing an administrative complaint

1. Complaint, in writing and duly sworn to is filed with the Supreme Court (Sec. 1, Rule 140, ROC);

a. If the charge is with merit, a copy will be served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer
within 10 days from the date of service (Sec. 2, Ibid).

b. If not or the answer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the charges are not meritorious, it
will be dismissed which must followed by an answer within 10 days from date of service.

2. Upon filing of respondent’s comment or expiration of the period upon filing comment, the SC
either refers the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation;
3. Report, and recommendation, or assign a Justice of the Court of Appeals (if respondent is an RTC
judge) or a judge of the RTC (if the respondent is a judge of an inferior court) to investigate and hear
the charges (Sec. 3, Ibid);
4. After hearings, the investigating justice or judge submits a report or finding of fact, conclusions of
law and recommendations to the Supreme Court (Sec. 5, Ibid);
5. The Supreme Court takes action as the facts and the law may warrant (Sec. 6, Ibid); and
6. The proceedings shall be private and confidential but a copy of the decision or resolution of the
Court.