Case Digest 7

Doctrine: Parental Authority
As a general rule, the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. However, insofar as illegitimate
children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code states that illegitimate children
shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Accordingly, mothers (such as
Renalyn) are entitled to the sole parental authority of their illegitimate children (such
as Queenie), notwithstanding the father’s recognition of the child. In the exercise of
that authority, mothers are consequently entitled to keep their illegitimate children in
their company, and the Court will not deprive them of custody, absent any imperative
cause showing the mother’s unfitness to exercise such authority and care.
Case title: Renalyn A. Masbate vs. Ricky James Relucio, GR. No. 235498,
(J. Perlas-Bernabe) July 30, 2018
FACTS:
Queenie was born on May 3, 2012 to Renalyn and Ricky James, who had been
living together with Renalyn’s parents without the benefit of marriage. Three years later,
the relationship ended. Renalyn went to Manila, supposedly leaving Queenie behind in
the care and custody of her father, Ricky James.
Ricky James alleged that Spouses Renata and Marlyn Masbate (Renalyn’s
parents) took Queenie from the school where he had enrolled her. When asked to give
Queenie back, Renalyn’s parents refused and instead showed a copy of a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) executed by Renalyn granting full parental rights, authority, and
custody over Queenie to them. Consequently, Ricky James filed a petition for habeas
corpus and child custody before the RTC (petition a quo).
A hearing was conducted where Renalyn brought Queenie and expressed the
desire for her daughter to remain in her custody.
The RTC ruled that the custody of three (3)-year-old Queenie rightfully belongs
to Renalyn, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code, which states
that “[n]o child under seven [(7)] years of age shall be separated from the mother x x x.”
The RTC likewise found that, while Renalyn went to Manila to study dentistry and left
Queenie in the custody of her parents, her intention was to bring Queenie to Manila at a
later time.
The CA set aside the assailed RTC Orders and remanded the case to the lower
court for determination of who should exercise custody over Queenie. The CA found that
the RTC hastily dismissed the petition a quo upon Queenie’s production in court, when
the objective of the case was to establish the allegation that Renalyn had been neglecting
Queenie, which was a question of fact that must be resolved by trial. Citing Section 18 of
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, which states that, “after trial, the court shall render judgment
awarding the custody of the minor to the proper party considering the best interests of
the minor,” the CA declared that the dismissal by the RTC of the petition a quo was not
supported by the Rules.
Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the RTC Orders granting custody to Renalyn
“pending the outcome of the case,” stating that only Queenie’s mother, Renalyn, has
parental authority over her as she is an illegitimate child. Further, the CA declared that
the RTC must thresh out Renalyn’s capacity to raise her daughter, which shall, in turn,
determine whether or not the tender-age presumption must be upheld, or whether
Queenie’s well-being is better served with her remaining in the custody of her maternal
grandparents in the exercise of their substitute parental authority or with Ricky James,
who was Queenie’s actual custodian before the controversy.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly remanded the case a quo for determination of
who should exercise custody over Queenie.
RULING:
Yes. The CA correctly remanded the case a quo for determination of who should
exercise custody over Queenie.
It is settled that habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where “the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.” In custody cases
involving minors, the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of determining
the right of custody over a child. The grant of the writ depends on the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over the minor; (2)
that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by the
respondents; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in the
custody of petitioner and not that of the respondents.
As a general rule, the father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. However, insofar as illegitimate
children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code states that illegitimate children
shall be under the parental authority of their mother.
Accordingly, mothers (such as Renalyn) are entitled to the sole parental authority
of their illegitimate children (such as Queenie), notwithstanding the father’s recognition
of the child. In the exercise of that authority, mothers are consequently entitled to keep
their illegitimate children in their company, and the Court will not deprive them of
custody, absent any imperative cause showing the mother’s unfitness to exercise such
authority and care.
In addition, Article 213 of the same Code provides for the so-called tender-age
presumption, stating that “no child under seven (7) years of age shall be separated from
the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.”
According to jurisprudence, the following instances may constitute “compelling reasons”
to wrest away custody from a mother over her child although under seven (7) years of
age: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug
addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable disease.
As the records show, the CA resolved to remand the case to the RTC, ratiocinating
that there is a need to establish whether or not Renalyn has been neglecting Queenie, for
which reason, a trial is indispensable for reception of evidence relative to the
preservation or overturning of the tender- age presumption under Article 213 of the
Family Code.
In opposition, petitioners contend that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family
Code would not even apply in this case (so as to determine Renalyn’s unfitness as a
mother) because the said provision only applies to a situation where the parents are
married to each other.
As basis, petitioners rely on the Court’s ruling in Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto V

(Pablo-Gualberto), the pertinent portion of which reads:
“In like manner, the word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Section 6
of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court has been held to connote a mandatory character. Article
213 and Rule 99 similarly contemplate a situation in which the parents of the minor are
married to each other but are separated by virtue of either a decree of legal separation or
a de facto separation.”
Notably, after a careful reading of Pablo-Gualberto, it has been determined that

the aforequoted pronouncement therein is based on a previous child custody case,
namely, Briones v. Miguel (Briones), wherein the Court pertinently held as follows:
“However, the CA erroneously applied Section 6 of Rule 99 of

the Rules of Court. This provision contemplates a situation in which
the parents of the minor are married to each other but are separated
either by virtue of a decree of legal separation or because they are living
separately de facto. In the present case, it has been established that
petitioner and Respondent Loreta were never married. Hence, that
portion of the CA Decision allowing the child to choose which parent to
live with is deleted, but without disregarding the obligation of
petitioner to support the child.”
For guidance, the relevant issue in Briones for which the stated excerpt was made
is actually the application of Section 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court insofar as it permits
the child over ten years of age to choose which parent he prefers to live with. As the
Court’s ruling in Briones was prefaced: “the Petition has no merit. However, the assailed
Decision should be modified in regard to its erroneous application of Section 6 of Rule
99 of the Rules of Court.”
Accordingly, since the statement in Pablo-Gualberto invoked by petitioners, i.e.,

that “Article 213 and Rule 99 similarly contemplate a situation in which the parents of
the minor are married to each other x x x,” was based on Briones, then that same
statement must be understood according to its proper context – that is, the issue
pertaining to the right of a child to choose which parent he prefers to live with. The
reason as to why this statement should be understood in said manner is actually not
difficult to discern: the choice of a child over seven (7) years of age (first paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code) and over ten (10) years of age (Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court) shall be considered in custody disputes only between married parents because
they are, pursuant to Article 211 of the Family Code, accorded joint parental authority
over the persons of their common children. On the other hand, this choice is not
available to an illegitimate child, much more one of tender age such as Queenie (second
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code), because sole parental authority is given
only to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit or unsuitable (Article 176 of the
Family Code).
Thus, since the issue in this case is the application of the exception to the tender-
age presumption under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code, and not
the option given to the child under the first paragraph to choose which parent to live
with, petitioners’ reliance on Pablo-Gualberto is grossly misplaced.
In addition, it ought to be pointed out that the second paragraph of Article 213 of
the Family Code, which was the basis of the CA’s directive to remand the case, does not
even distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children – and hence, does not
factor in whether or not the parents are married – in declaring that “[n]o child under
seven [(7)] years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.” “Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to
recognize any distinction.”
As such, petitioners’ theory that Article 213 of the Family Code is herein inapplicable –
and thus, negates the need for the ordered remand – is not only premised on an
erroneous reading of jurisprudence, but is also one that is fundamentally off-tangent
with the law itself.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or
legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable,
unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been
executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party.
Case title: Napoleon D. Neri vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy, GR. No. 194366;
(J. Perlas-Bernabe) October 10, 2012
Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari by petitioners: Napoleon, Alicia,

Visminda, Rosa, Douglas, Eutropia, and Victoria seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision of the CA which annulled the Decision of the RTC of Davao del Norte, and
entered a new one dismissing P’s complaint for annulment of sale and damages against
herein respondent.
During the lifetime of Ps’ mother, Anunciacion, she and her 2nd husband,
Enrique, acquired several homestead properties. When Anunciacion died, however,
Enrique in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and
Douglas, together with, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale (1979) adjudicating among
themselves the said homestead properties, and thereafter, sold the properties to the late
spouses Uy for a consideration of 80,000.
On 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of the said sale
against spouses Uy, assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the
prohibited period. And, also, for having been executed without the consent or approval
of Eutropia, Victoria, Rosa and Douglas; thus, depriving the latter siblings of their
legitime. Uy countered that the sale took place beyond the 5 year prohibitory period
from the issuance of the homestead patents. They also denied that Eutropia and Victoria
were excluded from the Extra-judicial settlement and sale of the subject properties, and
interposed further the defense of prescription and laches.
RTC rendered a Decision annulling the Extra-judicial settlement of estate with

Absolute Deed of Sale. It ruled that the sale is void because Eutropia and Victoria were
deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the
shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas.
On appeal, however, CA reserved and set aside RTC decision. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether Enrique, as guardian of his children and co-owner (with his children),
sell their co-owned property?
Ruling:
No, as to the shares of the minor children because as a natural guardian, he is

merely clothed with powers of administration. Doctrine: Parents should apply for
judicial guardianship in order for them to sell properties of their children. Even the
parents of their minor children are bound to post bond.
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution
of the settlement and sale, their NATURAL GUARDIAN and father, Enrique,
represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that
time, Enrique was merely clothed with POWERS OF ADMINISTRATION and bereft of
any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
Power of dominion is granted by law only to a JUDICIAL GUARDIAN of the ward’s
property and even then only with court’s prior approval secured in accordance with the
proceedings set forth by the Rules. Exception: RATIFICATION Consequently, the
disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children without the proper
judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority, is
unenforceable in accordance with Art. 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code.
Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the
estate with absolute deed of sale. The same, however, is not true with respect to Douglas
for lack of evidence showing ratification.
THEREFORE, the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and not binding on
Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas. Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs
became pro indiviso co-owners of the homestead properties with Eutropia, Victoria and
Douglas, who retained title to their respective shares.
Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in force at the time of the
execution of the settlement and sale, provide: ART. 320. The father, or in his absence
the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under
parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or
mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. ART.
326.
When the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father
or mother shall be considered a guardian of the childs property, subject to the duties
and obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court. Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of
the Rules of Court also provides: SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. When the property of the
child under parental authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the
mother, without the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When
the property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or the
mother shall be considered guardian of the childs property, with the duties and
obligations of guardians under these Rules, and shall file the petition required by
Section 2 hereof.
For good reasons, the court may, however, appoint another suitable person.
Administration includes all acts for the preservation of the property and the receipt of
fruits according to the natural purpose of the thing. Any act of disposition or alienation,
or any reduction in the substance of the patrimony of child, exceeds the limits of
administration.13Ï‚rÎ½ll Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor
under parental authority, does not have the power to dispose or encumber the property
of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a judicial guardian of the ward’s
property and even then only with courts prior approval secured in accordance with the
proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.Doctrine: Emancipation and Age of
Majority
Doctrine: Emancipation and Age of Majority
Judicial declaration of presumptive death is only applicable for the purpose of

contracting a valid subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code involve a presumption of death already
established by law. There is no need to file such petition under said provisions before
the court.
“Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous

marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse
present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.”
Case title: Estrellita Tadeo-Matias vs. Republic, GR. No. 230751; ( J.

Velasco Jr); April 25, 2018
Facts:
Petitioner Estrellita Tadeo-Matias and Wilfredo N. Matias entered into a lawful

marriage on January 1, 1968. After the marriage, the couple put up their conjugal home
in San Miguel, Tarlac City. Wilfredo continued to serve the Philippines as a member of
the Philippine Constabulary and on September 15, 1979, he set out from their conjugal
home to again serve the Philippine Constabulary. Wilfredo never came back from his
tour of duty in Arayat, Pampanga since 1979 and he never made contact or
communicated with the petitioner. According to the records of the National Police
Commission, he was already declared missing since 1979. Petitioner claimed that she
constantly pestered the then Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding Wilfredo,
but the Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his whereabouts, neither did they
have any news of him going AWOL, all they know was he was assigned to a place
frequented by the New People's Army.
After more than three (3) decades of awaiting, the petitioner is still hopeful, but
the times had been tough on her, especially with a meager source of income coupled
with her age, it is now necessary for her to request for the benefits that rightfully belong
to her in order to survive; thus she petitioned for the declaration of presumptive death
of Wilfredo to claim the benefits arising from the death of the latter.
On January 15, 2012, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 65 (RTC)
granted the petition declaring WILFREDO N. MATIAS absent or presumptively dead
under Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines for purpose of claiming financial
benefits due to him as former military officer.
On appeal of the Republic, the CA annulled the decision of the RTC and set aside
the petition on the ground that the RTC erred when it declared Wilfredo presumptively
dead on the basis of Article 41 of the Family Code when the purpose of the petitioner
was not to remarry; the RTC should have invoked Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 41 of the Family Code applies in the instant case – the
declaration of presumptive death for purposes of claiming benefits?
RULING:
No. Article 41 does not apply in the case at bar. The Court ruled that the petition
for the declaration of presumptive death filed by petitioner is not an action that would
have warranted the application of Article 41 of the Family Code which shows that the
presumption of death established therein is only applicable for the purpose of
contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law. Thus:
“Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during

subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before
the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be sufficient.”
Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the
presumptive death of Wilfredo as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the
declaration of presumptive death, petitioner categorically stated that the same was filed
"not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 a
amended. Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed
for the purpose of remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of
death under either Article 390 or Article 391 of the Civil Code as the basis of her
petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code express the general rule regarding
presumptions of death for any civil purpose.
Verily, the RTC's use of Article 41 of the FC as its basis in declaring the
presumptive death of Wilfredo was misleading and grossly improper. The petition for
the declaration of presumptive death filed by the petitioner was based on the Civil Code,
and not on Article 41 of the Family Code.
Doctrine: Funerals
“The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall
be in accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of
descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be
preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right. ”
Case title: Fe Floro Valino vs. Rosario D. Adriano, GR. No. 182894, (J.
Mendoza) April 22, 2014
FACTS:
Atty. Adriano married Rosario Adriano, herein respondent, on November 15,

1955. The two begot 2 sons, 3 daughters, and adopted one child. Their marriage failed.
Thus, the two lived separately. A year later, Atty. Adriano found a new love life, one of
his former clients, named Fe Valino, herein petitioner, where they live together as
common law partners. Despite such situation, Atty. Adriano continued to provide
financial support to Rosario and their children.
The husband died due to acute emphysema, a lung disease. At the time of
husband’s death, the first wife and children were having their Christmas vacation in the
US. Due to this, the common law wife, Valino, facilitated the funeral of Atty. Adriano.
The legal wife requested the common law wife to delay the internment for them to pay
their last respect to his dead husband. However, her request was not heeded. They
buried Adriano at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park.
Respondents were not able to attend the interment.
The legal family, having been deprived of the last chance to view the remains of
Atty. Adriano, filed a suit against the common law wife. In their claim that the deceased
did not wished to be buried in Manila Memorial Park.
In her defense, the common law wife countered that she and the deceased were
living together for more than 20 year and claims that she has the better right to make
decisions concerning the burial of Atty. Adriano.
RTC dismissed respondents (legal wife) petition. On the ground that it would not
serve any useful purpose and so he (Atty. Adriano) should be spared and respected.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and directed Valino to have the
remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of respondents.
Hence, the common law wife appealed to the SC.
ISSUE:
Who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.
RULING:
Under the law, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements is the surviving
legal wife. Article 305 provides:
“The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral
of a relative shall be in accordance with the order established for
support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same
degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In
case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right. ”
Art. 199. Also provides that whenever two or more persons are obliged to give
support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein
provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:

“No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or
exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles
294 and 305.”
In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 1103. Persons charged with the duty of burial. – The immediate duty of
burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the
expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons herein below specified:
(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the
burial shall devolve upon the surviving spouse if he or she possesses
sufficient means to pay the necessary expenses.
The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United
States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect,
waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make arrangements
for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral
arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or
renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and
voluntary intent to that end. While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and
Rosario and their children when he was still alive, the Court also recognizes that human
compassion, more often than not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a family
member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the respondents wasted
no time in making frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days so
they could attend the service and view the remains of the deceased. As soon as they
came to know about Atty. Adriano’s death in the morning of December 19, 1992
(December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately contacted Valino
and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to no avail.
Doctrine: Use of Surnames
While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is
to the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must
nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the adopted
child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption proceedings.
.
Case title: Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo
Wong, GR. No. 97906, (J. Regalado) May 21, 1992
Facts:
Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr., and Segundina Y.
Alcala. When he was two and a half years old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr.,
and his sister Margaret Alcala, was then 9 years old, they were – with the consent of
their natural parents and by order of the court – adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and
Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos.
Thenceforth, Maximo Alcala, Jr. acquired Wong as his family name. Upon
reaching the age of 22, Maximo filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr.
It was averred that his use of the surname Wong (1) embarrassed and isolated him from
his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in
fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and (2) he wants to erase
any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that (3) he is being ridiculed for
carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life; and that (4)
his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.
The Republic, through the Solicitor General, contends that Maximo’s allegations
of ridicule and/or isolation from family and friends were unsubstantiated; that it was
crass ingratitude to the memory of his adoptive father and to his adoptive mother who is
still alive, despite her consent.
Issue:
Are the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for change of
name valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of said petition?
Ruling:
Yes, Maximo can use the surname of his biological parents after being adopted.
While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect
that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be
borne in mind that the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident
rather than the object of adoption proceedings.
The Court decision in Calderon v. Republic must be upheld as it states that, “The
purpose of the law in allowing a change of name as contemplated by the provisions of
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is to give a person an opportunity to improve his
personality and to provide his best interest.”
Furthermore, in Uy v. Republic, it is held that, “It has been held that in the
absence of prejudice to the state or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of a former alien nationality which only hamper(s) social and
business life, is a proper and reasonable cause for change of name.” It bears stressing at
this point that to justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only
some proper or compelling reason therefor but also that he will be prejudiced by the use
of his true and official name.”
In the case above, it is sufficing to say that Maximo qualifies to change his family
name by virtue of his reasons.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some
proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been
held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to
write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously
used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former
alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.
Case title: In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or

Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan
Wang, GR. No. 159966; (J.Tinga); March 30, 2005
Facts:
A petition was filed by Anna Lisa Wang for the change of name and/or
correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of her son, a minor, Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang before the RTC of Cebu City.
Julian was the son of Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang. They were not yet
married to each other when Julian was born. Subsequently, when Julian’s parents got
married, the latter executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name
was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
Since the family plans to stay in Singapore and, since in Singapore middle names
or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a persons name, they
anticipated that Julian will be discriminated against because of his current registered
name which carries a middle name. Also, the spouses’ daughter and Julian might get
confused if they are really brothers and sisters because they have different surnames.
Lastly, Carulasan sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin language since they do not
have the letter “R” but if there is, they pronounce it as “L”. It is for these reasons why the
name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.
RTC: denied the petition. It found that the reasons abovementioned does not fall
within the grounds recognized by law. It further ruled that the real reason behind is only
convenience.
MR: Denied. The Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle name does not
justify the dropping of the middle name of a legitimate Filipino child who intends to
study there. The dropping of the middle name would be tantamount to giving due
recognition to or application of the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law which is
controlling.
Hence, this Appeal. SC required the OGS to comment on the petition.
OSG: Trial Court is correct. legitimate children have the right to bear the
surnames of both their mother and father, and such right cannot be denied by the mere
expedient of dropping the same (Family Code). Mere convenience is not sufficient to
support a petition for change of name and/or cancellation of entry.
Issue:
Whether the name mother’s surname should be dropped in the instant case
because it is a common practice in Singapore to omit said surname?
Held:
No. Petition is denied.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification, and that A CHANGE OF NAME IS A PRIVILEGE AND NOT
A RIGHT, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either
in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show PROPER AND REASONABLE
CAUSE, or ANY COMPELLING REASON which may justify such change. Otherwise, the
request should be denied.
VALID GROUNDS FOR CHANGE OF NAME:
1. When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or

pronounce;
2. When the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
3. When the change will avoid confusion;
4. When one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage;
5. A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all
in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and
6. When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the
desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of
name would prejudice public interest.
IN GRANTING/DENYING:
The question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the
court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the court and not all the best
evidence available.
What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request,

but a JUDICIOUS evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications
advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant
and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts.
DROPPING OF THE MIDDLE NAME FROM HIS REGISTERED NAME? – No law

supports such.
MIDDLE NAME PURPOSE

1. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as
well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given
name and surname as he has.
IN THE CASE AT BAR the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping of
his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his
integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established.
That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does
not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on

which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his
name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he
is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his
name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under
our laws.
Article 176 of the Family Code gives illegitimate children the right to decide if
they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father or the mother
who is granted by law with the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate
children.
Case title: Grace M. Grande vs. Patricio T. Antonio, GR. No. 206248, ( J. Velasco Jr)
February 18, 2014
FACTS:
Grace Grande and Patricio Antonio lived together as husband and wife for a
certain period of time (notwithstanding Patricio’s previous marriage). Out of this
relationship, two (illegitimate) sons were born. Their relationship eventually turned
sour and Grande left for the United States of America, and brought the kids with her.
Antonio filed a petition for parental authority, custody, and correction/change of

surname for their minor sons before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan,
alongside a pending notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity for the
children.
The RTC granted Antonio’s petition and ordered the full custody and change of
surnames (from Grande to Antonio) for his minor sons. Grande appealed to the Court of
Appeals, which modified the decision and granted only visitorial rights for Antonio
instead of full custody for the children.
Unsatisfied with the modified decision, Grande appeals to the Supreme Court
and particularly assailed the change of surname for their 2 minor children. She contends
that Article 176 of the Family Code (as amended under Republic Act 9255) does not
grant a father the right to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children. The
provision says:
Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may
use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly
recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has
the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-
filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall
consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a father can compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate
children by virtue of Article 176 of the Family Code as amended in R.A. 9255?
RULING:
No, a father cannot compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children.
Article 176 of the Family Code gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want
to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father or the mother who is
granted by law with the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
In this case, the particular provision used the word “may,” which shows that the
law’s intention is not to compel an acknowledged illegitimate child to use the surname
of his illegitimate father. Under the rules of statutory construction, the word “may”
connote that the law is merely permissive and does not indicate a mandatory meaning.
This means that the law only confers discretion upon the illegitimate child if
whether he/she chooses to use his/her father’s surname or not. Therefore, a father
cannot compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children.
A petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding; it

cannot be decided through a summary proceeding ● The fact that no one opposed the
petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make
the proceeding less adversarial in nature. ● A proceeding is adversarial where the
party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter
an opportunity to contest it. All the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial
were satisfied when all interested parties were afforded the opportunity to contest the
petition.
Case title: Republic vs. Trinidad R.A. Capote, GR. No. 157043, (J. Corona)
February 2, 2007
Facts:
In 1998, respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote (guardian ad litem) filed a petition

forchange of name of her ward from Giovanni Nadores Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores.
The petition alleged that: Giovanni is the illegitimate natural child of Corazon P.
Nadores and Diosdado Gallamaso; he was born on July 9, 1982, prior to the effectivity of
the New Family Code; his mother made him use the surname of the natural father
despite the absence of marriage between them;from the time Giovanni was born and up
to the present, his father failed to take up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of
financial, physical, emotional and spiritual concerns; Giovanni is now fully aware of how
he stands with his father and he desires to have his surname changed to that of his
mother’s surname; Giovanni’s mother might eventually petition him to join her in the
United States and his continued use of the surname Gallamaso, the surname of his
natural father, may complicate his status as natural child; and the change of name will
be for the benefit of the minor. Having found respondent’s petition sufficient in form
and substance, the trial court gave due course to the petition.
Publication of the petition was ordered and the local civil registrar and the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) was notified. Since there was no opposition to the
petition, respondent moved for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte before a
court-appointed commissioner.
The OSG, acting through the Provincial Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the
lower court granted the motion. After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered
a decision ordering the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni
Nadores. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, filed an appeal with a
lone assignment of error: the court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary
proceeding.
Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required,

the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change of name. Petitioner appealed to
the Supreme Court contending that the CA erred in affirming the trial court’s decision
which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable
parties.
The purported parents and all other persons who may be adversely affected by
the child’s change of name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding
adversarial.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petition for change of name should be granted.

2. Is a proceeding for change of name adversarial?
3. Did Capote comply with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding?
4. When is a proceeding considered adversarial?
Held:
1. Yes. The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni
availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules
of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial
court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the
hearing of Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil
Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father
while his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of name will erase
the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is also to his best interest as
it will facilitate his mother’s intended petition to have him join her in the United States.
This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.
2. The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name must be heard
in an adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the cancellation or correction of
clerical errors in entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a
petition for change of name under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a summary
proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under Rule 108 for it is not
alleged that the entry in the civil registry suffers from clerical or typographical errors.
The relief sought clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil registry,
although by granting the petition, the result is the same in that a corresponding change
in the entry is also required to reflect the change in name.
3. Capote complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding by
posting in a newspaper of general circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The
lower court also furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the notice, no one came
forward to oppose the petition including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the
petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same nor does it make
the proceeding less adversarial in nature. The lower court is still expected to exercise its
judgment to determine whether the petition is meritorious or not and not merely accept
as true the arguments propounded. Considering that the OSG neither opposed the
petition nor the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to
do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were not
adversarial enough.
4. A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
Respondent gave notice of the petition through publication as required by the rules.
With this, all interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world considered
bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial court gave due notice to the OSG
by serving a copy of the petition on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding
adversarial were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as
represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest the petition (Republic
of the Philippines vs Trinidad R. A. Capote, G.R. No. 157043, February 2, 2007).
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts
as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining
the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth,
if not attended by error, is immutable.
Case title: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs. Republic, GR. No. 174689;
(J. Corona) October 22, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his
first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
8.. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses
Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was
registered as “Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio” in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as “male.”
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but
feels, thinks and acts as a female” and that he had always identified himself with girls
since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the
United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a “woman” culminated on January
27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was
thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction
surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner)
had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married.
He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto”
to “Mely,” and his sex from “male” to “female.”
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Firstly,
the court is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with
the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual re-assignment, petitioner, who has
always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female.
Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should
not be in any way taken against him. Likewise, the court believes that no harm, injury or
prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition.
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of
entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. The CA rendered a decision in
favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis.
ISSUE:
Whether the changes in the petitioner’s entry shall be allowed?
RULING:
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought
he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter
one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on
the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s
first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil
registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must
show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he
failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his
true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of
petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition
should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be
legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative,
that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper
venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept.
More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not
prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and
naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths)
and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of
nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil
interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events
and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity,
status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In
contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407.
Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part

of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil
Code provides that: “all other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall
be governed by special laws.” But there is no such special law in the Philippines
governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they
existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually
done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the
infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error, is immutable.
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of
entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his
petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
Petitioner pleads that “the unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness,
contentment and the realization of their dreams.” No argument about that. The Court
recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into
the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them,
life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of
public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
Thus, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to the

competence of a court to take cognizance of a case at first instance. Unlike the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies, it cannot be waived.
Case title: Republic vs. Michelle Soriano Gallo, GR. No. 207074; (J.
Leonen) January 17, 2018
Facts:
To accurately reflect these facts in her documents, Gallo prayed before the
Regional Trial Court of Ilagan City, Isabela in Special Proc. No. 2155[5] for the
correction of her name from "Michael" to "Michelle" and of her biological sex from
"Male" to "Female" under Rule 108[6] of the Rules of Court.
In addition, Gallo asked for the inclusion of her middle name, "Soriano"; her
mother's middle name, "Angangan"; her father's middle name, "Balingao"; and her
parent's marriage date, May 23, 1981, in her Certificate of Live Birth, as these were not
recorded.
As proof, she attached to her petition copies of her diploma, voter's certification,
official transcript of records, medical certificate, mother's birth certificate, and parents'
marriage certificate... he Regional Trial Court, in its December 7, 2010 Order, granted
the petition.
It lent credence to the documents Gallo presented and found that the corrections
she sought were "harmless and innocuous."
The Office of the Solicitor General appealed, alleging that the applicable rule
should be Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for Petitions for Change of Name.[19] It argued
that Gallo did not comply with the jurisdictional requirements under Rule 103 because
the title of her Petition and the published Order did not state her official name, "Michael
Gallo."[20] Furthermore, the published Order was also defective for not stating the
cause of the change of name.
The Court of Appeals, in its assailed April 29, 2013 Decision, denied the Office of
the Solicitor General's appeal.[22] It found that Gallo availed of the proper remedy
under Rule 108 as the corrections sought were clerical, harmless, and innocuous.
However, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, believes
otherwise. For it, Gallo wants to change the name that she was given. Thus, it filed the
present Petition via Rule 45 under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Petition raises
procedural errors made by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in finding
for Gallo.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines raised a question of fact in

alleging that the change sought by Michelle Soriano Gallo is substantive and
not a mere correction of error;
2. whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo's petition involves a substantive
change under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court instead of mere correction of
clerical errors;
3. whether or not Michelle Soriano Gallo failed to exhaust administrative
remedies and observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Ruling:
In assailing the Court of Appeals' ruling that the change sought by Gallo was a
mere correction of error, petitioner raises a question of fact not proper under a Rule 45
Petition, which should only raise questions of law.
In the case at bar, petitioner raises an issue which requires an evaluation of

evidence as determining whether or not the change sought is a typographical error or a
substantive change requires looking into the party's records, supporting documents,
testimonies, and other evidence.
Rule 103 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the case at bar. The change in the
entry of Gallo's biological sex is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court while
Republic Act No. 9048 applies to all other corrections sought.
A person may now change his or her first name or correct clerical errors in his or
her name through administrative proceedings. Rules 103 and 108 only apply if the
administrative petition has been filed and later denied.
Republic Act No. 10172 does not apply in the case at bar as it was only enacted on
August 15, 2012—more than two (2) years after Gallo filed her Petition for Correction of
Entry on May 13, 2010.[85] Hence, Republic Act No. 9048 governs.
Gallo's Petition involves a mere correction of clerical errors.
Gallo is not attempting to replace her current appellation. She is merely

correcting the misspelling of her given name. "Michelle" could easily be misspelled as
"Michael," especially since the first four (4) letters of these two (2) names are exactly the
same. The differences only pertain to an additional letter "a" in "Michael," and "le" at
the end of "Michelle." "Michelle" and "Michael" may also be vocalized similarly,
considering the possibility of different accents or intonations of different people. In any
case, Gallo does not seek to be known by a different appellation. The lower courts have
determined that she has been known as "Michelle" all throughout her life. She is merely
seeking to correct her records to conform to her true given name.
However, Rule 108 does not apply in this case either.
The applicable law then for the correction of Gallo's name is Republic Act No.
9048... it is the civil registrar who has primary jurisdiction over Gallo's petition, not the
Regional Trial Court. Only if her petition was denied by the local city or municipal civil
registrar can the Regional Trial Court take cognizance of her case.
As to these corrections, Gallo should have sought to correct them

administratively before filing a petition under Rule 108.
However, the petition to correct Gallo's biological sex was rightfully filed under
Rule 108 as this was a substantial change excluded in the definition of clerical or
typographical errors in Republic Act No. 9048
Petitioner does not deny that the issue of non-compliance with these two (2)
doctrines was only raised in this Court. Thus, in failing to invoke these contentions
before the Regional Trial Court, it is estopped from invoking these doctrines as grounds
for dismissal.
Evidently the test for whether a correction is clerical or substantial is found in

the provision itself. Misspelled names or missing entries are clerical corrections if they
are visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding and if they may be readily
verified by referring to the existing records in the civil register. They must not,
however, involve any change in nationality, age or status.
Case title: Dr. Ruben C. Bartolome vs. Republic, GR. No. 243288; (J.
Caguioa) August 28, 2019
Facts:
Ruben Bartolome filed a petition to change his name under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court before the RTC of Paranaque City. The petitioner prays for the
correction of his name from “Feleciano Bartolome” as appearing in his birth
certificate to the name that he allegedly use since his childhood, “Ruben Bartolome”.
After the posting and publication the petitioner presented different proofs of his
identity which all bears the name “Ruben Bartolome”.
The RTC denied the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
insufficiency of evidence, and improper venue. It was held that the procedure sought
for the change of the petitioner’s first name is incorrect, and RA 9048 is the proper
remedy. As regards with the prayer to correct the last name, it was denied for
improper venue. It was further held that the RTC of Manila where the civil registrar is
located is the proper venue, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Lastly, the evidences presented was not sufficient to prove that he had been habitually
called “Ruben Bartolome” since childhood.
The CA held that the petitioner should have filed the correction in the entries of
his birth certificate under RA 9048, instead of Rule 103. It was likewise held that the
petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that the surname of his father
and his siblings is spelled as Bartolome.
The OSG argued that the CA correctly denied the petition. A petition pursuant
to RA 9048 before the civil registry should have been filed first in order to change his
first name and to correct the spelling of his surname.
Issue:
WON the chage/correction sought in the petitioner’s first name, middle name,
and surname, as appearing in his birth certificate, from Bartolome to Ruben Cruz
Bartolome should be filed under RA 9028, Rule 103, or Rule 108.
Held:
The SC denied the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the
CA.
The changes sought by the petitioner are all covered by RA 9048. In connection to
this, the change sought in the petitioner’s first name from “Feliciano” to “Ruben” is
covered by Section 4(2) of RA 9048, as amended, on the ground that he had
habitually and continuously used “Ruben”. And publicly known by that first name.
Further, the inclusion of the petitioner’s middle name “Cruz”, and the correction of
his last name from Bartholome to Bartolome, a mere clerical error, and is covered by
section 2 of the said law. The latter may be easily corrected by merely referring to the
existing records of the Civil Registrar as the last name of the petitioner’s parents and
immediate family members. Therefore, the petition should have been filed in the local
civil registry of the city or municipality where the records sought to be changed or
corrected is being kept, pursuant to section 3 of RA 9048, as amended.
The petitioner can only avail the appropriate judicial remedies when the
changes/corrections sought through the administration’s proceeding are denied.
Hence, if the prayer to administratively change the first name was denied, the same
may be brought under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. And if the prayers to
administratively correct the middle name and surname were denied, the same may be
brought under 108 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner alleges that he is now 76 years old and prays that his petition be
granted, given that the “government messed-up his birth certificate when he was an
infant and is now giving him a hard time. He just wants to fix this legally murky but
relatively simple problem before he dies for the sake of and love for his children and
grandchildren.”
In this regard, even if the Court were inclined to give due course to petitioner’s
Rule 103 petition in the interest of substantial justice, it should be emphasized that both
the RTC and the CA identically found that the evidence adduced by petitioner was
insufficient to support his claim that he has been habitually and continuously using the
name “Ruben Cruz Bartolome ” since childhood. As well, the Court notes that petitioner
did not also adduce evidence to show that his father or his siblings’ surnames were
actually spelled as “Bartolome. ” It is a threshold doctrine that the resolution of factual
issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings are generally binding on the Court.
While the Court recognizes several exceptions, none of these exceptions applies.
In view of the foregoing, the instant petition is denied, without prejudice to the filing of
the appropriate administrative action under R.A. 9048, as amended by R.A. 10172.
While Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows a plaintiff to join as many
separate claims as he may have, there should be some unity in the problem presented
and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction
thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Liberal construction of
the Rules may be invoked in situations wherein there may be some excusable formal
deficiency or error in pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of
the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the
Rules. (For Rule 1, in connection to Section 6 thereof)
Case title: Republic vs. Hon. Jose R. Hernandez, GR. No. 117209; (J.
Regalado) February 9, 1996
FACTS:
On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro

and Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a p petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl
Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive
parents, as well as the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the
aforenamed minor was sought. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for
the change of the first name or said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the
name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition and by which he
has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he
arrived at private respondents' residence.

At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change
of name in the same petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated May 3,1995,
petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the
petitions for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petitions should
be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings. After considering the evidence
and arguments of the contending parties, the trial court ruled in favor of herein private
respondents.
ISSUES:
1.WON THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GRANTING THE PRAYER FOR THE CHANGEOF THE
REGISTERED PROPER OR GIVEN NAME OF THE MINOR ADOPTEEEMBODIED IN
THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION.
2.WON THERE WAS A LAWFUL GROUND FOR THE CHANGE OF NAME.
HELD:
1.Yes. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter
a license to change the adoptee's registered Christian or first name. The automatic
change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview
of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption
proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in
this case, cannot properly be granted. A petition for change of name being a proceeding
in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to
vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication.
It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by

its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To
consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to
denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our
remedial law system. Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no
express prohibition against the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of
name, we do not believe that there is any relation between these two petitions, nor are
they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any common question of
fact or law, which conjointly would warrant their joinder. There is just no way that the
two actions can connect and find a common ground, thus
the joinder would be improper and that the court erred in its decision granting the
change of name embodied in the petition for change of name.
2. No. It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a privilege,
not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court which has the duty
to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless
weighty reasons are shown. Before a person can be authorized to change his name, that
is, his true or official name or that which appears in his birth certificate or is entered in
the civil register, he must show proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason
which may justify such change.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences,
much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency
due to CAH. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health.
Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along
the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that
respondent is an “incompetent” and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to
protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s
position and his personal judgment of being a male.
Case title: Republic vs. Jennifer B. Cagandahan, GR. No. 166676; (J.
Quisimbing) September 12, 2008
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from
Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It
appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is sufferingfrom Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female
characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics.
To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the
medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained
that “Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones,
her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female.”
The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General
appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil
registrar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be

changed.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in
deciding the case, the Supreme Court considered “the compassionate calls for
recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject
to outright denial.” The Supreme Court made use of the availale evidence presented in
court including the fact that private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the
statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan’s body produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for considering him as
being male.”
The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of
nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the
Supreme Court respects the respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision
to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court added that
a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the
light of the reasons and the consequences that will follow.
Section 1 of RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power
and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned
administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first
name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.
Case title: Republic vs. Lorena Omapas Sali, GR. No. 206023, (J. Del
Castillo) April 03, 2017
FACTS:
Lorena Omapas Sali filed a Petition for Correction of Entry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court before the RTC. In her petition, she averred that in recording the facts of
her birth, the personnel of the Local Civil Registrar of Baybay, Leyte, erroneously
entered in the records the following: Firstly, the first name of the petitioner as
"DOROTHY" instead of "LORENA" and Secondly, the date of birth of the petitioner as
"June 24, 1968" instead of "April 24, 1968. The petitioner has been using the name
"Lorena A. Omapas” and her date of birth as "April 24, 1968" for as long as she could
remember and is known to the community in general as such.
The trial court ruled in favor of Lorena Sali thereby granting the petition to
correct the erroneous entries in her birth certificate. However, The Republic, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the RTC Decision for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the court a quo because the title of the petition and the order
setting the petition for hearing did not contain Sali's aliases. The CA denied the appeal,
ruling that: (1) the records are bereft of any indication that Sali is known by a name
other than "Lorena," hence, it would be absurd to compel her to indicate any other alias
that she does not have; (2) Sali not only complied with the mandatory requirements for
an appropriate adversarial proceeding under Rule 108 of the Rules but also gave the
Republic an opportunity to timely contest the purported defective petition; and (3) the
change in the first name of Sali will certainly avoid further confusion as to her identity
and there is no showing that it was sought for a fraudulent purpose or that it would
prejudice public interest. Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law when it applied
Rule 108 instead of Rule 103, thereby dispensing with the requirement of stating the
respondent’s aliases in the title of the petition Whether or not respondent failed to
exhaust administrative remedies.
HELD:
Anent the first issue: NO. Sali's petition is not for a change of name as
contemplated under Rule 103 of the Rules but for correction of entries under Rule 108.
What she seeks is the correction of clerical errors which were committed in the
recording of her name and birth date. This Court has held that not all alterations
allowed in one's name are confined under Rule 103 and that corrections for clerical
errors may be set right under Rule 108. The evidence presented by Sali show that, since
birth, she has been using the name "Lorena."
Thus, it is apparent that she never had any intention to change her name. What
she seeks is simply the removal of the clerical fault or error in her first name, and to set
aright the same to conform to the name she grew up with.
Anent the second issue: YES on the part of Sali’s first name but NO on the part of
her birth date. At the time Sali's petition was filed, R.A. No. 9048 was already in effect.
Section 1 of RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over
applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned
administrative officers.
The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the
coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition
for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the
corresponding venue, form and procedure.
In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are
primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. In Republic v. Cagandahan, we said that
under R.A. No. 9048, the correction of clerical or typographical errors can now be made
through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. The law
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of clerical or
typographical errors. Thus, petitioner can avail of this administrative remedy for the
correction of his and his mother's first name.
In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali's first name,
was not within the RTC's primary jurisdiction. It was improper because the remedy
should have been administrative, i.e., filing of the petition with the local civil registrar
concerned. For failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the RTC should have
dismissed the petition to correct Sali's first name. On the other hand, anent Sali's
petition to correct her birth date from "June 24, 1968" to "April 24, 1968," R.A. No.
9048 is inapplicable. It was only on August 15, 2012 that R.A. No. 10172 was signed into
law amending R.A. No. 9048. As modified, Section 1 now includes the day and month in
the date of birth and sex of a person. Considering that Sali filed her petition in 2008,
Rule 108 is the appropriate remedy in seeking to correct her date of birth in the civil
registry. The Republic did not question the petition to correct Sali's birth date from
"June 24, 1968" to "April 24, 1968."
In fact, it did not contest the CA ruling that the requirements for an appropriate
adversarial proceeding were satisfactorily complied with. The petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Petition for Correction of Entry in the Certificate of Live Birth of
Dorothy A. Omapas with respect to her first name is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE to its filing with the local civil registrar concerned.
Nonetheless, it must be laid down as a rule that when there is a medical finding
that the petitioner in a case for correction of erroneous entry as to gender is
phenotypically male or female, the no-sex change or transplant certification becomes
mere surplusage.
Case title: Republic vs. Miller Omandam Unabia, GR. No. 213346, (J.
Castillo) February 11, 2019
FACTS:
Miller Omandam Unabia filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan
de Oro City a Petition for Correction of Entries on the Birth Certificate of “Mellie
Umandam Unabia”. He sought to effect the following entries in his Birth Certificate: (1)
His name from “Mellie Umandam Unabia” to “Miller Omandam Unabia”, (2) His gender
from “Female” to “Male”, and (3) His father’s middle initial from “U” to “O”.
The RTC granted the Petition, and ordered the Registrar of the Office of the Local
Civil Registry of Claveria to correct the Birth Certificate of Unabia, as requested. The
Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed
to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that Unabia failed to state a valid ground for
change of name and the aliases by which he was known, that Unabia failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, and that Unabia failed to present the physician who issued the
medical certificate stating that he is male.
However, the CA denied the OSG’s appeal, and affirmed the RTC Decision
granting the petition for correction of entries. Aggrieved, the OSG filed a petition for
review on certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that the case should have been
dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in granting Unabia’s petition for correction of
entries .
HELD:
No, the RTC did not err in granting Unabia’s petition for correction of entries, as
Unabia’s birth certificate contained clerical errors that necessitated rectification.
At the time when Unabia filed his Petition for Correction of Entries on the Birth
Certificate of “Mellie Umandam Unabia” in 2009, the governing law was RA 9048, not
yet amended by RA 10172, as the latter law was passed only in 2012. Under the
unamended RA 9048, there was no provision for the administrative correction or
change of clerical errors in the civil registries in the date of birth and in the sex of
individuals, but only correction of clerical errors and change of first names or
nicknames. Administrative corrections or changes relating to the date of birth or sex of
individuals were only authorized with the passage of RA 10172 in 2012.
Nevertheless, since the amendments introduced by RA 10172 are remedial in

nature, then it should apply to Unabia’s Petition. As to the failure of Unabia to present
the physician who issued the medical certificate stating that he is male, it must be
emphasized the Unabia’s medical certificate, which was issued by Dr. Labis, a Medical
Officer in Northern Mindanao Medical Center, is a public document, since it is issued by
a public officer in the performance of a duty. Under Section 23, Rule 123 of the Rules of
Court, documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Therefore,
there was no need to further identify and authenticate the Medical Certificate issued by
Dr. Labis, since a public document is self-authenticating, and requires no further
authentication in order to be presented in court.
Moreover, the Medical Certificate already states that there is a medical finding
that Unabia is phenotypically male, therefore, a finding that he has not undergone a sex
change or sex transplant is no longer necessary, contrary to the argument of the OSG. In
conclusion, the RTC properly held that Unabia’s birth certificate contained clerical
errors that necessitated rectification.
A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the

understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or
writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled
or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. On the other hand, substantial or
contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all
interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed. Substantial
and controversial alterations include those which may affect the citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage.
Case title: Ramon Corpus Tan vs. Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
City of Manila, GR. No. 211435, (J. Reyes, Jr.) April 10, 2019
FACTS:
On September 7, 2011, petitioner filed a Petition for Correction of Entry before

the RTC. Realizing that he failed to implead the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila (LCR Manila) and the National Statistics Office (now Philippine Statistics
Authority PSA), petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Petition and an
Amended Petition for Correction of Entry on September 30, 2011, this time impleading
the aforesaid offices as respondents.
In his Amended Petition, petitioner alleged that he was born on November 13,
1965 at St. Paul Hospital in the City of Manila; that his birth was duly registered in the
civil registry of Manila; that he had been using his real name “Ramon Corpuz Tan”
during his lifetime; that when he later secured a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth, he
discovered that his name was entered as “Ramon Corpus Tan Ko” instead of his true and
correct name which is “Ramon Corpuz Tan”; that the aforesaid material errors and
mistakes in the entries of his Certificate of Live Birth were due to inadvertence and error
of the hospital personnel who prepared the subject certificate; that “Ko,” which was the
first name of his father, was inadvertently included in his last name; and that the
mistake was not immediately rectified because he only discovered the same, after having
his own children.
In its assailed Order dated December 27, 2011, the RTC dismissed the subject
petition for correction of entry. The RTC ratiocinated that the petitioner failed to comply
with the requirements of an adversarial proceeding noting that the correction sought
for, is a substantial correction and is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, which
is not summary, but an adversarial proceeding. Not satisfied, the petitioner elevated an
appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA).
In its Decision dated September 27, 2013, the CA affirmed the December 27, 2011
and May 18, 2012 Orders of the RTC. The appellate court concurred with the trial court
that the error sought to be corrected is a substantial one which requires an adversarial
proceeding.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS ERRED WHEN THEY

RULED THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO OBSERVE THE REQUIREMENTS OF
AN ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDING IN THIS CASE
RULING:
At the onset, the Court notes that the change sought by petitioner in his Petition
for Correction of Entry before the RTC is inconsistent with the correction he prays for in
the present petition. In his Petition for Correction of Entry before the trial court,
petitioner prayed that his name be corrected from “Ramon Corpus Tan Ko” to “Ramon
CORPUZ Tan.” This is consistent with his government-issued identification cards and
other supporting documents he submitted.
In the present petition, however, he prays that his name be rectified from
“Ramon Corpus Tan Ko” to “Ramon CORPUS Tan.” The Court considers this variance as
a result of a typographical error due perhaps to the ineptness of petitioner’s counsel.
Thus, for purposes of this petition, the Court considers the correction to “Ramon
CORPUZ Tan” as petitioner’s proper prayer considering that it is the one consistent with
his supporting documents.
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court governs the proceeding for the
cancellation or correction of any entry concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Valencia, the Court declared that a petition for
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court covers not only clerical errors,
but also substantial changes. The difference lies only on the procedure which would
govern the correction sought. “If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be
adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality
of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.”
Corrections in the name, whether of the owner of the Certificate of Live Birth or any of
the parents indicated therein, may also involve substantial and controversial matters
which would require an adversarial proceeding.
In this case, the alleged error could not be considered a clerical error or a readily
apparent mistake. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the correction sought would definitely
have an effect on his filiation with the persons named in his Certificate of Live Birth.
As aptly observed by the appellate court, the name “Tan Ko” has been consistently used
not only in the entries for petitioner’s name, but also for that of his parents. In entry No.
7, the name of petitioner’s father was entered as “Tan Ko,” while his mother’s name was
entered as “Trinidad Corpus Tan Ko” in entry No. 12. Furthermore, his mother, as the
informant for petitioner’s birth certificate, signed as “T.C. Tan Ko” in entry No. 17.
Verily, the “correction” of petitioner’s name from “Ramon Corpus Tan Ko” to “Ramon
Corpuz Tan” would necessarily affect not only his name, but also the names of his
parents as entered in his Certificate of Live Birth.
As correctly explained by the appellate court, altering petitioner’s surname from

“Tan Ko” to “Tan” would, in effect, be an adjudication that the first name of his father is
indeed “Ko” and his surname “Tan.” Clearly, the correction would affect the identity of
petitioner’s father. Moreover, there would be a need to correct his mother’s name from
“Trinidad Corpus Tan Ko” to “Trinidad Corpuz Tan.” This would require deleting the
word “Ko” from “Tan Ko” and changing the letter “s” to “z” in “Corpus.”
Following Benemerito, to effect the correction, it would be essential to establish that
“Trinidad Corpus Tan Ko” and “Trinidad Corpuz Tan” refer to the same person. A
summary proceeding would certainly be insufficient to effect such substantial
corrections.
Petitioner failed to comply with the procedural requirements of an adversarial

proceeding under Rule 108. It is Lugsanay Uy case which finds application to the
present petition. In said case, the private respondent sought the “correction” of her
name in her Certificate of Live Birth from “Anita Sy” to “Norma S. Lugsanay,”
impleading the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City as respondent. The Court ruled that
respondent should have impleaded her parents and siblings as the persons who have
interest, and are affected by the changes or corrections she wanted to make. Simply put,
impleading and notifying only the local civil registrar is not enough, to wit:

The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general
circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State will not change the nature of
the proceedings taken. A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one
given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who are
not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected
parties. Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the
courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process
to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and
notify the affected or interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of
hearing, earnest efforts were made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible
interested parties. Such failure was likewise excused where the interested parties
themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; when there is no actual or
presumptive awareness of the existence of the interested parties; or when a party is
inadvertently left out.
Under Office of the Civil Registrar-General Administrative Order No. 1, Series

of 1983, as amended, the birth of a child shall be registered within 30 days from the
time of birth in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the city/municipality where it
occurred.
Case title: Matron M. Ohama vs. Office of the Local Civil Registar of
Aguinaldo, Ifugao, GR. No. 239584, (J. Perlas-Bernabe) June 17, 2019
Facts:
Matron alleged that he was born on May 13, 1986 in Aguinaldo, Ifugao, and the
fact of his birth was belatedly registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Aguinaldo,
Ifugao under Registry No. 2000-24 (Second Birth Certificate); unknown to him, there
was a prior certificate of live birth registered under Registry No. 45-86, (First Birth
Certificate) which contained erroneous entries in his birth records: his first name was
recorded as Matron instead of Matiorico; his last name was recorded as Ohoma instead
of Ohomna; and he had been using the name Matiorico Ohomna in his public and
private records, and he had been using the name as such; thus he prayed for the
cancellation of the First Birth Certificate, and since his Second Birth Certificate
contained the correct entries, that the same be maintained as his certificate of live birth.
After due notice and hearing, the RTC granted Matron’s petition and ordered the
cancellation of the first birth certificate, Registry No. 45-86. The Republic, however,
appealed the case to the CA, contending that Matron’s birth could no longer be the
subject of a second or another registration as the same had already been validly
registered.
Assuming that his original or first registration contains several errors, such do
not constitute valid grounds for the cancellation thereof, and the proper remedy is to file
a petition for correction of entries in the first registration under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court (Rule 108)
The CA granted the Republic’s appeal, thus Matron elevated the case to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the first birth certificate may be cancelled.
Ruling:
Under Office of the Civil Registrar-General Administrative Order No. 1, Series of

1983, as amended, the birth of a child shall be registered within 30 days from the time of
birth in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the city/municipality where it occurred.
In this case, petitioner’s birth had already been reported by his mother, Antonia Maingit
(Antonia), and duly recorded in the civil register of the LCR-Aguinaldo on June 13,
1986. Thus, as correctly pointed out by the CA, there can be no valid late registration of
petitioner’s birth as the same had already been lawfully registered within 30 days from
his birth under the first birth certificate. Consequently, it is the second birth certificate
that should be declared void and correspondingly cancelled even if the entries therein
are claimed to be the correct ones.
However, while the petition specifically prayed for the cancellation of

petitioner’s first birth certificate and the retention of his second birth certificate,
the ultimate objective was to correct the erroneous entries pertaining to petitioner’s
first and last names, i.e., from Matron Ohoma to Matiorico Ohomna, as he claimed that
people in the community know him by the latter name rather than the former. Rule 108
implements judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of entries in the civil
registry pursuant to Article 412of the Civil Code. The role of the Court under Rule 108 is
to ascertain the truth about the facts recorded therein.
The action filed by petitioner before the RTC seeks to correct a supposedly
misspelled name, and thus, properly falls under Rule 108. To correct simply means “to
make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from.” Considering that petitioner
complied with the procedural requirements under Rule 108, the RTC had the
jurisdiction to resolve the petition which included a prayer for “[o]ther reliefs just and
equitable x x x.” A general prayer for “other reliefs just and equitable” appearing on a
petition enables the court to award reliefs supported by the complaint or other
pleadings, by the facts admitted at the trial, and by the evidence adduced by the parties,
even if these reliefs are not specifically prayed for in the complaint. Consequently, the
CA erred in holding that petitioner has to refile another petition before the trial court
could resolve his claim.
Nonetheless, the Court finds that petitioner failed to sufficiently establish that his
father’s last name was Ohomna and not Ohoma through competent evidence, i.e., the
latter’s birth certificate, the certificate of his marriage to petitioner’s mother, Antonia,
on January 30, 1986, or a government-issued identification card or record. On this score
alone, the correction of petitioner’s first and last names should be denied. While the first
name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, the last name to which the
child is entitled is fixed by law. Although petitioner’s Elementary School Permanent
Record and Professional Driver’s License identify him as Matiorico Ohomna, the same
are insufficient to grant the petition. It pears stressing that the real name of a person is
that given him in the Civil Register, not the name by which he was baptized in his
Church or by which he was known in the community, or which he has adopted.
In addition, the Court notes that Antonia was the informant in both instances and
the one who signed both birth certificates. However, a perusal of Antonia’s signatures
on petitioner’s two (2) birth certificates shows that the same are materially different
from each other. Further, petitioner failed to show any plausible explanation why she
signed as Antonia Ohomaon the first birth certificate and as Antonia Ohomnaon the
second birth certificate.
Doctrine: Absence
The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is when he has

properties which have to be taken cared of or administered by a representative
appointed by the Court (Article 384, Civil Code); the spouse of the absentee is asking
for separation of property (Article 191, Civil Code) or his wife is asking the Court that
the administration of an classes of property in the marriage be transferred to her
(Article 196, Civil Code). The petition to declare the husband an absentee and the
petition to place the management of the conjugal properties in the hands of the wife
may be combined and adjudicated in the same proceedings, Peyer vs. Martinez, 88
Phil. 72, 80).
Case title: RE: Petition for Declaration of Absence of Roberto L. Reyes vs.
Hon. Jose P. Alejandro, GR. No. L-32026, (J. Patajo) January 16, 1986
]Facts:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite dismissing
the petition filed by petitioner-appellant Erlinda Reynoso Reyes to have her husband
Roberto Reyes declared an absentee.
In a petition Erlinda Reynoso prayed for the declaration of the absence of her
husband Roberto L. Reyes alleging that her husband had been absent from their
conjugal dwelling since April 1962 and since then had not been heard from and his
whereabouts unknown. The petition further alleged that her husband left no will nor any
property in his name nor any debts.
After hearing the Court a quo dismissed the petition on the ground that since
Roberto L. Reyes left no properties there was no necessity to declare him judicially an
absentee.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a need for the declaration of absence of Roberto Reyes
Held:
No. The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is because of his
properties which have to be administered by a representative appointed by the Court
(Article 384, Civil Code); the spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of property
(Article 191, Civil Code) or his wife is asking the Court that the administration of an
classes of property in the marriage be transferred to her (Article 196, Civil Code). The
petition to declare the husband an absentee and the petition to place the management of
the conjugal properties in the hands of the wife may be combined and adjudicated in the
same proceedings, Peyer vs. Martinez, 88 Phil. 72, 80).
Judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the order of the lower Court

dismissing the petition to declare Roberto L. Reyes an absentee. With costs against
petitioner-appellant.

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Doctrine: Parental Authority

Hence, this petition.

As basis, petitioners rely on the Court’s ruling in Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto V

Notably, after a careful reading of Pablo-Gualberto, it has been determined that

“However, the CA erroneously applied Section 6 of Rule 99 of

Accordingly, since the statement in Pablo-Gualberto invoked by petitioners, i.e.,

This case is a petition for review on certiorari by petitioners: Napoleon, Alicia,

RTC rendered a Decision annulling the Extra-judicial settlement of estate with

No, as to the shares of the minor children because as a natural guardian, he is

Judicial declaration of presumptive death is only applicable for the purpose of

“Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous

Case title: Estrellita Tadeo-Matias vs. Republic, GR. No. 230751; ( J.

Petitioner Estrellita Tadeo-Matias and Wilfredo N. Matias entered into a lawful

“Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during

Atty. Adriano married Rosario Adriano, herein respondent, on November 15,

Hence, the common law wife appealed to the SC.

Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:

In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Case title: In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or

No. Petition is denied.

VALID GROUNDS FOR CHANGE OF NAME:

1. When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or

What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request,

DROPPING OF THE MIDDLE NAME FROM HIS REGISTERED NAME? – No law

MIDDLE NAME PURPOSE

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on

Antonio filed a petition for parental authority, custody, and correction/change of

A petition for change of name must be heard in an adversarial proceeding; it

In 1998, respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote (guardian ad litem) filed a petition

Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature as required,

1. Whether or not the petition for change of name should be granted.

Whether the changes in the petitioner’s entry shall be allowed?

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part

Thus, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to the

1. Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines raised a question of fact in

In the case at bar, petitioner raises an issue which requires an evaluation of

Gallo's Petition involves a mere correction of clerical errors.

Gallo is not attempting to replace her current appellation. She is merely

However, Rule 108 does not apply in this case either.

As to these corrections, Gallo should have sought to correct them

Evidently the test for whether a correction is clerical or substantial is found in

Doctrine: Use of Surnames

On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro

2.WON THERE WAS A LAWFUL GROUND FOR THE CHANGE OF NAME.

It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by

Doctrine: Use of Surnames

Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex as appearing in her birth certificate be

Nevertheless, since the amendments introduced by RA 10172 are remedial in

A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the

On September 7, 2011, petitioner filed a Petition for Correction of Entry before

WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS ERRED WHEN THEY

As correctly explained by the appellate court, altering petitioner’s surname from

Petitioner failed to comply with the procedural requirements of an adversarial

Doctrine: Use of Surnames

Under Office of the Civil Registrar-General Administrative Order No. 1, Series

Whether or not the first birth certificate may be cancelled.

Under Office of the Civil Registrar-General Administrative Order No. 1, Series of

However, while the petition specifically prayed for the cancellation of

The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is when he has

Judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the order of the lower Court

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